Policy transfer and policy strategies:
how policymakers make sure lessons from abroad become durable policy changes at home

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While much of the Policy Transfer literature has been focused on discussing whether and how policymakers learn from abroad, less attention has been paid to how these same policymakers make sure lessons, policies, models, or insights from abroad become durable policy changes in their own jurisdictions. Policy actors are, of course, at the centre of policy transfer debates as learners, translators, or assemblers of policies originated elsewhere (Rose, 1993, 2005; Evans and Davies, 1998; Stone, 2012, 2017; Prince, 2010). In the cognate policy diffusion literature, they may also appear as "policy entrepreneurs", pushing for the adoption of policy innovations found in other jurisdictions (Mintrom, 1997). These are images which underline several important roles played by policymakers in the travel of policies. Yet they mostly relate to the early stages of transfer processes, such as the searching and selection of models, or the adaptation of foreign examples to new politico-administrative settings.

However, as many authors have noted, policy transfer processes unfold across several years, even decades (Westney, 1987; Page, 2000; Thatcher, 2007; Carroll, 2012; Dussauge-Laguna, 2012). They go well beyond both initial contacts established during study tours and international meetings, and subsequent policy formulation and design tasks.

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Indeed, it is difficult to assess the relative level of "success" of any policy transfer process unless one looks at its various iterations during implementation (Fawcett and Marsh, 2010). Therefore, to understand how policy transfer influences policy changes, one needs to look at how policy actors deal with changing circumstances to ensure that whatever has been transferred works and lasts in the new setting.

This paper argues that policymakers use various strategies (*e.g.* deliberate sets of actions used to achieve a certain goal) to ensure ideas, policies, and lessons from abroad become durable policies in their own jurisdiction. More specifically, when policymakers engage in policy transfer processes they develop two kinds of strategies: "policy building" strategies and "policy institutionalisation" strategies. While the former are closely related to the continuous process of (re) designing policy components and establishing favourable implementation conditions, the latter are more focused on taking care of political and long-term sustainability issues.

The paper contains three sections. The first provides an overview of the literature and advances a conceptual proposal regarding the specific strategies that may be used by policy actors engaged in policy transfers. The second illustrates how these strategies were used in two reform experiences in Chile and Mexico, specifically in the field of management for results ideas transferred to those countries throughout two decades (1990-2010). The third section concludes and discusses future avenues for research.

The paper is based on a previous research project (a doctoral dissertation), which involved a thorough review of official documentation from those two countries, as well as more than 50 semi-structured interviews with public officials, international experts, and academics. Some portions of the unpublished thesis have been taken as a basis and have been elaborated here.

Policy strategies as part of policy transfer processes

This section has two objectives. First, it provides a brief overview on the role the concept of strategies seems to play in the policy transfer and cognate literatures, particularly with regards to linking learning from abroad and actual policy changes. Based on these mostly scattered references, the section then elaborates on the concept and suggests two main sets of strategies ("policy building" and "policy institutionalisation") that policy actors may use.

These two sets of strategies are in turn further disaggregated, to allow for a finer-grained analysis on the subject.

Actors and strategies in policy transfer

The literature has long noted the relevance that "agents" have in policy transfer processes (Evans and Davies, 1999:368-369), particularly two main groups of them (Page, 2000). The first is that integrated by government officials. For example, in his study on how learning guided social policy changes in the UK and Sweden, Heclo (2010:301) remarked that civil servants were 'the most consistently important' group, 'among all the separate political factors'. These 'administrators' were responsible for 'gathering, coding, storing, and interpreting policy experience' (p. 303). They also provided 'concrete substance to new policy initiatives and in elaborating already established approaches' (p. 304).

A second group of key policy actors in policy transfer is that of the so-called 'policy entrepreneurs' (Westney, 1987; Rose, 1993:56-57). In his work on the diffusion of school reforms across US state governments, Mintrom (1997:739) defined them as 'people who seek to initiate dynamic policy change'. He stressed that '[t]o have them taken seriously, policy entrepreneurs must develop strategies for presenting their ideas to others'. Mintrom further noted that these 'policy entrepreneurs' invest a significant amount of time 'networking in and around government', in order 'to determine what arguments will persuade others to support their policy ideas'. Lastly, he remarked policy entrepreneurs try to build 'coalitions' (p.740).

More generally, the literature has suggested that policymakers develop some kinds of actions, or 'strategies', to further or to better support policy changes somehow triggered by policies from other jurisdictions. According to Levy (1994:300), 'learning has little impact unless those who learn are in a position to implement their preferred policies or to influence others to do so'. Similarly, Page (2003:173) has suggested that, 'drawing lessons from foreign experience and applying them requires commitment, energy, skill, and insight'. Wolman and Page (2002:481) have also stated that, 'utilization [of policy knowledge from other jurisdictions] might occur as part of the political process, with actors referring to the experience of other governments in an effort to persuade others of the desirability (or lack thereof) of a policy' (see also Robertson, 1991). Among the broader

transfer/lesson-drawing debates, it is assumed policymakers 'abstract' models, 'transfer' programmes, 'draw' lessons, or 'adapt' any of these to the politico-administrative settings of 'importer' jurisdictions (Rose, 1991, 1993, 2005; Evans and Davies, 1999; Page, 2000). Recent discussions on the 'circulation of ideas' and 'policy mobilities' have similarly emphasised the role of policymakers as 'editors', "assemblers", or 'translators' of policies and models (Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005; Sahlin and Wedlin, 2008; Prince, 2010; Theodore and Peck, 2011; Stone, 2012; McCann and Ward, 2012, 2013).

Other studies have referred to the 'strategic' character of policymakers' actions when linking knowledge from policies abroad with changes in their own jurisdictions. In studying how American consultants revamped the Canadian civil service based on management principles from the city of Chicago's reform experience, Roberts (1996:11) argued this had been possible because of the 'rhetorical strategy' employed by the reformers. He suggests that:

the consultants' strategy included three main 'arguments': 'that civil service reform […] was a "science" that could only be properly discussed by trained technicians. A second argument consisted of an attack on the motives of individuals who challenged the authority of the experts. A third argument consisted of a demonstration that the members of the expert community had reached agreement that certain reforms should be regarded as "best practice"' (Roberts, 1996:11).

Along similar lines, Gutiérrez (2010:60) has noted that Brazilian bureaucratic experts were capable of advancing water policy changes, inspired by the French experience and international standards, based on three strategies. These included gaining appointments in 'managerial positions related to water policy'; packaging reforms 'within a government program or policy paradigm so as to upgrade the reform's priority on the government agenda'; and promoting the 'formation of a pro-reform coalition'. Lastly, Thatcher (2007) argues that many of the regulatory changes which took place in Western Europe from 1960s-2000s were guided by cross-national learning and supported by the strategies used by policymakers, such as building coalitions and showcasing international regulatory

developments to explain the risks of not reforming, introducing legal changes, and legitimizing regulatory choices.

Summing up, previous scholarship has noted that certain groups of 'administrators' and/or 'policy entrepreneurs' develop some kinds of actions, even strategies, to make a connection between learning from abroad and policy changes in their own jurisdictions. These strategies might be related to the formulation of policy contents, or to adapting new policies to their receiving environment. Some might be more in line with efforts to persuade or mobilise support. Moreover, these strategies may focus on ensuring the effectiveness of policy changes, and providing them with favourable (or at least less adverse) conditions. At the same time, this quick review also shows that references to the concept of strategies are rather scattered and have not been fully explored.

Conceptualising strategies in policy transfer

The previous discussion shows that policy transfer studies have certainly acknowledged that policymakers use strategies (*e.g.* deliberate sets of actions used to achieve a certain goal) to make sure that the ideas, policies or lessons they have learned from other jurisdictions become actionable and durable in their own jurisdiction. In broad terms, one could suggest that some of these strategies are focused in using knowledge from abroad as part of the process of designing and redesigning the policy components of the new legislation or programme. These strategies could be labelled as *policy building* ones, as they are mainly aimed at setting the proper technical basis of the policy transfer process. Another set of strategies are closely related to the process of implementation and, more specifically, to the need for creating the proper administrative and political conditions for the transfer to be sustainable beyond the initial adoption stage. These strategies could be labelled *policy institutionalisation* ones, as they are basically focused on securing the durability of the programme or policy principles which have been transferred. In practice, there may certainly be some overlap between the two types of strategies, particularly when one takes into account that processes of transfer take some time to unfold. However, the distinction may be useful for analytical purposes.

As shown in Figure 1, these two sets of strategies could be further disaggregated. In the case of *policy building* strategies, once could think of at least four subtypes of

strategies. First, policymakers may use a *conceptualisation strategy*, which is related to developing a clear understanding of the policy topic that is being transferred from abroad (or that may be subject to consideration for a potential transfer). This strategy implies policy actors will try to learn about the policy's main assumptions, technicalities, and components, similar to what Rose (2005) has called "learning the concepts" and "abstracting a model".

Second, policymakers may develop a *professionalisation strategy*, which is related to broadening and guaranteeing enough expertise on the policy topic to be transfered. This is like what is usually referred to as capacity building efforts. It thus may involve training national or local experts so that they learn in more detail about foreign examples or specific methodologies required to implement the new policy.

Third, policymakers may recur to a *fine-tuning strategy*, which is focused on adjusting continuously the components of policy which has been transferred. In contrast to the *conceptualisation strategy*, used to defining the main policy contours, *fine-tuning* is related to day-to-day operational aspects. Therefore, it draws on practical experience and further international information that may be available for comparison as implementation proceeds.

Lastly, as noted by many of the authors previously mentioned, policymakers may use a *persuasion strategy*, which focuses on convincing other actors about the benefits of the new policies transferred from abroad. This strategy may be at play when advocating a reform, to facilitate implementation, or to keep the topic on the public agenda.

Figure 1.

Policy transfer strategies used by policymakers

The other set of strategies, focused on *policy institutionalisation*, could be similarly divided into four. The first one may be a *codification strategy*, which means policymakers try to incorporate policy changes into the legal and regulatory frameworks of their jurisdiction with two main objectives: to better protect the borrowed policy, and to reduce the chances of future policy reversals on the subject.

A second strategy is that of *political deactivation*. In contrast to the *persuasion* strategy described above, this was focused in developing actions to anticipate, eliminate, or at least minimise potential political conflicts among policy actors during implementation. Therefore, it involves negotiating, setting inter-organisational coordination terms, and reaching agreements about who owns what part of the policy.

The third strategy is *marketing*. This focuses on producing and disseminating packaged information about the new policy in national and international forums. The main intention is to showcase in policy papers, speeches, and presentations the features of the newly introduced policy, and the way in which it fits the new setting.

Finally, a fourth strategy that may be used by public officials is that of *international legitimation*. This relates to efforts made by policymakers to gain external 'certification' regarding the implementation of the borrowed policy. This may involve expressions from international organisations or transnational actors in the form of reports, evaluations or rankings praising the practice, or even calling it a model for other jurisdictions.

Summing up, policymakers engaged in policy transfer processes may use a variety of strategies to make sure lessons or insights they have drawn from other jurisdictions become tangible and durable policy changes in their own environments. The following section will try to show how these strategies may take place in empirical terms.

Policy transfer strategies at work: the cases of Chile and Mexico

This section illustrates how the strategies described above may happen in practice. In order to do so, the paper will use the experiences of management for results (MFR) policies in Chile and Mexico as examples. The first part will briefly describe the reforms, which involved cross-national learning processes throughout two decades in both nations. The second part will show how policymakers used these strategies to secure the establishment of MFR policies in their own jurisdictions.

The transfer of Management for Results ideas and practices to Chile and Mexico

Management for Results (MFR) policies may be defined as sets of ideas, practices, and instruments aimed at measuring the performance (mainly efficiency and effectiveness) of government programmes and institutions (Van Dooren *et al.*, 2010). These policies usually imply the design and implementation of policy tools such as performance indicators, logical frameworks, impact evaluations, results-oriented budgeting, and benchmarking practices. While historically there have always been administrative concerns regarding government performance, since the late 1980s MFR policies have gained currency as a result of the New Public Management reform movement which spread across the world (Hood, 1991; Pal, 2012).

In the cases of Chile and Mexico, both countries have already established relatively solid MFR systems, and are thus considered regional leaders on this subject (Kaufmann *et al.*, 2015). As shown in Figure 2 below, their national governments have introduced a

variety of MFR tools since the mid-1990s. These include indicators, evaluations, performance management practices, all of which have been tied in one way or another to their budgetary systems. Both countries have also reformed their institutional setting to either create new institutions in charge of these topics, or to adjust existing ministries in order to include MFR directorates. For instance, Chile transformed its Budget Directorate in the early 2000s to add a unit in charge of management control and evaluations. Similarly, in the mid 2000s, Mexico established the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Policy (CONEVAL), which coordinates dozens of social programme evaluations every year.

Figure 2.

MFR Policy Initiatives in Chile and Mexico (1990-2010)

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
CHILE			- Some agency-level performance management practices	- Pilot Plan (strategic planning and performance indicators)	- System of Ministerial Goals		- Performance indicators	- Programme evaluations; - General Management Reports	- PMGs			- Strategic definitions; - Impact evaluations	- Comprehensive spending evaluations	- New PMGs	- New performance indicators; - New programme evaluations; - New General Management Reports		- System for Monitoring Government Programming	- Evaluations of new programmes			- Delivery Unit/Targets; - Revised PMGs; - Evaluation of social policy
MEXICO							- PROMAP (performance management and measurement; evaluation principles)	- Budget' New Programmatic Structure and Performance Evaluation System; - PROGRESA's impact evaluation	- Rules for Managing Social Programmes			- Presidential Goals System	- Budget Indicators; - New M&E unit and tools at SEDESOL			- New Performance Evaluation System (indicators); - CONEVAL		- Special Programme for Management Improvement; - New Budget by Results (includes Performance Evaluation System); - Government wide use of Logical Framework Methodology for budgetary programmes; - 'Menu' of Evaluations SHCP-SFP-CONEVAL			

Source: Dussauge-Laguna (2013:221)

While the current features and regular functioning of Chilean and Mexican MFR systems reflect the institutional particularities of each country, the origins and main aspects of both systems can be traced back to a two-decades long process in which national policymakers drew lessons, inspiration, and knowledge from abroad (Dussauge-Laguna, 2013). Back in the early 1990s, Chilean officials travelled to the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and the US to learn about their pioneering NPM experiences. In the early 2000s, these same actors actively participated in OECD meetings on topics such as budgeting for results. Lastly, throughout those two decades, these officials maintained regular contacts with international experts from the World Bank and the Inter-American Bank, and participated in various international meetings with colleagues from other Latin American countries.

In the case of Mexico, senior officials similarly participated in OECD meetings since the mid-1990s. Throughout the 2000s, policymakers from the Social Development, Finance, and Public Administration ministries travelled to several countries considered to be "international best practices", such as the UK, the US, Canada, Chile and Colombia. They also received technical assistance from international experts sponsored by the World Bank and the Inter-American Bank, including former officials from Chile.

Thus, policymakers from these two countries learned different things at different points in time. They also aimed to use whatever they learned in different ways, as they were trying to deal with the various political and administrative constraints they faced across the years. However, in the end both Chilean and Mexican policymakers were able to pursue significant policy changes in terms of management practices, administrative routines, institutional settings, and regulatory and legal frameworks. The reason why they were able to do so can be partly found in the similar strategies they put in place, as described in the next paragraphs.

Policy transfer strategies and the making of MFR policies in Chile and Mexico
Looking at the Chilean and Mexican MFR reform experiences sheds some light on the kind of strategies policymakers set in motion to turn knowledge from policies abroad into actual policy changes in their own jurisdictions. Using the typology of strategies described above,

it is possible to see how these were applied in the reform experiences of these two countries.

Policy building

In terms of *policy building*, both Chilean and Mexican officials first focused in developing a clear understanding of what MFR (and its various tools) were about, thus engaging in a *conceptualisation strategy*. Knowledge from policies abroad served officials in both countries to delineate the main principles, components, and technicalities that formed the basis of the reform policies they were trying to introduce. Some specific examples of this strategy at work were attempts made by Mario Marcel (deputy director of the Chilean Budget Directorate) throughout the 1990s to propose a 'model of public management' for the central public sector. Then, in the early 2000s, Marcel and his team established a 'Management Control and Evaluation System', which still exists today, to better reflect international changes in results-oriented budgeting. In the Mexican case, an example of how this *conceptualisation strategy* worked is provided by the efforts led by policymakers at the Ministry of Social Development and later CONEVAL, who sought to create a new 'Monitoring & Evaluation system' for the social policy sector. Another example is that of officials from the Ministry of Finance, who prepared several publications during the second half of 2000s focused in explaining to other ministries, Congress, and the public in general how the then new 'Performance-Oriented Budgetary and Evaluation System' worked.

Chilean and Mexican officials also used the *professionalisation strategy* to build awareness and knowledge about MFR topics. In order to do so, they used foreign examples and international templates of methodologies (e.g. for designing performance indicators). For instance, in the mid-1990s, experts from the Inter-American Development Bank trained Chilean officials from the Budget Directorate on how to do programme evaluations using logical framework methodologies. Similarly, in the early 2000s, Mexican officials from the Ministry of Social Development attended training courses to learn about monitoring and evaluation. This *professionalisation strategy* relates also to the way in which both governments supported capacity building activities. In the 1990s, the Chilean Budget Directorate paid for external consultants to advice ministries and agencies in their governmentwide efforts to develop strategic plans and performance indicators. Similarly,

Mexico's CONEVAL funded evaluation courses both for public officials, and for external consultants to strengthen the evaluation market.

Chilean and Mexican officials also used the *fine-tuning strategy*, taking as a reference both international discussions and benchmarks, as well as their own practical experience in implementing MFR tools. Throughout the 2000s, Chilean officials introduced some minor adjustments to the 'Management Control and Evaluation System' based on what they saw among OECD countries. Similarly, in the late 2000s, taking the US and Canadian experiences as a reference, Mexican officials introduced changes to the way performance information is shared and communicated to the public and other agencies. The strategy of *fine-tuning* was also related to experiential learning, as policymakers periodically introduced some refinements in the design and operation of their MFR tools as they tried and tested them.

The fourth *policy building* strategy that Chilean and Mexican officials used was *persuasion*. Policymakers argued in various forums and outlets about the need for MFR reforms, while at the same time they tried to explain why MFR tools could suit well their countries' politico-administrative conditions. Indeed, much of the initial activities performed by Chilean officials in the mid-1990s were precisely focused in persuading other actors that MFR was relevant. Hence Marcel's writings on how and why it was possible to develop performance management practices in the public sector, and on how the Chilean approach to the subject did not have to be a copy of the British or Australian reforms. Several international conferences, publications and workshops sponsored by the Budget Directorate in the mid-1990s similarly sought to persuade government officials that a Chile should follow the worldwide trend on MFR. In Mexico, some key public officials published articles and books detailing the contents of the specific MFR initiatives they had sponsored, as well as explaining how and why evaluations and indicators were essential to improve efficiency and transparency in public programmes and public expenditure. During the second half of 2000s, those in charge of MFR tools and advancing budgetary reforms held several conversations with the incoming presidential, and later organised study tours to Paris (OECD) and Canada so that legislators could understand the relevance and logic behind performance-budgeting in other countries.

Policy institutionalisation

Policy institutionalisation strategies were also present in the two cases. The first one used by public officials was the *codification strategy*. In Chile, for instance, programme evaluations were formally added to the budget decree of 1997 (and later as part of the Budget Law in 2006). This was done to secure that this tool would be taken into account as part of annual budgetary cycles. As mentioned above*, codification* also happened with the formal creation of a Management Control Division (a unit dedicated to design, coordinate, and implement the new tools) in 2000. This was very important because it allowed the Budget Directorate to have a dedicated group of policy experts working on MFR aspects. In Mexico, *codification* took place, first, through the creation of a monitoring and evaluation unit inside the Ministry for Social Development and, later on, by including evaluation principles and establishing CONEVAL with the enactment of the General Law for Social Development in 2004. Moreover, policymakers at the Finance Ministry promoted legal and constitutional reforms in 2006-2008 to increase the political and legal weight of previous programme evaluation and performance-based budgetary reforms.

Chilean and Mexican officials also put in place a *political deactivation strategy*. Perhaps the clearest illustration in the Chilean case were the various exchanges between officials from the Budget Directorate, in charge of the new Management Control and Evaluation System, and officials from the Ministry of the President's General Secretariat. During the 1990s, both agencies participated in administrative modernisation initiatives, and tried to make sure their respective MFR programmes would not overlap. In 2010, with the creation of a new Delivery Unit inside the latter institution, officials took some measures to avoid inter-organizational conflicts or competition against the MFR tools managed by the Budget Directorate. In the case of Mexico, this *political deactivation strategy* was different but with similar concerns and outcomes. Throughout 2005-2007, policymakers from CONEVAL, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Public Administration held several joint-meetings to avoid the introduction of overlapping tools and ministerial conflicts. Moreover, CONEVAL shared with the other two agencies its evaluation methodologies and capacity building actions. As a result, CONEVAL built a partnership with the other two agencies, and maintained its technical leadership on these topics while making sure its team's previous work would not be wasted.

The *marketing strategy* was also employed in both countries. Leading officials from Chile's Budget Directorate actively participated in several conferences throughout the 2000s. They simply assumed that the higher the number of people knew about their Management Control and Evaluation System, the higher the chances of guaranteeing the system's institutionalisation. For the same reason, they published several institutional reports, describing the structure and evolution of the system. Mexican officials from CONEVAL and the Ministry of Finance have followed a similar strategy, and have participated in as many forums as possible to showcase their MFR approach.

Lastly, officials from both countries used an *international legitimation strategy*. The clearest example in the case of Chile is represented by the Budget Directorate's efforts to get their Management Control and Evaluation System evaluated by external experts. These evaluations were certainly useful to improve the design and implementation of the Chilean MFR tools, but were deliberately sought after because of broader political objectives. Reports by the OECD, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank were beneficial for Chilean officials on two fronts. In the short term, they increased the Budget Directorate's reputation within the central government. In the longer term, they increased the political visibility of the system, and thus increased the political costs of seeking to reverse it. There have been similar examples in the Mexican case. Officials from CONEVAL and the Ministry of Finance have asked, respectively, the World Bank and the OECD to assess their MFR tools. As in the Chilean case, this was intended as a source of technical advice, but mostly to get some kind of external certification to secure a place for their MFR initiatives in the political and government agendas.

Conclusions

This paper has argued that policymakers involved in policy transfer processes employ a variety of strategies to make sure that the policy insights, ideas and models they have gathered from abroad on a given policy field do become actual and durable policy changes in their own jurisdiction. These strategies may be focused on "building" the policy, that is in making sure all necessary design components and administrative conditions are in place for its proper implementation. Or they may be focused on furthering the political conditions required to "institutionalise" the policy and protect it from potential policy reversals.

Once the concept of policy strategies was presented as a useful addition to the policy transfer literature, some further elaboration was introduced in the form of a typology of policy strategies. The paper then tried to illustrate how these strategies may actually work in empirical terms. In order to do so, the paper presented some examples from the introduction of Management For Results policies in Chile and Mexico. These two countries have gone through a protracted policy transfer process, spanning for more than two decades. During these years, policymakers from both countries have drawn lessons and ideas about other countries' policies, and have then used them in the making of their own MFR policies. As shown in the previous section, this as possible because officials from both governments were able to put in practice effective policy strategies.

The paper has some potential limitations. First, the concept of policy strategies as part of the policy transfer literature may need further elaboration. Second, in broader theoretical terms, the paper has shown these strategies do seem to take place. Yet more needs to be said regarding questions such as when and how do policymakers use these various strategies, what strategies may be more frequently used and why, and whether or not the different kinds of strategies need to be used together or not. Third, while addressing a gap in the literature, the paper may have stretched a bit too much the contours of policy transfer studies, blurring the lines between the latter and policy studies in general (James and Lodge, 2003).

Despite the above, the paper may also be a useful contribution to the literature for various reasons. First and foremost, because it helps to flesh out the "agent" side of the policy transfer equation, which is usually dominated by the "structure-related" aspects (e.g. political institutions, the need to adapt borrowed policies, etc.). Second, because it speaks directly to more recent discussions on policy mobilities, which have underlined how the transfer of policies is a continued and fluent process (Clarke *et al.*, 2015). Third, it also touches on contemporary debates on the relationship between policy learning and policy change (Moyson *et al.*, 2017). Last but not least, because it shows that, in spite of the many papers that have been published on policy transfer and cognate subjects (Benson and Jordan, 2011; Hadjiisky *et al.*, 2017), there still is much to say about how policies travel around the world.

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