



**3rd International Conference
on Public Policy (ICPP3)
June 28-30, 2017 – Singapore**

Panel T04P05 Session 2

Revisiting Policy Entrepreneurship

Title of the paper

*Policy Entrepreneurship in Indonesia:
A Case Study in the Bureaucracy Reform
through Auction Office Policy in Jakarta Province*

Author

Tri Rainny Syafarani

Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Australia

t.syafarani@murdoch.edu.au

Date of presentation

Friday, June 30th 2017

**Policy entrepreneurship in Indonesia:
A case study in the bureaucracy reform
through auction office policy in Jakarta Province ¹**

Tri Rainny Syafarani

Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of policy entrepreneurship during Joko Widodo's administrations in Indonesia. The focus of this paper is Widodo's Governorship in Jakarta Province (2010-2014). The paper utilizes the framework of Multiple Streams outlined by Kingdon (1995) to critically analyse and evaluate the role of policy entrepreneur in the policy process by examining a range of reforms in Indonesia. The focus of this paper is the introduction of an "auction office" in Jakarta Province, developed and implemented by Joko Widodo as a new method for the recruitment of public officials. This paper highlights insights from a range of key bureaucratic officials in the Indonesian bureaucracy in relation to the effectiveness of this reform process. The "auction office" provided a new method for the public official recruitment for the street level bureaucracy that had never be applied in Jakarta. This study argues that the success and effectiveness of policy entrepreneurship, particularly in the policymaking process of the "auction office" in Jakarta, have been influenced by several factors. First, Widodo's prior life experiences, executive position, personal characteristics and his role in administration positioned his credentials as a policy entrepreneur. Second, Widodo's efforts in proposing the new regulation of public official appointments were viewed as not being within central law at the national level and therefore there was little justification to run the new Jakarta provincial regulation. However, Widodo as a policy entrepreneur provided a strong argument that the new method of the auction office was indeed acceptable within the existing rules. Third, the idea of this new official recruitment method was an integral administrative reform, as Widodo positioned Jakarta's bureaucracy as an agenda priority. The paper argues therefore that the success of policy entrepreneurship in Jakarta was closely linked to Widodo's credentials and previous successes. The paper also positions this success as the precursor to Widodo's Presidential elevation to the national level in Indonesia.

Key words: policy entrepreneur, policy entrepreneurship, governor, open selection.

¹ *This manuscript is still a draft. Please do not cite or quote without permission from the author.*

1. Introduction

Since a policy window is the strategic point to put a problem onto agenda, the policy entrepreneur take a crucial part in coupling the streams together once the policy window is open. The role of policy entrepreneur in the policymaking process has been studied especially by Kingdon (1985), and Mintrom (2000) and Mintrom and Norman (2009). The studies show the significant of policy entrepreneurship in the agenda setting process. Policy change does not necessarily happen if there is policy entrepreneur present (Kingdon 1995), it needs entrepreneurship efforts in advocating policy change. In this case, the purpose of policy entrepreneur is similar with the entrepreneur in the business context (Mintrom and Norman 2009, 649). In the policymaking process, the policy entrepreneurs are those who have particular skills, pay attention in identifying problem and solution, take advantages in the policy window opportunity to promote policy change, and to create pressure on decision making process. More than that, their action is not only significant when the policy window is open but also in the process of influencing and pushing the window of opportunity to be open (Mintrom, 2000).

As Kingdon's findings (1995), most of the outcomes are influenced by the elected politicians and not by the hidden actors. It means that usually the actors are those who are already well known in the society. Also, although the policy entrepreneur can come from the inside and outside the government bodies, usually the actors who play in the policy process are the insider who is experienced for long time in policy-making process. Since most the players are insider, it seems that people who are considered as a policy entrepreneur inside the governmental bodies will also play as political entrepreneur. Thus, there is possibility for the intersection between policy entrepreneur and political entrepreneur, and that is also the reason

why sometimes the term of political entrepreneur and policy entrepreneur is used interchangeably.

Even though the differences seem not to be clear between the two, the definition of policy entrepreneurship can be determined by focusing on the activity related to policy process and policy “change”. Political entrepreneur could be anybody who is in the governmental bodies, but does not necessarily mean that he or she is actively involved in the policy process by using their own resources and capabilities to create and implement certain policy as the ultimate aim. In this sense, Stijn Brouwer and Frank Biermann (2011) state a clear difference between policy entrepreneurs with other actors in policymaking. Policy entrepreneurs are risk-takers who accept the possibility of failure as the consequence of the policy change process. Furthermore, although policy entrepreneur can be found within bureaucrats, they can be identified by the actions they take rather than by position they hold (Brouwer and Biermann 2011, 2).

There are several elements in the policy entrepreneur (Mintrom and Norman 2009, 652-654): displaying social acuity, defining problems, building teams, and leading by example. Displaying social acuity means that the policy entrepreneurs usually has a good relationship within a policy network or community and use it effectively. They also have a comprehensive knowledge and understanding about the problems and respond to those issues appropriately. In defining problems, policy entrepreneur not only has a skill to identify problem but also to present evidence that shows an impending crisis, to evaluate current policy, and to generate policy support from other actors linked to the problem.

Similarly, Brouwer and Biermann (2011, 3) found several strategies of policy entrepreneurs in order to pursue policy change: attention and support-seeking strategies in addressing problems, convincing a wide range of participants about the preferred policy; linking strategies in creating cooperation with other parties; relational strategies in relating other factors related to policy change; and arena strategies related to time and place of the action.

The studies about policy process in Indonesia are commonly related to policy actors and policy implementation. However, it is still difficult to find research that focus on the role of policy entrepreneur within the policy process. Nevertheless, R. William Liddle (2013) points out several findings by Indonesian scholars that demonstrated Kingdon's spirit of analysis. For example, Liddle describes a research conducted by S.A. Schuette (2012) about Anti-Corruption Reform in Indonesia. Although Schuette did not cite the Kingdon directly, the findings can be one case of study that shows the important role of the actors in the case of Anti-Corruption Reform (Liddle 2013, 75). Also, Liddle mentions about a research (dissertation) by Djayadi Hanan (2012) that explicitly revealed the interaction between the executives and legislative in Indonesian presidentialism and democracy (Liddle 2013, 75).

The notion of the actors' roles in the policy process attracts scholars to dig deeper. However, this raises questions regarding those who are insiders at the same time as political entrepreneur. Kingdon, as summarised by Liddle (2013, 74), has already conclude that the policy actors are usually involved in policy making process as the insider who already play for long period in that arena. This finding triggers the questions about what are the motives of the insiders (or those who previously acts as the outsider) to become policy entrepreneurs, and how they can manage their position in creating the strategies.

In fact, research on the relationship between the institutional reform and the policy process in developing countries has been carried out. For example, research by Grindle and Thomas (1989) examines the role of decision makers, primarily elites policy as actors who come from diverse backgrounds and interests, and the policy making process in constructing significant policy and institutional changes. The analysis is based on a comparative study of several developing countries. However, the results of that research have not demonstrated a direct role of a policy entrepreneur who simultaneously uses all the skills and resources for the realization of the change.

Research on how the policy entrepreneur contributes to policy reform in Indonesia is still rarely found. One example is research by Shiffman (2003) on the political will and agenda setting, in which one of the important factors to fight for an issue into the agenda of the policy process is a political entrepreneur. Although political entrepreneur is included as one of the important actors in the study, the concept of political entrepreneurs will be slightly different from the policy entrepreneur, since the discussion of policy entrepreneur will also intersect with other roles and characteristics that focus on the establishment of a policy.

Thus, this study elaborates the role of policy entrepreneurship in the bureaucracy reform through auction office policy in Jakarta Province as the capital city of Indonesia. This study utilises a qualitative approach that relies on a case study. Items of data are mainly gathered from interviews and relevant documents. In this case of study, the informants involving in the interviews are primarily from the Jakarta's Office, academician, and journalists. This method is used to gain information and explain the "how" and "why" some phenomenon works (Yin 2009).

The paper's structure is follow: First, the introduction. Second, the review of the policy process in Indonesia. Third, the discussion about the auction office regulation and the

bureaucracy reform in Jakarta Province. Fourth, the analysis of the policy entrepreneurship in the policy process of auction office, and then the conclusion.

2. Policy process in Indonesia

2.1. The relation between central and provincial level of government in Indonesia

Since the decentralization program that began in January 2001 in Indonesia, every district in Indonesia has been given more significant power and resources in many important areas of policy. In other words, the central government capacity has been attenuated in several sectors, especially in the election of the head of the region and the issues related to local political accountability.² Furthermore, there was a new fiscal that determined the general allocation grant, natural resources revenues, and shares taxed.³ The decentralization program was largely cited to bring the government “closer to the people”, since this legislation give a broader opportunity for public participation in political, economic, and social activities (Bunnell et al, 2013). Also, the decentralization prevented the bottlenecks in decision making caused by central government planning and control, as well as it increased the sensitivity to local conditions and needs among government officials (Bunnell et al, 2013).

The decentralization formed autonomous regions that have the right to: (1) organize and manage their own government affairs; (2) choose the regional leaders; (3) manage their regional apparatus; (4) manage the wealth of the region; (5) collect local taxes and levies; (6) generate the benefits from the management of natural resources and other resources in the

² Law No. 22/ 1999 (amended by Law No. 32/ 2004).

³ *Ibid.*

area; (7) obtain the other income from legitimate sources; (8) get the other rights regulated in the legislation.⁴

The regional autonomy policy has made every region has great authority in making decisions based on local needs. Moreover, the implementation of direct local elections held since 2005 has made the elected regional head gets a stronger legitimacy compared to when the head of the region was selected and appointed by legislators. Hence, this decentralization followed by the direct local election in Indonesia has given a great optimism, especially for the improvement of social welfare.

Since the local governments have been given more power and resources, however, there are several critics to this decentralization program. For example, the critics from Vedi R. Hadiz (2003). Another criticism of the decentralization program is the possibility of an increase in corruption, collusion and nepotism at the local level. This is because the decisions made at the local level might support the emergence of new “small kings” who had power over capital and resources. Moreover, there are still gaps and ambiguity in the perception and interpretation of the legislation, particularly which is concerning in the delegation of authority, that can be used by the bureaucrats at local level as a justification for the mismanagement of resources and failure of the project.

Furthermore, since the provincial government has a position as the representative of the central government in the region, the provincial government claimed to have the authority for the regulation and supervision to the local government (districts or cities). On the other hand, the local government relied on the broader understanding of the authority of governance that permits the local level government to have their own authority and responsibility.

⁴ Law No. 32, article 21.

The other issue related to the implementation of the decentralization is the different understanding about the hierarchy (levels) of government. In some cases, the provincial government tends to consider that the hierarchical relationships between the provincial and local government is still essential in order to provide facilitation, instruction and supervision to the local government. On the other hands, the local government considers themselves as independent so that it is not necessary for local government to get approvals from the provincial government. Thus, it seems that the extension of the authority given to the local government has caused difficulty in the relationship between the provincial government and local government, especially in term of coordination and provision.

In relation to the process in the establishment of a regulation, in provincial level in Indonesia especially in DKI Jakarta, there is a Peraturan Gubernur (Gubernatorial Regulations) or Pergub No. 112/2012 on procedures for the establishment of local regulations. In this case, the auction office is one of the regulations that are set by the governor that is implemented in the Pergub No. 19/ 2013. However, the gubernatorial regulations would be recognized and have binding legal force if only it has been ordered and justified by the higher level of legislation or laws.⁵ In other words, Pergub is a regulation that is function as the implementation of the higher law, or to run the regional (provincial) regulations and authority.

In the making of a gubernatorial regulation or pergub, the governor may establish a special team that involve Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah (Regional Working Unit) or SKPD. There are several stages that are stipulated by law in the material preparation until the ratification and implementation of the regulation.⁶

⁵ Law No. 12/ 2011, article 8.

⁶ Law No. 12/ 2011, article 19-21.

2.2. The communication within the bureaucracy

In general, the communication within bureaucracy in Indonesia is a top-down communication. The flow of information and control is dominated by the higher levels, and horizontal communication is minimal (Datta et al, 2011). The interaction commonly takes place in a formal meeting, but little opportunity for discussion and debate in the meeting. The majority of participants in a meeting tend to avoid the criticism of the existing policy, and the approval depending on the higher position initiative has given challenging opportunities for innovation and change. One of the reason is because most of officials tend to protect their area due to time pressures (Datta et all, 2011). The top-down approach creates difficulties in coordination. This is because each division are equally waiting for instructions to act, and often among the divisions are not mutually recognize what has been done so it could emerge duplication and redundancies. This might cause the institutions becomes less efficient in performing their duties.

3. The auction office regulation and the bureaucracy reform

3.1. Bureaucracy issues (Corruption, coalition and nepotism)

In 2012, Transparency International Indonesia (TII) revealed that the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) The City of Jakarta is only 4.43, where on scale of 0-10 grades shows that Jakarta is still far below standard. It means that Jakarta is nor free from corruption, and it had indicated the problem in the bureaucracy of Jakarta.⁷

⁷Source: <http://www.jurnalmetro.com/hukum-a-kriminal/51-hukum-dan-kriminal/253-indeks-persepsi-korupsi-dki-jakarta-dibawah-standar.html>

Since the very beginning of their campaign before he elected as Governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo (Widodo) stated that he wants to reorganize the bureaucracy into clean, professional and transparent. It had been several issues that in the appointment of officials in Jakarta at that time, especially for the head position, did not give an open opportunity for those who have potentials in term of credibility and capability to fill the position. The appointees tend to be selected based on “like and dislike” rather than based on their competences. Those who have potentials sometimes had been rejected and had no access to be selected for the higher position.⁸

In addition, the direct appointment of head of district and villages chief by the regent or mayor are also particularly vulnerable to the issue of coalition and nepotism. Closed system, that is not transparent in the process of appointment, is giving a greater opportunity for those who have a personal closeness with the people involved in the selection process to be appointed. Moreover, the possibility of bribery is also open inside a closed appointment system. Thus, what Widodo proposed to open the selection especially for higher position in Jakarta by the auction office got many appreciations at that time, as well as controversy.

3.2. The change in the administration after the Widodo election

Widodo make a different approach in running the administration in Jakarta compared to the previous governments. Widodo was considered more communicative, willing to listen to input from the bottom so that policies are made based on suggestions and feedback from the community. As he had done in Surakarta when he served as mayor, Widodo also often

⁸ An interview with one of the high-level officials in Jakarta Office.

perform "*blusukan*" (impromptu visit) in Jakarta just to directly evaluate the situation on the site and get feedback from the people he met.⁹

This strategy of "blusukan" had made people think that Widodo was more open and closer to the community compared to the common leaders. The characters are full consideration by listening directly to the opinions of those around him about his idea. This is causing a lot of his ideas become concrete in the form of policies, after he got a lot of input from many parties, including those who are outside the government body. In the case of the auction office regulation, Widodo hear public complaints about poor bureaucracy in Jakarta.¹⁰ Then, he tried to make Jakarta better, and he proposed bureaucratic reforms through an open selection.

One of interviewees from high level official in Jakarta said that once he elected as a Governor, Widodo needs people who can work together and have the same vision and mission with him in running his government. For that, he needs the right instruments in selecting these people, especially to select those who will be at the high position in the grassroots level of government so that the administration can be more effective and efficient.

3.3. "*Lelang Jabatan*" as a new regulation in Jakarta Province

Before Widodo's administration, the selection and appointment for the higher level of officials were usually based on career path and experiences that is the time length of service in that area. As the consequence, there were a "waiting list" for those who want to get a higher level of their position. The problem is that if there were lack of resources to fill the higher level of position, then the position would be filled by those who might be had a

⁹ Interviews with several informants.

¹⁰ Interviews with a high-level official in Jakarta Office.

qualification in term of length of service but competency. Often, the selection that based only on length of service does not necessarily create a better service in the bureaucracy, especially if the appointees' capability did not match with the needs of the official positions.

Lelang jabatan, literally means auction positions, had been introduced Widodo very soon after he was elected as Governor of Jakarta Province in 2012. This term of auction positions refers to a procedure of public officials' recruitment for *Camat* (head of districts) and *Lurah* (villages chiefs) in Jakarta Province that aims to minimise the potential for corruption, collusion, and nepotism. This is because the process of the public officials' recruitment and selection is more open and transparent in the auction positions. Widodo said that the notion in implementing this auction positions came from the people, so he set a target to realise this idea immediately (Sendhikasari, 2013).

In fact, the use of the term auction positions is inaccurate since the essence of an auction is commonly used for goods or services. However, Widodo created the term of auction positions in to make it more easily recognisable as a new method in the recruitment process that is different from the previous method. Widodo announced the term of “auction office”, it was probably because it would attract attention, especially from mass media.¹¹ At the first time the term was introduced, it was debatable, since the meaning of the auction office was not suitable for explaining the real procedure of the recruitment. It was also created confuses to Widodo's staff about how to implement this auction office, especially it had been criticised by the Ministry of Empowerment of the State Apparatus and Bureaucracy Reform (Kementerian Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi or Kemenpan-RB).

¹¹ Interviews with three officials in Jakarta Office.

Apparently, on the implementation, the auction positions had been clarified that its meaning is an open selection and promotion of public office, or in short is the open selection.¹²

There are three factors behind this position auction (Susanti 2004, 56-60) The first is the desire to get a leader who can work according to the field and job area. The second is to avoid corruption, collusion and nepotism in the bureaucracy. The third is to create a democratic culture in a smaller scope. In this case, an open selection is to choose a district and village heads, as the highest position in the grassroots level, so that the position closest to the people and therefore can listen to the aspirations of the people directly.

In the previous recruitment method, the head of districts and villages chiefs are appointed by the higher positions. The head of districts is appointed and dismissed by the governor based on the proposal from the mayor or regent, and the villages chiefs are appointed and dismissed by mayor or regent based on the delegation of governor's authority. The reason is due to the hierarchy that the head of districts and villages chief are responsible to the mayor or regent. According to Law No. 29/ 2007 on the Provincial Government of Jakarta Special Capital Region, the appointment of the head of districts is under the authority of the mayor or regent who proposes the name of the candidate to the governor through the Advisory Board of Position and Rank (Baperjakat). In addition, the villages chief is appointed by mayor or regent after getting consideration from Baperjakat.

Unlike the new regulation of open selection, which was implemented in Governor's Decree No.19/ 2013, Baperjakat had a function in proposing the consideration to the Governor regarding the information about the candidates for the head of districts and villages chiefs who will be included in the auction or selection. Besides, there was a committee that determines the open selection. Based on this new regulation, mayors or regents did not have

¹² *Ibid.*

the authority to appoint the district heads and village chiefs or to propose the candidate to the governor. The power was taken over by the governor by forming a selection committee to conduct the open selection. This is different with the Law No. 29/2007 that states the governor only has the authority to choose a mayor or regent under the consideration of the DPRD DKI Jakarta (Regional House of Representatives of Jakarta). In this case of the open selection process, the new regulation gives the authority to governor to not only determine the mayor or regent promotion, but also the district heads and villages chief recruitment through the selection committee.

As the implication, the filling positions is more transparent and fair. In the past before the implementation of the open selection, people did not know who are the candidates for the head of districts and villages chiefs the region because the assessment procedure used in the appointment through Baperjakat is closed for public. Furthermore, since it is closed for public, the process might be influenced by many elements of decision-making power, and it would be difficult to control the objectivity of the appointment process. There is also a possibility that the appointee is the one who is close to the officials who have the power to influence the process. Another reason why the previous procedure could initiate the corruption, collusion and nepotism is because the closed recruitment will open the possibility for those who want to get a certain position easily without following the career path by giving bribe to the authorities.

As mentioned before, the purpose of the open selection is for transparency in the recruitment process of civil servants. The candidates will be selected based on certain indicators, and the selection process is conducted by a neutral and competent committee. The candidates are required to submit a work proposal so that the assessment is based on the merit system. Furthermore, this open selection aims to ensure a good and clean governance since

the filling of the positions is not merely based on an appointment, but through a competition that is open and accountable. Thus, it will produce a positive outcome, because the elected officials will have the professionalism, competence, and track record that correspond with the position.

The open selection process is conducted by the selection committee through several stages, namely the administration screening, field competence test, managerial competence test, health assessment, and verification of documents. The vacant positions are announced openly in the form of bulletin boards, printed media, and electronic and online media following the available budget. The announcement should be published at least 15 days before the application submission due date. In the announcement, it includes the name of the position, the terms of office, the due date of the documents submission, the material of selection process and procedures. The whole process of open selection is assisted by an independent team so that the procedure would be more accountable.

4. Policy entrepreneurship in the policy process of “Lelang Jabatan”

4.1. Who are the policy entrepreneurs?

Joko Widodo began his political leadership since becoming mayor in a small town of Surakarta for two periods (2005 and 2010). After he was chosen as one of the winners of ‘World Mayor Prize 2012’, more people believe that he is “the agent of change”, the future leader of Indonesia. Joko Widodo became one of the ‘media darlings’, when the media exposed various programs and policies that has been succeed in Surakarta. In the middle of the second period of his administration, Joko Widodo then was elected as the Governor of Jakarta in 2012 through a direct election. Most of people believe that his success to be chosen

as the number one person in the capital city of Indonesia was because his background in leadership as a mayor of the city of Surakarta.

Before he was appointed as a mayor of the city of Surakarta, Joko Widodo had not any political background. He was a businessman in wood furniture. However, he then grabbed the opportunity to be involved in developing his city by becoming a mayor. Thus, many people assume that his leadership style was also influenced by his business instinct, especially in capturing the opportunities to create change. One example of his success in Surakarta is when he relocated street vendors, and then he developed the traditional markets to secure local business.

Based on public opinion, Joko Widodo method of “blusukan” to hear what people want directly, especially by visiting the grass roots on location without notice, is an effective approach to gather information about what should he do as a major and governor to accommodate people needs. The media then raise the “blusukan” method as Joko Widodo’s characteristic, and then more and more politicians tried to do the same method as Joko Widodo to get closer to people, especially during the campaign period. However, the “blusukan” method could be ineffective if it is only done to get more popularity and critics about the “blusukan” method is about whether it is only to ask people about their needs without any formal action following it.

Widodo stated that the idea of this open recruitment basically come from the people of Jakarta, who want a clean and transparent governance. The idea of the “lelang jabatan” or the office auction might be not genuinely come from Widodo himself. However, most of the interviewees admit that Widodo has a genuine approach to make an idea to become more concrete and applicable. Thus, the idea might be come from many ways, including from the “blusukan”, but he had a unique strategy to introduce the idea to become an agenda.

Especially since he is a “media darling” and he actives in social media including Twitter and Facebook, he could get more support and it made his message become easier to be accepted.

Widodo as the governor or Jakarta Province had primarily role in setting the agenda, and in the policy process of the auction office. However, Widodo was not solely the policy entrepreneur. It is argued that the idea originally came from Widodo himself, but in the execution of created a new policy that could be operationally implemented, there were another individual who performed crucial role. He was the Head of BKD (Regional Personnel Agency),¹³ because if the Head of BKD did not support in shaping Widodo’s idea into an operational program, then the auction office or open recruitment would only become an idea without implementation.

4.2. How the policy entrepreneurs work in the policy process

Widodo was in the right moment, that was when the change of administration, and it offered an opportunity to the new rules. However, the process was not without a challenge. Some of the obstacles faced by Widodo include the fact that the new rule of the open selection was completely new, it never existed, so it was considered to have no legal basis as a legalization of its implementation, especially at the regional or provincial level. During this time, the rules made by the governor should refer to higher rules, such as presidential or statutory regulations. If Widodo wants to make a new rule, then he should not conflict with these higher rules. Moreover, the open selection process allows everyone to run and be elected as village or sub-district head, that is not by appointment by the mayor or regent,

¹³ Interview with an official in Jakarta Office.

making this policy deemed to violate the Law no. 29 of 2007 DKI Jakarta on the procedure of election of *lurah* and *camat*.

Based on several interviews with informants from Jakarta Officials, Widodo insisted on implementing the new regulation which he considered more transparent and accountable. Amid the controversy over the absence of the legal basis, and the possibility of the auction office is against the existing rules, Widodo assured that what he does was in fact consistent with the Law on Bureaucratic Reform. Widodo utilized the direction letter from the Minister of Empowerment of the State Apparatus and Bureaucracy Reform No. 16/ 2012 on the procedures for filling vacant positions in government agencies, based on law number 43/1999 on amendments to the Law No. 8/1974 on personnel subjects.¹⁴

Widodo assured the public that the new rule would be in line with the spirit of bureaucratic reform nationally, and supported by direction letter from Menpan-RB. Thus, the auction office proposed by Widodo was then translated as an open selection process to achieve the objectives of bureaucratic reform and good governance. Since this rule was completely new and had never been applied anywhere in Indonesia, especially in the provincial context in Indonesia for the selection process of street level leaders, Widodo involved staff and stakeholders to develop this new policy. Especially, there was BKD as a motor. He also involved other related government agencies, as well as internal resources with a PhD or Doctorate degree especially for advice in the preparation.

The other challenge was the inter-institutional coordination. Nevertheless, from the interviews it was revealed that intensive coordination for about three months was accomplished smoothly. The informants said that Widodo leadership was easily accepted by

¹⁴ See also the research of Abdullah Nazhim Izzuddin (2013).

his staff and the stakeholders. He was also fully supported by the Head of BKD who carry out the mandate of the Governor.

In addition to the legal issue and coordination, another problem in the effort to realize this new policy was the absence of operational funds. Of course, there was no initial budget to run this policy, especially in terms of technical implementation. The open selection process was expected to be objective, effective and efficient, so the fit and proper test should be done with computer system. It was not possible to use a third party in the provision of a computerized system since there is no budget. To tackle this problem, the selection process then involves other state institutions, namely Police, which already owns the technology and uses computer-based test.

Once the technical constraints were resolved, another problem that arised is the unpreparedness of the incumbent *camat* and *lurah* if they did not pass the test. That means they would automatically be dismissed from their position as subdistrict or village head. After the negotiation process, Widodo finally decided that the incumbents who participated in the selection process but did not pass the procedural examination had to stop from his position as a *camat* or *lurah*, but they could be transferred to other positions in the government of Jakarta Province at the level parallel to the previous position level.

Not all incumbents are computer-literate, so this new procedure was also challenging and demanding in term of mastery of technology. However, after going through several stages of socialization, finally this new policy could be accepted by public and could be implemented.

There are several stages of the formulation of Pergub No. 19/ 2013 about the open selection for Camat and Lurah in Jakarta (Izzuddin 2013, 7-8): (1) *Planning*. At this stage,

there were discussions among the heads of SKPD (Regional Working Unit) Government Bureau, including the Legal Bureau, the Bureau of Organization and Management, and Regional Employment Board about the open selection regulation; (2) *Preparation*. The Governor of DKI Jakarta formed a drafting team composed of several elements of the Chairman of the Government Bureau, the Legal Bureau, the Bureau of Organization and Management, the Regional Employment Board and the Provincial Secretary of Jakarta. After the preparation team was formed, the Governor made a decision letter; (3) *Formulation*. At this stage is the drafting process of the open selection regulation that will be discussed further at the discussion stage. The head of SKPD Government Bureau, the Legal Bureau, the Bureau of Organization and Management, Regional Employment Board submitted the draft of gubernatorial regulation to the Governor through the Provincial Secretary of DKI Jakarta; (4) *Discussion*. At this stage, the head of SKPD Government Bureau in coordination with the Legal Bureau, the Bureau of Organization and Management, Regional Employment Board discussed the regulations. To develop the regulation, the head of SKPD coordinated with the local secretaries. After the draft is completed, the draft will be enacted as a regulation; (5) *Ratification*. The gubernatorial regulation No.19/ 2013 on an open selection for Camat and Lurah was then signed by the Governor of DKI Jakarta. After receiving the approval from the Governor, the regulation was documented with the signatures of the Provincial Secretary and the Legal Bureau of Jakarta; (6) *Enactment*. Regulations which have been ratified by the governor then enacted by the head of Legal Beray if Jakarta. The enactment was set on March 28, 2013, signed by the provincial secretary with the establishment number 72 006 year 2013 in the state news of Jakarta; (7) *Dissemination*. The gubernatorial regulation that have approved and enacted then disseminated through electronic media, print media, as well as direct socialization by provincial government of Jakarta.

It appears that in this policy process, Widodo has act as a policy entrepreneur who seizes the opportunity to engage his desires. It seems clear that the change of leadership has become an opportunity for Widodo to create a new policy that is in line with his vision of mission.

Although it is difficult to ascertain what is the motivation for Widodo to realize the policy, from the interviews it can be said that there are internal and external factors that encourage Widodo to fight for his desires. The internal factors might be the characteristics of Widodo who always want to provide benefits for people. The external factor were the public pressures, especially after Widodo is called as "the agent of change" when he previously served as mayor of Surakarta. He was required to be able to move quickly and precisely, effectively and efficiently, so he needed people who can work along his pace.

4. Conclusion

In this case of the auction office policy in Jakarta Province, it appears that individuals holding important or highest positions had an important role in policy process and decision making. It was performed as a routinely top-down activity, based on the instruction and compliance with higher regulations.

Nevertheless, for a new and controversial policy such as this open selection for street level leadership that was the first time implemented in Jakarta Province and in Indonesia, it seems that there were more individual efforts to fight for this policy. Joko Widodo, as the new Governor in DKI Jakarta at that time was considered to have a strategic role. Moreover, he was popular due to this successful when he was the mayor of Surakarta, so he could influence various parties to fulfil his wishes.

Theoretically, it is quite risky to conclude that the success of policy entrepreneurship in this case of study is due to certain individual characteristics and certain position. Nevertheless, in the context of Indonesia at that time when Widodo was considered as a reformer, individual factors as policy entrepreneur is significant. Apparently, there were also several factors affecting Widodo's success, such as the opportunities of leadership turnover, as well as the public support in the bureaucracy reform in Jakarta Province.

Nevertheless, the individuals' role as a policy entrepreneur still need to be assessed further. Would the policy entrepreneur, in this case is Joko Widodo, continue to prevail if he has a highest position in a higher level than in the regional level, where he will face more complex conditions and interests. For example, it would be interesting to analyse his strategy in promoting a policy when he is a President in the national level.

Acknowledgements

This paper is based on broader on-going research of Tri Rainny Syafarani on policy entrepreneurship in Indonesia. This research is supported by Australia Awards for the funding, Asia Research Centre Murdoch University, and Indonesian Institute of Sciences. The author would like to thank to Yvonne Haigh for the discussion on the topic of this paper.

References

- Brouwer, Stijn, and Frank Biermann (2011), "Towards Adaptive Management: Examining the Strategies of Policy Entrepreneurs in Dutch Water Management", *Ecology and Society*, 16 (4), <http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-04315-160405>.
- Bunnell, Tim, et al. (2013), "Urban development in a decentralized Indonesia: Two Success Stories?", *Pacific Affairs*, 86(4), pp. 857-876.
- Datta, Ajoy, et al (2011), "The political economy of policy-making in Indonesia: Opportunities for improving the demand for and use of knowledge", *ODI Working Paper 340*, London, Overseas Development Institute.
- Grindle, Merilee S, Thomas, John W. (1989), "Policy Makers, Policy Choices, and Policy Outcomes: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries", *Policy Sciences*, 22, pp. 213-248.
- Hadiz, Vedi R. (2003), "Decentralisation and democracy in Indonesia: A critique of neoinstitutionalist perspectives", Working Paper Series (47), Hong Kong, SEARC of the City University of Hong Kong.
- Izzuddin, Abdullah Nazhim (2014), Seleksi terbuka camat dan lurah secara terbuka yang dilaksanakan oleh pemerintah DKI Jakarta berdasarkan peraturan gubernur nomor 19 tahun 2013, Thesis, Malang, Universitas Brawijaya.
- Kingdon, John W. (1995), *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*, New York, HarperCollins College Publishers.
- Liddle, R. William (2013) "Improving the Quality of Democracy in Indonesia: Toward a Theory of Action", *Indonesia*, 96, pp. 59-80.
- Lovell, Heather (2009), "The Role of Individuals in Policy Change: the Case of UK Low-Energy Housing", *Environmental and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 27, pp. 491-511, doi: 10.1068/c0878j.
- Mintrom, Michael, Norman, Phillipa (2009), "Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy Change", *The Policy Studies Journal*, 37(4), pp. 649-666.
- Mintrom, Michael (1997), "Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation", *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(3), pp. 738-770.
- Mintrom, Michael. 2000. *Policy Entrepreneurs and School Choice*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Sendhikasari D., Dewi (2009), "Lelang jabatan camat dan lurah", *Info Singkat*, V(9), pp.17-20.

Shiffman, Jeremy (2003), "Generating Political Will for Safe Motherhood in Indonesia", *Social Science and medicine*, 56(6), pp. 1197-1207.

Susanti, Annisa Dinar (2014), Kebijakan lelang jabatan pengangkatan camat dan lurah di DKI Jakarta tahun 2013 dalam rangka good governance, Thesis, Jakarta, Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah.

Yin, R.K. (1994), *Case study research: Design and methods*, Thousand Oaks, SAGE.

Online media:

Jurnal Metro. <http://www.jurnalmetro.com/hukum-a-kriminal/51-hukum-dan-kriminal/253-indeks-persepsi-korupsi-dki-jakarta-dibawah-standar.html>