3rd International Conference
on Public Policy (ICPP3)
June 28-30, 2017 – Singapore

Panel T07P04 Session 1

The Rise of Policy Labs

Title of the paper

Behavioural Insights Teams - A Research Agenda

Author(s)

Sarah Ball, Institute for Social Science Research, University of Queensland, Australia, s.ball@uq.edu.au

Date of presentation

28 June 2017

Abstract

Behavioural insights teams operate as policy labs in governments across the world, including the United Kingdom, United States and Australia. This paper explores the forms of knowledge and expertise these teams use and promote, their preferred methods and tools, how they interact with other institutions and in which policy realms they have found success. This examination shows that there is still much to learn about policy labs like the behavioural insights teams. I conclude by proposing a research agenda to address this gap using organisational ethnography to deepen our understanding of their impact on policy formulation and implementation more broadly.

Keywords: Behavioural insights, Public policy, Policy labs, Ethnography, Randomised controlled trials, behavioural economics

1. Introduction

The term ‘policy lab’ can be used broadly to apply to any hybrid team that combines innovative methods and applies them to policy issues. These teams can be internal or external to an organisation and often use experimentation or trials to evaluate or test their policy solutions and implementation. Behavioural insights teams are one example of a policy lab, and one that has achieved significant popularity across the developed world since 2010. This paper examines the current literature on three of these behavioural insights teams, in the United Kingdom, the United States and in Australia, and explores what forms of knowledge and expertise they draw on and promote, what methods and tools they use, how they interact with existing institutions and interests and whether there is a particular policy realm in which they thrive. This examination shows that despite behavioural insights teams efforts to publish their results widely there is still very little empirical research that explores the answers to these questions. Leading from this, I conclude by proposing a research agenda to address this gap and begin to explore the relationship between behavioural insights teams and government agencies, and their impact on policy formulation, design and implementation more broadly.

2. Policy labs and behavioural insights teams

A policy lab is a type of 'organisational hybrid' combining resources and practices from experimental research findings, using both laboratory and randomised controlled trials (RCTs), ethnography, 'big data' methods and digital and user design elements (Williamson, 2015). In 2001 the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA) set up a policy lab in conjunction with the Department of Education and Skills called Futurelab, an institution that used "experimental methods to design or discover new ways of working that address social and public needs" (Mulgan, 2014, p. 3). They were "located in the borderlands between sectors, fields and disciplinary methodologies" (Williamson, 2015, p. 3) allowing them to cut through 'standard organisational barriers' and work across bureaucratic lines (Mulgan, 2014).

According to Mulgan the success of Futurelab led to the development of one of the most successful policy labs out of government: the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) (Mulgan, 2014, p. 1). The UK government set up the BIT in 2010 and has had significant success in promoting interest in applying their particular brand of 'behavioural insights' outside the UK, now boasting offices in New York, Sydney and Singapore. They have also worked widely across government but in 2014 formed a mutual joint venture with NESTA and now work on projects across the government, private and NGO sector. One of the strengths of the BIT in achieving such acclaim is likely to have been supported by its work as a policy lab allowing them to work, like Future lab, as an "organizational hybrid combining elements of the political think tank, media production, disciplinary expertise in social and political science, design and digital R&D" (Williamson, 2015, p. 4). In this paper I will be exploring the growing popularity of the BIT, along with two other behavioural insights teams, to better understand their influence and impact on policy design.

The second team I will be discussing is the Social and Behavioural Sciences Team (SBST) from the United States. The SBST was launched in 2014 and collaborated with more than a dozen organizations, including the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Veterans Affairs, Health and Human Services, and Education to complete more than 30 trials (Social and Behavioural Sciences Team, n.d.). The SBST was supported by an executive order from former President Obama promoting

the use of behavioural science in program design and delivery. This may also have to some extent defined the parameters and inadvertently presented limitations for the SBST as it focused their work specifically on those behavioural factors that play a role in program outcomes, such as access to programs, the presentation of information, choice architecture, and the design of incentives (EO Executive Order 13707, 2015). Since February 2017, the unit has ceased to operate as its own entity and now functions under the Office of Evaluation Sciences as part of the General Services Administration (General Services Administration, n.d.). Despite this I have included them in this exploration given the important role they played in progressing the popularity of behavioural insights internationally.

The final team I will be looking at is the Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government (BETA). Launched in 2016, BETA was originally designed as a joint initiative between the central coordinating agency, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and 19 federal government partner agencies. Major participants included the Australian Tax Office, The Treasury, the Department of Human Services, the Department of Social Services and the Department of Employment. Since July 1, 2017 they have expanded to work more broadly across the Federal government, providing a consultancy-style 'fee for service' approach. As stated on their website, BETA's mission is to "build behavioural economics capability across the public service and drive its use in policy design by testing what works, where and in what context" (Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government (BETA), n.d.-a). They hope to achieve this through the promotion and monitoring of the use of evidence-based policy making and through the provision of technical expertise (Ames & Hiscox, 2016, p. 4).

I have selected these teams for a combination of availability of information and their representativeness of the behavioural insights agenda. I will use both academic literature and their policy publications to explore key questions about what forms of knowledge and expertise they draw on and promote; what methods and tools they use; how they interact with existing institutions and interests and whether there is a particular policy realm in which they thrive.

3. Defining features

3.1. What knowledge and expertise do they draw on and promote?

Including the three discussed here, there are at least 51 countries claiming to have some form of centrally-administered team to promote behavioural economics in public policy (Whitehead, Jones, Howell, Lilley, & Pykett, 2014). These teams and initiatives all focus on diverse policy areas defined by the interests of their government and the input of key stakeholders. However the forms of knowledge and expertise they draw on and promote are similar, notably they are all committed to promoting 'behavioural insights'. Behavioural insights was born out of a combination of factors, and its meaning is not clearly defined, but the most significant contribution comes from the field of behavioural economics. Behavioural economics was developed to supplement existing economic theory through the use of more complex models of human behaviour. Behavioural economics tries to capture the realities of behaviour, particularly those systematic biases that can be measured empirically (Mullainathan & Thaler, 2001).

What behavioural economists seek to illustrate through their research is that these biases in people's decision making processes are not random but measureable and predictable. These biases offer insights into why people failed to behave in ways that serve even their own best interests. This makes many of the findings of behavioural economics valuable to the design of public policy, a fact not lost on the Richard Thaler (2015), who stated in his book *Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics*, that behavioural economists had begun to wonder if, in addition to the two primary goals of empirical research and development of theory, "a third goal [was] lurking in the background: could we use behavioural economics to make the world a better place?" (p. 307).

Driven by this question, Thaler partnered with legal scholar Cass Sunstein to explore ways they could use behavioural economics to conscientiously design and implement policies that would help people avoid falling victim to behavioural biases. These ideas eventually took form in Sunstein and Thaler's 2008 book *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness* (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). 'Nudging', as described in the book, is a process of designing choices in a way that will support people to make better decisions, but maintain essential freedoms by ensuring that

people were free to make an alternative choice if they wished to do so (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).

All three teams make use of behavioural economics and nudge theory as their core base of knowledge and expertise. This is perhaps unsurprising for the BIT and SBST given that following the release of *Nudge*, Thaler went on to work with the UK Conservative Government as an academic advisor and Sunstein accepted a post as the head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs for the United States Government (Thaler, 2015, pp. 330-334). For BETA, the link is less overt, but the many examples of successful nudge-based trials emerging from the BIT and SBST were also a likely driver behind their establishment.

3.2. What methods and tools do they use?

There are also striking similarities in the methods and tools they use. Behavioural insights teams all promote the use of 'evidence-based' policy and in their case this is defined as being developed through the use of human-centred design and tested with RCTs. The OECD state that "the two most widely used methodologies are a relatively resource intensive, experimental technique like RCT and a relatively less resource-intensive activity of desk-based, non-experimental acquisition of existing knowledge" (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2017, p. 41). The UK team for example has undertaken over 400 randomised trials since launch. They have published a lot of these results as both policy papers and academic papers (some examples includeDolan et al., 2012; Hallsworth et al., 2016; Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe, & Vlaev, 2014; Sanders, 2016) and have also released two major annual reports and published several policy papers outlining the work of the New York office and from their partnership with the New South Wales Government (Behavioural Insights Team, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; NSW Premier and Cabinet Behavioural Insights Unit, 2014; NSW Premier and Cabinet Behavioural Insights Unit & Behavioural Insights Team, 2016). These reports all highlight a strong leaning towards the use of randomised controlled trials and quasi-experimental methods.

The SBST has also published much of their findings and these reports highlight their focus on the use of RCTs. Wherever possible, SBST aimed to implement projects as trials, even going so far as to say that "where random assignment proved infeasible,

SBST sought to derive credible estimates of effects using the best, most practical non-experimental identification techniques applicable in each circumstance" (Social and Behavioural Sciences Team, 2015, p. 29).

Given that BETA has been operating for a shorter period of time, they have only published two papers but importantly, both were RCTs (Hiscox, Hobman, Daffey, & Reeson, 2017; Hiscox, Oliver, et al., 2017). Aside from this they are preregistering trials on their website allowing for some access to information on their methods and tools, and also highlighting what forms of knowledge they draw on. BETA also prioritise randomised controlled trials as a key part of their service offer, stating that "BETA's projects typically involve two core pillars, designing behaviourally-informed interventions and testing those interventions using RCTs" (Ames & Hiscox, 2016, p. 2).

Despite this clear focus on quantitative measures all three teams also promote a human-centred or behaviourally-informed design approach. The SBST's express purpose is "to design its policies and programs to reflect our best understanding of how people engage with, participate in, use, and respond to those policies and programs" although they do not include any references to how they gather this information (Social and Behavioural Sciences Team, 2015, 2016). Administrative data appear to be the basis for most assessments. Both the UK and Australian teams are more explicit in their recommendation of the use of ethnographic or qualitative research in this pursuit. For BETA this takes the form of a four stage project development process beginning with a 'discovery' stage where they aim to conduct initial research to understand the context and gather information on the target population and their behaviours. This is then followed by a 'diagnosis' stage where they review data and materials and undertake fieldwork to define the behavioural problem and propose targeted interventions. This is then followed by the design and delivery of an RCT (Ames & Hiscox, 2016). In the UK the BIT follows a similar method for developing projects, which also has uses a four stage process: defining the outcome, understanding the context, building an intervention and then using the 'test, learn and adapt' approach to ascertain whether the intervention 'worked'. Again these early stages claim to require engaging with the people and situations involved and understanding the context 'from their perspective'. They

encourage policy makers to “use this opportunity to develop new insights and design a sensitive and feasible intervention” (Behavioural Insights Team, 2014, p. 7).

This early development stage is important given that there are those who have strongly opposed the use of RCTs as a standalone tool for designing and evaluating public policy, stating that RCTs must be part of a cumulative program (Deaton & Cartwright, 2016). This is due to the fact that an RCT can only find what works but not explain why and the why is important when you consider that the causal principles that underwrite policy prediction are not universal, rarely work on their own and can all have unique contributions to the overall effects (Cartwright & Hardie, 2012, p. 52). Notably however despite the credit paid to qualitative research this early contextual research is either not actually undertaken or is largely erased from the final reports, with a strong focus on trial results. As an example, while the BIT do make some references to qualitative research undertaken in their trials this data can only be found by searching through their lengthy annual reports. The executive summaries and communication materials focus almost exclusively on RCT results (Behavioural Insights Team, 2015, 2016b, n.d.-b). The SBST and BETA on the other hand are silent on the use of qualitative research although they both make references to literature that may be based on qualitative data as the source of behavioural insights (Hiscox, Hobman, et al., 2017; Hiscox, Oliver, et al., 2017; Social and Behavioural Sciences Team, 2015, 2016). This begs some important questions; are qualitative research methods being used but being cut from the narrative? If so, why? If however they are not being used, why not? And what does this mean for the interventions being designed? Could this absence from the narrative influence how behavioural insights is embedded by other teams? Perhaps if the BIT had been more explicit in their use of qualitative research maybe those that followed in their stead would have been less singularly focused on RCTs?

3.3. How do they interact?

Moving beyond the forms of knowledge, expertise, methods and tools behavioural insights teams use (or perhaps simply promote) there is also the question of how they interact with existing institutions and interests. All three have similar traits, functioning as policy labs they work across bureaucratic boundaries and appear to operate more similarly to a consultancy than a standard advisory body.

In the beginning the BIT's agenda was driven by the government, particularly the Prime Minister and his advisors, and according to CEO David Halpern, this support 'greatly enhanced' their ability to make an impact (2015, p. 213). However despite many successes there were times the BIT's ideas failed to gain traction with government departments. The reasons for this, according to Halpern, were usually "a mixture of practicalities and departmental resistance" (2015, p. 213). Some departments were more difficult than others to engage with, and those, according to Halpern, appear to have failed to engage for political reasons rather than any failing of the BIT. Despite this, the interaction between BIT and the departments appear to have begun to influence the 'method and mindset' with "notes into the PM and Ministers increasingly contain[ing] the language of behavioural insights" (Halpern, 2015, p. 217).

Since the days inside government, the BIT now functions as an external body working across broad institutional and interest areas. They work in fields such as policing, medicine and education but also more private sector interests such as developing a Mobile Phone Theft Index, whose aim is to inform consumers and to encourage manufacturers' efforts to improve security. They also supported the development of start-ups such as a recruitment tool, Applied, which aims to reduce implicit bias in hiring and Promptable, a behaviourally informed texting platform that works with colleges to help them send messages to students and their supporters, both of which they promote widely to governments and private institutions (Behavioural Insights Team, n.d.-a). This sees them operate broadly across policy contexts and interacting far more widely than the SBST or BETA. Information on this process is not however widely available.

Much less is known or published about the way the SBST worked with their partner organisations other than that they operated principally as consultants, assisting in the development of trials and providing advice on how to enact the Executive Order (EO Executive Order 13707, 2015). Maya Shankar, former Chief of the SBST, stated while presenting at Behaviour Exchange 2014 that she "began [her] mission as a one woman band going from agency to agency telling them about the potential benefits of behavioral science, asking them what problems they were already trying to solve, and then empowering them with the low cost tools that could help them achieve these goals more effectively and efficiently" (Shankar, 2014).

BETA operate similarly to the former SBST, a small, central team of experts in behavioural science and trial design responsible for promoting the use of behavioural insights. The point of difference however is that rather than being centrally funded like the SBST and BIT UK, in Australia the interested government agencies all contributed financially through a co-funding model (Ball, Hiscox, & Oliver, In press). This way of working with partner agencies led to a more bottom-up approach to institutional engagement. Five agencies were signed on at the soft launch of the team, growing to 19 partner agencies by the end of their first year. As they move into their second phase they will operate more closely to a consultancy with a pay-for-service approach. This may have a significant impact on the types of projects they are commissioned to work on in future as the more complex policy work, as opposed to service delivery or implementation 'tweaks', will likely be more costly and could limit their ability to convince departments to invest in the more complex policy problems (Ball et al., In press).

Beyond their specific projects the behavioural insights teams also interact with others in order to build expertise and drive support. For example, BETA have as a central tenet to build Australian Public Service (APS) capability to support the greater use of behavioural economics in policy making and service delivery and they support this by providing training and 'guidance notes'. Thus far they have trained over 1200 APS staff (Ball et al., In press). They also boast a large Community of Practice, spanning over 200 members across Australian Federal, state and territory governments, academics, both domestically and internationally as well as participants from non-government organisations. The BIT UK has also provided training at least in their early years, through seminars offered within Whitehall and across Government (Behavioural Insights Team, 2011). They also offered support to other teams internationally with several teams within Federal Government in Australia reporting support from the BIT. Unfortunately limited information is available on similar approaches by the SBST.

Unfortunately beyond these broad outlines on how the teams have driven interest in their program and trained staff very little is known about how these teams engage and work in partnership with their agencies. This begs the question, are some areas and particular policymakers more or less to invite engagement with a behavioural insights team? Where have they been rejected out of hand? This is undeniably an

important question to ask if we are to better understand the impact and influence of behavioural insights teams but, perhaps unsurprisingly, the teams have been circumspect on which partner agencies did not want to work with them or those projects that they did not pursue or where their services were declined.

3.4. Where do they thrive?

While the institutional and interest areas they operate in are diverse, there do seem to be areas in which behavioural insights teams thrive. In particular they have been successful in implementing and testing incremental changes to existing government policies and programs in order to increase compliance. This is supported by the recent OECD survey which found that for the most part behavioural insights remains focused on "enhancing consumer choice, either by changing defaults or by reducing information and transaction costs" (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2017, p. 38). These policies are generally of limited complexity (often a necessity when using an RCT), and focus heavily on the use of nudge theory, particularly regarding framing and simplification. For example, in the UK the most well-known and publicised trials include increasing organ donation, the collection rates of vehicle excise duty, taxes and fines, and reducing unnecessary antibiotic prescriptions. More recent trials have approached policy problems slightly differently, taking a broader policy problem, such as encouraging people to attend or remain in further education or improving health outcomes, and designing a suite of trials to target key points along the user pathway (Behavioural Insights Team, 2016b).

The SBST has also been successful in implementing incremental changes to existing policy, chiefly focused on increasing compliance through the use of nudge theory. Interventions included the promotion of financial products in the areas of retirement savings, student loans, rebates and income support and improving access to financial products for people in military service (Social and Behavioural Sciences Team, 2015, 2016). Of the published and pre-registered interventions shared by BETA, their work has also followed a similar trend, with trials in retirement income planning, timely reporting and tax compliance all making the list (Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government (BETA), n.d.-b). Behavioural insights teams, thus far, seem to thrive in areas where they can focus on incremental

changes which present a strong cost-benefit or return on investment, where there is existing data collected on large samples and which do not call into question the government agenda.

In his book, *Inside the Nudge Unit: How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference* Halpern discusses the importance of these small wins as "dramatic improvements can and are more likely to be achieved by systematically testing small variations rather than through dramatic leaps" (Halpern, 2015, p. 291). It is also known that small wins can be useful as stable, independent building blocks on which to slowly and iteratively build upon rather than overarching systemic changes (Weick, 1984, p. 44). Is this where behavioural insights teams are moving? It is widely accepted that a team should begin by making a case for behavioural insights, picking the 'low hanging fruit' and only then attempting to address the bigger, more complex policy problems. Halpern and Sanders for example state that,

> It is often better to start with modest interventions (or combinations of interventions) or, at least, those that have been rigorously tested elsewhere to establish your expertise and a baseline of trust with the administration. Your dream intervention will probably involve a lot more than sending a text message or a letter, and you'll likely struggle to get a complex trial off the ground without establishing an initial trust bank with policymakers. We quite often take a long list of interventions to policymakers at the first meeting. Many times, our top-priority interventions are tossed out almost immediately, because they either are too complicated to implement, deviate too much from established practice, or are deemed 'too wacky'. (2016, p. 59)

They theorise that it is only after the team is well established that behavioural insights might begin to enter the conversation at the problem formation or policy development stage. However it is hard to know if this is happening. With the SBST now no longer operating independently, the BIT UK operating outside of government and BETA still seeing itself in the 'low hanging fruit' stage there is yet to be any real empirical example of whether behavioural insights can thrive in more complex policy spaces. This will remain a challenge without more knowledge of the many options not taken. Understanding how project selections are made would highlight whether there is potential for more. Are these projects a fair assessment of the capability of behavioural insights or representative of the limitations of working with risk averse governments who are yet to see the overarching value of this project? At this point it is difficult to know.

4. What impact might they behavioural insights teams having on policy processes and outcomes?

As is clear from the questions posed above, while there is much we can say about the defining features of behavioural insights teams it is much harder to say what their impact is on policy processes and outcomes. The literature they have published outlines the forms of knowledge, methods and tools they promote, who they're interacting with and which policies and programs are particularly fertile ground for behavioural insights. Impact and influence are much harder to gauge from these snapshots as they only tell the story of the decisions made, the projects selected, the relationships successfully formed. While the policies and programs themselves can be evaluated, and perhaps even the teams themselves could be assessed, it is very hard to construct any kind of counterfactual. There is far too much we do not know about what has happened behind the scenes. For example, how are different institutional locations and policy realms using behavioural insights beyond the projects run by the teams? What influence do informal meetings, training and documents about behavioural insights have on policy design and implementation? Are qualitative research methods being used but being cut from the narrative? If so, why? What does this mean for the interventions being designed? Will they be as welcome when it isn't just about promoting compliance with existing government policy? These are important questions which we do not currently have answers to.

4.1. How do policy labs influence processes and outcomes?

One opportunity to assess the impact of behavioural insights teams on policy processes is to look at previous research on policy labs for similar examples. While there has been limited research in this space the ethnographic work of Ben Williamson on Futurelab, the prototypical policy lab that likely paved the way for the BIT, provides some valuable insights. Futurelab operated in Bristol, UK, between 2002 and 2010 in the area of educational technology and innovation. Williamson's case study highlights Futurelab's methodological commitment to both human-centred design and field trials, a cornerstone of many policy labs. In fact, similarly to the behavioural insights teams, "almost all of its own projects, and those of partners it supported, were designed as iterative prototypes that could be tested out 'in the wild' with selected relevant users" (Williamson, 2015, p. 9). Williamson explores this

through the lens of Latour and Woolgar's Science and Technology Studies (STS). STS is useful in this context as it calls into question the objectivity of supposedly ideologically-neutral scientific research. Their research illustrated that " scientific laboratories are deeply complex places where negotiations, arguments, disagreements and compromises are constantly hammered out as scientists seek to construct 'scientific facts,' or models of how the world works" (Williamson, 2015, p. 19). Williamson argues similarly that, far from being the beneficent purveyor of evidence-based policy, Futurelab was in fact "redefining the nature of the problems that policy should address, and simultaneously specifying the kinds of solutions appropriate to remedying them" (Williamson, 2014, p. 259).

When considering the impact and influence of policy labs Williamson states that they "require much greater scrutiny as political actors as they gain influence in the definition of policy problems and the specification of policy solutions" (Williamson, 2015, p. 20). There is a need to further explore the fundamentally political nature of policy labs, in the case of my research, behavioural insights teams, in defining the problems they focus on and the solutions they design. Particularly in light of the way they "emphasise the perceived neutrality, objectivity, rigour, and effectiveness of methods and downplay the political values that underpin the work that labs do" (Williamson, 2014, pp. 260-261). Behavioural insights teams, and policy labs in general, elevate particular forms of knowledge and expertise, in particular the results of RCTs. RCTs represent a way of maintaining links to quantification while accepting fallibility and flaws of designing for human beings all the while having the added bonus of being posed as a 'gold standard' of policy evaluation (Haynes, Goldacre, & Torgerson, 2012). This fits well with the findings of Jo Maybin, who in a recent text stated that "civil servants preoccupation with definition and classification can be understood as a coping mechanism for managing the complexity of the world, and as a feature of working in a bureaucratic decision-making environment in which there is a perceived need or aspiration to develop clear rules to enable social coordination (Maybin, 2016, p. 96)." These "classification systems provide a means of making highly complex social phenomena thinkable and actionable" (Maybin, 2016, p. 97). And so, the use of RCTs could be seen to represent a desire to manage complexity in an increasingly complex world. This was particularly timely given that faith in standard economic models could be seen to be failing after the global financial crisis.

Behavioural insights teams operating within government are of particular interest because, unlike external agencies, they are not required to bid for open contracts making their work far less transparent. Much of these processes, particularly in government organisations, happens behind closed doors. This is exacerbated by the fact that many 'nudges' are administrative not legislative and therefore "lack the transparency and public consideration that are normally associated with command regimes [and are] not subjected to advanced disclosure or debate" (Baldwin, 2014, pp. 844-845). If behavioural insights teams, and their supporters, continue to move forward with their agenda without sufficient transparency or scrutiny there is a significant risk that they could, in actuality or simply by perception, fail to effectively support welfare or act to shift costs to the public (Baldwin, 2014, p. 845).

Following the lead of Williamson (2015), Maybin (2016) and Latour and Woolgar (1986) I conclude by arguing that ethnographic approaches offer the key to exploring the answers to these questions. It presents an opportunity to look beyond the products created by these teams and see the negotiations, arguments, disagreements and compromises (Latour & Woolgar, 1986). It also allows us to better understand how such instruments are received and used by other policymakers, and how their use is framed. An ethnographic approach would allow access to the hidden workings and the policy decisions which occur, "beyond the record of formal investigation and official decisions [and] encompass the realm of potential choices, or choices not made" (Howlett, Perl, & Ramesh, 2009, p. 7). This is critical to answering the questions posed above and further understanding the impact and influence of behavioural insights teams in policy design and implementation.

References

Ames, P., & Hiscox, M. (2016). *Guide to developing behavioural interventions for randomised controlled trials*. Commonwealth of Australia.

Baldwin, R. (2014). From regulation to behaviour change: Giving nudge the third degree. *The Modern Law Review, 77*(6), 831-857.

Ball, S., Hiscox, M., & Oliver, T. (In press). A Brief History of the Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government *Journal of Behavioural Economics for Policy*.

Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government (BETA). (n.d.-a). Behavioural Economics. Retrieved from https://www.dpmc.gov.au/domestic-policy/behavioural-economics

Behavioural Economics Team of the Australian Government (BETA). (n.d.-b). BETA Registered Trials. Retrieved from https://www.pmc.gov.au/domestic-policy/behavioural-economics/beta-registered-trials

Behavioural Insights Team. (2011). *Behavioural Insights Team Annual update 2010–11* Behavioural Insights Team Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/behavioural-insights-team-annual-update.

Behavioural Insights Team. (2014). *EAST: Four Simple Ways to Apply Behavioural Insights*. Behavioural Insights Team Retrieved from http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/publications/east-four-simple-ways-to-apply-behavioural-insights/.

Behavioural Insights Team. (2015). *Update report 2013-2015*. Behavioural Insights Team Retrieved from http://38r8om2xjhhl25mw24492dir.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/BIT_Update-Report-Final-2013-2015.pdf

Behavioural Insights Team. (2016a). *Behavioral Insights for Cities*. What Works Cities Retrieved from http://38r8om2xjhhl25mw24492dir.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Behavioral-Insights-for-Cities-2.pdf.

Behavioural Insights Team. (2016b). *Update report 2015-2016*. Behavioural Insights Team Retrieved from http://38r8om2xjhhl25mw24492dir.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/BIT-Update-Report-2015-16-1.pdf.

Behavioural Insights Team. (n.d.-a). BI Ventures. Retrieved from http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/ventures/

Behavioural Insights Team. (n.d.-b). Blog. Retrieved from http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/blog/

Cartwright, N., & Hardie, J. (2012). *Evidence-based policy: A practical guide to doing it better*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Deaton, A., & Cartwright, N. (2016). *Understanding and misunderstanding randomized controlled trials*. NBER Working Paper No. 22595. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Dolan, P., Hallsworth, M., Halpern, D., King, D., Metcalfe, R., & Vlaev, I. (2012). Influencing behaviour: The mindspace way. *Journal of Economic Psychology, 33*(1), 264-277.

Executive Order 13707. (2015). *Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People*. Office of the Press Secretary, the White House Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/15/executive-order-using-behavioral-science-insights-better-serve-american

General Services Administration. (n.d.). About Us. Retrieved from https://oes.gsa.gov/about/

Hallsworth, M., Chadborn, T., Sallis, A., Sanders, M., Berry, D., Greaves, F., . . . Davies, S. C. (2016). Provision of social norm feedback to high prescribers of antibiotics in general practice: a pragmatic national randomised controlled trial. *The Lancet, 387*(10029), 1743-1752.
Hallsworth, M., List, J., Metcalfe, R., & Vlaev, I. (2014). The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance. *Journal of Public Economics, 148*(1), 14-31.
Halpern, D. (2015). *Inside the Nudge Unit: How small changes can make a big difference*. London: WH Allen.
Halpern, D., & Sanders, M. (2016). Nudging by government: Progress, impact, & lessons learned. *Behavioral Science & Policy, 2*(2), 52.
Haynes, L., Goldacre, B., & Torgerson, D. (2012). *Test, learn, adapt: developing public policy with randomised controlled trials*. Cabinet Office, United Kingdom.
Hiscox, P. M., Hobman, D. E., Daffey, M. M., & Reeson, D. A. (2017). *Supporting Retirees in Retirement Income Planning*. Commonwealth of Australia.
Hiscox, P. M., Oliver, T., Ridgway, M., Holzinger, L. A., Warren, A., & Willis, A. (2017). *Going Blind to See More Clearly: The Effects of De-Identifying Job Applications in the Australian Public Service. BETA Working Paper 2017-1*. Commonwealth of Australia.
Howlett, M., Perl, A., & Ramesh, M. (2009). *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles & Policy Subsystems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1986). *Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Maybin, J. (2016). *Producing Health Policy: Knowledge and Knowing in Government Policy Work*. London: Palgrave Macmillan
Mulgan, G. (2014). Behavioural Insights Team: our new partnership. Retrieved from http://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/behavioural-insights-team-our-new-partnership
Mullainathan, S., & Thaler, R. H. (2001). Behavioral Economics. In D. L. Sills (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (pp. 1094-1100): Pergamon Press.
NSW Premier and Cabinet Behavioural Insights Unit. (2014). *Understanding People, Better Outcomes: Behavioural Insights in NSW*. NSW Premier and Cabinet.
NSW Premier and Cabinet Behavioural Insights Unit, & Behavioural Insights Team. (2016). *Behavioural Insights in New South Wales: Update Report 2016*. NSW Premier and Cabinet.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2017). *Behavioural Insights and Public Policy: Insights from around the world*. OECD Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/behavioural-insights-and-public-policy-9789264270480-en.htm.
Sanders, M. (2016). Social influences on charitable giving in the workplace. *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 66*(1), 129-136.
Shankar, M. (2014). Nudging in Government *Behaviour Exchange 2014*. Sydney.
Social and Behavioural Sciences Team. (2015). *Annual Report 2015*. United States Government.
Social and Behavioural Sciences Team. (2016). *Annual Report 2016*. United States Government Retrieved from https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/2016%20Social%20and%20Behavioral%20Sciences%20Team%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
Social and Behavioural Sciences Team. (n.d.). About. Retrieved from https://sbst.gov/about/

Thaler, R. H. (2015). *Misbehaving: The making of behavioral economics*. London: Allen Lane.
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Weick, K. E. (1984). Small wins: redefining the scale of social problems. *American Psychologist, 39*(1), 40.
Whitehead, M., Jones, R., Howell, R., Lilley, R., & Pykett, J. (2014). Nudging all over the World. *Economic and Social Research Council*.
Williamson, B. (2014). Knowing public services: Cross-sector intermediaries and algorithmic governance in public sector reform. *Public Policy and Administration, 29*(4), 292-312.
Williamson, B. (2015). *Testing governance: the laboratory lives and methods of policy innovation labs*. Working Paper. University of Stirling.