3rd International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP3)

June 28-30, 2017 – Singapore

T02P20

Panel 20 – Formulating Public Policy

Session 3 - Policy Advice and Decision-Making: Case Studies

Explaining social actors influence on governmental agenda by adding an institutional analysis of the decision-making arena

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Thursday, June 29th, 13:30 to 15:30

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INTRODUCTION

The Multiple Stream Approach (MSA) is an influential analytical tool in public policy studies (for an assessment see Cairney, 2014). Although originally (Kingdon, 1995) focused on explaining agenda setting in policy cases in the EUA, in a quite rudimentary way compared to recent developments (Cairney and Jones, 2016), it is now widely admitted to be a model that can also be applied to the decision-making process of policy definition, in other words, to policy formation analysis: agenda setting and policy formulation (Zaharidis, 2007). Among all the debate and criticisms to this framework, the capacity of being applied to political and institutional contexts other than the EUA is a relevant issue for theory building as it would test the capacity of this analytical lens to be generalized to other cases (Béland and Howlett, 2016). In this paper, we are interested in verifying the explanatory capacity of MSA in one case study that presents a quite different political configuration: instead of Congress, agenda setting takes a bottom-up format, starting from civil society participatory arenas, and the decision-making process involves social actors who alternate between the role of social movement activists and bureaucrats at the time of policy formation.

As it is known, the MSA presents basic structural categories that would explain policy formation: the three streams (problems, policy and politics), the policy window event and the role of policy entrepreneurs (Zaharidis, 2007).

Our case study is the approval of a 2011 policy program named "Youth Alive" (PJV, acronym in Portuguese), which focused on preventing violence against young black persons in Brazil. The PJV is considered the first public policy dealing with this issue, despite the known history and mobilizations of awareness of this problem. Data available for the last 30 years shows a dramatically increase in the murder of young people (15 to 29 years-old): from 3,159 in 1980 to 25,255 in 2014 (Waiselfisz, 2016), above the average growth rate of murders' victims of all ages (over 50,000 homicides in the country in one year). Moreover, around 90% of these young victims are male and more than 75% of them are black. Given that 50,7% of Brazilians (Population Census of 2010, IBGE) define themselves as blacks, there is an obvious overrepresentation of homicide among black young people. Besides, an underestimated figure shows that at least 3,500 of these deaths

are the result of confrontational episodes with police forces.

From the problem stream perspective, indicators and various focusing events (murder cases of national repercussion) had been "flowing" for decades on its own independent dynamics as originally described by Kingdon. Several national and international organizations have drawn attention to this social problem throughout the 1990s to the 2000s, especially black social movements, which sees this type of violence targeted towards young black people living in poor areas of the country, in other words, as also the result of persisting racism in the Brazilian society and discriminatory attitudes from state institutions, including police forces. Until 2011, none of this resonated in Congress or the Presidency. The focus on young black people is, thus, justified by the higher incidence of homicide cases among the black population associated or even as a result of cultural racism still present in Brazilian society.

The transformation of this "condition" to a recognized "problem" that demanded attention from government authorities initiated at the "Conference for Public Policies for the Youth" in 2008. Public Policies Conferences are participatory and deliberative mechanisms used in Brazil to produce guidelines or priorities for the government in specific policy areas. Different segments of the civil society and government officials share the participation in these venues, which have a mixed top-down/bottom-up format: a national commission organizes the format and scope of the Conference and deliberations start from local municipalities, results are then deliberated in state or regional level and finally aggregated to a final National venue, which produces a final document with guidelines. As we explore in detail further on, the 2008 Conference for the Youth was characterized by active and strategic participation of a policy community that advocated more human rights as policy priority. The priority number 1 of the final document produced by this Conference contained recommendations for the government to deal with the issue of the high levels of violence that the black young population was constantly subject to.

As expected from MSA, the framing of the issue within the problem stream, however, does not suffice to transform it into policy formulation and it had to wait for a policy window that would open three years after the Conference. In 2011, with the election of a new administration and the nomination of activists from social movements to office positions at the

National Secretary for the Youth creates an opportunity to transform the conference deliberations into policy priority now from inside the government. Previous policy alternatives already under discussion served as a base for the design of solutions. The policy stream dynamics also reflects MSA expectations: a narrower policy community that shared similar interpretation of the causes of the issue and the definition of a viable alternative, which excluded some of the original demands.

So, if the MSA seem to fit quite well to explain this case up to now, when we observe the politics stream we find something different. In the politics realm, members of Congress and the Brazilian public opinion did not share the same view of the problem and, therefore, there was no political mood to support this policy as a solution.

As we will see in more detail further on, there was a dispute between the interpretation of the problem, its causes and respective solutions from the outside of the participatory arenas. Social movement activists and other human rights organizations understood policy solutions should focus on the young persons as victims of violence, including the ones killed by police forces. By contrast, members of the public security policy community and representatives of police and security forces in Congress believed causes for violence were related to a lack of effective police repression and insufficient punishment of violence perpetrators. For this community, strongly represented as caucus in Congress, police violence against the black, poor and young is not deliberately, hence not the result of racism, but rather a consequence of heavily armed drug trafficking which dominates underprivileged territories producing frequent confrontation with police forces.

In addition, public opinion itself supported more repressive and punitive solutions: a poll carried out in 2016 showed that 57% of Brazilians agreed with a(n) (in)famous phrase that reveals clearly their preference "a good criminal is a dead criminal" referring to the extremely high levels of police deadly confrontations (Datafolha, Nov/2016). So, national mood and the support of Congress cannot to be seen, at first, to fit MSA expectations.

This fit, however, is only apparent as we take into consideration an institutional analysis of the decision-making arena. The politics stream typically is focused on Congress, the President, political leaders etc but policy decision can occur in other institutional settings. An insulated

decision-making arena is characterized by the participation of a relatively unified policy community in terms of ideas and beliefs and the absence of (potential) opposing groups with credible veto powers. By incorporating an institutional analysis of the politics streams we not only can observe the political actors who can influence and support or oppose the issue but also who gets access to the definition of the alternatives within the policy stream.

Zohlnhöfer, Herweg and Huß (2015) also propose the introduction of institutional features to improve the specification of MSA. We share their understanding of this analytical need. We understand, it is reasonable to assume that specific forms of institutional settings increase the likelihood of problems becoming policies as they define who gets access to decision-making arena. Likewise, other institutional settings may produce more fragmentation of views and beliefs or more veto points or players. So, specifying which institutional settings are more conducive to agenda setting and policy formulation could be a relevant analytical contribution to MSA. This does not invalidate the MS, quite on the contrary, incorporating institutional effects show the incentives and constraints for behaviour and hence choice but actors and ideas remain central: "MS subscribes to the notion that institutions make things possible, but people make things happen" (Zahariads, 2007, p. 84)

We also adopt the idea of Mukherjee and Howlett (2015) of the need to identifying the actors in a stream. In our study, some key political actors are present in all three streams. We also understand that there is not only one policy entrepreneur, but a couple of them acting upon coupling politics, policies and problems together. In fact, we treat policy entrepreneurs as a restricted group of a wider policy community who share similar views, ideas or interpretations about politics, policy alternatives and problems. We are aware this is not generalizable as entrepreneurs may belong, for example, to different ideological camps (Remit, Herweg and Huß, 2015), but it may also be considered as a factor that influence political and policy integrity as there is less need for bargaining or negotiations with political actors from outside the policy community.

The objective of this paper, therefore, is to verify if MSA could also explain a specific political format in which agenda setting (or problem attention) is defined in participatory arenas involving civil society actors

and, hence, different from the standard analysis of traditional political institutions, such as the Presidency, Congress and alike. A second objective is to test whether the incorporation of an institutional perspective that identifies who will have access to the decision-making arena is a useful analytical tool. We hope that by analyzing one case study in-depth with the analytical lens of MS we can contribute to theory building.

This text is divided into three sections, in addition to this introduction. In Section 1 we present the analytical elements of MSA, the need to specify institutional settings and who are the actors, and its application to our case study. In Section 2, we give an overview of our case applying MSA and institutional analysis. Section 3 shows how the agenda of black youth social movements became a policy priority in participatory arena that would serve later for governmental agenda setting and how preliminary solutions to the problem of homicide among young black persons were also being prepared inside the National Council for the Youth, another participatory institution with members from the policy community of social movements activists. In Section 4, we focus on the policy window and the decision-making arena responsible for the formulation of PJV within the government and the role of policy entrepreneurs at this stage. In the final considerations, we highlight the contributions of MSA to our case study and the possibility of improving new analytical categories to increase theory building.

The empirical analysis was based on the following sources: 1) articles, dissertations and other published studies on the PJV; 2) data, documents, reports on activist blogs and reports already produced on the Plan; 3) five in-depth interviews with people who were at some point involved in the discussion of the issue and/or the elaboration of this policy and 4) the experiences of the authors themselves either as an activist of the black movement or as an evaluator of the PJV Program, which included technical visits with program managers in Brasilia. The interviews proved to be a crucial source of information to understand behaviors and choices of political actors involved and also to capture the effects of these movements for the resulting public policy.

Section 1. The Multiple Streams Approach: revisions and a case for institutional analysis

As it is known, the MSA presents basic structural categories that

would explain policy formation: the three streams (problems, policy and politics), the policy window event and the role of policy entrepreneurs (Zaharidis, 2007). Essentially, policy window is an opportunity that increases the likelihood of a problem to become a priority on government agenda providing a political entrepreneur is able to explore the streams of problems, policies and politics. In this section, we present some basic features of MSA and how we see the application of them to our case study.

The problem stream refers to the capacity of "framing the issue" as a potential object for public policy (Mukherjee and Howlett, 2015). It is characterized by the construction of an image in which a "situation" is persuaded to be a "public problem" in the sense that it needs government attention. It is understood as a moment of persuasion and it is interpretive - as opposed to an objective assessment -, involving essentially ideas, values and beliefs (Zaharidis, 2007; Kingdon, 1995; Mukherjee & Howlett 2015, Capella and Brazil, 2015).

The policy stream involves the definition of policy alternatives, or solutions to the problem, normally generated by specialists or policy communities (Zaharidis, 2007). It refers to building feasible or accepted solutions, which, for MSA, is not a rational and objective choice but rather a choice anchored on the values and beliefs of participants as there is normally more than one alternative to a problem (Mukherjee & Howlett, 2015). Based on the garbage can model, solutions are normally "ready" waiting for a problem to emerge in the political arena and can be proven to be quite controversy concerning disputes on the causes of the problem at stake and consequently the policies that could fix it (Birkland, 2007, p. 65).

Finally, the politics stream is referred originally by Kingdon as the level of political (and public) support to a problem (Kingdon 1995: 198). For Zaharidis (2007, p. 73), the political stream "consists of three elements: the national mood, pressure-groups campaigns, and administrative or legislative turnover". So, in this sense, the higher is the recognition from the public opinion that a problem should be the object of a public policy, the more likely to gather force and support. The same logic applies to pressure groups. However, the flow of the politics stream is especially influence by government change in power, seen as an opportunity to introduce new issues in the government agenda.

As streams are thought to be floating independently on its own

dynamics, sometimes a "critical juncture" or "policy window" emerge. It is a moment when the three streams are coupled or joined together (Zaharidis, 2007) opening a critical opportunity for political actors in an epistemic community to explore the need of governments to recognize the public relevance of a problem and the need for a solution (public policy). Triggers of a policy window may be "focus events" - such as disasters or indicators that are being debated in the public opinion - or "institutional events" - such as the change of government after elections. However, this moment does not automatically guarantee that a problem will be recognized as a priority in governmental agenda. On the contrary, MSA foresees that, at this moment, political actors need to exploit this opportunity and build alliances or support on a substantive agenda. Hence, the role of political entrepreneurs.

Political entrepreneurs are people who see the opening of a policy window and invest time and resources in building coalitions that connect solutions to problems and also join (coupling) the support from the political environment (Kingdon, 1995, p. 20). Analytically, MSA sees this time (or event) as "wrapping things up", that is, when the researcher can observe that the three streams are ready to be exploited by political actors. Originally, political entrepreneurs were seen as an individual, quite in an isolated term, but recent developments of MSA suggest that there is also the possibility for multiple (individual) political entrepreneurs acting in all three streams – or not (Mukherjee and Howlett, 2015) and also collective entrepreneurs (Remit, Herweg and Huß, 2015).

Zahariadis (2007) highlights one of the assumptions of this analytical perspective which refers to "how policies are made by national governments under conditions of ambiguity" (p. 65). Ambiguity refers to a situation where there are many alternatives for the solution of a problem, sometimes irreconcilable ones, cases in which more information does not solve the puzzle, although choices have to be made. Another element which is central in MSA is the role of ideas, especially guiding the framing of the problem and also the selection of alternatives as a clear contrast to an abstract model of objective rationalizations to explain collective choice. In this sense, "framing the issue" is a crucial step to place the problem as a potential object of a public policy (Zaharidis, 2007; Mukherjee and Howlett, 2015).

Some authors have pointed out the limitations of MSA but it is still understood for many policy analysts (Cairney and Jones, 2016) as a powerful and straightforward tool to identify processes and key elements that increase the likelihood of an issue becoming a public policy. Although originally centered in agenda setting, Kingdon's model has been subject of various additional specifications and empirical testing with varying degrees of success (Cairney, 2014).

Two further proposals for specification are especially useful here for our case study: who are the political entrepreneurs in all the streams and the effect of institutional settings on who have access to the decision-making arena.

Mukherjee and Howlett (2015) argue that a lack of specifications of who are the actors within the streams and subsystems obscures the role of them in different settings as empirical findings suggest that there is a "tendency of policy actors to form substantive issue alliances that cross institutional boundaries and include both governmental and non-governmental actors" (p. 67).

As well see later on, this kind of interaction applies well to our study as it shows the influence of social movement activists as political actors both as advocates, acting in social movements and participatory arenas, and as decision-makers, when they become bureaucrats within the state apparatus.

Second, Remit, Herweg and Huß (2015) suggest the introduction of the effect of formal institutions on decision-making or veto powers. They argue specifically that the political stream is strongly affected by institutions as, for example, it defines if policy entrepreneurs will be able to gather a majority of support, which is dependent on institutional settings, especially relevant when the policy need members of Parliament support. The authors also highlight the role of veto players, which may be able to block proposals, and the limitations that some institutional and political settings may produce on the strategies (and success) of a policy entrepreneur:

> In line with the institutionalist public policy literature, it can be expected that decision couplings will be unproblematic if a cohesive majority party backs the proposal resulting from agenda coupling in a Westminster political system. In contrast, if the proposal in question is advocated by an actor

who does not control all the relevant potential veto institutions, it is far from clear whether the proposal will be adopted at all and if so in which form. This argument again is completely in line with the mainstream literature on the impact of political institutions on public policies (Remit, Herweg and Huß, 2015, p. 7-8).

Although within this analytical universe abound attempts to specify the effects of certain institutions on the final outcome (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985; Peters, 2005; Immergut, 1998), there are two institutions that seems to to increase the chances of a problem becoming part of the government agenda in spite of a (initial) adverse political environment: the degree of centralization of decision-making authority in the Executive and the institutional opportunities for veto players to act.

Since the 1988 Democratic Constitution, there is a relative consensus that the institutional configuration provides the Brazilian executive (Presidents and Ministers) with different institutional advantages to adopt national policies in a highly centralized fashion (Figueiredo and Limongi, 1999) even within a federal state (Arretche, 2012) This institutional setting allows the Executive different strategies to initiate public policies. We will observe this in the case of the Plan Youth Alive (PJV) as this policy were formulated within the Presidential Office and did not need Congress approval.

With regard to opportunities to veto certain institutional configurations can produce, study Immergut (1992) is exemplary. The author analyzes how the proposals for creating public health systems in three European countries were processed, which, despite starting the decision process with relatively similar political characteristics, objectives and social demands, have very different results. The author comes to the conclusion that the institutional configurations of decision-making spaces were decisive. Also in our case, the potential veto players, against aspects of the proposal were excluded from the decision-making arena.

We turn now to the application of all these analytical lens to our case study.

Section 2.   MSA, actors and institutions: an overview of the case in study

The Youth Alive Program (PJV) is considered as one of the examples of transversal policies whose goal is to produce social protection and promotion by mobilizing different sectoral policy (Castro, 2012). It has its focus on young people, which in Brazil is defined from the ages of 15 to 29 years-old, and is targeted at the most vulnerable population. The chosen policy alternative was based on two sets of actions do curtail violence: 1) the guarantee of social rights and reduction of inequalities by giving access to various public services for the most socially vulnerable young people; and 2) awareness raising actions to reduce the "culture of violence" and "institutional racism", focused on combating racism and intolerance within public office institutions, including a high divisive issue in Brazil: police violence.

So, how do we apply MSA to our case study? The problem stream was being explored by social movements surrounding two segments in civil society: black movements and the organized youth movements. The framing of the issue (homicides among black persons were a concern for the whole youth) was specified within a participatory venue (the National Conference) and, finally, preliminary alternatives were discussed inside another participatory arena, the National Council of Youth Representatives (CONJUVE in Portuguese), a consultive collegiate body on public policies for the Youth with 60 representatives from the civil society (2/3) and the government (1/3). In our case at least, the framing of the issue is mixed with the politics stream as these social movement actors were also acting as a pressure group within the participatory venues. At this point, problems and politics are occurring (and being defined) outside government and Congress. Could this be understood as a bottom-up framing of the issue?

The use of participatory Conferences for the definition of Public Policy guidelines for specific policy areas has grown considerably during Lula and Dilma governments, members of the Worker's Party[4]. Romão (2014) accounts to eight conferences during Franco government (1992-1994), seventeen in Cardoso government (1995-2002), 65 in Lula government (2003-2010) and 26 in the first year of Dilma Rousseff government (2011). These participatory conferences, although producing varied impact on

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[4] From 1992 to 2011, there has been more than one hundred Policy Conferences in a wide scope of themes: education, health, culture, regional development, LGBT, racial equality to quote only a few.

policy formation, from none to some (Abers, Serafim and Tatagiba, 2014) are arenas occupied by civil society organizations and also social and popular organized movements, connect or not to a political party.

The youth black movements were not only active during the Conference of Public Policies for the Youth in 2008 but also acted strategically to convince other segments of the youth of the common grounds of their agendas (Moura, Silva and Gomes, 2017). For black movement activists and other organizations that supported their claims, there was no vagueness concerning the causes and consequences of the problem. For them, an association of lack of access to rights and public services with a historically and ingrained racist society produced social exclusion and the target of violence, including a selective attitude by police forces targeting poor and black young man, understood by activists as "the extermination or genocide of black people" by police forces.

The definition of alternatives (solutions) within the policy stream had two identifiable moments, both associated with a narrower policy community. Preliminary alternatives were discussed by a working group formed inside the National Council of Youth Representatives with the responsibility of starting to think about how to implement the guidelines approved in the National Conference. A second moment, more critical and decisive concerning the definition of a "technical feasibility and value acceptability" (Zaharidis, 2007, p. 72) is when the issue reaches government arenas. At this point in time, social activists become bureaucrats as many of them are designated to office positions. No members of other policy communities that could oppose or veto those policy alternatives had access to this policy arena giving the institutional settings.

This explains why it was possible to overcome the resistance to the project which may have arose in Congress. A public security policy community (Pavez, Gonçalves and Toledo, 2009, Pavez, 2013), with representatives in Congress, that had a different view (or belief) of the causes of the problems and the consequent needed solutions, were not involved in any of the streams. For them, the causes of violence were due to a lack of effective punitive laws, and consequence of drug trafficking disputes over territorial control that demanded, as policy solution, increased punishment and more equipped police repression. Parliament

Representatives of the public security policy community are especially organized in caucus in the Lower House. An estimate of April/2015 accounted to 275 representatives as members of the public security front inside the House, formed by ex-policemen, investigators and other members who share the views and beliefs of this community[5], which would amount to 54% of total seats. Other caucuses representing the interests of large agriculture and cattle farming businesses and the conservative evangelical caucus also tend to align themselves with the problem view or understanding of public security members. In fact, some of the representative may belong to more of one caucus or front (for example, public security and evangelical). The combination of these three caucuses associated with more conservative values would amount to 73% of total seats in the Lower House.

In fact, with one exception, all remaining social activists we interviewed answered straight forward: the Youth Alive (PJV) would never be approved in Congress. Reasons vary: one social activity says "it would not have a chance, it was not even a priority for the government at that time"; another says: "Congress would say that the proposal was to protect young criminals and vagabonds", other mentions "the issue of police brutality against the black and poor is a highly sensitive issue in Congress". The only one to partially disagree said "parts of the proposal would be approved, but not with the same contents in a Congress with strong conservative caucuses"

A majority of Brazilians are also supporters of more repressive measures as a solution to growing violence. An opinion poll showed that 87% of Brazilians agree with the proposal to lower the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16 (Datafolha polling institute, June/2015)[6] - that is to say, they should be tried as an adult and incarcerated in overcrowded prisons. For social movements, on the contrary, this type of solution would not eliminate the cause of the problem and it would only make it worse as it would, firstly, eliminate completely the adoption of measures adequate to adolescents. Secondly, adolescents would enter adult overcrowded prison system dominated by criminal factions where their destinies would then be

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[5] For a newspaper article on this, see http://politica.estadao.com.

[6] An English version of this poll can be read in https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/16/brazil-teenage-criminals-juvenile-rehabilitation.

sealed. As we also mentioned in the introduction, Brazilians also accept police violence as a way to curtail criminal activities ("a good criminal is a dead criminal").

In spite of this quite adverse political environment and national mood, there was the advent of a policy window in 2011 with a administrative turnover. As we will show the evidences further on, on the first year of President Dilma Rousseff government (from the Workers Party, PT), she nominated a young activist woman from social movements to the National Secretary for Youth Policies. As the first youngster to occupy this office, she uses this opportunity to propose the introduction of the issue of black persons homicides to the government agenda with the argument that it was a priority defined in the previous participatory venues, giving a legitimate reason within a political party historically connected to social movements. In other words, problem representation (framing) gets its force also from the idea that this was a priority defined by "popular consultation" as a result of social movements or civil society demands, creating a symbolic image strategically explored by both government and social and popular movements. The latter would explore the final policy outcome as the sole result of their mobilization capacity, reinforcing their discourses, beliefs and values.

Additionally, the new Secretary for the Youth brought other activists to compose her team, a group of youngsters occupies now decision-making positions in government. In this sense, activists become bureaucrats, which within the Brazilian literature on social movements is identified as movements of crossing the border between state and civil society, creating and reconstructing themselves in these positions (Abers and von Bulow, 2011; Dowbor, (2012). In terms of forming political alliances to advance their interests, Mukherjee and Howlett also observe a "cross institutional boundaries and include both governmental and non-governmental actors" (Mukherjee and Howlett, 2015, p. 67).

When the idea for dealing with the issue of black persons homicides arrives at the Executive Branch in 2011 would still need to be constructed. The issue was not seen yet as a priority and there were resistance from other government cabinets, including the Racial Equality Secretary and the Ministry of Justice. On the other hand, the support of the government Chief of Staff was crucial to gather collaboration from different Cabinets with a

larger budget, hence a capacity to provide some of the solutions involved in the definition of policy alternatives.

We now describe in more detail the interaction of these dynamics processes by analysing: problem framing, the actors in different streams and policy formulation.

Section 3. Problem Framing from bottom-up

As we pointed out in previous sections, the adoption of the PJV had an important symbolic meaning. First, because it was the first policy that explicitly mentioned the problem of prevalence of homicides among black youths. Secondly, it addresses part of the agenda of social movements, especially the black youth movements. So, how these events – the agenda of black youth movement and policy formation – connected to each other? In order to capture this, we need to look into the dynamics of some events taking into consideration their development and interconnectedness over time and the interactions between government and social actors. We attempt here to summarize the main events and actors involved, although it is still a dense description in order to show one central analytical aspect: how the issue was framed by youth black movements from a concern specific to the black youth community to a common issue to all of the youth during the First Conference of Public Policies for the Youth.

The black movement in Brazil dates from from the 1960s, but it is the creation of the Unified Black Movement (MNU) in 1978 which reorganizes the movement (Domingues, 2007). Since then the urban and police violence against the black people has been part of their mobilization agenda, based on public actions and campaigns on combating racism. But it is only from the opening of a youth policy agenda by Lula's government in 2003 that the black youth gets organized as a collective actor representing the interests of this segment.

In the first year of Lula administration, a general agenda for policies to the Youth was initiated. In 2003, a Special Committee on Public Policies for the Youth was established in the Lower House, which started a national discussion on this theme. From the report of this committee, drafts for a National Youth Plan and a Youth Statute emerged as well as the proposal to organize a National Conference on this theme. These proposals encompassed all of the youth and there were specificities concerning

violence and homicides at this moment in time.

Two years later, in 2005, the government creates the National Youth Secretariat (SNJ) subordinated to the General Secretariat of the Presidency (SG-PR), the National Youth Council (CONJUVE) and the National Program for Youth Inclusion (ProJovem) as a first response to the demands of social movements (Novaes, 2007). In fact, the signaling, early in Lula administration, that there would be a policy agenda for the youth produced an expansion of the organization of sectors and segments of social movements and associations specialized in youth issues. In this sense, "politics generated politics" by guiding the organization of movements and, as a consequence, broadening the mobilization around the theme of youth (Lowi, 1972 apud Souza, 2006, p.28).

This government decisions stimulated the "politicization of the youth" expanding the amount and type of organized social movements and organizations dedicated to the youth. These political events also impacted the youth segments of the black movement and they organize their First National Meeting of the Black Youth (I ENJUNE) in 2007, considered by activists as a historical and associative milestone (Ramos, 2014). The first ENJUNE produces two results relevant to our analysis: it sets their priority agenda in terms of policies and organized a network of actors for the first time with national capillarity. The following year, this organization would pay off. The youth black activists would arrive at the the National Conference on Public Policies for the Youth in 2008 organized and with a list of problems to be discussed and deliberate in this participatory venue (Juliano Gonçalves and Samoury Mugabe, interviews to the authors).

The resolution (or guidelines) approved in the ENJUNE in 2007 would be later on chosen as the priority agenda for all of the Brazilian youth at the Conference in 2008. The ENJUNE generated a report with approximately 700 proposals, in which themes such as homicide and police violence against the black youth appeared (see, for example, the ENJUNE resolution, 2007, pp. 13 and 14).

So, how could a relatively small segment of the youth get their priority agenda approved as number one in the National Conference? This is explained by two strategies activists adopted: organized participation in all deliberative spaces of the Conference and the sympathy of activists from other segments of the youth to form alliances and to obtain support in the

moments of deliberation. The support of other segments at the time of voting was crucial:

> We managed to convince the quilombola [communities formed by remnants afrodescents refugees from slavery times] youth that their were also black youth and they needed to vote. We managed to convince the youth segments from political parties that the black youth issue was important inside their own parties [referring to party members]. We were able to aggregate the issues of gender and LGBT by arguing that [there is] black youth also within LGBT and gender movements (Juliano Gonçalves, interview in Ramos, 2014, page 138)

After the Conference deliberations, the results were forward to another participatory venue. Between 2009 and 2010, at the end of the 1st Conference for the Youth and also the Second Conference for the Promotion of Racial Equality, the National Council of Youth Representatives (CONJUVE) began to study how to formulate the guidelines approved as priorities in the two Conferences.

Members of the CONJUVE had participated in the conferences and were also representatives of social movements, political parties and other organizations related to the Youth. But, an institutional change in the composition of CONJUVE allows the expansion of the representation of other segments of youth. With this, in 2008 black youth organizations and the black social movements increased their representation in this National Youth Council (BRAZIL, 2012). For Ramos (2014), this change in the representation, from 2008, allowed the insertion of more representatives linked to social movements rather than the previous overrepresentation of political parties activists.

The construction of policy proposals was organized by forming a Working Group of the Black Youth inside the CONJUVE. Seminars with social movements, specialists on the issue of youth and human rights, and government officials were organized with the goal of building guidelines for a Plan to Combat Black Youth Mortality (Ramos, 2014). Among the members of this Working Group, there were actors from different black social movements that formed a policy community who shared similar views on the problems of the black youth. As highlighted by our

interviewee, who served as a representative in CONJUVE, the discussion of this agenda was led by Ângela Guimarães (member of the black social movement named UNEGRO and affiliated to the Brazilian Communist Party). Later on, Angela would hold the presidency of CONJUVE and, subsequently, she would occupy government positions, becoming a broker between the work being done by the Working Group and the government. Ângela would, in 2011, become the Assistant Secretary at the National Youth Secretariat in Dilma Rousseff government when the Youth Alive program is adopted.

As the first steps within the policy stream, a document is produced by this Working Group, identifying the priorities and with recommendations for policy formulation. The timing of this event could not be more appropriate. One year later, an unexpected policy window opens with the change in administration and in the functions of the National Secretariat of Youth. At this point, the problem stream was matured and some preliminary solutions to the problem were also ready. However, as we will see in the next section, policy formulation inside the government had to filter many of the original demands from social movements.

Section 4. Policy Formulation after a Policy Window: actors coupling streams within an insulated institutional setting

As we described in the previous section, both the framing of the issue and the initial proposals of policy alternatives involved a narrow policy community that shared similar views and beliefs in their interpretation of the problem involving the high incidence of black youth mortality as a result of murders. In a broader sense, this community is connect to a wider network of actors, from different social sectors, that assumes human rights as a baseline for problem solution and policy making. There were no members of the public security community, such as conservative representatives from the Lower House, in any of these dynamics. In this section, we show how the institutional settings where policy definition was made also prevented the role of any potential veto player. In this sense, the politics stream was restricted to gather support from inside the government, which, in turn, influenced the policy alternatives available at the time for political actors. This section is heavily based on the information gathered from our five interviews and some documents/reports

published by the Brazilian Presidency Office.

In the first year of the Dilma Rousseff government (2011), there is an administrative change that opens a policy window for the issue of violence against the black youth to become a policy. Although Rousseff was a member of the same party (the Workers Party, PT) that had governed in the previous eight years (with Lula as President), she adopted new administrative strategies, policy priorities which, among other things, meant a review on the role of the National Secretariat of the Youth (SNJ, in the acronym in Portuguese) that would be the locus of the policy formulation of the PJV.

Although dealing with issues related to the youth, the SNJ had not yet been led by young persons themselves, even though some activists from political parties and social movements had occupied office positions within the Secretariat. The former Secretary for Youth was Beto Cury (2005 to 2010), also a member of the Worker's party, an adult who came from the trade union movement but had no direct activism in youth social movements. Cury, together with Regina Novaes (a renowned researcher on the subject of youth) initiated new public policies targeting the youth, among them PROJOVEM ("pro-youth program for social inclusion"), the most important policy in terms of number of beneficiaries and the size of the budget[7].

However, in 2011, President Rousseff decides to transfer the leading policy program PROJOVEM to the Ministry of Education for reasons of improving the implementation of this program, which would automatically diminished substantially the role of the Secretariat of the Youth (Divaneide Basílio by interview). When Severine Macedo is appointed to be Secretary of the Youth, however, she saw a political opportunity to introduce policies that had already being matured in the participatory venues. As a policy entrepreneur, Macedo saw these administrative changes as a policy window to advance an issue that the government did not show any intention of incorporating as a government priority (Juliano Gonçalves and Samoury Mugabe by interviews). The fact that the guidelines were a decision from participative forums also gave some strength and legitimacy

[7] The PROJOVEM program provides educational and professional training to youngsters aged from 15 to 29 years who have not completed formal schooling. In 2010, an estimate of 1 million persons had been awarded a monthly benefit as part of the attendance to the activities of the program.

to the proposal as the worker's party motto for their governments were "participation as a method to govern" and it was strategically explored by Macedo and her team to convince the relevance of the theme for governmental agenda (and image). Presentations to the Presidency highlighting the data, indicators showing the level of murders in Brazilian and the profile of victims - young, black and poor -, were also used by Macedo (by interview) to call the attention of government officials.

Macedo had long links with social and trade unions, besides being a member of the Worker's Party. A young girl, from the rural countryside, a trade unionist (FETRAF) and an activist of social movements, she had been the National Secretary of Youth for the Worker's Party. Supported by various youth social movements, Macedo assembles a technical (specialists) and political (activists from social movements) team, many of whom had been at the participatory arenas described in the previous section, incorporating, thus, members of the same policy community who had transit among social movements and representatives in participatory forums.

Undersecretary Ângela Guimarães, was, as we described before, an activist of the black movement and had been a representative and President of the Council of the Youth, from the Brazilian Communist Party. Divaneide Basilio becomes the Chief of Staff, a black woman, founder of the Youth Network for the Northeast, an activist of the Grassroots Catholic Movement (PJMP). Fernanda Papa, was Project Director at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and because of her previous work on the youth theme and recognized capacity to articulate organizations and institutions, accredited her to be the coordinator of the Program (PJV). From the position of activists demanding attention from the State to urgent issues, they become bureaucrats and policymakers within State apparatus. These movements of actors between state and civil society occurred in many other policy areas in Brazil (Abers and von Bulow, 2011; Dowbor, 2012) influencing policy agenda and formulation. These changes in the composition of the Secretariat of Youth were seen as positive by activists from social movements. As Danilo Morais (by interview) puts it, the change gave: "greater legitimacy with the movements because before, one had the impression that the SNJ was very distant from the movements [when it was Beto Cury]" .

In the Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality (SEPPIR), an office which would share the elaboration and implementation of the PJV, also activists become bureaucrats. The then head of the Secretary, Luiza Bairros, was Member of the Unified Black Movement (MNU) and a renowned leader, especially in the Black Women's Movement. As a Youth Advisor at SEPPIR, Luiza calls Felipe Freitas, a young black person and activist who also had participated in the previous participatory forums. He had also been the national coordinator of the campaign "Enough of Violence and Extermination of Young People". It is pointed out by Severine Macedo (interview) as a key actor into articulating the support of SEPPIR. Later on, Larissa Borges, active in participatory forums, also holds an office position to coordinate the PJV.

After gathering these social actors who had also been political actors within the policy and problem streams, the initial conditions was ready. Now from inside the government, the challenges were, first, to gather support from inside the Presidential Office as well as other Ministries and Secretaries within the Executive to provide acceptance and future support for the implementation of the policy; second, to specify a policy alternative technically viable but that could maintain the values of policy communities (Zaharidis, 2007, p. 72) and, third, to overcome two important actors for the success of the policy that presented resistance to adhere.

The initials actions were organized in two fronts. First, discussions with specialists in public Forums that would also involve other organizations from the civil society producing a combination of specialist suggestions with a widening support from other actors. These encounters were called "Forum of rights and Citizenship" and it was part of a wider strategy of the Brazilian Executive at that moment to produce "participation as a method of government". Second, the technical aspects were discussed inside the Presidential office where civil servants bureaucrats played a central role as they could advise on options to policy formulation. The most relevant solution, mentioned by our interviewees, but that can also be seen in the final policy document, was the idea of introducing the issue of race and/or violence within existing programs being implemented by other Ministries. By using a management technique called "situation rooms" (thematic gatherings bringing together policymakers and civil servants from different government offices), these

internal discussions essentially defined the final choice. As the Secretary of Youth states: "the PJV was designed inside the so called Black Youth Situation Room [and] in the beginning, it was difficult to convince the bureaucrats of the focus of the problem" referring to an explicit framing of lethal violence against the black youth, including the issue of "institutional racism".

The secretary of Youth together with her team would act as political entrepreneurs convincing bureaucrats and other officials of the important to maintain the focus on the black youth as a legitimate decision of previous participatory forums. At the same time, they would also engage into presenting the ongoing discussions to the Council of Youth (CONJUVE) and the Council of Representatives of Racial Equality (CPPIR) in order to keep the support of these representatives of civil society members outside government offices.

An important actor that political entrepreneurs gathered the support was the General Secretariat of the Presidency, Gilberto Carvalho. Considered a person with good relations and acceptance among social movements, our interviewers highlight that, initially, Carvalho and his deputy were convinced of the relevance of the issue when the Secretary of Youth and her team presented indicators of the prevalent incidence of murders among black youngsters that had been published, for the first time, with a racial estimate in Brazil (called "The Map of violence in Brazil 2004"): "the data touched them" said the Secretary of the Youth. Carvalho support was centrally important because he of position inside the Presidency and being a respected official (besides a public figure) who would himself call the meetings with officials from other Ministries and Departments which produced a higher number of attendees when compared to meetings called only by the unknown youngsters running the Secretary of Youth office. In this sense, the support of the Minister is seen as central to building a viable proposal.

Less than a year later, the Program Youth Alive was formulated and implementation started the following year, 2012, as a pilot project in the State with the highest levels of homicides among the black youth in Brazil, the northeastern State of Alagoas.

The final outcome, however, did not please members of the black youth social movements. For many of them the PJV meant a reduction in

the scope of actions compared to their original ideas discussed in the participatory forums, especially regarding a virtually absence of direct actions to curtail lethal police violence, a central issue for the human rights policy community. Indeed, the final policy does not involve any direct actions on this matter, only indirectly by proposing educational activities to "fight institutional racism" attempting to change the culture of organizations, including the police forces. For many of our interviews, the Ministry of Justice, which would have been the institution to act in public security matters, did not show much of an interest through the discussions of the PJV.

Although the Ministry of Justice did not became a veto player to the PJV, it was an office connected to the public security community which did not recognized racially motivated police violence as the real cause for the elevated number of homicides among this population. For the activist of CONEN (National Coordination of Black Entities) and a representative in CONJUVE, Danilo Morais: "the public safety agenda, especially the issue of police targeting is sensitive one not only in Congress but also within the Executive branch of the government". Officials and specialists of the Justice and Public Security Ministry, Morais continues: "are not opened to popular participation (…) and they reject the idea of police targeting (the blacks)". Another member of the black youth movement, Samoury Mungabe, goes further: "we (initially) won in the political (participatory) realms but lost in the institutional racism (…) the youth agenda was weakened as the result of these movements to stop an agenda that was flowing in a way that the big structures did not want to, even inside a more progressive government".

Ramos (2014, p. 154-156) also notices the absence of representatives from the Ministry of Justice in the debates on black youth homicide organized by the Council of Youth (CONJUVE) and even a surprise among representatives when the Ministry of Justice publicly announced the preparation of a "Plan for reduction of homicides" in parallel to what was being discussed in CONJUVE and CNPPIR. For Secretary of Youth, the difficult dialogue with the Ministry of Justice may be related to two reasons: the difficulty of breaking with the traditional model of public safety based on only on equipping the police and investigative support and an organizational culture which is not open to participatory decisions.

In fact, this collaboration was not possible to be established in 2011. The policy stream inside the government, therefore, filtered the original issues, selecting those alternatives that were technically viable at the formulation stage.

On the other hand, the political entrepreneurs of the PJV policy were able to overcome an initial unresponsiveness from another government office that were also crucial for policy formulation. A number of our respondents report that the Secretary of Racial Equality (SEPPIR in Portuguese) had to be convinced of joining the Program. Seen as a competing agenda with the policy priority already established by the Secretary, and thought "it should prioritize the Statute of Racial Equality." The PJV was being proposed not by the Secretary of Equality but byy the Secretary of Youth. According to Morais, however, SEPPIR slowly political actors from the youth movement who had transit between the two policy arenas – racial equality and youth – convinced the Secretary to collaborate and co-share the coordination of PJV. The arrival of Felipe Freitas, a black youngster and activist of the black movement who also had participated at the Council of the Youth, is considered by our respondents as the main broker to convince the support to PJV from the inside.

Final remarks

The application of the Multiple Stream Approach to our case study was helpful to explain how a sensitive a issue that divided opinions and beliefs was strategically explored by political entrepreneurs at a critical juncture. The fact that framing the issue was built from participatory forums as an agenda from social movements without any prior commitment from government, parliament or any other public official did not show to be an impediment for government agenda setting. As a matter of fact, based on the national mood (public opinion) and the amount of parliament representatives who did not share the same view of the causes of the issue, from the outset, MSA could predict that the issue of lethal violence against the black youth would not have all the conditions for the emergence of a policy window.

We argued here that even in divided situations in which the political stream does not seem to be in favour of issue support, MSA can explain problems turning into public policies at randomly or unpredictable

moments if the arena of decision-making is taken into account. In other words, institutional settings also influence the chances of a "condition" to become an "issue" and and a subject on the governmental agenda.

Essentially, institutional settings defines who is going to participate and have access to policy design and the decision-making. We find that the more insulated actors are from competing epistemic communities (potential veto players), the higher the likelihood of political entrepreneurs succeeding into coupling problems with politics and policy solutions. In our case at least, the centralization of legislative power in the Brazilian Executive Branch allowed political actors to produce policy-making without having to negotiate their proposals with members of Parliament. The Executive had enough institutional authority, in this case, to propose and implement public policies without Parliament consultation.

In fact, the institutional setting influenced not only the actors who could participate within the politics stream – voicing support or disagreement – but also within the policy stream as the alternatives were discussed among social movement activists who became government officials and civil servant bureaucrats, who had the technical knowledge to suggest viable solutions. One may also asserts that even the problem stream could be understood as influenced by institutional settings: the framing of the issue in participatory venues also involved a policy community that shared very similar views and beliefs and, again, did not encountered any unsurmountable veto points although negotiations and the formation of alliances were needed. If this policy had any legal obligation to be appreciated by Congress, the coupling of streams could still have been done but it is unlikely that the issues of institutional racism focused on police violence would have been maintained as close to the social movements views and beliefs on the matter.

This does not equate to say that all the original agenda set by social movements in participatory forums were maintained in the final outcome. But even the MSA model assumes that many filters will occur before a final alternative is chosen for different reasons such as pressure of time, incomplete information, not known viable solutions etc.

MSA was also analytical helpful to highlight how political entrepreneurs can explore policy windows strategically to further their agenda by alliances with key actors who help accepting the public or social

relevance of the issue as well as finding viable solutions to the problems at hand. Our case study suggests that it is more useful to think of collective actors (Zohlnhöfer, Herweg and Huß, 2015) and that also many of our political actors, especially the ones we identified as policy entrepreneurs, were acting in all three streams (Mukherjee and Howlett, 2015): framing the issues, discussing preliminary and viable solutions and convincing key actors of the political relevance of it.

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