**International Conference on Public Policy**
**Singapore, June 2017**

**T09P02: Partnerships for Liveable Cities**

# Partnerships in Shrinking Cities: Making Baltimore 'Liveable'?

## DRAFT- NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR CITATION

Dr Madeleine Pill, Lecturer in Public Policy
Department of Government and International Relations
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
University of Sydney
madeleine.pill@sydney.edu.au

## Abstract

The governance imperative to increase the City of Baltimore's population and thus alleviate its 'fiscal squeeze' has brought the liveability of this 'shrinking city' to the fore. City government has long been engaged in seeking partnership with private (corporate and non-profit) actors in developing and delivering a policy agenda to stabilise and grow the city. This paper draws from empirical research into collaborative governance in Baltimore. It focuses on the policy realm of neighbourhood revitalisation to examine the range of (explicit and implicit) liveability policies and initiatives. By considering the challenge of making Baltimore 'liveable' in terms of by whom, for whom, and where/ which neighbourhoods, the research reveals the city's deep inequities and exclusionary governance.

**Key words:** liveability, shrinking cities, urban governance, neighbourhood revitalisation

## Introduction[i]

The City of Baltimore, Maryland's current population of 615,000 (US Census Bureau mid-2016 estimate) is over a third smaller than its 1950 peak of 950,000. A quarter of the city's residents fall below the federal poverty level, compared to a 10% State and 15% national rate. The predominant narrative of decline is encapsulated in the following extract from the Mayor's annual 'State of the City' speech (2013):

*'From 1950 to 2000, the city lost a third of its population. Jobs disappeared, crime rates rose, schools deteriorated, and many neighbourhoods destabilised. City government itself was left with a legacy of high taxes, growing liabilities, and crumbling infrastructure'.*

Considering Baltimore as a 'shrinking city' - one which has experienced 'population loss, economic downturn, employment decline and social problems as symptoms of a structural crisis' (Martinez-Fernandez et al, 2012: 214) - refines any simple linear interpretation of decline as synonymous with deindustrialisation. In particular, the city's deprivation stems from a much longer history in which local and federal policies have concentrated and segregated its African American population. The city's racial composition is 64% African American, 32% White and 6% Hispanic/ Latin/ Asian (US Census 2010). As a research interviewee explained, 'inequality

in Baltimore is so much grosser than it is in the nation as a whole… and it's cut on racial lines, which makes it all the more obvious and all the more oppressive'.

The spatial fix of the City of Baltimore within its much wealthier surrounding region is longstanding and definitive. As Orfield (1998) explains, Baltimore City has become part of 'a pattern of regions walling in increasingly smaller and poorer core cities'. The city is economically and socially isolated from its neighbouring counties in the Metro Baltimore region, population 2.7m – a region 'on the upswing economically, but one in which stability and prosperity are distributed highly unequally across racial and community lines… more or less the norm in metropolitan America today' (Berube and McDearman, 2015).

Patterns of spatial division set in the early twentieth century were reinforced in the post-war period, with federally-supported suburbanisation (via highway construction and Federal Housing Administration activities) exacerbating the city's depopulation and its concentration of African American residents and of poverty. City neighbourhoods vacated by 'white flight' became renters' enclaves for African Americans, who had little choice but to rent substandard housing due to practices of 'financial apartheid' (Coates, 2014), generating further deterioration and dwindling city tax revenues. The displacement and disruption experienced by the city's communities - including the city's bisection by Highway I83 - were exacerbated by federal 'urban renewal', in which 'saving the city core in the face of profound economic and technological change was an overriding consideration' (Stone, 2015: 106) and large federal to local financial transfers were made to fund comprehensive redevelopment projects. As a government official commented, 'in the '60s and '70s what people call 'urban removal' as opposed to neighbourhood based change making… projects really messed up a lot of neighbourhoods, African American neighbourhoods particularly'.

In 1951 the NAACP unsuccessfully petitioned for the withdrawal of federal urban renewal funds on the basis that redevelopments 'place[d] the full strength of the Federal government behind a policy of rigid residential segregation' in Baltimore City (Williams, 2005). But the approach continued, and many African American residents were displaced to segregated public housing. It was not until 2005 that there was some redress, following ACLU legal action against the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on behalf of the city's African American public housing residents. The ruling found HUD guilty of violating the Fair Housing Act (1968) by unfairly concentrating such residents in the city's most impoverished and segregated areas. The judge concluded that HUD had treated Baltimore City as 'an island reservation for use as a container for all of the poor of a contiguous region' (Kline, 2007). Spatial segregation remains clear in Brown's (2016) 'black butterfly' of poor African American neighbourhoods west and east of the central north-south spine of the city (which constitutes part of what Brown describes as the 'White L').

In terms of its built form, the city's population loss manifests in the city's total of more than 16,700 vacant properties (Jacobson, 2015). Unsurprisingly there is a very strong correlation between neighbourhoods with the highest densities of vacant properties and those in the 'black butterfly' which had been subject to 'redlining' (the highly racialised practice of refusing mortgage finance). Thus key questions when considering the challenge of making Baltimore 'liveable' are – by whom, for whom, and where/ which neighbourhoods? As a respondent ably summarised:

*'We have a tremendous amount of racism institutionally in how we've been planned as a city, how our institutions function as a city, and the lack of resources and leadership to really do some reconciliation that's necessary, but then also address the 50 plus years of delayed investment in… neighbourhoods… very few pathways*

*for the majority of residents to really access any opportunity, whether it be schools or health or decent housing - and obviously, they're all interconnected'.*

## Approaches to Neighbourhood Revitalisation

### *Localist and privatist forms of governance*

The 1980s saw the 'de facto devolution' of federal retrenchment in the US. In Peck's (2012) terms, this necessitated adoption of more localist practices ('downscaling'), and also more privatist modes of city governance ('offloading'). In urban regime analysis this shift in governance is expressed as the heightened imperative for city government to form alliances with private actors and resources to gain 'power to' develop and implement policy agendas (Stone, 1993). In Baltimore, elite attention remained on downtown and the waterfront, with the Inner Harbor development becoming a global model for waterfront regeneration (Raco, 2003). Neighbourhoods did not gain elite attention and resource. Wealthier neighbourhoods which had the requisite voluntary capacity increasingly self-provided services (Crenson, 1983). Funding mechanisms enabled by City and State government legislation such as Business Improvement and Community Benefit Districts were introduced (supplemented in the 2000s by Community Impact Districts associated with the city's racetrack and casino). These enabled additional funding streams for privatist forms of neighbourhood service provision. But there was also rising awareness of the spatial division between elite emphasis on downtown and the waterfront and the need to address the problems faced by the city's poorer neighbourhoods. Calls for action came from BUILD, a community-based organisation rooted in the power base of the city's major black churches (Hula et al, 1997; Orr, 1992). The city's rising philanthropic presence also asserted neighbourhood inattention, as manifested in the Goldseker Foundation's 'Baltimore 2000' report (Szanton, 1986). In 1987 Schmoke, the city's first African American mayor, was elected on a platform of addressing the long-neglected neighbourhoods.

Private (but non-profit) actors such as the city's philanthropic foundations started to rise in importance given their 'power to' (amidst declining city corporate presence). Several foundations aligned with Schmoke's neighbourhood agenda. An example is the role played by the Enterprise Foundation, in partnership with city government and BUILD, in sponsoring a neighbourhood-targeted comprehensive 'community building' initiative in Sandtown-Winchester (commenced in 1990) (Pill, 2017). However, an advocacy organisation respondent commented that:

*'To really address the conditions in distressed neighbourhoods… requires something that only the federal government can do because it's kind of order of like a Marshall Plan... We put 130, 140, 150, nobody really knows, million into Sandtown-Winchester in the '90s… but you can only do that once a decade at that level and it wasn't enough and it took money from all the other neighbourhoods'.*

Thus the initiative became regarded as a lesson in the intractability of the city's neighbourhood problems, reinforced by its target area subsequently forming the locus for the city's April 2015 uprising after the death of a young black man, Freddie Gray, following injuries sustained whilst in police custody. All those interviewed acknowledged the uprising as an outcry against the city's continued inequities.

Schmoke and the philanthropic sector's neighbourhood emphasis did succeed in attracting some federal programmatic funds, albeit subject to much greater (time-limited, market-leveraging) strictures compared to the large federal transfers of the urban renewal era. Baltimore gained a ten-year federal Empowerment Zone designation and a federal HOPE VI programme for redevelopment of six public housing projects – though 'the goal of deconcentrating the poor

came largely at the expense of the poorest of the poor' (Stoker et al, 2015: 57) who were displaced.

### *Asset-based approach*

The advent of Schmoke's successor, O'Malley (in office 1997-2007) represented a disjuncture with Schmoke's emphasis on deprived neighbourhoods. The pivotal moment was the adoption in 2000 of an 'asset-based' (rather than need-based) mode of resource allocation to boost the city's housing market (expanded below). Continued reductions in federal aid combined with the city's shrinking tax base had led to the justificatory narrative of a 'greater realism' of market-based approaches. A neighbourhood-based non-profit respondent explained:

*'In the '90s, Clinton was elected after years in the desert with Reagan and Bush and the Republicans. So Clinton got elected everybody said, "Oh finally. The federal government's going to help cities again," right? Clinton's like, "I'd love to help but we're broke, we don't have the money". And that's when people started thinking, "Oh, Lyndon Johnson's never coming back. The Great Society is never coming. Even Richard Nixon was not coming back. We're never going to get all the money we used to get. We have to figure out a different approach." And that's where the asset based approach came from. It was a culture of scarcity'.*

The approach was adopted by O'Malley (and still remains) as the purported basis for city planning and resource allocation. It is manifested spatially via a typology of housing markets with different policy prescriptions and thus differential prioritisation of city elite resources - ranging from 'stressed' neighbourhoods (subject to demolition for site assembly, especially if aligning with the growth needs of major city institutions); through 'the middle' (where interventions seek to 'help the market'); to 'regionally competitive' neighbourhoods (not requiring intervention). The shift in approach signalled the continued rise in importance of private (non-profit) elites – the city's philanthropic foundations (Pill, 2017) but also its 'ed and med' institutions ('anchored' due to lack of mobility), which are the city's most significant employers, though exempt from paying property taxes as non-profit institutions. Crucially, city and foundation support maintains the asset-based rationale for resource allocation, thus favouring the physical development activities of Community Development Corporations, and 'pro-market' approaches of other non-profits (such as encouraging homeownership) in neighbourhoods 'in the middle'. For example, the non-profit Healthy Neighborhoods undertakes neighbourhood marketing to prospective homebuyers, along with provision of some financial assistance and advice for housing purchase and rehab, in thirteen city neighbourhoods 'in the middle'. Neighbourhood-based non-profits emphasised the need to align with the housing typology, a director of a Community Development Corporation explaining, '[we are] an asset-based community development organisation, we don't work in the strong areas and we don't work in the weak areas, we work in the middle'.

## 'Change to Grow' and Liveability

As Peck (2012) explains, after decades of neoliberal urbanism in the US the notion of 'fiscal squeeze' due to falling revenues and increasing need is normal and local. Research interviews confirmed that Baltimore 'is used to austerity and functions like that all the time'. The city's population loss and hyper-concentration of the poor has inevitably resulted in a shrinking tax base and rising service needs, cited to reinforce the 'harsh realities' narrative of the need to stop 'kicking the can down the road'. In 2013, the City released a financial reform plan, entitled 'Change to Grow' (City of Baltimore, 2013), framed as helping to achieve then Mayor Rawlings-Blake's goal (in office 2010-16) to grow Baltimore by 10,000 families in ten years by:

*'Seek[ing] to eliminate a nine-year $750 million structural budget deficit; allowing new investments in neighborhood infrastructure... providing a funding surge for the demolition of more than 4,000 vacant homes; all while reducing homeowner property taxes by more than 20%'.*

What was described by a city official as the 'meta-goal' is to deconcentrate poverty. As implied by the plan's title, this is explicitly sought through attracting and retaining people to live in the city through a focus on (some) neighbourhoods and by reducing property taxes (the city has the highest in Maryland - twice as high as neighbouring Baltimore County). Less emphasised is the poverty deconcentration resulting from the displacement of the city's poor through relocation resulting from 'stressed' neighbourhood redevelopment, as well as via housing mobility strategies (below). Mayor Rawlings-Blake's launch of the Vacants to Value initiative in 2010 (subject to the 'funding surge' in the above quote) encapsulates efforts targeted at the city's vacant properties (concentrated in its poorer neighbourhoods). It seeks to enrol the private sector in 'fighting blight' through provision of investment incentives coupled with increased code enforcement and some strategic demolition of blocks (limited by lack of resource), as well as provision of purchase assistance to homebuyers of formerly vacant, renovated houses (360 grants awarded up until 2015). A report sponsored by the city-based Abell Foundation (Jacobson, 2015) concluded the programme had been successful in code enforcement in some stressed neighbourhoods, but that development of vacant properties had been highly uneven (with the East Baltimore Oliver neighbourhood a notable beneficiary), and that the practice of selling city-owned houses to for-profit developers did not create or maintain affordable housing for current residents.

'Change to Grow' encapsulates the emphasis of Baltimore's governing elites on realising 'the great inversion' – or gravitation of a younger, more affluent population to the city - through a mix of changing middle-class tastes and elite actions (Ehrenhalt, 2013). The supposition is that millennials are attracted to urban life and density, given what Ross (2014) terms 'the urban values of a new generation' which are contrasted with old, suburban values. Elite actions include shifting incentives away from exit to 'securing the benefits of the city' (Stone, 2015: 115). The activities described above supported in neighbourhoods 'in the middle', such as marketing and provision of financial incentives to homebuyers, are part and parcel of these elite efforts to attract and retain the more affluent middle class to the city[ii]. Despite the city's longstanding 'spatial fix', the predication of city strategies on attracting and retaining the middle class does locate the city within its region. The city is framed as providing a cheap housing option compared to the broader metropolitan area (despite its relatively high property taxes). As the director of a Community Development Corporation explained:

*'Thirty years ago, Baltimore was in a bad position because it was a city in a small region when you compare it to New York or Boston or Philadelphia. It was squeezed between Washington and Philadelphia. But now that whole thing has merged together and now we're a low-cost alternative in a high-cost region. And that region goes, you know, from Washington to Boston. I think that will continue to be our niche for another generation or so'.*

City elite emphasis on attraction of a younger as well as more affluent population was reflected by interviewees mentioning 'millennials' as a prominent target group. One elite respondent cited the need for 'bike lanes, parks, better nightlife, jobs' in this regard. In her 2015 State of the City speech, the Mayor trumpeted Baltimore as the 'fourth fastest growing city for that demographic', expanding on this theme in her 2016 speech:

*'Baltimore is getting national attention for how many millennials are moving here. There are a number of reasons – jobs, of course, being one. But the reason they will stay is because Baltimore is pretty awesome. From musicians to artists to foodies, we have made Baltimore a hip place to be. People want a real city, not a generic landscape. They want to be part of a sustainable city. A walkable city. A city that shaped our nation's history. A welcoming city. A vibrant city in which each neighborhood has its own unique identity. A city of robust arts and culture'.*

An anchor respondent provided a pithy overview of the strategies associated with achieving the 'meta-goal':

*'Our approach to current challenges has been… to bring more white people back into city, to highlight the good that is existing in a lot of our neighbourhoods and there needs to be that, absolutely. But there's a polarity that I don't think we own as a city, I don't think we own it as a country… we are not addressing the root causes of a lot of the issues of our city… And it's difficult to attract new residents to our city without really addressing that'.*

An overarching point was that provision of even basic services is a struggle made more difficult by the demands for public safety spending (linked explicitly by some to the city's 'drugs and violence'). The policy adopted for those neighbourhoods deemed 'unmarketable' - the 'stressed' neighbourhoods which are majority African American - can be characterised as one of withdrawal (Davies and Pill, 2012). In prioritising service provision, the 'stressed' neighbourhoods lack the asset-based rationale to benefit:

*It's just the nuts and bolts of a city... they [the city] can barely manage that. And in certain [stressed] neighbourhoods like a Sandtown... they look at the [housing] typology like everyone else. They'll say, you know, in this area we're not going to pave the streets anymore. We're going to focus on public safety, fire, police, rat abatement, cleaning and…you know basic services. Maybe help people move out of that neighbourhood, but we're not going to invest in housing or infrastructure in that neighbourhood.*

## Making Baltimore Liveable - for whom/ which neighbourhoods

As posed above, the key questions which arise when considering the challenge of making Baltimore 'liveable' (or in city parlance, 'changing it to grow' ) are for whom, and where/ which neighbourhoods. Given the city's fiscal squeeze and reliance on localist and privatist approaches, the research reveals a largely opportunistic practice, albeit reflecting the spatial typology of policy interventions determined by neighbourhood 'assets'. Indeed, Stoker et al describe neighbourhood revitalisation in the city as scattered 'improvisations shaped by the pursuit of resources' (2015: 69). Neighbourhoods may gain elite attention when they intersect with other priorities – most notably economic development and population growth of the middle class.

Two brief case studies of neighbourhoods in the city help illuminate these imperatives, as well as illustrating the broadly shared notion amongst research respondents that Baltimore is a 'twin-track' city.

### *Port Covington*

Port Covington, the city's current waterfront megaproject, illustrates the forms of development prioritised by elites as well as the ways in which the vaunted 'public-private partnership' approach operates in practice. The developer, Sagamore, is owned by Kevin Plank, CEO of Under Armour (a sportswear company) whose corporate headquarters will anchor the development. It has approvals for $660 million of tax increment financing (TIF), the biggest financing package in the city's history. TIF bonds are planned to be used in part to finance public open space such as a waterfront park and a plaza around a proposed hydrothermal lake. Port Covington is one of the biggest proposed development projects in the US, estimated to cost a total of $5.5 billion and take until 2045 to redevelop 80 hectares of railyards and former industrial property in South Baltimore. It is envisaged by the developer as a 'city within a city' that will contain fifty new city blocks, parks, apartments, office space and retail, housing 10-15,000 new residents (Reutter, 2017).

Elites did acknowledge that the development proposal raises 'gentrification and race issues'. It was also cited as an example of how language has changed around social justice after the city

uprising in 2015, with developers' becoming more 'socially conscious' and local hiring becoming a common part of the dialogue. Citizen activists and advocacy organisations in contrast were clear that the development was 'tone deaf coming on the heels of the uprising', showing 'we haven't learned', and another example of where 'we're disinvesting from places that need it the most… and the benefits… promised don't materialise':

'*Sagamore… they're about to get like a bajillion-million-dollar TIF... they get these breaks from the city government and they're encouraged to develop these areas. So what he's going to do is build like this corporate park in Port Covington… it's going to become another one of those neighbourhoods in the 'white L', that's just, it gets all the funding and all the city benefits'.*

A community activist drew the distinction between the developer cultivating relationships with Port Covington's proximate communities and how 'the whole city is going to be affected by this because of… servicing a $600m debt for 40 years. So… everybody needs to be at the table.' The City's inclusionary zoning requirement (that 20% of housing be affordable for those earning up to 80% of the area's median income) was initially waived for the development. But in September 2016 a new MoU was negotiated between the City and the developer, involving the six proximate neighbourhoods and the community group BUILD. This heralded city-wide community benefits (such as 30% construction work by city residents) as well as 20% 'inclusionary housing', indicating some, albeit bounded, success for citizen activism in terms of improving 'the deal'. But the underlying assumptions about the city's development priorities – ie. by whom, for whom, and which neighbourhoods – do not seem to be up for debate.

### *Sandtown*

Post-uprising, 'stressed' neighbourhoods with the highest levels of vacant properties have been subject to greater attention and resource from elites. This is encapsulated in Project CORE ('Creating Opportunities for Renewal and Enterprise'), a principally Maryland State-funded $75m (4,000 property) demolition and redevelopment initiative which greatly accelerates and expands the City's ongoing Vacants to Value initiative. Sandtown, the West Baltimore neighbourhood which formed the uprising's epicentre, symbolically became the site for the initiative launch by the State Governor and city Mayor. As a government official explained:

*'It related to the unrest because Mister Freddie Gray… that was his neighbourhood. I think that was also a turning point for [the State Governor], because he wasn't as familiar with what was happening in these neighbourhoods… through the State's role in addressing that unrest, it was startling to him to see the level of vacancy and blight'.*

Some saw the approach as the only realistic course of action, a foundation respondent commenting, 'when you allow that much disinvestment, there's no other choice but to take it down', another explaining that Sandtown-Winchester has '33% vacant and abandoned housing right now'.

In its first year of operation (2016) 400 blighted properties were demolished in Sandtown and other target neighbourhoods. As a city official explained, the initiative is seen as boosting the city's efforts by providing sufficient resource for more strategic 'demolition in the context of a broader land use plan, and a phasing plan, and a greening plan'. The City's Green Network Plan was launched to coincide with Project CORE, with both initiatives currently subject to community consultation led by the City's Department of Planning. The Green Network Plan is described as:

*'a bold vision for reimagining vacant and abandoned properties and transforming them into community assets, creating an interconnected system of flourishing spaces throughout the city. Through a collaborative and community-directed process, the Plan will direct resources to underinvested areas and lay the foundation for the*

*revitalization of some of Baltimore's most challenged neighbourhoods'* [City of Baltimore Office of Sustainability, nd].

Another government official explained the perceived opportunities of combining demolition and greening strategies in terms which encapsulate elite emphasis on enhancing the city's liveability to attract wealthier, homeowning residents:

*'A community like Sandtown needs some fairly big interventions… do we need to really think big about bigger parks that rearrange how the city is designed? Back in the 1800s, as the city was growing out... some smart person laid out a series of residential squares which survive today [where there is] strong home ownership… so, there is a power that a park strategy, if we can sort out the politics and community equity issues around how much you'd have to really rearrange the deck chairs to come up with major spaces out of what is now a sea of empty row houses, or half empty row houses'.*

Elite and citizen activist perspectives were unsurprisingly bifurcated. A major non-profit saw it as an example of where there is now at least more 'talking about listening to communities' and other elites agreed it was not 'business as usual'. But community activists based in West Baltimore highlighted lack of community say, and saw it as a gentrification strategy clearing low income residents:

*'It's insensitive of our community... not even considering the issues that gave us blocks and blocks of blighted properties… this is a low income neighbourhood so you're proposing all this demolition to lure developers…. it's a slow gentrification process'.*

The new Mayor has reiterated the need to focus on 'building communities and neighbourhoods… [and] the amenities that go along with communities and neighbourhoods' (Reutter, 2016). In terms of the specifics of neighbourhood revitalisation, some activists commented on the need to build equity into communities via amenities other than housing:

*'The key to the rebuilding [of] a strong Sandtown-Winchester… we don't have any type of shopping or equitable experience here. If we could localize our spending and fortify our streets again, we could start to build on the equity within the community'.*

## Neighbourhood Revitalisation Priorities

Neighbourhoods in Baltimore gain attention when they intersect with the priorities of city elites. Port Covington is prioritised due to its perceived economic development and population growth opportunities. Its proximate neighbourhoods have been prioritised in community benefit negotiations, though some change in practice from the past is indicated by the city-wide benefits negotiated. Sandtown as a focus for Project CORE exemplifies city (and State) attention at the other end of the spectrum - a focus for demolition rather than development (albeit envisaged as enabling green infrastructure), linked by some to longer term gentrification, clearing low income residents as part of the 'changing to grow' to attract the middle class. The initiative also serves the political imperative of being seen to take concerted action after the worldwide attention garnered by the city uprising. But demolition as a reaction to the uprising – which was spurred by the city's inequities and police violence - is not the most obvious or needed response.

Other neighbourhoods may benefit from elite attention via their intermediary organisations where these are able to gain leverage from the proximity of anchor institutions. For example, the non-profit Central Baltimore Partnership gains support and resource given its proximity to Johns Hopkins' Homewood campus and its Community Partners Initiative. This encourages other resource flows (such as from Maryland State's neighbourhood initiative and foundation and bank support for its new development fund). A focus of BUILD, in partnership with a community development financial institution, on developing housing in the Oliver neighbourhood levers on

its proximity to Hopkins' hospital which is seen as 'greasing the wheels'. It is these efforts which have been most successful in drawing down Vacants to Value resource from the City (Jacobson, 2015). Anchor institution attempts to seek accommodation with their surrounding neighbourhoods is not an easy process given past histories of distrust due to episodes of conflict and neglect (such as those associated with Hopkins' hospital-anchored developments, stemming back to 1950s urban renewal). However, potential community partners recognised the need to work with these elite city institutions, as a community activist explained:

*'Hopkins doesn't have the best reputation. They have done some awful things… I get that but I'm also trying to create a dialogue with these people, because they are the 800-pound gorilla in the room… And we need to be able to work with them and they need to be able to know that we're not going to be calling them out every five minutes'.*

Stone's (2015) observation that foundations have become important backers of community development in disadvantaged neighbourhoods is also clear in Baltimore. Foundation neighbourhood-targeted efforts have taken a variety of forms, some drawing lessons from the perceived failure of the comprehensive community initiative approach taken in Sandtown-Winchester in the 1990s (above). But generally philanthropic support tends to crowd in and align with resource availability from anchors to enable 'collective impact'.

Some respondents saw such neighbourhood prioritisation as 'common sense', the path to pursue when resources are limited. Others made explicit that neighbourhoods that do not offer opportunities are 'written off' (as a community activist described it) where they do not offer economic development opportunities. A West Baltimore anchor institution official described it as being located in a 'containment area', explaining that Baltimore was often described in terms of 'a tale of two cities… one doesn't have anything to do with the other'.

All respondents linked funding scarcity with the need to work together. But in discussing collaboration, elites did not tend to mention citizens and community representatives, collaboration interpreted as being between the city's governing elites (public and private, non-profit, and corporate in the form of megaproject developers). The lack of city leadership was bemoaned by respondents of all types, a non-profit organisation respondent explaining, 'the City no longer sees itself as a leader in community development'. An elected politician explained that 'these outside institutions are working hard with each other because there's a vacuum in city government'. Though the City has prepared an 'Anchor Plan' (City of Baltimore, 2014), envisaged as a 'community and economic development strategy', anchor institution respondents shared a perception that 'there's not a lot of substance in it' and that, as with other initiatives, elite non-state institutions were setting the direction and that city government then sought to retroactively brand this as a city-led, or at least city-engaged, effort. A minor anchor institution respondent commented:

*'It's not a partnership. There's very little reciprocal relationship... there are structures within the City that do not allow for meaningful or even effective partnerships between the City and universities, the City and residents, the City and resident groups, the City and foundations, the City and any other'.*

The political geography of Baltimore is one of neighbourhoods. As a non-profit organisation respondent explained, 'we have a lot of little groups, and not groups with big capacity… 240 neighbourhoods and 600 neighbourhood associations'. Generally when mobilisation does occur, it has tended to reflect neighbourhood rather than city-wide concerns. But there is also an ongoing heritage of advocacy activities. For example, a key strategy pursued by advocacy organisations in the realm of public housing has been that of litigation ('fair housing complaints') to counter Baltimore's role as 'a container for the region's poor' (explained above). The outcome, regional housing mobility strategies (now institutionalised as the Baltimore Regional

Housing Mobility Program, a non-profit), involves provision of housing vouchers to former public housing residents to relocate to rental housing in neighbouring counties. An advocacy organisation respondent explained that thus far vouchers had been provided to 3,300 households, estimated to reach 4,400 by 2018. Such dispersal of existing (poor, African American) residents from 'low- to high opportunity neighbourhoods' aligns with the 'meta-goal' of deconcentrating poverty. A city government official saw such efforts as vital rather than continuing attempts to improve neighbourhoods 'beyond repair', thus echoing the findings of a city foundation-funded study (Rusk, 1996) which asserted that 'helping poor people leave bad neighbourhoods is the most effective anti-poverty programme'. A foundation respondent commented in relation to Sandtown's prioritisation for clearance and resident relocation under Project CORE:

*'If I'm already poor and black and living in that much trauma and I've got kids, if I got the opportunity to escape that, come on. I'm going to escape it'.*

But the strategies contrast with some citizen activist views regarding the gentrification of the city and the clearance of low income residents. The bifurcation revealed between elite and citizen activist views underscores the city's exclusion of the citizen from its governance as well as evidencing the racialised (and spatialised) class structures of governance by exclusion or domination of those lacking power and resource. Activist groups identified (white) gentrification as part of the city's 'twin track' trajectory:

*'Right now there is a scramble for resources and space in Baltimore where essentially white folks are trying to take Baltimore and push black folks out'.*

## Conclusion

Overall, progress towards achievement of the city's 'meta-goal' of deconcentrating poverty - through attracting and retaining the middle class to live in the city (gentrification) combined with spatial mobility (relocation/ dispersal) and social mobility (economic inclusion) initiatives for the poor - remains halting. The 1,000 person population increase (indicated by US Census mid-year estimates) trumpeted by the Mayor in her pre-uprising State of the City address (2015) has been followed by a post-uprising estimated population decline (of 6,000 people in mid-2016 estimates, taking the city population to 615,000). Anchor institutions expressed concerns about student recruitment following the uprising:

*'we've took a hit as far as students coming to Baltimore… [the unrest brought the underlying issues that] we've all known have been there to international attention, like how horrible is Baltimore that the poverty is this, the vacancies… the incarceration, the joblessness'.*

Baltimore – with its extremes of poverty and violence by Western world standards – provides a set of salutary lessons about the meaning of 'liveability' for different groups in society. The longstanding and deep inequities with which the city is riven remain shockingly visible. The uprising, perceived as an expression of these inequities, was regarded by respondents as a potentially critical juncture which provided an imperative for collaboration. But whilst the city's governance has seen a degree of adjustment in style and tone, the goals and fixes (spatial and otherwise) remain largely the same. As one foundation respondent commented, 'the conversation may have changed but the systems aren't changing'.

Yet most respondents found reasons to be hopeful about the city's future, though opinions diverge about the way forward. Some stressed the need for consensus, 'ways of partnering in a positive manner'. Others stressed the need for a more adversarial approach oriented to transformational change in opposition to what one activist described as the 'let's attract

corporate dollars to try and create a space where people come to the city' approach. Another posited:

*'a collective ownership model where individuals of and from the community could be able to be a part of the process… That is a model that is much more likely to not gentrify areas. And also at the same time do intentional community wealth-building and black institutional wealth-building'.*

The voice of black, young activists 'trained outside of the local non-profit formula' has clearly become stronger since the uprising. The strength of local action will be a key determinant of what happens next. Unsurprisingly, improving police-community relations was seen as a prerequisite for other change in the city - in terms of liveability, basic security and freedom from violence and trauma are key. In explaining this, some community activists reiterated the city's divided spatial governance and elite prioritisation of megaprojects:

*'Actual police reform… without change in the structure, the policies, the way they actually work in Sandtown… is the very first steps to actual change… even with this huge Sagamore and the TIF [Port Covington]… it gets diminished as soon as something happens with the Police Department'.*

*'Police-community relations… I think everything else is so minor… that developer developing Port Covington don't have absolutely nothing to do with my day-to-day existence… But I'm getting those kinds of conversations in my life all the time now - so and so got shot the other day… Why would anybody think those kinds of conversations in America are acceptable? They have become the norm and I don't want them to be the norm'.*

## References


Berube, A. and McDearman, B. (2015) Good fortune, dire poverty, and inequality in Baltimore: An American Story. The Brookings Institution http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2015/05/11-poverty-inequality-baltimore-berube-mcdearman [Accessed 19 April 2017]

Brown, L. (2016) Two Baltimores: The White L vs. the Black Butterfly. The City Paper, June 28th http://www.citypaper.com/bcpnews-two-baltimores-the-white-l-vs-the-black-butterfly-20160628-htmlstory.html [Accessed 4 May 2017]

City of Baltimore (2013) Change to Grow: A Ten-Year Financial Plan for Baltimore. Baltimore: Baltimore City

City of Baltimore (2014) The Baltimore City Anchor Plan: A Community and Economic Development Strategy. Baltimore: Baltimore City

City of Baltimore Office of Sustainability (nd) Green Network http://www.baltimoresustainability.org/projects/green-network/ [Accessed 9 June 2017]

Coates, T. (2014) The Case for Reparations. The Atlantic, June https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/ [Accessed 4 May 2017]

Crenson, M. (1983) Neighborhood Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Davies, J.S and Pill, M.C. (2012) Hollowing-out Neighbourhood Governance? Re-scaling Revitalization in Baltimore and Bristol. Urban Studies 49(10): 2199-2217

Ehrenhalt, Alan. 2013. The Great Inversion and the Future of the American City. New York: Alfred A. Knopf

Hula, R. C., Jackson, C. and Orr. (1997). Urban Politics, Governing Nonprofits, and Community Revitalization. Urban Affairs Review, 32(4): 459-489

Jacobson, J. (2015) Vacants to Value: Baltimore's bold blight-elimination effort is making modest progress despite limited renovation funds and questionable accounting. The Abell Report, published by the Abell Foundation, 28(5): 1-28 http://www.abell.org/sites/default/files/files/cd-vacants2-value1115.pdf [Accessed 9 June 2017]

Kline, G. (2007) Thompson v. HUD: Groundbreaking Housing Desegregation Litigation, and the Significant Task Ahead of Achieving an Effective Desegregation Remedy Without Engendering New Social Harms, University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class, 7(1): 172-191

Martinez-Fernandez, C., Audirac, I., Fol, S. and Cunningham-Sabot, E. (2012) 'Shrinking Cities: Urban Challenges of Globalization' International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 36(2): 213-25

Mayor's State of the City Speech (2013), 11 February http://www.baltimorecity.gov/OfficeoftheMayor/NewsMedia/Speeches/tabid/997/ID/4174/Mayor_Rawlings-Blakes_State_of_the_City_Address.aspx [Accessed 4 May 2017]

Mayor's State of the City Speech (2015), 9 March http://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-releases/2015-03-09-mayor-rawlings-blake-delivers-16th-annual-state-city-address [Accessed 4 May 2017]

Mayor's State of the City Speech (2016), 29 February http://www.baltimorecity.gov/news/general/2016-02-29-seventeenth-annual-state-city-address [Accessed 4 May 2017]

Orfield, M. (1998) Baltimore metropolitics: A regional agenda for community and stability. Metropolitan Area Program.

Orr, M. (1993) Urban Regimes and Human Capital Policies: A Study of Baltimore. Journal of Urban Affairs, 14(2): 173-87

Peck, J. (2012) Austerity urbanism: American cities under extreme economy. City 16(6): 626-655

Pill, M.C. (forthcoming 2017) Philanthropic Foundations in the City Policy Process: a Perspective from the United States, In: Policy Capacity: State and Societal Perspectives, Eds: W. Xun, M. Howlett & M. Ramesh. Palgrave Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy

Raco, M. (2003). New Labour, Community and the Future of Britain's Urban Renaissance, in: Imrie, R. and Raco, M. (eds). Urban Renaissance? New Labour, Community and Urban Policy. Bristol: The Policy Press, pp. 235-250.

Reutter, M. (2016) Graziano to go, rest to stay in Pugh administration, Baltimore Brew, December 7th https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2016/12/07/graziano-to-go-rest-to-stay-in-pugh-administration/ [Accessed 9 June 2017]

Reutter, M. (2017) Construction at Port Covington delayed at least nine months, Baltimore Brew, May 9th https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2017/05/09/exclusive-construction-at-port-covington-delayed-at-least-nine-months/ [Accessed 9 June 2017]

Ross, B. (2014) Dead End: Suburban Sprawl and the Rebirth of American Urbanism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press

Rusk, D. (1996) Baltimore Unbound: A Strategy for Regional Renewal. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press

Stoker, R., Stone, C. and Worgs, D. (2015) Neighborhood Policy in Baltimore: The Postindustrial Turn, In: Urban Neighborhoods in a New Era: Revitalization Politics in the Postindustrial City, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Eds. C. Stone and R. Stoker, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp50-80

Stone, C.N. (1993) Urban regimes and the capacity to govern: a political economy approach. Journal of Urban Affairs 15: 1-28

Stone, C. (2015) Reflections on Regime Politics: From Governing Coalition to Urban Political Order. Urban Affairs Review, 51(1): 101-137

Szanton, P. (1986) Baltimore 2000: A Choice of Futures, a Report to the Goldseker Foundation, Baltimore: Goldseker Foundation

Williams, R.Y. (2005) The Politics of Public Housing: Black Women's Struggles against Urban Inequality. New York: OUP

[i] This paper reports research drawing from a combination of extensive literature review of academic and policy documents; and in-depth, semi-structured interviews with salient actors in the governance of the city, including political leaders, public officials, foundation staff, non-profit organisations (including those which are neighbourhood-based) and community groups and citizen activists. An initial, exploratory round of interviews was conducted in November 2015; with the majority conducted May-October 2016. In total, 40 respondent interviews, 5 non-participatory observations and 3 group interviews were conducted. NVIVO content analysis was performed on the qualitative data. The research was supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council. Baltimore is one of eight case study cities, along with

Athens, Barcelona, Dublin, Leicester, Melbourne, Montreal and Nantes. The objective of the study is to explore how cities govern and contest spatio-temporally uneven crises of welfarism that they all experience, in different ways at different times.

[ii] Baltimore's efforts to 'change to grow' are focused on attracting and retaining US residents, but also encompass some efforts to accommodate international immigration. For the past decade the city has been an entry point for refugees under a federal government quota system (receiving 700-800 per year). In 2014 the Mayor established a Mayor's Office of Immigrant and Multicultural Affairs. In 2016 the International Rescue Committee, a non-profit which helps refugees settle in 26 US cities, launched a scheme to help clients buy homes in Baltimore, thus aligning with city policies and gaining the support of other non-profits, such as Healthy Neighborhoods. Trump has threatened to withhold federal funds from 'sanctuary cities' perceived as having lenient policies towards illegal immigrants. The rhetoric has yet to be tested, but explains why the outgoing and current mayors have stressed that Baltimore is a 'welcoming' (rather than 'sanctuary') city; and why advocates, with funding from three of the city's philanthropic foundations, have recently established a legal defense fund named 'Safe City Baltimore' for the city's estimated 15,000 undocumented immigrants.