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## The involvement of civil servants in ministerial advice. A profile of bureaucratic advice suppliers in Belgium

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### Abstract

The second wave of studies on political advisers defends a broad view of policy advisory systems where politicians rely on a multitude of knowledge and advice providers. Even if governance reforms enlarged the advisory system to a multitude of participants, mainly external (e.g. consultants, scientists, NGOs, or think tanks), public officials working within government remain major providers of advice to the ministers. A significant part of their policy work consists in providing policy notes and more or less processed information to the ministers and their cabinet members. This paper aims at identifying the characteristics of these bureau-ministerial advisers, that is public officials who are the most intensively involved in advice provision to ministers. It relies on a survey conducted in Belgium in both the federal and regional government on in-house policy work by graduated public officials (N=3,481). This survey is in many points similar with previous enquiries conducted in e.g. Canada and the Czech Republic. An index of advice giving to ministers is first built to assess the contribution of individual respondents to the request and needs of ministerial cabinets on the basis of the kind of policy tasks conducted and the contribution to policy documents. Linear multiple regression is used as the method to identify the characteristics of the bureau-ministerial advisers. Among these characteristics, the assessment will show their profile, their initial and professional training, their analytical skills, the kind of information they use, and the people they consult.

## Introduction

Ministerial advisers are part of a larger policy advisory system in which they collect information and advice from various actors who are both internal and external to the government. Although the size of the ministerial cabinets is gradually increasing both in Napoleonic and Westminster regimes, their staff cannot overcome all the policy tasks which traditionally belonged to the competence of the civil service. The civil service is still a major provider of information and advice to the ministers. They have the necessary background, detailed information about the implementation process, databases, and sometimes historical records about the running of public policies. Although their capacity may have decreased over time, their day-to-day management of public policies keeps them in a central position for producing analysis and advice on public policies.

Of course, all the civil servants are certainly not equally committed in advising ministers. In some governments, the advising skills of the public service are grouped together in policy units whose main activity is to provide foresight and advice for formulating future public policies. The staff is trained as policy analysts who dedicate their procedural knowledge to a wide array of issues. In others, the departments adopt a job-oriented approach and hire specialists who hold technical skills, such as engineering, biology, or agronomy. These specialists are possibly less involved in ministerial advice and rather act as 'incidental advisers'. In sum, within the public service, the profile of bureau-ministerial advisers, that is the civil servants the most intensively involved in ministerial advice, may be particular.

The aim of this paper consists in identifying the characteristics of the bureau-ministerial advisers who are the most intensively involved in advice provision to the ministers and their ministerial cabinets compared to other 'incidental advisers' within the public service. The activity of advising ministers takes different forms, including both oral and written reports, and covers a wide range of policy tasks. The degree of involvement of civil servants in ministerial advice may be influenced by personal characteristics, such as seniority, training, and past career. Further, these advisers may have particular habits about information gathering, consultation practice, and knowledge in analytical techniques. The attempt is to provide a picture of the bureau-ministerial adviser.

The study relies on a survey conducted in Belgium in 2013 and 2015 in four governments at both federal and regional levels about in-house policy work by graduated public officials (N=3,481). This survey is in many points similar with previous enquiries conducted in e.g. Canada and the Czech Republic. An index of advice provision to ministers is first built to assess the contribution of individual respondents to the request and needs of ministers and their ministerial cabinet members on the basis of the kind of policy tasks conducted and the contribution to policy documents. Then the linear multiple regression is used to identify the characteristics of the bureau-ministerial advisers. The tests are first provided at the national scale, and then disaggregated for each of the four governments studied, that is Wallonia, Federation Wallonia-Brussels, Flanders, and the Federal government.

### 1 Bureau-ministerial advisers as a specific kind of political advisers

The second wave studies on political advisers defend a broad view of policy advisory systems (Craft & Howlett, 2012) which stand on a multitude of knowledge and advice providers. Policy advisory

systems (PAS) are understood as “the interlocking set of actors and organizations, with a unique configuration in each sector and jurisdiction, that provides recommendations for action to policy-makers” (Craft & Wilder, 2017, p. 215). It has broadened the focus of analysis from individual advisers to a more holistic frame that facilitates examination of how various advisory units and practices interact with one another, and the dynamics of system configuration and operation over time (Craft & Halligan, 2017). A policy advisory system provides a holistic view on a series of individual and institutional advisers which operate with their own goals and procedures, for example the public service and central agencies, partisan ministerial advisers, external consultants, commissions of inquiry, parliamentary committees, think tanks, supranational organisations and formal advisory bodies. The aim of this paper is to concentrate more specifically on the bureau-ministerial advisers, that is the members of the public service who are advising the ministers and their cabinets, without being themselves members of these ministerial cabinets. They come in support to political decision with informational input and advice to the minister.

Policy advice refers to advice about the design and content of public policies, or more broadly any form of policy programs or measures. In order to delineate more precisely the boundaries of a policy advice, the challenge consists in distinguishing an advice on policy design from any other kind of information about the content and context of policy. To what extent must information be processed in order to be turned into a policy advice? Halligan proposed to restrict policy advice to “an activity that aims to support policy makers’ decision making by analyzing policy problems and proposing solutions” (Halligan, 1995, p. 139). While this definition emphasises the importance of policy analysis in policy advice, it may be too restrictive given the differences in formats and types of content that advice actually takes. “Policy advice is now understood to involve a broader suite of techniques and activities, at various points in the policy process, including the provision of recommendations, guidance, and the articulation of preferences in support of policy work” (Craft & Halligan, 2017, p. 49). For example, in Belgium, the policy analytical input of advice remains limited (Brans & Aubin, 2017).

However, policy advice should not be broadened too much and become synonymous to policy work. Policy advice is recognised as being one type of policy work, which also encompasses non-advisory activities, such as unit management, brokerage and negotiation, even if the boundaries remain unclear (Craft, 2015; Veselý, 2017). Broadly speaking the role of policy advisers consists in “clarifying the problem, identifying the alternative courses of action, and systematically determining the optimal response” (Colebatch, Hoppe, & Noordegraaf, 2010, p. 13), but their actual roles are very diverse. The profession extends far beyond the provision of policy analysis to, among others, directing departmental work, negotiating with stakeholders, evaluating policy proposals and monitoring the implementation of policy (Maley, 2015). “Some advice is ‘expert’ expertise; most is not” (Althaus, 2013, p. 5). Policy advisers cumulate specific knowledge and skills not limited to policy analysis tools and techniques (Veselý, 2017). They conduct a series of tasks related to policy work, which are not *per se* policy advice. In this current research, the aim is to concentrate only on the policy advice activity of civil servants. For this reason, the construction of the dependent variable measuring the contribution to ministerial advice will be limited to a set of activities closely linked to policy advice.

Even if governance reforms enlarged the advisory system to a multitude of participants, mainly external ones (e.g. consultants, scientists, NGOs, or think tanks), public officials working within

government apparatus remain major providers of political advice. A significant part of the policy advice role of bureau-ministerial advisers consists in providing policy notes and more or less processed information to the ministers and ministerial cabinet members. Recent contributions are depicting a decrease of the advisory role of civil servants in the Westminster systems in the last 30 years in parallel with a process of cabinetisation of the internal government policy advisory system, in particular ministerial offices (Craft & Halligan, 2017; Gouglas & Brans, 2016; Gouglas, Brans, & Jaspers, 2017). The division of tasks and related lack of trust between elected politicians and civil servants is much older and permanent in Napoleonic system, notably in Belgium where federal ministers have an average staff of 30 (which sometimes reaches 140 for vice-prime ministers), and organise a 'shadow administration' in their office (Brans, de Visscher, Gouglas, & Jaspers, 2017, pp. 61-63; Brans & Steen, 2007). Whatever the size reached by the ministerial cabinets or the weight of external advisers, such as interest groups, private consultants, and think tanks, the public service remains central in policy formulation and steering. Civil servants are running policies on a daily basis, manage database and keep historical records of policy developments. Despite a trend of externalisation of public policy, the public service should not be overlooked too quickly. According to recent surveys on policy work "policy advising is an integral part of 'standard' public administration and is not limited to the special advisory bodies and units that are the dominant focus of PAS scholarship" (Veselý, 2017, p. 142). Although their presence and capacity may have decreased in the last 30 years, civil servants remain important actors in the policy process.

In many political systems, civil servants are 'incidental advisers' (Veselý, 2017, p. 140). Policy advisor is far from being a generally recognised profession. For many civil servants, policy advice is an important activity, but only one among many others. It means that policy advice is not a specialised field in each jurisdiction. In many countries, notably Belgium, the civil service is organised around professional specialisation. 'Specialists' are those who have "an expertise on the specific technical issues pertinent to [the unit's] domain of expertise" (Lindquist & Desvaux, 2007, p. 123). Either they possess a deep understanding of a field or master a set of technical skills (for example civil engineers or biologists). They are opposed to 'generalists' who develop an expertise on the policy process and public management without initially holding any technical skills in the subject area. In the public service these specialists contribute to policy work as 'incidental advisers'.

The question of the degree of involvement of civil servants in ministerial advice holds, particularly for 'specialists'. The first consideration lies in the distinction between policy advice and ministerial advice. Ministerial advice is in a way a policy advice addressed to a specific actor, the minister. It is not a special kind of policy advice, but a policy advice sent to a particular recipient. The focus on ministerial advice emphasises the relationship between the policy adviser and the decision-maker. It contributes to a better understanding of the nature of the political administrative relations, that is the division of labour between the ministers and departments and the weight of ministerial cabinets in the policy process. In some countries, ministerial cabinets are much involved in policy formulation, and count a large staff, composed of both civil servants on secondment and personal advisers to the ministers (OECD, 2011). In Belgium, the role of ministerial cabinets is so pivotal and prevalent in the 'public service bargain' (Hood & Lodge, 2006), that the latter was coined a 'ménage à trois' between the ministers, the civil service and ministerial cabinets (Brans et al., 2017; De Visscher & Houlberg Salomonsen, 2013).

Thus, the role of ministerial cabinets is particularly prevalent in Belgium and would supposedly reduce civil servants' work to mere implementation. A recent study, based on the same data as this paper, showed that this was not the case. The involvement of civil servants in policy work is not that limited, and unexpectedly encompasses an active contribution to the formulation of public policies (Aubin, Brans, & Fobé, 2017). Many of them collaborate with the ministers and their cabinet in formulating public policies. As they cannot be identified by a specific job position (such as policy adviser), the aim of this paper is to identify the characteristics of these bureau-ministerial advisers. What is their profile? What kind of information and analytical techniques do they use in their policy work?

The consistent part of their policy work comprises the provision of policy notes and more or less processed information to the ministerial cabinet members, what is referred as ministerial advice. Bureau-ministerial advisers conduct a number of policy tasks and participate to the writing of policy documents. The policy tasks both consist in technical, financial and legal tasks and less formal duties such as issue tracking or outlining options (Howlett, 2009, p. 9; Wellstead, Stedman, & Lindquist, 2009, pp. 43-44). Policy documents are in a way the outputs of the policy tasks, even if once again they are difficult to distinguish. For example, they can be "reports, decisions, proposed bills, public speeches and minutes" (Veselý, 2017, p. 148). The participation of civil servants to the writing of policy documents is part of a process (Hoppe & Jeliaskova, 2006, p. 50). Usually, attributing the authorship or responsibility leads to "the problems of many hands (Thompson, 1980)" (Veselý, 2017, p. 148). For this reason, the participation in ministerial advice will be measured as a combination of specific policy tasks and contributions to policy documents with a view to isolate the individual contribution to ministerial advice.

Given their particular role, the bureau-ministerial advisers should have special characteristics compared to the other civil servants (Howlett, 2009; Wellstead et al., 2009). These characteristics relate to the location on the organisation, seniority, gender, job experience, university degree subject area, and the professional training attended. First, policy analysts tend to work in formal policy units (Howlett, 2009, p. 7). Foremost, ministerial advice from the civil service is then supposed to be issued in policy units. Their involvement may also depend on their location, either in a federal or sub-national government. In Canada, provincial policy advisers are more short-term, project oriented 'troubleshooters' whereas the Federal advisers are more often engaged in 'high-level' and long-term strategic planning (Howlett, 2009; Veselý, Wellstead, & Evans, 2014, p. 104). Second, Howlett concluded that seniority should not be so important among policy advisers: "[A] less hierarchical relationship exists among policy workers than is found in many traditional, hierarchic, bureaucratic organisations" (Howlett & Walker, 2012, p. 229). Thus, seniority should not characterise bureau-ministerial advisers. Third, an initial or a professional training in policy analysis is supposed to enhance the capacity and responsiveness of civil servants to answer requests from the ministers and their cabinet. Education and work stability are among the most important factors that shape policy advisers (Veselý, 2017, p. 147).

In their contribution to ministerial advice, civil servants use information or consult stakeholders. To what extent are they connected in policy networks? Contrary to their expectations, Wellstead et al. noticed that policy advisers in the Federal administrations in Canada did not have frequent contacts with groups outside the Federal administration. Their conclusion is that "their interaction within larger communities is limited" (2009, p. 47). This goes against the assumption that the 'new

environment' in which public administrations evolve, in the context of the New Public Governance perspective, pushes policy advisers to engage in greater consultation (Wellstead et al., 2009, p. 37). It is also expected that bureau-ministerial advisers give more attention to political documents issued for the minister, the Parliament or the political parties.

The work of policy analysis relies on analytical techniques (Mayer, van Daalen, & Bots, 2004; Meltsner, 1976). Formal techniques comprise quantitative methods (e.g. surveys, cost-benefit analysis, multiple-criteria decision analysis), trend extrapolations (e.g. causal models, logical frames, foresight or futures studies, and impact analyses), and analysis of organisations (e.g. SWOT, management games, or decision trees), and are put forward in many 'toolkit' policy analysis textbooks (for example Dunn, 2008; Weimer & Vining, 2010). However, this emphasis on formal techniques is somewhat exaggerated and underestimates the importance of procedural activities (Radin, 2013). Sources and types of used knowledge are diversified (Halligan, 1995). Analytical techniques may include the tools for making, maintaining and coordinating the actors' interactions as well (Kohoutek, Nekola, & Novotný, 2013). They involve analysing the political and multi-actor context (e.g. stakeholder analysis and Delphi methods) or attempts at making 'sense together' (e.g. interviews, focus groups or brainstorming) (Hoppe, 1999). Experience-based expertise is quite often placed on equal footing with scientific analysis as relevant and valuable information to the policy process (Williams, 2010). Government-based analysts employ "process-related tools more frequently than 'substantive' content-related technical ones, reinforcing the procedural orientation in policy work identified in earlier studies" (Howlett, Tan, Migone, Wellstead, & Evans, 2015, p. 165).

These different propositions will support the analysis made on the basis of statistical tests that are presented below.

## 2 A large-scale survey on bureaucratic policy work

This communication relies on a survey conducted in Belgium between the end of 2013 and mid-2015 in both the federal and regional governments on in-house policy work by graduated public officials (N=3,481). At the federal level, it targeted eight ministries or federal public services (services publics fédéraux/Federal Overheidsdiensten, or FPS): Economics, Finance, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Health, Defence and Social Security. In the regions of Flanders and Wallonia, both the regional administration, including the centralised departments and selected agencies, were studied. All the regional competencies are equally covered. For Francophone Belgium, the Federation Wallonia-Brussels (or French Community), a federated entity distinct from Wallonia, was investigated too.

This survey is in many points similar with previous enquiries conducted in Canada and the Czech Republic (Howlett et al., 2015; Nekola & Kohoutek, 2016; Veselý, 2017). In terms of content, it replicates most of the questionnaire used by Howlett and colleagues in Canada, but is partly adapted to national characteristics (Howlett & Newman, 2010; Howlett, Tan, Migone, Wellstead, & Evans, 2014; Howlett & Wellstead, 2012). It includes about 30 questions (with variations between the levels of government) divided into four chapters: the nature of policy work, analytical techniques, advisory system in the sector and policy capacity. LimeSurvey was used for constructing the questionnaire and sending invitations to potential participants. The questionnaire was set up in both French and Dutch and sent out to each person individually.

The target population comprises the Belgian graduated civil servants who work in departments and public agencies. Those delegated to the ministerial cabinets were excluded. Given the fact that policy analyst is not a recognised profession or position in the Belgian administrations, it was not possible to operate with samples. Therefore, an online questionnaire was sent to civil servants holding a university degree, as these individuals are assumed to take up positions in Belgian governmental organisations that relate to policy work and policy analysis. The group of civil servants to which invitations were eventually sent differed across levels of government, depending on the degree to which the heads of the departments or agencies were willing to accommodate the research team's request to provide them with the whole population of university graduated civil servants (operating in Belgium's governments at 'A level'). Sometimes, the contact lists provided by the organisations included a limited number of public servants, as those officials actually involved in policy analysis had already been selected.

At the federal level, only the federal Interior department provided a full list of A level civil servants. Six other FPSs provided a select list of email addresses for A level civil servants (Finance, Justice, Defence, Economics, Social Security and Foreign Affairs), based on the assumption that these were the people the questionnaire was targeting. The selected population predominantly includes middle-range civil servants, working as *attachés*, advisers or advisers-general. But it equally pertains to a limited number of mandated top civil servants, such as administrator-generals at the N-1 level for some but not all departments (for example, Health, Interior and Social Affairs). FPS Health did not provide any contact details but dispersed the survey through its internal communication channel to all of its employees.

By contrast, at the regional level the Flemish government provided the contact details of a more focused subset of university-graduated civil servants, that is, those working at rank A1 and A2. Similar to the situation at the federal level, this select group of civil servants was assumed to be involved in policy-analytical work frequently and considered as the questionnaire's target group. These two ranks at the A level do not pertain to the mandated top civil servants in Flanders (A3 rank or N level), nor do they include high functional positions such as director general. Rather, the selected population includes civil servants working as heads of unit, senior advisers, researchers or *attachés*. In Wallonia and Federation Wallonia-Brussels, then, the population is broader in comparison with those at the two other government levels. It includes all civil servants with a university degree without consideration of their function or rank, nor of their presumed involvement in policy-analytical work. In this regard, the population includes both middle-ranking civil servants and the top-level civil servants.

The survey was sent to the population of each government level in several rounds between the end of 2013 and the middle of 2015. In total, the survey was sent to 7,560 people. The overall response rate to the survey is about 40%. At the federal level, the total number of civil servants contacted to complete the survey was 2,253. The response rate for the federal level is about 38%, based on 858 responses. This is the total number of respondents (N=904) from which those in FPS Health (N=46) have been subtracted, as the population in that department is unknown.

In Flanders, the then 13 governmental departments and respective agencies made up 1,152 civil servants at A1 and A2 level contacted to participate in the survey. All of the centralised departments participated in the research, whereas several agencies did not. When contacted by the research

team, the heads of the agencies who had opted not to participate often indicated that their agency did not carry out matters of policy formulation but was predominantly involved in policy implementation. In total, 499 Flemish government officials participated by (partially) completing the questionnaire. The response rate for Flanders is 43%.

In Francophone Belgium, then, 4,155 officials were contacted, that is, civil servants with a university degree regardless of their function or level. This included 2,893 civil servants within the centralised department (SPW) and respective agencies of Wallonia and 1,262 civil servants within the administrations of the Federation Wallonia-Brussels, including the single ministry and several agencies. Some agencies declined participation too, but their absence does not affect the results as they involve few dozens of people and do not hold core policy competencies. Of 4,155 officials contacted in both Wallonia and Federation Wallonia-Brussels, 1,314 completed the survey fully or partially. Thus, the response rate for the entities of Wallonia and Federation Wallonia-Brussels is about 32%.

This paper relies on this survey to look more closely at the profile of bureau-ministerial advisers. They are members of the public service which collaborate the most with ministers and ministerial cabinets, without being themselves staff members of a ministerial cabinet. An index of advice giving to political advisers is first built to assess the contribution of individual respondents to the request and needs of ministerial cabinet members on the basis of the kind of policy tasks conducted and the contribution to policy documents. Building an index neutralizes the little differences which results from adaptations of the surveys over time.

This index of ministerial advice (MinAdvIndexR) was composed from answers to questions about the involvement in the preparation of policy documents and contribution to different policy tasks. From the different items, only those directly mentioning the minister and those closely related to political activities in the Belgian political system were retained to compose the index (see table 1). 13 variables were kept out of the 25 describing the different activities associated with policy work. All these variables measure the contribution to policy work. They were all coded from 0 to 4 (from never to always) and have the same weight in the index, which is the average of the answers to each of these 13 variables. The mean of the ministerial advice index (MinAdvIndexR) is 1.18 and the median is 1.07 (see Annex 1). The internal consistency of the index is high with a positive Shapiro-Wilks test ( $W=0.96598$  and  $p<0.005$ ) and a Cronbach's alpha of 0.92 ( $> 0.8$ ).

Table 1 The construction of the index of contribution to ministerial advice (MinAdvIndexR)

<b>Contribution to ministerial advice</b>	<b>Policy documents</b>	<b>Policy tasks</b>
<b>Min AdvIndexR</b>	<b>BWdoc</b>	<b>BWtak</b>
	<del>Research reports about policy</del>	Testing societal support for policies
	Cross-sector policy plans	Testing timing and feasibility of policy options
	Policy notes or briefs	Assessing (cross-sector) effects
	Government coalition agreement	<del>Determining budgetary impacts</del>
	New regulation	<del>Assessing legal acceptability</del>



Policy notes, reports or presentations to the minister	Investigating political risks for the minister
<del>Internal strategic notes to the administration</del>	Deciding on policy options
<del>Green or white papers</del>	<del>Implementing and coordinating policies</del>
Parliamentary questions	Follow up on commissioned research or evaluation
Questions from ministerial cabinets	Assist the minister at Parliament
<del>Budget documents</del>	Assist the cabinet in inter-cabinet meetings
<del>Futures studies</del>	
<del>Regulatory impact assessment (RIA)</del>	
<del>Program evaluation reports</del>	

Of course the construction of the index raised a number of questions about which variables to include in the calculation. A larger index was initially designed with 17 variables (13 + Green or white papers + Parliamentary questions + Determining budgetary impacts + Assessing legal acceptability) (MinAdvIndex). The internal consistency of the index was good too, but it was possible that these activities were not directly connected with ministerial advice. A more restrictive format of the index was also considered which only kept explicit references to the ministers and their cabinets in the items (7 variables) (MinAdvIndexRR). However, this kept too few items of the initial questions.

Then a linear multiple regression is used to identify the characteristics of bureau-ministerial advisers. A multiple regression is a regression with many independent variables (Pétry, 2003, p. 103). The idea behind the use of a multiple linear regression is to identify which specific characteristics bureau-ministerial advisers have compared to the ‘standard’ civil servants. Do they have a specific profile? Do they use more specific information and techniques? The results are relative and highlight the differences in profile and behaviour between bureau-ministerial advisers and their other colleagues. When no difference appears, it means that bureau-ministerial advisers do not use any particular source of information or technique more or less than do ‘standard’ civil servants. By ‘standard’ civil servants, we mean the whole population of the survey.

Using Stata, the index of collaboration with ministers is defined as the dependent variable, and four sets of multiple variables are successively tested: the actors’ characteristics, the types of information they use in policy work, the advice they request or receive and the analytical techniques they use (see Annex 2 for the details). Those groups of variables were put all together at once in the regression. First, the characteristics of the actors refer to the main activity of the unit in which they work (BDhf), their seniority in the public service and current sector (CAPerv), the kind of professional training they attended (CAPopl), their past professional experience (CAPwg), and their initial training (ALGond). They provide a specific profile of Bureau-ministerial advisers. Second, the types of information sources they use in their policy work is tested. Third, the frequency of request and reception of policy advice by different categories of stakeholders gives an account on the nature of their professional relations. Fourth, the analytical techniques they use are also tested. These multiple regressions are first conducted on the whole database, then reproduced for each of the four governments.

The multiple linear regressions about the civil servants characteristics were conducted for each of the three Indexes (MinAdvIndex, MinAdvIndexR and MinAdvIndexRR). MinAdvIndex and MinAdvIndexR produced the same results. This influenced the decision to keep the restrictive index given its parcimony. With MinAdvIndexRR, the results were much similar.

Given some differences in the conduct of the survey between the four governments, some variables are missing for one of the other subgroup and were excluded from the test. This is not the case for the actors' characteristics but well for the sources of information and the advice requested or received<sup>1</sup>. When possible some others were grouped together in two new variables<sup>2</sup>. These variables have very low means and do not seem to be central in the study.

### 3 The profile of bureau-ministerial advisers in Belgium

This part presents the results for the four Belgian governments put together, but also comments the variation between each government. A first correlation is calculated between the involvement in ministerial advice and the individual characteristics of the civil servants. The next ones show what kind of information and techniques bureau-ministerial advisers use.

Overall, the Belgian bureau-ministerial advisers work in policy formulation units, are more senior, and have a past experience in ministerial cabinets or in scientific research (see table 2). First, they are mainly located in units in charge of policy formulation (BDhf1New), but also of coordination and implementation, albeit to a lesser extent (BDhf2New and BDhf3New). This last outcome is explained by the relative absence of such specialised units, notably in the Federal and Francophone ministries<sup>3</sup>.

If the results are disaggregated in the four governments (Wallonia, Federation Wallonia-Brussels, Flanders and Federal government) (see Annex 3), some differences in results appear. In Wallonia, civil servants from the ministries are more involved in ministerial advice than the staff of public agencies while it doesn't have consequence in the other Belgian governments (BDsp). In Federation Wallonia-Brussels as well as in Flanders, being part of a coordination unit is not a factor of contribution too (BDhf2). In Flanders again, being part of an implementation or an inspection unit is even distancing civil servant from contributing to ministerial advice (BDhf3 and BDhf5). At the Federal government, the bureau-ministerial advisers are belonging to policy formulation and coordination units as well.

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<sup>1</sup> 'Reports and studies from international organisations' (ANinf6New) was not asked in Flanders, as well as 'citizens' platforms, individual scholars, individual citizens' (ADact14Scale1New and ADact14Scale2New, ADact16Scale1New and ADact16Scale2New, and ADact17Scale1New and ADact17Scale2New). Conversely, 'citizens' platforms and individual citizens' was not an option in the Francophone and Federal surveys (ADact19Scale1New and ADact19Scale2New).

<sup>2</sup> 'Reports from commissioned research' (ANinf14New) was merged together with 'Reports and studies from the in-house study services' (ANinf11New) in a new variable (ANinf15New). 'Experts from commissioned research' (ADact18Scale1 and ADact18Scale2) was merged too with 'Experts from the in-house study centre' (ADact12Scale1 and ADact12Scale2) in a new variable (ADact20Scale1 and ADact20Scale2).

<sup>3</sup> BDhf7New means "other" than the listed unit activities.

Table 2 Profile of civil servants most involved in ministerial advice (MinAdvIndexR)

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. regress MinAdvIndexR BDhf1New BDhf2New BDhf3New BDhf7New CAPerv2 CAPop11New CAPop13New CAPop14
> New CAPop15New CAPwg23 CAPwg26 ALGond1 ALGond6
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Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,307
Model	338.284182	13	26.0218602	F(13, 1293)	=	63.61
Residual	528.950193	1,293	.409087543	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.3901
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3839
Total	867.234375	1,306	.664038572	Root MSE	=	.6396

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
BDhf1New	1.042932	.0560707	18.60	0.000	.9329327	1.152932
BDhf2New	.6987543	.0698628	10.00	0.000	.5616974	.8358112
BDhf3New	.218555	.0474966	4.60	0.000	.1253762	.3117339
BDhf7New	-.1902731	.0793242	-2.40	0.017	-.3458914	-.0346549
CAPerv2	.0643249	.0179286	3.59	0.000	.0291526	.0994971
CAPop11New	.070579	.0281386	2.51	0.012	.0153768	.1257813
CAPop13New	.1170994	.0194454	6.02	0.000	.0789514	.1552474
CAPop14New	.0493348	.0221458	2.23	0.026	.0058893	.0927804
CAPop15New	.0911627	.0376811	2.42	0.016	.01724	.1650855
CAPwg23	.1975586	.0627166	3.15	0.002	.0745211	.3205961
CAPwg26	.1177648	.0479705	2.45	0.014	.0236562	.2118735
ALGond1	.1573951	.0456255	3.45	0.001	.067887	.2469033
ALGond6	.355465	.1414623	2.51	0.012	.0779442	.6329857
_cons	.445098	.0717909	6.20	0.000	.3042586	.5859375

Seniority in the same sector may raise the involvement of civil servants in ministerial advice, but the coefficient is very low (CAPerv2). The evidence is too limited to conclude on the influence of the hierarchical position on being part of the bureau-ministerial advisers. Both age and seniority in the public service do not discriminate the civil servants surveyed. In Wallonia and Federation Wallonia-Brussels, seniority in the civil service appears as an explanation, but with a limited coefficient too (CAPerv1) (see table 3). While Flanders is consistent with the national results, seniority does not play any role at the federal level.

Gender is not an issue, except in Federation Wallonia-Brussels where men are statistically more involved in ministerial advice than women (ALGsex). The outcome is more positive in Flanders where being a woman improves the chance to belong to the bureau-ministerial advisers.

As to professional training, the bureau-ministerial advisers participated to training sessions on public policy (CAPop13New), but also on writing policy briefs (*notes stratégiques/ beleidsdocumenten*), university certified training (including policy evaluation and public management), and training on writing management contracts (*contrats de gestion/ beheersovereenkomsten*) (CAPop11New, CAPop14New, and CAPop15New)<sup>4</sup>. No correlation appears with the training on analytical techniques (CAPop12New), which means that bureau-ministerial advisers did not attend additional training in analytical techniques compared to their colleagues.

<sup>4</sup> Management contracts either link public agencies to the government, or top managers with the ministers.

*Table 3* Comparison of the positive correlations between civil servants' characteristics and participation to ministerial advice in the four Belgian governments (MinAdvIndexR)

National	Wallonia	FWB	Flanders	Federal
BDhf1New BDhf2New BDhf3New	BDhf1New BDhf2New	BDhf1New BDhf3New	BDhf1New	BDhf1New BDhf2New
- CAPerv2	CAPerv1 -	CAPerv1 -	- CAPerv2	- -
CAPopl1New CAPopl3New CAPopl4New CAPopl5New	CAPopl2New CAPopl4New CAPopl8New	CAPopl3New CAPopl8New	CAPopl1New CAPopl5New CAPopl7New	CAPopl3New CAPopl6New
-	-	-	ALGsex	
CAPwg23 CAPwg26	CAPwg23	-	CAPwg24	CAPwg23
ALGond1 ALGond6	ALGond3 ALGond6	ALGond6 ALGond7	-	ALGond1

Contrary to the national results, civil servants advising the ministers in Wallonia are more trained in analytical techniques (CAPopl2New), but also in specific implementation tasks as is also the case of Federation Wallonia-Brussels (CAPopl8New). Above all the Federation highlights the training in public policy. In Flanders, being trained in how to deal with advices from formal advisory bodies is an important asset for contributing to ministerial advice (CAPopl7New), even if it is the training in writing management contracts which matters the most (CAPopl5New). At the federal level, in turn, the training in public policy as well as writing evaluation plans stand out (CAPopl3New and CAPopl6New).

Overall, past professional experience in a ministerial cabinet and a scientific institution (for example an university) improves the involvement of the Belgian civil servants in ministerial advice (CAPwg23 and CAPwg26). In Wallonia, past experience in the private sector is not conducive for getting involved in ministerial advice (CAPwg25). Past experience does not play a role in the Federation Wallonia-Brussels. In Flanders, it is only past experience in political parties which matters (for example in political party study centres or as parliamentary assistants) (CAPwg24). The Federal level is consistent with the national data as it also values past experience in ministerial cabinets. The coefficients of past experience are pretty high in the different models.

As regards initial training, degrees in Law and 'Philosophy and religious sciences' are relevant for an active participation of civil servants to ministerial advice (ALGond1 and ALGond6). 21 respondents declared having been trained in the disciplines of 'philosophy and religious sciences' (4 in Wallonia, 4 in Federation Wallonia-Brussels, 8 in Flanders and 5 at the Federal government). Ten of them score 2 or above in the Ministerial advice index which is far above the mean (MinAdvIndexR). Agents graduated from political and social sciences do not contribute more or less to ministerial advice. In Wallonia, rather than law, a graduate in political and social sciences constitutes an asset to advise the ministers (ALGond3), but philosophy and religious sciences also remain important. This last discipline matters in Federation Wallonia-Brussels too as well as Philosophy and pedagogy (ALGond7). Initial

training is not an influential factor in Flanders. Lawyers by training are also more frequently involved in advising the Federal ministers (ALGond1).

After the personal characteristics, additional variables were used in the regressions. We checked what kind of information Belgian bureau-ministerial advisers were using and observed that they use more often information from civil society than do their other counterparts (see table 4).

**Table 4** Information used by civil servants most involved in ministerial advice (MinAdvIndexR)

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR ANinf1New ANinf2New ANinf3New ANinf7New ANinf8New ANinf9New ANinf10New
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,588
Model	451.790569	7	64.5415099	F(7, 1580)	=	168.17
Residual	606.395414	1,580	.383794566	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.4269
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4244
Total	1058.18598	1,587	.666783859	Root MSE	=	.61951

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ANinf1New	.20041	.0182289	10.99	0.000	.1646545 .2361654
ANinf2New	.0763873	.0187521	4.07	0.000	.0396056 .113169
ANinf3New	.0964182	.0181594	5.31	0.000	.0607991 .1320372
ANinf7New	.0925956	.0175702	5.27	0.000	.0581322 .127059
ANinf8New	.1900427	.0192895	9.85	0.000	.1522069 .2278784
ANinf9New	.1112596	.0217432	5.12	0.000	.0686111 .1539082
ANinf10New	-.1057309	.0221418	-4.78	0.000	-.1491613 -.0623006
_cons	.1242735	.0462012	2.69	0.007	.0336515 .2148955

Concerning the kind of information sources they use in their policy work, bureau-ministerial advisers use more policy documents coming from the ministers and their ministerial cabinets than 'standard' civil servants use those sources (ANinf1New). They rely more on documents from the Parliament too (ANinf7New). The recourse to those kinds of documents shows their proximity to politics. To a lesser extent, they make more use of certain kinds of internal documents, such as existing legislation and policy plans and regulatory impact assessment reports (RIA) (ANinf2New and ANinf3New).

What really comes as a difference with their other colleagues is the higher degree of openness to interest groups. They more often declare using reports and studies from civil society organisations and NGOs, as well as from think tanks (ANinf8New and ANinf9New). Less than 'standard' civil servants, they turn to reports from foundations and other not-for-profit organisations (ANinf10New).

In Wallonia, policy documents coming from the ministers and their ministerial cabinets and reports and studies from civil society organisations and NGOs also come first (ANinf1New and ANinf8New). More particularly, respondents declare a stronger use of policy evaluations and of the reports of the National Bank, the Court of Auditors and the Federal Planning Bureau (ANinf4New and ANinf5New). In Federation Wallonia-Brussels, bureau-ministerial advisers rely exclusively on internal documents, and more specifically on policy evaluation reports and reports for the National Bank, the Court of Auditors and the Federal Planning Bureau (ANinf4New and ANinf5New). In Flanders, they are more eager to use reports from NGOs and civil society organisations as well as documents from the

Parliament (ANinf8New and ANinf7New). At the Federal level, they use more often press articles as well as reports from in-house study centres (ANinf13New and ANinf15New).

The use of information by civil servants involved in ministerial advice differs slightly from one government to another. Yet in all governments, political information and documents from civil society organisation are a prime source of information for ministerial advice.

These results also transpire when considering the advice that is requested or received (table 5). The most important difference with standard civil servants is that those committed in ministerial advice ask relatively more advice from sector-based business federations and professional associations (ADact7Scale1New). To a lesser extent, they ask advice from other public organisations than theirs, notably at other levels of government from the one at which they work (ADact4Scale1New).

**Table 5 Advice requested or received by civil servants most involved in ministerial advice (MinAdvIndexR)**

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR ADact4Scale1New ADact7Scale1New ADact15Scale1New ADact3Scale2New ADact5Scale2New ADac
> t11Scale2New
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,210
Model	157.53713	6	26.2561883	F(6, 1203)	=	50.01
Residual	631.542154	1,203	.524972697	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.1996
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1957
Total	789.079284	1,209	.652671037	Root MSE	=	.72455

  

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ADact4Scale1New	.0504554	.0205435	2.46	0.014	.0101504 .0907605
ADact7Scale1New	.1527114	.0230191	6.63	0.000	.1075493 .1978735
ADact15Scale1New	-.0666826	.0253763	-2.63	0.009	-.1164694 -.0168958
ADact3Scale2New	.1884053	.0221083	8.52	0.000	.1450302 .2317804
ADact5Scale2New	.0819886	.0193623	4.23	0.000	.0440009 .1199763
ADact11Scale2New	.0645522	.0289232	2.23	0.026	.0078067 .1212976
_cons	.8239832	.0397312	20.74	0.000	.7460331 .9019333

In Wallonia, the request of advice is also directed towards the professional federations (ADact7Scale1), but the most important requests go to other Belgian public organisations (ADact4Scale1) (see table 6). In Federation Wallonia-Brussels, bureau-ministerial advisers also ask advice to the professional federations (ADact7Scale1), as well as civil servants from other sectors (ADact2Scale1). In Flanders, the request of advice is more frequent towards NGOs and civil society organisations (ADact8Scale1), as well as to advisory bodies and professional federations (ADact3Scale1 and ADact7Scale1). At the Federal level, the request of advice is mainly targeting trade-unions and employers' associations (ADact6Scale1). At this level, advice is also requested from direct colleagues, advisory bodies and professional federations (ADact1Scale1, ADact3Scale1 and ADact7Scale1), but much less from individual citizens. Federal standard civil servants turn to these actors more frequently for advice (ADact17Scale1).

In terms of advice reception, civil servants advising ministers receive more advice from the institutionalised advisory bodies such as the economic and social committees (e. g. *Conseil central de*

*l'économie/Centrale Raad voor het Economie, Sociaal-Economische Raad van Vlaanderen or Conseil économique et social de Wallonie*) (ADact3Scale2New). They also receive more advice from supranational organisations and scientific research groups (ADact5Scale2New and ADact11Scale2New) (see table 5).

*Table 6* Comparison of the positive correlations between civil servants' sources of information and participation to ministerial advice in the four Belgian governments (MinAdvIndexR)

National	Wallonia	FWB	Flanders	Federal
ANinf1New ANinf2New ANinf3New ANinf7New ANinf8New ANinf9New <i>ANinf10New(-)</i>	ANinf1New ANinf2New ANinf4New ANinf5New ANinf7New ANinf8New	ANinf1New ANinf4New ANinf5New ANinf7New	ANinf1New ANinf4New ANinf7New ANinf8New <i>ANinf10New (-)</i>	ANinf1New ANinf2New ANinf3New ANinf13New ANinf15New
ADact4Scale1New ADact7Scale1New <i>ADact15Scale1New(-)</i>	ADact4Scale1New ADact7Scale1New <i>ADact8Scale1New(-)</i>	ADact2Scale1New ADact7Scale1New	ADact3Scale1New ADact7Scale1New ADact8Scale1New	ADact1Scale1New ADact3Scale1New ADact6Scale1New ADact7Scale1New <i>ADact17Scale1New(-)</i>
ADact3Scale2New ADact5Scale2New ADact11Scale2New	ADact2Scale2New <i>ADact4Scale2New(-)</i> ADact5Scale2New ADact8Scale2New <i>ADact11Scale2New(-)</i> ADact20Scale2New	ADact3Scale2New ADact5Scale2New	ADact6Scale2New	ADact5Scale2New <i>ADact6Scale2New(-)</i> ADact16Scale2New ADact17Scale2New

In Wallonia, the most important difference in terms of advice reception between bureau-ministerial advisers and standard civil servants is that the former receive more advice from NGOs and civil society organisations (ADact8Scale2New). They also receive more advice from international organisations and experts from the in-house study centres (ADact5Scale2New and ADact20Scale2New). In Federation Wallonia-Brussels, it's mainly from the formal advisory bodies and the European and international organisations (ADact3Scale2New and ADact5Scale2New). In Flanders, bureau-ministerial advisers only receive more frequently advice from trade-unions and employers associations (ADact6Scale2New). At the Federal level, they receive more often advice from individual citizens and scholars (ADact16Scale1New and ADact17Scale1New), but also from European and international organisations (ADact5Scale1New).

The last test about the characteristics and practice of civil servants involved in ministerial advising concerns the use of analytical techniques. In general, there exists a strong correlation between the involvement in ministerial advice and the use of analytical techniques (coef. 0,69 with p>0.000). More specifically, some techniques are more familiar to and more often used by bureau-ministerial advisers (see table 7). These include regulatory impact assessments and stakeholder analysis (ANtec5New and ANtec9New). Brainstorming and SWOT (Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats) are slightly more used as well (ANtec3New and ANtec4New), and to a lesser extent cost-benefit analysis and futures studies (ANtec7New and ANtec12New). By contrast interviews and focus groups as well as multicriteria analysis matter less for advice production by this group of civil servants (ANtec1New and ANtec8New).

**Table 7** Analytical techniques used by civil servants most involved in ministerial advice (MinAdvIndexR)

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR ANtec1New ANtec3New ANtec4New ANtec5New ANtec7New ANtec8New ANtec9New ANt
> ec12New
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,594
Model	342.476729	8	42.8095911	F(8, 1585)	=	94.47
Residual	718.254541	1,585	.453157439	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.3229
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3195
Total	1060.73127	1,593	.665870226	Root MSE	=	.67317

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ANtec1New	-.047814	.0142848	-3.35	0.001	-.0758331 -.019795
ANtec3New	.1223331	.0167562	7.30	0.000	.0894664 .1551997
ANtec4New	.1388897	.0208889	6.65	0.000	.097917 .1798624
ANtec5New	.2015712	.0212376	9.49	0.000	.1599144 .2432279
ANtec7New	.0660829	.0192505	3.43	0.001	.0283238 .1038421
ANtec8New	-.1115384	.0190409	-5.86	0.000	-.1488864 -.0741904
ANtec9New	.1648771	.0184351	8.94	0.000	.1287174 .2010367
ANtec12New	.0963854	.0199779	4.82	0.000	.0571996 .1355713
_cons	.6331291	.0348261	18.18	0.000	.564819 .7014391

Wallonia bureau-ministerial advisers rely relatively more on benchmarking (ANtec14New), but they do not make more use of multicriteria analysis than do the standard civil servants (see table 8). In Federation Wallonia-Brussels, they use survey, SWOT, cost-benefit analysis, Delphi and benchmarking (ANtec2New, ANtec4New, ANtec7New, ANtec13New and ANtec14New). In Flanders, the results follow the national trend, except that cost-benefit analysis and futures studies are not correlated to a higher involvement in ministerial advice (ANtec7New and ANtec12New). At the Federal level, the results are close to the national population, except that they more often use futures studies (ANtec12New).

**Table 8** Comparison of the positive correlations between civil servants’ use of analytical techniques and participation to ministerial advice in the four Belgian governments (MinAdvIndexR)

National	Wallonia	FWB	Flanders	Federal
<i>ANtec1New (-)</i>	ANtec3New	ANtec2New	ANtec1New	ANtec3New
ANtec3New	ANtec4New	ANtec4New	ANtec3New	ANtec4New
ANtec4New	ANtec5New	ANtec7New	ANtec4New	ANtec5New
ANtec5New	ANtec9New	ANtec13New	ANtec5New	ANtec7New
ANtec7New	ANtec12New	ANtec14New	ANtec9New	ANtec9New
<i>ANtec8New (-)</i>	ANtec14New			ANtec13New
ANtec9New				
ANtec12New				

In sum, within the four Belgian governments, bureau-ministerial advisers work more in policy formulation units and have a past experience in ministerial cabinets or scientific institutions, or sometimes within political parties (as for Flemish civil servants). Their seniority or hierarchical position is supporting but not guaranteeing such involvement. An initial training in law, and



surprisingly philosophy and religious sciences is an asset. Political and social sciences may grant access to ministerial advice, but only in Wallonia. A professional training in public policy and writing policy briefs, enhances participation too. When they use information, civil servants involved in ministerial advice mobilise more political documents, as well as reports from interest groups. They also request more advice from professional federations than their other colleagues.

#### 4 Incidental advisers well connected to civil society

About a quarter of the Belgian graduated civil servants are incidental ministerial advisers and 10% of them are rather frequently involved in ministerial advice. Although the policy administrative capacity of the central and regional governments may have declined, civil servants remain important actors in the policy advisory system. Given the Napoleonic political-administrative relation in Belgium with a very strong influence of the ministerial cabinets, the evidence produced in Belgium is certainly relevant for many other countries. Despite plethoric staffs of collaborators in ministerial cabinets, civil servants still participate in ministerial advice.

In Belgium, bureau-ministerial advisers are characterised by a shared set of features. First, they tend to be located in policy formulation units, that is units in which policy formulation is the main activity. This result is rather surprising given the limited institutionalisation of such units in the Belgian administrative systems. These units are not necessarily formal policy units but they are recognised as such by the insiders (Howlett, 2009, p. 7). Although policy advice is not limited to 'special advisory units' (Veselý, 2017), belonging to such units raises the odds to get involved in advising the minister.

Second, seniority is not so much at stake in the participation to ministerial advice. The variable appears, but with low explanatory power. This validates the rejection of the hierarchical model of the administration which would put the senior civil servants in the privileged position to advise the minister (Howlett & Walker, 2012, p. 229). Policy analytical capacity is diffused among civil servants at different hierarchical and seniority levels. This result appears as an additional evidence that the senior level may be short-circuited by the ministerial cabinets (Thiébaud, 1994).

In terms of personal characteristics, gender does not seem to have an impact at the national level. However, in Flanders more women are advising ministers than men, while this is the opposite case in the Federation Wallonia-Brussels. The gender issue is worth to be questioned in this government.

Third, education matters, but not as much as expected (Veselý, 2017, p. 150). While professional training shows an orientation toward policy analysis, writing policy briefs, and in the case of Wallonia, analytical techniques, the same cannot be said about initial training. Studying social and political sciences is an asset only in Wallonia. Law, philosophy and religious sciences come out as the most influential initial training. This is consistent with the idea that the Belgian civil service is made of specialists who acquire policy and management competence through experience (Lindquist & Desvaux, 2007, p. 123).

What seems to really matter in terms of profile is past experience. At the national level, civil servants with prior positions in ministerial cabinets and scientific research increase their chances to participate in advising the minister. Also, in Flanders, the most useful experience is to work for a political party, not necessarily as an elected politician, but rather as an employee of a political party.

study centre or as a parliamentary assistant. It may well be that the latter positions come earlier in the career of bureau-ministerial advisers than positions in ministerial cabinets which highlight the fact that many junior collaborators get involved in advising the minister.

The importance of a past experience in ministerial cabinets is an indication of how 'career hoping' between the administrative and political levels creates an 'osmosis' between politicians and civil servants, and how civil servants are unhindered in changing hats between the two positions (Gouglas et al., 2017; Peters & Pierre, 2004). It corroborates findings from past work according to which spells of civil servant secondment in ministerial cabinets can also benefit their careers later on (Göransson, 2008).

In terms of information use, the bureau-ministerial advisers use more often political documents such as documents and reports from the ministers and their cabinet as well as parliamentary documents. This exchange brings another indication of a closer collaboration between this category of civil servants and the political advisers from the ministerial cabinets, what was called 'political-administrative osmosis' in the previous paragraph (Peters & Pierre, 2004).

However, the most important debate about information use concerns the connections of policy advisers to policy networks, that is actors external to the government. Research on civil servants in other countries, for instance Canada, suggests that their interactions with the outside are limited (Wellstead et al., 2009, p. 47). The results of this survey partly contradict this expectation. It reveals that at least those civil servants involved in advising the minister are more connected to the outside world than their other colleagues. They use reports from NGOs, civil society organisations, and think tanks. They request advice from professional federations, and receive the statements from formal advisory bodies. This close relationship is particularly relevant in Flanders, when civil servants are trained to deal with these advices. At the federal level, external relations are predominantly entertained with the so-called social partners, probably given the traditional role of negotiation on social policy issues at this level of government. It is not certain that this is a consequence of the 'new public governance' which has pushed the civil service towards closer contacts with citizens. Belgium has always been a 'moderately neo-corporatist' state (Fraussen, Bossens, Wilson, & Keating, 2017, p. 195), and it appears in the results that the actors consulted are traditional interlocutors of the public authorities. More important, however, is the conclusion that bureau-ministerial advisers are more open to society, and probably help connecting the ministers to the stakeholders' needs. They are more engaged than expected.

The results on analytical techniques are quite mixed, but seem to validate the idea that ministerial adviser are not expert policy analysts who build their advice on systematic research or data processing (Howlett et al., 2015, p. 165). Overall, they tend to use more analytical techniques than their other colleagues, and prefer more specific techniques than interviews and focus groups. Beyond this, they mobilise a wide range of techniques: quantitative methods (cost-benefit analysis), trend extrapolation (futures studies and RIA), analysis of organisations (SWOT), but also the tools to analyse the political context (stakeholder analysis) and the more collaborative techniques (brainstorming). It also transpires that they may rely on process-related tools more than on substantive and rigorous scientific analysis.

## Conclusion

Ministerial advisers are part of a larger policy advisory system in which they collect information and advice from various actors who are both internal and external to the government. Although the size of the ministerial cabinets is gradually increasing both in Napoleonic and Westminster regimes, their staff cannot cope with all policy tasks. The civil service is still a major provider of information and advice to the ministers. The aim of this paper consists in identifying the characteristics of bureau-ministerial advisers.

The study relies on a survey conducted in Belgium in 2013 and 2015 in four governments at both federal and regional levels (N=3,481). An index of advice provision to political advisers was first built to assess the contribution of individual respondents to the request and needs of ministers and their cabinet members on the basis of the kind of policy tasks conducted and the contribution to policy documents. Then the linear multiple regression is used to identify the characteristics of the civil servants who are the most involved in supply of advice to political advisers.

The paper shows that about a quarter of the Belgian graduated civil servants are incidental ministerial advisers and 10% of them are rather frequently involved in ministerial advice. This figure is not anecdotal given the very important size of ministerial cabinets in this country. Those civil servants share some characteristics that differentiate them from their other colleagues. They have the particularity to work mainly in policy formulation units, they do not need to reach a top position to be involved, or hold a specific university diploma, even if a graduate in law is still an asset. However, they usually followed training courses in public policy, policy briefs, and sometimes analytical methods. Past experience in ministerial cabinets and scientific research improves the odds for civil servants to become advisers to the minister. In terms of information use and consultation, these civil servants are more attentive to political documents and connected to the stakeholders, in particular the groups usually consulted in neo-corporatist systems (advisory bodies, professional federations, social interlocutors, etc.). In a nutshell, these civil servants have a political profile and some competence in policy analysis, even if they remain 'incidental advisers'.

## Annex1: Descriptive statistics on the dependent variable

```
. summarize MinAdvIndexR, detail
```

MinAdvIndexR				
Percentiles		Smallest		
1%	0	0		
5%	.0769231	0		
10%	.2307692	0	Obs	1,810
25%	.5384616	0	Sum of Wgt.	1,810
50%	1.076923		Mean	1.184445
		Largest	Std. Dev.	.8118475
75%	1.769231	3.692308		
90%	2.384615	3.769231	Variance	.6590963
95%	2.615385	3.846154	Skewness	.5527333
99%	3.230769	4	Kurtosis	2.614261

## Annex2: List of independent variables

### Location in the civil service

BDsp1	Department
BDsp2	Public agency

### Unit main function

BDhf1New	Policy formulation
BDhf2New	Policy coordination
BDhf3New	Policy implementation
BDhf4New	Policy evaluation
BDhf5New	Inspection and control
BDhf6New	Studies and research
BDhf7New	Other (unspecified)

### Seniority

CAPerv1	Public service
CAPerv2	Current sector
CAPerv3	Current unit ( <i>only Federal</i> )

### Professional training

CAPopl1New	Writing policy briefs
CAPopl2New	Analytical techniques
CAPopl3New	Policy design
CAPopl4New	Certified university training (e.g. policy evaluation or public management)
CAPopl5New	Writing management contracts
CAPopl6New	Writing evaluation plans
CAPopl7New	Processing advice
CAPopl8New	Practical implementation tasks (e.g. public procurement)

### Profile

ALGsex Gender  
ALGjaar2 Age

**Professional experience (first position or past experience in)**

CAPwg1 First position  
CAPwg21 Federal/Regional government  
CAPwg22 Municipality  
CAPwg23 Ministerial cabinet  
CAPwg24 Political party (parliamentary assistant, study centre, etc.)  
CAPwg25 Private sector  
CAPwg26 Scientific institution  
CAPwg27 Civil society organisation  
CAPwg28 European institution (*only Federal*)  
CAPwg29 Educational sector (*only Federal*)

**Initial training**

ALGond1 Law  
ALGond2 Economics and management  
ALGond3 Political and social sciences  
ALGond4 Social assistant (*not for FL*)  
ALGond5 Languages and history  
ALGond6 Philosophy and religious sciences  
ALGond7 Psychology and educational sciences  
ALGond8 Teacher training  
ALGond9 Sciences (physics, chemistry, mathematics, etc.)  
ALGond10 Applied sciences (civil engineering, etc.)  
ALGond11 Bioengineering and applied biology  
ALGond12 Medicine  
ALGond13 Pharmacy  
ALGond14 Physical education and physiotherapy  
ALGond15 Nursing

**Types of relevant information**

ANinf1New Documents from the minister or his cabinet  
ANinf2New Current regulations and programs  
ANinf3New Results from RIAs  
ANinf4New Evaluation reports  
ANinf5New Reports from the Court of Auditors, Planning Bureau or National Bank  
ANinf6New Reports from European and international organizations (*not for FL*)  
ANinf7New Parliamentary documents  
ANinf8New Reports from NGOS or civil society  
ANinf9New Think tank reports and studies  
ANinf10New Reports from not-for-profit research and policy foundations  
ANinf11New Reports from governmental research units (*not for FL*)  
ANinf12New Scientific articles

ANinf13New	Press articles
ANinf14New	Commissioned research ( <i>only FL</i> )
ANinf15New	Reports from governmental research units and commissioned research

### Consultation and advice

<i>Request</i>	<i>Receive</i>	
ADact1Scale1New	ADact1Scale2New	Officials in the same sector
ADact2Scale1New	ADact2Scale2New	Officials from other sectors
ADact3Scale1New	ADact3Scale2New	Advisory bodies
ADact4Scale1New	ADact4Scale2New	Other public organizations
ADact5Scale1New	ADact5Scale2New	International or European organisations
ADact6Scale1New	ADact6Scale2New	Trade Unions or employers' organisations
ADact7Scale1New	ADact7Scale2New	Professional federations
ADact8Scale1New	ADact8Scale2New	NGOs and other civil society organisations
ADact9Scale1New	ADact9Scale2New	Study centres from the political parties
ADact10Scale1New	ADact10Scale2New	Think tanks
ADact11Scale1New	ADact11Scale2New	Scientific research groups
ADact13Scale1New	ADact13Scale2New	Private consultants
ADact14Scale1New	ADact14Scale2New	Citizen movements ( <i>not for FL</i> )
ADact15Scale1New	ADact15Scale2New	Individual private companies
ADact16Scale1New	ADact16Scale2New	Individual scientists ( <i>not for FL</i> )
ADact17Scale1New	ADact17Scale2New	Individual citizens( <i>not for FL</i> )
ADact18Scale1New	ADact18Scale2New	Commission research ( <i>only FL</i> )
ADact19Scale1New	ADact19Scale2New	Citizen movements or individual citizens ( <i>only FL</i> )
ADact20Scale1New	ADact20Scale2New	Experts from in-house research units

### Analytical techniques

ANtec1New	Interviews or focus groups
ANtec2New	Survey
ANtec3New	Brainstorming
ANtec4New	SWOT analysis
ANtec5New	Regulatory impact assessment
ANtec6New	Environmental impact assessment
ANtec7New	Cost-benefit analysis
ANtec8New	Multicriteria analysis
ANtec9New	Stakeholders analysis
ANtec10New	Management games
ANtec11New	Decision tree
ANtec12New	Foresight analysis
ANtec13New	Delphi method
ANtec14New	Benchmarking
ANtec15New	Logical frames

### Annex3: Regressions in the four governments

#### Walloon government

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR BDsp BDhf1New BDhf2New BDhf5New BDhf7New CAPerv1 CAPopl2New CAPopl4New CA
> Popl8New CAPwg23 CAPwg25 ALGond3 ALGond6 if BDsp2 ==1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	429
Model	49.8163628	13	3.83202791	F(13, 415)	=	13.14
Residual	120.99568	415	.291555855	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.2916
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2695
Total	170.812042	428	.399093557	Root MSE	=	.53996

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
BDsp	-.2716303	.0615602	-4.41	0.000	-.3926389 -.1506217
BDhf1New	.5551655	.1261074	4.40	0.000	.3072765 .8030544
BDhf2New	.3233152	.1094877	2.95	0.003	.1080956 .5385349
BDhf5New	-.2682931	.0778273	-3.45	0.001	-.421278 -.1153082
BDhf7New	-.3093621	.0830809	-3.72	0.000	-.472674 -.1460502
CAPerv1	.0589985	.0295914	1.99	0.047	.0008307 .1171663
CAPopl2New	.1016789	.0344046	2.96	0.003	.0340499 .1693078
CAPopl4New	.074839	.0338518	2.21	0.028	.0082966 .1413815
CAPopl8New	.058362	.0261675	2.23	0.026	.0069248 .1097993
CAPwg23	.20551	.0871797	2.36	0.019	.0341411 .3768788
CAPwg25	-.1475607	.0538321	-2.74	0.006	-.2533783 -.041743
ALGond3	.1571132	.0724894	2.17	0.031	.014621 .2996055
ALGond6	.6099467	.2739741	2.23	0.027	.0713966 1.148497
_cons	.9968554	.1336751	7.46	0.000	.7340907 1.25962

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR ANinf1New ANinf2New ANinf4New ANinf5New ANinf7New ANinf8New if BDsp2 ==1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	532
Model	80.183239	6	13.3638732	F(6, 525)	=	54.41
Residual	128.941642	525	.245603128	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.3834
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3764
Total	209.124881	531	.393832168	Root MSE	=	.49558

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ANinf1New	.1078614	.0241364	4.47	0.000	.0604457 .1552772
ANinf2New	.0608202	.0236558	2.57	0.010	.0143486 .1072918
ANinf4New	.0534225	.0259466	2.06	0.040	.0024505 .1043944
ANinf5New	.0547907	.0235163	2.33	0.020	.0085931 .1009883
ANinf7New	.0772082	.0245933	3.14	0.002	.0288949 .1255215
ANinf8New	.1370321	.0238197	5.75	0.000	.0902386 .1838257
_cons	.2041771	.0583958	3.50	0.001	.0894589 .3188953

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```
. regress MinAdvIndexR ADact4Scale1New ADact7Scale1New ADact8Scale1New ADact2Scale2New ADact4Scale2New ADact5
> Scale2New ADact8Scale2New ADact11Scale2New ADact20Scale2New if BDsp2 ==1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	366
				F(9, 356)	=	14.99
Model	39.1916776	9	4.35463084	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	103.436834	356	.290552904	R-squared	=	0.2748
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2564
Total	142.628511	365	.390763044	Root MSE	=	.53903

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ADact4Scale1New	.1560299	.0440172	3.54	0.000	.0694635 .2425963
ADact7Scale1New	.0845412	.0338473	2.50	0.013	.0179754 .151107
ADact8Scale1New	-.1042872	.0513007	-2.03	0.043	-.2051777 -.0033967
ADact2Scale2New	.0762577	.0309084	2.47	0.014	.0154716 .1370438
ADact4Scale2New	-.1088407	.0461411	-2.36	0.019	-.199584 -.0180973
ADact5Scale2New	.1013792	.0327296	3.10	0.002	.0370116 .1657468
ADact8Scale2New	.2080695	.054566	3.81	0.000	.1007573 .3153816
ADact11Scale2New	-.1384866	.0449511	-3.08	0.002	-.2268898 -.0500835
ADact20Scale2New	.1023213	.0316225	3.24	0.001	.0401308 .1645117
_cons	.5039392	.0602743	8.36	0.000	.3854007 .6224777

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR ANtec3New ANtec4New ANtec5New ANtec9New ANtec12New ANtec14New if BDsp2 ==
> 1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	532
				F(6, 525)	=	27.09
Model	49.2594575	6	8.20990959	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	159.112687	525	.303071786	R-squared	=	0.2364
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2277
Total	208.372145	531	.392414586	Root MSE	=	.55052

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ANtec3New	.0551447	.0231831	2.38	0.018	.0096016 .1006877
ANtec4New	.1236328	.0299802	4.12	0.000	.0647369 .1825287
ANtec5New	.0792036	.030114	2.63	0.009	.0200449 .1383623
ANtec9New	.0960229	.0237657	4.04	0.000	.0493354 .1427104
ANtec12New	.0566461	.0269408	2.10	0.036	.003721 .1095711
ANtec14New	.0795082	.0256998	3.09	0.002	.0290211 .1299952
_cons	.5275366	.0441922	11.94	0.000	.4407213 .614352



## Government of the Federation Wallonia-Brussels

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR BDhf1New BDhf3New CAPerv1 CAPop13New CAPop18New ALGsex ALGond6 ALGond7 if
> BDsp2 ==2
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	146
Model	29.5807745	8	3.69759682	F(8, 137)	=	12.54
Residual	40.3866813	137	.294793294	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.4228
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3891
Total	69.9674558	145	.482534178	Root MSE	=	.54295

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
BDhf1New	.9473828	.2816473	3.36	0.001	.3904448 1.504321
BDhf3New	.348919	.0937082	3.72	0.000	.1636175 .5342205
CAPerv1	.1038766	.0468176	2.22	0.028	.011298 .1964552
CAPop13New	.1649784	.0485791	3.40	0.001	.0689165 .2610402
CAPop18New	.1412326	.0422005	3.35	0.001	.057784 .2246813
ALGsex	-.2456152	.0928676	-2.64	0.009	-.4292544 -.061976
ALGond6	.6612316	.2860015	2.31	0.022	.0956832 1.22678
ALGond7	.6117231	.20024	3.05	0.003	.2157623 1.007684
_cons	.3952711	.2284118	1.73	0.086	-.0563975 .8469397

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR ANinf1New ANinf4New ANinf5New ANinf7New if BDsp2 ==2
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	223
Model	29.3295438	4	7.33238594	F(4, 218)	=	22.65
Residual	70.5866604	218	.32379202	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.2935
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2806
Total	99.9162041	222	.450072992	Root MSE	=	.56903

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ANinf1New	.1479633	.0371458	3.98	0.000	.0747524 .2211743
ANinf4New	.1047583	.0373506	2.80	0.005	.0311438 .1783728
ANinf5New	.109048	.0384008	2.84	0.005	.0333636 .1847323
ANinf7New	.076344	.0382749	1.99	0.047	.0009079 .1517802
_cons	.2428639	.0775866	3.13	0.002	.0899481 .3957797

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR ADact2Scale1New ADact7Scale1New ADact3Scale2New ADact5Scale2New if BDsp2 ==2
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	135
Model	25.0040387	4	6.25100968	F(4, 130)	=	19.27
Residual	42.172117	130	.3244009	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.3722
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3529
Total	67.1761557	134	.501314595	Root MSE	=	.56956

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ADact2Scale1New	.1035482	.048904	2.12	0.036	.0067976 .2002988
ADact7Scale1New	.1177705	.0582717	2.02	0.045	.0024868 .2330541
ADact3Scale2New	.2164238	.0545176	3.97	0.000	.1085672 .3242804
ADact5Scale2New	.1517854	.0491444	3.09	0.002	.0545591 .2490116
_cons	.4058301	.0910886	4.46	0.000	.2256221 .586038

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```
. regress MinAdvIndexR ANtec2New ANtec4New ANtec7New ANtec13New ANtec14New if BDsp2 ==2
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	225
Model	31.273647	5	6.2547294	F(5, 219)	=	19.72
Residual	69.4520331	219	.317132571	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.3105
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2947
Total	100.72568	224	.449668215	Root MSE	=	.56315

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ANtec2New	.1260916	.0484683	2.60	0.010	.0305675 .2216157
ANtec4New	.1135416	.0473596	2.40	0.017	.0202028 .2068805
ANtec7New	.1449644	.0400763	3.62	0.000	.0659797 .223949
ANtec13New	.1434255	.0591375	2.43	0.016	.026874 .259977
ANtec14New	.2071484	.0517746	4.00	0.000	.1051081 .3091887
_cons	.4584733	.0585819	7.83	0.000	.3430169 .5739297

## Flemish government

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR BDhf1New BDhf3New BDhf5New BDhf6New BDhf7New CAPerv2 CAPopl1New CAPopl5Ne  
> w CAPopl7New ALGsex CAPwg24 if BDsp2 ==3
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	375
Model	107.679181	11	9.78901645	F(11, 363)	=	24.41
Residual	145.551334	363	.400967862	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.4252
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4078
Total	253.230515	374	.677086938	Root MSE	=	.63322

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
BDhf1New	.2915711	.1073765	2.72	0.007	.0804131 .5027291
BDhf3New	-.4181413	.1147647	-3.64	0.000	-.6438284 -.1924541
BDhf5New	-.9855009	.2088607	-4.72	0.000	-1.39623 -.5747721
BDhf6New	-.5430014	.1572547	-3.45	0.001	-.852246 -.2337568
BDhf7New	-1.097108	.1958607	-5.60	0.000	-1.482272 -.7119438
CAPerv2	.09791	.0341613	2.87	0.004	.0307311 .1650888
CAPopl1New	.1640875	.0643511	2.55	0.011	.0375397 .2906353
CAPopl5New	.31418	.0878158	3.58	0.000	.1414884 .4868716
CAPopl7New	.2616029	.0820128	3.19	0.002	.1003231 .4228828
ALGsex	.1723959	.0682798	2.52	0.012	.0381222 .3066696
CAPwg24	.6079938	.2628585	2.31	0.021	.0910771 1.124911
_cons	1.127788	.1874137	6.02	0.000	.7592351 1.496341

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. regress MinAdvIndexR ANinf1New ANinf4New ANinf7New ANinf8New ANinf10New if BDsp2 ==3

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	450
				F(5, 444)	=	86.53
Model	160.702133	5	32.1404266	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	164.910278	444	.371419545	R-squared	=	0.4935
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4878
Total	325.612411	449	.725194679	Root MSE	=	.60944

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ANinf1New	.2033326	.0393053	5.17	0.000	.1260851	.2805801
ANinf4New	.1955759	.033255	5.88	0.000	.1302192	.2609326
ANinf7New	.1262772	.0368345	3.43	0.001	.0538855	.1986689
ANinf8New	.29267	.0358722	8.16	0.000	.2221696	.3631704
ANinf10New	-.0983269	.0377758	-2.60	0.010	-.1725685	-.0240854
_cons	.2706147	.0857983	3.15	0.002	.1019935	.4392359

. regress MinAdvIndexR ADact3Scale1New ADact7Scale1New ADact8Scale1New ADact6Scale2New if BDsp2 ==3

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	390
				F(4, 385)	=	32.35
Model	68.3187503	4	17.0796876	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	203.284054	385	.528010531	R-squared	=	0.2515
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2438
Total	271.602805	389	.698207724	Root MSE	=	.72664

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ADact3Scale1New	.1575429	.03914	4.03	0.000	.0805881	.2344978
ADact7Scale1New	.1314624	.0427417	3.08	0.002	.047426	.2154987
ADact8Scale1New	.194567	.0425721	4.57	0.000	.1108641	.2782699
ADact6Scale2New	.1579163	.0418595	3.77	0.000	.0756143	.2402182
_cons	1.11876	.0697685	16.04	0.000	.9815849	1.255935

. regress MinAdvIndexR ANtec1New ANtec3New ANtec4New ANtec5New ANtec9New if BDsp2 ==3

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	451
				F(5, 445)	=	47.18
Model	112.852466	5	22.5704933	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	212.879619	445	.478381167	R-squared	=	0.3465
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3391
Total	325.732086	450	.723849079	Root MSE	=	.69165

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
ANtec1New	.0799713	.0360084	2.22	0.027	.0092036	.1507389
ANtec3New	.1288421	.0379518	3.39	0.001	.0542551	.2034291
ANtec4New	.1395919	.0433248	3.22	0.001	.0544453	.2247385
ANtec5New	.2868551	.0420419	6.82	0.000	.2042297	.3694805
ANtec9New	.1628137	.037111	4.39	0.000	.0898791	.2357483
_cons	.8723702	.0750971	11.62	0.000	.7247812	1.019959

## Belgian Federal government

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR BDhf1New BDhf2New CAPopl3New CAPopl6New CAPwg23 ALGond1 if BDsp2 ==4
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	370
				F(6, 363)	=	27.97
Model	69.8256328	6	11.6376055	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	151.053703	363	.416125903	R-squared	=	0.3161
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3048
Total	220.879336	369	.598588986	Root MSE	=	.64508

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
BDhf1New	.6717808	.0881102	7.62	0.000	.4985102 .8450513
BDhf2New	.5725794	.0990073	5.78	0.000	.3778795 .7672792
CAPopl3New	.1049617	.0327562	3.20	0.001	.040546 .1693774
CAPopl6New	.1929282	.0558148	3.46	0.001	.0831673 .3026891
CAPwg23	.4044374	.1113941	3.63	0.000	.1853786 .6234962
ALGond1	.3350887	.0712264	4.70	0.000	.1950205 .475157
_cons	.7170185	.0565564	12.68	0.000	.6057991 .8282378

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR ANinf1New ANinf2New ANinf3New ANinf13New ANinf15New if BDsp2 ==4
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	380
				F(5, 374)	=	53.58
Model	95.2459967	5	19.0491993	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	132.958672	374	.355504471	R-squared	=	0.4174
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4096
Total	228.204669	379	.602123137	Root MSE	=	.59624

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ANinf1New	.2168455	.0347626	6.24	0.000	.1484909 .2852
ANinf2New	.1674626	.0383776	4.36	0.000	.0919997 .2429254
ANinf3New	.1576351	.0347594	4.54	0.000	.0892867 .2259834
ANinf13New	.089909	.0304492	2.95	0.003	.0300358 .1497821
ANinf15New	.0778746	.0331417	2.35	0.019	.0127071 .143042
_cons	-.0120103	.1031012	-0.12	0.907	-.214741 .1907204

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR ADact1Scale1New ADact3Scale1New ADact6Scale1New ADact7Scale1New ADact17Scale1New ADact5Scale2New ADact6Scale2New ADact16Scale2New ADact17Scale2New if BDsp2 ==4
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	317
				F(9, 307)	=	15.12
Model	56.7305107	9	6.30339007	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	127.968944	307	.416836953	R-squared	=	0.3072
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2868
Total	184.699455	316	.584491947	Root MSE	=	.64563

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ADact1Scale1New	.1255566	.0378625	3.32	0.001	.0510538 .2000595
ADact3Scale1New	.1127067	.0376014	3.00	0.003	.0387176 .1866958
ADact6Scale1New	.2026386	.0735328	2.76	0.006	.0579466 .3473306
ADact7Scale1New	.1477344	.03724	3.97	0.000	.0744564 .2210124
ADact17Scale1New	-.1554459	.0621464	-2.50	0.013	-.2777328 -.0331591
ADact5Scale2New	.0907504	.0302835	3.00	0.003	.031161 .1503398
ADact6Scale2New	-.1406891	.0699489	-2.01	0.045	-.2783291 -.0030491
ADact16Scale2New	.1297655	.0533262	2.43	0.016	.0248343 .2346966
ADact17Scale2New	.1323738	.0510523	2.59	0.010	.0319171 .2328306
_cons	.4344164	.11539	3.76	0.000	.2073611 .6614716

```
. regress MinAdvIndexR ANtec3New ANtec4New ANtec5New ANtec7New ANtec9New ANtec13New if BDsp2 ==4
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	380
Model	79.2069014	6	13.2011502	F(6, 373)	=	33.05
Residual	148.997768	373	.399457822	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.3471
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3366
Total	228.204669	379	.602123137	Root MSE	=	.63203

MinAdvIndexR	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ANtec3New	.099082	.031171	3.18	0.002	.037789 .1603749
ANtec4New	.0852926	.0370107	2.30	0.022	.0125167 .1580684
ANtec5New	.2390473	.0351201	6.81	0.000	.1699891 .3081054
ANtec7New	.1125908	.0347657	3.24	0.001	.0442295 .1809521
ANtec9New	.0911931	.0332052	2.75	0.006	.0259003 .1564859
ANtec13New	.1020376	.0380458	2.68	0.008	.0272264 .1768488
_cons	.5247824	.0706076	7.43	0.000	.3859435 .6636213

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