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#### **Panel T T02P09**

### **Session 1 Opportunities and Challenges for Collaborative Networks**

### **Collaborative Governance and Public Values: Examples from the Israeli Case<sup>1</sup>**

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## Abstract

Collaborative governance arrangements have gained value as a useful tool in a world of multiple actors and of fluid and dynamic public policy. However, they are also cumbersome, costly, difficult to manage, and even sometimes risky for democracy. This paper explores two questions: 1) Do collaborative governance arrangements contribute to the promotion of public values? 2) Do policy style and administrative culture of the country contribute to collaborative governance? We answer these questions using two theoretical lenses. We argue that collaborative governance is worthwhile when there is some disagreement about either the value elements or factual elements of a policy, but not in cases where these two elements are agreed upon or not. Moreover, the lens of policy styles and administrative tradition explains why collaborative governance is better suited to some countries than others.

## **Introduction**

After four decades of reforms in the public service, the need to find new institutional arrangements that will improve the government organization's ability and legitimacy to serve the public interest has increased. These widespread reforms in the public sector, beginning from the 1980s, onward created a new environment for public organizations. Many public services are delivered by networks that include numerous stakeholders, making government not the only player designing and implementing policy. Such a situation makes it difficult for public organizations to supervise the delivery of public services, especially due to the relinquishing of government knowledge to suppliers and the growing gap in citizens' trust in government organizations.

Considering the challenges of the post-new public management era, this paper explores two questions regarding the implementation of collaborative governance: 1) Do these arrangements contribute to the promotion of public values? 2) Do the policy style and administrative culture of the country contribute to collaborative governance? These two questions are not mutually exclusive, because they relate to different policy levels. However, we maintain that embracing the two-fold perspective can enhance our understanding of the benefits of collaborative governance arrangements and the feasibility of implementing them. Furthermore, we claim that identifying the conditions under which collaborative governance is not beneficial is equally important.

We first present the changes in government patterns that created the need for rethinking the range of stakeholders in the public policy arena. Then we discuss the term “collaborative governance” and its various meanings as well as its values. The

third section explores the conditions under which it is beneficial to use collaborative arrangements and when it is not. In the last part, we present examples from Israel to test our ideas about when collaborative governance arrangements can and cannot promote public values.

***A crisis of governability or a change in scenery?***

Researchers have identified three waves of public administration reforms. The first, which began at the end of the nineteenth century and lasted until the end of the 1970s, was based mostly on the Weberian model and involved the desire of the modern state to exercise control via hierarchal structures. These models were based on differentiations in work functions, expertise and rational rules. The second wave from the 1980s until the end of the 1990s included the New Public Management reforms that, among other things, embraced managerial methods from the private sector, the goal that people should get value for their money, privatization, outsourcing, performance management and viewing the public as clients. The third wave from the beginning of the millennium until today, which some researchers call Post-New Public Management, contains diverse models that despite their varieties include several common features such as changing the view of serving the public from serving clients to serving citizens, emphasizing trust as a basic milestone in the activities of public organizations, collaboration with diverse actors, exploring and promoting public values, embracing holism and integrating government units as a way to cope with the fragmentation that was created in the previous wave of reform (Dunleavy et al., 2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Stoker, 2006; Van de Walle et al., 2016; Vigoda-Gadot, 2009).

These trends parallel the public policy literature that emphasizes the term “governance” instead of government. These perspectives underscore the idea that policy is a product of dialog and interaction between different actors from different sectors, and government agencies are only one of the actors in these processes (Osborn, 2010; Rhodes, 2012; Richards and Smith, 2002). For example, Hajer (2003) uses the term “institutional void” to describe the undermining of state institutions and the deterioration of knowledge and professionalism along with the strengthening of processes such as globalization and individualization. In a similar manner, Rhodes (1994) uses the term “hollow state” to describe the pressures that state institutions experience from globalization as well as local forces. Researchers also refer to the importance of determining narratives for the formation of public policies and for the ability to identify mutual targets and values that can steer networks by using soft power mechanisms (Rhodes, 2007 and Nye, 2005 in Baker and Stoker, 2013; Rhodes, 2012; Stone in van Ostaïjen and Jhagroe, 2015).

The changing nature of the policy process has led to the use of less coercive tools (DeLeon, 2006; Howlette, 2014; Salamon, 2002). Thus, we must find the proper tools or institutional arrangements that can enable dialogs among the various actors in the networks rather than relying on market or hierarchal structures (Bevir, 2012; Rhodes, 2012). This background is in many ways the basis for the emerging interest in collaborative governance.

### ***Collaborative governance: Frame of reference***

Researchers trace the roots of the term “collaborative governance” to different points in time ranging from the beginning of the nineteenth century up to the last two decades (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Emerson and Gerlak, 2014; McGuire, 2006; Wanna,

2008). In general, collaborative governance includes an action or strategy in which different stakeholders work together to promote a policy process or decision making based on consensus regarding public issues (Ansell, 2012; Ansell and Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012).

Several reasons have brought the notion of collaborative governance to the center stage: the changing nature of the roles of government, globalization, the development of technology and the increase in risk and complex problems. They also highlight the need to be more responsive to citizens and re-enforce the trust in democratic processes, and the importance of the interdependence between policy design and implementation (Booher, 2004; Keast and Mandell, 2014; Vigoda-Gadot, 2004; Wanna, 2008; Williams, 2012).

It is possible to detect at least three layers of definitions that reflect the divergence of the different definitions and the level of inclusion of different collaborative efforts. On the first level is the well-known definition of collaborative governance, that of Ansell and Gash (2008): "A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage program or assets" (p. 544). While Ansell and Gash (2008) emphasize the integration of stakeholders from different sectors and the formal structure of these arrangements, Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh's (2012) definition may reflect another layer that is wider in its range, and includes the interaction of different actors inside government, as well as informal interactions, not just formal arrangements. For them collaborative governance is: "The processes and structure of public policy decision making and management that engage people

constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, level of government, and/or public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished" (p. 2). Furthermore, in a third layer Vigoda-Gadot (2004) and Wanna (2008) refer to an even wider scope for collaboration governance that includes a historical as well as developmental governmental process that emphasizes the government's tendency to work in collaboration with different sectors and actors and in different fields.

The literature distinguishes between the concept of collaboration and other concepts that are similar and reflect some kind of work with government officials. For example, researchers note that there is a continuum that ranges between cooperation, coordination and collaboration (Emerson and Gerlak, 2014; Keast and Mandell, 2014; O'Flynn, 2008). The differences in the three processes involve the actors taking part, their contribution to the process, the expectations from them (in terms of time, resources, change, etc.) and the extent of the interdependence between them. In collaboration, the relationship is usually formal, long term, and reciprocal, enabling the process to influence policy design and promote innovation (Keast and Mandell, 2014, pp. 12-13). It seems that the phenomenon of collaborative governance is more common today than ever before.

### ***Collaborative governance and public values***

Shaw (2013) argues that the inspiration for public value management has not been accompanied by the required institutional arrangements. Although suggesting several roots for such consideration, he claims that there is still a need to further explore the way we incorporate the idea of identifying and incorporating public value into public sector organizations.

In this paper, we aim to develop Shaw's observation. On the one hand, we claim that the implementation of a collaborative governance arrangement can serve as an institutional mechanism for building public value management. On the other hand, we believe that we should be more aware of the configurations that are not beneficial or suitable for the implementation of collaborative governance arrangements.

We focus on the use of the term “public value” that emerged from Mark Moore’s (1995) book "Creating Public Value" in which he raised normative and practical issues about how public managers should promote actions that have real value for the public. Moore refers to values such as justice, fairness, and efficiency as being complicated, vague and competing with one another. To help managers promote public values Moore (1995, p. 22) suggests a strategic triangle that includes: 1) identifying whether the action includes public value, 2) identifying the legitimation of the action (in the political and legal context) and 3) identifying the administrative and practical feasibility of the action.

Since Moore's writing, the interest in public value has moved from the individual manager (Bozeman, 2002; Moore, 1995) to a more general quest for identifying public values as a general outcome of the actions of public administration. For example, Stoker (2006) explains:

Public value is more than a summation of the individual preferences of the users or producers of public services. The judgment of what is public value is collectively built thorough deliberation involving elected and appointed government officials and key stakeholders. The achievement of public value in turn depends on actions chosen in a



reflexive manner from a range of intervention options that rely extensively on building and maintaining networks of provision (p. 42).

Stoker, thus, refers to a mutual deliberative creation that should guide the *modus vivendi* of public sector organizations. This is the core idea of his suggested model of public value management as a new model that builds on the previous layers of the old public administration and New Public Management roots but aspires to be a more pragmatic and value oriented model. Although the interest in public value has inspired various writers (Hartley et al., 2015; Jorgenson and Bozeman, 2002 in Bozeman, 2007; Kelly, Mulgan, and Muers, 2002; O'Flynn, 2008; Plantinga, 2010; Shaw, 2013; Smith, 2004; Stoker, 2006), some have criticized these directions. For example, Rhodes and Wanna (2007, 2009) claim that the quest for public value fits the entrepreneurial American administration but not the hierarchical Westminster model. Furthermore, embracing the goal of public value raises the fear of the intervention of the administrative echelon in political decisions that are beyond their authority. The critics also note that there are times when public employees must enforce less enjoyable actions on citizens such as collecting taxes and incarcerating prisoners, and emphasize the risk of embracing populist policies designed for short-term benefits. In their view, the idea of public value is meaningful only if the public values are a product of an ongoing dialogue between elected officials and managers in the context of tradition, and the narrative thus reflects a dynamic process, not the decision of one person (Rhodes and Wanna, 2007, p. 416).

Alford and Hughes (2008, p. 134) claim that managers do not choose the values but should consider that their premises reflect the will of the elected representatives and the citizens. Mauri and Muccio (2012) maintain that it is possible to distinguish

between political and administrative decisions. The elected officials define the boundaries of permissible administrative operations, thereby mitigating concerns about harming democratic principles.

Thus, public values are a product of an ongoing collective, multi-dimensional, politically mediated process of defining citizens' preferences based on social and political interactions (Moore, 1995; O'Flynn, 2008; Smith, 2004; Stoker, 2006). We should be cautious when implementing mechanisms that define it, so we do not harm democratic principles or reflect a narrow, one-sided definition of public value. Given the nature of collaborative governance as a mechanism that is suitable for public value management, we must keep in mind its profound implications for government and its administration and their role in today's democracy (Ansell, 2012). Collaborative governance as a mechanism has ideological implications. Therefore, when a government considers engaging in collaboration, it should always ask if it is useful for promoting public values.

### ***Collaborative governance in different situations: A theoretical matrix***

It is useful to determine when collaboration is more advantageous than other mechanisms. In other words, when does collaborative governance contribute to policy design and implementation, and when is it just a burden that complicates or diverts the process with discussions that are time consuming and expensive in terms of money and other resources? (Booher, 2004; Rummery, 2006).

Ansell (2012) claims that collaborative governance is an alternative strategy to two other well-known strategies in democracies: the managerial strategy and the adversarial strategy. While the first is based on the ability of experts to contribute to decision-making processes, the second emphasizes the competitive aspects of

democracies, and the legal strategies of control and supervision (p. 503). Both, Ansell claims, distance the decision-making process from the political process and therefore from the public (ibid, p. 503). Collaborative governance is supposed to bring politics back into the administrative process and to give life to negotiations that are lacking in the legal process. Emerson et al. (2012) claim that collaborative governance can exist only when there is no other option.

However, the unanswered question is when does this mechanism have an advantage over others? In other words, when is collaborative governance the best strategy for the best decision-making process?

In 1959 Thompson and Tuden offered a typology that ties decision theory to the administration needed to “facilitate these several strategies” (p. 197). Continuing Simon’s (1945) analysis that distinguished between value and factual decisions, they formulated a 2X2 matrix, which resulted in four administrative situations for the different kinds of decisions. These situations, illustrated in the four cells in Table 1, are a result of the extent of agreement or disagreement about the facts and value elements, as Simon called them (1947), or about the belief in causation and the preference for the outcomes, as Thompson and Tuden (1959) called it. Thus, the first axis presents the agreement or disagreement about the knowledge needed to make a decision. For example, experts do not agree about the acceptable level of radiation from antennas near schools and its impact on children in and around the school. The second axis presents the agreement or disagreement about the values at the heart of the policy. For example, there is no agreement about the need for gun control.

Table 1: Various kinds of decision-making strategies and their administrative implications for collaborative governance

|                        | Agreement on facts  | Disagreement on facts  |
|------------------------|---|--|
| Agreement on values    | Traditional Government - Traditional centralized government in which collaborative governance is not needed | Knowledge-Oriented Collaborative Governance - Stakeholders engage in learning and knowledge production |
| Disagreement on Values | Value-Oriented Collaborative Governance Stakeholders engage in agreeing on priorities                       | Government in Search of Decisions - No place for collaborative governance                              |

The four cells in the matrix are “descriptive of four strategies ... for four types of decision issues” (p. 198). Relying on the evolution of the matrix (Dery, 1996), the first type of decision is an administrative decision. In this situation, there is no disagreement about the values at the heart of the policy or knowledge about how to execute it. In other words, the government knows what to do and how to do it. The second type of decision is the experimental decision. In this situation, there is disagreement about how to implement the policy due to insufficient knowledge. Learning is the best strategy for this situation. The third type of decision is a political decision. In this situation, there is disagreement about the values at the heart of the policy but not on how to implement the policy once it is agreed upon. Utilizing political tools such as negotiations will help in these situations. The fourth type of decision involves a situation that occurs prior to making a decision. In this situation, there is a lack of knowledge needed to determine the policy and disagreement about the policy's core values

Before applying this typology to collaborative governance, it is important to note two points. First, it is agreed today that there is no dichotomous division between the values and facts or knowledge. However, the degree of each component may vary.

The cells represent infinite types of decisions within the matrix (Dery, 1996).

Applying the matrix to different decisions in practice will raise the question of proximity to the label to which it refers. Second, each decision can be associated with a different label at different times. This movement will have implications for the development of collaborative governance and must be considered when discussing the terms agreed to in collaborative governance.

Thinking of collaborative governance in terms of a decision-making strategy helps us answer the question of when it is beneficial for government to engage in it. We propose that two situations are considered worth the time and effort involved in collaborative governance, and two are not. The difference between the two is related to the degree of conflict involved.

### ***Collaborative Governance: Policy Styles and Administrative Culture***

Most studies on collaborative governance deal with its specific context and focus on the features and its mechanisms. A question that is less considered is, what is the effect of national contexts on the potential emergence of collaborative governance arrangements? We offer to explore different policy styles or administrative cultures in different countries when considering collaborative governance arrangements.


The first perspective arises from the term “policy styles” that reflects the political and cultural context and refers to them as "a more or less stable pattern of policy making that arises from the government's approach to problem solving and the relationship between government and other actors in the policy process" (Richardson, 1982, p. 13

in Bovens et al., 2002, p.15). Boven et al. (2002) identify two dimensions that affect the policy style. The first is the approach to problem solving, which can be anticipatory or reactive. The second refers to the relationship with actors from other sectors and involves the approach to policy design, which can be consensual or imposed. Thus, for example, the Netherlands is an example of a consensual and anticipatory policy style, while Britain serves as an example of an imposed and reactive policy style. It seems reasonable to assume that countries that are characterized as consensual and have an anticipatory policy style are better candidates for collaborative governance arrangements due to their history of relationships between various sectors as well as their tradition of devoting resources to mechanisms for solving policy problems and planning.

A second complementary perspective that may contribute to the feasibility of collaborative governance arises from the notion of administrative culture (Peters, 2009). While it seems more specific than the idea of policy styles, it is reasonable to assume that the institutional and historical features of public administration affect the inclination toward collaborative governance. Loughlin et al. (2011 in Hammerschmid et al., 2016, pp. 260-261) describe four administrative traditions. The first is the Napoleonic tradition evident in countries such as France and Italy that reflects a strong centralized state that is antagonistic to social actors. The second is the organicist tradition evident in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands that reflects a federal state with cooperation between state and social actors. The Anglo-Saxon tradition, evident in countries such as Britain and the United States, has a mixed framework of the state as well as a pluralistic relationship with social actors. Finally, the Scandinavian tradition, evident in countries such as Denmark and Norway, reflects a mixture of the features of the organicist state and the Anglo-Saxon states.

Despite the different points of view when framing policy styles and administrative traditions, they have common bases. Both perspectives allow us to posit that countries that have traditionally collaborated with social actors and have more pluralistic characteristics along with an anticipatory rather than a reactive style will be more comfortable with the idea of collaborative governance. Thus, countries such as the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries and the UK are better candidates for this format than France and Italy.

Figure 1: Policy style



Next we will explore these claims in the Israeli context.

### ***Policy style and the Israeli context***

Established in 1948, Israel is a young democracy and is regarded as a developed country. Its GDP per capita of around \$35,000 US dollars places it under the OECD average of \$46,500 (OECD, 2016). Israel is a relatively small state with approximately 8.6 million people (CBS, 2017). Its population is diverse and eclectic. Furthermore, Israel faces ongoing security challenges that also affect its policy style.

The development of the Israeli administrative tradition exhibits a unique and at times unresolved pattern. Due to Britain's control over the country before 1948, Israel's public administration was based on the British tradition. In the early years of Israel's public administration, the Westminster model of civil service based on a professional civil service was the chosen path. This tradition was accompanied by a centralized political system that was dominated by the Mapai Party (the Labor Party) for the first 30 years. This pattern continued even with the change of the political leadership in 1977. However, since the 1980s political influence and political appointments at various layers of public administration have become increasingly common (Cohen, 2016; Dery, 1996; Galnoor, 2011).

At the same time, Israel has a complicated relationship with the third sector. Although in the pre-state stage NGOs such as WIZO, Naamat, the Histadrut (the national labor union) and the Jewish Agency played an important role and delivered most of the public services to the population, in the first years of the state most of these organizations were incorporated into the state-owned structures or funding arrangements. Since then, the third sector has been regarded as an arms' length provider of services to the state and often as an interest driven entity in conflict with the state. In the past three decades there has been an increase in the number of NGOs,



but they are still not perceived as "entities with distinct social roles, whose preservation and nurturing is important regardless of the instrumental achievements they might have" (p. 49) (Gidron et al., 2003). Moreover, the Israeli public seems to have embraced the narrative about NGOs as problematic, focusing on issues such as their personal agendas and the high salaries of their managers (Blau, 2010; Heruti-Sovar, 2015). They are generally viewed as organizations that filled the void created by the retrenchment and privatization of the welfare state rather than as an equal partner.

Regarding the first feature of policy style – the anticipatory versus the reactive style – Israel is characterized as a reactive state. Given its constant preoccupation with security issues and the atmosphere of constant threats, Israel's policy style is more pragmatic and reactive (Galnoor, 2011; Yair, 2014). At the same time, its administration is known for its shortfalls in planning and the anticipation of problems (Cohen, 2016; Dror, XXX; Galnoor, 2011; Nachmias, Arbel-Gaz and Meydani, 2010). Regarding the second feature of policy style – the consensual type versus the imposed type – as mentioned, the Israeli state and its administration historically did not see the third sector and the private sector as equal partners. Regardless of specific counter examples (for example, the Lautman Foundation of Stef Wertheimer that has had a long-lasting relationship with government initiatives), in this regard Israel seems to resemble France as a statist state with a Napoleonic tradition that is antagonistic to the organization of civil society. Furthermore, due to changes such as the reduction in government expenditures as part of the GDP and privatization (Galnoor, Paz-Fuchs and Zion 2015), the need to rely on the involvement of the private and third sectors has increased, but has been accomplished mainly through

contracts rather than collaboration (Limor and Brindt, 2017) and reflects a suspicion towards these sectors (Talias, 2017). Nevertheless, in Israel, as in many other countries, there is a growing inclination to collaborate, and there are a growing number of examples of such collaborations. Cohen (2016), for example, claims that although Israel did not experience a formal NPM reform, it has recently been undergoing the types of internal reforms that characterize post-NPM. These reforms involve the taking of incremental steps that are more acceptable to the Israeli political culture and include growing features of collaborations.

Thus, we can categorize Israel as a country with statist roots that is quite antagonistic to collaborating with the civic sector in public policymaking. Furthermore, it is reactive in its policy style, despite developments in recent years that reflect a moderate change in its orientation to planning and more collaboration that is still new to its basic tradition.

***The Israeli case: Exploring some examples via the collaborative governance value matrix***

We can use the case of Israel to explore the collaborative governance matrix.

**Cell 1: Traditional Government**

When there is agreement on values and facts, the government knows what it should do and how to do it. Hence, there is no need to engage in collaborative governance. In this situation, traditional centralized government is the best strategy for decision-making. For example, when a government needs to issue driver licenses, it knows who should have a driver license and how to issue them. In different situations, it

might consider contracting out the driver tests, but at this point it does not need to collaborate with other actors to decide differently.

In the same manner, it is accepted that a decision about a national immunization program is in the hands of the government and it knows how to do it. Even when considering vaccines outside of these norms, it is still accepted that the best decision-making strategy is a managerial one. For example, on July 29, 2013 the Israeli Ministry of Health initiated an immunization program to provide the population with a booster shot against polio after traces of the virus were found in several areas around the country. Following consultations with international organizations, the ministry launched a special campaign for another round of vaccinations (Even, 18.8.13; Even, 11.8.13; Director General Memorandum 19/13, Director General Memorandum 18/13). Called “Two Drops,” (The Ministry of Health website), the campaign achieved its goal. After six months, the ministry announced that one million children had received the additional vaccine. Before returning to the regular vaccination program, the ministry underscored that threat was real and due to the special campaign, no child was infected (The Ministry of Health web site).

This story is interesting because it could have ended completely differently. Many questioned the ministry’s professional legitimacy, despite the fact that it had consulted with experts inside and outside the country (Ilan website; memorandum 19/13).

Furthermore, despite creating the necessary administrative mechanism for implementing the program through the local authorities, there were many who called for opening the process up to different voices. These voices were from concerned citizens and doctors who thought the entire campaign was unnecessary and took several steps to disparage it (Gal, 20.8.13; Gershoni and Bahrah, 27.8.13; Globes,

22.8.13; Magnazi, 29.8.13). Some contended that the intention to change the process was a sign of the lack of trust in the ministry's policy (Even, 11.8.13). This contention continued even when the ministry clarified its instructions along the way, for example, providing guidelines for those with weak immune systems (Even 18.8.13; Gal 20.8.13; Kelner 20.8.13; The Ministry of Health, 20.8.13; Rosenbloom, 19.8.13). Throughout the campaign there were those who said that this was a battle over the authority of the ministry being waged by various networks in society that questioned the basic professionalism of the ministry (Matia, 3.9.13; Niv, 18.8.13).

Nonetheless, given the immediacy of the issue, the government felt sure in its policy once it was made and knew what had to be done. Opening it up for some kind of participation in the policy process would not have served the public value. According to Ansell (2012), this is a classic managerial situation, which does not call for collaboration despite the many voices in the field.

Despite the pressure to involve other people in the decision-making process, in this case, the ministry chose to consult with others but made the final decision on its own without creating a formal mechanism. This is clearly an example of the advantages of the managerial approach. In this instance, collaborative governance would not have increased the ability to implement the policy or its legitimacy, and certainly would not have increased public value.

## **Cell 2- Knowledge-Oriented Collaborative Governance**

In this cell stakeholders engage in learning. Here there is agreement about the values, but there is disagreement or a lack of knowledge about the facts. Hence, the government agrees about what should be achieved but does not agree on how to do it.

In this cell, collaborative governance can help promote public value. This situation

exemplifies the difficulties government faces due to the numerous actors now involved in policy design and its implementation.

Two examples will help illustrate this cell. In the first example, there is agreement that it is important to study math in school, but over the years, Israeli students' scores in this subject have not been satisfactory. Defining the problem as one of knowledge, the Ministry of Education launched a national program to engage with organizations that shared their knowledge about how to encourage students to take the most challenging math courses available to them, thereby earning the highest level of credit in math in the national matriculation exam (The Ministry of Education website). In this situation, the best alternative for action is not known, but sharing the knowledge of the various actors creates the opportunity to design a better policy (Buuren, 2009). Collaborative governance as a mechanism that brings together various stakeholders can help share knowledge from different sources and places. This kind of learning requires collaboration, because it is deliberative. Therefore, it flourishes with the involvement of a variety of actors.

The second example also involves education. For many years, organizations from different sectors have initiated and operated extra-curricular programs in the educational system. The Ministry of Education passed rules regarding who can provide such programs and under what terms (for example, memorandum 2.1-12). However, many principals felt that they did not have enough knowledge to choose between one program and another. Moreover, the ministry felt it did not have enough knowledge to formulate the needed regulations.

In November 2012, the ministry established the "Unit for Cross-Sectoral Programs and Partnerships." The initial goal was to take charge of the numerous extra-curricular

programs being offered to the schools. Later, it was used to share knowledge about these programs and innovations (Ministry of Education website). The unit assembled round tables for three purposes: creating a computerized database of the extra-curricular programs, building a model of how to engage with the programs and formulating a written agreement about the essence of the collaborative cooperation. The final product that resulted from the collaboration was similar to “TripAdvisor”, a database in which the schools not only selected programs but also rated them, providing other schools with feedback on the quality of the programs (Director General Memorandum 9.12-1). What began as an unwieldy situation resulted in a collaboration that involved policymaking and implementation.

Two illustrations of these processes are a round table on programs for LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) youngsters and museum programs in schools. In the first case, the goal was to build an agreed-upon program for parents, teachers and students. This collaboration resulted in the creation of various programs and even a budgetary allocation from the ministry. The museum round table resulted in various programs that met the criteria of the existing database and that satisfied both sides.

Today external organizations want to take part in this process and take the feedback they receive seriously. The ministry, in return, made the organizations part of the design of the database. Since it is constantly changing, the ministry works together with the organizations on the criteria that should be in the database and how they should be presented (interview with the manager of the unit, Michal Oz-Ari, 2.4.2017).

After trying to take control of an issue it did not have the knowledge to solve, collaboration helped the ministry learn how to design a better policy. Moreover, the

deliberative process adopted helped the implementers learn how to execute the policy. Eventually, the process was reciprocal in nature and most importantly helped the school principals learn about the programs available and obtain feedback about their value.

### **Cell 3: Value-Oriented Collaborative Governance (VCG)**

In this cell stakeholders engage in a process over value preferences. In these situations, there is disagreement about the values and agreement about the facts. When government knows how to execute a policy but does not agree about which value is more important to promote, as in this cell, collaborative governance can be helpful. This situation exemplifies the difficulties government faces due to the different values in public policy.

The collaborative governance mechanism -- based on the desire for consensus -- can help in such cases to create a political process of negotiation and compromise. The participation of various actors and the ability to reach an agreement may help government achieve more legitimacy than otherwise. The dispute over values can be seen as a dispute over competing values or a disagreement over priorities.

An example of competing values is the dispute on society's ethos. While there is a notion of the importance of an ethos to each community, its normative form is in dispute. One attempt to deal with this sensitive issue in Israel is an initiative by a group of philanthropists called "Living Together." Their intention is to create a common ethos for Israeli society based on shared responsibility and solidarity. This initiative encourages the creation of a common society, celebrates the differences of each group in society, and rejects violence and racism. They are seeking a common central core for the existence of the state of Israel and exploring what can be done to

spread it (interview with the head on the initiative, interview with Miki Nevo, 28.1.2017).

Regarding disagreement over priorities, the efforts to overcome the underrepresentation of three communities in Israeli society in the job market - the Arab citizens of Israel as a national ethnic minority, the ultra-Orthodox community as a sector that alienated itself from the job market and the Ethiopian community as a community of new immigrants - is an interesting example. While there is no disagreement about the need to integrate all communities in the labor market, no one has created a successful method for doing so. In other words, the value of equal access to the workforce has not been high on the value preferences. Various actors such as NGOs, the Ministry of Finance and other organizations have joined together to make the job market more diverse, thus promoting values such as equal opportunity and culturally sensitive work places. Here the collaborative governance mechanism was used to legitimize and promote the implementation of a goal that most agreed upon but did act upon (the President of Israel's web site – Israel Hope in Employment).

When there is disagreement on policy values or when government tries to implement goals that create disputes over values, collaborative governance is a mechanism that helps government gain legitimacy for its proposed policy and change value preferences.

#### **Cell 4: Government in Search of Decisions**

In this cell, the state is in search of decisions, because there is no agreement about values or facts. Thus, when government does not agree on public values and does not



know how to promote them, as illustrated in this cell, it should not engage in collaborative governance as a strategy for decision making.

There are two different situations that exemplify this cell. The first is when there are issues that are best left untouched, because they are in dispute, and no one knows how to deal with them. In these situations, there is a need for inspiration before these issues can be addressed. Nonetheless, any attempt to make such decisions should not be done in a collaborative governance arrangement.

Immigration in the age of globalization is an example of this cell. Israel was established as a Jewish state. However, since 1990 many non-Jewish immigrants have entered Israel (legally and illegally), raising questions for policymakers. Among these immigrants were those who came to the country to work, infiltrators and refugees. The policymakers disagreed on the immigrants' legal status, on the reasons why they immigrated and on how to treat them. With regard to values, there are arguments as to whether the state of Israel can open its gates to all those who may want to come to it, thereby threatening the Jewish identity of the state. With regard to facts, there are disagreements about how to reduce the number of illegal non-Jewish immigrants who have already entered the country. In light of Jewish history, the question of the appropriate means of achieving this end resonates very strongly in Israel. As a result, over the years the government has made some policy decisions to mitigate the phenomenon but several issues remain unresolved (Efrain, 3.12.11 Knesset committee on foreign workers, 21.11.2006). Thompson and Tuden (1959) describe this situation as an "anomic structure."

The second example is a situation where the subject is so new that government needs to decide by itself about the course of action it wants to pursue based on both

establishing new value preferences and gathering new knowledge. For example, there are challenges to the basic notion of the value of work (Gorz, 1999; Van Parijs, 2004) and explorations of alternative contributions to society. These ideas have led to the international movement “Universal Social Income, UBII” (Van Parijs, 2004) as one illustration of the subject.

While some countries are experimenting with the basic income idea (AFP, 14.12.16; Henley, 3.1.17, Hildebrandt, 9.3.16), in Israel there is a lack of agreement or knowledge about the issue (Ahitov, 25/2.16). This idea, which requires new thinking about the state's economy and the immediate connection between a salary and work, is not one that collaborative governance could shed light on or increase its legitimacy. This is a case that needs a visionary, someone who is willing to take a risk. Therefore, two courses of actions are likely to develop, both of which call for maturation. In this situation, the demands of collaborative governance, including the process of deciding on a policy and implementing it together in a reciprocal manner, cannot exist.

In extreme cases when government does not know where to go and what to do when it gets there, collaborative governance can be not only a burden but also hamper the policy and the connection between the actors altogether. Therefore, in this situation it will not have the ability to devise a policy or legitimize it, and certainly will not help increase public value. These situations may be a place for more inspirational actions by individuals or groups (Dery, \*\*Thompson and Tuden, 1959) but formal arrangements of collaborative governance are not productive in these situations.

## **Conclusions**

Collaborative governance arrangements are confusing. While they are often touted as a worthier tool in a world of multiple actors and a fluid and dynamic public policy arena, they are also cumbersome, costly, difficult to manage and even sometimes risky for democracy. In this paper, we tried to cope with these challenges by asking two questions – when is it worthwhile to embrace collaborative governance arrangements, and when is it not?

For this purpose we used two theoretical lenses. The first considers a nation's policy style and administrative tradition, and the second uses Thompson and Tuden's (1959) theoretical matrix to decide whether it is worthwhile to engage in collaborative governance efforts and of what kind. Using these two lenses, we arrived at three tentative propositions.

First, this dual layer perspective enriches our understanding by considering the engagement in collaborative governance not only through its process (or normative feature) but also by concentrating on the specific context in which decisions are made and implemented. Hence, instead of studying the mechanism itself, these two lenses emphasize the components of the policy issue and the conditions under which the policy is designed and implemented.

Second, while the two layers do not exclude one another, this dual layer perspective clarifies when using collaborative governance is beneficial and for what reasons.

The first lens of policy styles and administrative tradition helps explain why collaborative governance seems more suited to some countries than others.

Nevertheless, in countries in which embracing collaborative governance is not a

natural choice, such as in Israel, we must acknowledge the difficulties of implementing collaborative governance and the resulting need to create a more supportive atmosphere and to be more patient in trying to promote this approach.

The second lens of the collaborative governance matrix can help us determine when to create these arrangements, who should participate, what is meant to be achieved and whether or not they are the best choice of method.

Third, the two cells in the matrix that are beneficial for embracing collaborative governance highlight the different situations for capacity and legitimacy that promote public value. Furthermore, they suggest the elements that should be emphasized when recruiting the various stakeholders. Thus, when there is a need to create more value preference consensus such as in the value-oriented collaborative governance cell, the emphasis should be on recruiting diverse representative stakeholders. In contrast, in the case of knowledge-oriented collaborative governance where the need is to create knowledge, the recruitment should be based on the information held by the various stakeholders. When there is disagreement on both elements, there is a need to create an inspirational process that might ultimately result in implementation by the government.

Finally, these arguments exemplify how collaborative governance is but another layer of changes with which government can decide to engage. Hence, although collaborative governance is part of the third wave of government reforms, as in previous reforms the goal is not to replace governmental arrangements altogether but to adopt more diverse mechanisms according to the specific situation. This paper seeks to contribute to the issues that need to be recognized when considering adopting collaborative governance mechanisms. Ultimately, our goal is to help answer the

question: Given the diagnosed situation, how can we use these mechanisms in a more beneficial way to promote public values? More experimental case studies from different countries using the typologies and ideas suggested here can enrich our exploration of this question.

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Interview with Miki Nevo, 28.1.2017

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