

## **Action and Reaction in Interest Group Advocacy: The Trump Administration's First Hundred Days**

Beth L. Leech  
Rutgers University  
[leech@polisci.rutgers.edu](mailto:leech@polisci.rutgers.edu)

Amy McKay  
Exeter University

Gregory Lyon  
Rutgers University

*with*

Joost Berkhout  
University of Amsterdam

Patrick Bernhagen  
University of Stuttgart

Adam Chalmers  
Kings College London

### ABSTRACT

Much of the interest group literature focuses on the actions of the groups themselves, attempting to measure their assumed influence over public officials. More properly viewing interest groups in their political context, however, demonstrates how often those groups are *reacting* to the activities of parties and officials, rather than *causing* the actions of those entities. In this first public paper from the Agendas and Interest Groups research project, a four-country analysis involving hundreds of policy issues, we use data from the US case to document what happened to the agenda status of nearly 500 issues during the first 100 days of the Trump administration. For most issues, we find no change in agenda status under President Trump. But for some, we find dramatic change influenced by partisan preferences, group type, and issue area.

Keywords: Lobbying, Interest Groups, Agendas, US Policymaking, Trump Administration

Paper prepared for presentation at the 3<sup>rd</sup> International Conference on Public Policy, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, June 28-30, 2017.

*Draft paper; please consult authors before citing.*

Interest groups—groups organized around a shared policy goal—have long fascinated and puzzled political scientists and political observers alike. Before the US Constitution was even signed, James Madison wrote that because people have "passions," they would always join together with others who shared these passions. Government's role, then, is to mediate and synthesize among the factions formed by individuals with shared passions. In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that Americans are particularly likely to form nongovernmental groups because of the nature of their egalitarian democracy. Writing in 1908, Arthur Bentley conceived of interest groups as billiard balls bouncing against each other, propelled by vectors of force. For Bentley, the number of group members represented something like mass, and the intensity of preference represented acceleration, giving a political analogue to the physics equation “force equals mass times acceleration” as a means of estimating group influence. David Truman (1951) argued that groups would form naturally as a result of a disturbance, such as a terrorist attack, a bridge collapsed, or economic downturn.

Not till 1965 was it pointed out that interest groups need some incentive to form and to stay together. Mancur Olson's (1965) *Logic of Collective Action* argued that the incentives of group members would affect the ability of the group to exist and to achieve its goals. As a result, small groups focused on highly concentrated benefits were likely to succeed; large groups with diffuse goals were likely to fail. While Olson provided a much-needed perspective to theories of interest group formation, a major actor was still being ignored: the government.

The Agendas and Interest Groups project seeks to address this shortcoming by focusing on the agendas of interest groups and how these are reflected—or not reflected—in government activity. The project is a four-country, five-investigator research project funded jointly the social science research councils of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany. The goal of the

project is to map and begin to explain the level of congruency between the preferred agendas of interest groups, the preferred agendas of public citizens, and the actual agenda being pursued by national governments. The project is a comparative study of agendas and interest groups being conducted in parallel in the US, the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany.

To gather information about interest groups' preferred agendas, when we are finished we will have interviewed about 100 interest group representatives in each country—some of these twice. From these interviews, we derive a number of issues on which each group worked or, importantly, would *like* to be working on. In this first paper from the project, we use data from the US case to document what happened to the agenda status of more than 400 issues during the first 100 days of the Trump administration.

While interest groups are too often viewed in the literature as autonomous forces acting to influence government, we find that they are more accurately described as reactive groups ever-responding to government action. Rather than independent entities capable of pressuring governments to act differently than they otherwise would, we find that interest groups react to the agenda set by the government and have little influence over the agenda. However, some groups and issues do have, at least under this president in his first 100 days, the ability to grab the attention of the president, while other issues, group types, and partisan preferences are ignored. These differences raise important normative questions about the ability of different groups to achieve policy success.

### **Literature Review**

Much of the interest group literature focuses on the actions of the groups themselves, attempting to measure their assumed influence over public officials. Viewing advocacy in its political context, however, demonstrates how often those groups are reacting to the activities of

parties and officials, rather than causing the actions of those entities. Early scholars of interest groups virtually ignored the role of government actors. Heinz et al., invoking Locke's description of power, decried the tendency for studies of lobbying and campaign contributions to model groups as omnipotent:

Much of the literature virtually ignores officials and appears to assume that, like billiard balls, they will go wherever the groups send them. (Heinz et al. 1993, 12; also quoted in Ainsworth 1997, 518).

There are, of course, substantial exceptions to this critique, both old and new. In their classic work, Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963) were struck by how little influence the interest groups had, and how they acted as "service bureaus," providing information and assistance to government officials but failing to twist any arms. Ainsworth (1997) and Hall and Deardorff (2006) provide theoretical analysis (and in Hall and Deardorff's case, a formal model) that helps explain why government officials and interest groups might work together. Baumgartner et al. (2009) and Baumgartner and Mahoney 2015 analyzed group-government interactions in 98 US policy issues to document the ways that the interest groups work with governmental allies and the importance of those governmental allies to advantageous outcomes for the groups.

The most important of those allies, in the Baumgartner et al. analysis, was the president. Whether or not the president favored and pursued a policy initiative was the primary predictor of the success of that proposal, notwithstanding the effects of interest group lobbying (and concomitant resource expenditure).

Under the Constitution, the president may command military forces, convene or adjourn Congress, veto laws, ask cabinet members to submit their opinions in writing, grant pardons and select United States ambassadors. In addition to expressed powers, the president also has implied powers, which presidents have interpreted differently through the years and which give the

president some latitude to do what he or she wants. The president also is granted the right to make decisions in times of great urgency. These are known as emergency powers. Some emergency powers are limited in scope: The president can declare a place devastated by a storm a federal disaster area, making it eligible for federal aid. Other emergency powers are much vaster in scope. During the Civil War, for example, President Abraham Lincoln spent money without congressional approval, and he also suspended a number of civil liberties, including the writ of habeas corpus.

Another type of inherent power is the executive order, which is a rule or regulation issued by the president that has the force of law. All executive orders must be published in the Federal Register, the daily publication of federal rules and regulations. The president can issue executive orders for three reasons:

1. To enforce statutes
2. To enforce the Constitution or treaties
3. To establish or modify how executive agencies operate

Congress provides an additional, if somewhat less effective, check on executive orders. In theory, any executive order can be later annulled by Congress. But in the last 34 years, during which presidents have issued some 1,400 orders, it has defeated just three. More often, Congress will counter executive orders by indirect means, holding up nominations or bills until the president relents.

Beyond these Constitutional powers, the literature has established numerous abilities and tools that the president has with which to affect policymaking. Personal tools include negotiation tactics and the “power to persuade” (Neustadt 1990), the veto and the threat of veto in order to produce a desired policy outcome (Cameron 2000; Krehbiel 1998; Kiewit and

McCubbins 1991), and “going public” in order to mobilize popular support for policies, especially when the Congress is not cooperating (Kernell 1997).

Another important, and less well-understood, power of the president is to help set the federal policy agenda. By initiating policy proposals and advocating these proposals to members of Congress and the public, the president has considerable “first mover” power. Edwards and Barrett (2000) show that congressional leaders tend to follow the lead of the president as they structure their legislative efforts. Further, Edwards and Barrett find that when government is unified, presidential initiatives are adopted at a significantly higher rate than purely congressional initiatives (2000). Even under divided government, their analysis concludes that presidential initiatives still make up a significant portion of the congressional agenda and, on average, have the same chance of passing as purely congressional initiatives.

While the president has some influence over the ultimate outcome of a proposed policy, the extent and direction of this influence is a matter of debate. Some find that voiced presidential support for a measure tends to increase public support for it (Kernell 1997; Ostrom and Simon 1985, Rivers and Rose 1985, Rohde and Simon 1985, Brace and Hinckley 1992) or that administration opposition to a measure reduces its chances of success (Baumgartner et al. 2009). Others find that presidential support does little to help a proposal’s chances (Edwards 1989; Bond and Fleisher 2000; Collier and Sullivan 1995, Neustadt 1990). Wood and Lee (2009) provide evidence that, at least recently, when the president voices support of a bill, opponents of the bill rise to challenge it, actually reducing the chances of its success.

Still others argue that the effect of presidential support on policy outcomes is conditioned on such factors as presidential approval (Bond and Fleischer 1990), the salience and complexity of a bill (Canes-Wrone and de Marchi 2002), the partisanship and ideology of Members of

Congress (Cohen et al. 2000; Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards and Barrett 2000), the policy preferences of the congressional membership (Krehbiel 1998; Brady and Volden 1998), the current presidential regime (Skowronek 1993), or the presidential honeymoon period (Beckmann and Godfrey 2007; Light 1999; Brody 1991).

Finally, Beckmann (2010) and others argue that in addition to helping to set the agenda and negotiating votes with Members of Congress, presidents routinely engage in direct lobbying of leaders in Congress to help shape the legislative agenda. The president works with leaders to determine the options rank-and-file members of Congress may vote upon. This ability to shape congressional votes gives the president a powerful tool with which to influence policy outcomes. Several scholars argue that legislation that is lobbied on by the White House is significantly more likely to pass than is legislation that is not lobbied on by the president (Beckmann 2010, McKay and Webb 2017, Baumgartner et al. 2009). Thus, even a weak president facing a divided Congress will still have influence in federal policymaking through the powers to persuade, to set the agenda, to engage the public and interest groups, and to lobby policymakers directly.

### **Theory and Hypotheses**

We argue, first, that most issues most of the time do not change their agenda status. Second, when issues do enter or exit the governmental agenda, they do so in predictable ways: Certain groups will find greater ability to influence the agenda than other groups. Specifically, under the new Trump administration, we expect that business groups and others mostly supported by Republicans will find greater agenda success relative to nonprofit groups and groups mostly supported by Democrats.

## Research Design

To test our theory, we draw a stratified random sample of 100 IGs in each country, oversampling to ensure that half of the interests represent non-business interests (e.g. citizen groups, unions, religious organizations). Our universe of groups from which we draw the sample will rely on the population data collected previously by the Dutch principal investigator (Berkhout 2014), except in the US, where we will use sources maintained by Columbia Books in a manner that parallels the work of Berkhout. The *Washington Representatives* directory (and its online companion, Lobbyists.Info), includes all organizations from lobbyist-filed federal Lobbying Registration Reports, as well as numerous other organizations that are active but exempt from registering because of spending levels, type of lobbying conducted, or some other exclusion in the law.

We conduct face-to-face semi-structured interviews (Leech 2002) with a representative from each of organization in the organization's office. The person being interviewed is generally the head of government relations for the organization, or at least someone who works on governmental policy. We inquire about (1) what issues they are working on, (2) what policy proposals they favor, oppose, or wish to modify regarding the issue, (3) whether the issue is something they have initiated or were reacting to, and (4) how important the issue is to their organization. We then ask about issues they are interested in, but not acting upon, especially those issues that they are actively monitoring. Finally, we elicit a "wish list" or "dream list" of issues that they would like to be working on but do not see as politically feasible at the moment, as well as a "nightmare list" of issues their organizations hope to keep off the agenda. We ask them to rank the top five of all of these issues in terms of their long-term importance to the organization. On each of a group's top five issues, the subject answers a series of closed-ended



questions about activities they have undertaken so far on the issue, if any, and their expected level of success.

Previous researchers have used a variety of definitions of “issue.” Grossman (2014) considers successful and significant policy changes, Baumgartner *et al.* (2009) consider a random sample of topics on which interest groups report being active, and Burstein (2014) uses a random sample of policy topics that Congress has considered. Our definition of an issue is closest to that of Baumgartner *et al.*, but different in the sense that we make a special point of eliciting issues that are not on the agenda.

Responding first to a question about what their organizations are currently working on makes it easier for the respondent to respond to the question, “What else, in an ideal world or in another administration or another Congress, would you *wish* to be working on?” Repeated prompts inquiring about “is there anything else?” help elicit the most complete list (Leech *et al.* 2013, 217), which the respondent can then rank by importance. Organizations often have internal or external documents listing their long-range plans about the policies they would like to work toward, approved from above or by the membership of the organization, and we will enquire about those as well.

When interviews from all countries are complete, these will have generated up to 500 issues per country different issues of most importance to the sampled interest groups. From this list we are building a data set that includes coded information from the interviews as well as secondary-source information as available. In the US case, we gather information about the number of organizations involved in the issue (from searches of the federal Lobbying Disclosure Reports), salience (from media coverage), and government activity (from Congress.gov). For any of the issues that have public opinion data available, we collect that information as well.

From the interviews, we code mentions of the issues lobbyists described. In the present case, we identify mentions of each issue in three presidential outlets: 1) Executive Orders, which have the force of law, 2) Presidential memoranda, which affect policy implementation and also have the force of law, and 3) mentions in the president's proposed budget, which is just a proposal but which sets the agenda and the point from which Congress begins to bargain, bicker, or re-write. For each of these the direction was also coded. That is, did the Administration support or oppose the interest group's position (or take no position). (Please see appendix for further information on our coding procedures.)

While these formal signals, transmitted through official political institutions and executive powers, have been an important vehicle of executive power and signaling for past presidents, the extensive use of alternative mediums such as social media, renders the Trump administration somewhat unorthodox. For instance, Trump's tax reform proposal that included significant reductions in corporate tax rates was an important issue to many of the groups in our sample, yet the issue of corporate tax reduction is found nowhere in any of the documents we coded. Trump has lifted the issue via social media posts and a hastily released three page document that outlines the plan.

### **Analysis**

Figures 1 and 2 show the count of issues on which the president took or did not take a position. We see that most of the issues brought up by our interviewees were not mentioned by the president. Of 493 issues mentioned by lobbyists, less than 100 of them were mentioned in any presidential document. While the timeframe of 100 days is short, it is remarkable how little influence interest groups seem to have over the agenda of the president, especially a new president with no legislative or executive-branch history.

However, on those issues on which the president did take a position, there was a slightly higher number of losers than winners. This is further evidence that interest groups have not had a significant influence over President Trump.

*Figure 1. Interest Group Issues Affected by Executive Orders and Memos*





Figure 2. Interest Group Issues Affected by Proposed US Budget



### Party support

The data become more interesting as we focus on just those issues on which the president did take a position. Figures 3 and 4 present striking graphs that show how the signal the president sent regarding interest groups' issues varies considerably by party support. For the organizations that said mostly Democrats agree with their positions, the effect of executive orders and memoranda is hugely negative. For groups that mostly have Republican support, the president's positions are all positive. Mixed-support issues are closer to equally divided between positive and negative signals.

In short, for both executive actions and the president's budget proposal, Republicans are clearly the winners in President Trump's agenda in the first 100 days. Executive actions have largely benefited issues that groups say Republicans support, while the budget yielded several negative signals for issues that groups say Democrats support.

*Figure 3. Effect of Executive Actions on Interest Group Issues, by Party Support*





Figure 4. Effect of Proposed Budget on Interest Group Issues, by Party Support



### Partisanship

Highly partisan issues, as indicated by the groups we interviewed, received significant attention in these early days of the administration. The greatest number of executive action signals were negative signals for highly partisan issues. It seems Trump went after the contentious issues early on, and in ways that our interest groups did not want. Meanwhile, issues indicated to be somewhat or not partisan saw much less action in executive orders and memos.

The trend is not the same for partisanship in the budget, where the signals were somewhat mixed. The partisanship of an issue seemed to have little significance for whether or not there was budgetary signaling.

Figure 5. Effect of Executive Actions on Interest Group Issues, by Level of Partisanship





Figure 6. Effect of Proposed Budget on Interest Group Issues, by Level of Partisanship



### Group Type

Executive action by group type paints somewhat unsurprising pictures, as shown in Figures 7 and 8. The high number of negative signals for business is driven largely by Trump's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an issue of great importance to many businesses that supported the trade deal.

The budget, which contained cuts to nearly all of the broad areas of government except defense, yielded negative signals for all types of groups. Citizen groups, charities, and unions in particular saw lots of their issues get negative signals due to steep cuts across the board. Business had more positive signals but still had its share of negative signals. With regard to executive orders and memoranda, businesses won in the executive orders but lost in the memoranda



because Trump pulled out of negotiations of both TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TIIP) using memoranda.


Quite a few of our corporate interest groups put corporate tax reform high up on their "dream lists." While Trump has tweeted and talked quite a bit about corporate tax reform, it does not show up in any of our three measures. Still, we consider this an agenda "win" for business.

Finally, trade associations were clear winners, while other group types had mixed results.

Figure 7. Effect of Executive Actions on Interest Group Issues, by Type of Group



Figure 8. Effect of Proposed Budget on Interest Group Issues, by Type of Group



### Issue area

Figures 9 and 10 show the distribution of signals received by groups working in different issue areas. Issue areas are defined by the ongoing Comparative Agendas Project coding scheme. Among these, issues related to the environment, foreign trade, and immigration received the bulk of negative signals. Domestic commerce, health, and technology saw boosts in executive actions. A number of groups were opposed to a single-payer system of health care and Trump's actions aligned with this view.

One notable finding relates to the positive signals for technology-related issues. Trump issued executive orders to strengthen cybersecurity, a win for technology advocates.

Figure 9. Effect of Executive Actions on Interest Group Issues, by Policy Type




Figure 10. Effect of Proposed Budget on Interest Group Issues, by Policy Type



### Examples and Discussion

In this section we provide some examples of the issues our groups expressed an interest in and how they might have been affected by the change in presidential administration.

#### Transportation and Infrastructure

Support for increased spending on infrastructure and transportation was an issue was mentioned by six of the 70 groups in our sample. Support ranged from labor unions to businesses, including a large hotel chain and a multinational car company. Despite the unanimity of interest groups in favor of increased infrastructure spending, the issue has been the subject of conflicting signals from the Trump administration.

During the campaign and election period, much was made of Trump's plan to put forth a significant infrastructure stimulus plan to rebuild antiquated bridges, roads, and rail lines throughout the United States and reinvigorate job growth. Yet despite the informal signals from Trump on the campaign trail and elsewhere, along with support from a handful of significant groups, our data highlight the relatively poor signals the Trump administration has offered for transportation issues.

As seen in the graphs grouped by the Comparative Agendas Project coding scheme (Figures 9 and 10), transportation-related issues received several negative signals in the budget, but little action in the executive orders or memos. Specifically, the budget proposes significantly reducing support for Amtrak, a public-private federal US train service; eliminating support for a federal program that ensures rural areas have access to air service, known as Essential Air Surface; ending TIGER grants, which provide funding for interstate federal transit across the US; and cutting the Department of Transportation's budget by 13 percent, or \$2.4 billion (pp. 35-6).

To the extent that groups still see a path forward for increased transportation and infrastructure spending, the signs offered by the administration indicate this may be a more difficult issue to get on the formal policy agenda than Trump's occasional—and often informal—remarks would suggest.

## **Immigration**

Another issue important to multiple of our groups was immigration. Groups as diverse as a charity, a union, two businesses, a non-profit, and two universities deemed immigration reform an important issue in their list of priorities. All hoped to ease entry to the United States. The graphs grouped by Comparative Agendas Project issue code highlight the well-known negative signals that immigration has received under the Trump Administration.

Specifically, two executive orders in the early days of Trump's presidency represented substantial shifts in executive policy toward immigration. Executive Order 13767 and Executive Order 13768, both issued on January 25, 2017, directed executive departments and agencies to augment immigration enforcement.

Executive Order 13769, promulgated on January 27, 2017, suspended visas for visitors from seven majority-Muslim countries—Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, and Libya— for 90 days and ceased refugee resettlement for 120 days. The order also banned Syrian refugees indefinitely. The order was challenged in federal court on constitutional grounds. The administration then released another Executive Order, number 13780, on March 6, 2017, that revised the earlier order, removed Iraq from the list, lifted the Syrian refugee ban, and detailed the reasons for issuing the first order. The constitutionality of the directives is still pending as courts have largely blocked the order. Most recently, on May 25, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit blocked it and declared that the order was issued with animus and discrimination. As of the time of this writing, the Department of Justice has petitioned to have the Supreme Court to hear the case.

How the groups in our sample react to these changes and fluctuations on an increasingly important issue such as immigration looks to be a useful proxy to tease out the various sources of influence on the political agenda and how they may, or may not, see their preferences realized.

### **Trade policy**

Finally, trade policy is an issue in which many of our respondents expressed an interest. The TPP and the TIPP are somewhat unusual in that the president's position is at odds with the preferences of many businesses. On most other issues, the president is in agreement with business entities, if he takes a position at all. The president's ideological commitment to putting

America First has outweighed the preferences of large companies who benefit from the free trade policies sought by previous presidents. Meanwhile, several labor organizations were in agreement with the president on this issue, resulting in labor organizations' receiving more positive signals than negative signals.

The TPP was the result of seven years of negotiation, culminating in 12 nations agreeing to relatively open borders. President Obama confirmed his support of the final draft of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement in early 2016. It has been controversial in the US, creating winners, losers, and uncertainty. While companies that import or export goods would stand to benefit from reduced tariffs, companies that manufacture goods in the US objected that the deal would export jobs and reduce wages. The pharmaceutical industry, for example, wanted all countries to agree to a 12-year patent for US-made drugs, while other partners, such as Australia, preferred a 5-year patent.

President Trump came down on the side of domestic manufacturers. Three days after he was inaugurated, the president fulfilled a campaign promise by issuing a memorandum curtailing further American involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The still-developing TIPP agreement will also not be pursued under President Trump. The president's Constitutional power to negotiate treaties expects presidents to be able to make or not make trade deals, and no checks on this power exist. Since large businesses and labor unions both object to the two trade agreements, it is unlikely they will be revisited before a new president takes office.

### **Conclusions**

This paper has used the Trump administration's first 100 days as a forum for evaluating some of the questions posed by the larger Agendas and Interest Groups project. Our interviews with 70 representatives of lobbying groups in Washington—about half representing business and

half representing nonprofit organizations—provides us with nearly 500 issues about which interest groups cared in the last few months of the Obama Administration (most of the interviews occurred in August of 2016.) The election of President Trump took the Washington lobbying community by surprise. While most issues—about 85 percent—saw no change in agenda status as Trump settled in to the White House, those issues that the president did attend to stand out for the sharp change in their agenda status. Further, there are some clear trends in which issues and groups tended to win or lose under President Trump. The data suggest that issues supported by Republicans or by businesses and trade associations were more likely to receive positive signals from the new president, while issues supported by Democrats and charities or citizen groups received negative signals. Issue area was also found to be predict the level of attention the president gave and the direction of the signal. Foreign trade, immigration, and the environment all receive quite negative signals, while cybersecurity and defense issues receive positive signals.

Our next step is to develop an understanding of why certain issues have attracted President Trump's attention. We will gather information from our 70 respondents, whom we intend to re-interview to query directly how the new administration in Washington has affected their policy agendas and tactics. We will also expand our coding of the agenda to include legislative and bureaucratic agendas in addition to the chief executive's. And by simultaneously doing the same research in three European countries, we hope to realize an understanding of the why and how of governmental agenda setting.



## References

- Ainsworth, Scott H. 1997. "The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22: 517-33.
- Bauer, Raymond A., Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter. 1963. *American Business & Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade*. Chicago: Atherton Press.
- Baumgartner, Frank R. and Christine Mahoney. 2015. "Partners in Advocacy: Lobbyists and Government Officials in Washington." *Journal of Politics* (2015). Volume 77 (1): 202-215.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball and Beth L. Leech. 2009. *Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball and Beth L. Leech. 2009. *Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Beckmann, Matthew N. 2010. *Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Beckmann, Matthew N. and Joseph Godfrey. 2007. "The Policy Opportunities in Presidential Honeymoons." *Political Research Quarterly* 60(2): 250-262.
- Bentley, Arthur Fisher. *The Process of Government; a Study of Social Pressures*. Chicago,: The University of Chicago press, 1908.
- Berkhout, Joost, Brendan Carroll, Caelesta Braun, Adam Chalmers, Tine Destrooper, Simon Otjes, and Anne Rasmussen. 2015. 'Interest Organizations Across Economic Sectors: Explaining Interest Group Density in the European Union.' *Journal of European Public Policy*, forthcoming.
- Berkhout, Joost. 2014. 'Codebook for Websites of Interest Organizations: Why interests organize on only some issues.' University of Amsterdam
- Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleisher. 1990. *The President in the Legislative Arena*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleisher. 2000. "Partisanship and the President's Quest for Votes on the Floor of Congress." In Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher (eds.), *Polarized Politics: The President and Congress in a Partisan Era*. Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Brace, Paul and Barbara Hinckley. 1992. *Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents*. New York: Basic Books.
- Brody, Richard A. 1991. *Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Burstein, Paul, Shawn Bauldry, and Paul Froese. 2007. "Bill Sponsorship and Congressional Support for Policy Proposals, from Introduction to Enactment or Disappearance." *Political Research Quarterly* 58: 295-302.
- Cameron, Charles M. 2000. *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Canes-Wrone, Brandice and Scott de Marchi. 2002. "Presidential Approval and Legislative Success." *Journal of Politics* 64: 491-509.
- Cohen, Jeffrey E., Jon R. Bond, Richard Fleisher, and John A. Hamman. 2000. "State-Level Presidential Approval and Senatorial Support." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25: 577-59.
- Collier, Kenneth and Terry Sullivan. 1995. "New Evidence Undercutting the Linkage of Approval with Presidential Support and Influence." *Journal of Politics* 57: 197-209.

- de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1835 and 1840. *Democracy in America*, Volumes I and II.
- Edwards, George C. III and Andrew Barrett. 2000. "Presidential Agenda Setting in Congress." In Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher (eds.), *Polarized Politics: The President and Congress in a Partisan Era*. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Edwards, George C. III. 1989. *At the Margins: Presidential Leadership in Congress*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Grossman, Matt 2014. *Artists of the Possible: Governing Networks and American Policy Change since 1945*. Oxford University Press
- Hall, Richard L., and Alan V. Deardorff. 2006. "Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy." *American Political Science Review* 100 1: 69-84.
- Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and Robert Salisbury. 1993. *The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making*. Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press.
- Kernell, Samuel. 1997. *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*. 3rd ed. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press
- Kiewet D. Roderick and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Leech, Beth L. 2013. *Lobbyists at Work*. New York: Apress.
- Leech, Beth L. "Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 35, no. 4 (2003): 665-68.
- Light, Paul C. 1999. *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Clinton*. 3rd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Madison, James. 1788. *Federalist 10. The federalist: a collection of essays, written in favour of the new Constitution*. New York.
- McKay, Amy and Brian Webb. 2017. "Presidential Success in Congress: The Effect on Interest Groups." Working manuscript.
- Nelson, Robert L. and John P. Heinz. 1988. "Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in Washington." *Law & Society Review* 22: 237-30.
- Neustadt, Richard E. 1990. *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan*. New York: Free Press.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Ostrom, Charles W. Jr. and Dennis M. Simon. 1985. "Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity." *American Political Science Review* 79: 334-358.
- Rivers, Douglas and Nancy L. Rose. 1985. "Passing the President's Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 29: 183-196.
- Rogers, James R. 2005. "The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Production." *Public Choice* 123: 217-233.
- Rohde, David W. and Dennis M. Simon. 1985. "Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response: A Study of Institutional Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 29: 397-427.
- Skowronek, Stephen. 1993. *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton*. Cambridge [Mass.]: Harvard University Press.

- Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Wood, B. Dan and Han Soo Lee. 2009. "Explaining the President's Issue Based Liberalism: Pandering, Partisanship, or Pragmatism." *Journal of Politics* 71(4): 1577-1592.

**Table 1. Types of groups interviewed**

Group type	#	%
Trade	9	14 %
Business	16	25 %
Professional Association	5	8 %
Union	4	6 %
Citizen & other non-occupational	26	40 %
Other	5	8 %
Total	65	100 %

**Appendix: Coding procedure**

- Sources of data: Original data from AIG interviews, Executive Orders, Presidential Memos, and March 2017 Trump Administration. Budget.
- Review of all Executive Orders and Presidential Memos issued as of 5/26/17.
- Review of 2018 Budget released by Trump administration in March 2017.
- Data drawn from whitehouse.gov website.
- Hand-coded signal type contained in the three sources for 493 issues from 2016-2017 US-AIG interviews
- Each issue coded three times for each source.
- Coded -1 (Negative Signal) if issue was mentioned signal or action was in the opposite direction of the interest group's position. For example, if a group support greater funding for something and the budget proposed a reduced budget, it received a -1 code.
- Coded 0 if the issue was not mentioned.
- Coded 1 if issue was mentioned and aligned with the interest group's preferred position.
- Executive Order and Presidential Memo variables then combined to form Executive Action (i.e., if the issue was mentioned in either an Executive Order, Presidential Memo, or both).
- Numerical totals can be found in the tables.