

# International Anti-Corruption Frameworks: a typology of policy prescriptions

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## **Abstract**

Based on the understanding that corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon, the proposed typology of anti-corruption policies considers theoretical perspectives on corruption, problem(s) deriving from corruption in practice and different response strategies. The paper contributes to existing anti-corruption typologies by moving beyond unidimensional structuration logic. Practitioners might find it a useful tool for understanding failures of anti-corruption initiatives as well as allowing for an ex-ante assessment for the most suitable policy approaches within a given context.

The outset of the study is constituted by a review of existing classifications of anti-corruption policies and a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. The following development of a comprehensive typology is based on a reviews of over 40 best practices, toolkits, guidelines, manuals developed by the most important supra-national donor agencies and NGOs (e.g., UNODC, UNDP, the World Bank, OECD, Transparency International, USAID, etc.). The study maps existing strategies of tackling administrative corruption included in these documents, identifies and categorizes their main features. The resulting framework proposes twelve aspects to be apprehended in a comprehensive classification of anti-corruption efforts.

The conclusion discusses the relation between identified policy elements and provides an overview of which of them are considered in policy guidelines and manuals – and which ones require additional attention. The summary further provides suggestion how a comprehensive typology can be used in policy planning and evaluation.

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## 1. Introduction

Corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon involving several actors, activities and behaviors. Its complexity directly affects its understanding as well as the design, implementation and monitoring of public policies against it.

These difficulties have not stopped public institutions to enact anti-corruption policies whether aimed internally at its own operations or more largely targeting the public sphere. But one of the consequence has been a difficulty at properly understanding the imbrication of these policies within the wider perimeter of the State's actions.

The identification and classification of the characteristics of myriad of anti-corruption policies has been one of the main avenues used to properly understand and define the structure and component part of the anti-corruption process. This understanding is fundamental for evaluating anti-corruption policy programmes, both in their cross-policy dynamic but also to identify their main characteristics and vectors.

While various classifications of anti-corruption efforts have been developed they are frequently limited in perspective and not standardized. For instance, McCusker (2006) presents three key schools of thought on corruption prevention and strategies, emphasizing different levels on which corruption can be tackled: interventionism, managerialism, organizational integrity. As other authors, such as Huberts (1998), Graycar (2015) or Blind (2011), he does not embed these aspect within their wider environment taking into account the various steps of the anti-corruption process or the ideological and conceptual groundings of these anti-corruption policies. While interesting and useful, these attempts at understanding the anticorruption reality, is not complete enough to allow a proper evaluation of the different options. Classification, as a way to advance conceptualization, reasoning, data analysis and social science research in general (Bailey 1994), needs to be pushed further to better understand the dynamics at play.

This research paper addresses this current lack, by producing a standardized and comprehensive typology of anti-corruption policies developed in the public sector. Specifically, it will focus on administrative corruption defined as deviances in public sector institutions, interactions and processes at central and local level (OECD 2015). The majority of anti-corruption interventions and reforms in the public sector have been targeting public corruption at the state administration level (World Bank 1997, USAID 2009: 4, European Commission 2014).

In order to fulfill this aim, this study will review existing typologies of anti-corruption policies present in the literature, identify their limitations and suggest a more comprehensive classification through the analysis of the best practices, toolkits, guidelines, manuals developed by relevant supra-national donor agencies and NGOs (e.g., UNODC, UNDP, the World Bank, OECD, Transparency International, USAID, etc.). It is believed that on the topic of corruption, these international guidelines are the most influential in the development of national and local policies.

The value and utility of a typology of anti-corruption policies is mainly related to possibility of generating more accurate analysis of the challenges and requirements for developing well targeted anti-corruption interventions (Blind 2011). It will contribute to the academic discourse on the conceptual frameworks underlying different types of corruption in the public sector as well as on the options currently being developed to counter them. It will, *in fine*, constitute a useful check-list for agencies and policy makers to orient the development of sound anti-corruption policies.

## 2. Administrative corruption and anti-corruption policies

The majority of anti-corruption interventions and reforms in the public sector have been targeting public corruption at the state administration level (World Bank 1997, USAID 2009: 4, European Commission 2014). For this reason, administrative corruption will be the main focus of this paper. Administrative corruption refers to deviances in public sector institutions, interactions and processes at central and local level (OECD 2015). It mainly alters the implementation of policies rather than their formulation (Gould 1991; Huberts 1998; OECD 2015; Riccardi & Sarno 2013). Administrative corruption is often opposed to political corruption, which involves elected public officials and mainly influences the formulation of laws, regulations and policies (Kramer 1997; OECD 2015: 28; The World Bank 2003: 6). Specifically, administrative corruption refers to the abuse of public office or public role for private gain during the implementation of public policies or service delivery. By public office, we refer to positions within public institutions (e.g. schools, hospitals) in addition to governmental ones, with the exclusion of politicians.

Quasi-private organizations that have a strong link to the public sector, either because their mandate is dictated by the State or because the State is their main shareholder, are part of the perimeter of this study. But, private companies providing public services are excluded from our definition of administrative corruption. Indeed, corruption mechanisms and types in the private sector are different from those affecting the public sphere and, consequently, anti-corruption strategies developed in the private sector would need a different ad-hoc classification.

Administrative corruption entails several specific types of corrupt conducts. This study will consider those detailed in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2004). These include, among other, the bribery of national public officials<sup>1</sup>; bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations<sup>2</sup>; embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official (theft of state assets or diversion of state revenues)<sup>3</sup>, trading in influence<sup>4</sup>, abuse of function<sup>5</sup>, illicit enrichment<sup>6</sup> (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2004: 17-19).

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<sup>1</sup> "The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties." (United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 2004: 17)

<sup>2</sup> The promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in relation to the conduct of international business. The solicitation or acceptance by a foreign public official or an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties (United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 2004: 17-18).

<sup>3</sup> The embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity, of any property, public or private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the public official by virtue of his or her position

<sup>4</sup> The promise, offering or giving to a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage for the original instigator of the act or for any other person. The solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage (United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 2004: 18).

<sup>5</sup> The abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity (United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 2004: 18-19).

<sup>6</sup> Illicit enrichment, that is, a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income (United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 2004: 19).

Nepotism<sup>7</sup> and favoritism will also be included (Hanna 2011; Transparency International 2013).

In spite of the large amount of anti-corruption policies implemented in the public sector (European Commission 2014), there has been a serious lack of comprehensive evaluation distinguished by type of anti-corruption policy and setting.

The monitoring and evaluation of anti-corruption policies is a fundamental step of anti-corruption programmes (UNODC 2003). Monitoring and evaluation are, indeed, essential not only to identify and deter non-compliance but also for assessing the overall strategy and eventually make some adjustments. Assessments are also necessary to identify new strategic elements in the fight against corruption and modify existing ones (*Ibidem*). Sound assessments need to clearly distinguishing the features of corruption, the characteristics of the anti-corruption policy implemented and the settings where it has been implemented.

In addition, as a consequence of the recent debate on the persistence of policy failures (Howlett et al. 2015), the importance of examining the characteristics of public policies and of evaluating their effectiveness has becoming more and more relevant. The analysis of public policies characteristics at all levels and stages of policy-making is also fundamental to prevent policy failures (Howlett et al. 2015). It could, indeed, prevent one of the main reasons of policy failures – i.e., the lack of appropriate research on problems causes (*Ibidem*).

Drawing on the above mentioned needs, a classification of anti-corruption policies could be the ideal starting point to identify the main elements for a sound planning of anti-corruption programmes, and, in a later stage, to detect what works and what doesn't in the fight against corruption.

### 3. Scope and methodology

This article aims to develop a comprehensive and standardized typology of anti-corruption policies, by identifying the core-elements of corruption conducts in different areas of the public sector.

In order to fulfill its scope this paper takes the following methodological steps:

1. Reviewing the literature on existing anti-corruption policies classifications and highlighting their strengths and weaknesses;
2. Identifying the main best practices, toolkits, guidelines, manuals developed by relevant supra-national donor agencies and NGOs (e.g., UNODC, UNDP, the World Bank, OECD, Transparency International, USAID, etc.); systematizing them in a dataset, reviewing their content;
3. Mapping the existing strategies of tackling administrative corruption included in those documents;
4. Identifying and categorizing their main features.

In its final analysis, this paper will critically discuss the features of anti-corruption strategies included in the best practices, toolkits, guidelines developed by relevant supra-national donor agencies in order to identify the main core-elements a sound

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<sup>7</sup> "Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state revenues." (The World Bank 1997: 8-9)

classification of anti-corruption policies should cover. Ultimately, the study will develop a comprehensive typology on the basis of the identified core-elements.

For the purpose of this research, the terms typology and classification are used interchangeably. "Classification is the general process of grouping entities by similarity" (Bailey 1994: 4). A classification can have only one dimension or category (unidimensional) or more than one (multidimensional). The different categories of one classification are usually correlated or related. Typology can be considered a specific type of classification, such as taxonomy. While the former more often refers to classification of empirical entities and it is mainly used in the biological sciences, the latter is mainly used in the social sciences (*Ibidem*).

### 3.1. The dataset

The analysis included in this paper is based on a dataset, developed for the scope of this study, of existing best practices, toolkits, guidelines, manuals on anti-corruption strategies developed by relevant supra-national donor agencies and NGOs (i.e., UNODC, UNDP, the World Bank, OECD, Transparency International).

The choice of focusing only on the strategies developed by these international organizations draws on two main reasons:

1. These supra-national agencies have been developing the main Conventions Against-Corruption and, as a consequence, they have shaped the main understanding of this phenomenon and the strategy to prevent and eliminate it.
2. The anti-corruption guidelines and manuals they have developed are the most influential - and in some cases mandatory provisions or frameworks- in the development of national and local anti-corruption policies.

According to these two reasons, we can surmise that the types of anti-corruption strategies included in these documents are exhaustive in terms of coverage.

The following Table 1 summarizes the publications reviewed for the purpose of this paper, by type of agencies who published them. Table 2 lists the 43 type of anti-corruption policies constituting the core-set of data which have informed the development of the typology of anti-corruption policy.

Table 1. List of publications included in the dataset

Agency	TI	OECD	UNODC	UNPD	WB	ICAC
NAME OF THE PUBLICATION	Corruption fighters toolkit: civil society expériences and emerging stratégies by Transparency International (2002).	Anti-corruption instruments and the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises by OECD (2003)	UN Guide for anti-corruption policies, (2003)	Practitioners guide- Capacity Assessment of ACAs,UNDP (2011)	Governance and Anti-Corruption: Ways to Enhance the World Bank's Impact (2006)	Public Sector Anti-Corruption Framework Manual (2009)
	Best practices for anti-corruption commissions by Transparency International (2013).	Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance (2010)	The Global programme against corruption UN ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOLKIT (2004)	GLOBAL ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE (GAIN) HIGHLIGHTS OF THE KEY ACHIEVEMENTS IN 2014, UNDP (2014)		
	Together against Corruption: Transparency International Strategy 2020 (2015)	Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (2009)	Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, UNODC (2009)	Users-Guide-Measuring-Corruption-Anticorruption, UNDP (2015)		
		Recommendation of the Council for Development Co-operation Actors on Managing the Risk of Corruption (2016)	Guidebook on anti-corruption in public procurement and the management of public finances, Good practices in ensuring compliance with article 9 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, UNODC (2013)	GLOBAL ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE (GAIN) 2014-2017		
			National Anti-Corruption Strategies - A Practical Guide for Development and Implementation, UNODC (2015)			

The review of the publications listed above resulted in the identification of 43 different types of anti-corruption policies targeting administrative corruption.

*Table 2. List of anti-corruption policies included in the dataset*

<b>N</b>	<b>Name of the specific anti-corruption policy</b>
1	Public Hearing with government officials from each department
2	Access to a single window system across government departments to submit their complaints in writing
3	Appeals Process that allows complainants to appeal the decision outcomes of the public hearing.
4	Proactive disclosure through wall paintings of the names of beneficiaries, and a summary of benefits regarding services from every department.
5	Administrative practices for requests and appeals
6	monitoring and oversight arrangements
7	proactive disclosure outputs (open data)
8	response and appeal rates,
9	Enabling environment (civil society, media).
10	Systems for recruitment, hiring, retention, promotion and retirement of public officials
11	Selecting specialized staff and providing specialized training for positions vulnerable to corruption
12	Adequate remuneration and payscales
13	Training in ethics
14	Codes of conduct for public officials
15	Staff rotation
16	Decentralization (establish local decision making infrastructures e.g., district-level councils)
17	E-Governance
18	Red flags
19	Corruption risk assessment
20	Reporting by public officials of acts of corruption
21	Protection of reporting persons
22	Protection of witnesses, experts and victims

23	Internal controls
24	Additional (external) controls
25	The four-eyes principle
26	Establishing preventive anti-corruption body or bodies (e.g., Anti-Corruption Agency)
27	Oversight by government agencies such as Parliament, Ombudsman, Supreme Audit Institution, and the Anticorruption Agency through audits, investigations,
28	Disclosure systems (of assets and liabilities; of conflict of interests, of gifts and benefits)
29	Disciplinary measures
30	Financial sanctions
31	Freezing, seizure and confiscation
32	The use of objective and predetermined criteria for decisions (in public procurement, selection of personnel, etc.) in order to facilitate the subsequent verification of the correct application of the rules or procedures
33	Procedures for the adoption of the national budget;
34	Timely reporting on revenue and expenditure
35	system of accounting and auditing standards and related oversight
36	Assigning specific responsibilities to appropriate employees for authorizing transactions and activities.
37	Promoting the participation of society in the prevention of corruption
38	Raising public awareness and education on corruption
39	Promoting the contribution of the public to decision-making processes
40	Freedom to seek, receive, publish and disseminate information concerning corruption and its restrictions
41	Raising public awareness on anti-corruption bodies
42	Public access to information
43	(Anonymous) reporting of corruption



## 4. Reviewing the literature on anti-corruption policies classification

The literature on the development of anti-corruption programs and policies at international, national and local level is vast and diverse. However, a standard and comprehensive typology of anti-corruption reforms is still lacking. Existing classifications of administrative anti-corruption policies have been mainly developed as a support to research on other specific research topics, and not as ad-hoc research issue. For this reason, these existing classifications are mainly focused on one or two specific features of anti-corruption strategies (e.g., the schools of thought underneath them, the types of system used to implement them, the strategic approach used to prevent corruption) and leave behind other relevant elements.

McCusker (2006: 8-9), for example, focuses on the schools of thought underlying anti-corruption strategies:

- a) *Interventionism* – the relevant authorities wait for the corrupt action to take place and then intervene to capture and punish the wrongdoer. This school of thought encourages retribution, rehabilitation and deterrence. However, it ignores several issues, such as the fact that the harm has already occurred and cannot be undone; the majority of corruption cases are unreported; and no attention is paid to improving supervision to deter corrupt actions in the first place.
- b) *Managerialism* – the individuals or agencies seeking to engage in corrupt behavior can be prevented from doing so by establishing appropriate systems, procedures and protocols. Managerialism advocates the reduction or elimination of opportunities benefiting the individuals engaging in corruption. Limitations concern the fact that individuals do not necessarily operate according to the principles of managerialism and differently react to corrupt influences. Managerialism provides one set of rules to deter individuals with different motivations to engage in corruption, with the result that the success of the anti-corruption effort will probably concern only the less scheming corruptees. At the same time, managerialism ignores market forces.
- c) *Organizational integrity* – advocates the creation of norm of ethical behavior through the integration of an organization's operational system, corruption control strategies and ethical standards. This school of thought suggests that the mechanism of corrupt behavior and deviance stems from the organization rather than the individuals of which it is comprised. Therefore, in order to reach a successful level of reducing corruption, targeting the organizational context in which individuals operate is recommended.

On a different ground, Huberts (1998) identifies six main anti-corruption strategies according to the different mechanisms of corruption:

- a) economic – highlights the need for reducing the financial and economic stimuli for corruption (e.g. paying higher salaries to civil servants to reduce vulnerability or temptation to bribes);
- b) educational – suggests the importance of changing attitudes and values of the population and civil servants (e.g. through training and educational campaigns; increasing public exposure; changing family attitudes; influencing attitude of public servants; etc.);
- c) cultural – claims the need of improving ethical standards and examples given by those in power to civil servants (e.g., more commitment by politicians to combat corruption), development of ethical code of conduct for civil servants, as well as on

- the enhancement of protection for whistle blowers;
- d) organizational or bureaucratic – highlights the importance of strengthening internal control systems and supervision (e.g. auditing systems), decentralization, careful selection of personnel and staff rotation; but also technological improvement helping the organizational system (e.g. conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs).
- e) political – suggests the importance of increasing transparency in the monitoring of party finances and on a more rigorous separation of public powers;
- f) judicial or repressive measures – claims the need for implementing harsher penalties for corrupt practices but also for creating independent anti-corruption agencies.

Huberts' (1998) classification is based on the views of 257 experts from 49 countries with different political, economic and societal conditions, and it is thus based on international and practical experience with anti-corruption efforts.

Dish et al. (2009) reviewed more than 150 anti-corruption studies and classified them into six broad categories:

- a) Political-structural analyses, focusing on systemic corruption. This category includes those policies targeting the structural features of corruption instead of the individual motivations and opportunities. It mainly concerns grand and political corruption.
- b) Rule of Law includes policies oriented to the control and prosecution of corruption (e.g., institutional arrangements for prosecuting and enforcing Anti-Corruption (AC) mandates.
- c) Public administration and systems improvements for preventing corruption concern public sector and public finance management reforms.
- d) Extractive industries and service delivery includes those anti-corruption policies mainly targeting public sector corruption through the improvement of accountability and transparency in public sector institutions.
- e) Non-state actors and the attention to transparency and accountability concerns the importance of citizens but also the media and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) for the promotion of transparency and accountability.
- f) Capacity building and organizational development and a society's ability and capacity to address corruption.

While McCusker's and Huberts' classification focuses only on one main features of anti-corruption efforts for classifying them (i.e., the school of thought and the specific strategy, respectively), Dish et al. classification takes three main elements into consideration: the type of corruption (e.g., political, systemic, administrative, etc.), the aim of the anti-corruption policy (e.g., preventing, controlling corruption, etc.) and the type of actor implementing the policy (e.g., public administration, non-state actors, etc.). Unfortunately, these three elements are not included in all the categories of their classification. However, Dish et al. classification introduces the importance of differentiating anti-corruption policies according to the type of corruption and the policy function (i.e., whether the policy has been designed to prevent, detect or eliminate corruption).

With this regard, Blind (2011: 3) strongly affirms the need for classifying corruption according to three "temporal stages" or policy functions: 1) Prevention Stage where vulnerabilities to corruption are assessed, 2) Detection Stage where the actual eruptions of corruption are examined; 3) Elimination Stage where control of corruption, including anticorruption activities are probed. Even if this three stages might suffer from endogeneity because "control of corruption can impact the prevention of corruption by

providing signals of vulnerability to corruption, for instance, and detection can mesh with control through the process of reporting and constant surveillance of corrupt acts, transactions and behavior”, it is still fundamental to distinguish them in order to understand how they interact with each other and in order to better evaluate the results of the anti-corruption effort.

Graycar’s (2015) framework for the analysis of corruption also provides useful hints on how to best classify anti-corruption efforts. In particular, his study claims the importance of separately analyzing the types of corruption, the activities during which corruption takes place (e.g., appointing personnel, procuring services, controlling and regulating activities, etc.), the sector where corruption occurs (e.g., health, construction, tax administration, etc.), and the specific places where it happens (e.g., regions, municipalities, specific workplaces, etc.).

Generally speaking, the above mentioned classifications contributed to the advancement of formalization and categorization of existing anti-corruption policies under different points of view. However, it is still evident the need to combine the categories of the various classifications and integrate them with other elements in order to obtain a more comprehensive overview of anti-corruption policies functioning.

The above-mentioned elements are the starting point of this study for the development of a more complete typology of anti-corruption policies.

## 5. Building a typology of anti-corruption policies

The review of existing classifications of anti-corruption policies presented above illustrates the lack of a standard way through which anti-corruption policies can be categorized. In addition, it identifies a set of elements which are missing from existing classifications. On the basis of these findings, this article identifies a first set of categories which should be considered to develop a typology of anti-corruption policies (see chapter above).

In order to detect potential additional core-elements to be accounted for producing a comprehensive and standardized classification of anti-corruption policies, this paper reviews the main best practices, toolkits, guidelines, manuals on anti-corruption strategies developed by relevant supra-national donor agencies and NGOs (i.e., UNODC, UNDP, the World Bank, OECD, Transparency International). As already mentioned in paragraph 4.1, the analysis has been carried out on 43 different types of anti-corruption policies.

As a results of these two different levels of analysis, this study identifies the following eleven elements (variables) for informing a comprehensive typology of anti-corruption policies:

### a) Nature of administrative corruption

a1) Type of administrative corruption- the specific types of administrative corruption addressed by the policy(e.g., bribery, diversion of public funds, trading in influence, etc.);

a2) Activities/Procedures – the public sector activities or procedures during which corruption takes place (e.g., appointing personnel, procuring services, controlling and regulating activities, etc.);

a3) Sectors - the public sectors where corruption occurs (e.g., health,

construction, tax administration, etc.);

a4) The person who initiates the corruption act (e.g., who asks/offers the bribe);

a5) The person who suffers the corruption act (e.g., the person who have been asked or offered a bribe);

b) Conceptual aspect – the conceptual/theoretical aspects underlying the policy.

c) Function - the function or “temporal stage” of the anti-corruption effort (e.g., preventing, detecting, controlling/eliminating corruption);

d) Nature of Policy - the types of policy tool (e.g., regulations, restructuring, incentives; etc.);

e) Implementing body – the type of (proposed/actual) implementing body (e.g., governmental agencies, international bodies, etc.);

f) Target – the target/s of the general scheme (e.g., civil servants, citizens, etc.);

g) Object – the main target/s of the anti-corruption policies (e.g., civil servants, managers, citizens);

h) Principle - the main underlying principle of the policy;

A description of each variable and respective categories are reported in the following paragraphs along with the results of the analysis for each of them.

## 5.1. Nature of administrative corruption

The nature of administrative corruption covered by the anti-corruption policy is one of the core-elements of the typology. In order to identify the nature of corruption, five different variables have been addressed, as following.

### 5.1.1. The types of administrative corruption

The different types of corruption have been identified and defined according to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)<sup>8</sup>. In particular, the following corruption types have been considered to define administrative corruption in the public sector:

1. Active bribery of national public officials (article 15)<sup>9</sup>
2. Passive bribery of national public officials (article 15)<sup>10</sup>
3. Active Bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations (article 16)<sup>11</sup>
4. Passive Bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations (article 16)<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2004). United Nations Convention Against Corruption. United Nations, New York. Web [http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026\\_E.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> “The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.” (United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 2004: 17)

<sup>10</sup> “The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.” (United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 2004: 17).

<sup>11</sup> The promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in relation to the conduct of international business. (United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 2004: 17-18).

5. Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official (article 17) <sup>13</sup>
6. Trading in influence (Article 18) <sup>14</sup>
7. Abuse of functions (Article 19) <sup>15</sup>
8. Illicit enrichment (Article 20) <sup>16</sup>
9. Nepotism<sup>17</sup>

Table 3 below illustrates the number of identified policies which could be used to address the different types of administrative corruption.

*Table 3. Number of identified anti-corruption policies by type of administrative corruption*

a1) Type of administrative corruption addressed			N of policies
1. Bribery	1.1. Of national public officials	1.1.1. Active	42
		1.1.2. Passive	42
	1.2. Of foreign public officials	1.2.1. Active	42
		1.2.2. Passive	42
2. Embezzlement			40
3. Trading in influence			39
4. Abuse of function			40
5. Illicit enrichment			41
6. Nepotism			39

When analyzing the existing anti-corruption policies included in the dataset, it emerged that the majority of them have a broad scope and could be basically applied to prevent and/or eliminate all types of administrative corruption mentioned above. In particular, 35 out of 43 identified strategies could target all types of corruption.

Trading in influence and nepotism are the types of corruption the least addressed by existing anti-corruption policies in the public sector, while bribery is the most targeted. This might be due to the fact that bribery often entails the practical exchange of money and gifts and, therefore, there is something concrete which can be more easily detected and prevented than the merely exchange of favors characterizing trading in influence and nepotism.

The proper classification of the nature of corruption is fundamental both in terms of anti-corruption planning and evaluation. During the policy planning-phase, it is fundamental to design and orient the policy towards the main features of the interested

<sup>12</sup> The solicitation or acceptance by a foreign public official or an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties (United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 2004: 17-18).

<sup>13</sup> The embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his or her benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity, of any property, public or private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the public official by virtue of his or her position

<sup>14</sup> The promise, offering or giving to a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage for the original instigator of the act or for any other person. The solicitation or acceptance by a public official or any other person, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person in order that the public official or the person abuse his or her real or supposed influence with a view to obtaining from an administration or public authority of the State Party an undue advantage (United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 2004: 18).

<sup>15</sup> The abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity (United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 2004: 18-19).

<sup>16</sup> Illicit enrichment, that is, a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income (United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 2004: 19).

<sup>17</sup> "Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, or the diversion of state revenues." (The World Bank 1997: 8-9)

specific type of corruption. At the same time, during the policy evaluation-phase, it is essential to identify and classify the type or types of corruption addressed by the evaluated policy, in order to assess whether the policy tool was well-fitting with the problem, but also in order to collect pre and post data on the correct phenomenon targeted by the policy. Collecting the right information is fundamental for developing a sound assessment of policy impact.

Following this reasoning and according to the problem-solving approach to public policy (Lasswell 1971; Merton & Lerner 1971; Turnbull 2006), it can be claimed that this category of the typology – together with the following category 5.1.1 – is the dominant determinant of our model. Indeed, it influences all the others (and especially the type of policy).

#### 5.1.2. Activities and procedure during which corruption happens

The types of corruption mentioned above can take place during different activities or procedures in the public sector. Analysing the context where corruption takes place is fundamental for the development of realistic and contextual strategies as counter measures.

The different public sector activities and procedures have been identified looking at UNODC and UNDP publications and ICAC Manual (see Table 1 above). Ten main different types of activities and procedures in the public sector have been selected for building the typology of anti-corruption policies:

1. Decision-making procedures. It refers to all those choices made for the correct functioning of a given organization. The decisions could concern both the structural mechanisms of the organization and the personnel (ICAC 2009).
2. Controlling and regulating activities for the general public. It refers, for example, to the delivery of licences, issuing of permits and documents, but also tax declaration or the clearance of goods through customs.
3. Delivering public utility or medical service. It refers to the delivery of services to the general public such as electricity, water, medical checks, etc.
4. Recruitment and selection/promotion in public service or government institutions.
5. Contract administration. It refers to all those activities aimed at issuing/renewing/terminating contract of public administration personnel.
6. Inspection. It concerns checking the compliance with laws, regulations, policies and procedures determined by public organizations among citizens and businesses (e.g., at a business premise for checking the implementation of safety at work standards).
7. Stores Management. It refers to the proper recording, organization, classification and control of stocks within public administration. These stocks could be used for abusing power, or paying bribes.
8. Management of finances. It refers to budget preparation and presentation, the public availability of information, open budget preparation, execution, and reporting, effective audit and legislature oversight.
9. Cash handling. It concerns the management of cash money collected within a public organization.
10. Government contract/public procurement. It refers to all activities and procedures related to procurement, from the invitation to tender to the selection of the project and award of contract.



The characteristics of corruption, as well as its consequences and costs, largely vary according to the type of activities and procedures during which it takes place. For example, bribing a public official in order to speed-up the issuing of a certificate or licence has different mechanisms and consequences than bribing a public official for misallocating a public procurement contract. The different mechanisms and impacts of corruption also change on the basis of the public sector where corruption takes place. This issue is addressed in the following section 5.1.3.

*Table 4. Number of identified anti-corruption policies by type of public sector activity and procedure during which corruption happens*

a2) Public sector activity and procedure during which corruption happens	N of policies
1. Decision-Making Process	35
2. Controlling and regulating activities for the general public (licensing; regulation; issuing of permits, certificates, documents; admission and exams in the public school, tax declaration; customs certificate; etc.)	36
3. Delivering public utility/medical services (e.g., electricity, water, sanitation, visit, intervention, etc.)	35
4. Recruitment and Selection/Promotion in public service or government institutions	36
5. Contract administration	37
6. Inspection (e.g., at a business premise for checking safety at work)	25
7. Stores Management	21
8. Management of finances	36
9. Cash handling	30
10. Government contract/public procurement	40

The analysis shows that the largest amount of identified policies could be used to prevent and repress corruption in public procurement. Indeed, due to the well-known high risk of corruption related to this type of public procedures and to the high costs and impact in terms of misallocation of resources and quality of infrastructures, many initiatives have been developed to target corruption in public procurement. It is worth mentioning two dedicated publications of OECD (2007)<sup>18</sup> and UNODC (2013)<sup>19</sup>, detailing how to prevent and counter this phenomenon.

Stores management is the activity for which the lowest number of anti-corruption policies is applied. Inspections and cash handling are also among those activities for which a low number of anti-corruption policies has been identified.

This categorization provides further elements to identify the type of problem anti-corruption policies should focus on. It complements the information provided by the previous classification on the nature of corruption by addressing also the context, in terms of procedures and activities within the public sector, during which corruption could occur. For the same reasons mentioned above, this distinction is fundamental both for planning and evaluating anti-corruption policies.

### 5.1.3. The public sectors/areas where corruption occurs

A categorization of the public sectors where corruption could occur (Table 5) is a further piece of information contributing to the proper identification of the problem under investigation. The features, consequences and impact of corruption across

<sup>18</sup> "Bribery in Public Procurement - METHODS, ACTORS AND COUNTER-MEASURES"

<sup>19</sup> "Guidebook on anti-corruption in public procurement and the management of public finances - Good practices in ensuring compliance with article 9 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption"

different sectors largely vary. For example, active bribery of a public official to obtain a construction permit has different mechanisms and consequences than illicit enrichment in the disaster relief areas.

*Table 5. Number of identified anti-corruption policies by type of public sector activity and procedure during which corruption happens*

a3) Public sector area where corruption happens	N of policies
1. Construction	43
2. Health	43
3. Tax Administration	43
4. Energy	43
5. Environment and water	43
6. Forestry	43
7. Customs and Immigration	43
8. Legal system	43
9. Disaster relief	43
10. Education	43
11. Other	5

Despite the importance of identifying the different categories of this variable for a complete identification of the problem of corruption, the analysis of the existing policies does not show any specific pattern. All the identified policies could, indeed, potentially be applied to all the identified sectors.

#### 5.1.4. The person who initiates the corruption act and the person who suffered it

Clearly identifying the persons who initiated the corruption act and who suffered it is a difficult task and somehow it contradicts the definition of corruption as victimless event.

Indeed, by definition, corruption is characterized by the active participation of both counterparts in the act. However, in some cases – such as illicit enrichment or abuse of function – it is evident who initiated the corruption act and who the main victim was. And this information could be used to further improve the understanding of the problem and clarify, for example, who should be the target of the policy.

For this reason this section provides the categorizations of these two elements but does not report the number of policies of each category to avoid misleading interpretation of the results

*Table 6. Number of identified anti-corruption policies by person/entity who initiated the corruption act*

a4) The person who initiates the corruption act (e.g., who asks/offers the bribe)
1. Civil servants
2. Governmental agencies
3. Citizens
4. Businesses

*Table 7. Number of identified anti-corruption policies by person/entity who suffered the corruption act*



<b>a5) The person who suffers the corruption act (e.g., the person who have been asked or offered a bribe)</b>
1. Civil servants
2. Governmental agencies
2. Citizens
3. Businesses
4. Society as a whole

## 5.2. The conceptual aspects of the anti-corruption policies

This category of the typology concerns the underlying theoretical framework which informs anti-corruption policies. Three main perspectives on corruption have been identified and considered:

1. Principal-agent perspective highlights the role of individuals' calculations about whether or not to engage in or oppose corruption; the influence of transparency, monitoring, and sanctions on those calculations; and the technical challenges of monitoring and sanctioning corrupt behavior (Marquette & Pfeiffer 2015: 1).
2. The problem-solving perspective see corruption as a way of dealing with deeply-rooted social, structural, economic and political problems. Anti-corruption interventions need to better understand the functions that corruption may serve and find alternative ways to solve the real problems that people face if anti-corruption work is to be successful (Marquette & Pfeiffer 2015: 1);
3. Collective action perspective highlights the relevance to individuals' decisions of group dynamics, including trust in others and the (actual or perceived) behaviour of others. When corruption is seen as 'normal', people may be less willing to abstain from corruption or to take the first step in implementing sanctions or reforms. This theory highlights the challenges of coordinated anticorruption efforts (Marquette & Pfeiffer 2015: 1).

It has been widely recognized that anti-corruption policies have been largely influenced and based on a conceptualization of corruption as principal-agent problem (Marquette & Pfeiffer 2015; UNDP 2015; Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2013; Johnson 2012). The idea is that, according to the principal agent paradigm, the contemporary anticorruption framework mainly concerns policies and measures aimed at reducing the opportunities and incentives for corruption (Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2013).

This idea is confirmed by the analysis developed in the present paper. Indeed, the majority of the identified anti-corruption policies can be related to the principal-agent paradigm. However, it seems that also the collective action approach is fairly frequently used to inform these policies.

Table 8. *Number of identified anti-corruption policies by conceptual framework*

<b>b) Conceptual aspects</b>	<b>N of policies</b>
1. Principal-agent model (theory of change)	26
2. Problem-solving model	11
3. Collective action model	16

In addition, the analysis shows that the theoretical understanding of corruption is partially influenced by the characteristics of the problem (see chapters above) – together with other elements more linked to the specific context and period of interest. For example, types of corruption involving economic benefits (such as illicit enrichment, embezzlement, etc.) are usually interpreted through a principal-agent approach, while types of corruption mainly involving the trade of influences or favors are more understood as collective action problem.

### 5.3. The function of the anti-corruption effort

Determining the main function of the anti-corruption effort is fundamental in order to apply the right type of policy in the right temporal stage; to understand how the different temporal stages interact with each other and to better evaluate the results of the anti-corruption effort (Blind 2011).

The OECD International Convention (2003: 4) indicates four main functions of the anti-corruption measure:

1. “Prevention in a repression perspective: increasing the transparency of public operations, through for instance the adoption of measures to facilitate access to information.
2. Prevention in an incitation perspective: changing the logics of action which lead public or private actors to bribery. For example, managing conflicts of interest in the public service allows protecting the integrity of official decision-making.
3. Detection: defining and supporting the role different actors can play detecting potential cases of corruption (e.g., tax inspectors, auditors).
4. Repression: defining offences (of bribery and related offences, such as money laundering) and setting up State mechanisms to investigate and sanction the breaching of the law.”

The majority of the identified types of anti-corruption policies have been designed for preventing corruption through the management of public affairs (e.g., selecting specialized staff; reporting by public officials of acts of corruption, etc.).

The prevention of corruption in an incitation perspective, for example through the participation of society, is the second most frequent function of the identified anti-corruption policies, followed by the prevention of corruption through transparency mechanisms in the public sector.

*Table 9. Number of identified anti-corruption policies by the temporal stage/function of anti-corruption effort*

c) Temporal stage/function of anti-corruption effort			N of policies
1. Prevention stage	1.1. Prevention in a repression perspective	1.1.1. Management of public affairs (Art. 9 UNCAC)	20
		1.1.2. Transparency in the public sector (Art. 10 UNCAC)	11
	1.2. Prevention in an incitation perspective	1.2.1. Participation of society (Art. 13 UNCAC)	13
2. Detection stage			7
3. Repression/Elimination stage			5

It is evident the predominance of preventive anti-corruption policies rather than detection or repression ones. This result probably mirrors the preventive approach to anti-corruption strategies of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. The first ten articles (Artt. 5-14) of the Convention are, indeed, specifically addressed to this type of policies. According to article 5 “each State Party must put in place the overall context and framework to prevent corruption, as required by the Convention, by developing and implementing a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy” (UNODC & UNICRI 2009: 3). This should be achieved through the promotion of the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability (*Ibidem*).

The types of function or temporal stage of the anti-corruption effort is influenced by the characteristics of the problem and its conceptual understanding. The urgency for developing repressing policies usually depends on the seriousness of corruption and it is more related to a principal-agent interpretation of the problem. While for less serious types of behaviors which might lead to corruption, prevention strategies still represent the best approach, especially under a collective-action interpretation of corruption mechanisms.

#### 5.4. Nature of public policy

Another core-element of the typology of anti-corruption strategies concerns the specific type of public policy and related mechanisms. In order to pinpoint the main categories and characteristics of this category we mainly referred to Howlett, M. (2010) and Hood (1983).

While reviewing these two publications, we identified four main types of government tools:

1. Organizational implementation tools, “which rely upon the use of government institutions and personnel to affect policy output delivery and policy process change” (Howlett 2010: 53 );
2. Authoritative implementation tools, “primarily involving and relying on the ability of governments to direct or steer targets in the directions they would prefer them to go through the use of the real or perceived threat of state-enforced sanctions” (Howlett 2010: 62);
3. Financial implementation tools, mainly involve the transfer of treasure resources to or from specific public actors in order to encourage them to perform some activity (financial incentives) or to discourage them (financial costs);
4. Information based implementation tools, rely on the use of information (knowledge and data) available to governments to influence consumer and producer behavior according to government aims, and/or collect information in order to update their aims (Howlett 2010).

All these tools have then been further distinguished according to their substantive or procedural aspect. The former affects both the production and consumption/distribution of goods and services in society; the latter involves the organization and reorganization of government agencies and process in order to produce the needed result (Howlett 2010).

Table 10. *Number of identified anti-corruption policies by type of policy*

d) Type of policy			N of policies
1. Organizational implementation tools	1.1. Substantive organizational instruments	1.1.1. Direct use of government agencies/mechanisms for policy purpose (e.g., e-governance, compliance offices, risk analysis and due diligence systems, auditing systems, selection of personnel, etc.)	12
		1.1.2. Use of indirect government organizations for policy purpose (e.g., consulting agencies for evaluating the risk of corruption or managing whistleblowing mechanisms, etc.)	1
	1.2. Procedural organizational instruments	1.2.1. Institutional change (e.g., anti-corruption training to civil servants, selection of personnel, etc.)	9
		1.2.2. Creation of institution (e.g., anti-corruption agencies, anti-corruption officers or central agencies, tribunals and other quasi-judicial bodies, ad-hoc task forces, commissions, inquiries and public hearings, legislative and executive oversight agencies, etc.)	7
2. Authoritative implementation tools	2.1 Substantive authoritative instruments (same definition as above)	2.1.1. Direct government regulation (e.g., anti-corruption laws, independent regulatory commissions, governmental anti-corruption agencies, codes of conduct; etc.)	4
		2.1.2. Indirect government regulation (e.g., ethical standards, delegated professional regulation, voluntary or incentive regulation, external corporate intelligence specialists, etc.)	1
		2.1.3. Market creation and maintenance (e.g., creation of partnering against corruption, when businesses stand together and join efforts in refusing systematically to enter into business with corrupt partners, or in corrupt markets)	1
	2.2. Procedural authoritative instruments	2.2.1. Policy network activation and mobilization tools (e.g., creation of network of experts both from the public and private sector providing recommendations and developing Memoranda of Intent, etc.).	1
3. Financial implementation tools	3.1 Substantive financial instruments	3.1.1 Positive financial incentives (e.g., raising wages of civil servants, etc.)	1
		3.1.2. Negative financial incentives (e.g., fines for civil servants, etc.)	1
		3.1.3. Cash or tax-equivalent positive financial tools (e.g., preferential procurement for institutions/businesses promoting compliance, favourable insurance and loan guarantees for efficient civil servants, promoting bonus for efficient civil servants, vouchers for public services, )	1

	3.2 Procedural financial instruments	3.2.1. Policy network creation and mobilisation tools (e.g., funding research to the idea of anti-corruption, etc.)	1
4. Information-based implementation tools	4.1. Substantive informational instruments	4.1.1. Information dissemination tools (e.g., exhortation and moral suasion, information campaigns, knowledge dissemination network such as Transparency International's Anti-corruption Solutions and Knowledge (ASK); etc.)	16
		4.1.2. Information and knowledge collection tools (e.g., anonymous reporting lines, whistleblowing mechanisms, judicial inquiries and executive commissions, national statistical agencies, surveys and polling, developing anti-corruption index, etc.)	14
	4.2. Procedural informational instruments	4.2.1. Information release tools (e.g., freedom of information legislation, tools and ethic)	10
		4.2.2. Information release prevention tools (e.g., anonymity of whistleblowing, censorship, official secret acts, privacy acts)	6

Information-based implementation tools are the most frequent type of anti-corruption policies. This can be related to the fact that they are relatively simple to be implemented and their development involves lower amount of resources than other more complex types of policy.

The second most frequent type of anti-corruption policy is substantive organization implementation tools, concerning the direct use of government agencies and mechanisms for policy purpose (e.g., e-governance, compliance offices, risk analysis and due diligence systems, auditing systems, selection of personnel). Institutional change, such as the implementation of anti-corruption training to civil servants, better selection of personnel, etc., as well as the creation of new institution, such as Anti-Corruption agencies and bodies, are also frequently applied for developing anti-corruption policies.

The analysis also suggests that the type of policy tool mainly depends on the nature of corruption and its theoretical understanding. This result confirms Blind (2011) hypothesis that when corruption is understood as a transaction between an agent and a client, both evaluating the benefits and costs of this transaction, then this evaluation can be affected by, for example, the probabilities of detection, of sanctions if caught, of institutions, rules and regulations that can be used in fending off against accusations, etc. On the other hand, when corruption is interpreted as a deviation from socially accepted norms and ethic, the factors creating the ground for such deviances should be targeted, for example through information campaigns, through the development of codes of conduct and their application.

### 5.5. Type of (proposed/actual) implementing body

The type of implementing body is mainly determined by the specific type of policy tool. The analysis of the recorded anti-corruption policies allowed the identification of the main proposed implementing bodies. As illustrated in Table 11 below, the majority of anti-corruption policies should/could be implemented by Governmental agencies. Non-Governmental agencies are also fairly frequently involved in the implementation of this

type of policies (e.g., raising public awareness and education on corruption). The relevant role of International Organizations in the prevention and fight against corruption is also confirmed, together with the importance of involving the private sector for comprehensively contrasting this phenomenon.

*Table 11. Number of identified anti-corruption policies by type of (proposed/actual) implementing body*

e) Type of (proposed/actual) implementing body		N of policies
1. International organizations	1.1 OECD	9
	1.2. TI	9
	1.3. UN	9
	1.4. WHO	9
	1.5. WB	9
	1.6. EU	9
2. Justice System		6
3. Private sector		6
4. Governmental agencies/ Government Departments		40
5. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)		16
6. Other (specify)		2

The choice of the anti-corruption policy implementing body, as well as the target of the policy, is dictated by the function of the policy and especially by the type of policy tool. For example, substantive organizational tools with the use of government agencies will be implemented by governmental agencies and mainly target civil servants; substantive organizational tools with the use of indirect government organizations could be implemented by private entities and mainly target governmental agencies and civil servants. Substantive authoritative tools will be implemented by the justice system and target governmental agencies and civil servants. From the analysis of the identified policies, it does not emerge any clear link between the nature of corruption and the type of implementation body. This relationship is, indeed, mediated by the type of policy tool.

## 5.6. Main target of the general scheme

When considering the main target of the general anti-corruption scheme, it emerges that the identified policies mainly target national agencies and actors. Sub national actors are also frequently involved in the development of anti-corruption policies. Only half of the identified policies are designed to target the international level.

This result highlights the importance of environmental proximity of the implementation bodies to properly design, coordinate, monitor and evaluate the public policy.

*Table 12. Number of identified anti-corruption policies by main target of the general scheme*

f) Main target of the general scheme	N of policies
1. International	7
2. National	42
3. Sub-national	41



While international organizations have an important role in identifying and defining effective anti-corruption framework, corrupt behaviors, and their consequences are generally born at the national or subnational level.

### 5.7. The main target/s of the anti-corruption policies

Governance agencies and civil servants are the most frequent targets of existing anti-corruption policies. This means that the majority of the identified policies are designed to modify or improve mechanisms related to the work of these subjects. This result is probably also due to the fact that the target of this article is administrative corruption in the public sector.

*Table 13. Number of identified anti-corruption policies by main target of the policy*

g) Main target of the policy	N of policies
1. Citizens	22
2. Businesses	9
3. Governmental agencies	32
4. Civil servants	25
5. Civil society	1

Even if the public officials are the main targets of the anti-corruption policies in the public sector, the importance of citizens' and businesses' involvement and cooperation is demonstrated by the fact that these subjects are also frequently indicated as targets of the policies.

### 5.8. The principles of the anti-corruption policies

Transparency, accountability, and integrity are considered the main underlying principles of anti-corruption. Indeed, they encompass ideas contrary to this phenomenon, such as openness, responsiveness and ethics (UNDP 2015). "Transparency can be defined as the availability of information, both to the general public and to individuals that comprise the government workforce, as well as clarity about government processes, rules, and decisions." (UNDP 2015: 21). "Accountability refers to the rights of citizens to request a response to questions about government decision-making, as well as the obligation of government to respond" (Ibidem).

These principles are the fundamental building blocks of integrity and are often used for informing anti-corruption policies. However, these concepts are broad in scope and closely interlinked, and it might be difficult to differentiate them in terms of public policies.

*Table 14. Number of identified anti-corruption policies by principle*

h) Principle	N of policies
1. Transparency	27
2. Accountability	17
3. Integrity	20

In the attempt to attribute one main underlying principle to each of the identified policies, the analysis identified a prevalence of policies based on the transparency principle, followed by integrity and accountability.

Information-based implementation tools are linked to transparency principles, while the majority of organizational, financial and authoritative policy instruments are more informed by the idea of putting the agents in front of their responsibilities and be accountable. When the policy draws on both transparency and accountability mechanisms, the integrity principle also follows as a consequence of what has been mentioned above.

## 6. Discussion and conclusion


The proposed typology, including the variables and respective categories described in the previous chapter, allows to exhaustively covering the main types of anti-corruption policies found in the documents produced by international organizations (see Annex 1 for the complete typology and metadata on its categories).

The proposed categorization covers fundamental aspects of the anti-corruption programming, such as the types of corruption concerned, the activities during which corruption happened, the theoretical interpretation of the problem, the temporal stage of the intervention, the specific type of public tool, the target of the policy, as well as the underlying principles. By covering these elements, the proposed typology not only overcomes the main pitfalls of existing classifications but also offers a first comprehensive framework through which classifying anti-corruption efforts.

In addition, the identification and categorization of the various elements of anti-corruption strategies allows investigating how these elements are interlinked.

In particular, three main macro-categories can be recognized in the typology: 1) the characteristics of the problem the policy wants to address (from category a1 to category a5), 2) the theoretical understanding of the problem (category b), and 3) the objective and characteristics of the policy (from category c to category h).

*Figure 1 - Hierarchical relation between the main categories of the typology*



As summarized in the flow-chart above, the analysis of the data included in our analytical grid suggests that the characteristics of the problem (i.e., corruption) partially influence the theoretical and conceptual understanding of the problem. For example, types of corruption involving economic benefits (such as illicit enrichment,



embezzlement, etc.) are mainly linked to a principal-agent interpretation of their mechanism, while types of corruption mainly involving the trade of influences or favors are seen as more rooted in the societal norms and thus understood and interpreted through the collective action approach. It is relevant to highlight that the understanding of the corruption problem is not only influenced by the characteristics of the phenomenon itself but also by contextual factors.

The characteristics of the problem and its understanding inevitably affect the objective of the policy and the characteristics of the response to the problem. Types of corruption more related to the trade of influence and non-monetary favors, interpreted through a collective action approach, are usually targeted by organizational implementation tools or information-based policies. Types of corruption involving high financial benefits – such as illicit enrichment and embezzlement – and understood as a principal-agent problem, are mainly dealt with authoritative implementation tools.

The type of policy tool is influenced by both the type of problem under investigation and by the main objective/function of the policy. When the policy should aim to prevent corruption, the policy tools usually concern substantive organizational instruments (with direct use of government agencies and mechanisms), procedural organizational tools, financial implementation tools and information dissemination policies. If the aim of the policy is to detect corruption, the main policy tools are substantive organizational tools (with use of indirect government organizations) and information and knowledge collection tools. When the policy aims at repressing/eliminating corruption, authoritative implementation tools are mainly put in place.

The objective of the policy and the type of policy tool determine the type of implementing body, general scheme and target of the policy. For example, substantive organizational tools with the use of government agencies will be implemented by governmental agencies and mainly target civil servants; substantive organizational tools with the use of indirect government organizations could be implemented by private entities and mainly target governmental agencies and civil servants; substantive authoritative tools will be implemented by the justice system and target governmental agencies and civil servants.

Besides shedding light on the links between the abovementioned policy elements, this study brings about several other benefits to research on anti-corruption, both for practitioners on anti-corruption policies design at national and international level, policy makers and academics.

With regard to the former, this investigation allows to taking stock of the main international recommendations and requirements in this regard and reviews what is covered by existing initiatives and guidelines at international level and what would need further attention in terms of research. In particular, it emerged that, among the identified anti-corruption policies, bribery is the type of corruption more frequently targeted, while nepotism and trading in influence have been covered by a much lower number of initiatives. These conducts would, thus, need to be better investigated in terms of preventive, detection and repressive actions. Public procurement is the public areas counting the highest amount and variety of policies recommendations at international level. The management of finances, contract administration, recruitment, and selection/promotion of personnel, controlling and regulating activities for the general public are also areas of the public sector where a quite large number of policies have been addressed. While stores management, cash handling, and inspection are the areas more in need of further attention in terms of anti-corruption programming and international recommendations.

Furthermore, the preventive approach to corruption is clearly dominant among existing policies, as well as the focus on governmental agencies as main implementing bodies of anti-corruption initiatives.

Concerning the type of policies, information-based implementation tools (e.g., Right-to-Information Systems and Right-to-Hearing Systems) (together with substantive organizational implementation tools, concerning the management of personnel, control and detection systems, are those mostly covered by international guidelines and manuals. It also emerges that these organizational implementation tools are mainly developed with the use of government agencies/mechanisms rather than with indirect government organizations (e.g., consulting agencies for evaluating the risk of corruption or managing whistleblowing mechanisms, etc.). Despite this, it is worth mentioning a number of suggestions and publications on how to involve non-governmental organizations in the fight against corruption, especially private organizations (see for example OECD 2016; OECD, UNODC & World Bank 2013; OECD 2010; OECD 2003).

The range of potential financial implementation tools is also still very poor and should be seen as a priority for future anti-corruption guidelines at international level.

Despite these shortcomings in the anti-corruption policies panorama at international level, a positive sign concerns the increasing orientation towards policies involving transparency of information and the participation of citizens and civil society to the process of improving governmental agencies accountability and integrity.

The results of this study can also support policy makers in better designing anti-corruption policies and contrasting policy failure by clearly framing the focus anti-corruption policies should have. A clear categorization of the problem under investigation and of the types of policy implemented for addressing it, can also be used for efficiently monitoring and evaluating the overall strategy of anti-corruption policies. Sound assessments need to clearly distinguishing the features of corruption, the characteristics of the anti-corruption policy implemented and the settings where it has been implemented. Such a classification could, thus, be used in the policy evaluation process in order to understand whether a given anti-corruption programme clearly details all the identified categories and how these categories interact between each other. In addition, a precise categorization of the problem targeted by the policy allows collecting the correct information on the phenomenon and, thus, perform a proper policy impact evaluation.

In terms of academic impact, this study allows rethinking the structure and content of existing anti-corruption policies classifications by comparing them to the proposed typology (see Annex 2). Taking into consideration McCusker (2008) classification, the schools of thought of Interventionism, entailing the intervention of the relevant authorities only once the corrupt act has taken place, can be linked to the repression/elimination stage of anti-corruption policies, to international organisations and judicial systems as implementing bodies, to authoritative policy tools, to accountability and integrity principles putting the agents in front of their responsibilities and to a principal-agent interpretation of corruption issues. On the other hand, Managerialism and Organizational Integrity, concerning the prevention and detection of corruption before it happens through organizational systems and ethical norms, are related to the prevention and detection stage of the anti-corruption policy, to organizational, financial and information-based implementation tools, to transparency principles and both principal-agent and collective action approach to corruption problems.

Considering Huberts classification (1998), it emerges that cultural and education mechanisms of anti-corruption are related to preventive and detection policies, to information-based implementation tools, transparency principles and collective action model. Huberts' Organizational mechanisms are also mainly present in the prevention and detection phase of anti-corruption policies and in organizational implementation policy tools. This mechanism is mainly linked to integrity principles and to both the principal-agent and collective action understandings of corruption. On the other hand, economic mechanisms can instead, be related to preventive and repressive anti-corruption policies, to financial implementation tools, accountability principles and principal-agent approach to corruption. Judicial or repressive dynamics are found in the repressive stage of anti-corruption policies, are usually implemented by international organizations and the judicial systems, they inform authoritative implementation tools and are shaped by accountability principles and principal-agent interpretation of corruption.

Confronting the categories of the proposed typology against the classification of Dish et al (2009), it emerges that their category of Political-Structural policies mainly concerns types of grand-corruption - such as embezzlement, trading in influence, abuse of function and illicit enrichment. This category can be mainly related to the prevention stage of anti-corruption policies, developed by international organizations and governmental agencies. It can be linked to information-based implementation tools, transparency principles and collective action model. The category they identified as Rule of Law should mainly concern types of corruption which can be more easily detected and prosecuted than others - such as embezzlement, trading in influence and illicit enrichment. This category clearly refers to the repression/elimination stage of anti-corruption policies and to authoritative implementation tools developed by the justice system. Accountability is the main underlying principle and problem-solving approach the main conceptual guidance. Their category of Public administration and systems improvements concerns types of corruption which can be prevented through public sector and public finance management reforms – such as bribery, embezzlement, abuse of function, illicit enrichment. As far as this category is linked to the principal-agent understanding of corruption, it mainly resembles organizational and financial implementation tools. Their category of Extractive industries and service delivery includes those anti-corruption policies preventing and detecting public sector corruption – such as bribery – through organizational and information-based implementation tools mainly informed by transparency and accountability principles. The category of Non-state actors' policies highlights the importance of preventing and detecting corruption through transparency and accountability principles and information based implementation tools mainly targeted at citizens and civil society. Capacity building and organisational development mainly concerns the prevention and detection stages of anti-corruption policies mainly implemented through organizational and financial tools and based on accountability and integrity principles.

The categorization of the identified types of anti-corruption policies through the other authors' classification, allows stating that the majority of them are following educational (22) and organizational (13) mechanisms, while Judicial or repressive mechanisms are the least present among the policies found within international guidelines and manuals.

In addition, still in terms of academic impact, the results of the analysis confirms the prevalence of the principal-agent approach in the orientation of anti-corruption policies (Marquette & Pfeiffer 2015; UNDP 2015; Persson, Rothstein & Teorell 2013; Johnson 2012). With this regard, even if this prevalence is still present, the collective action model has been using for informing a fairly high number of anti-corruption initiatives.

To conclude, the results of this study are not only useful to classify the existing anti-corruption initiatives, but have demonstrated their value for understanding the main strengths and weaknesses of existing policies, as well as their dynamics, and for providing a comprehensive framework to plan, design and evaluate anti-corruption interventions.

Even if comprehensive and exhaustive, this typology suffers one main weakness: its categories are not mutual exclusive. This issue is due to the complexity of the corruption phenomena and to the fact that several anti-corruption policies are inevitably linked one another.

Further steps for improving research on policy classification and evaluation should consider the importance of identifying the local context where the policy has been developed. Blind (2011) also claims the importance of understanding the context where the anti-corruption policy has been applied as well as the motivation of corruption. With regard to the former he suggests that: "What may seem like small sums at the national level may be fairly substantial kickbacks at the local government or village level, as argued in a recent study on corruption in Asia (UNDP 2008)". Concerning the latter he reminds the importance of distinguishing between corruption for "need vs greed". As other authors (Kolstad et al 2008; Booth and Fritz 2008) has already suggested, the political context is also fundamental to understand corruption and to prepare anti-corruption policies and programmes. This is indeed, crucial to understand to what extent the pre-existing social contexts can ease or impede the mechanism of change brought about by the anti-corruption policy (Marra 2000; Johnson 2012).

A more systematic review of existing anti-corruption policies, including not only international initiatives but also national ones, should be developed as follow-up of the present research.

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## Annex 1 – Proposed typology of anti-corruption policies

a1) Type of corruption addressed	1. Bribery	1.1. Of national public officials	1.1.1. Active
			1.1.2. Passive
		1.2. Of foreign public officials	1.2.1. Active
			1.2.2. Passive
	2. Embezzlement		
	3. Trading in influence		
	4. Abuse of function		
	5. Illicit enrichment		
	6. Nepotism		
	7. Corruption in general		
a2) Public sector activity or procedure during which corruption happens	1. Decision-Making Process		
	2. Controlling and regulating activities (licensing; regulation; issuing of permits, certificates, documents; admission and exams in the public school, tax declaration; customs certificate; etc.)		
	3. Delivering public utility/medical services (e.g., electricity, water, sanitation, visit, intervention, etc.)		
	4. Recruitment and Selection/Promotion in public service or government institutions		
	5. Contract administration		
	6. Inspection (e.g., at a business premise for checking safety at work)		
	7. Stores Management		
	8. Management of assets		
	9. Cash handling		
	10. Government contract/public procurement		
	11. Other		
a3) Public sector area (sector) where corruption happens	1. Construction		
	2. Health		
	3. Tax Administration		
	4. Energy		
	5. Environment and water		
	6. Forestry		
	7. Customs and Immigration		
	8. Legal system		
	9. Disaster relief		
	10. Education		
	11. Other		
a4) The	1. Civil servants		

person who initiates the corruption act (e.g., who asks/offers the bribe)	2. Governmental agencies		
	3. Citizens		
	4. Businesses		
a5) The person who suffers the corruption act (e.g., the person who have been asked or offered a bribe)	1. Civil servants		
	2. Governmental agencies		
	2. Citizens		
	3. Businesses		
	4. Society as a whole		
b) Conceptual aspects	1. Principal-agent model (theory of change)		
	2. Problem-solving model		
	3. Collective action model		
c) Temporal stage/function of anti-corruption effort	1. Prevention stage	1.1. Prevention in a repression perspective	1.1.1. Management of public affairs (Art. 9 UNCAC)
			1.1.2. Transparency in the public sector (Art. 10 UNCAC)
		1.2. Prevention in an incitation perspective 2003	1.2.1. Participation of society (Art. 13 UNCAC)
	2. Detection stage		
	3. Repression/Elimination stage		
d) Type of policy	1. Organizational implementation tools	1.1. Substantive organizational instruments	1.1.1. Direct use of government agencies/mechanisms for policy purpose (e.g., e-governance, compliance offices, risk analysis and due diligence systems, auditing systems, selection of personnel, etc.)
			1.1.2. Use of indirect government organizations for policy purpose (e.g., consulting agencies for evaluating the risk of corruption or managing whistleblowing mechanisms, etc.)
		1.2. Procedural organizational instruments	1.2.1. Institutional change (e.g., anti-corruption training to civil servants, selection of personnel, etc.)
			1.2.2. Creation of institution (e.g., anti-corruption agencies, anti-corruption officers or central agencies, tribunals and other quasi-judicial bodies, ad-hoc task forces, commissions, inquiries and public hearings, legislative and executive oversight agencies, etc.)



	2. Authoritative implementation tools (there are many types of authoritative instruments. All involve, and rely primarily on, the ability of governments to direct or steer targets in the directions they would prefer them to go through the use of the real or perceived threat of state-enforced sanctions)	2.1 Substantive authoritative instruments (same definition as above)	2.1.1. Direct government regulation (e.g., anti-corruption laws, independent regulatory commissions, governmental anti-corruption agencies, codes of conduct; etc.)
			2.1.2. Indirect government regulation (e.g., ethical standards, delegated professional regulation, voluntary or incentive regulation, external corporate intelligence specialists, etc.)
			2.1.3. Market creation and maintenance (e.g., creation of partnering against corruption, when businesses stand together and join efforts in refusing systematically to enter into business with corrupt partners, or in corrupt markets)
		2.2. Procedural authoritative instruments	2.2.1. Policy network activation and mobilization tools (e.g., creation of network of experts both from the public and private sector providing recommendations and developing Memoranda of Intent, etc.).
	3. Financial implementation tools	3.1 Substantive financial instruments	3.1.1 Positive financial incentives (e.g., raising wages of civil servants, etc.)
			3.1.2. Negative financial incentives (e.g., fines for civil servants, etc.)
			3.1.3. Cash or tax-equivalent positive financial tools (e.g., preferential procurement for institutions/businesses promoting compliance, favourable insurance and loan guarantees for efficient civil servants, promoting bonus for efficient civil servants, vouchers for public services, )
		3.2 Procedural financial instruments	3.2.1. Policy network creation and mobilisation tools (e.g., funding research to the idea of anti-corruption, etc.) 4.1.1. Information dissemination tools (e.g., exhortation and moral suasion, information campaigns, knowledge dissemination network such as Transparency International's Anti-corruption Solutions and Knowledge (ASK); etc.)
	4. Information-based implementation tools (those based on the last of the four categories of resources set out by Hood (1986): nodality	4.1. Substantive informational instruments	4.1.2. Information and knowledge collection tools (e.g., anonymous reporting lines, whistleblowing mechanisms, judicial inquiries and executive commissions, national statistical agencies, surveys and polling, developing anti-corruption index, etc.)

	or centrality or, as we have defined it, communicating knowledge of information to target groups)		4.2.1. Information release tools (e.g., freedom of information legislation, tools and ethic)
		4.2. Procedural informational instruments	4.2.2. Information release prevention tools (e.g., anonymity of whistleblowing, censorship, official secret acts, privacy acts)
e) Type of (proposed/actual) implementing body	1. International organizations	1.1 OECD	
		1.2. TI	
		1.3. UN	
		1.4. WHO	
		1.5. WB	
		1.6. EU	
	2. Justice System		
	3. Private sector		
	4. Governmental agencies/ Government Departments	4.1.	
		4.2.	
	5. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)		
	6. Other (specify)		
f) Main target of the general scheme	1. International		
	2. National		
	3. Sub-national		
g) Main target of the policy	1. Citizens		
	2. Businesses		
	3. Governmental agencies		
	4. Civil servants		
	5. Civil society		
g) Main underlying principle	1. Transparency		
	2. Accountability		
	3. Integrity		

## Annex 2 – Comparison of the proposed typology with existing classifications of anti-corruption policies

Main categories of the proposed typology		Categories of McCusker (2008) classification	Categories of Huberts (1998) classification	Categories of Dish et al. (2009) classification
<b>a1) Type of corruption addressed</b>	1. Bribery	Not specified	Not specified	Public administration and systems improvements, Extractive industries and service delivery, Capacity building and organisational development
	2. Embezzlement	Not specified	Not specified	Public administration and systems improvements, Political-structural and Rule of law
	3. Trading in influence	Not specified	Not specified	Political-structural and Rule of law
	4. Abuse of function	Not specified	Not specified	Political-structural, Public administration and systems improvements, Non-state actors
	5. Illicit enrichment	Not specified	Not specified	Public administration and systems improvements, Political-structural and Rule of law
	6. Nepotism	Not specified	Not specified	Non-state actors
<b>b) Conceptual aspects</b>	1. Principal-agent model (theory of change)	Managerialism and Interventionism	Organizational, Economic and Judicial or Repressive	Public administration and systems improvements, Extractive industries and service delivery, Capacity building and organisational development
	2. Problem-solving model	Interventionism	Organizational, Judicial or Repressive	Public administration and systems improvements, Extractive industries and service delivery, Capacity building and organisational development and Rule of law
	3. Collective action model	Organizational integrity	Cultural and Educational	Political-structural and Non-state actors

<b>c) Temporal stage/function of anti-corruption effort</b>	<b>1. Prevention stage</b> (where vulnerabilities to corruption are assessed and addressed in order to prevent it)	Managerialism and Organizational Integrity	Cultural, Educational, Organizational and Economic	Political-structural, Public administration and systems improvements, Extractive industry and public service delivery, Capacity building and organisational development, Non-state actors
	<b>2. Detection stage</b> (this includes defining and supporting the role different actors can play detecting potential cases of corruption. For instance tax inspectors, auditors.	Managerialism and Organizational Integrity	Cultural and Organizational	Extractive industry and public service delivery, Capacity building and organisational development, Non-state actors
	<b>3. Repression/Elimination stage</b> (defining offences of bribery and related offences and setting up State mechanisms to investigate and sanction the breaching of the law)	Interventionism	Economic and Judicial or Repressive	Rule of law
<b>d) Type of policy</b>	1. Organizational implementation tools	Managerialism and Organizational Integrity	Organizational	Public administration and systems improvements, Extractive industries and service delivery, Capacity building and organisational development
	2. Authoritative implementation tools	Interventionism	Judicial or Repressive	Rule of law
	3. Financial implementation tools	Managerialism and Organizational Integrity	Economic	Public administration and systems improvements, Capacity building and organisational development
	4. Information-based implementation tools	Organizational integrity	Cultural and Educational	Extractive industries and service delivery, Political-structural and Non-state actors
<b>e) Type of (proposed/actual) implementing body</b>	1. International organizations	Managerialism and Interventionism	Cultural, Educational, Judicial or Repressive	Political-structural, Public administration and systems improvements, Capacity building and organisational development, Non-state actors
	2. Justice System	Interventionism	Judicial or Repressive	Rule of law
	3. Private sector	Managerialism and Organizational Integrity	Cultural, Educational, Organizational and Economic	Capacity building and organisational development

	4. Governmental agencies/ Government Departments	Managerialism and Organizational Integrity	Cultural, Educational, Organizational and Economic	Public administration and systems improvements, Extractive industries and service delivery, Capacity building and organisational development and Political- structural
	5. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)	Managerialism and Organizational Integrity	Cultural, Educational and Organizational	Capacity building and organisational development, Non-State actors
h) Main underlying principle	1. Transparency	Managerialism and Organizational Integrity	Cultural and Educational	Extractive industries and service delivery, Political-structural and Non-state actors
	2. Accountability	Interventionism	Economic and Judicial or Repressive	Extractive industries and service delivery, Capacity building and organisational development and Rule of law
	3. Integrity	Organizational integrity and interventionism	Organizational	Public administration and systems improvements, Capacity building and organisational development