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Cultural policy and diaspora: a comparative analysis

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Introduction: diasporic tensions

Two recent incidents in the Netherlands revealed the complicated relationship between homeland and host land of diaspora communities. The first one is related to the uproar in Morocco following the death of a fishmonger in October 2016 and the protests this has caused up to today.[1] Within the Dutch Moroccan community, a clear divide is visible between those opposing and those agreeing with the protesters. This has led to a situation in which members of the diaspora community are intimidating people from their own community[2], and have organized protests in a few Dutch cities.

The second incident is slightly different in nature. In March 2017 diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Netherlands[3] deteriorated, when members from the Turkish government tried to travel to the Netherlands to address political rallies as part of the campaign for an upcoming referendum.[4] The Dutch government prohibited them to come to address those rallies, because, in the words of Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte "the Dutch public space is not a place for political campaigns for other countries".[5] There was also fear that campaign would feed tensions within the Dutch Turkish community, which were already high after the failed coup in June 2016. Back then protesters went to the streets expressing their support for Recep Tayyip Erdogan, responding to a call by Erdogan

[1] "According to local media and authorities, Fikri jumped inside the trash truck that police used to destroy the confiscated fish in a desperate attempt to recover it and he was caught inside the crusher." http://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-protests-idUSKBN12V2IT, last visited June 16, 2017

[2] On June 15 2017, a hotline was opened for people from the Moroccan community who felt threatened or intimidated by people from their own community. Source: http://www.volkskrant.nl/buitenland/meldpunt-geopend-voor-marokkanen-die-zich-bedreigd-voelen-inzake-rif-geweld~a4501113/, last visited June 16, 2017

[3] The conflict was larger than just the escalation in the Netherlands. Several other European countries were confronted with the same situation, but the response was different per country. In Germany and Austria for example several rallies were prohibited as well; in France however the minister of Foreign Affairs was allowed to deliver a speech.

[4] On April 16 2017 a referendum was held throughout Turkey on whether to approve 18 proposed amendments to the Turkish constitution that were brought forward by the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). If approved, the office of the Prime Minister would be abolished and the existing parliamentary system of government would be replaced with an executive presidency and a presidential system. The number of seats in Parliament was proposed to be raised from 550 to 600 while the president was proposed to be given more control over appointments to the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). (Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_constitutional_referendum,_2017, last visited June 14, 2017)

[5] https://www.trouw.nl/democratie/ook-nederland-wil-geen-turkse-campagne~a305e2d64/, last visited June 13, 2017

on television to his nation. As in the Moroccan case, a domestic conflict kept the minds of the diaspora community in the Netherlands busy.[6]

A clear analysis of these events came from Halim el Madkouri, specialist in Arab Studies and Radicalization. He pointed out an interesting contrast: the Dutch Turks went to the streets to defend the homeland regime, whereas the Dutch Moroccans in support of the opposition were protesting publicly. What is similar in both cases, is that political issues in the homeland caused a division amongst the diaspora community in the Netherlands, making it almost impossible for the Dutch government to take a stand. With each stand they took, they estrange themselves from part of the diaspora community and therefore from part of the national population.

Methodology and structure

These incidents are just two examples of how diaspora communities relate to their homeland, and how some governments actively engage the diaspora community in domestic affairs whereas others don't seem to maintain a relationship with them. The strong ties between the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant community in the Netherlands and their motherland for example stand in strong contrast with the Dutch diaspora communities, who are barely involved in Dutch domestic situations. The lack of interest is also present on a government level. For example, not a single member of parliament made any attempt during the campaigns to address the voters abroad.

For this paper I want to take a closer look at these different approaches, with a particular interest in the role of the government, either as an initiator through policy or as an actor addressed by the diaspora community. What makes this a (cultural) policy issue? In my dissertation *Connecting and representing* (Minnaert 2016) I analysed a little over 40 years of parliamentary debate on international cultural policy in the Netherlands, and explored how this debate was part of the discourse on national identity and its changing meaning in times of globalization. As in most countries, in the Netherlands cultural diversity is addressed in cultural policy, whereas the relationship with the diaspora community is part

[6] On the evening of March 12 2017, the conflict almost escalated when the Dutch police threatened to evict the minister of Family Affairs Fatma Betul Sayan Kaya. The minister travelled to Rotterdam in an attempt to deliver a campaign speech, but was stopped by the policy and special forces. She was escorted out of the country, back to Germany.

of foreign policy. This interdepartmental nature of the issue – the influence of globalization on culture and nation – makes it an interesting topic to research. National identity became part of the debate on integration, which has made national identity a norm for immigrants to adapt to. This is different from the attitude in the Nineties of the 20th century, when policy makers were looking for ways to integrate cultural diversity into existing policies. This resulted in a debate on the (mis)representation of cultural minorities and immigrant groups in the national cultural infrastructure. Just aside, cultural diversity within the Dutch Kingdom of the Netherlands, Curacao, Sint Maarten and Aruba was barely addressed. In the noughties the tone shifted, and cultural diversity was gradually considered a threat for the national identity (Minnaert 2016). The debate on national identity has since turned inward considerably, and the focus has been on integration and adaptation (WRR 2007, Minnaert 2016). As for the contact with the diaspora community, there has never been much attention for the Dutch communities abroad; it has occasionally been mentioned in policy texts concerning foreign cultural relations, and mostly related to heritage and traditions. The focus of international cultural policy has shifted to economic and cultural diplomacy, aiming at influencing the foreign perception of the Netherlands (Minnaert 2014, 2016).

The last two decades the amount of policy papers on this topic (or on cultural policy in general) is limited. Much of the parliamentary debate was about institutionalizing, for example by establishing an institute that overlooked language policy and an institute for international cultural cooperation. A term connected to this important role of other agents in the shaping of cultural policy is *implicit cultural policy*, a term coined by Jeremy Ahearne (Ahearne 2004, 2009). Implicit cultural policy widens the scope of what can be considered cultural policy, making it relevant to look at other policy fields and structures. To quote Ahearne: "A diverse range of agents are involved in these culture-shaping activities, which can include corporations, educational institutions and religious organisations as well as political parties and departments of government. From this perspective, cultural policy is not just the domain of a relatively minor branch of government, but a necessary part of what holds a particular social and political order together."[7] I find this concept of implicit cultural policy valuable; it encourages to look beyond formal government institutions when researching cultural policy. In this particular case, initiatives from and institutions formed by

[7] http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/theatre_s/cp/research/researchthemes/implicit/, last visited June 17, 2017

the diaspora are just as much part of the research on cultural policy as are formal policy papers and government-led organisations.

Michel Foucault also started out from the premise that the notion of government is wider than just the formal institute, by looking at governing structures within society. It is precisely this distinction between government-led structure (top-down) and initiatives from the diaspora community itself (bottom-up) that seem to match with the two examples discussed in the introduction, and that can be of use when looking at other cases of countries. During his lecture series on this topic,[8] Foucault distinguished three different forms in which *governmentality* manifested itself (Burchel, Gordon and Miller 1991):

1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security.
2. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of saviors.
3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes 'governmentalized'.

To govern, in this sense, is to control the possible field of action of others. I therefore decided not to look exclusively at policy texts, simply because in most cases the initiative for this lay at the diaspora community itself, and most governments are very hesitant to take active measures to do so. In other words, there's limited to no actual policy texts to look at.

[8] Foucault talked at length about the concept 'governmentality' during several lectures at the Collège de France in 1978 and 1979. These lectures are published in *The Foucault effect: studies in governmentality* (Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991).

I looked at both primary sources (e.g. formal websites of ministries or other (non-) governmental institutes and secondary (e.g. the compendium on the cultural policy of different European countries). As part of the critical reading, I used elements of the critical discourse analysis (CDA) and the way national culture is both addressed in and constructed through such (policy) texts. Particularly the work of Roth Wodak (Wodak 1999, 2009) on the discursive construction of national identity and her use of CDA were inspirational for this paper. Her work has parallels with the concept *policy-as-discourse*, in which policy is not seen as a set of solutions for problems, but as one of the ways to define a problem. Carol Bacchi for example describes governments as institutions that don't react on problems that are present in society: "Rather 'problems' are 'created' or 'given shape' in the very policy proposals that are offered as 'responses'" (Bacchi 2000: 48).

Initially I planned to research nine countries. That turned out to be a bit too ambitious for the time available, so I postponed two European cases (Greece and Norway) and Australia. I looked at six countries: Germany, France, the Netherlands, China, Japan and South Korea. I was curious if there were different approaches between the two continents (Asia and Europe), and between countries within those continents. Of course there are limitations to this approach. For example, I encountered language problems with the Asian cases, where interestingly the websites of the diasporas sometimes partially were in English. Another pitfall was *orientalism*, a concept Edward Said introduced in 1978 his well-known work with the same title. The term refers to a Western tradition of prejudiced outsider-interpretations of the Eastern world (Said 1978). Being a researcher from the West, I've tried to be very reticent in judging the way countries deal with this matter. But I am sure that there is a lot more nuance to this debate than I can show in this exploratory paper.

The paper is divided into three sections. First I look at the matter from a theoretical perspective. More specifically I address the question how the notion of diaspora plays a role in theories on identity, culture and nation(alism), and what previous research has been done regarding diaspora and (cultural) policy. Then I shift my focus to the observations during the case studies. I describe how in the different countries the contact with the diaspora community is given shape and what - if any - role the government plays in maintaining or initiating that contact. At the end of this paper I draw some more general conclusions, and look ahead to further possibilities and concept.

National identity and liquid culture

In 1984 Benedict Anderson introduced the term *imagined communities* to define a nation, emphasizing that the members of that nation formed a communion who will never actually meet each other (Anderson 1984). Around the same time Ernest Gellner addressed the relationship between nation and state: "The state has certainly emerged without the help of the nation. Some nations have certainly emerged without the blessings of their own state. It is more debatable whether the normative idea of the nation, in its modern sense, did not presuppose the prior existence of the state" (Gellner 1983: 6). Indeed, nowadays nation and nation state are considered interchangeable in the public discourse, but the history of most nation states as such with a central government goes back only a few centuries.

A discursive approach to national identity is applied by Ruth Wodak in her work on the discursive construction of Austrian identity (Wodak 1999). She defines identity as "the relationship between two or more related entities in a manner that asserts the sameness or equality "(Wodak 1999: 11). Her definition emphasizes that identity only has meaning in relation to the Other, and refers to similarities within the nation. In addition, Wodak proposes that identity is layered, and that these layers of identity also affect each other: "Individuals as well as collective groups such as nations are in many respects hybrids of Identity, and thus the idea of a homogeneous 'pure' identity on the individual or collective level is a deceptive fiction and illusion" (Wodak 1999: 16). This important role of the Other in the definition of a national identity is particularly relevant when it comes to diaspora communities. They are literally surrounded by the Other, but are at the same time part of the Other in that they are citizens of another nation.

Also relevant in this case is the work of Stuart Hall, and more specifically his work on cultural identity and diaspora. Hall connects nation formation and cultural identity, stating that during the 19th century awareness grew that the subject or individual was not autonomous and self-sufficient, but was defined in its relationship with "significant others, who mediated to the subject the values, meanings, and symbols – the culture – of the worlds he/she inhabited" (Hall 1996: 597). With the use of the word 'mediated', Hall emphasised that there was no strict separation between the individual and its surroundings, but that there was mutual influence. The concept of identity he considered could play the role of bridge between "the 'inside' and the 'outside' – between the personal and the public

worlds" (Hall 1996: 597-598). Crucial in the work of Hall is his notion of representation: "It follows that a nation is not only a political entity but something which produces meanings – a system of cultural representation. People are not only legal citizens of a nation; they participate in the idea of the nation as represented in its national culture" (Hall 1996: 612). Therefore, Hall prefers the use of the term identification, which emphasises that there is a process going on, a submission to a discursive practice (Hall 1996: 616).

According to Hall, the construction of a unifying national culture played an important role in the stability of the nation state as regime on a global scale: "The formation of a national culture helped to create standards of universal literacy, generalized a single vernacular language as the dominant medium of communication throughout the nation, created a homogeneous culture and maintained national cultural institutions, such as a national education system. In these and other ways, national culture became a key feature of industrialization and an engine of modernity. […] National cultures construct identities by producing meanings about 'the nation' with which we can identify, they are contained in the stories which are told about it, – memories which connect its present with its past, and images which are constructed of it" (Hall 1996: 612-613). This conception of both the nation and the role of culture are very relevant for this paper. The participation in the idea of a nation very much applies to the diaspora community, an issue also addressed by Hall in his work. Because the nation is not so much a physical entity, but a discursive construction, the members of the nation that live outside the territorial borders also contribute to that practice.

But this role of culture as a common identity layer within a nation state is subject to change. "Most modern nations consist of disparate cultures which were only unified by a lengthy process of violent conquest – that is, by the forcible suppression of cultural difference" (Hall 1996: 616-617). Another author that addresses this issue is Zygmund Baumann. Of particular interest are his concepts of liquid modernity and nomadism (Baumann 2000, 2012). As Baumann describes in *Culture in a liquid modern world*, three waves of emigration have led to a situation in which the cultural composition of almost every nation state has changed significantly during the 20th and 21st century (Baumann 2012). During the first wave, emigrants left Europe and settled mostly in the colonies. The second wave is showing a reversed pattern, when people from the former colonies travelled to the occupying nation to start a new life. The third wave shows a pattern of people

traveling all over the world, resulting in a situation in which no country can be seen as solely an emigrating or immigrating population.

Baumann uses the idea of liquidity to describe how these processes have blurred the previously existing borders surrounding these concepts. The idea of a community within the territorial borders of a nation state that shares a – partially constructed – cultural identity is outdated, and has been replaced by a diverse blend of cultural identities. The concept of nomadism refers to the individual that is constantly on the move, and that is shifting roles to adapt to the situation. Both seem very relevant for research into diaspora, and how they are part of both the homeland and the host land.

Comparing diasporas: creating a toolbox

During my research I encountered several studies looking at diaspora communities and their relationship with the homeland. In this paragraph I look closer at some of those, thus trying to come up with a toolbox to compare the way different governments relate to diasporas. There are two approaches/sources I want to explore here: the Encyclopedia of diasporas, and research on diasporas and international relations.

Encyclopedia of diasporas

The most systematic approach is offered in the *Encyclopedia of Diasporas*.[9] The first part of the book contains essays on the history of some diasporic movements, and the impact and assimilation that the immigrant cultures experience in their adopted cultures. The second part contains over 60 portraits of specific diaspora communities. Because each portrait follows a standard outline, it makes it (partially) possible to compare the different diasporas. They have looked for example at alternative names, the location where the communities are mainly concentrated, the history of the diasporic movement, the demography or composition of the migrant community, the way it is organized in the host country etc. This

[9] "The encyclopedia consists of two volumes covering three main sections: Diaspora Overviews covers over 20 ethnic groups that have experienced voluntary or forced immigration. These essays discuss the history behind the social, economic, and political reasons for leaving the original countries, and the cultures in the new places; Topics discusses the impact and assimilation that the immigrant cultures experience in their adopted cultures, including the arts they bring, the struggles they face, and some of the cities that are in the forefront of receiving immigrant cultures; Diaspora Communities include over 60 portraits of specific diaspora communities. Each portrait follows a standard outline to facilitate comparisons"

wide variety of topics is definitely interesting to streamline the data, but what seems to be missing is an attempt to interpret this information on a meta-level. The profiles also approach the diasporic community on a national level, meaning that for example the Chinese community in Japan is described.

Diasporas and international relations

An approach more aimed at policy consequences is offered by Yossy Shain and Aharan Barth in their article *Diasporas and international relations theory* (Shain and Barth 2003). They connect diaspora to international relations, laying out the different roles the diaspora community can play in the relations between host and home country. This influence can be twofold: diasporas can be of influence on the homeland, in that the homeland devotes attention to them in their foreign policy. On the other hand, it can influence the host land, whose foreign policy is influenced due to a lobby by the diaspora.

Shain and Barth argue that the influence of diasporas can best be understood by placing them in the theoretical space between constructivism and liberalism, stating that "[c]onstructivism seeks to account for actors' identities, motives, and preferences, while liberalism deals largely with explaining their actions once the preferences are settled. (Shain e.a.2003: 451). In their view, states as actors are both goal-driven and rule-driven, and the formation of an identity is subject to ecological (actor and its environment), social (relations between actors themselves), and internal processes. On the other hand, within liberalism the idea the states are the primary actors in international affairs is rejected. Domestic groups have influence, and diasporas are seen as a domestic group because they are 'inside the people' (Shain e.a. 2003: 460-461). This is emphasized by the increased amount of diasporas that are allowed to vote. "diasporas are interest groups participating in the domestic political process of the homeland. As such, they seek to advance their identity-based interests, both directly through lobbying and indirectly by providing information to the institutional actors. Furthermore, given their international location, they are singularly (among interest groups) important to the homeland government as tools of influence vis-a-vis foreign governments (Shain e.a. 2003: 462)

From an identity perspective, diaspora communities are geographically placed outside the nation, but attach to the nation through the national identity. This duality in identity makes the position of the diaspora ambiguous: "Because of their unique status,

diasporas—geographically outside the state, but identity-wise perceived (by themselves, the homeland, or others) as 'inside the people'—attach great importance to kinship identity. Given their international location, diasporas are aptly suited to manipulate international images and thus to focus attention on the issue of identity." (Shain e.a. 2003: 451). In other words, diasporas can in some cases be used by their former homeland, while at the same time they themselves can also take the initiative. They discuss three possible diasporic roles, making a difference between passive and active roles. For them the active roles are relevant, either at influencing foreign policies of either their host land or their homeland. On the one hand, diasporas can lobby to influence the way their host land looks at the relationship with their homeland (over-here). On the other hand, they can try to influence how their homeland is conducting its foreign policy and the relation with the host land (over-there) (Shain e.a. 2003: 453-454).

An interesting case study of this approach comes from Panagoula (Youly) Diamanti-Karanou, whose dissertation was on the Greek diaspora in the USA. In a comprehensive way, she explains the difference between nation and ethnicity: "Ethnic identity (or, more accurately, ethno-national identity since it is connected to a homeland state) is preserved in the diaspora through a variety of institutions such as family and community institutions, religious institutions, economic associations, formal educational institutions and cultural organizations (Murphy & Leeper 1996, as referenced in Diamanti-Karanou 2015: 28)

She also relates nation to diaspora: "The phenomenon of diaspora is an extension of the phenomenon of the nation. Diasporas are communities of co-ethnics or co-nationals who live outside of the homeland but who preserve or are expected to preserve a strong connection to their homeland and to its national identity. This definition distinguishes the diaspora from notions of immigration that presuppose that the immigrant would assimilate into the host culture and cut most ties to the homeland." (Diamanti-Karanou 2015: 24) In other words, by focusing on their diaspora identity, the focus is **not** on how the immigrant identity is influenced by the host country, but on the specific ties with the homeland. This seems to contrast the approach of most policy initiatives and debates, which do focus on this idea of integration and adaptation. She does make some interesting statements about the way the diaspora community approach culture and traditions, stating: "Diasporas tend to be locked, at least partially, in the time of departure from the homeland. Thus, many

times they have preserved traditional elements that tend to disappear in the homeland. " Diamanti-Karanou 2015: 37)

An important point made by her is the difference in reasons why the diasporas took place. According to her, "Cohen (1997) classifies diasporas along the following lines: victim diasporas (the historical reason for their dispersal was violence, slavery or persecution), labor and imperial diasporas (including colonizers and indentured workers), trade diasporas (focusing on merchants), and cultural diasporas (with postcolonial, hybridized identities that center on culture and ideas). He also makes the distinction between diasporas with a national homeland and stateless diasporas, for example, Kurds and Sikhs" (Diamanti-Karanou 2015: 29).

Case studies

With a better understanding of the changed relationship between the concepts of culture, nation and state, and of how diasporas have been studied in relation to policy, it's now time to change the focus to the six case studies that have been selected for this comparative analysis. The fact that the nation states all have a different history of origin, a different geographical location, a different population size, etc… is not new, nor is it something that in itself is a result of this research. What is important, is that all these differences need to be taken into account when looking at how these different countries connect to their diaspora community.

In all the six countries I looked at, in some way or another, some kind of organisation is keeping an eye on the diasporic communities abroad. With this I mean that the diasporic community is not just focused on its relationship with their host country; they have found a way to collectively be connected to the home country and to each other. The cases differed in the role the government plays, and how these communities aimed their communication and/or activities at the government of the home country. In the analysis, I do not claim to give an overview of all the possible connections with the diaspora communities I discovered. I do hope this analysis results in this can result in a first model to analyse the way countries approach this particular dilemma.

Semantics: labelling the diaspora

In all three Asian cases, different words are being used for different types of diaspora. In Japan for example, there are different words for the four generations of emigrants. The general term is *Nikkei*, which derives from the term *nikkeijn* (Komai 2007: 3). The different generations are labelled *Issei* ("first generation"), *Nisei* ("second generation"), *Sansei* ("third generation") and *Yonsei* ("fourth generation"). An interesting identification of the different uses of the term Nikkei comes from the Organisation *Discover Nikkei*, which has done some interesting research on Nikkei identity. "The term Nikkei has multiple and diverse meanings depending on situations, places, and environments. Nikkei also include people of mixed racial descent who identify themselves as Nikkei. Native Japanese also use the term Nikkei for the emigrants and their descendants who return to Japan. Many of these Nikkei live in close communities and retain identities separate from the native Japanese."[10] There are different Chinese words for the Overseas Chinese, the English term to describe the Chinese residents in other countries than China. In her article "Who Are "Overseas Chinese Ethnic Minorities"? China's Search for Transnational Ethnic Unity", Elena Barabantseva clearly explains the different types of minorities that can be differentiated.

In the Korean case, there is no single name for the diaspora. According to the special Wiki on Korean diaspora, "the historically used term gyopo, also spelled kyopo, meaning "nationals") has come to have negative connotations as it is referring to people who, as a result of living as sojourners outside the "home country", have lost touch with their Korean roots. As a result, others prefer to use the term dongpo, meaning "brethren" or "people of the same ancestry"). Dongpo has a more transnational implication, emphasising links among various overseas Korean groups, while gyopo has more of a purely national connotation referring to the Korean state. Another recently popularized term is gyomin, meaning "immigrants"), although it is usually reserved for Korean-born citizens that have moved abroad in search of work, and as such is rarely used as a term to refer to the entire diaspora." In those different names, different motives for the diasporas are included.

This usage of different words for the generations or the types of diaspora is not common in Europe. Neither in France nor the Netherlands different names are used for emigrant communities. On the contrary, In the Netherlands this labelling of first, second,

[10] www.discovernikkei.org, last visited June 23

third and fourth generation is used when talking about the immigrant communities, for which also the general word "allochtoon" is used. Recently a debate started on the use of this word and its negative connotations, stating it emphasized the ethnic background of people who are in principle Dutch nationals with a Dutch passport. But the people who have emigrated are simply called *emigranten*. In France the same appears to be the case. There are two general terms, *émigrants* and *immigrés*. In Germany, the general term for the diasporic community has changed for historic reasons. During World War II, the Nazi regime used the term *Volksdeutsche* ("ethnic Germans") to describe the larger German nation. The term used nowadays is *Auslanddeutsche* (Germans abroad). The change is not simply semantics. The term Volk translates as folk, clearly referring to the community as one. Ausland translates as 'foreign countries', stating that the element that connects these people is the fact that they live abroad.

Bottom-up or top-down: a changing role for governments

There seems to be a difference in the way European diasporas connect to each other and to the homeland, when compared to the Asian cases I looked at. Very generally speaking, the initiative to stay in touch with the motherland in the Asian cases seems to come mostly from the diaspora community itself. They united themselves in foundations or associations, and choose to meet on a frequent basis to discuss how they related to the motherland. IN the European cases, there is limited to no contact from the diaspora communities with the homeland, and the countries themselves have developed some kind of institutional way to promote and expose their own national culture. Of course there's much more nuance to this, but I'll give some examples that are exemplary of this conclusion.

Asian cases

The previously mentioned discovernikkei.org is an interesting example. The initiative came from The Japanese American National Museum, with major funding from the Nippon Foundation, a non-profit philanthropic organisation. This foundation has many partners that deal with the relations between Japan and other nations. Discovernikkei is doing a lot of research on the diaspora community, and hosts and posts events to enhance and strengthen the community feeling. Also interesting is the large database of lesson plans

related to Nikkei topics. There are for example lessons on Japanese-American artists[11], Stone culture[12], but also the fate of American citizens of Japanese ancestry during WWII[13]. The website also has more practical info, for example on how to get the Japanese citizenship back.[14] In that sense, the organisation seems to partially fulfil tasks of the government.

In the case of China, something similar seems to happen, e.g. the initiative is taken by the diaspora community abroad. The department responsible for the foreign relations is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council. An important role in the contact with the diaspora community is played by the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese . The China-wiki states: "Established on October 12, 1956, and while maintaining the overall rights and interests of the entire population, All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese safeguards the lawful rights and interests of returned Overseas Chinese, their relatives and Chinese living abroad, and shows concern and care for the just rights and interests of Chinese living overseas. The federation operates with a general affairs office, organization and personnel department, legal work department, cultural liaison department, and economic liaison department." The website of this federation (http://www.chinaql.org/) is, not surprisingly, in Chinese. A translation with Google shows some interesting insights in the history of the organisation. According to the website it was established already in 1937, by Chinese outside the motherland that wanted to support the country in the war. Throughout the years, the name of the organisation has changed, but its main aim remained the same.

In the case of South Korea there is explicit mentioning of the diaspora community by the Ministry of Foreign affairs in their policy related to public diplomacy. This policy also appears to aim at using the population for diplomacy purposes: "MOFA succeeded in inserting Korea's successful history of development into foreign textbooks and tried to revise distorted image of Korea described in foreign media or textbooks. Also, several participatory public diplomacy programs were implemented : 'the Youth/Senior Public Diplomatic Corps', 'Every Citizen is a Foreign Service Officer', 'Dream Project' and 'public diplomacy interns at foreign missions'. Through these programs, MOFA gained the support

[11] http://www.discovernikkei.org/en/resources/lessonplans/94/, last visited June 23 2017
[12] http://www.discovernikkei.org/en/resources/lessonplans/82/, last visited June 23, 2017
[13] http://www.discovernikkei.org/en/resources/lessonplans/19/, last visited June 23, 2017
[14] http://www.discovernikkei.org/en/journal/2016/11/14/japanese-citizenship-back/, last visited June 23, 2017

of the Korean people in public diplomacy and made full use of the diplomatic capacity of the general public. "[15]. One of the initiatives to bring back some of the diaspora community to come study in Korea is the Overseas Korean Foundation, a scholarship program with a central aim: "build the foundation of educating human resources who can make contributions to the development of overseas Korean societies as well as in the motherland by finding the next generation talents of excellent overseas Koreans."[16] Besides this, there are interesting globally oriented organisations that try to connect the diasporic community. For example, the Overseas Korean Foundation offers lessons, as well as information on events all over the world.

European cases

The European examples appear to be very different. Both in Germany and in the Netherlands there are barely any formal contacts with the diaspora communities abroad. In the case of Germany, a wide network of Goethe Institutes focuses on fostering knowledge about Germany. The institutes are autonomous and politically independent, although they are mostly funded by the German Foreign Office and Press Office. Also, language courses are very important as a source of income. In the case of the Netherlands there is an even less prominent role of the government. There is no clear structure other than the existing network of diplomatic representation. In many countries there are associations of Dutch citizens, and they plan meetings on a (more or less) regular basis, but there is barely any contact between the different communities. There is also no large institutional network; the consulates and embassies play a more formal role in maintaining the contact with the diaspora communities. Surrounding King's day (April 27th) they organise small events with drinks. But that's about it.

The exception appears to be France, where the government explicitly plays a role. In France two institutes are involved in presenting and promoting French culture abroad. The role of the Institut français, which stands under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is "to act as the conduit for a new, more ambitious "diplomacy of influence", within the framework of French governmental policies and priorities. It will help to promote French

[15] http://www.mofa.go.kr/ENG/policy/culture/overview/index.jsp?menu=m_20_150_10, Last visited June 23, 2017
[16] http://mofa.go.kr/ENG/about/Study/OKF/index.jsp?menu=m_70_70_30, Last visited June 23, 2017

influence abroad through greater dialogue with foreign cultures, while responding to the needs of France via a policy of listening, partnership and openness to other cultures. The Institut français replaces the Culturesfrance association, with the legal status of a "Public Industrial and Commercial Undertaking". The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has transferred a number of new missions to the Institut français in addition to those performed by Culturesfrance in the field of cultural exchanges and welcoming foreign cultures to France."[17] Another organisation is the *Alliance Francaise*, whose work is much more aimed at language courses. For the diaspora community, the *Assemblée des Français de l'étranger* plays a central role. This assembly is directly responsible for protecting the rights of the French nationals abroad, and it consists of three layers: directly elected representatives (155 in total), senators representing the French abroad[18], and 12 officials appointed by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs presides the Assembly, assisted by three vice presidents.

Closing thoughts

With this paper I've tried to explore the connection with the diaspora community does not appear to be much of a policy issue. It is however very much connected to the previously introduced concept of governmentality. Countries differ in the way the diaspora community still feels connected to the motherland, and how they consider themselves to be a connected community.

The idea of a national community is subject to change. There might be a new generation of diaspora communities coming up, namely that of the former immigrants that return to their motherland. For example, the first wave of guest labourers that came to the Netherlands in the sixties is now moving back to (mainly) Turkey and Morocco. They are connected to their children and grandchildren that were born in the Netherlands, and in that sense they are connected to Dutch society. In their own country they might be considered strangers, due to the fact that they grew up in a different cultural environment.

In the beginning of the paper I raised the issue what type of policy this issue was related to. I still think this is a topic that is very much related to implicit cultural policy. The

[17] http://www.institutfrancais.com/en/about-us, last visited June 23 2017

[18] In total there are eleven constituencies for French residents overseas, each of which elects one representative in the National Assembly.

way that on a national level cultural diversity is handled can influence the context in which the diaspora community. The Hofstede index provides an interesting starting point. Therefore it's not so much about how the diaspora community plays a role in influencing foreign policy.

As a last step in my analysis I turn to the work of Geert Hofstede, whose tool of seven characteristics to differentiate between national cultures might be an interesting addition to this analysis. This model is not specifically designed for analysing diaspora communities, but it possibly offers a better understanding of the changes people experience when they move from their homeland to their host land.

Hofstede distinguishes the following characteristics (Hofstede 2001, 2010): [19]

- power distance index (PDI): People in societies exhibiting a large degree of Power Distance accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and which needs no further justification. In societies with low Power Distance, people strive to equalise the distribution of power and demand justification for inequalities of power.
- Individualism vs collectivism: individualism can be defined as a preference for a loosely-knit social framework in which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families. Collectivism represents a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society in which individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.
- Masculinity vs femininity: Masculinity represents a preference in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material rewards for success. Society at large is more competitive. Its opposite, femininity, stands for a preference for cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life. Society at large is more consensus-oriented.
- Uncertainty Avoidance Index: Countries exhibiting strong UAI maintain rigid codes of belief and behaviour and are intolerant of unorthodox behaviour and ideas. Weak

[19] This information is also available on the website https://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html; the following info is taken directly from that site. On the website there are references to other works by Hofstede on which this list is based.

UAI societies maintain a more relaxed attitude in which practice counts more than principles.

- Long Term Orientation vs Short Term Orientation: Societies who score low on this dimension, prefer to maintain time-honoured traditions and norms while viewing societal change with suspicion. Those with a culture which scores high, on the other hand, take a more pragmatic approach: they encourage thrift and efforts in modern education as a way to prepare for the future.
- Indulgance vs Restraint: Indulgence stands for a society that allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural human drives related to enjoying life and having fun. Restraint stands for a society that suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by means of strict social norms.

Of course there's much to be said about this way of quantifying cultures, particularly because of the implied importance of specific characteristics in society and the connotations connected to the idea of high and low. For example, a high value is given to individualism and indulgence, suggesting that those are of higher value than collectivism and restraint. This is definitely not the way I want to interpret these scores. The model does provide interesting terminology to describe and compare societies and the ways individual members of society relate to the other inhabitants.

When placing the six case studies in this model, some interesting trends come up:

	power distance	Individualism	Masculinity	uncertainty avoidance	long term orientation	Indulgence
Germany	35	67	66	65	83	40
France	68	71	43	86	63	48
Netherlands	38	80	14	53	67	68
China	80	20	66	30	87	24
South Korea	60	18	39	85	100	29
Japan	54	46	95	92	88	42

As a tool it's interesting to see how these societies differ from each other, and how people who grew up in a particular society sometimes have to deal with a society that is entirely different. For example, on the level of individualism there are strong differences between the researched countries. Should a former resident from South Korea or China decide to move to the Netherlands, that person moves from a society that is strongly oriented towards the collective to one in which individualism carries the upper hand. It would be interesting to see if this idea of collectiveness is reflected in the way the diaspora movement operates as a collective. This approach seems to be quite promising, since it starts off from the notion of culture. It helps in understanding where diaspora communities originate, and thus can show some of the cultural differences.

NB This article is not a finished version, it clearly is work in progress. During the conference I'd love to hear more examples, things I overlooked, local knowledge about some of the cases I discussed

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