



# Right-Wing Populism Among European Public Servants – A Cross Country Comparison

PRESENTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC POLICY (ICPP)

28-30 July, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (NUS), Singapore

Panel 8: Democracy, Institutions, and Public Policy Performance

## ABSTRACT

There is a longstanding tradition of research into the political attitudes of public servants. This research is pretty consistent in the finding that public servants (at least in Europe) are more left-leaning than the average citizen. This might be an important factor in how policy issues are confronted and solved: public servants might look to the state more as a solution than as a potential problem for instance. There have not yet been any investigation, however, into the populist held beliefs and attitudes among public servants. This paper investigates the political ‘color’ of public servants and their attitudes on several populist topics. The data is retrieved from round seven of the European Social Survey (ESS) (2014-2015), and covers Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The results show that there are considerable differences between countries and between topics, when it comes to the question whether or not public servants differ from average citizens.

Keywords: Public-private cleavage; Voting behavior; Ideology; Bureau Voting Model; Public Service Motivation

Wouter van Acker  
KU Leuven Public Governance Institute  
wouter.vanacker@kuleuven.be  
Faculty of Social Sciences  
Parkstraat 45, Bus 3609  
B-3000 Leuven, Belgium

# 1. INTRODUCTION

Right-wing populism (whatever that may mean, and I'll get back to that later on) has dominated the news headlines over the last year or so. Whether it has been stopped, or halted, or has won, no one seems to know yet. Everyone does seem to agree that it is a force to be reckoned with. It's a term linked with a decrease in trust among citizens in those who govern them. A term linked with a loss of resilience. And, especially in Europe, a term linked with nationalistic and anti-immigration rhetoric.

There has been quite some research into the populist attitudes of citizens (e.g. Hawkins et al., 2012; Oesch, 2008; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Akkerman et al., 2014). What are their backgrounds? What are their beliefs and political attitudes? At the same time, there has been an extensive research tradition into the political attitudes of public servants (a small and random sample: Aberbach & Rockman, 1976; Blais et al., 1991; Jensen et al., 2009; Rattsø & Sørensen, 2016; Bednarczuk, 2015). However, a cross-over study has not yet been conducted. Besides the typical gap-in-the-literature argument, why would this be a relevant cross-over to begin with? The political attitudes of public servants matter. They get orders from, and have to carry out the plans of, politicians. Sure. But they also have considerable room to shape decisions, policies and budget-allocations (for example through information asymmetries in their advantage). Especially in the NPM and post-NPM era, where the 'let managers manage' adage was based on the notion of autonomy. So what would or could the implications be of populist held attitudes among public servants? Do public servants trust the classic institutions the same amount as citizens? Or more? Or less? The same could be asked of their perception of their political influence as an individual. Or what he or she thinks about migration and refugees. And further: are there differences between countries on these issues? The research I present through this paper is a first, exploratory attempt to shed a light on these questions. Exploratory, as the data and methodology is not perfect, but, if you can forgive me, a valid attempt not the less.

The structure of this paper follows a somewhat straight-forward logic. First I will go into further detail on previous research, findings and models on the political attitude of public servants. Then I will introduce the academic debate and findings concerning the measurement of and research on populism. Both overviews will be non-exhaustive, but sufficient of the purpose of this paper. Third and fourth I will turn to the data and methodology, and the results of the statistical analysis. Finally these will be discussed

and the paper will be concluded, including suggestions for further research and the limitations of this paper.

## **2. POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF PUBLIC SERVANTS**

Public servants are more left-leaning than non-public servants. Or are they? Research on the political attitudes of public servants dates back to the 1970s, and mostly points towards them having a more left-leaning ideology (Jensen et al., 2009; Knutsen, 2005; Garand et al., 1991; Bennett & Orzechowsky, 1983; Blais et al., 1991; Wise & Szuecs, 1996). There are some notable exceptions, however (Park & Perry, 2013; Bednarczuk, 2015), that find American public servants to be more likely to vote Republican. Tepe (2012) finds that there is an important difference between public servants in public service sectors on the one hand (education, health care, etc.), and those working in the administration on the other. The latter are significantly more right-leaning than the former. Overall, however, the main findings for Europe are overwhelmingly in favor of the thesis that public servants are more left-leaning.

But why would they be more left-leaning? With a broad brush it's possible to paint two pictures. The first to arrive on the scene is one rooted in rational-choice and public-choice theory. The so-called Bureaucratic Voting Model (BVM) considers public servants to be rational beings, who act and vote out of self-interest. Hence, as a public servant you want to maximize your budgets, and secure your job (Niskanen, 1971). The most logical thing from that perspective is to vote for a party that favors a large and growing role for the government and public sector. This would thus lead public servants to vote for left-wing parties, instead of right-wing parties, assuming that the latter prefer more market-based solutions.

A second model, focusses on the self-selecting effect of public servants' values and intrinsic motivation to work in the public sector: public sector motivation (PSM). The self-selection argument entails that people choose the sector they want to work in, based on the values they hold, and where these values can come to fruition. It is argued that the public sector therefor attracts people who are more altruistic, more oriented towards working for 'the common good', and who are less interested in extrinsic rewards for their work (Perry & Hondegem, 2008; Andersen et al., 2011; Vandenabeele, 2007; Steen, 2006). They have, in short, "a desire to serve the public interest, loyalty to duty and to the government as a whole, and social equity." (Perry & Wise, 1990, p. 369) It has been suggested in the past, that public

service motivation is linked to politics and policies (Perry, 1997), and it has indeed been found to correlate with political identity and ideology (Garand et al., 1991; Vandenabeele, 2011).

Both arguments are based on strong conceptual footings, and have been investigated extensively. Both, however, focus on traditional left-right issues. The manner and measure in which the state should intervene in the economy. In the current political climate, it seems worthy to investigate how public servants score on certain non-economic themes. As right-wing populism rules the headlines in Europe, and in some cases the country, how do public servants view the issues it stands for? Based on the above, it would be logical to assume they differ (quite strongly, perhaps) from the median voter. But populist politics has been found to defy conventional political behavior theory and logic.

### **3. POPULISM**


Populism is a three-headed beast. It can be a political strategy, ideology or a discursive style at the same time (Gidron & Bonikowsky, 2013). As a political strategy, it focusses on the organization of population mobilization, and the policy choices that are made in order to have a populist appeal (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Weyland, 2001). The discursive take on populism, in contrast, is mainly concerned with text and speech analysis of populist politicians. It focusses on the language that is used in order to paint a picture of moral good and bad, us and them, people and elite (Kazin, 1995; de la Torre, 2000). Finally, the third option, and focus of this paper, investigates populism as a political ideology. One of the most used definition from this perspective is the following:

“[Populism is] a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543, cited in Gidron & Bonikowsky, 2013)

The ‘thin-centered ideology’ refers to the fact that populism does not have an elaborate, cohesive ideological background such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, etc. What they share is the idea of a corrupt elite vs. the pure masses, and a willingness to act as a megaphone for ‘the common man’ (Roberts, 2007). However, the lack of an underlying political ideology leads to a considerable variety of populist movements and parties. The American Tea Party is quite different

from the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV). Alternative for Germany (AfD) is quite different from Chávez's Socialist Party. This also shows that populism is not merely a phenomenon on the right-wing of the political spectrum. Especially in South-America, the populist movement has also been considerably left-wing (Doyle, 2011; Baker & Greene, 2011). Considering the data I use in this paper, coming from European countries, the focus here lies on right-wing populism.

Figure 1: Division and focus of populism as a concept



As we have established what populism means as a political ideology, what exactly constitutes right-wing populism? First and foremost, although there is some overlap, it is important to distinguish it from the extreme right. Parties on this end of the spectrum are inherently anti-democratic and authoritarian (Mudde, 2000; Norris, 2005). Populism, on the other hand, strives to save democracy from the hands of the so-called corrupt elite. “Populists themselves argue that they are true democrats. After all, not only do they represent the people, they are also saving democracy from the corrupt elites and dangerous outsiders.” (Jacobs, 2010, p. 2) Politicians ought to return to the will of the people, often through different forms of direct democracy (Mudde, 2007).

So what are some of the characteristics that underlie the right-wing populist ideology? Alienation is a key word in the answer to this question. Many populist voters share a deeply rooted dissatisfaction with the way the current democracy works (Taggart, 1995; Oesch, 2008). They often feel as if their impact on politics is non-existent, and their trust in traditional institutions (parliament, the courts, political parties etc.) is very low (Fieschi & Heywood, 2004). Finally, anti-migration and cultural protectionist standpoints have been found to be the common denominator in explaining the electoral success of right-

wing populist parties throughout Europe (Ivaresflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008). Economic grievances, although often used as an explanation in the media and by politicians, is consistently found to be less/not important in explaining populist votes.

In the following analysis I will investigate whether or not public servants differ from the median voter when it comes to these populist attitudes. Based on the discussion about the political attitudes of public servants, I expect them

1. to have more trust in public institutions (as they are an integral part of them, and place more trust in the state as a solution/problem solver),
2. to be more satisfied with the way the democracy currently functions (again, since they are an integral part of it, and see it work up-close),
3. to perceive their potential political influence as higher (once more, since they operate closely to the political processes, and because they have more trust in the receptiveness of political institutions),
4. to have more 'positive' attitudes towards immigration at large, and refugees in particular (considering the altruistic and social motives underlying the idea of public service motivation).

In short, I expect public servants to have less populist attitudes than the median voter.

## **4. DATA AND METHODS**

The data for this investigation are retrieved from the European Social Survey. More specifically: round 7 (2014/2015)<sup>1</sup>. The data from this round were limited for this research to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. I've chosen to focus on Northwestern-European countries in order to justify the comparisons between cases. This left me with 23,160 cases, divided between the eleven countries as follows:

---

<sup>1</sup> The data, the questionnaire and the methodology of the ESS can be consulted at [www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org) or ESS (2014a).

Table 1: Respondents per country

Country	Respondents	Country	Respondents
Austria	1795	The Netherlands	1,919
Belgium	1769	Norway	1,436
Denmark	1,502	Sweden	1,791
France	1,917	Switzerland	1,532
Germany	3,045	United Kingdom	2,264
Ireland	2,390		

The differences between the number of cases between countries, between the populations of the countries, and the differences within countries of gathering respondents from certain remote regions, it is essential to use weights in the use of ESS data (ESS, 2014b). Design weight were used for within-country analysis, and population size weights were used for cross-country comparisons. The research design used here draws heavily on Van de Walle and Lahat (2016).

The sector of employment was measured through the question: 'Which of the types of organization on this card do/did you work for?'

- a. Central or local government
- b. Other public sector (such as education and health)
- c. A state-owned enterprise
- d. A private firm
- e. Self-employed
- f. Other

Answers a, b and c were computed to constitute public servants, d, e and f were as non-public servants.

The respondents level of trust (between 0 (no trust) and 10(complete trust)) was asked separately in the survey for parliament, political parties, politicians, and the judicial system (excluding the police). Satisfaction with the current state of the democracy was asked in a similar fashion (between 0 (extremely dissatisfied) and 10 (extremely satisfied)). The respondents were asked to place themselves on the left-right scale varying from 0 (left) to 10 (right). On the issues of refugees, the respondents were asked if they agreed with the statement that the government should be generous when accepting refugees into the country (0 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly)). Finally, views on immigration and the perception of political influence was asked through several questions. After a factor analysis the following two factors were established:

Table 2: Factors 'views on immigration' and 'perception of influence'

Views on immigration	Perception of influence
Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?	How much would you say that politicians care what people like you think?
Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?	How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?
Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?	And how much would you say that the political system in [country] allows people like you to have an influence on politics?
Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?	

The Cronbach alpha for 'views on immigration' and 'perception of influence' are respectively 0.8474 and 0.8388. To control for differences between countries I use a two-way ANOVA including a Scheffe test, and checking for interaction effects between country and the sector of employment. Within countries I use a one-way ANOVA to investigate whether or not there are significant differences within between public servants and non-public servants. Finally, regressions are run for each of the dimension per country, controlling for age, gender, income and education.

Before turning to the results, it is worth explaining why I didn't just measure the differences in voting for right-wing populist parties. This variable in the ESS data contains a large amount of 'refusals', a.k.a. voters who did not want to answer. There is a strong likelihood that these are not random. The differences are large between countries (e.g. 9.53% in Austria, 0.11% in Belgium, and 3.68% in Ireland), meaning that in some countries it is not considered sensitive or private to talk about ones political preference. Secondly, it is especially relevant with regards to right-wing populism. It can reasonably be argued that a disproportionate amount of the refusals are voters for the respective right-zing populist party considering the stigma that still surrounds these parties in some countries. This makes us end up with skewed, uncertain, and very small samples. Statistical analysis on these data is therefore rather problematic.

## 5. RESULTS

On the following pages the reader can find basic graphs depicting the mean scores on the different independent variables, divided between countries first, and public servants and non-public servants second. The two-way ANOVA's showed that the differences between countries were significant on all the factors.



Figure 2: Trust in parliament




Figure 3: Trust in legal system




Figure 4: Trust in political parties




Figure 5: Trust in politicians




Figure 6: Satisfaction with democracy




Figure 7: Views on immigration




Figure 8: Views on refugees





Figure 9: Placement on left-right scale



Figures 2 through 9 show the differences between the two groups within each country, as well as between countries. Although the differences between countries are very interesting, analyzing and explaining these differences is not the goal of this paper. As mentioned before, the differences between the countries were found to be significant for each issue, and no interaction effects between countries and sector of employment were found. In every instance the public servants differ from the non-public servants as was expected. On average

1. they trust parliament, the legal system, politicians, and political parties more,
2. they are more satisfied with the current state of the democracy,
3. they have more positive views on immigration and refugees,
4. they perceive themselves to have more political influence,
5. they place themselves more to the left on the left-right scale.

The question remains, however, whether or not these differences are statistically significant or not. This question is answered per issue, and per country, in table 3 hereunder. In this table, red indicates that the difference is *not* statistically different. Green indicates that the difference found *is* statistically significant. In all cases the significant differences were marginal to small. This table shows us that the actual results are quite different from what was expected and assumed on the basis of figures 2 through 9.

First and foremost, we see a significant number of issues where the differences between public servants and non-public servants are not a straightforward. Secondly, there seems to be two types of populist attitudes: one where public servants largely differ from non-public servants (immigration, refugees, influence and left-right scale), and one where the picture is a lot messier (trust and satisfaction with democracy). Finally, there seems to be a great degree of difference between countries as to how comparable their body of public servants is to the general public.

Table 3: Overview of statistically (in)significant differences per country

	AT	BE	DK	FR	DE	IE	NL	NO	SE	CH	UK
TRUST IN PARLIAMENT <sup>2</sup>	Red	Red	Green	Red	Red	Green	Red	Red	Green	Red	Red
TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM <sup>2</sup>	Red	Green	Green	Green	Red	Red	Red	Green	Green	Red	Red
TRUST IN POLITICIANS <sup>2</sup>	Red	Red	Green	Green	Red	Green	Green	Red	Red	Red	Red
TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES <sup>2</sup>	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
SATISFIED WITH DEMOCRACY <sup>3</sup>	Red	Green	Red	Green	Green	Green	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
VIEWS ON IMMIGRATION <sup>4</sup>	Red	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
VIEWS ON REFUGEES <sup>5</sup>	Red	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Red	Green	Green	Green	Green
PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE <sup>6</sup>	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
LEFT RIGHT SCALE <sup>7</sup>	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Red	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green

In the final step of the analysis I ran regressions for each of the dimensions per country. All were simple OLS regression, with the exception of ‘Views on refugees’, which was an ordinal logistic regression, given the ordinal nature of the question it is based on. The results are shown in table 4 through 12. \* indicates a p-level of  $\leq 0.05$ , \*\*  $\leq 0.01$  and \*\*\*  $\leq 0.001$ . The control variables are also gathered through the ESS survey data. ‘Sector’ represents whether the respondent works in the public or private sector (reference category). ‘Age’ is the age of the respondent in years at the time of the survey. ‘Gender’ is categorized with men (0) as the reference category. ‘Education’ is considered an ordinal scale variable, consisting of the following possibilities:

1. Less than lower secondary
2. Lower secondary
3. Lower tier upper secondary
4. Upper tier upper secondary
5. Advanced vocational, sub-degree
6. Lower tertiary education, BA level
7. Higher tertiary education, MA level

‘Income’, finally, is a ten-step scale, interpreted as a continuous variable. The scale is formed around the national median yearly net income in the local currency, and thus differs per country. This makes the

<sup>2</sup> Green = Public servants have higher trust than non-public servants.

<sup>3</sup> Green = Public servants are more satisfied with the current state of their respective democracies.

<sup>4</sup> Green = Public servants have more positive views on immigration and immigrants

<sup>5</sup> Green = Public servants have more positive views on refugees

<sup>6</sup> Green = Public servants have a more positive perception of their political influence

<sup>7</sup> Green = Public servants place themselves further to the left on the left-right-scale

relative income per person easier to compare between countries. An income of € 17.000,- in the Netherlands obviously represents something different than the same income in Greece.

Table 4: Regression results 'trust in parliament'

**TRUST IN PARLIAMENT**

Variables	Country											
	AT (1)		BE (2)		DK (3)		FR (4)		DE (5)		IE (6)	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
Sector	-0,300		-0,020		0,081		0,148		0,101		0,202	
Age	-0,001		-0,001		0,001		0,001		0,000		0,001	
Gender	-0,097		-0,357	**	-0,510	***	-0,093		-0,389	***	-0,431	***
Education	0,353	***	0,259	***	0,382	***	0,244	***	0,195	***	0,166	***
Income	0,004		0,024		0,064	**	0,076	**	0,130	***	0,065	**
Constant	3,551	***	3,770	***	4,102	***	2,440	***	3,679	***	2,946	***
N	1210		1428		1271		1589		2521		1644	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,0471		0,0547		0,111		0,0538		0,0687		0,0386	
	F = 0,000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000	

Variables	NL (7)		NO (8)		SE (9)		CH (10)		UK (11)	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
	Sector	-0,130		-0,029		0,228		0,187		-0,213
Age	-0,002		-0,002		-0,001		-0,005	**	0,002	
Gender	-0,115		-0,280	*	-0,263	*	0,108		-0,397	***
Education	0,266	***	0,253	***	0,251	***	0,131	***	0,155	***
Income	0,120	***	0,079	***	0,094	***	0,035		0,099	***
Constant	3,683	***	5,398	***	4,646	***	5,629	***	3,364	***
N	1590		1291		1536		1166		1.722	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,1228		0,0781		0,0775		0,0267		0,0472	
	F = 0,000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,000		F = 0,000		F = 0,0000	



Table 5: Regression results 'trust in legal system

**TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM**

Variables	Country											
	AT (1)		BE (2)		DK (3)		FR (4)		DE (5)		IE (6)	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
Sector	-0,161		0,130		0,236		0,296	*	0,104		-0,003	
Age	0,000		-0,013	***	0,008	*	0,000		-0,003	**	0,000	
Gender	0,059		-0,183		-0,267	*	0,016		-0,406	***	-0,301	***
Education	0,281	***	0,227	***	0,251	***	0,177	***	0,206	***	0,132	***
Income	0,036		0,020		0,077	***	0,074	**	0,128	***	0,088	***
Constant	4,611	***	4,520	***	5,576	***	3,949	***	4,581	***	4,503	***
N	1217		1433		1266		1604		2528		1660	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,0339		0,0503		0,0852		0,0366		0,0705		0,0318	
	F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000	

Variables	NL (7)		NO (8)		SE (9)		CH (10)		UK (11)	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
	Sector	-0,114		0,355	**	0,259	*	0,096		-0,131
Age	-0,004	*	-0,005		0,002		-0,005	*	-0,001	
Gender	-0,356	***	-0,253	*	-0,330	**	-0,010		-0,322	**
Education	0,296	***	0,185	***	0,175	***	0,169	***	0,130	**
Income	0,095	***	0,062	*	0,089	***	0,084	***	0,112	***
Constant	4,670	***	6,291	***	5,052	***	5,710	***	4,744	***
N	1591		1294		1539		1178		1.717	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,1343		0,0612		0,0561		0,0457		0,047	
	F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000	

Table 6: Regression results 'trust in political parties'

**TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES**

Variables	Country											
	AT (1)		BE (2)		DK (3)		FR (4)		DE (5)		IE (6)	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
Sector	-0,098		-0,021		-0,055		0,198		-0,013		0,231	
Age	0,000		-0,006		0,001		0,001		-0,001		0,001	
Gender	-0,266	*	-0,121		-0,017		0,050		-0,091		-0,251	*
Education	0,090	*	0,1571909	***	0,233	***	0,081	**	0,094	***	0,054	
Income	0,045		0,024		0,033		0,018		0,061	***	0,052	*
Constant	3,020	***	3,580	***	3,840	***	2,105	***	3,221	***	2,781	***
N	1211		1431		1258		1602		2522		1659	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,0107		0,027		0,0475		0,0098		0,017		0,0134	
	F = 0,0235		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0077		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0005	

Variables	NL (7)		NO (8)		SE (9)		CH (10)		UK (11)	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
	Sector	-0,103		-0,032		0,178		0,035		-0,076
Age	-0,001		-0,005		-0,003		-0,004	*	0,001	
Gender	0,276	**	0,056		-0,143		0,263	*	-0,081	
Education	0,193	***	0,140	***	0,201	***	-0,055		0,088	**
Income	0,071	***	0,053	**	0,066	***	0,068	**	0,062	**
Constant	3,579	***	4,659	***	3,964	***	4,953	***	2,810	***
N	1592		1286		1534		1160		1.719	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,0631		0,0338		0,0612		0,0173		0,0194	
	F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0012		F = 0,0000	

Table 7: Regression results 'trust in politicians

**TRUST IN POLITICIANS**

Variables	Country											
	AT (1)		BE (2)		DK (3)		FR (4)		DE (5)		IE (6)	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
Sector	-0,099		-0,071		0,094		0,279	*	0,050		0,292	*
Age	0,002		0,000		0,004		0,004	**	0,000		0,001	
Gender	-0,196		-0,129		-0,014		0,028		-0,069		-0,336	**
Education	0,127	**	0,227	***	0,242	***	0,129	***	0,121	***	0,075	*
Income	0,047		0,034		0,060	**	0,011		0,072	***	0,073	**
Constant	2,800	***	2,988	***	3,301	***	1,820	***	2,972	***	2,704	***
N	1215		1431		1265		1603		2526		1664	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,0125		0,0436		0,0625		0,023		0,0241		0,0236	
	F = 0,0096		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000	

Variables	NL (7)		NO (8)		SE (9)		CH (10)		UK (11)	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
	Sector	-0,076		-0,008		0,184		0,097		-0,184
Age	-0,002		-0,006	*	-0,003		-0,003		0,002	
Gender	0,321	***	0,082		-0,102		0,265	*	0,010	
Education	0,201	***	0,151	***	0,161	***	-0,006		0,098	***
Income	0,095	***	0,063	**	0,089	***	0,020		0,085	***
Constant	3,471	***	4,510	***	3,848	***	5,132	***	2,540	***
N	1595		1291		1551		1176		1.727	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,0787		0,0416		0,056		0,0075		0,0271	
	F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000	

Table 8: Regression results 'satisfaction with democracy'

**SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY**

Variables	Country											
	AT (1)		BE (2)		DK (3)		FR (4)		DE (5)		IE (6)	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
Sector	-0,200		0,191		0,020		0,413	**	0,208	*	0,210	
Age	0,004		0,003		0,003		0,002		0,002		0,001	
Gender	0,098		-0,298	**	-0,125		-0,086		-0,128		-0,470	***
Education	0,123	**	0,192	***	0,202	***	0,205	***	0,095	***	0,120	***
Income	0,041		0,002		0,050	**	0,116	***	0,114	***	0,154	***
Constant	4,515	***	4,310	***	5,862	***	2,526	***	4,785	***	3,786	***
N	1212		1433		1265		1597		2526		1619	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,0113		0,0328		0,0423		0,065		0,0349		0,0601	
	F = 0,0174		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000	
Variables	NL (7)		NO (8)		SE (9)		CH (10)		UK (11)			
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.		
Sector	-0,194		0,047		0,042		0,234	*	-0,053			
Age	0,000		-0,002		0,000		-0,002		0,001			
Gender	-0,061		-0,058		-0,067		-0,162		-0,363	**		
Education	0,219	***	0,112	***	0,150	***	0,042		0,139	***		
Income	0,083	***	0,041	*	0,089	***	0,057	*	0,074	***		
Constant	4,722	***	6,638	***	5,630	***	6,956	***	4,348	***		
N	1578		1286		1536		1174		1.695			
R <sup>2</sup>	0,0847		0,0217		0,0441		0,0155		0,035			
	F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0027		F = 0,0000			

Table 8: Regression results 'vies on immigration'

**VIEWS ON IMMIGRATION**

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Country</u>		<u>Country</u>		<u>Country</u>		<u>Country</u>		<u>Country</u>		<u>Country</u>	
	<u>AT (1)</u>		<u>BE (2)</u>		<u>DK (3)</u>		<u>FR (4)</u>		<u>DE (5)</u>		<u>IE (6)</u>	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
Sector	-.2497576		.0834657		.2505225	*	.3191604	**	.1555133	*	.2287997	
Age	-.0014753		.0004458		-.0011965		.0003505		-.0002065		.0009721	
Gender	.0122698		-.3408931	***	.0118264		-.1871723	*	-.1772136	***	-.3386896	***
Education	.4763548	***	.2717305	***	.3824238	***	.3711236	***	.3342649	***	.3354203	***
Income	.0092179		.0373874		.0256105		.0452026	*	.0782509	***	.0451432	*
Constant	2,936	***	3,614	***	3,611	***	3,146	***	3,922	***	3,599	***
N	1231		1436		1273		1606		2536		1690	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,1317		0,1041		0,1663		0,1421		0,1428		0,1039	
	F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000	
<u>Variables</u>	<u>NL (7)</u>		<u>NO (8)</u>		<u>SE (9)</u>		<u>CH (10)</u>		<u>UK (11)</u>			
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.		
Sector	-.0005525		.0434134		.1633858		.1507505		.1922504			
Age	.0014		-.0004787		-.0092848	***	-.0006576		-.0014851			
Gender	-.0482575		-.0399695		.1240627		.006067		-.4413341	***		
Education	.230984	***	.2846317	***	.2922758	***	.2871894	***	.3250268	***		
Income	.0021096		.0491353	**	.0419577	**	.047491	*	.0416247	*		
Constant	4,231	***	4,213	***	5,242	***	4,298	***	3,499	***		
N	1599		1297		1555		1198		1,736			
R <sup>2</sup>	0,0956		0,1217		0,1365		0,1063		0,129			
	F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000			

Table 10: Regression results  
 'views on refugees

**VIEWS ON REFUGEES**

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Country</u>											
	<u>AT (1)</u>		<u>BE (2)</u>		<u>DK (3)</u>		<u>FR (4)</u>		<u>DE (5)</u>		<u>IE (6)</u>	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
Sector	0,135		-0,329	**	-0,347	**	-0,332	***	-0,322	***	-0,271	**
Age	-0,001		-0,003		0,008	**	-0,002	*	0,002		0,000	
Gender	-0,186		0,098		-0,248	*	-0,246	**	-0,088		-0,198	*
Education	-0,271	***	-0,102	***	-0,159	***	-0,114	***	-0,173	***	-0,063	*
Income	-0,045	*	0,029	*	0,013		0,039	*	-0,023		0,019	
N	1208		1427		1261		1590		2519		1641	
	Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0,0000		Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0,0000		Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0,0000		Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0,0000		Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0,0000		Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0,0004	

<u>Variables</u>	<u>NL (7)</u>		<u>NO (8)</u>		<u>SE (9)</u>		<u>CH (10)</u>		<u>UK (11)</u>	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
Sector	-0,013		-0,296	**	-0,083		-0,118		-0,271	**
Age	-0,003		0,008	**	0,000		0,000		-0,001	
Gender	-0,024		-0,201		-0,275	**	-0,401	***	-0,036	
Education	-0,108	***	-0,031		-0,194	***	-0,170	***	-0,137	***
Income	0,083	***	-0,010		0,017		0,012		-0,011	
N	1591		1290		1533		1187		1.723	
	Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0,0000		Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0,0002		Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0,0000		Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0,0000		Prob > Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0,0000	

Table 11: Regression results 'views on political impact

**PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL IMPACT**

Variables	Country											
	AT (1)		BE (2)		DK (3)		FR (4)		DE (5)		IE (6)	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
Sector	0,091		0,042		0,121		0,373	***	0,152		0,314	**
Age	-0,004	*	-0,005		-0,008	*	0,000		-0,004	***	0,000	
Gender	-0,282	**	-0,256	*	-0,267		-0,041		-0,202	**	-0,341	***
Education	0,286	***	0,238	***	0,370	***	0,139	***	0,242	***	0,085	**
Income	0,060	**	0,050	*	0,102	***	0,042	*	0,109	***	0,089	***
Constant	1,919	***	2,552	***	3,339	***	2,017	***	2,221	***	2,420	***
N	1231		1.436		1273		1606		2536		1690	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,0817		0,077		0,1606		0,0399		0,0957		0,041	
	F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000	
	<u>NL (7)</u>		<u>NO (8)</u>		<u>SE (9)</u>		<u>CH (10)</u>		<u>UK (11)</u>			
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.		
Sector	-0,145		0,208		0,210		0,344	*	0,087			
Age	-0,002		-0,011	***	-0,016	***	-0,002		0,000			
Gender	0,103		-0,094		-0,125		-0,371	**	-0,187			
Education	0,298	***	0,316	***	0,294	***	0,158	***	0,150	***		
Income	0,074	***	0,093	***	0,086	***	0,102	***	0,071	***		
Constant	2,883	***	3,754	***	3,770	***	4,129	***	2,624	***		
N	1599		1297		1555		1198		1736			
R <sup>2</sup>	0,1304		0,1435		0,1462				0,0525			
	F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000			

Table 12: Regression results 'left right schale'

**LEFT RIGHT SCALE**

Variables	Country											
	AT (1)		BE (2)		DK (3)		FR (4)		DE (5)		IE (6)	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
Sector	-0,102		-0,397	***	-0,749	***	-0,594	***	-0,344	***	0,251	*
Age	0,002		0,006		0,006		0,000		0,003	**	0,001	
Gender	0,012		-0,201		-0,216		-0,268	*	-0,101		-0,117	
Education	-0,212	***	0,039		-0,159	***	-0,085		-0,108	***	-0,028	
Income	0,018		0,043		0,119	***	0,071	**	0,078	***	0,046	*
Constant	5,279	***	4,541	***	5,545	***	5,208	***	4,542	***	4,961	***
N	1145		1.395		1238		1531		2470		1424	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,0374		0,0152		0,0605		0,0233		0,0277		0,0248	
	F = 0,0000		F = 0,0007		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0248	

Variables	NL (7)		NO (8)		SE (9)		CH (10)		UK (11)	
	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.	Coef.	Sign.
	Sector	-0,399	***	-0,822	***	-0,687	***	-0,271	*	-0,528
Age	0,000		0,004		0,013	***	0,003		0,003	*
Gender	-0,386	***	-0,207		-0,122		-0,646	***	-0,297	**
Education	-0,121	***	-0,051		0,056		-0,183	***	-0,065	*
Income	0,154	***	0,063	**	0,154	***	0,099	***	0,105	***
Constant	5,024	***	5,462	***	3,490	***	5,515	***	4,861	***
N	1531		1272		1514		1134		1588	
R <sup>2</sup>	0,0661		0,0533		0,0618		0,0571		0,0491	
	F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000		F = 0,0000	



The results from the regression analysis show that many of the explanatory value of sector of employment vanishes in many instances when there are controls for gender, age, education and income. With regards to trust and satisfaction with democracy, 'sector' is non-significant for trust in parliament and political parties. Trust in the legal system is only significantly explained by the sector of employment in France, Sweden and Norway. Only in France and Ireland do public servants have more trust in politicians than non-public servants do. The satisfaction with democracy is significantly higher among public servants in Switzerland, France and Denmark. Although the ANOVA-tests earlier on found highly diverse outcomes between countries on these issues, the results from the regression analyses are a lot more unambiguous: sector of employment, with a few exceptions, does not seem to matter in explaining the trust in institutions and satisfaction with democracy as it currently functions.

The ANOVA-tests showed a clear break on the issues of migration, refugees and perception of political influence. It was expected that the regression analysis would show the clearest influence of employment sector on these issues on the basis of the ANOVA results. Danish, German and French public servants showed significantly more positive views on immigration than non-public servants. Regarding views on refugees, the results were more in line with expectations. Only in Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Austria did the sector of employment *not* contribute to the explanation of the views of the respondent with regards to the way refugees should be treated. The Perception of political influence, furthermore, shows to be significantly more positive among public servants in France, Switzerland and Ireland, compared with non-public servants. Finally, the placing on the left-right scale was significantly more to the left for public-servants in all countries but Austria. The model for Ireland was not statistically significant with  $F = 0,0248$ .

## **6. CONCLUSION**

In this paper I investigated the populist attitudes of public servants in comparison to non-public servants. The previous findings on the political attitudes of public servants (usually more left-wing than non-public servants), the fact that they work within the system itself and the concept of public service motivation caused me to expect they would have more trust in and satisfaction with democratic institutions. This turned out not to be the case. Only in a few countries were the trust-levels in institutions and levels of satisfaction with the democracy different between public servants and non-public servants. The same

picture was drawn for views on immigration and the perception of political influence. Only on the views of refugees and the placement on the left-right scale was the difference between the two sectors of employment significant in a more (but not perfectly) consistent fashion across countries.

The overall conclusion might be that public servants do not differ significantly from non-public servants in their populist attitudes, with the possible exception of views on refugees, and several exceptions between countries on the other variables. The findings from previous private-public cleavage literature and public service motivation literature can thus not simply be extended to the topic of populism. France is a notable case to pick out, however, since the French public servants were the only ones to continuously differ from non-public servants in the way that was expected. Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden were three other countries that returned multiple times, but not nearly as consistent as France. The way in which public servants are recruited differ strongly per country, and the way in which this is done perhaps influences the populist attitudes that are recruited.

To be clear, I did not measure populism. So, the conclusion can't be that public servants are just as populist as non-public servants. As discussed earlier in the methodology section, the measurement of populism is not possible with ESS data. This study therefore is of an exploratory nature. Further research should investigate the populist attitudes using for example the measurement instruments used by Akkerman et al. (2014). A second limitation is the fact that some of the significant differences found in the regression can be discussed. With the type of population sizes as gathered through the ESS, significance levels of 0.05, or even 0.01 are not very strong. Considering the exploratory nature of this study, however, they are still highly interesting to note.

## **7. REFERENCES**

- Aberback, J., & Rockman, B. (1976). Clashing beliefs within the executive branch. *American Political Science Review*, 70, pp. 456-468.
- Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G. & Sonin, K. (2011). *A Political Theory of Populism*. NBER Working Papers, no. 17306. Available at: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17306>
- Akkerman, A., Mudde, C. & Zaslove, A. (2014). How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47:9, pp. 1324-1353.

- Andersen, L.B., Pallesen, T. & Pedersen, L.H. (2011). Does ownership matter? Public service motivation among physiotherapists in the private and public sectors in Denmark. *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, 31:1, pp. 10–27.
- Baker, A. & Greene, K.F. (2011). The Latin American left's mandate: Free market policies, economic performance, and voting behavior in 18 countries. *World Politics*, 63:1, pp. 43-77.
- Bednarczuk, M. (2015). Ideology, Vote Choice, and Bureaucracy Across Time: A Longitudinal Test of the Bureau Voting Model in the United States. *Administration & Society*, DOI: 10.1177/0095399715598342.
- Blais, A., Blake, D., & Dion, S. (1991). The Voting Behavior of Bureaucrats. In Blais, A. (Ed.): *The budget-maximizing bureaucrat: Appraisals and evidence*, pp. 205-230. University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburgh, USA.
- Bennett, J.T. & Orzechowski, W.P. (1983). The voting behavior of bureaucrats: Some empirical evidence.
- de la Torre, C. (2000). *Populist Seduction in Latin America: The Ecuadorian Experience*. Ohio University Press, Athens, USA.
- Doyle, D. (2011). The Legitimacy of Political Institutions: Explaining Contemporary Populism in Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44:11, pp. 1447-1473.
- ESS (2014a). *Source Questionnaire Round 7*. Available at:  
[https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round7/fieldwork/source/ESS7\\_source\\_main\\_questionnaire.pdf](https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round7/fieldwork/source/ESS7_source_main_questionnaire.pdf)
- ESS (2014b). *Weighting European Social Survey Data*. Available at:  
[http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS\\_weighting\\_data\\_1.pdf](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf)
- Fieschi, C. & Heywood, P. (2004). Trust, cynicism and populist anti-politics. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9:3, pp. 289-309.
- Garand, J.C., Parkurst, C.T., & Seoud, R.J. (1991). Bureaucrats, Policy Attitudes, and Political Behavior: Extension of the Bureau Voting Model of Government Growth. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 1:2, pp. 177-212.

- Gidron, N. & Bonikowski, B. (2013). *Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda*. Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series. No. 13-0004. Available at: [scholar.harvard.edu/files/gidron\\_bonikowski\\_populismlitreview\\_2013.pdf](http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/gidron_bonikowski_populismlitreview_2013.pdf)
- Hawkins, K., Riding, S. & Mudde, C. (2012). *Measuring Populist Attitudes*. Political Concepts: Committee on Concepts and Methods Working Paper Series. Available at: [works.bepress.com/cas\\_mudde/72/](http://works.bepress.com/cas_mudde/72/)
- Ivarsflaten, E. (2008). What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41:1, pp. 3-23.
- Jacobs, K. (2010). *So do they empower the people? Populism, electoral reform and direct democracy in Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands*. ECPR JS Workshop 20. Available at: <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/7e3bf0fa-64a7-4922-923f-19e10c77ab5e.pdf>
- Jensen, J.L., Sum, P.E. & Flynn, D.T. (2009). Political Orientations and Behavior of Public Employees: A Cross-National Comparison. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19, pp. 709-730.
- Kazin, M. (1995). *The Populist Persuasion: An American History*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, USA.
- Knutsen, O. (2005). The impact of sector employment on party choice: A comparative study of eight West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44:4, pp. 593-621.
- Niskanen, W. (1971). *Bureaucracy and representative government*. Aldine-Atherton, Chicago, USA.
- Mudde, C. (2000). *The ideology of the extreme right*. Manchester University Press, Manchester, USA.
- Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39:4, pp. 542-563.
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- Norris, P. (2005). *Radical Right – Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- Oesch, D. (2008). Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. *International Political Science Review*, 29:3, pp. 349-373.

- Park, H.M. & Perry, J.L. (2013). The Transformation of Governance: Who are the New Public Servants and What Difference Does it Make for Democratic Governance? *The American Review of Public Administration*, 43:1, pp. 26-49.
- Perry, J.L. (1997). Antecedents of public service motivation. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 7, pp. 181-197.
- Perry, J.L. & Hondeghem, A. (2008). *Motivation in public management: The call of public service*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
- Perry, J.L. & Wise, L.R. (1990). The motivational bases of public service. *Public Administration Review*, 50, pp. 367-373.
- Rattsø, J. & Sørensen, R.J. (2016). Public-private political cleavage: what happens after retirement? *Public Choice*, DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0324-9.
- Roberts, K.M. (2007). Latin America's Populist Revival. *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 27:1, pp. 3-15.
- Steen, T. (2006). Public Sector Motivation: Is there Something to Learn From the Study of Volunteerism? *Public Policy and Administration*, 21:1, pp. 49-62.
- Taggart, P. (1995). New Populist Parties in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 18:1, pp. 34-51.
- Tepe, M. (2012). The Public/Private Sector Cleavage Revisited: The Impact of Government Employment on Political Attitudes and Behaviour in 11 West European Countries. *Public Administration*, 90:1, pp. 230-261.
- Van de Walle, S. & Lahat, L. (2016). Do Public Officials Trust Citizens? A Welfare State Perspective. *Social Policy & Administration*, DOI: 10.1111/spol.12234.
- Vandenabeele, W. (2007). Towards a theory of public service motivation: An institutional approach. *Public Management Review*, 9:4, pp. 545-56.
- Vandenabeele, W. (2011). Who wants to deliver public service? Do Institutional Antecedents of Public Service Motivation Provide an Answer? *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, 31:1, pp. 87-107.

Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics. *Comparative Politics*, 34:1, pp. 353-384.

Wise, L.R. & Szücs, S. (1996). The Public/Private Cleavage in a Welfare State: Attitudes toward Public Management Reform. *Governance*, 9:1, pp. 43-70.