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*Just a marketplace of ideas? Climate change (policy) skepticism in
light of transnational networks*

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Corporations and think tanks in Germany – beyond the political character of policy related research and consulting

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Abstract

Typologies of think tanks distinguish between academic, political party related, commercial, advocacy and partisan think tanks. The mushrooming population of think tanks can thereby be distinguished and sorted according to major tasks like academic research across the many disciplines and normative orientations (pluralist science), evidence based policy advice committed to party perspectives, a wide range of contract and / or for profit research and related services (including lobby assistance), usually quite specialized campaign and cause related research services (much of it progressive, but conservative and reactionary causes are frequently overlooked) and research and other activities dedicated to specific world views (in distinction to political party related ideology, prime example: neoliberal think tanks), respectively. Typologies are tricky, of course. Many think tanks do not fit neatly into just one bracket. A critical epistemology of knowledge requires to reject attempts to separate academic and other research efforts on epistemological grounds (without denying considerable differences between academic and non-academic research), because all knowledge needs to be considered political, science based or not. While think tank network studies can be employed to overcome some of the problems of the typological approach by way of examination of the multiple links between think tanks categorized in different brackets (Plehwe 2015), common logics of constituencies (like specific business interests linking academic and political or partisan think tanks) continue to sort (business) interests according to certain objectives. Foregrounded are specific links between interests and ideas of particular corporations and knowledge / expertise operations, not corporate (or class) interests as a whole (compare the otherwise excellent study of Mayer 2016 on the Koch empire and allies in the U.S.).

A more general (more structural, less agency oriented) approach to business and think tanks thus requires a broader effort dedicated first to a rather simple question: Which relations do corporations maintain with think tanks? How did and do they develop? What can we say about the corporation think tank nexus considering the corporate class as a whole? While such a perspective should be aware of competing and conflicting business-think tank relations (e.g. renewable energy fighting fossil fuel energy interests or business supporting competing political parties) in order to not draw problematic conclusions with regard to the ruling capacities of the corporate class, the resulting picture can also be considered a likely antidote against neo-pluralist world views. We simply need to know more about the multiple linkages and involvements of corporations in the machinations of knowledge-power regimes. Germany as a case is considered as an open variety of capitalism due to its intricate relationship with other European varieties and the supranational institutional structure of the EU.

1. Introduction

The critical study of think tanks has to confront three major challenges: sociological, epistemological and political. Firstly, many studies uncritically reproduce think tank claims to independence instead of subjecting such claims to critical analysis in an effort to position ideas in the context of socio-economic systems and power structures. Secondly, most think tank studies maintain a traditional epistemology of positivist science instead of a critical analysis of the science philosophical underpinnings of self-presentations that emphasize “evidence base” and related claims to objectivity or truth. Thirdly, think tank studies continue to focus on visible output of think tanks, policy papers and other written or oral material. While it is important to deal with the role of ideas in the policy process, think tank output as input of media and policy debates are only some of the significant contributions think tanks make. Scholars need to look beyond research and advisory functions in order to improve the understanding of elite coordination and other governance functions in which think tanks are involved.

The last challenge has recently been taken on by Diane Stone. Her volume “knowledge actors and transnational governance” (Stone 2013) has examined the global think tank space, and thereby helped to shed more light on the private business and civil society dimensions of global policy making and governance arrangements. Her case studies covered the Global Development Network, the Overseas Development Institute, the Open Society Foundation and ASEAN-ISIS. While refraining from generalization, Stone observed five commonalities across all four cases: 1.) non-governmental, charitable, third sector, independent organizations securing specific public objectives, 2.) efforts characterized by knowledge-policy nexus, diverse bridging efforts, and effective research communication and dissemination to secure policy relevance, 3.) transnational dimensions, 4.) common policy interest in transition and development, 5.) each case provides an example of a governance network and as such illustrative of broader dynamics of network governance. While think tanks did not figure prominently in the private authority in international relations literature (Cutler, Haufler, Porter 1999), Stone’s work paves the way to meet empirical challenges common to neogramscian and discursive institutionalist approaches to IR and IPE. While planning groups and elite coordination are key concepts in the work of Gill (1991) and Schmidt (2002) on Europe, for example, there has been limited attention to the organizational infrastructure of Europe’s new constitutionalism. Stone in any case moves the analysis beyond the attention that has been paid to individual institutes or foundations, and helped establish the new empirical field of think tank networks (Plehwe 2015)

The epistemological challenge can be met by a stronger reliance on the key insights of post-positivist contributions to political science. The original book on the argumentative turn (Fischer /Forrester 1993) in fact used think tank communities to reject theories of technocracy and a new (intellectual, ruling) class (compare also King and Szelényi 2004). Fischer’s (1993) chapter presented the successive and competing camps of New Deal and Great Society think tanks on the one hand, and the neoconservative and neoliberal think tanks of the Goldwater-Reagan ascent on the other hand to observe and document the political character of think tank research and policy advice. Fischer’s contribution demonstrated thereby the rich opportunities of the merger of a post-positivist approach to policy studies and comparative empirical work. His contribution to the argumentative turn has been acknowledged and absorbed in many fields. But it continues to play a surprisingly marginal role in the area of think tanks studies, which are still driven by typological distinctions of academic and partisan think tanks instead of studying the links between intellectuals and ideas in the distinct

spheres of science and politics. Fischer's analysis of the link between think tanks, ideas and relative power positions that change over time are also lost if the social constructivist dimension of political technocracy is isolated from the power structure. Such a version of post-positivist knowledge degenerates to the image of a market place of ideas and the alleged rule of supply and demand – the neoliberal counter-image to political technocracy (Nik-Khah 2017). Yet another problem connected to the focus on political technocracy and the important perspective of a relational battle of knowledge and influence leads to the challenge number three: the lack of class analysis in think tank studies.

Class has been nearly eliminated as a category related to the subject of knowledge and expertise. National varieties of knowledge regimes are distinguished based on institutional configurations of the public administration and legislature (independent expert base or weak internal expertise) and configurations and traditions of outside supply (competitive, corporatist), statist, competitive market and coordination regimes have been distinguished (compare Campbell and Pedersen 2014). Corporations and class forces play a role as part of the market or component of corporatist coordination, but at the same time knowledge is easily dismissed and belittled if an employer or trade union bias can be detected and pointed out. Much like the system theoretic separation of the sphere of science, the world of think tanks has been constructed as a field of its own. While Medvetz (2012) closely observes the corporate ties of early research organizations in the United States, he turns attention to the field of think tanks itself when he approaches the emerging space of think tanks after WW II. While he emphasizes bias and limits of knowledge production in think tanks not least due to the relative proximity of organizations to business interests, no close examination of the distribution of corporate links to the think tank field is undertaken.

The way scientific knowledge as a base of policy related research and advice is constructed to be legitimate evidently requires a large enough distance to organized interests and the corporate class even in the case of business and trade union think tanks. Despite the recognition of pluralism and the need to integrate a broad range of knowledge from society, the widely accepted technocratic appeal of science has obscured the extent to which the social sources of the prevalent knowledge regime can be traced to corporations and the capitalist class in particular way beyond corporate think tanks. A resulting structural bias of the knowledge regime should not be equated or reduced to political bias. Structural bias in favor of propertied classes needs to be examined in conjunction with political cleavages in order to comprehend multiple asymmetries and fundamental constraints of political pluralism. The structural configuration thus needs to be recognized in order to fully appreciate the political confrontations in the knowledge regime. While knowledge struggles like all social struggles are always relational, a structural class analytical approach is needed to reconnect research institutes and think tanks sufficiently and in recognition of sufficient complexity to the social bases of policy related expertise and advice.

In this paper I will briefly revisit Karl Mannheim's knowledge sociological approach (section 2) that informs our subsequent examination of direct and indirect roles of corporations in the (transformation of the) contemporary German knowledge and power regime. For the first time we will examine systematically the position of corporations in the different compartments of German research and consulting. In section 3 I will provide an overview of the German regime of policy related research and consulting. We will revisit existing accounts of the German knowledge regime and point to shortcomings with regard to our central research question regarding the link between corporations and think tanks. The next step will be the empirical analysis. Because it is not possible at

this point to examine all the organizations involved in policy related research, we will restrict the analysis to the field of economic and social policy. Germany's austerity promotion has been at the center of public debate both in Germany and even more abroad. The salience of the topic and the wide range of conflicting interests involved in economic and social policy making suggest particular relevance and interest in this area. Section 4 will introduce the different organizational landscapes of economic and social policy research: 1) basic research institutes, 2) problem oriented basic research institutes, 3) applied science institutes, 4) political party and interest group think tanks and 5) private sector / civil society think tanks. We will account for all institutes that supply economic and social policy related research and examine each institute with regard to corporate links. In section 5 we will discuss our results and conclude in section 6 with a summary of major results and an agenda for further research.

2) Sociology of knowledge: a framework to study policy related research and consulting

Karl Mannheim offers sociology of knowledge grounded in socio-economic life. Mannheim's idealistic concept of a free floating intellectual has been easily dismissed (Konrad and Szelényi, Nordmann). But he nevertheless worked in the tradition of historical materialism combining the perspectives of historicism and relativism. Precisely because of his insistence on the relevance of the socio-economic system for all aspects and limits of knowledge production, Mannheim became a key target for liberal and neoliberal critiques insisting on the independence of science (compare Beddeleem 2017). From a modern, neo-Gramscian and / or Foucaultian perspective, Mannheim has much to offer. His framework is well suited for bridging the gap between (economic) determinism (by interest groups, economic structures) and different degrees of autonomy, a move that remains necessary for better understanding the confluence of economic and other interests in the making of academic and think tank knowledge of various normative orientations. As Mannheim states:

This preliminary systematic work in the history of ideas (genesis of intellectual standpoints, D.P.) can lead to a sociology of knowledge only when we examine the problem of how the various intellectual standpoints and 'styles of thought' are rooted in an underlying historico-social reality (Mannheim, 1925: 182).

Mannheim clearly warns here against perspectives that disconnect intellectual from socio-economic life. But because socio-economic realities are not unitary and homogeneous from country to country, from era to era etc., corresponding knowledge regimes also tend to be diverse. Mannheim suggests that only the combined study of social thought and social stratification (best understood as classes, in his view) yields a sociology of knowledge that goes beyond history of ideas and social history. He goes on to argue for the elimination of naturalism and all crude conceptions of class and knowledge or interests and ideas, all of which lead to oversimplification. He refers to a naturalist epoch of Marxism, when material interests were thought to dictate ideology, and instead seeks to develop the notion of mediated relationships to interest:

If we want to broaden ideological research into a sociology of knowledge...the first thing to do is to overcome the one-sidedness of recognizing motivation by interest as the only form of social conditioning...In the case of ideas held because of a direct interest, we may speak of 'interestedness'; to designate the more indirect relation between the subject and those other ideas, we may use the parallel expression 'committedness'. In fact, it is one of the most striking features of history that a given economic system is always embedded, at least as to its origin, in a given intellectual cosmos, so

that those who seek a certain economic order also seek the intellectual outlook correlated with it. When a group is directly interested in an economic system, then it is also indirectly 'committed' to the other intellectual, artistic, philosophical, etc. forms corresponding to that economic system. Thus, indirect 'committedness' to certain mental forms is the most comprehensive category in the field of the social conditioning of ideas. (Mannheim, 1925: 183-4).

Mannheim thus requires scholars to examine ideas and knowledge in relation with social strata that sustain them in a sufficiently differentiated way. He does not ask for studies insinuating greater autonomy per se, though, because such autonomy basically does not exist. But the expansion of knowledge production he already witnessed in his time (first half of the 20th Century) required more fine-grained examination of intellectual life. Subsequently, the picture becomes even more complicated. Due to the increasing commercialization of science, it is certainly not the case that the influence of interests in knowledge production is lesser today, but we are also seeing an expansion of cultural production occurring at varying degrees of distance from specific economic interests. Mannheim clearly would have required think tank researchers to discuss the ways in which think tanks are embedded in the specific socio-economic structure. This requires an eye for direct class and economic interests on the one hand, and for the ways in which commitment to corresponding cultural articulations express indirect links to social and economic interests. We will now look if this challenge has been met in think tank research on Germany so far.

3) Germany's knowledge regime

Most presentations of think tanks in Germany suffer from an American understanding of think tanks as private, civil society based organizations. German think tanks are then distinguished from the model because of a strong role of the state. Most academic think tanks, but also the political party and church affiliated think tanks – Germany's political party foundations and the major religion foundations – are publicly financed. Remain a segment of privately funded think tanks and advocacy think tanks that are closer to the U.S. model. Thunert (2004) highlights the DGAP (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik) and the Bertelsmann Foundation as privately funded academic think tanks. His section on advocacy think tanks includes business and trade union related think tanks on the one hand, and ideological think tanks related to conservative wings of Germany's political party spectrum in particular, but also the Öko-Institut. The latter grew out of social movement activism against atomic power and pesticides, for example. Throughout the chapter the model character of U.S. organizations (e.g. CFR for DGAP or Heritage and Cato for the Frankfurter Institute Stiftung Marktwirtschaft). While Thunert mentions early think tanks funded by the private sector – most notably the Institut für Weltwirtschaft in Kiel – his overview leaves an impression of a heavily state sponsored and quite pluralistic think tank landscape with a minor role of private corporations. Thunert's presentation falls way short of Mannheim's call for research both on interested and committed groups. While the former are present as part of the world of advocacy think tanks (lumping together the most powerful business think tanks and quite small environmental think tanks), no questions are asked with regard to the culture corresponding to the restoration and Europeanization of German capitalism since the 1950s.

The more recent and most comprehensive comparative book on knowledge regimes offers a typology of competitive market regimes (USA), statist regimes (France) and a regime of coordinated research organizations (Germany) (Campbell and Pedersen 2014). The knowledge regime typology coincides neatly with the capitalism models usually distinguished in the varieties of capitalism

literature ranging from arm's length to coordinated and state centered (Hall and Soskice 2003). On the plus side this approach takes capitalism serious and discusses social and economic research as a central subject. Business and labor are given particular attention. But albeit useful a heuristic, the regime model suffers from shortcomings similar to the stylized varieties of capitalism approach. German corporatism is somehow growing out of a long history of institutionalization, which makes it difficult to explain National Socialism, for example. Transformations of German capitalism after WW II including the strong and growing dimension of Europeanization remain completely outside consideration. The stylized type of capitalism and knowledge regime quite evidently directs the attention to Germany's think tanks landscape. Fortunately the authors did not completely close their eyes with regard to the latest modifications. Growing lobbying efforts and mushrooming partisan think tanks show more resemblance with the liberal market regime of the U.S. than what is held to be the coordinated German regime.

Campbell and Pedersen in any case closely relate the coordination of research organizations to the alleged corporatist tradition suggesting a keen interest to secure tripartite input from the major organized groups / stakeholders in society, corporations, labor and the state. Based on expectations derived from the model, the authors express surprise about the often informal character of coordination (instead of formal coordination of research) and about the recent shift toward the competitive knowledge regime (similar to the United States featuring advocacy research organizations and lobbying). If the notion of a coordinated regime would have been used as an ideal type to observe the real type of Germany in terms of closer more and less similarity over time the authors would have been better prepared to research and explain the historical evolution of the knowledge regime. Instead the authors choose to sample on the dependent variable for most of the time period covered. The coordinated model the authors present as typical was not in place after WW II, however, let alone before the Nazi-period. Germany's knowledge regime adopted a certain amount of coordination in the 1960s only in the core area of social and economic policy making, and returned to a corporate supply side oriented model from the late 1970s onward (Hesse 2016). Additional change was driven by social movement dynamics clashing with established institutional arrangements, which indeed added a new layer of private and civil society research organizations in the environmental field first and in other fields later. But this process started much earlier than the authors have it. If the corporatist Golden Age model was the "German model" in any case it was a surprisingly short lived model of about 10 years only.

Before the tripartite moment of the late 1960s, Germany's knowledge regime was characterized by a strong dose of class struggle. Trade union research organizations clashed with employer related research organizations supporting German versions of neoliberalism (ordoliberalism, Social Market economy) against the socialist economic democracy ideas of trade unions, the Communist party and strong segments of Social Democracy. Only with the new Bad Godesberg program of the SPD (1959), Social Democracy embraced a version of social market capitalism and pushed macro-coordination on the traditional model to include labor and the trade unions. The key author of economic and social policy expertise in the program was Karl Schiller. Only after the first economic slump of the mid 1960s, Social Democrats and Schiller in particular joined the federal government and started the era of macro-coordination. Tripartism thus depended on the ban of the Communist Party (1956), the gradual adoption of a Social Democratic version of Market economics (democratic socialism/Bad Godesberg version of SPD Social Market economy) and the return of the business cycle that required stronger government activism in economic policy making. By the early 1970s the

relatively peaceful coordination at the macro-level already came to an end because major segments of German economic policy research shifted away from Keynesianism and macro management to monetarism and supply-side economics (Hagemann 2017). Below the level of macro-economic policy making a lot of cooperation continued to be sure: joint interests in education and training and joined management of social insurance and pension institutions required the participation of labor and capital. But in macro-economic policy making, confrontations were far more common than cooperation for most of the history of the Federal Republic. And the think tank landscape can hardly be well understood with reference to coordination only, formal and informal.

Apart from the failure to comprehend the historical evolution of the German economic model and the implications for the knowledge regime the authors are missing key institutional aspects of the German academic and policy research regime. They speak about semi-public institutes although most of the institutes included are funded fully by federal and state governments (e.g. the economic research institutes like DIW, IFW, IFO etc.). Other institutes are fully private like the trade union institutes WSI and IMK or the employer institute IW. Certain functions of the trade union foundation that owns WSI and IMK – Hans-Böckler-Foundation – are funded by the ministry of education, namely scholarships for students. It remains their secret in fact to explain what “semi-public means”. If German think tanks qualify as semi-public because of partial funding from the state, why are American think tanks considered private although they derive much of their income from public sources? Campbell and Pedersen present key government consulting units like the German Sachverständigenrat and the research of the Bundesbank as neutral, if rather conservative. They inform about the research units of the ministries and the peculiar system of party foundations. The funding of hundreds of party foundation offices around the world (Ebert foundation more than 100 locations, Adenauer foundation 80 offices serving more than 100 countries just to name the two big foundations) from the German foreign ministry and the different specializations (e.g. trade union capacity building by Ebert Foundation, business association capacity building by Adenauer foundation) go unnoticed.

In the advocacy section the authors open in the following way: “Germany does not have a tradition of independent privately funded policy research organizations like the United States does.” (Campbell and Pederson 2014, p.143) According to the authors this is due to the well-funded party foundations. But around the same time the Institute of Economic Affairs was founded in the UK and not long after the Foundation of Economic Education was founded in the United States, German businesses funded the Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft (ASM), which was the key think tank to support Ludwig Erhard’s Social Market Economy. While the authors discuss the recently founded campaign organization Initiative for a New Social Market Economy (INSM) they fail to recognize the predecessor efforts jointly carried out by ASM and the campaign organization “Die Waage” during the Adenauer era and beyond (in the case of ASM). The authors discuss the informal networks of heads of research institutes and the joint economic report of five major economic research institutes, but they fail to observe the opposition report published annually by the “Memorandum group” (Working Group Alternative Economic Policy) in Bremen since 1975, since 1995 extended to Europe (EuroMemo Group). Likewise the authors observe the working group of economic research institutes, which provides another meeting point of six major research organizations and many 14 other organizations in the economic research and policy field. The observations are all structured to draw a picture of cooperation and coordination even if differences between think tanks prevail (p.149f.). Only the last section (161f.) departs from the narrative of

coordination to alert readers to competition growing since 20 years (30), which would suggest a beginning somewhere in the 1990s. The authors mention EU demand for multi-country teams here for the first time. The problem with this analysis: The authors are missing the dynamic of the late 1970s, which gave rise to a new group of neoliberal think tanks in Germany and Europe. The Kronberger Kreis (later Stiftung Marktwirtschaft) was founded then, and the strong pull of Brussels started in the 1980s when the single market program was adopted. Certainly way before German unification served to further unsettle what was left of the compromise and coordination architecture of the 1970s. The authors do mention a strong increase in corporate and private foundations that finance policy research and consulting activities and the proliferation of corporate lobbying in Berlin. But they refrain from a dedicated effort to observe the changes in the think tank landscape in conjunction with the transformation of the business sector.

Altogether, the impression of Germany's compromise and cooperation architecture is considered more stable by the authors than the knowledge regimes of France and the United States to which Germany is contrasted, regardless of the somewhat increasing competition as of late. The institutional legacy of the golden age of corporatism is invoked to explain such stability akin to Denmark. Alas, Denmark's trade union density is still almost 67 percent (down from 74 in 1999) whereas Germany's union density is now at 18.1 percent (down from 25 in 1999)¹, which casts some doubt about the extent to which corporatism can be considered important. But let us now switch to a different perspective, namely the closer observation of the relationship of think tanks and corporations in Germany and the way it has changed.

4) Germany's system of think tanks and the role and relevance of corporations in policy research

If we shift attention to the role of corporations in think tanks we need first to ascertain the different segments of the German landscape involved in economic and social policy research. Germany's academic landscape is divided in Universities and research institutes both committed to basic research, frequently with an eye to policy relevance (problem oriented research). Universities and research institutes can also be closely interrelated (shared staff: position of research director at institute with small teaching load at university). Relevant state funded institutes belong to

- 1.) Max Planck Organization
- 2.) Leibniz Society

Max Planck Organizations are governed by a national structure whereas Leibniz has been created as an umbrella of high level institutes that are co-funded by state and federal governments.

Table 1: Fully state funded basic and policy related research organizations of the Leibniz and Max Planck Societies

Leibniz Institutes	Max-Planck Institutes
DIW Berlin*	MPI Tax and Law*
Ifo*	MPI Social Science Cologne **
WZB**	MPI Social Law and Social Policy**

¹ https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN_DEN

IWH Halle**	Institute for Research on Collective Goods**
RWI Essen**	
ZEW Mannheim**	

Source: own compilation from Leibniz and Max Planck Websites

While all the institutes mentioned are financially independent from corporate and corporate foundation funding and cannot in this regard be considered close to corporations, there are numerous links to corporations at the level of supervisory and advisory boards.

Business representatives are disproportionately represented in the Max Planck Senate: 16 of 52 senators have a private sector background in contrast to two trade union representatives (one internal, one external). The MPI executive Committee counts nine members of whom six have a corporate background. Charged with preparing the Senate meetings, no trade union representative is a member.

At the level of individual Max Planck Institutes, the share of business representatives in councils (Kuratorien) is also always higher than the share of trade unions. The Cologne Institut for the Study of Societies has two business representatives and one trade unionist. The Max Planck Institute Social Law and Public Finance has two business representatives, no trade unionist. Even the Munich Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy has a share of 4 business representatives of 13, no trade unionist

At Leibniz, the senate has on corporate representative, no trade unionist. Individual Leibniz institutes are of particular interest. The Munich CES Ifo Institute has 27 corporate members in the 71 strong council, not a single trade union representative. The Berlin based Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung has 4 business representatives and one trade unionist in a 13 strong council. Mannheim's ZEW has 2 business people in a 11 strong council, no trade unionist. RWI has 8 corporate members, one trade unionist out of 15 members.

Other (primarily) academic organizations

The second layer of academic research institutes is comprised of organizations funded by public and private sources. These organizations are not privileged in terms of secure co-founding by state and federal sources (usually 50:50, WZB exception 75 percent federal, 25 percent Berlin). In these cases, foundation funding and private funding plays a (much) stronger role than in the case of the MPI and Leibniz institutes, although the funding structure needs to be examined in detail. In terms of structural business influence it makes a big difference if an institute obtains additional funding mostly from (public) science foundations or from corporate sources. Unlike Leibniz institutes, many institutes in this segment have significant funding from private corporations and corporate foundations.

Research institutes, mixed funding

Walter Eucken Institut
Niedersächsisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (NIW)

Research institutes of the corporatist “partners”: Business Associations and Trade Unions

<p><i>Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln (IW), branch office in Berlin, ~80</i> Walter-Raymond-Stiftung der BDA</p>
<p><i>Böckler Foundation: WSI ~30,</i> <i>Institut für Makroökonomie und Konjunkturforschung (IMK), ~20</i></p>

Private, Business (co-)funded think tanks, fully or partly directed by corporations or business associations or business related foundations etc.

Business Campaign /civil society

Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft
Die Familienunternehmer (ASU)
Berlinpolis dissolved since 2010, successor institut re:public Institut für Zukunftspolitik
Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft
Bürgerkonvent x

Academic and partisan research / think tank services

Deutsche Bank Research
Deutsches Institut für kleine und mittlere Unternehmen (DIKMU)
Bertelsmann Stiftung (also campaign)
Stiftung Marktwirtschaft (also campaign)
Unternehmerinstitut (UNI) x
Centrum für Europäische Politik x
Econwatch x
Friedrich von Hayek Stiftungx
Stiftung Ordnungspolitik (sop) x
Studienzentrum Weikersheim x
Stiftung Neue Verantwortung x
Forum Ökologisch-Soziale Marktwirtschaft x
Institut für Unternehmerische Freiheit (iuf) x

Foreign

Open Europe Berlin x

Commercial

Adelphi-Consult x
Adelphi-Research x
Prognos x

Trade Union related / business critical

Arbeitsgruppe Alternative Wirtschaftspolitik
Progressives Zentrum

Institut Solidarische Moderne (ISM) x TT mit dem Ziel politische Alternativen
zum Neoliberalismus zu entwickeln

Conclusions

A closer analysis of Germany's landscape of policy related research and consulting institutes in the austerity (broadly conceived) related field of economic and social policy reveals a strong asymmetry between business related and other research organizations. Not only do business related organizations of all kinds (research, campaign, consulting etc.) outnumber trade union and other group related organizations, but business interests are also much more closely tied into the web of state funded higher end research. The corporatist picture drawn by Campbell and Pedersen draws on what scholars found to be a distinctive German pattern of bringing expertise into decision making from all the major sectors of society. But even if this can still be considered an important element of Germany's civic epistemology, a conflict theoretical perspective needs to bring in the structural weight of different interests in society and their relative capacity to pursue programs and strategies in society, politics and the economy. This research supports a strong notion of hierarchy in Germany's policy related research and consulting knowledge. The pro-austerity hierarchy in Germany's knowledge regime does not come about by simple lobby pressure or the configuration of the German economics profession. The structural weight of the business community, its culture and preferences is built into the whole of Germany's academic and non-academic pluralism. Since trade unions and other groups that challenge the priorities of private capital in decline (trade unions) or relatively weak (critical NGOs like Attac), there is no reason to expect a shift in the structural composition of the think tank landscape. If Germany's "corporatism" has been lopsided even when it was stronger during a short period of time (late 1960s), the structural weight of the business class has been growing ever since the 1980s both in Germany and in Europe. Corporate interests' structure EU policy related research and consulting in many ways and need to be examined to complement a domestic German study. The two regimes are not situated at different levels. The European and German dimension are closely intertwined since German experts serve in European functions and European think tanks influence within German discourse. Before gaining a clearer understanding of the intertwined weight of corporate interests vis-à-vis other interests and the structural weight of business related knowledge we should refrain from repeating stereotypes from the age of national comparative capitalism studies.

Looking at the role and relevance of business representatives and corporate funding at the same time is not enough. Closer studies need to find out what kind of influence accrues to business representatives in the high end research organizations. The corporate representatives at the MPI in Cologne obviously does not prevent Wolfgang Streeck from writing about the end of capitalism. The influence of business representatives on the CESIfO institute at the same time could be considered strong because Hans-Werner Sinn was frequently advocating German export industry positions. It is clearly necessary to also bring in the content of the research to assess more and less proximity to corporate or class interests. It is important to remember Mannheim's point: instrumental knowledge of say corporate interests directly expressed by academics is one type of relation of knowledge to the socio-economic system, not the only way. Selectivity may be more important than direct determination of what is known and what remains in the dark or without impact.

Still need to be examined / added to the above categories

Think Tank	In Wiki	(not yet in Wiki)	To Do/Kommentar
<i>Allianz für den Rechtsstaat</i>	x		
<i>Arbeitsgemeinschaft Wirtschaftliche Verwaltung</i>		x	
<i>Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung</i>		x	
<i>Berliner Institut für christliche Ethik und Politik</i>	x		
<i>Council on Public Policy</i>			
<i>Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik</i>	x		
<i>Europa Institut</i>	x		
<i>Evangelische Akademie</i>	x		

<i>Tutzing</i>			
<i>Forschungsinstitut für Ordnungspolitik</i>			dissolved
<i>Freiheitswerk</i>	x		
<i>Goinger Kreis</i>		x	Not sure if this should be included
<i>Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung</i>		x	
<i>Hamburgisches Weltwirtschaftsinstitut</i>	x		
<i>Haus Rissen Hamburg</i>		x	
<i>Institut Arbeit und Qualifikation</i>		x	
<i>Institut Arbeit und Technik der Fachhochschule Gelsenkirchen</i>		x	
<i>Institut für Mittelstandsforschung</i>		x	
<i>Institut für ökologische Wirtschaftsforschung</i>		x	
<i>Institut für soziale Gegenwartsfragen</i>	x		
<i>Institut für Sozialökonomische Strukturanalysen</i>			
<i>Institut für Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung</i>			
<i>Institut für strategische Studien</i>	x		
<i>Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität zu Köln (IWP)</i>		x	Universität/Professoren
<i>Institut für Zukunftsstudien und Technologiebewertung (IZT)</i>		x	
<i>Institute for Cultural Diplomacy (icd)</i>	x		

<i>Institute for Innovation and Valuation in Health Care</i>	x		
<i>KielerInstitut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)</i>		x	Näher anschauen
<i>Mannheimer Forschungsinstitut Ökonomie und Demographischer Wandel</i>		x	Das MEA ist eine Abteilung des MPI für Sozialrecht und Sozialpolitik (Hauptsitz ab sofort in München). Seit 2011 umbenannt in: Munich Center for the Economics of Aging
<i>Mittelstandsinstitut Niedersachsen</i>		x	
<i>Oswald-von-Nell-Breuning-Institut für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsethik</i>		x	
<i>Partner für Innovation</i>			2006-2006, bisher größte Innovationsinitiative in Deutschland; kein dauerhafter Think Tank; Frage: Trotzdem aufnehmen? Denn es arbeiteten über 400 ExpertInnen in verschiedenen Kampagnen. Siehe hierzu das Böckler-Paper: http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_arbp_127.pdf
<i>Re:publik Institut für Zukunftspolitik</i>		x	
<i>Sozialforschungsstelle Dortmund</i>		x	TU Dortmund
<i>Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</i>		x	
<i>Tönissteiner Kreis</i>		x	
<i>Trierer Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Umwelt-, Regional- und Strukturforschung e.V.</i>		x	Kooperation mit Universität Trier
<i>Wittenberg-Zentrum für globale Ethik</i>		x	
<i>Zentrum für gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt</i>		x	
<i>Pestel Institut</i>		X	

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Appendix:

Kommentar [dp1]: Muss alles auf Englisch sein? Angaben teils auf Deutsch in den Tabellen

1) Proportion Corporate/Union Representatives at the MPG Senate*

Person	Gender	Corporation/Institution	Corporate activity	Area	Corporation	Labour Union
Barner, Andreas Prof. Dr. Dr.	m	C. H. Boehringer Sohn AG & Co.	Shareholders Committee	Pharmaceutical Company	x	
von Bomhard, Nikolaus Dr.	m	Re Group Munich	CEO	Reinsurance Company	x	
Enders, Thomas Dr.	m	Airbus Group	Chief Executive Officer	Aerospace	x	
Fehrenbach, Franz	m	Robert Bosch GmbH	Chairman Supervisory Board	Multinational Corporation	x	
Gatzer, Werner	m	Finanzagentur GmbH ÖPP Deutschland AG Flughafen Berlin Brandenburg GmbH Deutsche Post AG	Director	Finance	x	
			Supervisory Board	Public Private Partnership fostering Agency		
			Supervisory Board	Airport Business		
			Supervisory Board	Deutsche Post (Mail and Logistics)		
Gruss, Peter Prof. Dr	m	Evotec Founder/Board Siemens AG	Founder/Board	Biotech Company	x	

		Actelion Re Group Munich Allianz SE Geschäftsführung der Verlagsgruppe Georg von Holtzbrinck GmbH	Supervisory Board Member Supervisory Board Supervisory Board	Multinational Company Biotech Company Reinsurance Company Insurance Company		
von Holtzbrinck, Stefan, Dr.	m	Georg von Holtzbrinck GmbH	CEO	Publishing Company	x	
Kagermann, Henning Prof. Dr. Dr.- Ing. e. h.	m	BMW, Deutsche Post, Re Group, Deutsche Bank	Supervisory Board (All)		x	
Leibinger- Kammüller, Nicola, Dr.	w	TRUMPF GmbH Lufthansa AG Siemens	CEO Supervisory Board Supervisory Board	Tool Manufacturer Lufthansa Group (Airport Business) Multinational Company		
Marcinowski, Stefan Dr.	m	BASF Wintershall BASF Coatings DWS Investment GmbH	Former Board Member Supervisory Board Supervisory Board	Chemical Company Oil/Gas Company	x	

			Supervisory Board	Investment Company		
von Metzler, Friedrich	m	B. Metzler seel. Sohn & Co. KGaA	CEO	Private Bank	x	
Pöllath, Reinhard Prof. Dr.	m	Beiersdorf Maxingvest AG	Former CEO Tschibo/ T: Supervisory Board Supervisory Board	Consumer Goods	x	
Schneider, Peter-Jürgen,	m	Salzgitter AG	Former CEO/T: Supervisory Board	Steel Company	x	
Schüth, Ferdi Prof. Dr.	m	hte (since 2008: BASF)	Supervisory Board	Multinational Corporation	x	
Thomas, Ralf P. Dr.	m	Siemens AG	Financial Director	Multinational Corporation	x	

Weder di Mauro, Beatrice Prof. Dr.	w	Robert Bosch GmbH Bombardier Fraport AG Deloitte	Administrative Council Administrative Council Consultant Advisory Board	Multinational Corporation Aircraft Manufacturer Airport Business Consulting Company	x	
Burtscheidt, Markus	m	MPG	Employee Representative MPG			x (?)
Huber, Berthold	m	IG Metall	Former Board	Labour Union		x
	w=2; m=18					
					16 from 52	2 from 52

2) Proportion Corporate/Union Representatives at the MPG Executive Committee

Person	Gender	Corporation/Institution	Corporate activity	Area	Corporation	Labour Union
BARNER, Andreas Prof. Dr. Dr.	m	C. H. Boehringer Sohn AG & Co. KG	Shareholders Committee	Pharmaceutical Company	x	
von Holtzbrinck, Stefan, Dr.	m	Georg von Holtzbrinck GmbH	CEO	Publishing Company	x	
Marcinowski, Stefan Dr.	m	BASF Wintershall BASF Coatings DWS Investment GmbH	Former Board Member	Chemical Company	x	
			Supervisory Board	Oil/Gas Company		
			Supervisory Board	Investment Company		
			Supervisory Board			
von Metzler, Friedrich	m	B. Metzler seel. Sohn & Co. KGaA	CEO	Private Bank	x	
Schüth, Ferdi Prof. Dr.	m	hte (since 2008: BASF)	Supervisory Board	Multinational Corporation	x	
Thomas, Ralf P. Dr.	m	Siemens AG	Financial Director	Multinational Corporation	x	
	w=0; m=6			Total Members: 9	6	0

3) Proportion Corporate/Union Representatives MPI Gesellschaftsforschung Köln / Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Cologne

Institution	Person/Title	Gender	Governing Body	Corporation / Economy	Labor Union	University / Academic Sphere	Politics/Ministries/Coruts/Others	Personal Detail	Source
MPI Gesellschaftsforschung Köln	Martin Börschel	m	Kuratorium				x	Mitglied Landtag NRW	http://www.mpifg.de/institut/kuratorium_de.asp
MPI Gesellschaftsforschung Köln	Carsten Fiedler	m	Kuratorium	x				Chefredakteur, Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger	http://www.mpifg.de/institut/kuratorium_de.asp
MPI Gesellschaftsforschung Köln	Prof. Dr. Axel Freimuth	m	Kuratorium			x		Rektor der Universität zu Köln	http://www.mpifg.de/institut/kuratorium_de.asp
MPI Gesellschaftsforschung Köln	Dr. Rainer Hank	m	Kuratorium	x				Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung	http://www.mpifg.de/institut/kuratorium_de.asp
MPI Gesellschaftsforschung Köln	Andreas Kossiski	m	Kuratorium				x	Mitglied des Landtages NRW, Geschäftsführer der DGB-Region Köln-Bonn	http://www.mpifg.de/institut/kuratorium_de.asp
MPI Gesellschaftsforschung Köln	Dr. Rolf Mütznich	m	Kuratorium				x	Mitglied des Bundestages	http://www.mpifg.de/institut/kuratorium_de.asp

MPI Gesellschafts- forschung Köln	Dr. Norbert Röttgen	m	Kuratorium				x	Mitglied des Bundestages	http://www.mpifg.de/institut/kuratorium_de.asp
MPI Gesellschafts- forschung Köln	Helm- ut Stahl	m	Kuratorium				x	ehem. Mitglied Landtag NRW	http://www.mpifg.de/institut/kuratorium_de.asp
MPI Gesellschafts- forschung Köln	Dr. Wolfgang Uellenberg- van Dawen	m	Kuratorium		x			Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB); seit November 2008 Bereichsleiter Politik und Planung ver.di Bundesverwaltung	https://www.zewk.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/f12/Downloads/koop/tagungen/Ringvorlesung2012/Ring130110/Wirtschaftsdemokratie_Ringvorlesung3.pdf
MPI Gesellschafts- forschung Köln	Dr. Beate Wieland	w	Kuratorium				x	ehem. Präsidentin Uni Paderborn; heute: Abteilung Forschung und Technologie im Ministerium für Innovation, Wissenschaft und Forschung des Landes NRW	http://www.health3punkt0.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Wieland-Dr.-Beate.pdf
Mitgliederzahl Gesamt	10	w=1; m=9		2	1	2	5		
Davon Wirtschaft/ Unternehmen	2								
Davon Gewerkschaft	1								
Andere	7								

4) MPI Steuerrecht und öffentliche Finanzen / MPI Tax Law and Public Finance

Institution	Person/Titel	Gender	Governing Body	Corporation / Economy	Labor Union	University / Academic Sphere	Politics/Ministries / Courts/ others	Personal Detail	Source
Max Planck Institute Social Law and Public Finance	Johannes Geismann	m					x	State Secretary, Federal Ministry of Finance	http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/organization/board_of_trustees.html
Max Planck Institute Social Law and Public Finance	Heike Göbel	w		x				Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/organization/board_of_trustees.html
Max Planck Institute Social Law and Public Finance	Prof. Dr. rer. pol. Bernd Huber	m				x		President, LMU Munich	http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/organization/board_of_trustees.html
Max Planck Institute Social Law and Public Finance	Prof. Dr. Christian Kaeser	m		x				President, IFA Germany; Siemens AG	http://www.ifa-deutschland.de/%C3%BCberuns/vorstand/

Max Planck Institute Social Law and Public Finance	Prof. Dr. h.c. Rudolf Mellinghoff	m					x	President, Federal Tax Court	http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/organization/board_of_trustees.html
Max Planck Institute Social Law and Public Finance	Prof. Dr. Klaus-Peter Naumann	m					x	Secretary General, Institute of Public Auditors (Wirtschaftsprüfer)	http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/organization/board_of_trustees.html
Max Planck Institute Social Law and Public Finance	Prof. Frederick van der Ploeg	m					x	Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies	http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/organization/board_of_trustees.html
Max Planck Institute Social Law and Public Finance	Prof. Dr. Christoph M. Schmidt	m					x	President, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung	http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/organization/board_of_trustees.html
Max Planck Institute Social Law and Public Finance	Prof. Dr. Roman Seer	m					x	Former President, German Tax Law Association	http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/organization/board_of_trustees.html
Max Planck Institute Social Law and Public Finance	Dr. Christian Thimann	m		x				Executive Committee, AXA Group	http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/organization/board_of_trustees.html

Max Planck Institute Social Law and Public Finance	Prof. Dr Franz-Christoph Zeitler	m					x	Former Vice President, German Central Bank	http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/organization/board_of_trustees.html
Mitgliederzahl Gesamt	11	w=1; m=10		3	0		7		
Davon Wirtschaft/Unternehmen	3								
Davon Gewerkschaft	0								
Andere	7								

5) MPI Sozialrecht und Sozialpolitik / Social Law and Social Policy

Institution	Person/Titel	Gender	Governing Body	Corporation / Economy	Labor Union	University / Academic Sphere	Politics/Ministries/Courts/ others	Personal Detail	Source
Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	Dr. Marc Beise	m	Kuratorium	x				Leiter des Wirtschaftsressorts der Süddeutschen Zeitung, München	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien
Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	Dr. Joachim Breuer	m	Kuratorium				x (Berufsgenossenschaft = welche Einordnung?)	Hauptgeschäftsführer der Deutschen Gesetzlichen Unfallversicherung (DGUV), Berlin	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien
Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	Dr. Daniel Deckers	m	Kuratorium	x				verantwortlicher Redakteur, Ressort "Die Gegenwart", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurt am Main	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien

Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	Georg Fischer	m	Kuratorium				x	Direktor für Soziales, GD Beschäftigung, Soziales und Integration, Europäische Kommission, Brüssel	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien
Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	Prof. Dr. Herbert Henzler	m	Kuratorium	x				Herbert Henzler Beratungs- und Beteiligungs GmbH, Grünwald	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien
Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Kirchhof	m	Kuratorium				x	Vizepräsident des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Karlsruhe	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien
Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	Dr. Joachim Lemppenau	m	Kuratorium	x				Vorsitzender der Aufsichtsräte der IDEAL Versicherungsgruppe, Berlin	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien
Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	Dr. h.c. Peter Masuch,	m	Kuratorium				x	Präsident des Bundessozialgerichts a.D., Kassel	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien
Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	Emilia Müller	w	Kuratorium				x	Bayerische Staatsministerin für Arbeit und Soziales, Familie und Integration, München	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien
Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	MinDir Dr. Ulrich Orlowsk	m	Kuratorium				x	Abteilungsleiter im Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, Bonn	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien
Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	Dr. Doris Pfeiffer	w	Kuratorium				x (?)	Vorstandsvorsitzende des GKV-Spitzenverbandes, Berlin	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien
Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	Dr. Monika Queisser	w	Kuratorium				x	Leiterin der Abteilung Sozialpolitik, OECD, Paris	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien

Max Plack Institute Social Law and Social Policy	Prof. Dr. Franz Ruland	m	Kuratoriu m				x	Vorsitzender des Sozialbeirats der Bundesregierung a.D., München	http://www.mpisoc.mpg.de/17047/Gremien
Mitgliederzahl Gesamt	13	w=2; m=6		4	0	0	9		
Davon Wirtschaft/Unterne hmen	4								
Davon Gewerkschaft	0								
Andere	9								

6) Proportion Corporate/Union Representatives at the Leibniz

Person	Gender	Corporation/Institution	Corporate activity	Area	Corporation	Labour Union
Dr. Kurt Bock, Vorstandsvorsitzender der BASF SE	m	Chairman Board	CEO	Chemical Company	x	
Total Members:					1	0

7) ifo Kuratorium - CESifo Kurator

Person	Gender	Corporation/Institution	Corporate activity	Area	Corporation	Labour Union
Dr. Peter-Alexander Wacker (Chairman)	m	Wacker Chemie AG	Chair Supervisory Board	Chemical Company	x	

Dr. Elga Bartsch	w	Morgan Stanley	Chief European Economist/Managing Director	Bank	x	
Dr. Otto Beierl	m	LfA Förderbank Bayern	CEO	Bank	x	
Dr. Aldo Belloni	m	Linde AG	CEO	Technology Corporation	x	
Uwe Burkert	m	Landesbank Baden-Württemberg	Chief Economist	Bank	x	
Milagros Caiña-Andree	m	BMW AG	Member Executive Board	Car Manufacturer	x	
Dr. Rainer Feurer	m	BMW AG	Manager Strategy and Controlling	Car Manufacturer	x	
Claudia Heinzl	w	Gustav Heinzl GmbH & Co. KG	CEO	Machine Manufacturer	x	
Sabine Herold	w	DELO Industrie Klebstoffe GmbH & Co KGaA	Managing Partner	Glues	x	
Nina Hugendubel	w	H. Hugendubel GmbH & Co. KG	CEO	Bookstore	x	
Manuela Kasper-Claridge	w	Deutsche Welle	Head Economic Editorial Department	Media	x	
Dr. Michael Kerkloh	m	Flughafen München GmbH	Executive Board and Director	Airport	x	
Franz-Josef Kortüm	m	Webasto Roof & Components SE	Head Supervisory Board	Roof System Supplier	x	
Gerd Kremer	m	GLL Real Estate Partners GmbH	Managing Partner	Real Estate	x	
Prof. Dr. Kurt Lauk	m	Globe Capital Partners GmbH	President	Investment	x	

Johannes Peter Martin	m	Procedere Consulting	Managing Director	Consulting	x	
Dr. Jürgen Michels	m	Bayern Landesbank	Head Economy Department/Researcher	Bank	x	
Siegmar Mosdorf	m	CNC Communications & Network Consulting AG	CEO	PR-Agency	x	
Kai Ostermann	m	Deutsche Leasing AG	Deputy CEO	Leasing Agency	x	
Dr. Horst Reinhardt	m	Landwirtschaftlichen Rentenbank	CEO Spokesperson	Agricultural Insurance	x	
Dr. Hans Schleicher	m	LfA Förderbank Bayern	Deputy CEO	Bank	x	
Dr. Werner Schnappauf	m	Bank of America Merrill Lynch	Senior Advisor	Bank	x	
Axel Strotbek	m	Audi AG	Board Member	Car Manufacturer	x	
Ursula Weidenfeld	w	Newspaper Tagesspiegel	Journalist	Media	x	
Dr. Theodor Weimer	m	UniCredit Bank AG	Spokesperson CEO	Bank	x	
Dr. Rainer Wend	m	Deutsche Post World Net	Executive Vice President	Mail and Logistics	x	
Dr. Maximilian Zimmerer	m	Allianz SE	Board Member	Insurance	x	
	m=21; w=6			Total Members: 71	27	0

8) DIW Kuratorium (Board of Trustees*)

Person	Gender	Corporation/Institution	Corporate activity	Area	Corporation	Labour Union
Axel A. Weber	m	UBS Group AG	President Supervisory Board	Bank	x	
Klaus Feiler (MdB)	m	Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe (BVG) Tempelhof Projekt GmbH Berliner Bäder-Betriebe Infrastruktur-Verwaltungs GmbH Berlinwasser Holding AG Messe Berlin GmbH WISTA-Management GmbH	Supervisory Board (all)	Regional (Berlin) Infrastructure	x	
Dr. Markus Kerber (former BDI Director)	m	Commerzbank AG	Supervisory Board	Bank	x	
Christian Kloevekorn	m	Gegenbauer	Board	Facility Management	x	
Stefan Körzell	m	The Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB)	Member of the DGB National Executive Board	Labour Union		x

9) ZEW Aufsichtsrat (Supervisory Board)

Person	Gender	Corporation/Institution	Corporate activity	Area	Corporation	Labour Union
Dr. Ralf Krieger	m	Freudenberg SE	Board Member	Technology	x	
Dr. Gitte Neubauer	m	Cellzome GmbH	CEO	Healthcare	x	
	m=2; w=0			Total Members: 11	2	0

10) RWI Essen Verwaltungsrat (Administrative Council)

Person	Gender	Corporation/Institution	Corporate activity	Area	Corporation	Labour Union
<u>Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Reinhard F. Hüttl</u>	m	BMW Group	Supervisory Board	Car Manufacturer	x	
Manfred Breuer	m	Commerzbank	Former CEO	Bank	x	
Prof. Dr. Claudia Buch	w	Deutsche Bundesbank	Vize President	Bank	x	
Reinhold Schulte	m	National Bank Niederrhein AG	Supervisory Board	Bank Industrial and Handicraft Buildings	x	
Volker Behr, Essen	m	Sparkasse Essen	Board	Bank	x	
Hans Jürgen Kerkhoff	m	Stahlinstitut VDEh	Board	Steel Company	x	

Prof. Dr. Thomas A. Lange	m	National Bank AG	CEO Spokesperson	Bank	x	
Herbert Lütkestratkötter	m	Hochtief AG	Head Supervisory Board	Construction Company	x	
Andreas Meyer-Lauber	m	DGB	Director DGB NRW	Labour Union		x