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Why does South Korea need a “bridge over troubled water”?

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Why Does South Korea Need a “Bridge Over Troubled Water”?

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Abstract

The South Korean National Assembly voted overwhelmingly to impeach President Park Geun-hye on December 9, 2016 and the Constitutional Court unanimously ruled to uphold the parliamentary impeachment of Park on March 10, 2017, which led to the possibility for a new government headed by a newly-elected president. The terms, “good governance” and “bad governance” can be relevantly applied to discuss the political corruption scandal so-called ‘Park-Choi gate’ in South Korea. This paper provides a general overview of the impeached President Park government focusing on the reasons why the Park-Choi gate took place in the Korean society. In examining the causes and effects for the corruption scandal, this study uses a series of theoretical framework such as the politics-administration dichotomy theory, imperial presidency, bureaucracy theory, and the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm. The study result shows that characteristics of the Park administration including the absence of separation between politics and administration, extremely strong presidential power, the violation of bureaucratic principles, and overemphasis on the NPM doctrines brought about the Park-Choi gate and the impeachment of former President Park. By identifying the features of governance under the Park administration in terms of good governance indicators noted by the World Bank, this study raises some critical thoughts on both importance and difficulties of designing and managing good governance. Also, this study can shed light on the direction of the new South Korean government aiming to improve the quality of governance in terms of organization and process of policy-making and implementation in the future.

Keywords: Politics-administration relations, imperial presidency, political corruption scandal in South Korea, good governance, New Public Management, bureaucracy theory

Introduction

In order to answer the question of whether or not South Korea needs a “bridge over troubled water,” it is necessary to ask what actually happened, why it happened, who made it happen, and which outcomes it produced. The 2016 South Korean political scandal, Park Geun-hye–Choi Soon-Sil gate (‘Park-Choi gate’)¹ involves extensive influence of the former President Park’s confidant, Choi Soon-sil over the 18th President of South Korea. Choi who has been under trial since October 2016, was accused of abusing her personal ties with Park by meddling in state affairs including security, economic and cultural policies. To a large extent, Choi intervened in Korean government ranging from speechwriting and policy decisions to nominating officials despite she was a simply ordinary citizen without holding any official government position or security clearance (reports by several news media including JTBC and Chosun broadcasting Company). The widespread coverage of this political scandal, begun in late October 2016, reported that Choi had access to confidential information and document for the president. And, Choi and senior secretaries in the Presidential

¹ After the Korean judicial system concluded the former President Park’s direct involvement in the political scandal, ‘Choi Soon-sil gate’ was called the ‘Park gate’ or ‘Park-Choi gate.’

Office had allegedly used their power to extort \$60 million from Korea’s large business conglomerates to form two culture- and sports-related foundations.

On December 9, 2016, the impeachment motion, signed by 171 opposition and independent lawmakers, passed overwhelmingly with 234 in favor, 56 against, two abstentions and seven invalid votes in the 300-member National Assembly and then Prime Minister Hwang became the acting president. On December 21, 2016, a Special Prosecution Team began to investigate the Park-Choi gate and produced a book of 90-day probe of the scandal as a result of investigation into President Park, former presidential aides, conglomerates, and other concerned parties. On March 10, 2017, the Constitutional Court ruled to uphold the impeachment of Park with all 8 judges’ agreement on the ground that Park violated the Constitution and laws through abuse of power, bribery, and coercion in colluding with her confidant Choi, and dereliction of duty as a president on the day of the Sewol Ferry sinking, which claimed more than 300 lives. Both the Constitutional Court hearings and the parallel, 70-day investigation by the special prosecution team acknowledged a list of illegal presidential wrongdoing that justified the impeachment decision. The grounds for the impeachment of the Constitutional Court points to the violation of national sovereignty and the rule of law by granting political power to Park’s aide Choi, Park’s abuse of power in appointment of civil servants, Park’s infringement of the freedom of speech/press, and the violation of duty to protect the right to life and to faithfully carry out presidential responsibilities. Table 1 shows how the Park-Choi gate proceeded.

Table 1. Timeline of the Park-Choi gate

Dates	Key Events
Late October, 2016	Media coverage began
November 29, 2016	President Park offered to begin the process of removing herself from power
December 9, 2016	National Assembly voted to impeach President Park and then Prime Minister became the acting president
December 21, 2016	A Special Prosecution Team began to investigate the political scandal
March 10, 2017	The Constitutional Court of Korea ruled to uphold the impeachment of Park
May 9, 2017	As a result of the new election, Moon Jae-in was elected as a new president

Until the final impeachment decision, South Korea was ‘a nation in trouble.’ Not to mention that Korean government was not completely operated as it was supposed to work, Korean society was in shock and confusion, which resulted in a divided nation across pro-Park versus anti-Park citizens symbolized as ‘candles versus flags.’ In both downtown Seoul and other cities, anti-Park candlelight rallies that called for her to step down and to be impeached had kept fierce for an extended period of time while a relatively small number of Park’s supporters, so-called the Korean flag, ‘Taegukgi’ held demonstrations that asserted the nullification of impeachment. The social division between the pro- and anti-Park was especially deepened during the 92-day impeachment trial. Pro- and anti-Park lawmakers also intentionally added to confusion and division instead of performing their duties to ease conflicts for the purpose of seeking their own political interests and agendas. In consequence, the political corruption and cronyism scandal so-called the Park-Choi gate had shaken the nation to the foundation by wasting a huge amount of national assets and doing serious damage in national image.

Considering these negative effects of the Park-Choi gate on the whole country, it is essential to ask the question: why did the worst corruption scandal take place in South Korea? More specifically, it needs to ask whether the Park-Choi gate was attributed to individuals or systems. This question is to identify whether the political scandal leading to grave harm in the integrity of government was a

product of all concerned individuals' problems or flaws in the design and operation of systems in Korean government. Due to the inherently complex nature of political corruption scandal, research on the causes for the Park-Choi gate should take various analytic dimensions into account in order to describe a comprehensive overview of the governance during them Park administration. For example, a series of major questions can be raised: did the Park-Choi gate result from 1) illegal power sharing between Park with Park's senior staff member in the presidential house (Blue House) and a civilian, Choi, 2) Park's tactless governance, 3) malfunction of political system, public administration system, civil service system, or legal system, 4) relations between politics and administration in the public policy process, 5) culture of South Korea in the political, economic, social, ethical, and legal aspects, 6) problems in check-and-balance system among three branches of government, 7) violation of bureaucratic principles, 8) Korean society of political indifference, and 9) inability of mass media to detect and report the scandal.

Based on these plausible questions that warrant serious consideration, this paper examines the reasons why the Park-Choi gate took place under the Park government through four theoretical frameworks such as the politics-administration dichotomy theory, imperial presidency, bureaucracy theory, the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm. We begin by reviewing the four theoretical frameworks used to explain the causes of the political scandal and present related evidence produced by the Korean judicial system to support our argument. And then, this paper provides a description of the Park governance in terms of good governance indicators set by the World Bank. South Korea makes for a unique and interesting case study on political corruption scandal leading to president's impeachment and citizens' participation and attention to state affairs so-called "candlelight revolution." This case can offer other countries across the world with a meaningful opportunity to deliberate on the meaning of good governance, integrity and trust in government, and roles of citizens

Literature Review

The political corruption scandal, Park-Choi gate is one of the significant factors explaining the importance of both integrity in government and good governance. The Park-Choi gate is a very recent incident and all concerned parties to the corruption scandal are in the middle of trials, which account for scarce Korean literature on this topic. Only a very few research examined the topic from a legal perspective. For instance, Yun (2017) interpreted the South Korean Constitution and Constitutional Court Act on impeachment of president to analyze the impeachment procedure including the scope of grounds for impeachment and characteristics of impeachment process.

Another stream of research dealt with the theme of integrity in government, particularly focusing on corruption in the public sector. The main research themes vary across the definitions of government corruption (Kim, 1998; Choi & Lee, 1999; Choi, 2000; Kim, 2001; Kim, 2003), empirical investigation on the corruption of public agencies (e.g., periodical publications by the Presidential Commission on Anti-Corruption, statistical yearbook by the Ministry of the Interior, reports by universities and research institutes, and audit results by the Board of Audit and Inspection Office), and anti-corruption policies and legislation to increase the integrity of government (Cho, 2001; Kim & Lee, 2001, Jang, 2001; Lee, Park, & Lee, 2002; Kim, 2006; Kim, 2012).

Studies on political corruption scandals conducted by foreign scholars investigated the roles of political scandals played in government, political institutions, and society such as lowering regard for government leaders and politicians (Lanoue & Headrick, 1994; Clarke et al., 1998; Bowler & Karp, 2004), impacts on electoral consequences (Banducci & Karp, 1994; Hetherington, 1999; Cowley,

2002), creation and intensification of political discontent (Kasse & Newton, 1995; Norris, 1999; McAllister, 2000), and lack of trust in government (Easton, 1965, 1975; Bowler & Karp, 2004; Chang & Chu, 2006, Morris & Klesner, 2010). To sum up the Korean and international literature on the topic of political corruption scandals, the studies tend to analyze the scandals from the political, legal, and administration perspectives focusing on negative effects of corruption on every aspect of nations, causes of corruption, and preventive measures against political scandals.

To extensively and intensively examine the Park-Choi gate, this study uses four theoretical foundations - the politics-administration dichotomy theory, imperial presidency, bureaucracy theory, and the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm. Especially, there is a vast volume of the Korean literature on the relations between politics and public administration. A majority of studies on politics-administration relations sought to describe the history in the Korean public sector reforms across different presidencies, the impacts of government reforms on bureaucrat-politician relationship (i.e., politics of government reform), or the characteristics of administration’s policy systems. Through such an analysis, scholars identified a list of key elements of policy system and political system in terms of actors, structures, environments, power, legal system, and procedures. For example, Park and Wilding (2016) reviewed the trends of Korean government reforms to answer the question of whether and how Korean administrative reforms result in politicization that is defined as “the extent to which relationships between the political and executive branch are intertwined” (p. 1060). Their investigation reveals different degrees of the public sector reform’s impact on politicization across three different periods, as summarized in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Relations between Government Reform and Politicization across Presidencies

Periods	Presidencies	Relations between government reform and politicization
Transitional period (1981-1993)	Chun Doo-hwan Roh Tae-woo	Monopolistic: president as a main political actor
Transformational period (1993-2008)	Kim Young-sam Kim Dae-jung Roh Moo-hyun	Tripartite: president, legislature, and ministers as main political actors
Post-transformational period (2008-)	Lee Myung-bak Park Geun-hye	Bipartite: president and legislature as main political actors

Source: Park & Wilding (2006: 1064-1075)

The literature on imperial presidency dealt with the features and limitations of presidential leadership and power which belong to a specific presidency in each country all around the world. In line with a great deal of case studies on imperial presidency, the literature on the NPM paradigm covered the theoretical introduction, practical application, and evaluation of the NPM principles across localities, fields, and countries as case study format. All over the world, the NPM has been so prevalent that numerous studies on this theme are accumulated in the field of public management. Analysis of the literature on the three theoretical frameworks- imperial presidency, the NPM paradigm, and Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy will be closely discussed in the next section

1. Case Analysis by Theoretical Framework: Politics-Administration Dichotomy Theory, Imperial Presidency, Bureaucracy Theory, and NPM Paradigm

1.1. Politics-Administration Dichotomy Theory

For more than a century, the politics-administration dichotomy has been a contentious notion in

the field of public administration. The discussion focuses on the nature of relationships between administrators and politicians and the proper role of politicians and administrators in the political and administrative process. Although many scholars have made efforts to assert the reasons for why or why not politics and public administration should be distinct from each other, there has not been a consensus on the issue.² Some scholars support that politics and administration should be distinct since it will ensure an effective, efficient and neutral bureaucracy.³ On the contrary, others argue that the two disciplines should not be separated because of their interconnections. The old significant, classical model explaining the politics-administration relations is the politics-administration dichotomy that lays groundwork for the American public administration system. Originating from Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson, numerous debates have been continued for the purpose of answering the question about whether and to what extent public administrators should be involved in the political process. In his book, "The study of Administration", Wilson (1887) proposed a theory that politics and administration are inherently different and administration is a managerial, technical process functioning in the independent sphere.

In contemporary times, Svara (1999) pinpointed that the model of politic-administration dichotomy is not conceptually and empirically right and re-conceptualized the dichotomy model into the politic-administration complementarity model, treating it as a concept of continuum. The complementarity model not only recognizes the need for distinction between politics and administration but also emphasizes interdependence, reciprocal influences, and extensive interactions between elected officials and public administrators in the public policy-making and implementation process. In a later study, Svara (2006) proposed the four possible models of political-administrative relations: separate roles model, autonomous administrator model, responsive administrator model, and overlapping roles model. His criteria for classifying the four standard models are 1) the degree of distance and differentiation between elected officials and administrators and 2) the level of control of administrators by elected officials.

More specifically, Svara (2006: 955-966) describes the separate roles model as the subordination of administrators to elected officials and the strict separation between politicians and administrators. The autonomous administrator model indicates the distinct separation of politicians and administrators by means of administrators' autonomy to resist political leaders' control. The responsive administrator model emphasizes the subordination of administrators functioning as supporters of elected officials and the close political alignment of politicians and administrators. The overlapping roles model regards administrators and politicians as having the overlapping functions and the reciprocal influence between administrators and politicians through extensive interaction. As shown in Figure 1, Svara's possible models of political-administrative relations, each four model has its own extreme form such as isolated administrators model, bureaucratic regime model, manipulated administrators model, and politicized administrators model.

² Overeem (2006: 5) summarized these two strands of the argument: 1) those who think "politics and administration are (and should be) distinct but interconnected" and 2) those who think "politics and administration are (and should be) interconnected but distinct." But, in prior research, the extent of distinction between politics and administration had not been clearly stated.

³ Simon (1976) argued the relations between politics and administration from the perspective of the fact-value distinction.

Figure 1. Possible Models of Political-administrative relations: standard (shaded area) and extreme

		Degree of distance and differentiation between elected officials and administrators	
		Very High	Very Low
Level of control of administrators by elected officials	Very High	Isolated administrators	Manipulated administrators
		Separate roles	Responsive administrators
Very Low		Autonomous administrators	Overlapping roles
		Bureaucratic regime	Politicized administrators

Source: Svava (2006: 956)

In order to analyze and understand the Park-Choi gate, it is necessary to trace the history of the relationships between politics and public administration in South Korea. Huntington (1991) examines the processes by which the transitions of thirty-five countries from nondemocratic to democratic political systems occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. He designates four types of regime transitions: 1) “transformations” where the elites in power took the lead in generating democracy; 2) “replacements” where political opposition groups took the lead in engendering democracy; 3) “transplacements” where democratization took place from joint actions by government and the opposition; and 4) “interventions” where democratic regimes were instituted by an outside power.

In light of the Huntington’s types of regime transitions, the democratization in South Korea was a combination of transformation and transplacement (Young, 2015). The authoritarian regime under the Chun Doo-hwan administration (the Fifth Republic) negotiated regime changes (transplacement) with political opposition. The ruling political party leader Roh Tae-woo met and planned for drafting a new constitution for the new Sixth Republic. Share and Mainwaring (1986: 178-179) propose a slight different typology of democratic transition from Huntington’s typology: 1) transition through regime decline or collapse; 2) transition through extrication by elites with authoritarian power; and 3) transition through transaction between regime and political opposition. Among their typology, the case of Korean democratic transition belongs to the third type of regime transition.

Based on the argument by Huntington (1991) and Share and Mainwaring (1986), the evident characteristics of politics-administration relationship in South Korea can be identified that first, the political control of public administrators has become firmly established after democratization in late 1980s and second, internal accountability through official hierarchy is more emphasized than public administrators’ external accountability to the National Assembly expertise, asymmetry of information, and secrecy of public administration.

In a discussion of comparison between political neutrality and policy neutrality, the former means that public officials are required to act in the course of their duties in a politically neutral manner. It includes the requirement to act impartially and to implement the government’s policies. In South Korea, the involvement of public administration in political elections was quite in existence through the First to the Fifth Republics until about 1987 (National Police Agency, 2007). After the early 1990s, the involvement of public administration in political elections has almost disappeared because of three reasons. First, the reinstatement of local autonomy; that is, local representative

assemblies were held in 1991 and the elections for the head of local governments (e.g., mayor of Seoul Special City, governors of provinces, or city mayors) took place in 1995. Second, in 2002, the Anti-Corruption Commission was formed on the basis of the Anti-Corruption Act enacted in 2001. The objective of the commission was to discover wrongdoing, misconduct, and unethical activities including corruption, fraud, bullying, health and safety violation, cover-ups and discrimination through whistle blowing and to protect whistle-blowers. The whistle blowing policy led to diminished involvement of public administration in elections. Third, the horizontal political regimes changed in 1998 (Kim Dae-jung administration), 2003 (Roh Moo-hyun administration), 2008 (Lee Myung-bak administration), and 2013 (Park Geun-hye administration).

In detail, to analyze the reasons for the Park-Choi gate, this paper examines the history of the relations between politics and public administration in South Korea ranging from the Park Chung-hee administration to the Park Geun-hye administration, which covers from 1963 to 2016. The analysis variables are the fundamental paradigm for government operation, government's reform initiatives, policy environment such as critical political events and disputatious social issues, and features of civil service system across the respective presidency. The causes of the Park-Choi gate will be explained by Svava's (2006) four models of political-administrative relations which indicate that differences in governmental structure, political dynamics, and cultural values in different countries determine how politicians and administrators interact with each other.

Park Chung-hee Administration (1963-1979)

The basic paradigms for the operation of the Park Chung-hee government were economic growth via state modernization and national security emphasizing anti-communism and independent national defense capability. Such ideology as economic growth and national security was set with the intention of supplementing the lacking legitimacy of the Third Republic of Park administration because it was founded by coup d'état. Since, the Park administration pursued the export-oriented industrialization (EOI) policy dominantly initiated by government, the bureaucratic regime in the context of developmental state represented strong meritocracy, professionalism, and mass production of public services.

On the contrary, due to the presidential domination of the ruling party through the presidential nomination of National Assembly candidates, the National Assembly was relatively weak. In addition, President Park directly nominated one-third of member of the National Assembly, so that the National Assembly did not exercise proper political functions. The manifest characteristic of policy-making structure consisted in the area of politics, namely, the National Assembly and political parties became weak as technocrats and military elites took lead in making policy decisions (Ahn, 1994).

In the sixties and seventies, the Korean political system was affected by the culture of Confucianism and its continued influences from traditional dynasties to modernization processes. Koh (1996: 191) pointed out that Korean Peninsula has been popularly described by the academic scholars as the "most Confucian part of the world," since Korean governments effectively made the best use of ancient tradition for the purpose of national development and formation of Korean democracy. In short, the first Park Chung-hee administration can be defined as the initiating stage for the system of bureaucratic authoritarianism and the latter Park administration appeared to go through the stage of strengthening bureaucratic authoritarianism.

Chun Doo-hwan Administration (1980-1988)

The political vacuum formed by the sudden, tragic death of former President Park Chung-hee was occupied by the next President Chun Doo-hwan. By taking over political and military power and constituting the national salvation committee, President Chun aimed to rule the country in complete control. Thus, to build legitimacy of the Fifth Republic, he attempted different public policies from the former President Park such as restructuring the heavy-chemical industrial sector and chaebols (big business conglomerates) and giving more emphasis on justice and equality functioning as key principles of national government. This policy orientation was opposed to growth, which was a slogan set by the former President Park administration.

Originating from the Chun administration, the notion of ‘small government’ began to be adopted in the field of public administration. The Chun administration’s bureaucratic regime in the context of developmental state was composed of strong meritocracy with some politically-motivated cutback management, strong reform of public administration for expedited and less corrupt public service delivery, professionalism, and mass production of public services. Under the circumstance, the ruling party was dominated by President Chun while the National Assembly was very weak.

Starting from April 1987, Korean policy environment became extremely volatile due to a series of intense student demonstrations that subsequently joined by workers and citizens in protesting the government. To resolve the chaos by accommodating citizen demands, the Chun administration was forced to announce the June 29’s declaration that was comprised of constitutional amendment to provide direct, competitive election of president, amnesty to political prisoners, protection of human rights and freedom of press, strengthening local and educational economy, and substantial social reform. This June 29th’s declaration was a turning point for changing Korean politics from authoritarian rules to democratic beginning and transition. With the presidential election in December 1987, a new president of the Sixth Republic became to open the door for Korean democracy.

Roh Tae-woo Administration (1988-1993)

The Roh Tae-woo administration formulated the main governance ideology focusing on welfarism⁴ and democratization since he was a part of the military dictatorship associated with the former President Chun. To actualize democratization, the Roh administration made full efforts to balance power between the legislative branch and the executive branch, adopt the system of the Constitutional Court for checks and balances, reinstate the local autonomy system by initiating local elections in provinces, cities and municipalities, and guarantee the rights for freedom of press through abolishment of the Basic Press Act of 1980. Thus, the presidential domination of the ruling party was weakened.

The Roh administration also implemented a variety of public policies for welfarism such as assuring labor rights, introducing a national minimum wage system, and providing economic autonomy by means of privatizing public corporations. Similar to the former President Chun Doo-hwan, Roh administration also pursued ‘small government’ maintaining bureaucratic regime in the context of developmental state that supported strong meritocracy, professionalism, and mass production of public services. In 1990, to end the country’s chronic factional political strife, President Roh announced such surprise agreement as a three-party merger. As a result of the merger among

⁴ “Welfarism” is a term denoting all theories, principles or policies associated with a welfare state.

three opposition parties, a new conservative ruling party- the Democratic Liberal Party was created with a commanding majority in the National Assembly.⁵ As a result, the Sixth Republic went through transformation within the regime and ruling party.

The clear-cut characteristic in the South Korean politics is the democratization during the mid-1980s driven by a strong social movement and civic mobilization. Judging from the perspective of policy neutrality, Korean bureaucracy had a considerable degree of autonomy in performing public affairs in a professional manner during authoritarianism ranging from the Third Republic to the Fifth Republic. On the contrary, since the democratization specifically in 1987, the scope of both activities and autonomy exercised by bureaucrats was getting reduced (Lee, 2008). This is why the long-lasting shrunk scope of politics under the policy system of bureaucratic authoritarianism became vitalized as a momentum of democratization in 1987 and put greater emphasis on bureaucracy's responsiveness. In short, the idea of democracy, globalization, and welfarism resulted in shaping the post-democratization in the Korean political system, which pointed to the institutional democratization and democratic consolidation.

Kim Young-sam Administration (1993-1998)

Portrayed as the first civilian government after the military regimes initiated by the military coup d'état by the former President Park Jung-hee in 1961 in succession to President Chun Do-hwan and President Noh Tae-woo, the Kim Young-sam government pursued the institutionalization of democracy and implemented economic policies for an open economy through globalization. Specifically, the Kim administration purged political soldiers, scaled back military authoritarian agencies, abolished a set of regulatory policies, and opened financial markets to foreign competition. Three major reform laws were enacted by the presidential initiatives- the Administrative Procedure Act, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and the Basic Law for Regulation for the purpose of accomplishing 'small but strong government.' In addition, the system of real name banking⁶ was adopted in 1993 and NPM-based administrative reform was commenced by forming the Presidential Commission for Globalization in 1995, aiming to undertake the Kim administration's globalization initiatives.

Kim (2006: 520) depicted the policy making system of the Kim Young-sam administration as authoritarian regime in contrast to political system that was evaluated as institutional democratization. That is, as political system became to be democratic, the roles of public administrators played in the public policy process were relatively diminished. Particularly, in the later period of the regime, the National Assembly got stronger while presidential domination of the ruling party was weakened. In a nutshell, the Kim administration indicated a transition from bureaucratic regime to the regime of responsive administrators and transplacement by the opposition party headed by the next President Kim Dae-jung.

⁵ In 1990, President Roh united with former Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil and Kim Young-sam, a long-time opposition leader. The three political parties, the Democratic Justice Party, the Unification Democratic Party, and the New Democratic Republic Party, was merged into the new party called the Democratic Liberal Party.

⁶In 1993, Korean government adopted the Real Name Law that required individuals prove their identity when conducting financial transactions. The objective of real-name financial transaction system was to break the collusive link between politicians and businessmen, reduce corruption, and enhance transparency in financial transaction.

Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998- 2003)

The Kim Dae-jung administration had very little choice but to drastically perform administrative reforms to cope with the challenges of globalization and economic crisis. With the wave of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, South Korea borrowed \$ 57 billion as a bailout package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In return, Korea was required to reshape the overall institutions and systems aiming to recover from the financial turmoil, improve performance, and create good governance. To overcome the IMF financial crisis, from the beginning of the Kim Dae-jung administration in 1998 to the end of Roh Moo-hyun administration in 2008, Korean government reforms have been undertaken in line with NPM doctrines across the public, financial, and private sectors and labor relations. The Kim administration actively fulfilled strong NPM-inspired reform initiatives including cutback management, privatization, introduction of private sector competition system into the operation of public administration, and performance management like Management by Objectives (MBO). The reform initiatives were based on the philosophy of “parallel development of democracy and the market economy (KDI, 1999; Lee, 1999).

On the basis of the NPM perspectives, the Kim administration incorporated the logic of competition and the market principle into organizational management through the idea of agencification⁷ that intend to enhance customer-oriented public service delivery, foster performance-focused management of government with increased autonomy in financial, organizational, and personnel matters, and establish businesslike management. In addition to the NPM-based reform agendas, the Kim administration promoted e-government reforms by establishing the Special Committee for E-Government, playing roles as a special committee under the Presidential Commission on Government Innovation to improve efficiency, transparency, and accountability of Korean government. The aggressive management reform strategies under the Kim Dae-jung government brought about stronger influence of the civil society, pluralization of the policy processes, representative bureaucracy reflecting regional representation and gender representation, and open recruitment for public positions. This is why the Kim administration was described as “people’s government.”

As a result of public sector reform efforts, the transition from bureaucratic regime to the regime of responsive administrators became to get much stronger than the former Kim Young-sam government. With decentralization within the National Assembly to committees and subcommittees and congressional initiation of public law enactment (e.g., the Basic Law for Regulation including a provision of regulation impact assessment), the legislative power of the National Assembly was getting stronger while presidential domination of the ruling party was lessened, especially in the later period of the regime (Kwon, 1998, 2005; Hahm & Kim, 1999; Kim & Moon, 2002).

Roh Moo-hyun Administration (2003-2008)

The basic principle for government operation under the Roh Moo-hyun administration pointed to decentralization, participatory democracy, social equity, innovation, and balanced local or regional

⁷ The concept of ‘agencification’ is a key element of the NPM. Pollitt et al. (2001: 271) defined agencification as “an apparent global convergence in the adoption of the agency form.” Talbot (2004: 6) proposed three basic criteria that characterize the NPM style of agencies such as structural disaggregation (creation of task specific organizations), performance contracting, and deregulation.

development.⁸ Emphasizing the value of participation and political, administrative decentralization, the Roh administration designed a variety of channels for the general public to directly participate in politics, guaranteed the right of the people to recall elected official as a means to adopting an element of direct democracy, and formulated government personnel policy for representative bureaucracy to reflect the representation of gender, regions, minorities, and civil service positions. Consequently, such policy environments as representative bureaucracy, introduction of the Senior Executive Service (SES) in 2006, open recruitment for managerial positions, and the widened, diversified civil society made the meritocracy of the Roh administration weaken. The Special Law on Decentralization Promotion enacted in 2004 transferred central decision-making authority and functions to localities and abolished special administrative agencies (SAA; local offices of central ministries) that resulted in shrinking ministerial power and putting some ministries at risk of reorganization (Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, 2005; Kang, 2006). In the end, the balanced development policy was causative of the conflict between political determination of policy priority and decentralization.

In succession to the former Kim Dae-jung administration, the Roh administration still underscored professionalism in government bureaucracy and NPM-based administrative reform involving performance contract and strategic management. At that time, government in the Republic of Korea was metaphorically called “republic of evaluation” owing to the enforcement of the Government Performance Evaluation Act enacted in 2006 (Hur, 2012). In a similar vein, the hosting the Presidential Conference of National Financial Resource Allocation reflected the performance-oriented policy governance. Besides, the newly established Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralization (PCGID) played significant roles in developing national informatization and e-government projects focusing on financial management, procurement management, and performance management.

Under the Roh administration, both the National Assembly and the opposition party exercised strong power evidenced by a series of legislator-initiated enactment including the Special Law on Decentralization Promotion of 2004 and decentralization roadmaps of 2003. The more obvious example pointed to the impeachment of the President Roh Moo-hyun in 2004. In a 193-2 vote by the National Assembly, his presidential powers as head of state and chief executive were suspended until the final decision of the Constitutional Court to dismiss the articles of impeachment. It was a direct consequence of weakened presidential domination of the ruling party and reduced presidential power. Therefore, the increasing legislative power together with strong influences of the civil society gave rise to the regime of responsive administrators during the Roh administration.

Lee Myung-bak Administration (2008-2013)

In 2008, the Lee Myung-bak government laid out an agenda for fulfilling the governance ideology such as construction of developmental state in accordance with pro-market policies, neoliberal economic policies, and the rule of law. Seeking the vision of the first-class developed country via economic revitalization, the Lee administration placed greater emphasis on governing and fostering the nation in a business friendly and market friendly manner. To accomplish these objectives,

⁸ The Roh administration formed the Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralization (PCGID). With full support of the President Roh, as a major agent of government innovation, PCGID was to make Korean government more open, transparent, and closer to citizens.

a series of neoliberal economic policies involving cutback management, deregulation, reengineering of public corporations, corporate tax cut, privatization, free trade, and deregulation was implemented. In a continuous stream to the former Roh government, which was fascinated by the NPM theories, the Lee government kept undertaking strong NPM-based administrative reform through performance contract, pay-per-performance, and strategic management.

Because Lee Myung-bak was the CEO of a big firm as well as the mayor of Seoul before his election as president, his CEO-style leadership with a hint of arbitrariness brought about the weakened seniority system, especially personnel management in local governments and the regime of responsive administrators. Thus, under the Lee administration, the neoliberal reforms in both the public and private sectors, along with weakening civil service protection (e.g., early retirement) resulted in decreased autonomy of administrators and the limited extent of depoliticization in a relative sense (Chang, 1999; Oh, 1999; Kang, 2002; Oh, 2009; Oh & Chun, 2012; Jung, Chun, & Oh, 2015; Park & Wilding, 2016).

Underlining the subordination of administrators and close political alignment of politicians and administrators, the political-administrative relations during the Lee administration were diversified into two different regimes- the regime of isolated administrators and the regime of politicized administrators. That is, low and mid-ranking administrators and young generation with new life styles showed the extreme degree in clear subordination of administrators to politician and separate roles and norms whereas high ranking administrators tended to become elected officials at the central and local level, indicating extremely reciprocal effects between elected officials and administrators and shared roles. As a result, under the Lee government, the National Assembly enjoyed strong political power evidenced by a number of legislator-initiated enactment and weakening presidential domination of the ruling party, contrary to strong opposition party.

The reason why the Lee government earned low popularity consists in the agreement on resumption of U.S. beef imports, also so-called the “mad cow disease” incident in 2008. Another reason points to the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project in 2011 that was estimated to spend full investment and funding totaled approximately \$17.3 billion. These two events caused public demonstrations organized by strong civil society acting usually against administration’s major initiatives. In consequence, these decisive events led to critical complications to smoothly administering state affairs for the Lee government.

Park Geun-hye Administration (2013-2016)

The Park Geun-hye administration corresponded to the responsive administrator model and was subsequently diversified into the isolated administrator model (extreme case of the separate role model) and the politicized administrator model (extreme case of the overlapping roles model). Intrinsically, public officials are required to hold “neutral competence” (as proposed by the separate roles model) by making a professional judgment and maintaining neutral perspectives into the public policy process. Moe (1985) argued that political expectations in the modern presidency drove president to seek for “responsive competence” instead of “neutral competence.” In the same vein, Wolf (1999) explained “responsive competence” as a product of centralization of coordinating all concerned organizations performing policy-making and implementation (pp. 142-143).

Under the Park administration, members of the National Assembly looked for politically

“responsive competence” from public administrators who acceded to the political norms and preferences of politicians involving president’s political needs. The representative example is the so-called culture “blacklist,” a list of anti-government artists created by the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. According to the report by 90-day investigation of a Special Prosecution Team, the Presidential Office created both “blacklist and whitelist” to control artists as a means of taking major advantages in filtering cultural content creation and distribution and as a result, more than 172 million was misused by conservative Park administration. Another example is the incident that a few high-rank public officials in the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism were demoted to a less important post and even forced to step down by virtue of direct pressure from the minister and President Park Geun-hye. The reason can be boiled down to their interference with Choi’s pursuit of personal interests. These events manifest the weakened protection of the civil service system under the Park administration. In particular, early retirement and less job security drove public administrators to act as political agents of elected officials or party majority.

Owing to the final authority over major policy decisions, members of the national Assembly could occupy a superior position so that public administrators had no choice but to support the preferences and expectation of political leaders. In reality, as compared to other previous presidencies, the number of bills initiated by the National Assembly was on the increase while the percentage of administrator-initiated enactment was on the decrease under the Park administration. As Svava’s (2006) possible models of political-administrative relations state, the Park government showed the extreme version of the responsive administrator model, “manipulated administrators” where political leaders even manipulated administrators to the extent that administrators became powerless and neutral, professional standards were impossible to maintain (p. 961). This situational context during the Park government appears to be a contributing factor to the political corruption scandal, Park-Choi gate and impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye.

As a governance vision, the Park administration sought a number of new presidential agendas including economy revival, people’s happiness, cultural prosperity, and peaceful unification that ultimately intended to accomplish a trustworthy government. In priority, the Park administration designed the new paradigm for government operation, so-called “Government 3.0” with a view to making government more open, transparent, service-oriented, individual citizen-oriented, problem-centered, and competent, thus pursuing the post-NPM principles. The Park government followed the Kim Da-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Lee Myung-bak administrations in terms of the NPM ideas focusing on government performance evaluation. Park and Wilding (2006) evaluated most administrative reforms during the Park government as gearing toward reinforcing presidential power rather than streamlining the executive (p. 1074). At the same time, there has been a remarkable increase in the policy-making power of the National Assembly, evidenced by the number of bills initiated by legislators in the 18th and 19th National Assembly. Both strong legislative powers and active adoption of the NPM doctrines resulted in making the Park administration align with the Svava’s (2006) responsive administrator model.

The most influential event under the Park administration is the ‘Sewol Ferry Disaster’ occurred on the morning of April 16, 2014, resulting in a total death of 304 passengers and crew members. The sinking of the Sewol Ferry brought about widespread social, political, and emotional reactions within the Korean society. In general, many people criticized the actions of the captain, most of the crew, the ferry operator, and the regulators who had responsibility in overseeing its operations. At the same time, Korean citizens censured the South Korean government for incompetence and irresponsibility and

media for its disaster response. The general public as well as victims' family members expressed deep anger at all concerned government agencies, politicians, and personally at Park Geun-hye for the reason that she is the President of South Korea who has the ultimate obligation to protect Korean citizens. Consequently, the Sewol Ferry incident caused citizens' disappointment toward political and public administration systems in South Korea and contributed to the President Park's political downfall. The ferry accident continuously put pressure on the Park administration and became to affect the Park's impeachment, terminating her presidency.

Discussion: Characteristics of Political-Administrative Relations during the Park government as an Explaining Factor of Park-Choi Gate

In regard to public policy-making and public administration, a series of incidents happened in the South Korean Presidential Office, a few government agencies, and public foundations during the Park Geun-hye administration is quite contrary to the Wilson's politics-administration dichotomy. There was no clear boundary between policy decision-making and administration so that the blurred boundary gave rise to the malfunction of democratic accountability system which deteriorated transparency in the public policy process. The more serious problem pointed to the failure of guaranteeing one of the significant values of public administration- neutrality in both politics and policy. Considering the events disclosed to the public that public officials could not say 'no' even to a set of unfair and irrational policy decisions and were forced to implement the decisions with no question asked, the effects and importance of politics-administration dichotomy is beyond description. The absence of separation between policy and administration led to preclude political neutrality of public officials that is guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Article 7(2).⁹

One of the reasonable frameworks for identifying the causes of the Park-Choi corruption scandal and the impeachment of Park points to the characteristics in relations between politics and public administration in terms of power difference, the division of roles and norms, and the level of control of administrators by elected officials, as Svvara (2006) proposes. To this end, this paper investigates how political-administrative relations has been changed from 1963 (Park Jung-hee administration) to 2016 (Park Geun-hye administration) summarized in Table 3 below. Table 4 shows the changes in the number of bills initiated by the National Assembly which reflect the strength of legislative power. Table 5 compares the percentage of administrator-initiated enactment among five successive administrations starting from the Kim Young-sam administration in 1993 to the Park Geun-hye administration in 2016. During the Park administration, administrator-initiated enactment was 57%, which indicate the low level of government's legislative power and capacity despite the Park's affiliated party held in majority in the National Assembly. In comparison, 81.8% of administrator-initiated bills were passed during the Noh Moo-hyun administration regardless of the opposition party held in a majority in the National Assembly. Thus, Table 4 and Table 5 reflect the concentrated power of the legislative branch gaining the upper hand to check and even control the executive branch.

⁹ In the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, the Article 7(1) prescribes that "all public officials shall be servants of the entire people and shall be responsible to the people" and the Article 7(2) prescribes that "the status and political impartiality of public officials shall be guaranteed as prescribed by Act."

Table 3.Changes in Politics and Administration Relations from 1963 to 2016

Administration	Characteristics of administration's policy systems	Characteristic of public officials
Park Chung-hee (1963-1979)	Founding of modern bureaucracy ¹⁰ : beginning and strengthening stage of bureaucratic authoritarianism (a combination of military elites and technocrats)	Autonomous administrators in the context of bureaucratic authoritarianism
Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1988)	Cracking stage of bureaucratic Authoritarianism (a combination of military elites and technocrats)	
Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993)	Sinking and dismantling stage of bureaucratic authoritarianism (pluralists policy making with reduced roles of technocrats)	
Kim Young-sam (1993-1998)	Germinal stage of new governance (president-centric authoritarian policy making system)	Responsive administrators in the context of new governance
Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003)	Stage of heading for new governance (president-centric authoritarian policy making system)	
Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008)	Embodying stage of new governance (participatory and decentralized policy making system)	
Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013)	Returning to traditional governance emphasizing the rule of law	Responsive administrators and further diversification into isolated administrators and politicized administrators
Park Geun-hye (2013-2016)	Returning to bureaucratic authoritarianism (president-centric authoritarian policy making system, imperial presidency)	Responsive administrators and further diversification into isolated administrators and politicized administrators

Source: Moon, 1988; Song, 1999; Moon & Ju, 2007; Kim, 2008; Lee, 2009; Jung, Chun, & Oh, 2015


Table 4. Changes in the Number of Legislator-Initiated Enactment

National Assembly Period	13th 1988-1992	14th 1992-1996	15th 1996-2000	16th 2000-2004	17th 2004-2008	18th 2008-2012	19th 2012-2016.05
Number of Legislator-initiated enactment	462	252	806	1,651	5,728	11,191	16,729
Presidency: Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993); Kim Young-sam (1993-1998); Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003); Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008); Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013); Park Geun-hye (2013-2016)							

Source: Chun, 2013; National Election Commission, 2012; Cha & Kang, 2016

¹⁰ According to Max Weber (1962), modern bureaucracy refers to the rational government system on the basis of legal-rational authority as an ideal type.

Table 5.Changes in the Percent of Administrator-Initiated Enactment (unit: %)



Source: Office for Government Policy Coordination (2016); Ministry of Government Legislation (2016)

In summary, in light of the models of Svvara (2006), Korean government was transformed from the autonomous administrators model to the responsive administrators model. Considering Kim’s (2000) argument that political-constraints were continued to be a major obstacle in Korean government reforms, a certain condition like small ruling party and big opposition party had critical effects on government reform efforts and bureaucrats’ compliance. During the Park Geun-hye administration, public officials were very supportive and extremely responsive to politics (i.e., politicians, elected officials, or party majority who give direction to the political process), not to the public. Meanwhile, assertive and powerful members of legislature exercised authority in making major policy decisions by controlling or even manipulating administrators (Lee, 2008; Kim, 2008; Lee, 2009; Jung, Chun, & Oh, 2015). Accordingly, as public officials became much more responsive to the preferences of elected officials and the National Assembly’s policy-making powers were increased, the policy neutrality of public administrators was withered by degrees. It points to the term, “specialist without spirit” that describes the phenomenon of overly responsive administrators.

In a similar vein, Table 4 and Table 5 account for the interesting, contrasting tendency. The number of legislator-initiated enactment has been constantly increasing with the maximum value in the Park Geun-hye government. On the contrary, the percentage of administrator-initiated enactment has been on the decrease with minimum value in the Park Geun-hye government. The rise of legislative powers is evidenced in the number of bills initiated by legislators, which grew from 806 in the 15th National Assembly (1996-2000) to 5,728 in the 17th National Assembly (2004-2008) and to 16,729 in the 19th National Assembly (2012-2016). In addition, Table 6 indicating the change in power distribution among main political actors including president, the National Assembly, Prime Minister, and ministries across past presidencies represents the transformation from the autonomous administrators model to the responsive administrators model in the history of Korean government.

Park and Wilding (2016) attributed the reduction in both ministerial power and prime ministerial power to presidential efforts to develop economy and increase control over ministries and agencies. This is caused by the very nature of presidential power guaranteed by the Constitution. Because the Korean president is the head of government and the chairperson of the Cabinet which is the highest body for policy deliberation and resolution in the executive branch (Article 66 and 88 of the Constitution), the president is likely to seek control over the policy process at ministerial expense. Additionally, the continuing government reform efforts focusing on the NPM principles (e.g., abolishing offices under the prime minister or privatizing government-funded corporations) since the

Kim Young-sam administration are causative of the reduction in both ministerial power and prime ministerial power. During the Park Geun-hye government, the increasing politicization of presidency along with the decreasing power of both ministers and prime minister laid groundwork for the political corruption scandal, the Park-Choi gate. Therefore, all Tables reflect the reason why the Park-Choi gate and the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye ultimately took place in Korea on the basis of Svava's (2006) models of political-administrative relations.

Table 6. Changes in the Power Distribution among Main Political Actors

Period	1981-1993	1993-2008	2008-Present
Presidency	Chun Doo-hwan Roh Tae-woo	Kim Young-sam Kim Dae-jung Roh Moo-hyun	Lee Myung-bak Park Geun-hye
Presidential power	Strong	Some reduction vis-à-vis ministers	Increasing
Legislative power	Weak	Increasing	Strong
Prime ministerial power	Weak	Increasing	Decreasing
Ministerial power	Weak	Increasing	Decreasing

Sources: Chang (1999); Oh (1999); Jung, Chun, & Oh (2015); Park & Wilding (2016)

1.2. Imperial Presidency

The obvious characteristic of the Park government lies in imperial presidency. The Park government became imperial since it had relied on powers beyond those allowed by the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. As Schlesinger (1973) who wrote "The Imperial Presidency" stated, the presidency under the Park government turned out to be uncontrollable and overly exceeded the constitutional limits. It is because the Park government failed to recognize and adopt the fundamental principle that the Constitution of the Republic of Korea established three separate branches of government- the legislative branch, executive branch, and judicial branch, not for efficiency but to prevent abuse of power. In contrast with the basic philosophy of the Constitution, former president Park arbitrarily exercised power and possessed strong monopoly power ignoring the functions of check and balance. Park had very much influence as to the appointment of most members of government agencies no matter their ranks in hierarchy. It raises a question of what happened to the legitimacy of power and why it occurred.

During the Park administration, there was no relevant mechanism in place to restrict the president's actual power and decision-making authority. That is, any control and monitoring mechanisms for detecting and limiting the arbitrary exercise of power did not work in both the executive branch and the legislative branch. All situational conditions failed to prevent the President Park from monopolizing political power and abusing power. As a consequence, the president had been active and enthusiastic in protecting the Choi family instead of serving Koreans who are taxpayers. One of the remarkable evidence is that Park specifically ordered two culture ministry officials to be dismissed from their positions, after they tried to find an explanation for alleged irregularities in Choi's daughter's appointment to the national dressage team. Although the two public officials only did their job according to professional norms and expertise and owned such legal rights as lifetime employment all government officials held, the direct command from president paralyzed the Constitutional rights of public officials stipulated in the Article 7(2) of the Constitution.

In general, power and authority of Korean president arises from four sources such as the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, the political party a president affiliates, presidential institutions including powerful secretariat, and legitimacy acquired by national election. First of all, the Constitution stipulates a series of presidential status and authority.¹¹For example, the Korean president who can serve for one five-year term is head of government, head of state, chairperson of the Cabinet, and commander in chief of the South Korean armed forces. Also, the president can exercise the power to declare war, propose legislation to the National Assembly, declare a state of emergency, and veto bills. However, the president does not have the power to dissolve the National Assembly. This is why other research framework such as politics-administration dichotomy is additionally used to examine the characteristics of the Park Geun-hye government.

The second power source points to the political party a president affiliates, which is a determining factor making the Korean president as an imperial (Yang, 113).The president has the power to nominate candidates for every election that is a very strong vehicle for controlling the political party and constructing divided government rather than unified government and that result in power distance between the president and the legislature and malfunction of a system of checks and balances. In reality, when it comes to the relationship between the Presidential Office and the legislature, Korean president generally have played a leading role in his/her affiliated political party that controls the legislature and deprives members of the legislature of autonomy and political belief. It led to the Korean Constitutional Court's decision to uphold the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye. As a result, executive power grew farther and further and led to inability to strike the balance between legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

The third base of political power for president lies in the presidential institutions including powerful secretariat. Korean president can have powerful decision-making authority in organizing, staffing, and managing the Presidential Office so-called the Cheong Wa Dae (Blue House). The Presidential Office is supposed to provide both president and senior presidential secretaries with necessary supports for handling state affairs. In light of the Korean history, the Presidential Office had possessed the concentrated decision making power. Many people raised suspicions about the reason why officials in high positions- for example, former presidential chief of staff, former senior presidential secretary for civil affairs, former senior presidential secretary for Policy Coordination, former three closest presidential aides, and ex-Culture Minister and Vice Minister- proactively helped Choi meddle in national affairs to make illegal gains for Choi's family. How could Choi influence and control all of the high-rank officials with official positions and authority? It was mainly due to Choi's undue influences in the Park administration supported by former President Park's power; that is, the key element of imperial presidency enabled Choi's words and commands to exert the same effect with those of President Park.

The influence-peddling political scandal, the Park-Choi gate exemplifies that the whole system of Presidential Office is broken. Above all, the former three closest presidential secretaries were initially recruited by Choi's former husband and a former senior aide to the former President Park. The three aides were nicknamed "three gatekeepers" to Park. According to the report of the Special Prosecution Team, the three aides did not negotiate with Congress, other members of the executive branch, and political groups to implement the president's agendas. Rather, they concentrated on making dogmatic decisions without open communication or information sharing and on protecting the

¹¹ The Article 52, 53, 66, 70, 73, 74, 76, and 77 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea

interests of the president, Choi family and themselves. Also, they completely controlled the flow of essential information and people into the Presidential Office that played roles as a negative version of gatekeepers.

The fourth source for power of president consists in ensuring legitimacy that is acquired by presidential election. The former President Park was elected through national election so that the Park administration at least began with legal-rational authority. In contrast, the Chun Doo-hwan government severely attempted to create legitimacy in government to dilute the fact and image of the military dictatorship. This is why the Kim Young-sam government was named the first “civil government” as a symbol of the legitimate regime change. Similarly, the two definitions of presidencies like “people’s government” (the Kim Dae-jung government) and “participatory government” (the Noh Moo-hyun government) express the significance of regime’s legitimacy which influences the scope and degree of presidential power.

Imperial presidency was clearly evidenced by the former President Park’s involvement in creating a so-called culture “blacklist,” through which artists were refused state subsidies. According to the investigation findings by the special prosecutor, Park and Choi conspired in committing many crimes, including creating a blacklist to intentionally discriminate against artists critical of the Park government along with a “whitelist” used to selectively support people in cultural sector who are in favor of the government. In 2017, the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (BAI) conducted the comprehensive auditing and inspection of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism.¹² BAI found more than 400 cases that the ministry had been illegally and unfairly discriminated specific cultural organizations or artists who were unfavorable to government. For instance, it turned out that the ministry arbitrarily made decisions on the awarding of grants in accordance with the orders from the Presidential Office, administered policy programs without proper feasibility studies, and did unlawful budget execution. BAI requested the minister of responsible authority to take a disciplinary action on public officials who violated laws and regulations and made crucial remarks that public officials did not raise an objection to their superiors in spite of illegal or unjust orders. It is evident that the existence of blacklist for artists seriously infringes on the freedom of thought and conscience explicitly guaranteed by the Korean Constitution. None could imagine a likelihood of creating the blacklist as a means to discriminate and control anti-government artists in the context of the democratic Korean society, especially considering the fact that such a shocking event occurred under military dictatorship about 30 years ago in Korea.

The second evidence for negative effects of imperial presidency is one of the powerful apparatus that belongs to the Presidential Office. The Civil Affairs Administration Division of the Presidential Office failed to detect, prevent, and remove certain kind of corruption committed by President’s relatives and associates. What is worse, the chief staff of the division played a key role in assisting Choi to interfere with national affairs, seek private gains, and involve in unjust, illegal acts across public administration. The Special Prosecution team and a series of trials discovered the fact that Choi deterministically requested the former President Park to appoint him as a chief staff of the Presidential Office because of Choi’s personal network with his family. It is very ironic to see that the person in charge of preventing corruption of president’s relatives and associates kept a cozy

¹² In December 2016, the National Assembly asked the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (BAI) to carry out a thorough inspection on the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism in regard to the political corruption scandal, Park-Choi gate. From January to March 2017, BAI inspected the operation of the ministry and announced the final inspection reports in June 2017.

relationship with Choi and commit illegal and unethical conducts by taking advantage of his official position and authority for personal interests. In addition to the failure in checking corruption inside the Presidential Office, there was no high-ranking and independent organization ensuring an independent investigation on corrupt practices of senior officials in public agencies.

The third evidence for strengthening imperial presidency is the president's power exercised in personnel management, especially in the case of the Senior Civil Service (SCS) positions filled by career employees or political appointments. The original purpose of adopting the SCS in 2006 was to increase competitiveness and openness of government and to recruit competent, professional staff as a reform initiative under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. However, the SCS resulted in Park's misuse of power given by the people for private gains at the cost of crucial values such as democracy, fairness, legitimacy, and law and order. The representative example is that Park ordered the demotion and dismissal of public officials in the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, which violate the constitutional rights of government officials.¹³ These all contribute to explain why the Park-Choi gate took place in South Korea.

1.3. Bureaucracy Theory

Weber (1962) described the bureaucratic form as an ideal way of organizing public agencies. His arguments are supported by the reality that the bureaucratic form in the public and private sectors is adopted by lots of countries all over the world, although bureaucracy is well known to produce a set of disadvantages including rigidity, red tape, paperwork, goal displacement, and impersonality (pp. 650-578). Weber's bureaucracy theory can explain why the Park-Choi gate occurred and what outcomes can be produced in the event of failure to abide by the principles of bureaucracy theory.

Weber's Principle of Bureaucracy: Technical Competence

Weber's bureaucracy theory indicates that organizational roles are held on the basis of technical competence, not because of social status, kinship, or heredity. The evident characteristic of the Korean civil service system lies in the classification system of non-elective government officials on the basis of qualification and technical competence. During the Park administration, the way of personnel administration in the Presidential Office, government agencies, public foundations, and Korean ambassador positions was very similar to the spoils system. The investigation of the Special Prosecution team, the verdict of the Constitutional Court, and trials found that Park's close confidant, Choi as a civilian without official position arbitrarily wielded power by assigning public positions to her relatives or close friends for the purpose of seeking her personal gains thanks to unlimited support and delegation of decision-making authority from Park. Even a minister was fired by reason of different political viewpoints and administration styles from president and her secretariats in the Presidential Office. Park government's personnel management was full of abnormal, corrupt practices including the practices of "revolving door greetings" and parachute personnel employment as a result of bribes-for-special-favors. A series of illegal and irrational events by excluding the merit system posed the greatest threat to uphold the fundamental principle of bureaucracy that shapes the public administration field.

¹³ One of the claims in the impeachment bill is Park's infringement of the freedom of speech and press which belong to the Constitutional rights. But, insufficient evidence made it possible to conclude that Park pressured the Korean newspaper SegyeIlbo to fire its CEO for publishing an exposé concerning the Presidential Office leak (<http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=2998555>).

The recruitment based on merit such as test through open competition constitutes the essence of bureaucratic administration. Choi caused the massive corruption scandal by using presidential powers at will to pocket billions of won, interfere in state affairs and gain her daughter illegal high-school graduation and college admission. She was accused of having influenced Ewha Womans University to change their admission criteria to make her daughter get admission to university and earn credits without attendance. Ewha Womans University also takes a bureaucratic form, so the major principles of bureaucracy should have applied to the university. The university's failure to follow the criteria for selection and promotion of students consequently contributed to enlarge the scope of the Park-Choi gate and resulted in legal punishment for the university president, professors, and university employees.

Weber's Principle of Bureaucracy: Hierarchy of Authority

Weber's bureaucracy theory notes that the organization of roles in a bureaucracy is determined by each lower office in the hierarchy under the control and supervision of a higher office. This is a principle of the chain of command which effectively applied to the Presidential Office and government agencies in the policy making and implementation process during the Park administration. In the event of the creation of blacklist and whitelist, Park gave direct order to the former Culture Minister and the minister ordered to high ranking officials according to the reporting command line. Despite various advantages of bureaucracy, superior's control over subordinates based on the principle of hierarchy of authority made the ex-Culture Minister blindly obey to Park's orders over the blacklisting of cultural figures. The culture ministry granted conservative artists and denied liberal artists state subsidies. Namely, the culture ministry "controlled" the artists through the three key art organizations (the Arts Council Korea, Korean Film Council and the Korea Publishing Publication Industry Promotion Agency) to which artists file applications seeking state subsidies for their projects. Put simply, the hierarchical order among the executive branch made it possible to administer national affairs with no question asked.

According to the SBS Broadcasting news documentary, "The Birth of Power" televised on April 30, 2017, if anyone raises different opinions to Park, she immediately tends to express unpleasantness while she smiles whenever anyone agrees to her ideas. In a similar context, the news documentary visualizes what happened in every cabinet meetings focusing on body languages of Park compared to those of all ministers, as a satire. Park is the only one talking, more exactly reading the prepared manuscripts, and other ministers are very busy with taking memo in respective prepared notepads without talking or making eye contacts. The image of the meeting is not up for information exchange, discussion, and two-way communication, but up for top-down command or one-way notification that is unchallengeable and irrefutable. Why did all ministers keep writing down Park's speech despite a stenographer always took the entire session of speech and dialogue down in shorthand and distribute the minutes to all ministries right after cabinet meetings? This is a product of placing unnecessary and excessive emphasis on the principle of bureaucracy- hierarchy of authority.

It is astounding that no single person in the Korean civil service system said "no" to former President Park and to high-rank public officials. In the U.S., former Acting Attorney General Sally Yates and several bureaucrats in Department of Finance opposed to President Donald Trump's executive order on immigration. President Trump fired Sally Yates for the reason that she betrayed the Department of Justice by refusing to defend his executive order restricting travel and immigration from seven majority-Muslim countries. What makes differences in the attitude of government employees between the two countries? It seems that it is not due to quality of individual public official,

but due to the institution of civil service system. The United State government adopts an open career system, the position classification system while South Korea takes the hierarchy system in main and the position classification system in part as a closed career system. Relatively, public officials in the U.S. are more likely to say “no” to their superiors when pushed against their will and make voices based on their belief system since they have a great deal of opportunities to change jobs owing to an open flow of employment between the public and the private sectors. On the contrary, Korean public officials take it for granted that they have to obey any commands from superiors and that civil service system means lifetime employment, considering the lack of free flow of employment from the public to private areas. In Korea, the Government Officials Act explicitly prescribes that public officials are obliged to obey superiors’ work-related commands (Section 7, 57).

Weber’s Principle of Bureaucracy: Recordkeeping, Rules and Regulations

Weber’s bureaucracy theory states that first, administrative acts, decisions, and rules should be formulated and put in writing (written document like files) and second, rules, standard operating procedures, and norms should be used to control the behavior and the relationship between roles in an organization. Most public administration was fulfilled by direct orders from the Presidential Office after chief secretaries took orders from Park. Detailed rules and regulations are necessary for government officials as a frame of reference regarding work behavior and work performance. But, in the event of the creation of both blacklist and whitelist and the extortion of donations from big conglomerates to establish foundations, any rules and regulations as well as record keeping did not apply. Instead of the system of rules and standard operating procedures, three chiefs of staff to the Presidential Office called “three gatekeepers” delivered president’s agendas in accordance with their own rules by adjusting the flow of information and persons to the Presidential Office. Therefore, the principle of record keeping as to government decisions and actions in both original and draft forms was disregarded. Without keeping records on national affairs, most decision-making processes among public agencies and the Presidential Office under the Park government were performed by an informal channel of communication such as private meetings or phone calls.¹⁴ Consequently, the loop hole in administering the Korean civil service system as a subsystem of public administration contributed to make the Park-Choi gate happen and continue for a considerable period of time without any halt or restriction from public agencies, political parties, judicial system, mass media, or the public.

On July 26, 2016, Cable news channel TV Chosun first reported that the Presidential Office forced a few conglomerates to donate almost 80 billion won (\$71.8 million) to Mir Foundation, a newly founded nonprofit organization aimed at promoting Korean culture to the world. The report said Park’s former senior secretary for policy coordination used his power in the coercive fundraising by pressuring the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI). In addition, Choi built another nonprofit organization, K-Sports foundation intended to promote Korean sports that also received donation from the businesses. The news media raised huge suspicions about whether Choi used her personal ties with Park to extort donations from big firms to establish the two foundations she controlled, why the two foundations were formed in the first place, and who actually ran the organizations. Park and Choi

¹⁴ As examples for government decisions that are inconsistent with the established system of rules, regulations and SOPs in government bureaucracy, policy-making decisions on the deployment of a terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) missile defense, the agreement between Korea and Japan on the issue of sex slavery, and nomination of four ministers of national government who have extraordinary demerits in professional and ethical aspects caused a lot of argument and suspicion to the Korean society. The prosecutor’s office, the Special Prosecution Team, and trials ascribed these contentious policy decisions as Choi’s interference in key national policy making and personnel appointment for high-rank positions as a means to gain personal, financial benefits.

defended the two foundations as contributors to her policy of “cultural prosperity” in South Korea.

On November 20, 2016, for the first time, the prosecution named an incumbent President as a “criminal suspect” on the ground that Park was involved in forcing conglomerates to donating a large amount of money to Choi’s two foundations. The evidence was that right after Park had lunch with 17 heads of top conglomerates on July 24, 2016 and explained the objective of the two nonprofit organizations, most of them made big donations. In particular, Park and Choi targeted the specific conglomerates in desperate need of special favor from the Presidential Office such as special amnesty to chiefs of big firm, special tax breaks, or favorable government interventions. With Park’s direct involvement and support, Choi made the behind-the-scenes deals with chiefs of businesses. It represents atypical phenomenon of crony capitalism (bribe in return for business favors) that is deeply rooted in the Korean society as a product of the legacy from government-driven rapid economic growth. Also, some senior government officials at the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism offered special favor to Choi when she planned to establish the Mir and K-Sports Foundations, to raise funds from the business, and to receive a legal permission for the establishment of the two foundations. In fact, bureaucrats in the Ministry acted swiftly on the order of a delegate like Choi and took only a single day to grant approval to the two foundations in question, but usually take at least several weeks.

Weber’s Principle of Bureaucracy: Impersonality

Weber noted impersonal authority and impersonal relations as the main features of bureaucracy. It means that office bearer should not bring the office with him/her because of the separation of person from position. Public officials can exercise decision making authority on the ground that their authority is endowed by the official government positions, not by the individual officials. In a similar context, superiors should be formal in dealings with their subordinates, which correspond to the bureaucratic administration. As major reasons for the Park-Choi gate, this paper discusses the absence of clear separation between politics and administration and excessive imperial presidency. In addition to these two reasons, the failure to abide by the principle of impersonal authority and impersonal relations can explain the Park-Choi gate. All parties concerned used their official authority to achieve personal interests. This is especially true for President Park, the Presidential Office, ministers, public corporations, and public officials who were involved in the Park-Choi gate.

1.4. New Public Management (NPM) Paradigm

As a global phenomenon, the New Public Management (NPM) was prevalently adopted by many countries across the world including Korea. In particular, Korea had placed excessive emphasis on NPM doctrines and regarded them as an effective cure-all for all kinds of problems in the arena of public administration and management. In reality, as a number of previous studies on NPM suggests, the NPM-inspired reforms were implemented through a variety of management techniques and practices drawn mainly from the private sector such as decentralizing management within public services, providing flexibility, increasing use of markets and competition in the provision of public services, optimizing information technology, improving the quality of regulation, and increasing focus on performance, outputs and customer orientation (Hood, 1991; Kickert, 1997; OECD, 1995; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Above all, persistent emphasis on output controls measured by quantitative performance indicators had changed a wide range of public sector management involving contracting-out and other market-type mechanisms for public service provision. Korean government had carried out performance evaluation with a view to assessing public policy programs, public service delivery,

public agencies, and each individual public official through various methods such as Integrated Public Service Evaluation System (IPSES), balanced scorecards (BSC), performance appraisal system, performance agreement system, performance-related pay (PRP), and 360 degree feedback.

Two-thirds of OECD member countries implemented performance-related pay (PRP) or are still implementing (OECD, 2005). With wide variations in the degree of PRP applied throughout an entire civil service system, South Korea have had an extensive, formalized PRP policy that directly links performance evaluation to pay as a tool for motivating public officials and individually hold them accountable. However, as a large number of studies pinpointed, performance measurement and assessment in the public sector involve inherent limitations no matter how performance pay is an appealing idea. First of all, the notion of performance is multi-dimensional, complicated so that it is difficult to come up with the most accurate definition, to find the most valid measurement indicators, qualitative or quantitative, and to design different sets of PRP systems applied to different dimensions across public agencies, public positions, public roles, and policies. Second, previous research showed conflicting conclusion in regard to the direct causal relationship between PRP and performance as a result of motivational effects. As such, if the influence of performance pay on performance improvement is ambivalent, one of the NPM doctrines- focus on performance and pay determination system based on performance- may leave much to be desired.

According to Ibrahim (2012), NPM reforms are not relevant applied to some developing countries for several reasons: first, despite the NPM model aims at enhancing transparency and eradicating corruption in the public sector, it tends to create such opposite effects as a greater prevalence of corruption; Second, developing countries are likely to fail to manage the public sector according to market-based principles due to inadequate infrastructure and a lack of experience and know-how in operating markets (Mongkol, 2011); Third, developing countries tend to show strong resistance to decentralization due to the long history and culture of centralization in the public sector (Mongkol, 2011); Fourth, in developing countries, the absence of legal foundation related to the adoption and management of contracting out as an innovative option for public service delivery system obstructs successful administration of NPM (Hughes, 1998). Apart from the fact that Korea is not a developing country, several aforementioned reasons correspond to the Korea's situations such as a high rate of corruption in the public sector,¹⁵ long history of centralization and culture of centralized decision-making,¹⁶ and insufficient experience of managing public agencies based on market mechanism.

When first introducing and applying the NPM principles to the Korean public administration arena, there was no in-depth, deliberative investigation regarding to what extent the NPM model would be relevant to the context of Korea and which element of NPM reform could be suitable or unsuitable for the public sector of Korea and Korean culture. It is true that NPM has been very prevalent, attractive trend and boom actively employed by many countries all over the world. However, it does not mean that NPM is a precise combination of guidelines or a standard package that ensures successful outcomes or that should be followed entirely by any countries. Rather, more

¹⁵ According to the 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) reported by Transparency International, South Korea is the 52 least corrupt country out of 175 countries. The average corruption rank is 41.77 from 1995 to 2016, reaching a record high of 52 in 1999 and a record low of 27 in 1996.

¹⁶ Local assemblies were constituted in 1991 and elections of the head of local government were initiated in 1995. It is fair to say that the full-scale enforcement of local government law in Korea was existed from 1991 (Yang, 2001).

reasonable thinking indicates the recognition of NPM as a useful set of approaches and techniques that can be employed collectively or partially according to each country's different circumstances (Mongkol, 2011).

Although reservations about NPM policy leave many basic issues unanswered,¹⁷ Korean governments had actively continued to adopt the well-known patterns of NPM, particularly since the Kim Young-sam administration. The NPM paradigm spread around the world and was particularly successful in some countries such as the UK, the US, New Zealand, and Australia. Then, as compared to other many countries that are receptive to internationally propagated NPM ideas, how the NPM paradigm affect the Park administration in terms of the Park-Choi gate? NPM focuses mainly on the outcomes rather than the process of implementation. Public policies formulated during the Park administration completely disregarded the entire public policy process including agenda setting, policy formation, and citizen participation in decision making. As a result, overreliance on measurable quantitative outputs as a proxy of performance did harm to procedural rationality as well as content rationality that is essential to the public policy process.

Characteristics of the Governance under Park Administration: Good or Bad Governance?

Based on the causes for the Park-Choi gate, analyzed by four theoretical frameworks- politics-administration relations, imperial presidency, bureaucracy theory, and the NPM paradigm, this paper evaluates the characteristics of the governance under the Park administration in terms of key elements of good governance. According to the World Bank, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project reports governance indicators for over 200 countries and territories over the period 1996-2015 for six dimensions of governance: control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and absence of violence, rule of law, regulatory quality, and voice/accountability. This paper discusses the characteristics of the Park administration in terms of the good governance indicators of the World Bank, shown as in Table 7.

Table 7. World Bank's WGI (Worldwide Governance Indicators)

Control of corruption	Extent to which public power is exercised for private gain including both petty and grand forms of corruption as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests
Government effectiveness	Quality of public services, quality of civil service, and degree of its dependence from political pressures, quality of policy formulation and implementation, and credibility of government's commitment to such policies
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism	Likelihood of political stability and/or politically-motivated violence including terrorism
Rule of law	Extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by rules of society, and in particular the quality of
Regulatory quality	Ability of government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development
Voice and accountability	Extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media

¹⁷ For instance, Kim (2000) pointed out a set of main counterarguments against imitating business management and applying the western public management methods to other countries without serious deliberation.

According to the 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) reports by Transparency International, South Korea is the 52 least corrupt country out of 175 countries (refer to footnote 14). According to the public opinion poll conducted by one of the major newspapers Kukminilbo, citizen opinion on the causes of the Park-Choi gate indicates the corruption of high-rank public officials and the upper class (47.8%), serious flaws in the presidential system (21.1%), crony capitalism (11.5%), nepotism and egoism (11.1%), lack of citizens' monitoring (3.7%), and don't know (3.6%) listed in the order of importance.¹⁸ The finding represents a considerable amount of inner rage felt by most Koreans due to the breakdown of democracy and fairness as a result of the Park-Choi gate. The occurrence of political corruption scandal in South Korea itself signifies the misuse of public powers for illegitimate private gains. In reality, the Park-Choi gate took various forms of political scandal including bribery, extortion, cronyism, influence peddling, and nepotism.

The ground for the final decision of the Constitutional Court for Park's impeachment lies in the violation of the South Korean Constitution and other laws of official duty. Specifically, the four claims in the impeachment bill are on 1) the violation of national sovereignty and the rule of law by granting political power to Park's aide Choi, 2) Park's abuse of power in appointment of government officials, 3) Park's infringement of the freedom of speech/press, and 4) the violation of duty to protect the right to life and to faithfully carry out presidential responsibilities. In this regard, the Park administration can be described as the lack of key elements of good governance such as the rule of law. In addition, the Constitutional Court found that Park ordered the Presidential Policy Advisor to establish the two foundations and granted her friend Choi to extort more than \$69 million from conglomerates. This is a direct violation of the Constitution, the businesses' freedom of corporate management and the right to property. It shows the Park administration with no regulatory quality, one of the important indicators of good governance.

In terms of other good governance indicator- government effectiveness, during the Park Geun-hye government, the relation between politics and administration applies to the Svava's (2006) responsive administrators model. Judging from the number of legislator-initiated enactment and the percentage of administrator-initiated enactment, the Park government had high degree of dependence from political pressures. Another feature in the Park government is the increasing politicization of presidency along with the decreasing power of both ministers and prime minister and a set of contentious policy decisions made by the Park administration. One of the typical work behaviors of government officials is to make no effort for improvement in performing national affairs. Government officials usually think that it is judicious to just watch and wait on any problems or tasks since decision-making and administration necessarily make them hold accountable. Some Korean scholars named this as "public officials without souls" problem in the Korean bureaucracy. In short, these all examples manifest the lack of government effectiveness during the Park government.

As a consequence, the impeached President Park and the Park administration failed to assume public accountability, which is a good governance indicator. Judging from the accountability perspective proposed by Romzek and Dubnick (1987), the Park government failed to ensure legal accountability, professional accountability, and political accountability. As the Constitutional Court, the Special Prosecution team and trials proved, the Park administration violated multiple laws and organizational activities were not placed in the hands of public officials with expertise because of

¹⁸ Source: public opinion poll by the newspaper Kukminilbo with the Korean Society Opinion Institute (KSIOI) from Dec, 1 to 3(N=1000 adults nationwide, margin of error= 31% at the 95% significance level) (Kukminilbo, December 9, 2016).

Park’s overreliance on her aide Choi. In light of a majority of anti-Park protests for a certain period of time, the Park administration did not seek political accountability due to the lack of responsiveness to the general public, elected officials, and interest groups. By comparison, the Park administration focused mainly on pursuing bureaucratic accountability by placing the highest priority on the top of bureaucratic hierarchy, the former President Park including the Presidential Office. It appears that the inordinate pursuit of bureaucratic accountability together with failure to assume legal, political, and professional accountability prohibited the Park government from performing state affairs in an effective and efficient manner. Put simply, the Park administration can be boiled down to bad governance.

Table. 8. Types of Accountability Systems

		Source of Agency control	
		Internal	External
Degree of Control Over Agency Actions	High	Bureaucratic	Legal
	Low	Professional	Political

Source: Romzek & Dubnick (1987: 229)

Conclusion

In light of history in the Korean politics, a president appears to have the same meaning with an almost almighty power. In particular, the former President Park Chung-hee, the impeached President Park’s father, was very well known for dictatorship and his daughter Park grew up learning how the president as a military dictator governed the nation in complete control. Under the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee, people who were against him were subject to punishment including torture and imprisonment, or worse, death. Even after the dictatorial regime passed a long time ago, some of the old generation still regards Korean president as someone whose power cannot be challenged or objected under any circumstances. This explains why a series of pro-Park protests in opposition to candlelight rallies held by many older people including traditional “Park the Elder” supporters during the most chaotic period.

South Korea could have a chance to have a genuine democracy when Kim Young-sam became Korea’s first civilian president in 1993 after three decades of military ruler Park Chung-hee. The most genuine meaning of functioning democracy was established by Kim Dae-jung who took power in 1998. Relatively, young generation witnessed one of the most critical events-parliamentary impeachment of former President Roh Moo-hyun in 2003. The national Assembly dominated by the opposition Grand National Party passed the impeachment motion for Roh for the reason that he made supportive comments about his political party. For the first time, the impeachment motion made the general public recognize that presidential powers can be challenged and stripped off. In this case, politician tried to strip the former President Roh off his power, not by the people themselves.

Recently, the younger generation experienced the final ruling of Park’s impeachment by the Constitutional Court, originating from the National Assembly’s motion of impeachment. Park became the first democratically elected president to be forced to leave office by politicians, the judicial system, and the majority of anti-Park citizens with candlelight. Now, all generations in South Korea perceive

that there is no absolute power, not even for a president and that people can make a president resign from office. The unique attributes of politics and government governed in previous administrations leave trails and still affect the Korean society. That is, the outdated Korean political system which has been mired in corruption, cronyism and factionalism still has a strong impact on politics and public administration at present. The Park-Choi gate and Park's impeachment clearly verifies the influence of political culture deeply rooted in Korean politics, presidency and public administration.

Then, it is time to offer an answer to the title of this paper. It appears that South Korea needs a "bridge over troubled water" that can serve as a window of opportunity for the fresh beginning of good governance aiming to lift the country to the next level and to buffer a deep division among people by correcting every dimension of bad governance during the Park administration. First of all, the new president Moon Jae-in has to change the rules of game by reforming the country's political system concentrating on setting a clear boundary: 1) between politics and administration and b) between politics and business. South Korea needs a strong, outspoken, legitimate, and decisive president with powerful leadership skills instead of seeking imperial presidency. Basically, it is imperative to form a culture that president, elected officials, public officials, staff at the Presidential Office, politicians, CEOs, and scholars can say "no" when they are pushed against public interests, fairness, legality, rationality, and transparency. To do it, unwavering efforts

Now, in South Korea, most people agree that greater attention should be placed on calls for political, administrative, and institutional reforms to be implemented. This is the way to prove a series of countrywide anti-government demonstrations with candlelight change politics, government, and public administration and transform "people power" into positive dynamics. What should South Korea have to prevent a repeat of the Park-Choi gate? The Korean civil service system needs to learn something from the Park-Choi gate as organizational learning accompanied by correcting problems of the system. South Korea needs to change the rules of game by overhauling the nation's political system as well as reforming public administration/management systems. Under the new government, collusive ties between politics and business need to be severed, while public administration and management should play roles in preventing and monitoring the ties.

It cannot be argued that the Park-Choi corruption scandal disgraced the nation and made the people angry and frustrate with the Park administration for secretly allowing the ordinary Choi with no official or professional title to interfere in important state affairs without rein. Nevertheless, the new phenomenon should not be underestimated in that a series of candlelight rallies in peace and order were not led by political parties, politicians, interest groups, labor unions, and religious groups but held voluntarily by the people, for an extended period of time. Despite there are also many people critical of the candlelight protests, by means of a huge, peaceful crowd gathering, collective voices of the people absolutely forced the National Assembly to pass the impeachment motion on December 9, 2016 and finally opened the door for the Constitutional Court to uphold the parliamentary impeachment. In this regard, the scale, duration, and characteristics of the candlelit rallies shed meaningful lights on the future of South Korea.¹⁹

The year 2016, so-called the year of a historic "candlelight revolution," implies that Koreans will continue to have a bigger say in national affairs, politics, presidency, Presidential Office, and public administration through various avenues in 2017. It is for sure citizens will not keep silent about

¹⁹ What started as a crowd of 200,000 on Oct. 29 in downtown Seoul grew to 1 million on Nov. 12, 1.9 million nationwide on Nov. 26 and a record 2.32 million on Dec. 3(The Korea Times, December 30, 2016).

injustice, corruption, abuse of public power and evils of imperial presidency after they voiced their opinions with candles and learned how much the united candles changed many things and made real differences in the Korean society. The impeachment of the president and legal punishment for both secretaries of the Presidential Office and government officials involved in the corruption scandal can be a good precedent that public figures who are sworn to serve the people for public interests lacking responsibility and morality should be punished. With this significant event as a momentum, further intensive research on the Park-Choi gate including this paper is expected to be a “bridge over troubled water” for the purpose of accomplishing a new South Korea. In order to start all over again, we need to liquidate the old problematic systems that caused the Park-Choi gate. Thus, it is necessary to make the responsible people and groups for the Park-Choi gate to take into account for their decisions and actions, to rebuild national anti-corruption and integrity system, to recreate culture preventing political scandals, and to deliberate on good governance and bad governance.

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