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Academic Administrative Entrepreneurs (AAEs) and Policy Transfer: Its Theoretical Discussion and the Indonesian Experience

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Academic Administrative Entrepreneurs (AAEs) and Policy Transfer: Its Theoretical Discussion and the Indonesian Experience[1]

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present theoretical discussion from ongoing research on the role of academics-turned-top public officials as agents of transfer in Indonesia. Indonesia has a tradition of recruiting academics into top policy-making and bureaucratic positions to transfer policies and innovations, particularly since the authoritarian New Order Regime (1966-1998) until the present situation of transition to democracy. This practice, which in some way has become the norm, were emerged to bridge the gap of expertise, find quick answers, and to some extent, the presence of academics in administrative leadership position made the regime's policy appear more technocratically sound and legitimate. In this paper, Academic Administrative Entrepreneurs (AAEs) will be introduced and elaborated as the term to represent this practice. Using library research and document analysis, this paper tries to present a theoretical discussion on the role of academics as agents of transfer within policy transfer approach, as well as providing insight into the practice of recruiting academic in public office in Indonesia.
Keywords: *policy transfer, agents of transfer, academics, Indonesia*

Introduction

Indonesia has a tradition to appoint academics into public office. With their expertise, academics are expected by elected officials to promote innovation and initiate reform agendas by bridging the expertise gap in public organizations. Academics was perceived as having the expertise to find technocratic solutions to development problems. To some extent their 'scientific and objective' endeavours made the regime's policy appear more technocratically sound and legitimate (Hadiz and Dhakidae, 2005; Heryanto, 2005).

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This practice can be traced back since the early Indonesian independence period (1945-1950) to the Reformation Era (1998-onward). Especially since the New Order Regime (1966-1998), the embedding of academics, mainly professors from major universities, in ministerial positions and the bureaucracy became the norm.

In this paper, Academic Administrative Entrepreneurs (AAEs) will be introduced as a concept to better understand this practice of recruiting academics in public office. Policy transfer will be employed as the exploratory theoretical approach for understanding this phenomenon, where the AAEs will be categorized as the agents of transfer under this approach.

This paper tries to offer ways of examining the role of AAEs in the policy transfer process. The proposed research frameworks consider: the resources they bring to the policy-making process; their ethnographic profiles which contribute to their emergence and power base; their selection of strategies and activities in doing policy transfer, as well as how to evaluate the effectiveness of their role.

Policy transfer and the agents of transfer

Policy transfer needs to be understand both as a way of doing policy and as a method of policy analysis inquiry. As a way of doing policy, policy transfer offers an intentional, action-oriented and conscious learning approach to the policy-making process. Policy transfer is about knowledge and learning and fundamentally driven by the search for evidence of what works (Legrand, 2012). Policy transfer can also allow policymakers to manage policy complexities and to fill the gap of expertise in policy formulation. This places policy transfer as potentially an important tool in the modern policy-making process but only if a rational, evidence-based approach can be adopted (Dolowitz, 2003; Evans, 2009a; Evans, 2009b).

Developing countries tend to find and adopt quick answers from successful policies in other countries, for instance, the good governance agenda have mostly been delivered through a policy transfer process (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2009a). Although, of course, the risk of inappropriate policy transfer remains high as cultural assimilation is critical to achieving quality outcomes.

As a method of inquiry, the power of policy transfer analysis lies in helping us to understand how decision-makers as agents of transfer acquire knowledge (Evans, 2009a; Evans, 2009b). Therefore, as an intentional, action-oriented and conscious policy learning activity, the study of agents of transfer is essential for policy transfer analysis where critical attention need to be paid to the interaction between indigenous policy actors and policy borrowers (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2009c; Zhang and Marsh, 2016).

The agents of transfer are identified within the 'who transfers?' dimension in the Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) heuristic understanding of the policy transfer process. The subject of research on the agents of transfer are, as Evans (2009c) observes: who or what is identified as the agent(s), who wants it, what do they want from it, how are they going about affecting it, to whose benefit and why? Furthermore, this requires distinguishing the resources that they bring to the process of policy-oriented learning, specifying the role they play in the transfer process, and determining the nature of the policy transfer that the agent(s) is/are seeking to make.

Regarding who is identified as agents of transfer, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) initially noted nine key actors: elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs and experts, transnational corporations, think tanks, supra-national governmental and nongovernmental

institutions and consultants. Just as there is a limitless number of transferable items, so there is also an unlimited range of individuals and organisations who can become involved in the policy transfer process (Dolowitz, 2003).

One of the agents of transfer that has been discussed in the literature is academics, although they are implicitly put under the terminology of 'experts.' Academics can work independently or be incorporated into the workplans of other agents such as pressure groups, think-tanks, consultancy agencies, or in the Indonesian case, directly recruited as top bureaucrats responsible for aspects of the policy-making process. This latest case has never been systematically documented in policy transfer research and needs to be studied further.

Agents of transfer then generally can be grouped into two broad categories: state and non-state actors. Non-state actors tend to have more works on advocating 'soft transfer' of general policy ideas, experts and programmes using the extensive transnational network of 'policy transfer entrepreneurs' (Evans and Davies, 1999; Stone, 2012). By contrast, government officials are more involved in 'hard' transfer of policy practices involving formal decision-making, legislation, and regulation. One problem of the previous studies was not explicitly positioned the academics especially its variant like AAEs in a distinct category. It will be interesting to examine the position of AAEs since by nature they are non-state actors but have to exercise functions of state agencies.

Defining the AAEs

Following the discussion on types of agents of transfer, Bennet and Howlett (1992), as well as Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), decide to focus and interested in

acknowledging the role of experts in the transfer process since other actors claimed already widely discussed within other literature. This is also as respond to an increasing trend for every policy-maker getting advice from policy experts to develop policy (Benson and Jordan, 2011).

However, most of the scholars like Rose (1991), Bennet and Howlett (1992), Dolowitz and Marsh (1996), Stone (1999), and Benson and Jordan (2011), did not explicitly mentions academics as a distinct entity of agents of transfer. Academics, which in this paper is defined as a teacher or scholar in a university or other higher degree institution, certainly also categorized as policy expert based on their intellectual capacity, expertise and access to the resource of policy-related knowledge. Through their teaching, researching and community development activities as faculty members of certain universities, this paper proposes that they are exercising their role as agents of transfer. They are also potentially engaged in policy transfer through their involvement and affiliation with external knowledge network or incorporated into another agent such as think-tank and consultancy agencies. Their participation in formal policy process become more apparent when they are also recruited by elected officials or regimes as AAEs.

The term AAEs are a synthesis of different concept which intended to represent particular dimension behind the practice of recruiting academics in public office as agents of transfer. This term overarched concepts like experts as agents of transfer, policy entrepreneurs, and administrative leadership.

Public policy is present to answer specific public issues and interests. The nature of policy making process tends to focus on making significant changes through small steps (Lindblom, 1980; Sutton, 1999). However, when new challenges appear

so significant, policy innovation that offers a major change of doing things are needed. Here the concept of policy entrepreneurship then introduced (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996; Mintrom and Norman, 2009)

The emergence of policy entrepreneurship corresponds to the nature of policy transfer, where policy transfer is distinctive from the standard forms of policy making from its focus on the remarkable movement of ideas between systems of governance through the intermediation of agents of transfers and policy transfer network (Evans, 2009c). The possession of expertise becomes the point of strengths for policy entrepreneurs involvement in the policy transfer process, particularly in the practice of 'soft transfer' (Stone, 1996).

Mintrom and Vergari (1996) and Mintrom and Norman (2009) suggested that to make effective any effort to offer new ideas and innovation; policy entrepreneurs must have access to resources and decision-making arenas. Hall (1993) also argued that one of the central features of [effective] policy learning are the presence of experts in government inner-circle or who positioned in between bureaucracy and intellectual community. AAEs then can be offered as a concept and case of examples where experts can closely related and even become an integral part of policy process as decision-makers.

For the purpose of making the conceptual definition of the AAEs, consequently, it is also important to incorporate the concept of 'administrative leadership' (Van Mart, 2003) since it will provide a contextual explanation regarding in which arena policy entrepreneurs in AAEs concept is operated. Administrative leadership refers to and encompass leadership position from the frontline supervisor to the non-political head of the organization in the executive branch, including their

political designees, such as agency secretaries and director, commissioners, or legislatively approved directors (Van Mart, 2003). AAEs then refer to academics as agents of transfer who exercises administrative leadership and possess policy entrepreneurship qualities.

What is studied when AAEs are studied?

To analyse the role of agents of transfer, particularly AAEs in the policy transfer process, it is important to utilize a two-dimensional framework:

1. An ethnographic framework to understand the resources and biographical background of the AAEs, and how they contribute to their emergence (see Figure 1);
2. An AAEs policy analysis framework to investigate their strategies, activities, and effectiveness (see Figure 2)

Figure 1. **Ethnographic framework for understanding the emergence of Academic Administrative Entrepreneurs (AAEs)**


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┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│          Career path            │
│                                 │
│ Personal characteristics:       │
│   • Age, ethnicity, gender      │
│   • Academic background and     │
│     degree                      │
│   • University activities and   │
│     previous positions          │
│   • University affiliation      │
│ Political characteristics:      │
│   • Previous      related       │
│     experience                  │
│   • Political  affiliation  and │
│     alignment                   │
│   • Political acceptance        │
│ The source of origin/previous   │
│ post:                           │
│   • Inside government           │
│   • Outside government          │
│                                 │
│          Resources              │
│ • (Knowledge  and  expertise,   │
│   cultural,   political, social-│
│   national elite network)       │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
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┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│        Time context:            │
│   • Political situation         │
│   • Administrative              │
│     challenge                   │
│   • More suitable vs. more      │
│     skilled                     │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
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┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│        AAEs appointment         │
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The first framework involves describing the ethnographic profile of agents of transfer such as career paths, resources, and how the variables interact with particular contextual factors resulting in the appointment of academics into certain roles.

To fulfill the aim to understanding AAEs ethnographic profile, examining their career path as the initial step of this framework will be a useful approach. Kerby (2009) suggest two kinds of characteristics which influenced career path: 1). Personal characteristics are related to gender and university/education background; and, 2). Political characteristic such as previous related experience, political acceptance,

political strength, and contextual political factors, which might be influential in deciding their appointment.

The next 'variable' is resources. Resources can be defined as the practical means or instruments that actors have control and have some interest, to be utilized in order to realize their objectives; with resources, actors would be able to influence other actors and networks surrounding them, and therefore resources is closely related to power and influence (Hermans and Thissen, 2008). Resources also can be defined regarding with capacity which must possess by actors to effectively exercise their role.

This framework proposed four types of interrelated resources that hypothetically should be owned by AAEs: 1). Knowledge and expertise resources; 2). Cultural resources; 3). Political resources; 4). Social-national elite network resources.

Knowledge and expertise are the most valuable resource, and capacity should own by AAEs. Expertise refers to the ownership of relevant skill, knowledge, or judgment, in policy development and change within particular policy area. In the academic world, the level of expertise can be referred to academic qualifications, research and consultancies experience, as well as access to other knowledge networks.

The ownership of knowledge, expertise and public engagement also has positioned academics in some extent as the nation's moral guardians as well as a new kind of 'charismatic hero' (Griffiths, 2010; Franz, 2007). This statement indicated the high level of cultural capital enjoyed by academics. Universities and academics who work in it also considered having an important cultural role in development where all these position and role contribute to what it called as cultural resources, resources which can make academics regarded as influential in shaping ideal society through

their intellectual endeavours.

However, it is also important to understand academics from the perspectives of its political resource and their social-national elite network resources. Political resources refer to their relationship with political elites, and social-national elite network resources are related to their membership in power elite cycle.

Bennett and Howlett (1992) argued that the possession of knowledge and information resources eventually will differentiate the powerful from the non-powerful. Therefore, it is believed that academics even had been traditionally viewed as forming part of (political) elite itself (Griffiths, 2010; Chatterton, 1999). Academics also has been connected with the political elite and their networks through shared particular interest in a certain issue. Academics involvement in the circle of elite networks and political position are most likely to be found a base on their aspiration to maintain and develop their professional interests rather than seeking political authority (Griffiths, 2010).

The importance of having political resources and social-national elite networks corresponds with the notion that any effort of offering new ideas and innovation effective, policy entrepreneurs or in this case is AAEs must have access to resources and decision-making arenas (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996; Mintrom and Norman, 2009). Evans and Davis (1999) and Evans and McComb (2004) in their framework of policy transfer process also identified the importance of agents of transfer in doing elite and cognitive mobilization as an integral part of the voluntary policy transfer process.

Placing time context into the discussion on the career path is also important. Since promoting change activities is heavily related with utilizing windows of

opportunity, as a consequence, the perfect timing will become a key determinant. Timing is referred to the political situation and emerging administrative challenge that needs to be responded to the new ideas in the process of policy change. Regarding with this assumption, Kerby (2009) argued that the general rule is people who appointed can be viewed as 'more suitable,' which it may not necessarily translate into 'more skilled' or 'more experienced.'

After examining the emergence of AAEs through the ethnographic framework, the next framework to be employed is AAEs policy analysis framework to investigate of how their possession of resources and ethnographic profile will determine their selection of strategies, activities, and level of effectiveness (see Figure 2 below).

Resources and Ethnographic Profile (see **Figure 1**)	**Strategies**	**Activities**	**Evaluating the effectiveness**
Career path: • Personal characteristics • Political characteristics • The source of origin/previous post **Resources**: • Knowledge and expertise • Cultural • Political • Social-national elite network	Set of actions or kinds of strategies applied to enable support of change (Meijerink and Huitema, 2010)	• Outputs for affecting stability or change • Types of functions/set of actions (Mintrom and Vergari, 1996; Roberts and King, 1991) • Answers to the key questions of policy transfer process, e.g.: what is transferred, from where it is transferred, and how the transfer process conducted (mechanism and degrees), etc. (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) • Transfer mechanism	• Programmatic, political and process success (Marsh and Sharman, 2009; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012; Fawcett and Marsh, 2012) • Influence on policy outcomes • Potential obstacles of transfer process

Legend: Please note that this is not necessarily a linear process; it is likely to be iterative in formulation

Meijerink and Huitema (2010), under policy entrepreneurship perspective, identified five strategies to be adopted which in many aspects correspond with Mintrom and Norman (2009) and Mintrom & Vergari (1996). These strategies are 1). Developing and disseminating new ideas within multi-level governance networks; 2). Building coalitions; 3). Anticipating, manipulating, and exploiting windows of opportunity; 4). Connecting informal to formal networks; and, 5). Crafting institutions for learning or for realizing particular policy ideas.

Most policy change and innovation experiencing constraint at the stage of implementing the strategy, which usually caused by resistant bureaucracy and

political elite who prefer status-quo. Therefore it is important to maximize multi-level governance networks approach in developing and disseminating new ideas. These multi-governance networks approach closely related to the next strategy of building coalitions to balance advocacy with the brokerage.

The next strategy related with how to utilize windows of opportunity to launch new ideas. Regarding with this, it will be important to create venues where formal and informal networks can connect, ideas are discussed, and strategy to coped with resistant parties can be formulated. Creating venues also has a similar aim to craft new institutions of learning and realizing new policy ideas and innovations.

Strategies need to be implemented in actions, where Roberts and King (1991) identified a set of actions: 1). Creative/intellectual activities, related with generating and disseminate new ideas that can come from other policy domains into the local context; 2). Strategic activities, where policy entrepreneurs formulated both long or short-term strategies for action; 3). Mobilization/execution activities, which associated with taking the innovation into formal deliberative and policy formulation process as well as its implementation; 4). Administrative/evaluative activities, which indicates involvement in implementation and evaluation of the new idea and innovation.

Under the context of policy transfer, the option of a set of actions also determined by the answers to key questions on Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) heuristic understanding of the policy transfer such as: What is transferred? From where it is transferred? And, how the transfer process conducted?

The next crucial part of discussion related to assessing the output and effectiveness of transfer process. Measuring the success and effectiveness of AAEs role are closely related with examining the success of policy transfer process itself.

Marsh and Sharman (2009) and Dolowitz and Marsh (2012) offered three dimensions of success: 1). Programmatic success, which related with criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, and resilience; 2). Political success refers to the evaluation and acceptance in the political arena. However, policies may be unsuccessful in programmatic terms but appear to be a political success. Nevertheless, this political success of the government in short-term perspective potentially might bring programmatic failure in the longer timeframe; 3). Process success, for instance, if it is passed unamended in the legislation process.

However, Marsh and Sharman (2009) admitted that this distinction is likely problematic regarding with determining 'success for whom' the change is. In a political environment, 'success' is a contested concept, merely related to social construction and power relations, or how outcomes can serve a particular interest. In this stage, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) asserted the importance of restricting and concentrate on how far policy transfer has achieved the aims set by policy makers, not just what is perceived as a success by actors involved in the policy arena.

Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) also suggested that there are three factors determine the failure or success of policy transfer: 1). Uninformed transfer, where the borrowing country has insufficient information about the transferred policy and how its operation in its originating country; 2). Incomplete transfer referred to a condition when the transfer has occurred, but crucial elements and success factors in originating country may not be transferred; and, 3). Inappropriate transfer, where there is insufficient attention has been paid to the differences in economic, social, political, and ideological contexts between the originating and borrowing country.

Evans (2009c) also identified three sets of variables of potential obstacles during policy transfer process: 1). Cognitive obstacles, which occurs in the pre-decision phase; 2). Environmental barriers refer to factors surrounding implementation stages; 3). Domestic public opinion, where elite group (political, bureaucratic, economic), media, and constituency groups opinion will also determine the success of transfer process.

Furthermore, Evans (2009c) and Benson and Jordan (2011) also mentioned some potential constraints factors on the successful policy transfer process, based on data from several case studies: 1). The originating policy is too complex and difficult to implement; 2). Incompatibility with the local context, policy system, and dominant value system; 3). Constraints on political, bureaucratic, technological and economic resources; 4). Normal policy implementation problems.

Based on all previous discussion, researching the role of AAEs as agents of transfer will be very helpful if using this two-dimensional framework in following ways:

1. The process is suggested to begin by employing framework illustrated in Figure 1, to understand internal dynamics behind the emergence of AAEs. This framework is related with describing ethnographic profile such as career path and extended to examining their resources, and also how the variables interact with particular context resulting with the appointment of academics into certain office.

2. The next step is utilizing framework at Figure 2 emphasizing the iterative process of how resources and ethnographic profile of AAEs determine the selection of strategies and activities. The selection of strategies and activities

itself reflect the actual role exercised by AAEs. This framework will also guide the evaluation of success or failure including identifying possible situation responsible or influencing the policy outcomes.

In general, the two frameworks described in Figures 1 and 2 represent the key areas of the empirical investigation of the role of AAEs in the policy transfer process.

Indonesia: an early investigation on the emergence of AAEs

This section will try to explore AAEs in Indonesia using frameworks mentioned above. However, as research is still in progress, not every element will be described. AAEs resources, mainly academic affiliation (originating institutions) and political affiliation will be examined to get insight into the emergence of AAEs particularly using the case of the history of ministerial appointment in Indonesia. The discussion on this issue will be lead by the ethnographic framework as shown in Figure 1.

The illustration will be limited only to AAEs who ever served in cabinet-level portfolios such as a minister, vice minister/junior minister, and heads of several governmental bodies. AAEs also can easily found within larger proportion in the lower level of appointment, either in central or local government. However, the limitation to focusing on cabinet level is aimed to give a macro perspective of the existence of AAEs in most prominent and visible positions.

As basic figures, from the first cabinet in independent Indonesia (1945) to the current cabinet of the Reformation Era, in total 13.9% cabinet members have had a background as academics. In the previous cabinet (2009-2014), from the 17 vice-ministerial posts, ten were occupied by university professors. The detail of figures is explained in Table 1 below.

Table 1. AAEs in Indonesian Cabinet

No.	Name of Cabinet/Period/ Number of Cabinet Members	AAEs/ Percentage	Academic Affiliation *	AAEs Political Affiliation **
1. Early Independence Era				
1.	Presidential/ 2 September 1945-14 November 1945/ 21	3	*UI* (2), *UGM* (1)	N/A
2.	*Sjahrir I*/ 14 November 1945-12 March 1946/ 17	1	*UI* (1)	N/A
3.	*Sjahrir II*/ 12 March 1946-2 October 1946/ 25	1	*UI* (1)	N/A
4.	*Sjahrir III*/ 2 October 1946-3 July 1947/ 32	-	-	-
5.	*Amir Sjarifuddin I*/ 3 July 1947-11 November 1947/ 34	-	-	-
6.	*Amir Sjarifuddin II*/ 11 November 1947-29 January 1948/ 37	-	-	-
7.	*Hatta I*/ 29 January 1948-4 August 1949/ 17	-	-	-
8.	Emergency/ 19 December 1948-13 July 1949/ 12	-	-	-
9.	*Hatta II*/ 4 August 1949-20 December 1949/ 19	-	-	-
	Total amount of cabinet members in Early Independence Era: **214**	Total amount of AAEs as cabinet members in Early Independence Era and its percentage of the population of all cabinet members: **5 (2.3%)**	The proportion of AAEs's academic affiliation within the population of all AAEs in this era: *UI* (**4; 80%**), *UGM* (**1; 20%**)	The proportion of AAEs political affiliation within the population of all AAEs in this era: **0**
2. Parliamentary Democracy Era				
1.	Federal Republic of Indonesia/ 20 December 1949-6 September 1950/ 17	1	*UI* (1)	N/A
2.	*Susanto*/ 20 December 1949-21 January 1950/ 10	-	-	-
3.	*Halim*/ 21 January 1950-6 September 1950/ 15	-	-	-
4.	*Natsir*/ 6 September 1950-27 April 1951/ 18	2	*UI* (1), *UGM* (1)	*PSI* (1), *PIR* (1)
5.	*Sukiman-Suwirjo*/ 27 April 1951-3 April 1952/ 20	-	-	-
6.	*Wilopo*/ 3 April 1952-30 July 1953/ 18	1	*UI* (1)	*PSI* (1)
7.	*Ali Sastroamidjojo I*/ 30 July 1953-12 August 1955/ 20	3	*UI* (1), *ITB* (1), *Unpad* (1)	*PIR* (2), *Progresif* (1)
8.	*Burhanuddin Harahap*/ 12 August 1955-24 March 1956/ 23	2	*UI* (1), *ITB* (1)	*PSI* (1), *Parindra* (1)
9.	*Ali Sastroamidjojo II*/ 24 March 1956-9 April 1957/ 25	1	*UPI* (1)	*PNI* (1),

No.	Name of Cabinet/Period/ Number of Cabinet Members	AAEs/ Percentage	Academic Affiliation *	AAEs Political Affiliation **
10.	*Djuand*a/ 9 April 1957-10 July 1959/ 24	2	*UIN* (1), unidentified (1)	*Murba* (1)
	Total amount of cabinet members in Parliamentary Democracy Era: **190**	Total amount of AAEs as cabinet members in Parliamentary Democracy Era and its percentage of the population of all cabinet members: **12 (6.3%)**	The proportion of AAEs's academic affiliation within the population of all AAEs in this era: *UI* (**5; 41.7%**), *ITB* (**2; 16.7%**), *UGM* (**1; 8.3%**), *Unpad* (**1; 8.3%**), *UPI* (**1; 8.3%**), *UIN* (**1; 8.3%**), unidentified (**1; 8.3%**)	The proportion of AAEs political affiliation within the population of all AAEs in this era: **10 (83.3%)**. From the population of 10, it consist of: *PSI* (**3; 30%**), *PIR* (**3; 30%**), *Progresif* (**1; 10%**), *PNI* (**1; 10%**) *Murba* (**1; 10%**) , *Parindra* (**1; 10%**)
3. Guided Democracy Era (Old Order Regime)				
1.	Working I/ 10 July 1959-18 February 1960/ 33	1	*UI* (1)	N/A
2.	Working II/ 18 February 1960-6 March 1962/ 40	1	*UI* (1)	N/A
3.	Working III/ 6 March 1962-13 November 1963/ 60	2	*UI* (1), *IPB* (1)	N/A
4.	Working IV/ 13 November 1963-27 August 1964/ 66	3	*UI* (2), *IPB* (1)	N/A
5.	*Dwikora I*/ 27 August 1964-22 February 1966/ 110	10	*UI* (5), *Unpad* (1), unidentified (4)	*Murba* (1), *Masyumi* (1)
6.	*Dwikora II*/ 24 February 1966-28 March 1966/ 132	9	*UI* (4), *UPI* (1), unidentified (4)	*Murba* (1), *Masyumi* (1)
7.	*Dwikora III*/ 28 March 1966-25 July 1966/ 79	8	*UI* (5), *UPI* (1), unidentified (2)	*Masyumi* (1)
8.	*Ampera I*/ 25 July 1966-17 October 1967/ 31	5	*UI* (2), *PTIK* (1), unidentified (2)	*Masyumi* (1)
9.	*Ampera II*/ 17 October 1967-6 June 1968/ 24	5	*UI* (4), *PTIK* (1)	N/A
	Total amount of cabinet members in Guided Democracy Era (Old Order Regime): **575**	Total amount of AAEs as cabinet members in Guided Democracy Era (Old Order Regime) and its percentage of the population of all cabinet members: **44 (7.65%)**	The proportion of AAEs's academic affiliation within the population of all AAEs in this era: *UI* (**25; 56.8%**), *IPB* (**2; 4.5%**), *UPI* (**2; 4.5%**), *PTIK* (**2; 4.5%**), *Unpad* (**1; 2.3%**), unidentified (**12; 27.3%**)	The proportion of AAEs political affiliation within the population of all AAEs in this era: **6 (13.6%)**. From the population of 6, it consist of: *Masyumi* (**4; 66.7%**), *Murba* (**2; 33.3%**)

No.	Name of Cabinet/Period/ Number of Cabinet Members	AAEs/ Percentage	Academic Affiliation *	AAEs Political Affiliation **
4. New Order Era				
1.	Development I/ 6 June 1968-28 March 1973/ 24	12	*UI* (9), *IPB* (1), *UIN* (1), *Unpad* (1)	*PDI* (1)
2.	Development II/ 28 March 1973-29 March 1978/ 24	15	*UI* (11), *Unpad* (2), *IPB* (1), *UIN* (1),	*PDI* (1)
3.	Development III/ 29 March 1978-19 March 1983/ 32	8	*UI* (6), *Unpad* (1), *Unand* (1)	N/A
4.	Development IV/ 19 March 1983-23 March 1988/ 42	9	*UI* (8), *Unpad* (I)	N/A
5.	Development V/ 23 March 1988-17 March 1993/ 44	6	*UI* (5), *IPB* (1)	N/A
6.	Development VI/ 17 March 1993-14 March 1998/ 43	7	*UI* (3), *ITB* (2), *IPB* (1), *Unsyiah* (1)	N/A
7.	Development VII/ 14 March 1998-21 May 1998/ 38	10	*UI* (3), *ITB* (3), *IPB* (1), *ITS* (1), *Undip* (1), *UIN* (1)	*Golkar* (1)
	Total amount of cabinet members in New Order Era: **247**	Total amount of AAEs as cabinet members in New Order Era and its percentage of the population of all cabinet members: **67 (27.1%)**	The proportion of AAEs's academic affiliation within the population of all AAEs in this era: *UI* (**45; 67.2%**), *ITB* (**5; 7.5%**), *Unpad* (**5; 7.5%**), *IPB* (**5; 7.5%**), *UIN* (**3; 4.5%**), *Unand* (**1; 1.5%**), *Undi*p (**1; 1.5%**), *Unsyiah* (**1; 1.5%**), *ITS* (**1; 1.5%**)	The proportion of AAEs political affiliation within the population of all AAEs in this era: **3 (4.5%)**. From the population of 3 it consist of: *PDI* (**2; 66.7%**), *Golkar* (**1; 33.3%**). However, it becomes general knowledge that most cabinet members in this regime were affiliated to *Golkar* as the ruling party.
5. Reformation Era				
1.	Development Reform/ 21 May 1998-20 October 1999/ 37	12	*UI* (3), *ITB* (3), *IPB* (2), *UGM* (1), *ITS* (1), *Undip* (1), *UMM* (1)	*Golkar* (1)
2.	National Unity/ 26 October 1999-9 August 2001/ 36	12	*UI* (3), *IPB* (2), *UAJ* (2), *UGM* (1), *Unhas* (1), *UII* (1), *UMM* (1), *IIP* (1)	*PKB* (1)
3.	Cooperation/ 9 August 2001-20 October 2004/ 33	8	*UI* (2), *IPB* (2), *UGM* (1), *UIN* (1), *UMM* (1), *UAJ* (1)	N/A

No.	Name of Cabinet/Period/ Number of Cabinet Members	AAEs/ Percentage	Academic Affiliation *	AAEs Political Affiliation **
4.	United Indonesia I/ 21 October 2004-20 October 2009/ 34	12	*UI* (5), *UGM* (2), *ITB* (1), *ITS* (1), *IPB* (1), *Unhas* (1), *UAJ* (1)	*PKS* (1)
5.	United Indonesia II/ 22 October 2009-20 October 2014/ 58 (34 ministers and 24 other cabinet level officials include vice ministers)	21	*UI* (6), *ITB* (3), *UGM* (3), *IPB* (2), *Unand* (2), *ITS* (1), *Unpad* (1), *Unlam* (1), *UIN* (1), *UAJ* (1)	N/A
6.	Working/ 27 October 2014-current/ 34	9	*UI* (3), *UGM-Undip-Uncen-Paramadina-UMM-HKBP* (1)	*PDI-P* (1)
	Total amount of cabinet members in Reformation Era: **232**	Total amount of AAEs as cabinet members in Reformation Era and its percentage of the population of all cabinet members: **74 (31.9%)**	The proportion of AAEs's academic affiliation within the population of all AAEs in this era: *UI* (**22; 29.8%**), *UGM* (**9; 12.2%**), *IPB* (**9; 12.2%**), *ITB* (**7; 9.5%**), *UAJ* (**5; 6.8%**), *ITS* (**3; 4.1%**), *UMM* (**3; 4.1%**), *UIN* (**2; 2.7%**), *Unand* (**2; 2.7%**), *Undip* (**2; 2.7%**), *Unhas* (**2; 2.7%**), *Uncen* (**1; 1.4%**), *Paramadina* (**1; 1.4%**), *HKBP* (**1; 1.4%**), *Unlam* (**1; 1.4%**), *IIP* (**1; 1.4%**), *Unpad* (**1; 1.4%**), *UII* (**1; 1.4%**)	The proportion of AAEs political affiliation within the population of all AAEs in this era: **4 (5.4%).** From the population of 4, it consists of *Golkar, PKB, PKS, PDI-P* each one.
	Total amount of cabinet members since early independence era: **1458**	Total amount of AAEs as cabinet members since Early Independence Era until Reformation Era and its percentage of	Proportion of AAEs's academic affiliation within the population of all AAEs since Early Independence	Proportion of AAEs political affiliation within the population of all AAEs since Early Independence Era until

		the population of all cabinet members: **202 (13.9%)**	Era until Reformation Era: see in detail at **Table 3**	Reformation Era: see in detail at **Table 2**
Note	* **Universities:** • *UI* : University of Indonesia, Jakarta • *IPB* : Bogor Agricultural Institute, Bogor • *ITB* : Bandung Institute of Technology, Bandung • *UGM* : Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta • *Unpad* : Padjajaran University, Bandung • *UIN* : Islamic State University (formerly Islamic State Institute/ *IAIN*) • *UAJ* : Atma Jaya University, Jakarta • *ITS* : Surabaya Institute of Technology, Surabaya • *UPI* : Indonesian Education University (formerly Education and Teaching Institute), Bandung • *Unand* : Andalas University, Padang • *Undip* : Diponegoro University, Semarang • *UMM* : Muhammadiyah Uninversity, Malang • *PTIK* : The Police Science Academy • *Unhas* : Hasanuddin University, Makassar • *Unsyiah* : Syah Kuala University, Banda Aceh • *Uncen* : Cenderawasih University, Jayapura • *UII* : Indonesian Islamic University, Yogyakarta • *Paramadina* : Paramadina University, Jakarta • *HKBP* : HKBP Nomenssen, Medan • *Unlam* : Lambung Mangkurat University, Banjarmasin • *IIP* : Government Science Institute		** **Political parties:** • *PSI* : Indonesian Socialist Party • *PIR*: Great Indonesian Party • *Progresif* : Progressive Party • *Parindra* : Great Indonesian Party • *PNI* : Indonesian National Party • *Murba* : People Consultation Party • *Masyumi*: Islamic People Party • *PDI* : Indonesian Democratic Party • *PDI-P* : Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle • *Golkar* : Functionalist Party • *PKB* : National Awakening Party • *PKS* : Prosperous and Justice Party	

Based on Table 1, the summarized information (as in Table 2 and Table 3) will provide insight into the pattern of AAEs recruitment under specific time context. In general, the history of Indonesian government can be analysed under five period or era:

1. Early Independence Era (1945-1949). This era marked by the transition of power from colonial Dutch's East Indies government to newly created republican government. This period witnessed the continuous military conflict between the Indonesian and Dutch army, which affect the stability of government administration. The condition became more eased after the formal acknowledgment of Indonesian independence from the Netherlands in 1949.

2. Parliamentary Democracy Era (1949-1959). In this ten years period, Indonesian political history witnessed the experimentation of democracy, starting from the changing of state formation (back forth from unitary state to federal state) to changing forms of government from presidential system to parliamentary system.

3. Guided Democracy Era/Old Order Regime (1959-1968). Due to the political instability of parliamentary system in the previous era which was not beneficial for a young nation, Indonesian first president's Soekarno decides to take unilateral action by enforcing 'guided democracy' model of centralised power in the hand of the president as the supreme leader. Differences between the previous era where cabinets experienced only short-term period, cabinets under this era tends to be more stable. However, under consideration of political accommodation, members of cabinet became expanding.

4. New Order Era (1968-1998). Eventually, the policy of political accommodation in Old Order Regime did not work because of deep friction between political forces. The conflict between communist wing in government and the military, bring an end of this era where the military took over the power for the next 32 years under the presidency of General Soeharto in New Order Regime. Determined to offer political and security stability as well as a more developmental oriented regime, the New Order leadership prefer to recruit more AAEs to give support for its technocratic and developmental regime.

5. Reformation Era (1998-…). However, a period of economic stability during the New Order hides gloomy facts of political repression and human rights violations. The pro-democracy movement takes advantage of the 1997-1998

financial crisis to oust the authoritarian New Order regime. The Reformation

Era is now representing the second phase of Indonesian experimentation of

democracy after the failed one in the 1950s. This era characterized by a

massive change in political institution such as the adoption of coalition

government under presidential system, constitution amendments, and 'big

bang' decentralization.

Each era with its distinctive nature affects the pattern of AAEs recruitment,

regarding its number and source of appointment (see Table 2 below).

Table 2. Summary of AAEs in Indonesian Cabinet

No.	Era	Total amount of cabinet members	Amount of AAEs in the era	Amount of AAEs affiliated to political parties
1.	Early Independence Era (1945-1949)	214	5 (2.3%)	0
2.	Parliamentary Democracy Era (1949-1959)	190	12 (6.3%)	10
3.	Guided Democracy Era/Old Order Regime (1959-1968)	575	44 (7.6%)	6
4.	New Order Era (1968-1998)	247	67 (27.1%)	3
5.	Reformation Era (1998-…)	232	74 (31.9%)	4
`Total		**1458**	**202 (13.9%** from 1458**)** or in average **40.4%** of each era and **4.9%** of each cabinet	**23 (11.4%** from 202**)**

From the table, it has been shown that:
1. The recruitment of AAEs particularly has been increasing since the New

    Order developmentalist regime. The regime endeavour to accelerate

    development in post-independence period bring consequences of recruiting

    more experts and technocrats to accelerate economic development. Suharto's

    New Order government which can be divided into three periods: economic

    recovery (1966-1973), rapid economic growth and increasing government

investation (1974-1982), and export-led growth and deregulation (1983-1996), has succeeded to positioned Indonesia as one of the Asian economic miracle where for instance between 1988-1991 Indonesia's GDP grew by an average of 9% per year, slowing down to 7.3% in the next 1991-1994 and then rising again in the following two years before hit by Asian economic crisis in 1997 (https://www.indonesia-investments.com/culture/economy/new-order-miracle/item247).

2. The next regimes in the Reformation Era apparently also still keen to recruit AAEs in ministerial/vice ministerial portfolio, even with the higher percentage. Professor Habibie's presidency (1998-1999; himself a leading technocrat) and Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency (or SBY; 2004-2014) witnessed the eagerness of balancing political development as a state in transition with economic development. In particular, the SBY's second term (2009-2014) was marked as the only era where the vice-ministerial post was massively created to support political appointee minister with experts in their portfolio. From the 17 vice-ministerial posts in that era, ten were occupied by university professors and the rest were from career bureaucrats. The SBY's vice-president in his second term, Boediono, himself is a professor of economics from UGM.

3. Most of the AAEs recruited in cabinets since the New Order were not politically affiliated with certain political parties. However, it already becomes a general knowledge that in New Order regime, *Golkar* as the ruling party incorporate some of the AAEs in the cabinet as part of their experts group and thus making the AAEs as party cadre. Nevertheless, it was also admitted that

their membership was mostly nominal and they are still able to maintain their characters more as academics or AAEs rather than as political persona.

4. The situation is quite different in the case of AAEs during the Parliamentary Democracy Era where ten of twelve AAEs were explicitly part of the political parties which coalesce to form a government. Their involvement in political parties was mandatory since the nature of parliamentary system required clear affiliation of every political appointee to be politically accepted. The affiliation to political parties then considered as part of political resources that AAEs should have.

5. The situation of AAEs political affiliation relatively was not recognized anymore since the Reformation Era. The Law No. 5 Year 2014 on State Civil Apparatus strictly prohibit any civil servant to become a member or affiliated with any political parties, which also applied to every university lecturer who mostly has status as a civil servant. The exception applied for AAEs from private universities which did not have civil servant status, which was quite rare since most AAEs were recruited from leading state universities.

Continuing the discussion on university's affiliation, below table (Table 3) indicate the proportion of AAEs origin university and how this fact became part of their personal characteristics which contribute to their appointment.

Table 3. AAEs and its Academic Affiliation

No.	Era	AAEs academic affiliation
1.	Early Independence Era (1945-1949)	*UI* (**4**), *UGM* (**1**)
2.	Parliamentary Democracy Era (1949-1959)	*UI* (**5**), *ITB* (**2**), *UGM* (**1**), *Unpad* (**1**), *UPI* (**1**), *UIN* (**1**), unidentified (**1**)
3.	Guided Democracy Era/Old Order Regime (1959-1968)	*UI* (**25**), *IPB* (**2**), *UPI* (**2**), *PTIK* (**2**), *Unpad* (**1**), unidentified (**12**)
4.	New Order Era (1968-1998)	*UI* (**45**), *ITB* (**5**), *Unpad* (**5**), *IPB* (**5**), *UIN* (**3**), *Unand* (**1**), *Undi*p (**1**), *Unsyiah* (**1**), *ITS* (**1**)
5.	Reformation Era (1998-…)	*UI* (**22**), *UGM* (**9**), *IPB* (**9**), *ITB* (**7**), *UAJ* (**5**), *ITS* (**3**), *UMM* (**3**), *UIN* (**2**), *Unand* (**2**), *Undip* (**2**), *Unhas* (**2**), *Uncen* (**1**), *Paramadina* (**1**), *HKBP* (**1**), *Unlam* (**1**), *IIP* (**1**), *Unpad* (**1**), *UII* (**1**)
Total		**202**, consist of: *UI* **101 (50%)**, *IPB* **16 (7.9%)**, *ITB* **14 (6.9%)**, *UGM* **11 (5.5%)**, *Unpad* **8 (3.9%)**, *UIN* **6 (2.9%)**, *UAJ* **5 (2.5%)**, *ITS* **4 (1.9%)**, *UPI* **3 (1.5%)**, *Unand* **3 (1.5%)**, *Undip* **3 (1.5%)**, *UMM* **3 (1.5%)**, *PTIK* **2 (0.9%)**, *Unhas* **2 (0.9%)**, *Unsyiah* **1 (0.5%)**, *Uncen* **1 (0.5%)**, *UII* **1 (0.5%)**, *Paramadina* **1 (0.5%)**, *HKBP* **1 (0.5%)**, *Unlam* **1 (0.5%)**, *IIP* **1 (0.5%)**, Unidentified **13 (6.4%)**

From the table, all in all, it is visible that AAEs from the *University of Indonesia* (UI) dominated the figure (50%). The top five of AAEs originating universities are *University of Indonesia* (UI)*, Institut Pertanian Bogor* (IPB)*, Institut Teknologi Bandung* (ITB)*, Universitas Gadjah Mada* (UGM), and *Universitas Padjajaran* (Unpad). These prominent universities have a tradition as part of Indonesian major university league where the latest rank also indicate the consistent illustration (for Indonesian universities rank, see for instance: http://www.4icu.org/id/). Most of these universities are public or state-owned universities, where only 6% from the total AAEs since the first cabinet were from private universities. To some extent, this indicates that political regime was much more committed to developing public universities and therefore the academics from the respective universities was more trusted to hold governmental portfolio according to their expertise.

The tendency to recruit non-academics alumnae from public universities for other governmental position also more preferred and visible in many different institution or level of governments, where for instance the alumnae of UGM is quite dominating especially during the Joko Widodo's presidency (2014-current) where himself is UGM's alumnae and therefore raised the term of '*Mafia* UGM' to represent this phenomenon.

However, the domination of AAEs from *University of Indonesia* (UI) is quite fascinating facts. The geographical proximity as leading university located in the nation's capital of Jakarta has given an advantage to their academics as people who become easily reached to provide academic and professional advice for any government needs. The emergence of AAEs from UI was visibly noticed during the New Order era where almost every economic portfolios in the cabinet were filled with them.

Referring to the previous fact, during this period, there were groups of AAEs from UI famously known as 'The Berkeley Mafia.' 'The Berkeley Mafia,' is a term used to describe a group of economists from the University of Indonesia, all of whom were graduates of UC Berkeley. They were recruited between 1968-1988 as economic experts and were responsible for formulating Indonesia's development policies under the authoritarian New Order. This clique has been criticised for promoting a market liberal developmental agenda in Indonesia since UC Berkeley was claimed as the stronghold of neo-liberal economics. Their presence is similar to the 'Chicago Boys' from Chile in the 1970s and 1980s which served under General Augusto Pinochet regime (1974-1990), a situation in an era that to some extent shared similarities regarding political and economic context with Indonesia.

Referring to the discussion from Table 2, arguably the factor of the social-elite network has played a significant role in AAEs appointment, as well as the time context. However, there are still many facets and variables that worked behind AAEs appointment that should be carefully investigated in this still ongoing research.

Conclusion

Investigating AAEs will make at least four main contributions to the study of public policy. Firstly, it evaluates policy transfer analysis as an exploratory elite theory of policy development, in particular, related to the unique phenomenon in the Indonesian political system, which is the role of AAEs. Secondly, studying AAEs emphasises the importance of what Stone (2004) believes to be the strength of policy transfer studies – its focus on the role of the agents of transfer and recognizes that issues of institutional design and agency are crucial to the generation of successful policy outcomes. Finally, this study provides an understanding of a state in transition through the lens of the policy transfer framework, an unexplored field in Indonesian policy science. In addition, it will make a general theoretical and case study contribution to the comparative public policy literature on policy transfer.

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