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Elaborating a Critical Study of Governance in Thailand: On Applying Metagovernance and Critical Realism

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Abstract

The study of governance has become ubiquitous within public policy discussion and research. By applying critical realism and metagovernance approach, this paper challenges a network-oriented approach and argues that even in a seemingly highly network-oriented situation, hierarchy is still functioning well and alive and persists. Governance must do with much more than networks, institutions, or narratives.

In specific, the case of a certain quasi-nongovernmental agency (quango)—Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF) is chosen ti exemplify the argument. With the widely claimed innovative working approach of THPF to funding and operation, THPF has mostly received well collaborations from its partners and been seen as working for a networked approach correspond with the new governance perspective. Nevertheless, THPF, in fact, utilizes other different modes of governance, not just networks. Networks are operated with hierarchies and markets in a strategic way. This implies that the state and hierarchies are well and alive, being not totally replaced by the new governance, and governance by network, indeed, appears in the 'shadow of hierarchy'.

Keyword: Governance, Metagovernance, Critical Realism, Modes of steering, Thai Health Promotion Foundation, Thailand

Introduction

The concept of governance has become ubiquitous especially within the study of politics and public policy (Fawcett, 2016). It is popular in a world where government has become an increasingly complex matter dependent on diverse stakeholders. Bevir (2012) reasons that ideas, activities, and designs of governance seem unconventional as they often involve hybrid practices, multi-jurisdiction and plurality of stakeholders linked together in networks. Frederickson (2005) even rhetorically asks 'What ever happened to public administration? Governance, governance everywhere'. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the meaning of governance, thereby becoming one of the most contested concept in social science.

This paper is interested in governance as a theory of governing, steering and coordination, which is arguably the most generic aspect of governance and relevant to every sector (Peters and Pierre, 2016). As a theory of governing, it is interested in the purposive actions and practices of attempting to, directly or indirectly, provide or coordinate governance. Theories of governance are analytical lenses that help us understand our contemporary world—providing *"an analytical tool kit for reflecting on and participating in the production of ordered rule in our increasingly complex, fragmented and dynamic society"* (Ansell and Torfing, 2016, 1).

As argued by Bevir (2012), governance gives *"a theoretical term to discuss general issues of social coordination irrespective of whether or not government played an active role in such coordination"* (p.16). Approaching governance from theoretical perspective also stimulates a re-consideration for changes in governance. Changes in governance do not simply imply that government has lost its power in governing; yet, they indicate that the state is exercising the power in different manners. Oft-cited version of governance given by Rhodes (1997) as underlying changes in governing characterized as 'governance without government' seemingly deemphasizes the important of the state. Such 'governance' equates simply to network. However, this paper challenges a network-oriented approach as the veneer of governance, and argues that even in a seemingly highly network-oriented situation, hierarchy is still functioning well and alive and persists. Governance must do with much more than networks, institutions, or narratives.

Treating governance as a theory does not necessarily imply any pre-supposedly certain actor/action or set of actors/actions. It allows, and even encourages, one to look at the variety of governance modes at work, not only those of network. This better suits the reality of governance as the state in modern governance is indeed a 'congested state', full of fragmented and plural forms of governance, not just networks (Skelcher, 2000).

Self-claiming to align with the emerging second generation of governance studies which put many achievements of governance studies in the previous generation under critical scrutiny (Palumbo, 2015), this paper aims to show the explanatory power of critical realism (CR) and metagovernance in the study of governance. It is not heavily interested in explaining the empirical case as such. Instead, it is focused on what it is (only) allowed to see through CR and metagovernance frameworks. The paper is divided into two important parts. The first part deals with the theoretical backgrounds proposed in the paper. The second part moves to the application of the theories and frameworks to elaborate the superiority of the frameworks in understanding the complex reality of governance and public policy. The case of Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF) in Thailand is used to exemplify the argument. It is hoped that this paper can, more or less, show how the metagovernance concept can be better used to study governance in Thailand and elsewhere.

Part 1: Why CR? And What Has CR Offered to the Study of Governance? Towards the Study of Metagovernance

Governance Theory and Critical Realism (CR)

Governance is a popular but notoriously slippery term. For Jessop (2016b), the term is *"both equivocal, because it has different but stable meanings in different contexts, and ambiguous, as its meanings vary even in similar contexts"* (p.74).[1] Lexicographically, it conveys many different meanings (see Welch, 2013). Governance is also often used in conjunction with a particular qualifying prefix (Ansell and Torfing, 2016). One major problem with many available definitions is that they either define governance too narrowly or leave the definition open for an endless number of contextual interpretations. Against this background, however, there is still a need to give a working definition of governance for this paper. To face the challenge and offer a working definition, governance here refers to *the diverse ordered mechanisms/structures, strategies of coordination, interactions, and practices involved in coordinating social relations that are adopted by government, other public autonomous actors, private and civil society actors, and other organizations and functional systems in the face of complex reciprocal interdependence among their actions, activities and operations which aim to solve societal problems or create social opportunities*.[2]

There is no single 'theory' of governance, but rather many overlapping theoretical discussions and debates.[3] Theories of governance, for Peters and Pierre (2016), "*are still emerging and generally lack of conceptual sophistication of jul-fledged theories in the social sciences"* (p.4). One can trace the development path of governance theory. According to Ansell and Torfing (2016), the early account has involved the notion of a unidirectional shift from government to governance suggesting that processes of governing were somehow self-organizing

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[1] This significantly makes the term 'governance' having no equivalent in many other languages. In Thailand, governance is differently translated and interpreted (see Bowornwathana, 2008). Among them, *'Thammapiban'* (Good Governance), *'Karn Judkarn Pokkrong'* (possibly literally translated as *Government Management*) and *'Karn Boriharn Pokkrong'* (possibly literally translated as *Government Administration*) are popularly used. However, such translations are not fully recognized in the academic community as they cannot convey the extensive meaning of the English term 'governance'; many prefer to remain using the English word instead.

[2] The definition drew and developed from ones given by Bob Jessop (2011, 2016b) and Louis Meuleman (2008).

[3] However, among differences, theories of governance can be specified as commonly revolve around five areas (Ansell and Torfing, 2016) which are:

(1) the interaction of different actors, jurisdictions, levels, and institutional arenas;

(2) roles of different public, private and civil society actors in governing processes;

(3) the history, background and context of governance concerning how governance is designed, organized and orchestrated, or how it evolves over time and across sectors and domains;

(4) the measurement of governance, commonly in terms of impacts and effects, or how different kinds of governance contribute to more effective, democratic or innovative ways of solving societal problems, delivering public services or regulating social and economic life;

and (5) governance failure, or how to improve governance to secure desirable outcomes.

and did not require government. Immediately after, critics occurred. Consequently, governance is starting to be seen as not replacing government, but rather supplementing and transforming government. Some prefers to link how governance often operates in the shadow of hierarchy, that is, government does participate in governance in distinct ways. It is argues that the first generation of governance studies is focused on the positive aspects of governance and ignoring its darker and more problematic aspects while subsequent generations responded by exploring the dark side of the topic. As the paper aims to show the superior of the metagovernance framework based on CR, it is inevitable that the paper somehow explores the weakness of other approaches. This is why this paper positions itself in the second generation of governance studies (see Palumbo, 2015).

Also, this paper is interested in the *second order* of policy and governance studies which aims to criticize an existing explanation, for example, for an unrealistic assumption of a certain approach.[4] By working on the area of the second order, one cannot and should not explain much about policy and governance themselves, yet can and should explain (and criticize) about existing explanations and approaches within policy and governance studies. In the field of public policy and public administration where the climate of practice-turn thinking and methods-driven research are dominant, the second order policy and governance studies which is concerned more on meta-theory is not very popular. This work argus that the study of policy and governance is not simply about the topic, it is also about the approach which ones adopt, that is, how ones study the area of inquiry. Implicitly or explicitly, assumptions have been made before any analysis; realizing the theoretical predispositions can make a better analysis.

Unfortunately, the extant literature on governance in general appears to overlook CR (Marsh, 2008; McAnulla, 2006a, 2006b; Fawcett & Daugbjerg, 2012; cf. Bevir & Rhodes, 2006c). As I argued elsewhere (see Ungsuchaval, 2016a), critical realists do not follow either foundational or anti-foundational theory of the state typically held by positivists and interpretivists respectively. Instead, they are more interested in the role of the state in redesigning how modes of governing, that is, hierarchies, markets, and networks, intricately operate independently and dependently. Many also contend that critical realists emphasize the ways the state modifies the strategic terrain to favor certain hybrid combinations of the three differing governing modes over and above others (Whitehead, 2007; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Fawcett and Daugbjerg, 2012).

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[4] As Stanley (2012) classifies political science into two stylized 'orders', this work, in the same way, argues that there are two orders in policy and governance studies. The first order which is the primary aim of most scholars in the field is to explain policy and governance, making arguments or explanations of 'real world' policies and governance as empirically observable. On the contrary, the second order is more focused on how scholars themselves make sense and conceptualize policy and governance. Consequently, works in the second order aim to criticize an existing explanation, for example, for an unrealistic assumption of a certain approach. Such second order, in Stanley's words (2012), *"is necessarily self-referential, reflexive and 'meta' (and as such, to an extent 'parasitical') since it necessarily depends on the pre-existence of explanations"* (p.94).

Historically, CR as commonly agreed is a series of philosophical movements/ideas/ positions corresponded by the works of Roy Bhaskar[5] (e.g., 1986, 1989, 2008, 2014a) (and, perhaps, Rom Harré (Harré and Madden, 1975)). Appearing in the context of the post-positivist crises in the natural and social sciences in the 1970s and 1980s, CR exemplifies a broad alliance of social theorists and researchers trying to develop a properly post-positivist social science and philosophy.

Nowadays, many contemporary scholars employ the term CR without strictly or naively aligning their ideas with Bhaskar (see Maxwell, 2012; Elder-Vass, 2010; Pawson, 2006; Jessop, 2005; Campbell, 1988).[6] Jessop (2005, 2015) fairly suggests that it is worth to distinguish CR in general from CR particular positions and arguments. He argues that *"Bhaskar's critical realism is very distinctive and, in its entirely (especially as developed in recent years), it excludes many other critical realist positions"* (Jessop, 2005, 42). CR "is [now] not the invention of one man" (Vandenberghe, 2014, 3; see also Sayer, 2000).

This paper takes such position of CR in general, that is, seeing CR in a broad sense by substantially drawing ideas from many people' CR, including Bhaskar, that seem compatible with this work and can contribute a new understanding of CR and the study of governance. However, prior to elaborate the contribution of CR to the study of governance, general grounds of CR which are related to the paper must be clarified. These are *realist* ontology, *relativist* epistemology, and *meta-theory* primacy.

Realist Ontology and Relativist Epistemology: An Impossible Combination?

CR is commonly known for its ostensible and practicable capacity to successfully combine and reconcile a realist/objectivist ontology with a relativist/constructivist/interpretivist epistemology (Archer et al., 2016; Vandenberghe, 2014; Brown, 2014; Maxwell, 2012; Hatch, 2011; Sayer, 2000, 2010; Bhaskar, 1998; Frazer and Lacey, 1993). Essentially, CR seeks to make a distinction between ontological and epistemological understanding of the social world. For CR, ontology precedes epistemology; it is the nature of the scientific object that should determine its proper epistemology, rather than vice versa. The issue for CR-guided researchers is always: what theories or concepts are required to understand the data available and to bring into focus the processes or mechanisms that are really at work? (Ackroyd and Karlsson, 2014). Ontology thus has implications for research (see Bhaskar, 2014b) which are independent of those of

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[5] In fact, the term CR was not originally used by Bhaskar and the term was already visible with different meaning from Bhaskarian tradition. There were the term 'transcendental realism' in *A Realist Theory of Science* (2008[1975]) and 'critical naturalism' in *The Possibility of Naturalism* (2014a[1979]). Bhaskarian CR was developed as an elision of both aforementioned terms which has later been taken by Bhaskar and other scholars (see Bhaskar, 1998).

[6] It is noted that Bhaskar has his own particular logic of CR and Bhaskar's recent dialectical development of CR as an emancipatory concept such as 'dialectical CR' (see Bhaskar, 1993, 1994) has significantly departed from the earlier ideas of CR which many other scholars have been interested in and developed and, arguably, led to a separate branch or second phase of CR (see Bhaskar and Hartwig, 2010; Bhaskar, 2017). More importantly, in fact, developed detailed elaboration of CR explanations and their applications to social phenomena have involved many other scholars who have arguably contributed to the development of contemporary CR especially in social science (e.g. Archer, 1995; Sayer, 2000, 2010; Elder-vass, 2010; Porpora, 2015). However, by saying this, it does not mean to obscure the important of the enriched contribution of Bhaskar on CR.

epistemology; this allows the position of ontological realism which is compatible with epistemological constructivism.

By holding a 'realist' ontology, CR suggests that the real world does exist regardless of what we happen to think about it. Unlike positivists, CR also believes that there are things that can be observed and things that cannot be observed (but needed to be posited as well). There are deep structures that cannot be observed and even if we find a way to do so, it might offer a false picture of the phenomena or structures and their effects. To put this in Bhaskar's language (2008), reality is stratified, open, and emergent; reality should be seen as morphologically emergent. Social worlds cannot be reduced to mere observable objects, facts or ideas that people have about. The social world is an emergent reality which has its own particular powers and properties. The focus of CR is thus on 'structures'[7] and 'mechanisms'[8], not regularities or patterns of events. This is corresponded with the goal of critical social science, that is, to probe beneath the surface of things (Sears and Cairns, 2015), to get at the *"structures and mechanisms which causally generate the observable phenomena […] which allows us to explain*[9] *them"* (Keat and Urry, 1982, 5). These structures and mechanisms are on the domain of the *real*, rather than the *actual* or *empirical* (Bhaskar, 2008); they actually exist in the social world, but they are to be regarded as potential or tendential (Blom and Morén, 2011). Therefore, realist ontology *"affirms the existence (or reality) of a largely mind-, experience-, language-, concept-, theory-, and practice-independent world"* (Pihlström, 2014, 252).

However, how we see the world is theory-dependent or theory-laden, but not theory-determined; variables are always conceptual interpretations. For CR, knowledge is individually constructed and lacking objectivity. Although the (objective) world exists independently of people's perceptions, languages, or imagination, part of that world consists of subjective interpretation that influence the ways in which it is perceived and experienced. This double recognition is essential and relatively novel in social science (O'Mahoney and Vincent, 2014). In short, CR epistemology holds that *"there is a real material world but that our knowledge of it is*

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[7] Here, structure or institutional structure refers to sets of internally related objects, which may be physical, material, and practices carried out by human (de Souza, 2013). This structure ontologically makes social science different from natural science, that is, the former's emphasis is on the activity- and concept-dependent of social structures while the latter's emphasis is on natural structures (Bhaskar, 2014b). Archer (1996) argues that this structure represents the realm of interests. This structure associates with 'the context of action' in that *"all structures manifest temporal resistance and do so generically through conditioning the context of action"* (Archer, 2010, 239). The phase 'context of action' is the context delineated for investigation by researchers. CR suggests that social action or intentional behavior (e.g. teaching) presupposes the existence of certain conditions (e.g. schools, teacher training institutions) for engaging in those actions (see Bhaskar, 2014a).

[8] Unfortunately, the term 'mechanism' used by CR researchers conjures images of a deterministic relationship between cause and effect. Indeed, a literature of CR obviously shows this to be a total misunderstanding. However, the term remains reluctantly adopted in this paper for the sake of consistency with the broader CR literature.

[9] Explanation is the essential goal of critical approaches. As Sears and Cairns (2015) state, *"positivist approaches see k to predict events, interpretive approaches to understand the meaning they hold, and critical approaches to explain them"* (p.70). This shows a clear link towards CR as one ultimate goal of CR is to create explanatory theories which then can offer better explanations of social phenomena (O'Mahoney and Vincent, 2014, 6).

often socially conditioned and subject to challenge and reinterpretation" (della Porta & Keating, 2008, p.24; see also Jessop, 2005). This make CR close to interpretivism in the (relativist/ constructivist) epistemological aspect (Marsh, Hall, and Fawcett, 2014; Sayer, 2000, 2010; Olsen, 2010).

Such relativist epistemology of CR conveys a significant implication about theoretical development. CR embraces an idea that that no theory or position is totally correct and complete. An accurate representation of a phenomenon is impossible (Maxwell, 2012). However, although the knowledge is relative, strong arguments for preferring one set of beliefs, one set of theories about the world to another, are able to be created, in certain contexts (Bhaskar, 2017). In other words, although knowledge is subject to reinterpretation across broader social domains, CR does not take that all theories are equal. 'Reality' is not what people say it is as constructionists believe. For CR, there is a potential for 'better' understandings of the world. Although the knowledge is subject to fallibility, it does not necessarily mean that all knowledge is equally fallible. According to Zachariadis, Scott and Barrett (2013), CR accepts that *"some researchers may have more valid explanations or theories that approximate the intransitive domain with more probabilistic accuracy than others"* (p.857).

CR as a general orientation to theory development can allow concepts that help build more accurate explanations of social phenomena than those which currently exist. However, it does not necessarily secure a successful empirical research but a better explanation—a theoretical explanation. As CR seeks to give a theoretical explanation, it holds that some views of the work are more accurate than others, that is, 'the better theories, the better understandings' (O'Mahoney and Vincent, 2014).

Meta-theory Primacy: A Reconsidered Social Ontology of Structure and Agency

Some suggest that CR should be seen as a meta-theoretical position or tool that can inform our empirical investigations and help to develop proper theoretical frameworks and methodological procedures (Archer et al., 2016; Fleetwood and Ackroyd, 2004). In this regard, CR is essentially not a theory but a philosophical perspective. Porpora (2015) makes an interesting point, that is, the function of CR is "*to specify what makes for productive scientific activity. From that perspective, it counsels confronting rather than ignoring important scientific differences where they exist. If that requires largely conceptual rather empirical analysis, then, from the CR perspective, so be it"* (p.202). Unsurprisingly, one might find this paper conceptual rather than empirical as it aims to show the superiority of CR and metagovernance as a framework to critical governance studies.

One key reason why the term 'critical' attached to CR implies a serious attention towards meta-theory (Cruickshank, 2003).[10] CR takes meta-theoretical, philosophical, and theoretical issues in a distinct way and contributes a new understanding towards the issues, especially the issue of structure and agency. The ontological differences between those who are more structure-centered and more agency-centered lead a conclusion about where to look for and what counts as the significant causal mechanism in the first place (Wendt and Shapiro, 1997). Structure refers to context and the setting within which social, political and economic events emerge and obtain

[10] Studying meta-theory is an inquiry into the philosophical groundings of theories which investigates theories's most basic philosophical assumptions such as structure and agency, material and idea, and truth. In this sense, meta-theory is an exploration of the theoretical frameworks which give direction to a study, a theory, a researcher.

meaning. It is also about the ordered nature of relations and entities. In contrast, agency is action which is a political conduct (Hay, 2002). It refers to the capacity of an actor to act consciously and realize one intentions. Here, an actor assumably has autonomy and choice to perform. Being set up as such, structure and agency is commonly seen as oppositional; nonetheless, it is not always necessarily the case.

As the notion of structure and agency is a never-ending debate in social science, this paper is neither seeking to reconcile the debate nor claiming that they can be reconciled. Instead, it would like to go with the idea of the interaction with structure and agency not as a problem demanding a solution, but a means to problematize the social world (Savigny and Marsden, 2011). With reference to such interaction, an alternative way to study both structure and agency and a better analytical framework is possible.

CR holds that *"the concepts which inform the meta-theory that defines structure and agency can only be developed via a critical dialogue with alternative social ontologies"* (Cruickshank, 2003, 3). CR claims that structure and agency need to be linked so that the explanatory weight on only structures or individuals resulting in determinism and an incompetence to explain individuals' social relations will be avoided.[11] To think about the structure and agency requires a commitment to the reality of social structures understood as relations between social agents in virtue of their occupancy of social positions. For CR structures are causally efficacious; they do enable actions that would otherwise not be possible and constrains ones (Benton and Craib, 2011). Through the activities of social agents, social structure are kept in being, reproduced. However, individual or collective agency may also modify, transform social structures as well.[12] Such actions of social agents on reproduction or transformation of social structures can be both unintended and intended. Hence, the constraining and enabling power of structures and the reproductive and transformative power of agency can be co-operationally seen together with CR perspective (Bhaskar, 1993).

Therefore, CR treats structure and agency as 'duality', rather than dualism.[13] The relationship between institutions and ideas or structure and agency, for CR, is thus dialectical (Hay, 2002; McAnulla, 2006a, 2006b; Marsh, 2008, 2010; see also Furlong and Marsh, 2010). In sum, structure and agency for CR have their own causal power and their distinctions are both a matter of ontological and analytical (see Hay, 2002). It is important to note that what makes CR approach to the structure/agency issue distinctive lies on the notion that social structures and

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[11] This can be traced back to the notion regarding society and persons in which most critical realists would agree that they are distinct 'levels'—both real, but interdependent and interacting with one another (Bhaskar, 1993, 2014a).

[12] In other words, structure and agency are linked through the idea of emergent properties (see Danermark et al., 2002; Elder-Vass, 2007, 2010), which equips the finest definition of structures, helping to abstain from the view that structures determine agents. Seeing social structures as emergent properties, consequently, points to the way of seeing structures as being created by the actions of individuals in the past, and then have causal power in their own right. CR thus does not advocate that meanings happen independently of individual subjects; on the contrary, it postulates that patterns of meanings are shared and meanings are inscribed in institutions and processes which affect, but definitely do not determine, individuals (McAnulla, 2006a, 2006b; Marsh, Hall and Fawcett, 2014).

[13] Dualism here refers to the fact that social structures and human agency are different strata without any interaction.

social agents are ontologically distinct from each other. This is corresponded with the primacy of ontology held by CR. CR is thus not regarded as an 'either-or' approach but an 'and-and' one.

The Metagovernance Analytic

Versions of governance theory raise inquiries regarding structure and agency in governing. Two major theories of governance—institutionalism and interpretivism—are seen to be correlated with structuralism and intentionalism respectively (see Ungsuchaval, 2016a).

Institutional explanations are tended to base decisively on structural explanations (Peters, 2011; see also Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Duit & Galaz, 2008). Hay (2002) points out the structuralist tendencies of the new institutionalism which emphasizes *"the mediating and constraining role of the institutional settings within which […] outcomes were to be realized"* (p. 105). Thus, institutionalists put a lot of emphasis into mechanism of institutional constraint. In contrast, interpretive explanations are relied upon agential explanations (see Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). They see that structures, if any, play little role and do not have independent causal role; institutions are needed to be decentered.

Ultimately, institutionalist and interpretivist debates is about what and how to privilege in the study of governance, structure or agency. Both of the accounts, to some extent, recognize both structure and agency but with different priority.[14] Both approaches are an 'either-or' approach which, using Sayer's term (2010), can be called a kind of 'intellectualist fallacy'. Although one may be interested in social structure, it does not imply any priority for 'structure' over 'agency'; the assumed incompatibility of them is overstated and the suggestion that one has to decide between these two ideas is misguided (López & Scott, 2000, 5). This paper says that structures and agencies are operationally interdependent, albeit ontologically separated. Structures cannot operate on theirs own; they need individuals to operate them (Sayer, 2010). Institutions have independent casual power. There can be no action without structure (and vice versa) (Archer, 1995). This idea clearly one milestone of CR which benefits the metagovernance analytic. The duality of structure-agency points to the co-existence of government and governance which will be discussed next.

Against this background, CR-informed governance can thus be defined as *"the structures and practices involved in coordinating social relations that are marked by complex, reciprocal interdependence, and metagovernance refers in turn to the coordination of these structures and practices"* (Jessop, 2011, 108). Grounded in the dialectic of structure-agency, governance does not merely involve structures or processes but 'social relations'. This point would be more clear when discussing the strategical relation between governing structures and governance agency later in the upcoming part.

Not every scholar approaches metagovernance through CR. However, realizing metagovernance through CR allows one to be philosophical, focusing on meta-theory and the complexity and reality of policy and governance.

Defining Metagovernance

Unfortunately, the definition of metagovernance changes according to how governance is defined. Nevertheless, a common starting point is to refer metagovernance as 'governance of

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[14] Traditionally, voluntarists see social processes as being reducible to the seemingly unconstrained actions and wills of individuals; they privilege agency over structure. Structuralists, in contrast, produce much of their strength by countering the voluntarist; they presume structural determinism with passive agency, if any.

governance' (Kooiman, 2003). Metagovernance *"involves deliberate attempts to facilitate, manage, and direct more or less self-regulating processes of interactive governance without reverting to traditional statist styles of government in terms of bureaucratic rule making and imperative command"* (Torfing et al., 2012, 122). In short, as Peters (2010) suggests, it is about *"the process of steering devolved governance processes"* (p.37). To study metagovernance, primarily, is to look at the role, capacity, and legitimacy of public organizations to exercise control over the more devolved and decentralized forms of decision-making characteristic of network governance (Fawcett, 2016).[15]

Torfing et al. (2012) review the existing definitions of metagovernance and then redefine it to capture the discursive, normative, and strategic aspects of the exercise of metagovernance, that is,

> *"a reflexive, higher order governance practice that involves (a) the production and dissemination of hegemonic norms and ideas about how to govern and be governed; (b) the political, normative, and context-dependent choice among different modes of governing, or among different combinations of governing modes; and (c) the strategic structuring and managing of particular institutional forms of governance in order to facilitate sustained interaction, prevent dysfunctions, and advance particular political goals"* (p.131).

One can argue that metagovernance can be considered a 'multilevel concept', that is, a concept *"that can be applied in multiple contexts, and can have both a deep critical theoretical and even philosophical meaning, but also refers quite legitimately to concrete acts that can be usefully measured in empirical research"* (Wood, 2016, 527).

Metagovernance is directed at controlling the *environment of action* rather than the action itself. To frame action indirectly can be the most effective manner of governing in the complex governance situation.

Metagovernance and its powerful explanatory strength is essentially underpinned by and sympathetic towards CR. Some even point out an association between CR and metagovernance (Jessop, 2004, 2005, 2007; Marsh, 2011; Fawcett and Daugbjerg, 2012; Davies, 2013; Bevir and Rhodes, 2015; Ungsuchaval, 2016a). This paper mainly aims to elaborate the link between CR and metagovernance in terms of the structure-agency dialectic.

Government + Governance in the Shadow of Hierarchy

Although government and governance shares the same etymological root, that is, the Greek word 'kybernân' or 'kubernetes' which means to steer, to govern, to pilot (concerning how to create a system of rule), they have different meanings.

In the context of governance theory, the term 'government' is not simply equated with the central administrative agency of the state that decides and executes public policy and service or the 'government of the day'. Instead it can be alternatively interpreted in two, but interrelated, major ways. First, government refers to the formal structures of the public sector or the apparatuses of the state and the set of actors which exercise state power (Peters and Pierre, 2016,

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[15] Indeed, according to Fawcett (2016), three difference approaches to the study of metagovernance are specified. They are pluralist, neo-Weberian, and Neo-Marxist. Each approach emphasizes different role and dimension of the state vis-a-vis governance. This paper can be seen as going along with the neo-Marxist approach which emphasizes how modes of governance coexist and interact with one another.

5). It includes bureaucracy, the courts, and other state agencies. From this regard, government is not an entity but a conglomerate of actors; government is not the only actor who tries to influence societal developments. Its interventions are interventions in a policy network, in which power, resource dependency, and strategic behavior are vital elements (Fenger and Bekkers, 2007, 17). Second, government is seen to be closely linked with old, hierarchical mode of governing. These two interpretations often used interchangeably. While government refers to hierarchies, governance refers to new, non-hierarchical modes of governing, principally markets and networks.

Analytic of metagovernance, as stated by Whitehead (2003, 7), brings two significant benefits. First, it enables the political and economic changes associated with governance to be positioned within the context of changing patterns of state power, strategy and intervention. Second, it tends to break down the arbitrary divide that has been constructed between government and governance—suggesting instead a hybrid form of governance that is fashioned 'in the shadow of hierarchy'. This second point is worthwhile to be further discussed here.

As CR does not point to an 'either-or' approach regarding meta-theoretical issues, it implies the possibility of the coexistence of allegedly contradicted things. Every interactions and modes in metagovernance perspective have causal power and they are 'equal' as fundamental units of analysis and theory development in terms of 'and-and' (Kooiman, 2003, 8).

Metagovernance positions 'government' and 'governance' as a duality, not a dualism (Marsh, 2011) and suggests that government and governance coexist in the shadow of hierarchy. In other words, the old, hierarchical government does coexist with new, non-hierarchical modes of governance. This means that there is not necessarily to be 'governance, rather than government' or 'governance without government'; the unidirectional shift from government to governance repeatedly echoed by some authoritative governance theories (see Rhodes, 1996, 1997; Smith, 1998; Richards and Smith, 2002) is oversimplified, non-realistic, and lack of analytical value.[16] In the case of EU, Kjaer (2010) argues that, rather than involving contradictory developments, governing and governance are mutually constitutive in that more governing implies more governance and vice versa. Both government and governance, for CR, are operationally, dialectically, interactively, and iteratively coexist in different ways across different policy areas and polities over different times (Ungsuchaval, 2016a). Governments are in fact capable of influencing policymaking in the decentered world of interactive governance through the exercise of metagovernance (Torfing et al., 2012, 132). The persistence role of the state in all processes of governing is re-emphasized.

The idea of metagovernance has emerged in conjunction and partial response to the notion of (new) governance. For Jessop (1997), metagovernance is a counter process to governance, whereby

> *"political authorities [at national and other levels] are more involved in organizing the self-organization of partnerships, networks and governance regimes. They provide the ground rules for governance; ensure the compatibility of different governance mechanisms and regimes; deploy a relative monopoly of organizational intelligence and information with which to shape cognitive expectations; act as a 'court of appeal' for disputes arising within and over governance; seek to rebalance power differentials by*

[16] This does not means that they are not worthwhile to study and lack of their own merits. In fact, such approaches has contributed many new perspectives to study governance and government and can be considered the basis for a further discussion on theories of governance.

strengthening weaker forces or systems in the interests of system integration and/or social cohesion; try to modify the self understanding of identities, strategic capacities and the interests of individual and collective actors in different strategic contexts and hence alter their implications for preferred strategies and tactics; and also assume political responsibility in the event of governance failure" (Jessop, 1997, 575).

Governance, which occurs in the shadow of hierarchy, allows roles for the state. One such key state role is 'collibration'—the strategically continual rebalancing of several modes of governance to improve the effectiveness of indirect and direct state intervention (see Dunsire, 1993a, 1993b, 1996; Jessop, 2004, 2011, 2016a, 2016b). Such role reflects the state power which extents beyond hierarchy. In other words, collibration is where the shadow of hierarchy is most evident.

The phase 'shadow of hierarchy' refers to the indirect influence which states might exercise over other actors in political and civil society through either the real or imagined threat of executive or legislative action, or both. Such influence draws on the state's unique capacities and powers, including coercion (Jessop, 2016b; see also Scharpf, 1994; Whitehead, 2003; Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008). In Jessop own accounts (2004, 2011), one defining feature of metagovernance is the shadow of hierarchy. Consequently, it is the state which usually decides on the balance between, and the operation of, different modes of governance. Besides, metagovernance as a process taking place within, and is shaped by, the broader power relations which exist in society (Jessop, 2010). Metagovernance necessarily displays the patterns of structural inequality in society or a particular system.

In reality, even though public organizations might be dependent on private/non-state rule-makers associated with an increasing emergence of new modes of governance, private (market and networks) governance was not as private as it seemed; there would not be any private governance if it was not for the public shadow of hierarchy (Meyer, 2012, 1-2). Delving into the surface of new, nonhierarchical modes of governance, it is expected to see old, hierarchical modes underneath (Rhodes and Visser, 2011, 123). As Meyer (2012) points out, self– or co–regulation would not take place without the shadow of hierarchy; the shadow of hierarchy is regarded as a necessary condition for the success of such regulations.

Modes of Governance: Hierarchy, Market, and Network

Metagovernance is considered as an important concept for understanding how forms of government and new forms of governance are linked. As it suggests the coexistence of government and governance, metagovernance is intended to *"facilitate, manage, and direct multilateral policymaking, but as the various actors have their own rule and resource bases and can freely decide whether to exchange or pool their resources, metagovernance cannot take the form of imperative command"* (Torfing et al., 2012, 132). In other words, although it is focused on the state power, traditional forms of hierarchical steering should not be reverted; the point is to respect the capacity for self-regulation of the new governance forms in order to preserve the commitment of the public and private actors.

The challenge of metagovernance is that how to provide direction to a governance system through mechanisms which maintain the virtues generated by delegated and devolved forms of governing while providing central direction and control. Indeed, this is the most fundamental task of governing, which always entails the balancing of control and autonomy.

One can see the role of hierarchy in three major cases in the context of metagovernance. The first case is being 'a shadow of hierarchy'. Although, many public agencies have tried to evade authority, the 'shadow of hierarchy' is clearly darker within government than without (Peters, 2010, 38). The second case is that hierarchical solution is needed to secure order and efficiency within an organization albeit not necessarily. Some tasks must be done through hierarchical steering. The third case is, when there is a crisis, hierarchy seems to give a quick and directional response. Centralized decision-making is often seen in dealing with crises. However, it is important to note that hierarchy has its own weaknesses as well. Yet, this paper takes the stance that each modes of governance have their own distinctive strengths and weaknesses; they are not, and cannot, interchangeable.

As a theoretical concept, governance refers to all processes of social organization, coordination, and governing (Bevir, 2012). To better make sense of governance requires an investigation on abstract theories of hierarchy, market, and network as types of organization, governing. In this respect, governance need not only involve oversight and control—let alone the state—but also markets and networks.

Essentially defined as mechanism and strategies, different kinds of governance can be identified. Jessop (2003, 2007, 2011, 2016a, 2016b) distinguishes four main kinds of governance: anarchy, hierarchy, heterarchy and solidarity. One can link these governance types with different sets of social relations; for example, anarchy with exchange and markets, hierarchy with states and inter-state relations, heterarchy with networks and society,[17] and solidarity with (real or imagined) communities. Others point out many other types (see Thompson et al., 1991; Thompson, 2003; Rhodes et al., 2003; Kooiman, 2003; Meuleman, 2008, 2011; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; Bevir, 2012).

Among them, one of the most extensive account on metagovernance developed by Meuleman (2008) classifies governance into its most basic modes of governing: hierarchies, market, and networks. They are three ideal types of social coordination and steering; each of them depends on a certain form of governance to coordinate actions.[18] This paper goes along with such classification.[19] By classifying different modes of governance, it seems that the occurrence of governance is at the intersection of different modes of social relations which then

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[17] Many scholars who pursues 'governance' in the narrow sense is likely to commonly equated it only with the third form of coordination, network. This paper instead argues for a broader definition of governance emphasizing the relational dimension of governance. To understand governance broadly can bring a discussion about *"how different governance modes, hierarchies, markets, or networks co-exist and the potential tensions and dilemmas that arise from their co-existence"* (Kjær, 2011, 106), a discussion in which a narrow definition of governance cannot successfully think about. To develop a critical study of governance needs a reconsideration towards philosophies underlying governance theories, as versions of governance theories raise the question about ontology and epistemology of governance (see Ungsuchaval, 2016a), and a very definition of governance per se. How governance is defined thus matters. The virtue of governance will be well applicable when it is defined in a broader sense.

[18] Some see these modes of governance as structural arrangements—ways of providing direction towards certain governance problems; in other words, there is a 'right' governance solution through manipulating the *structures* within which it is presumed to be generated (Pierre and Peters, 2000).

[19] It is important to note that various hybrids are possible. And such classification, noted Jessop (2016b), is more typological or speculative tan empirically grounded.

allows the plausibility of adopting different approaches to their interplays. One approach advocated here is the Strategic Relational Approach to governance which will be discussed later.

In short, hierarchies depend on authority and centralized control. They divide complex tasks into more manageable ones, thereby encouraging a division of labour and specialization. On the contrary, markets depend on prices and dispersed competition. They produce coordination through exchanges and prices although most of their activities often rely on laws and governments. As hierarchies and markets are often ill suited to the distribution of goods and services in contemporary new governance arrangement, networks are considered alternative. Networks depend on trust across webs of associations. They do not usually contain an authoritative center to coordinate; they show repeated and enduring exchanges, if any. Cooperative set-ups, coalitions, relational contracting, and partnerships are common examples of network relationships. One can also connect these different modes of governing to other properties including the means of communication, rationality, criterion of success, basic relations, degree of dependence, and so on (see Table1).

Table 1. Comparing three modes of governing

	Hierarchies	**Markets**	**Networks**
Mechanism	Authority	Prices	Trust
Means of communication	Command	Exchange	Dialogue
Rationality	Substantive and goal-oriented	Formal and procedural	Reflexive and procedural
Criterion of success	Effective goal attainment	Efficient allocation of resources	Negotiated consent
Basic relations	Employment	Contracts and property rights	Exchange of resources
Degree of dependence	Dependent	Independent	Interdependent
Means of conflict resolution and coordination	Rules and commands	Bargaining	Diplomacy
Culture	Subordination	Competition	Reciprocity
Stylized mode of calculation	*Homo hierarchicus* favoring system, rules and regulations	*Homo economicus* favoring interests and maximization of interests	*Homo politicus* favoring public dialogue, exchange
Typical exemplified model of governance	State-centric governance	New Public Management Good Governance	Network Governance Democratic Governance

Source: Adapted from Bevir (2012, 17); Jessop (2003, 102); and Lowndes and Skelcher (1998, 319)

Part 2: On Applying CR and Metagovernance in Thailand: A Case of Thai Health Promotion Foundation

The focus of governance studies here is rather on the meso- and micro-level of analysis; the paper is interested in governance *inside* a public organization, namely Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF). According to Meuleman (2008), the macro level which is concerned with the relations between government and society has relatively much better investigated in the governance research community. Such interest is similar to the interest of Kooiman's first-order governance (Kooiman, 2003). In contrast, how modes of governance emerge and are organized inside public organizations in relation to the first-order governance is still relatively less studied. This can be seen as an interest in a higher order governance.

It is important to note that this paper is a more theoretical paper and a preliminary study of metagovernance in Thailand. Empirical evidence has not much been incorporated. However, to elaborate the framework of metagovernance, the identification of empirical manifestations of governance is required to the extent that it can adequately show the explanatory power of the framework. Empirical data about THPF discussed here comes from two important sources: documents published by THPF and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders.[20] Fenger and Bekkers (2007) suggest that the emergence of governance practices can be observed in two important ways: the shifts taking place in various existing policy domains or societal sectors, and the emergence and function of new modes of governance.

In Thailand, shifts in governance have largely come from governance and public sector reforms, especially through downsizing and privatization as major policies of Thai governments starting from the 1980s. Agencification resulting in the rising of quasi-autonomous public organizations is evident in recent decades. THPF is one of the output of the shift. Non-hierarchical mechanisms have been promoted through civil society engagement. However, such shifts are not totally replacing the old, hierarchical government and the state. The state and government are transforming and learning to employ new modes of governance and govern at a distance.

The case of THPF represents a complex interaction of different modes of governance. THPF applies different governance approaches for internal matters, such as strategic planning, organizational governance, and human resource management, and for external matters, such as granting, networking, and dealing with health and societal issues.

Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF): Some Background

THPF is a new kind of public organization operating to provide financial and technical support and ongoing monitoring and evaluation to anyone who shares its visions. Established in 2001, THPF claims itself as the first organization of its kind in Asia; and through collaborating with all sectors of the society, it serves as an 'innovative enabler' or a 'catalyst' to enhance health promotion and a healthy society and environment for all people in Thailand (Buasai, Kanchanachitra and Siwaraksa, 2007; Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong, 2015). It also owns resource centers that assist civil societies in applying, utilizing and accounting for its funds

[20] Due to research ethics, interviews were analyzed anonymously. This paper is not intended to disclose the sources of interviews.

efficiently and appropriately (Watabe et al., 2016). Ultimately, THPF is interested in facilitating sustainability by promoting structural change.

In fact, in the Thai health sector, there are three major organizations and local government agencies who share major funding roles for promotion and prevention services in Thailand; THPF is the most innovative one that is relatively designed to finance population-wide promotion and prevention activities (Watabe et al., 2016; see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Promotion and prevention financing and service stakeholders in Thai health systems



Source: adapted from Watabe et al. (2016, 4)

Abbreviations

THPF = Thai Health Promotion Foundation
PPA = prevention and promotion area-base payment
PPE = prevention and promotion express-based payment
PBF = performance-based financing
NHSO = National Health Security Office
UC = the Universal Coverage scheme
CUPs = contracting units for primary care
PCUs = primary care units
PHC = primary health care
Tambon = a local governmental unit in Thailand which is below district (*amphoe*) and province (*changwat*)

According to the Health Promotion Foundation Act, B.E.2544 (2001), THPF has the status of a state agency which is not a government agency or a state enterprise under the law on

budgetary procedures, and the income of THPF is not required to be remitted as income of the state. In principle, THPF resembles a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization (or quango) operating outside the formal structure of government. The law regulates revenue for THPF to be directly transferred from the additional two percent of excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol products and pooled in an independent public fund governed by the Prime (or Deputy Prime) Minister. Currently, THPF has annual revenue about US$ 120 million which seems to be large compared with other quangos (see National Reform Council, 2015); however, the funding is relatively small (about 7.3 percent) compared with the financial expenses of other state agencies in the health sector in Thailand (see Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong, 2015; Watabe et al., 2016). This unusual financial mechanism is believed to generate a regular and sustainable budget for THPF.[21]

THPF's approach to health promotion comes from one of the most significant milestones of global health promotion, the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (1986), which calls for a paradigm shift in treating public health issues by stressing the crucial role of non-health sectors and socio-ecological approach to public health (WHO, 2009). It works by following the notion of 'social determinants of health' which requires a multi-sectoral approach of operation (see Galbally et al., 2012). THPF adopted the approach since its establishment to promote healthy public policy and building civil society.

In practice, THPF as a quango performs itself as an intermediary organization between the state and the funded nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, (including other recipients). Sometimes, it somehow operates as an 'arm of the state' (Rakyutidharm, 2014a) while at other times it operates as an umbrella organization for the funded NGOs. This creates a complex situation between the state and society in Thailand. THPF conveys an institutional oddity for its double nature: a granting foundation and a public organization. In fact, THPF claims itself not only being a mere 'sponsor' or 'foundation' but also doing facilitates and supports to build partnership and calls their grantees 'partners' (Galbally et al., 2012; Rakyutidharm, 2014a). This is why THPF positions itself as an 'innovative enabler' or a 'catalyst' to enhance health promotion and a healthy society.

Buasai (1997) observes that the establishment of THPF reflects the necessity for reorienting existing health promotion infrastructures toward a greater capacity for social mobilization. Since its establishment, THPF has made numerous achievements (see Galbally et al., 2012; Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong, 2015). It is admired as one of the most successful organization promoting a networked government approach (see Phusavat et al., 2011).[22] THPF promotes the reduction in alcohol consumption and smoking rate, increase road safety and accident prevention, promote well-being environment in organizations, and so on. Thailand's campaign for tobacco control funded by THPF is regarded as one of the most

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[21] This is a kind of 'earmarked/dedicated tax' assigned for special purposes; as it is not part of general consolidated revenue, the main advantage of earmarking tobacco and alcohol tax revenues for tobacco and alcohol control or health promotion is that they can be expected to ensure a continuous, regular source of funding for programs which is not subject to annual budgetary review (WHO, 2016; see also Buchanan, 1963; Athanassakos, 1990; McCleary, 1991).

[22] It is important to note that in Thailand, the strengths of professional associations and NGOs have greatly contributed to successful public campaigns, especially health- and social-related issues. Therefore, THPF has been particularly recognized as a pioneer for adapting and deploying the networked government concept (Phusavat et al., 2011).

remarkable and successful stories in global health by the Center for Global Development in the project 'Millions Saved' (Glassman and Temin, 2016). It also supports the establishment of many innovative social and health policy. THPF is a strong advocate of health and social promoting policy. Not only direct advocacy and funding NGOs, when necessary, THPF establishes new organizations to mobilize and run campaigns (Galbally et al., 2012). Expanding networks of partners have become tools for advocacy of THPF. However, most people know THPF through its social marketing. THPF has employed sponsorship with health promoting messages as a key social marketing method. These massages are mostly about anti-alcohol and anti-smoking. THPF likes to claim that its achievements cannot be attributed only to the organization, but are to be acknowledged as collective contributions by its partners and collaborating organizations over the country (Adulyanon, 2012). Notably, THPF's investment on health promotion seems to provide high return to the public (Hanvoravongchai et al., 2014).

International societies admire THPF as a successful viable innovative financial mechanism for promoting healthy public policy. As a member of the International Network of Health Promotion Foundations (INHPF), THPF has been invited to support the development of health promotion mechanisms in other countries. Recently, World Health Organization (WHO) (2016) regards THPF as one of the most effectively innovative financial mechanism for health promotion of the world; and compared to other countries where earmarked tax is applied, THPF is relatively and highly autonomous as it is not solely supervised by the Minister of Health but independent board of 21 members under the supervision of the Prime Minister. Hence, THPF is considered as *"the most important and the most instructive health promotion initiative in the region"* (Moodie et al., 2000, 256).

The Strategic Relational Approach (SRA) and the Study of THPF's Governance Structures and Funding Context

This section is devoted to show how to theoretically elaborate CR's consideration of structure/agency with the case of THPF. As CR particularly pays attention to the interaction of structure and agency, many scholars have tried to develop models for it (see Archer, 2003, 2010; Jessop, 2005, 2007; Hay, 2002). Nevertheless, the model developed and applied here is that originally initiated by Bob Jessop, that is, the 'Strategic Relational Approach' (SRA).

The SRA suggests the relationship between structure and agency as dialectical by examining structure in relation to action, action in relation to structure. According to Jessop (2005), structures are seen analytically as strategically-selective in their form, content and operation while actions are seen as structurally-constrained, more or less, context-sensitive, and structuring. To investigate such structure, one need to look at how a given structure might privilege some actors, some identities, some strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, or some actions over others. Similarly, examining such actions requires a study of the ways, if any, in which actors (individual and/or collective) take account of this differential privileging through 'strategic-context' analysis when undertaking a course of action. Ultimately, the SRA is focused on the relations between structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities and (differentially reflexive) structurally-oriented strategic calculation/action (Jessop, 2005, 48).

Applying the model to the study of THPF's governance and funding structures (see Figure 2), it can be argued that, in the beginning (*row one*), the inadmissible dichotomy between external constraint and free-willed action is presented. In other words, there are ontologically separated governance structures and THPF as an organization. *Row two* illustrates when, for the first time, the governance structures and THPF interact with one another resulting in emergent

structures (THPF's governance structures) and social agent (THPF as a governing body). The SRA makes its occurrence on *row three* as it is more directly concerned with certain conjunctures, including the distinctive spatio-temporal selectivities of structures and the differential spatio-temporal horizons and action capacities of individual/collective agents (Jessop, 2005, 49). In this case, that certain conjuncture is the metagovernance of THPF and the funding of THPF. In other words, this paper looks at the strategic relational aspects of metagovernance and funding of THPF.

Figure 2. The Strategic Relational Approach to THPF's governance and funding structures



Source: the author own composition based on the SRA illustrated by Jessop (2005, 50)

In this case, THPF's governance structures in relation to THPF as a governing body has become to be concerned with 'interactive governance of THPF' requiring the process of metagovernance, that is, the strategically interactive/selective governance structures held by a metagovernor. Likewise, THPF as a governing body in relation to its governance structures has become a metagovernor responsible for the interaction of strategically selectivity of metagovernance. In this level, metagovernance as a structural constraint influences the operations and behaviors of THPF, making it to take care of the interactive co-existence of modes of governance. THPF as a metagovernor similarly has a capacity to influence and change the structurally-inscribed strategic selectivity (metagovernance as a governance of modes of governance). They are dialectical.

As THPF essentially operates by funding, THPF as a metagovernor then interacts with the funding structure. The funding structure in relation to THPF has become THPF's funding structure while THPF as a metagovernor in relation to the funding structure has become THPF as metagovernor in the funding context. The SRA makes its case again at the *row three* of this relations as THPF's funding structure (in relation) has become 'strategically selective funding context of THPF' while THPF as metagovernor in the funding context (in relation) has become a 'structurally-oriented strategic funder'. Again, they are dialectical.

The idea of structural selectivity emphasizes the tendency for certain structures and structural configurations to selectively fortify specific forms of action, tactics, or strategies and to discourage others. The idea of structurally-oriented strategic calculation/action, in the same way, features the possibility of reflection on the part of individual/collective actors about the strategic selectivities inscribed within structures so that they come to orient their strategies and tactics in terms of their understanding of the current conjuncture and their 'feel for the game' (Jessop, 2005, 49).[23]

The SRA based on CR philosophy yields significant contributions. First, by treating the ontological distinctiveness but interrelated of structure and agency, it unfolds the dialectical relation of structure and agency in a more complex manner. Second, it pays a deep attention to the emergent patio-temporal properties of structures and agencies in terms of coordinates and extensions, properties, selectivities, and horizons of actions (Jessop, 2005). Third, the SRA reminds us that the facticity and fixity of structures have no meaning outside the context of certain agents pursing certain strategies. By this, SRA implies that the structurally inscribed strategic selectivities of structures are always and inevitably spatiotemporal as all structures have a definite spatiotemporal extension (Jessop, 2001). More importantly, structures in the SRA *"are only strategically selective rather than absolutely constraining, scope exists for actions to overwhelm, circumvent, or subvert structural constraints"* (Jessop, 2016a, 55). Structures and agencies, and their associated tendencies, are never fully constituted as they remains vulnerable to transformation by one another. Fourth, the SRA questions the apparent naturalness of governance; there is always the ineradicable selectivity of the governance structures which produce and reproduce a certain governance arrangement.

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[23] Indeed, the interaction of the structurally-inscribed strategic selectivity and the structurally-oriented strategic calculation/action continues to the fourth and fifth row which are concerned with the strategic relational aspects of successive conjunctures and a possible outcome of the recursive interaction between the strategic selectivities of institutions and the reflexive behavior of agents in producing a structurally coherent, apparently self-reproducing, social configuration—marked in some cases by systematic contradictions or patterned incoherence, respectively (Jessop, 2001, 1223; see also Jessop, 2005).

As the SRA *"interprets structures in terms of the structurally-inscribed spatio-temporal strategic selectivities inherent in particular patterns of social relations"* and *"examines actors in terms of their capacities to engage in strategic-context analysis and to reflexively reorganize structures over different spatio-temporal horizons to modify their selectivities"* (Jessop, 2005, 53), governance is consequently best studied as a 'social relation' in this respect. It implies that, whether regarded as a structure or as a process/practice, governance is far from a passive tool or neutral mechanism. Governance is about a strategy. To put in a context of state-society relation, state and non-state actors choose particular strategies in relation to governance in pursuit of their goals and thus shape the structure of governance, its institutions and apparatuses. Governance is arguably the result of past strategies.

According to Biebricher (2013),

> *"the existing structures prove to be strategically selective and favor certain actors, strategies, discourses, etc. over others. However, while actors' identities and strategies, etc. are shaped by those structures […] they are not determined by them. Actors are endowed with agency—they are able to learn and adapt their strategies—thus reshaping structures, which then have a different set of strategically-selective effects on actors. Hence, it is a strategic-relational approach that assumes that actors shape structures and vice versa"* (p.394).

Governance of interest has inbuilt biases which privilege some agents and interests over others; yet whether, how, and how far these biases are actualized relies on the changing balance of forces and their strategies and tactics. The SRA help to better analyze the interplay of governance structures at work.

The SRA denies endeavors to capture the 'essence' of governance and directs instead to elaborate useful theoretical and methodological tools to study its changing and interactive forms, functions, and effects. Instead of looking at governance as a substantial, unified thing or unitary substance equated with only network, the SRA widens its focus, so as to capture not just the different governance mechanisms, i.e. network, hierarchy, and market, but the exercise and effects of the mechanism as a contingent illustration of a changing balance of forces, mediated in an institutional and discursive manners, that aim to advance their respective interests inside, through, and against a governance arrangement. Surely, CR and the SRA links with the analytic of metagovernance (see Jessop, 2016a, 2016b; Ungsuchaval, 2016a).

Therefore, to study governance of THPF, the SRA suggests us to look at what is privileged by THPF and under what context gives rise to a structure that is strategically-selective. This paper would like to argue that THPF has strategic selectivity for its governance structures and funding context. Network governance is favored as a governance structure, although there are other modes of governance (i.e. market and hierarchy) interactively function as well. Besides, NGOs and other civil society organizations are the major beneficiary of the funding. The strategically selective governance structure and funding context of THPF which makes THPF become a structurally-oriented strategic funder comes from two forces: NPM-influenced public sector reform and the Ottawa Charter's health promotion approach.

Pubic Sector Reform and Structural Tendencies/inequalities of THPF's Governance Structures

Bowornwathana (2000) asserts that *"Thai government reformers have emphasized especially the efficiency aspects of the new public management (NPM) as the most important*

objective of reform" (p.394). During the last few decades, one relatively important aspect of reforms was that Thailand underwent a horizontal shift from public to semi-public, autonomous organizations and agencies. For reasons of efficiency and effectiveness in complex situations and political prudence or credibility, some public tasks have been delegated to more autonomous semi-public or even private institutions. Such reform is also known as programs of 'agencification'—the program of transferring as many government activities as possible into quasi-autonomous or agency-type organizations (Pollitt et al., 2005; Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). Such agencification in Thailand is considered as the most part of the autonomization of the state and a result of NPM reform (Bowornwathana, 2006). The concrete result of the agencification in Thailand is the rise of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization, also known as 'quango'.

Although quangos may look different in different countries, they are fundamentally organizations funded by taxpayers, but not controlled directly by central government. Quangos can enjoy some kind of autonomy and functions at arm's length from governments. In Thailand, quangos are commonly known as 'autonomous public organization/agency' (see Bowornwathana, 2006, 2012). Most autonomous public organizations in Thailand are single-purpose organizations performing a specific social function in specific area.

Among Thai quangos, THPF is one of the most significant one in Thailand, especially in the health sector and civil society. THPF can be considered to be a 'public body' type of quango (see Allix and Van Thiel, 2005; Greve, Flinders, and Van Thiel, 1999), that is, an organization which operates public task at arms' length but publicly funded, obtains revenue from state budget or levying, holds a certain degree of ministerial responsibility, has statutes as a control mechanism, and functions in public domain.

Despite its 'quasi-autonomous' status, THPF has scarcely been independent of government, let alone the state. THPF has never, in fact, been 'independent' in the sense which its most enthusiastically naive defenders assume. Executives on the Board of Governance are all political appointees, which often leads to instability and inefficiency of direction. There are many times that political interferences has caused conflicts inside the organization. This fact unavoidably influences THPF's operation and governance as well as its public image. Nevertheless, neither has THPF always functioned like a straightforward instrument of the government or governing classes. In this sense, it can be argues that THPF has engaged in, borrowed Mills's (2016) language, *"a grey area—sometimes darker, sometimes lighter—between government and civil society"* (p.4).

THPF is a product of new governance logic as the state is, to some extent, hollowed out through networks and contracts (Milward and Provan, 2000; Rhodes, 2012) and having some missions devolved to other agencies—thereby, becoming an enabler rather than a doer. The state through THPF mostly act 'steering' while non-state actors, markets and civil society, do the 'rowing' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003; Braithwaite, 2000; Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2004). THPF's operations as a new type of public agency *"no longer centre on managing people and programs but on organizing resources, often belonging to others, to produce public value"* within the web of multi-organizational, multi-governmental, and multi-sectoral relationships that increasingly characterize modern governance (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004, 8). Scholars agree that networking and contracting between the government and NGOs are emerging trends of government-NGO relations which features the characteristic of the new governance (Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Gronbjerg, 1993; DeHoog and Salamon, 2002; Hartogs and Weber, 1978; Gutch, 1992; Kramer, 1983).

However, contrasting ideology of THPF as quango in terms of the provision of public services can be observed. Principally, THPF is considered to rather work in a New Public Governance (NPG) paradigm while the general idea of the existence of quango is a result of NPM ideology. NPM and NPG are starkly different scenarios (Defourny, Hulgård, and Pestoff, 2014). Traditionally, the state is the dominant player in the field. Nonetheless, in the NPM scenario, the core of the state has been shrunk with the replacement of new dominant players of the private sector. Market mechanisms and business management tools and techniques are adopted in the public sector. Quango can be seen as an effort to de-centre the core of the state by fragmenting the authority of the central state in order to boost the effectiveness and efficiency of the state agencies. Quango is obviously one of the phenomena happened throughout a broader NPM public sector reform. In contrast, despite sharing the idea of the shrinking state, the NPG advocates a major role for the third sector and civil society as alternatives to the state and the market; network is thus a favored governance mode.

It is interesting to see that THPF can be considered an organization which structurally privileges non-hierarchical governance (networks and markets) over hierarchical one. However, it inevitably operates under the shadow of hierarchy; and hierarchical governance is indeed play an equally important part as a mode of steering. The existence of THPF reflects an arena where NPM and NPG ideologies are negotiated and intersected. The differences between NPM and NPG are not as important as the point that THPF has structural inequality regarding governance structures.

Health Promotion and Structural Tendencies/inequalities of THPF's Funding Context

THPF has been using a certain approach for its work for health promotion since its establishment (see Siwaraksa, 2005; Galbally et al., 2012; Ungsuchaval, 2016b). The approach is derived from the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (WHO, 1986). As one of the most influential policy documents in the history of health promotion, the Charter defined health promotion as the process of enabling people to increase control over their health and its determinants and establishes the fundamental guiding principles and values of health promotion in five key action areas: (1) building healthy public policy; (2) creating supportive environments; (3) strengthening communities; (4) developing personal skills; and (5) reorienting health services. These five areas together encompass the goals of health promotion: to go 'upstream' and have an impact in the socio-economic and environmental determinants of health; to focus on population health; to emphasize prevention rather than treatment; and to build capacity in communities and individuals (Naidoo and Wills, 2016). The policy consequences which is worth to mention here are that the Charter has profoundly shaped the strategies and operations of THPF by expanding THPF's scope of 'health' promotion to include physical, mental, social, and spiritual dimensions and advocating THPF's engagement with civil society organizations.

By committing to the broader definition of health, THPF has engaged in many non-health (as traditionally defined) policy areas as the 'health in all policies' is the vision for global health promotion. Unsurprisingly, THPF has thus involved with various actors from non-health sector, be they actors of the state, society, or both. In other words, THPF has subscribed the 'non-health to address health' approach.

It can be argues that, with the Charter's framework, THPF has strategically selective working partners, that is, actors from civil society, typically NGOs. Considered the Thai context of public health, the state has been the sole actor responsible for the public health in the country until a few decades ago;[24] civil society has been absent in health sector reform for a long time (see Chuengsatiansup, 2008). The emergence of THPF can be considered as one of a progressive movement to include civil society into the health sector. However, such civil society is not confined to work within only traditionally defined health issues. When THPF uses the non-health to address health, it implies a particular attempt to mobilize civil society to work for health promotion. NGOs as a prominent set of actor within civil society are thus deliberately chosen to be the partner. Funding of THPF, influenced by the Charter, has made THPF structurally become civil society/NGO sympathizer.

In practice, one may argue that THPF, as a funder engaging with multiple stakeholders from different sectors, has treated everyone the same way, be they either NGOs or governmental agencies. Nonetheless, it is evident that THPF in effect favors civil society. First, the major beneficiary of THPF's funding has been mostly non-governmental agencies (see Table 2). For example, in 2014, THPF spent about 137.3 million US$ (4,874.8 million Bath) which more than half of it (51 percent) is used to fund non-governmental agencies (THPF, 2015).[25] Second, one key aspect of THPF's working strategy, the tri-power strategy also known as 'Triangle that Moves the Mountain' (Wasi, 2000; Adulyanon, 2012) is social movement/participation.[26] Every successful cases advocated by THPF involves an active participation of civil society and NGOs (see Galbally et al., 2012; Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong, 2015). Last but not least, the very status of THPF as a quasi-autonomous 'non-governmental' organization (quango) emphasizes the 'non-governmental' side of organizational existence. THPF is a result of endeavor to solve health issues by using non-state structures and mechanisms.

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[24] This resonates with the nature of health sector in other countries where decisions in the health policy area are rather dominated by professional groups (Peters and Pierre, 2016, 87) and bureaucrats.

[25] By this, THPF has become popular and essential for civil society in Thailand. Undoubtedly, THPF thus has significant impacts towards civil society and is recognized as a significant player in Thai civil society (Pitidol, 2016a, 2016b; Rakyutidharm, 2011, 2014b; Shigetomi, 2006, 2009) and even a large source of funding of most civil society organization in Thailand (Phatharathananunth, 2014; Rakyutidharm, 2014a; Ungpakorn, 2009; Chutima, 2004).

[26] To move the immovable 'mountain' is symbolized for the extreme difficulty encountered in bringing about social change. The strategy to successfully solve the difficult problem indicates that strengthening the three interconnected angles of the triangle or sectors is necessary. The three angles are the creation of knowledge and evidence through research, social mobilization and policy/political advocacy. Creating relevant knowledge provides evidenced-based action and policy. Facilitating social movement raises public awareness and action. Fortifying the political authority's involvement allows policy advocacy. These three aspects must be connected together in order to effectively generate the holistic ability to solve difficult social and health problems.

Table 2. Proportions of the annual THPF fundings separated by types of agencies (%)

Year	Nongovernmental agencies (NGOs, foundations, associations, communities, academic institutes, etc.)	Governmental agencies	Other agencies (business, professional associations, etc.)
2001	49	26	25
2002*	56.8	39.1	4.2
2003**	33	59	8
2004	46	42	12
2005	60	40	-***
2006	46	38	16
2007****	-	-	-
2008	65.74	17.74	16.52
2009	63	21	16
2010	62	25*****	13
2011	55	24	21
2012	43	38	19
2013	43.4	39.4	17.2
2014	51	32	17
2015	39	46	15

Source: adapted from THPF (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016).

**This is the exact number stated in the annual report. It appears that the summary of proportion slightly exceeds an amount of the percentage. However, this does not affect the proportion of the funded.*
***No exact number is provided for the nongovernmental agencies and the other agencies in the annual review this year. This number is estimated by the author based on the annual review.*
****Private organizations are included with nongovernmental agencies in this year report.*
*****No information is provided in the annual report this year.*
******This year annual report places governmental agencies with communities and local organizations.*

The Interaction of THPF's Modes of Governance

Links between the SRA and metagovernance are established (see Jessop, 2010, 2016a, 2016b). Developed to address structure–agency dialectics, the SRA *"is well suited for exploring the operational autonomy of government and governance as well as the limits on strategic choice and conduct imposed by their broader social context"* (Jessop, 2016b, 79). According to Jessop (2016b), to study governance in reality, one should not strictly take or reject one-sided state- or society-centered approaches to governance due to the fact that the state-society distinction is not a real social *a priori* but a social construct; thus state and society is seen as the structural coupling and co-evolution of governance and governance arrangements with a broader set of institutions and social practices. In addition, state power is not confined to imperative coordination—exercised through coercion, command, planning and bureaucracy—but also opened to networks, partnerships, contracts, and other forms of governance. This account definitely goes along well with the conduct of metagovernance.

As previous section showed how the structural inequality of THPF privileges some structures, actors, and practices over another, this section, on the other hand, is devoted to show how the modes of governance—hierarchies, markets, and networks—are, in effect, strategically chosen and utilized by THPF as well as how they interact with one another in the context of THPF's functions.

Metagovernance is used to obtain some coherence among modes of governance and generate an appropriate balance among different stakeholders and interests for the sake of social cohesion (Jessop, 2004). And this takes place within a structurally inscribed strategically selective context which asymmetrically privileges some outcomes over others. From this view, one can expect that institutionally inscribed asymmetries of power of THPF as shown before can lead to heterogeneous patterns of governance/government. This paper argues that THPF as a complex modern public organization utilizes different modes of governance in order to reach its goals with effectiveness and efficiency. Such modes of governance are in practice executed by the office through different channels.

At the most fundamental level, THPF itself is a result of governance at a distance. By this, it means that the relationship between the Thai state (that steers) and THPF (that is object of steering) is hierarchical. However, THPF as an organization to be steered is given an amount of discretion to develop and implement its own policies based on the recognition of self-regulation. THPF operates within the shadow of hierarchy, namely the Health Promotion Foundation Act, B.E. 2544 (2001), which is established by the state. The Act is a hierarchical solution to generate and coordinate health promotion work and keep self-regulation headed towards the general good.

Under such shadow of hierarchy, hierarchical, market, and network governance as modes of steering are utilized. THPF mostly uses hierarchies to secure the order and efficiency of works. The examples are organizational bylaws and regulations which regulate the conduct of personal and organizations involving with THPF. This includes the staff of THPF and the partners working with THPF. Hierarchies are also seen in the implementation and enforcement of contracts as they are law-binding ones. Legal consequences are clearly specified and adapted if the contracts are broken.

In addition, with a specialized division of task, THPF has many sections or departments working for specific issues. THPF strategically operates under ten-year goals and master plans created annually. Currently, there are 15 master plans (see Table 3) that THPF has endorsed as its strategic plans for health promotion, which are proactively and strategically executed through its

partners nationwide and administrated by 10 granting sections and 11 support sections (see Figure 3).

Table 3. 15 strategic master plans of THPF

Master Plan	Approach
1. Tobacco control plan 2. Alcohol and substance abuse control plan 3. Road safety and disaster management plan 4. Health risk control plan 5. Physical activity promotional plan 6. Healthy food promotion plan 7. Healthy media system and spiritual health pathway promotion plan	Issue-based approach
8. Health promotion plan for vulnerable populations 9. Health child, youth and family promotion plan 10. Healthy community strengthening plan 11. Health promotion in organizations plan 12. Health promotion in health service system plan 13. Health promotion innovation and open grant plan	Area/Settings-based approach
14. Health promotion mechanism development plan 15. Health literacy promotion plan	System-based approach

Source: Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong (2015, 64).

Although the CEO of THPF is responsible for a management of the organization as a whole, detailed managerial practices are more associated with directors of different section; they are the one who have authority to grant or not to grant and interact with the granted. Given a great deal of authority and power of the directors in practice, a situation of a segmented executive within THPF is expected. There has long been a criticism that the departmental structure of THPF causes policy 'chimneys' in which policies and programs have been developed within a section without considering being given to the possibility which a policy or program initiative in one area might have unforeseen or unintended consequences elsewhere. This kind of departmental structure, in effect, conditions ones to think vertically, within the confines of their own areas, rather than horizontally on the impact of an issue across other areas in THPF. Such issue of policy/program chimneys is intensified by the pathology of 'departmentalism'.[27]

[27] The general idea of 'departmentalism' refers to *"the way in which a minister will pursue the narrow interests of his/her own department at the expense of wider government policy"* (Richards and Smith, 2002, 22). The idea of policy chimneys and departmentalism describes departments or sections as forwarding their own interests, for instance, regards relations with other departments in terms of struggle for resources, and suggests that there is a reluctance to cooperate between departments on issues which cross-cut sectional responsibilities.

Figure 3. Internal organizational structure of THPF



Source: adapted from http://www.thaihealth.or.th/Aboutus.html [accessed 24 June 2017]

In the context of THPF, the directors of different sections are suspected and found to pursue the narrow interest of their own sections with the expense of broader organizational interest. All too often, different sections of THPF have unintentionally granted partner organizations which later turned out to work in the same area or be the same organizations.[28] Or sometimes with intention, they have done it to increase their own outputs and performances. Besides, partners obtaining grants from different sections at the same time have suffered from different standards and protocols. Evidently, a director of section who is a sympathizer understanding nature of nonprofit works suits the social and nonprofit workers rather than another who is bureaucratic sympathizer prioritizing paperworks and regulations. Departmentalism is thus a pathology which prompts the directors of sections to think of the micro-interests of their section regardless of much thoughts on the macro goals of their own organization. This potentially harms the organization because coordinations are inclined to happen at the lowest level weakening cross-sectional initiatives. Hence, there is a certain level of reluctance for cross-cutting cooperation within THPF.

Market governance also plays an important part as an essence of THPF's operation. One prime mechanism performing in accordance with the principle of market is granting. The core of THPF's granting derives from the contracting-out principle, be they THPF as a principle and the recipient as an agent. By dividing the roles of providers and purchasers, THPF, compared to other health agencies, can employ tools for strategic purchasing to choose service providers more flexibly and allow them to give targeted prevention services more efficiently; the role of THPF is relatively *"catalytic and leverages innovative ideas with flexible funding to a wide range of multi-sectoral networks"* (Watabe et al., 2016, 7). THPF uses contract-based grants or grant-aid contracts as the instruments to fund the recipient. Grants as a tools of government in the new governance paradigm reflect a turn to indirect, non-hierarchical tools for public action (Salamon, 2002). According to Beam and Conlan (2002), grants, conceptually, are payment from a donor government (the grantor) to a recipient organization or an individual (the grantee) aiming to stimulate or support some sort of service or activity of the recipient. The supported activity can be either a new or ongoing one. Through grants, the grantor may involve the provision of service whereas the grantee generates actual performance; responsibility for the activity is shared by the two parties. Grants come as many forms; the most common one is cash payments.

Unlike traditional philanthropic grants, THPF provides project-based grants which are the contract-based funding for fixed or known periods of particular projects in the delivery of service or products without legal liability for damage for failure to operate. Such grants are renewable depended on the performance, impact, and plausibility of the project. THPF grants require application or proposal to describe detailed plans, the rationale, objectives and beneficiaries of the project, scheduled operations, the way to measure the impact and performance, the budget for operation, and so on. Proposals go to expert review screening. After receipt of funds, grantees are asked to maintain financial records and submit them to financial audits and undergo file performance or/and annual reports.

In practice, THPF has two approaches towards granting: proactive and passive. Passive grants or 'open grants' are a channel for anyone to submit a proposal for funding. This means

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[28] Although there is no formal regulation forbidding THPF to grant the same organization more than one project at the same time, it seems that granting more than one project for the same organization with the similar kind of work is considered ineffective, inefficient, and sometimes raising a conflict of interest. Thus, many directors, in practice, have tried to avoid doing so.

that THPF only reacts by to reviewing and considering the proposal. Generally, THPF runs three rounds of open grants a year and might grant an amount to partners who, in turn, grant and manage grants, as they are potentially closer to the community or the target group. Open grant budget is normally limited at the maximum of 100,000 baht.

In contrast, proactive grants, also known as 'partnership model' for funding, which accounts for the majority of the total THPF grant budget, are a strategy that directly encourages other organizations to perform the activity. THPF is in the business of working with partners to create projects mutually, rather than merely reacting to proposals. There are four key stages in the THPF partnership model: proposal development, technical review, project approval, and supervision, monitoring and evaluation (Galbally et al., 2012). In principle, THPF brings together a group of potential partners for the initial creative design phase and to develop a program. Subsequently, this group suggests about who is best to implement the program and why. This means that THPF needs to strategically think about what to promote and who will be the potential partner of the project. This implies that THPF does not simply operate with different partners, but rather strategically identifies gaps and potential partners. Therefore, it is sensible for THPF to consider itself more than a funder but an enabler.

In the case that the grantee cannot reach expected tasks of the project or fail to manage the project, THPF will, in effect, consult with the grantee to solve the issue. THPF will take a lead in damage assessment. If the grantee is responsible, THPF will only abolish the project and then order the grantee to return the remaining money. Although there is no legal punishment for failure, THPF granting is a kind of legal contract which two parties need to sign to activate it. If corruption or any illegal activities are evidenced related to the project, the grantee must return all grants obtained since the commencement of the project to THPF plus an amount of interest. To a certain degree, this contract is legal-binding based on hierarchical governance.

Such granting/contracting creates 'contracting regime'. This contracting regime[29] refers to the partnership configuration that on the one side has government being a funder and on the other side has NGOs being recipient; public and private agencies are thus involved in a mutually dependent yet not equal relationship (Smith and Lipsky, 1993). Contract-based granting of THPF can be considered a hybrid of market, hierarchy and network.

THPF also employs a strategy called 'social marketing' for public participation, that is, constant information sharing with the general public and among network partners. This is crucial to mobilize different segments in the society which helps maintains and sustains the momentum of working together.

Moreover, THPF claims to be active in stakeholder involvement. Participation of partners is evident from the beginning of the project cycle. Potential partners are welcome to discuss the project and further fine tune the project proposal (Galbally et al., 2012). Being more than a 'sponsor', THPF aims to facilitate and support to build partnership and calls their grantees 'partners'. For THPF, 'partnership model' replaces the pure market purchaser-provider contracts as it collectively designs the activity with partners, not just doing contracting/tendering.

THPF is obviously considered utilizing network governance (see Phusavat et al., 2011). THPF's proactively and strategically executed every program/project through its partners. THPF is not an operative agent in itself; it is totally relied on other organizations to perform the tasks.

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[29] Contract regime used here is not equal with purchase-of-service contracts. The word 'regime' is deliberately used to address a set of stable relationships which go beyond simple common practice and display the way the world works (Smith and Lipsky, 1993).

In many policy area, THPF performs itself as a network integrator—pointing out how all parties or entities could contribute and solve the problem. THPF has managed to engage all relevant parties or entities for a certain issue. This stimulates information exchange which leads to better policy solutions. It is evident in many projects that both THPF and its partners effectively synchronized their responsibilities, plans, and tasks. The partners have dealt with local organizations while THPF has coordinated with public agencies and private firms at the national level. These modes of governance of THPF are summarized in the Table 4.

Table 4. THPF's mechanisms for different modes of governance

Shadow of hierarchy
Health Promotion Foundation Act, B.E. 2544

Governance Modes	Techniques/activites
Hierarchy (Causal relations)	-Law-biding effect of granting contracts -Organizational bylaws and regulations -Division of labour/specialization of work -Authorities of executive/managerial officers -Paper-based work -Etc.
Market (Financial relations)	-Granting based on contracts and exchanges -Contracting out programs and services -Explicit standards and measures of performance -Professional management of public organization -Output controls -Outcome-orientation -Social marketing -Public relations -Etc.
Network (Unstructured relations)	-Partnerships and networking -Participation -Social mobilization and movement -Knowledge-based system -ThaiHealth center -Etc.

There are evidences that different modes of governance depend on one another. Larsson (2013) points out that, while the state can enhance its power by using networks to govern, networks do rely on sovereign power to preserve the conditions for effective network governance. Davies (2011) states the tendencies for network coordination to degenerate into hierarchical coordination as networks fail to cultivate the 'connectionist citizen-activists' who could energetically solve policy and management problems in de-politicized, trust-based networks. Likewise, Börzel ans Risse (2010) found that self-regulating networks are, in fact, function in the 'shadow of hierarchy' where *"the state threatens—explicitly or implicitly—to*

impose binding rules or laws on private actors in order to change their cost–benefit calculations in favor of a voluntary agreement closer to the common good rather than to particularistic self-interests" (p.116). Networks are unlikely to exist without hierarchy and market; markets are unlikely to function without hierarchy and network, and so on. They coexist with one another (Fawcett, 2016).

In effect, the state is central as it can bring to bear enormous financial resources to develop and support governance arrangements (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009, 13). This seems true in the case of THPF. THPF as a quasi-autonomous state agency responsible for health promotion of all Thai populations has been capable of holding an enormous of money and then spent it on projects though other actors because it, to a certain degree, has a 'state' status through formal legislation, the Health Promotion Foundation Act, B.E. 2544 (2001). Private organizations in Thailand alone are not capable of such task. THPF obviously exercises a kind of state power. In addition, the establishment of THPF though the Act can be considered as a hierarchical solution for addressing new health and related social problems. The very being of THPF is thus totally based on hierarchical governance.

CR account of metagovernance is highly concerned with re-stating the role of the state in governance arrangement and contests a version of governance by networks (Ungsuchaval, 2016a, 681). State and hierarchies can be considered well and alive even in the new governance. In public organizations, government and state power are routinely and authoritatively implicated in the exercise of all forms of governance (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009).

Even though the state has become less hierarchical, as argued by network governance scholars, it does not necessarily *"exclude a continuing and central political role for [..] states"* in creating the rules and context within which governance takes place (Jessop, 2004, 66). The state might be less hierarchical in terms of organization, yet hierarchies still play an important role in terms of coordination. This point says that hierarchies-as-organization is different from hierarchies-as-coordination. Scharpf (1993) distinguishes between hierarchical organization and hierarchical coordination, and reminds us that even hierarchical organizations has been increasingly relied on non-hierarchical forms of coordination as well.

THPF as a quango favors non-hierarchical forms of governance. Indeed, it can be argued that THPF was originally designed to utilize new modes of governance rather than old, hierarchical ones. Network and market governance are routinely seen as main functions of THPF's operations. Therefore, claiming to be more than a mere sponsor, THPF in fact is initially designed to function with various mechanisms. Granting, albeit the most visibly, is not the only mechanism of THPF's functions. In relation to its partners, THPF is ultimately interested in capacity building of partners. Only granting cannot reach the goal. Unfortunately, being the most common and obvious part to the public, granting is mistakenly seen to occupy all dimensions of THPF's functions. It resembles the peak of the iceberg which is easy to see but not all that constitute the iceberg (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Iceberg model of THPF's key functions



By investigating THPF in detail, although granting is the most obvious part of THPF's function, there are also three other key functions which have made THPF become what it is today. They are the body of the iceberg which constitute THPF's function—the part which is hardly seen by the public. THPF is keen on building networks and then utilize them to achieve the goals. Operations, granting and networking, require knowledge; the creation of knowledge and innovation is thus another key function of THPF. The last but not least function is the management dimension. THPF highly values its relatively flexible management, compared with most of other public organizations. Broadly regulated by the Act, THPF can create and use its own organizational bylaws. This seems to support the other functions to reach their most efficiencies.

It is observed that one mode of governance (often hierarchy) was sometimes used to solve conflicts and another (often networks) to develop more solutions. For example, when there is organizational crisis, centralized command and control has been chosen as a strategy to dealt with issues. Information and decisions over the very organization are centralized into the executive members plus a chosen few seen to be capable of effective and efficient planning and solving problems. The recent crisis of THPF under the investigation of many governmental agencies has proven the use of the strategy. Just members of executive level consisting of the CEO, deputy CEOs, and the higher-ups in Policy and Strategy Section are directly responsible for dealing with the crisis.[30] However, such centralized strategy is believed to provide coherent

[30] This usage of strategy is also recognized by executive members of THPF according to interviewing with them.

direction and efficiency and secure time. In contrast, stakeholder involvement is employed to overcome wicked problems. Consensual solutions, programs, and projects are developed from collaborative planning with partners or potential partners.

Indeed, the interaction of governance modes is not unidirectional and one at a time. Although in a situation in which one mode seems to dominated, the other were running in the background. A hierarchical phase was backed by trust of partners (network governance) and granting contracts (market governance) and vice versa. Sometimes, hierarchy was utilized to stimulate the start and to mark the end of a network process. It appears that a hierarchical structure of THPF was considered to be necessary in order to force the beginning of network cooperation on a certain issue which was novel, or involves oppositional actors or fragmented policy community. Likewise, market techniques such public relations and social marketing were used to stimulate civil society involvement (network governance). It is possible to argue that metagovernance happens in THPF's operations. Governance choices are, explicitly and implicitly, analyzed and selected by the authorities to deal with certain issues. The CEO and the directors of sections have considered it natural, or even suggestive, to switch between modes of governance or integratedly use different modes when they deemed this necessary. Those involving in the project, to a certain degree, seem accepted to such style of governance as well.

Therefore, THPF was designed to operated more flexibly and innovatively, compared to other public organizations. However, the capacity of the organizational structure and principle, in effect, was not used to a maximum extent. Governance modes supposed to function and interact in harmony often seem messy and unorganized. There have been empirical traces which show the problem of disintegrated, fragmented governance modes; although each mode can perform well on its own term, the disintegration obscures the potential and effective of interactive governance. In recent years, THPF has tried to integrate such fragmented works. The integration approach is now included in every master plan and indicator. This raises the question of the do-ability in practice.

Postscript

One important challenge for researching metagovernance is whether conscious design and management of governance is feasible, and if so, to what extent it is disputed. How can we assure that metagovernance is not merely contingent or just a matter of practicality? Or even how can we be so sure that metagovernance happen at all? The issue of the conscious design of governance modes that work as well as the manageability of the combination of them is the matter of empirical study.

To study governance is to study the unobservable thing. One alternative way to look at the unobservable thing is to use CR. With its distinctive philosophy, CR allows one to look beyond the empirical manifestation, that is, to see the structures and mechanisms of the entity of interest at the deeper ontological domain (See Danermark et al., 2002; Elder-Vass, 2007, 2010; Porpora, 2015).

Moreover, although it is useful, as this paper have shown, to consider the role of social ontology of the governance such as structure and agency in the analysis, it is worth noting that the option to introduce such level of complexity carries a trade-off. Savigny and Marsden (2011) point out that *"if we study both structures and agents we may increase the complexity of out analysis at the expense of parsimony"* (p.10).

Trying to develop and elaborate CR and metagovernance into governance and policy studies is to consider the concepts' capacity to 'fly', flighting back to reality (see Shapiro,

2005).[31] It is to show an alternative way to study governance which can yield more complex explanations. This links to the notion that CR stimulates the creation or development of a *better* explanations or theories.

This paper elaborates how one can develop and use CR-informed approach to study governance and metagovernance. It argues that networks are always not a panacea and potentially subjected to hierarchical governance as well. Other modes of governing such as market and, especially, hierarchy should be given equal attention. Even in the institution seemingly favor networks like THPF also possesses and utilizes hierarchies and markets, albeit often implicitly and in the shadow of hierarchy. This research seeks to explore why THPF has become as it is by looking at its most fundamental element, that is, governance modes such as hierarchy, market, and network. The better understanding of governance should look at different but related modes of governing and their interaction through the work of strategically selective of governance structure. The concept of metagovernance and the SRA based on CR were developed and applied to study the governance and the 'governance of governance' of THPF. Governance and funding structure was particularly investigated

To study governance through institutionalist and interpretivist approaches is not sufficient to grasp the complex reality of governance. Among the influence of interpretive turn in the study of public policy and governance (Bevir, 2010; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003), this paper instead suggests an alternative approach in which bringing interpretive back in the analysis is not enough; it should bring hierarchy and criticality back in the analysis as well. The alternative approach is underpinned by CR philosophy. CR strengthens the metagovernance concept with 'critical' understanding of governance *per se* and related meta-theoretical issues. Hence, CR shows many criticality regarding governance studies. It suggests an alternative to the structure-agency issue yielding to the analytic of metagovernance. It emphasizes the critical interaction of structure and agency, the structural inequalities/tendencies of governance, the coexistence of government and governance in the shadow of hierarchy, and the interaction between the modes of governance. As reasoned by Fischer (2016), being *"'critical', in relation to policy analysis, was more flexible than 'interpretive'"* and to be *"'interpretive' does not have to be 'critical'"* (p. 96). This paper hopes to open a discussion on an alternative account to study governance that transcends a variety of positivist and interpretive approaches.

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[31] The idea of making a concept 'fly' is the metaphor *"intended to capture a heady sort of intellectual freedom and maneuverability, a feeling that the written outputs of the social and political sciences may have outcomes beyond academe, and […] therefore inevitably intertwined with taking risks, challenging self-evident truths and reaching out to new audiences"* (Flinders and Wood, 2014, 136; see also Ostrom, 2000).

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