

# T05P07 / International Administrative Governance: Studying the Policy Impact of International Public Administrations

**Topic :** T05 / Policy Formulation, Administration and Policymakers

**Chair :** Jörn Ege (German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer / University of Exeter)

**Second Chair :** Michael Bauer (German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer)

## GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE

International public administrations (IPAs), i.e., the secretariats of international (governmental) organizations (IOs) that constitute the international counterparts to national administrative bodies, wield independent influence on the development and implementation of public policies (Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009). While scholars of Public Administration and Public Policy regularly investigate the impact of organizational structures and personnel of ministerial bureaucracies and executive agencies on policy-making (Aberbach et al., 1981; Maggetti and Verhoest, 2014), such research questions have only recently been posed at the level above the nation state (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Bauer et al., 2016; Stone and Ladi, 2015). Previous research has successfully identified different administrative, political and context-related factors that might enable bureaucratic influence to occur. However, integrative approaches that allows for the systematic empirical analysis of several explanatory factors under a common theoretical framework are rare (Eckhard and Ege, 2016). More specifically, the state of the art can be characterized by three deficiencies: 1) Research on IPA influence is often characterized by a focus on single instances of influence. Thus, the conditions under which international bureaucracies influence policy-making (and their relative importance in terms of explanatory power) are a matter of academic controversy. 2) Factors related to the bureaucratic fabric of IOs such as administrative fragmentation, specialization, and differentiation have thus far remained outside the focus of most empirical analyses, and efforts to link administrative patterns to IPA influence are largely missing. 3) It has also been critically observed that pertinent research is characterized by a bias toward positive (or successful) instances of IPA influence (Busch, 2014, p. 57). Cases where influence is absent are rarely included in the analysis. This makes it difficult to test the explanatory power of different potential causes of influence and take into account the possibility of asymmetric causality.

Against this background, the panel aims to contribute to the current debate by probing into what could be called an *international administrative governance* perspective on IOs in order to study the policy impact of IPAs more systematically (see Knill and Bauer, 2016). The proposed perspective is a heuristic scheme that puts administrative tools center stage and links them to IO policy-making. Similar to a conceptualization introduced by Hood that views nodality, authority, treasure, and organization as central government tools (Hood and Margetts, 2007), we suggest focusing on the administrative toolkit for policy-related action available to IPAs. Based on this (broadly understood) perspective, the panel aims to attract scholars from different social science disciplines that study the administrative toolkit in order to conceptualize, describe and explain the policy impact of IPAs. In view of the deficiencies outline above, we hope that taking specific IPAs as the analytical starting point and comparing its administrative resources, external relations, and networking activities will improve our understanding of international administrative governance and how it matters for policy-making above the state.

### References

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## CALL FOR PAPERS

International public administrations (IPAs), i.e., the secretariats of international (governmental) organizations (IOs) that constitute the international counterparts to national administrative bodies, wield independent influence on the development and implementation of public policies. Previous research has successfully identified different administrative, political and context-related factors that might enable bureaucratic influence to occur. However, an integrative approaches that allows for a comparative empirical analysis of several explanatory factors under a common theoretical framework are rare. Thus, we still lack systematic knowledge of how international administrative bodies affect policy-making processes of IOs and global governance more generally. Against this background, the panel aims to contribute to the current debate by probing into what could be called an *international administrative governance* perspective on IOs in order to study the policy impact of IPAs more systematically. The proposed perspective is a heuristic scheme that puts administrative tools such as (network) centrality, different forms of authority, financial means and organizational structures center stage and links them to public policy-making at the international or global level. Starting from the assumption that policy-making is a result of strategic interactions among multiple political, administrative and societal actors that vary substantially in terms of policy-making constraints and resources, the panel aims to combine two major questions:

- Focusing on the dependent variable: How can we conceptualize and measure the influence of IPAs on policy-making within and outside IOs?
- Focusing on the independent variables: What are relevant administrative tools and strategies and how are they used during the interaction with political and societal actors?

The panel invites conceptual and empirical papers on the role of IPAs in the provision of (global) public policy that may come from a variety of disciplines such as Policy Analysis, Public Administration, International Relations and Comparative Politics. Preferential treatment is given to comparative papers that combine theoretical work with systematic empirical analyses.

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## Session 1

Friday, June 30th 08:15 to 10:15 (Block B 3 - 4)

### Discussants

Kim Moloney (Hamad Bin Khalifa University)

Ronny Patz (LMU München)

### Studying the policy influence of International Public Administrations – A conceptual framework

Jörn Ege (German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer / University of Exeter)

Michael Bauer (German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer)

In this paper, we propose an approach to conceptualize and systematically measure the influence of International Public Administrations (IPAs) on policy-making in international (governmental) organizations (IOs). IPAs, i.e., the secretariats of IOs that constitute the international counterparts to national administrative bodies, wield independent influence on the development and implementation of public policies. Previous research has successfully identified different administrative, political and context-related factors that might enable administrative influence to occur. However, integrative approaches that allows for a comparative empirical analysis of several explanatory factors under a common theoretical framework are rare. Thus, we still lack *systematic* knowledge of how international administrative bodies affect policy-making processes of IOs and global governance more generally. Against this background, we aim to contribute to the current debate in three ways. 1) We take stock of previous research on administrative influence, 2) introduce a conceptual framework and 3) develop a measurement scheme for administrative influence. Thus, the paper focuses primarily on administrative influence as the dependent variable. In order to explain administrative influence, the paper also proposes an explanatory model, which explicitly takes into account the role of IPAs' bureaucratic autonomy.

### The Policy Impact of International Financial Regulatory Regimes above the States. New forms of global administrative governance?

Erica Gorbak (University of Buenos Aires-Harvard Law School)

Globalization has eroded the boundaries that separate governors from the governed, has eroded the distinction between public and private, has opened the game to many different players, has made domestic financial markets become cross market and multilateral cooperative; has transformed law and politics.

In this framework, international financial regulatory bodies/networks of different types and nature (e.g. the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Financial Stability Board (ex FSF), the highly political and state centered forum G20 that appears to be making policy and such policy making is the opposite of international law) were created or reformulated to promote financial stability and prevent systematic risk.

The global financial crisis in the aftermath of the financial shocks of 2007-2008 was a challenge to three of the most promising institutions of international law: the WTO, the IMF and the international network of regulatory agencies such as the Basel Committee and the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and it was a challenge they failed to meet.

The standards development process they follow is quite different from that of a legislative or governmental

body or a domestic regulator. "Soft" international regulations - like the expert and technical BC recommendations- get filtered into domestic regulatory systems and while not legally binding, national governments and lawmakers are factually bound to implement them and are lately assessed. Global standards impact them and affect state and non state actors differently. Global financial regulation now works like a legal system, even as it is propounded by institutions that do not claim to be acting with the force of law.

From this transnational interaction many concerns arise and the primitive question on how are we governed and who governs is brought up again. Furthermore, global networks face a serious democratic and legitimacy deficit. Can domestic administrative law principles be a legitimate basis for the regulation of Global Networks? If not, should global administrative law standards be developed to legitimate Global Networks? Greater transparency, legitimacy, accountability, efficacy need to be encouraged at the global level. However, the ultimate need will rest on the domestic level. Consequently, a shift in the paradigm of administrative law is required to successfully reconcile inconsistencies between the global and the domestic order.

In this context, it is necessary to conceptualize, describe and explain the policy impact that these financial institutions have above states to identify how they affect policy making processes within the international organizations and outside them. In this paper we will take specific financial regimes to study them making both a theoretical analysis and combining it with an empirical analysis to better assess their impact in international or global administrative governance.

## **Resource mobilization strategies and administrative structures in the United Nations system**

Ronny Patz (LMU München)

Klaus H Goetz (University of Munich)

Successful resource mobilization has evolved into a key goal for many present-day International Public Administrations (IPAs). A large number of international organizations (IOs) depend to significant shares (on often earmarked) voluntary contributions. In the UN system, organizations such as UNICEF or UNHCR have had to mobilize close to 100% of their funding without support from the core UN budget since their creation. Specialized agencies like WHO have moved in the past two decades towards budgets that require 80% voluntary support and extensive mobilization efforts, including from major private donors. These dynamics are well-known to practitioners and have also received increased attention in International Relations (IR) and Public Administration (PA) recently. However, little is still known about what role the administrations of IOs play in developing or adapting resource mobilization strategies and about how IPAs structure resource mobilization as a core function internally. Our key expectation is that, in order to successfully address permanent and emerging challenges that their IOs face, IPAs will play a central role in shaping their IOs resourcing strategies, thereby substantially influencing global public policy-making.

To test this expectation and to follow-up on earlier research, this paper presents rich empirical evidence gathered from UN Joint Inspection Unit reports, official UN documents related to the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR) and interviews with officials in UN, ILO, UNESCO and WHO to show that resource mobilization has become a core function of individual IOs, shaped by IOs' policy profiles and their direct environment. However, going beyond previous findings, we demonstrate how resource mobilization is also a systemic feature of the UN system as a whole. In this system, we see dynamics of cooperation between IPAs, competition among organizations for the same funds as well as macro-dynamics of resource availability shaped by global geopolitical and economic dynamics.

Based on these observations and theoretical insights from PA, IR, Organizational Sociology and Public Management, we develop a theoretical model to explain the choice of different types of resource mobilization strategies and the related administrative structures within the UN system. The paper thus contributes to the evolution of theory in IR and PA and is the starting point for a research project on the administration of resource mobilization in the international system.

## **Partial Two-Way Mirror: International Organization Budget Transparency**

Kim Moloney (Hamad Bin Khalifa University)

Our paper evaluates the budget transparency of international organizations. Building on IMF, OECD, and Open Budget Index standards for sovereign-state budget transparency, we create a first-of-its-kind 104-item budget transparency measure reflective of international organization characteristics. International

organizations are important global dispensers of accumulated knowledge. This includes the purveying of advice on member-state budget transparency. Despite this role, we find neither the World Bank nor the UN Development Programme or the OECD to be fully transparent although the World Bank comes closest.

Note: The second author is Rayna Stoycheva. She is registered with IPPA but the IPPA "Submit Paper" mechanism only allows me to enter my name. Author order: Kim Moloney, Rayna Stoycheva.

## **An Examination of Institutional Bias in Providers of Legal Advisory Technical Assistance on Selected Trade and Investment Issues: Implications for Developing Countries**

Kiyoshi Adachi (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)

Developing countries are sometimes assisted by the secretariats of intergovernmental organizations, including many entities in the United Nations (UN) family and the Bretton Woods Institutions, in building the rule of law as a foundation for their sustainable development. Such external assistance is requested by developing countries in order to help write new laws, policies and regulations where they did not exist, to review draft legislation, or to assist in the updating and amendment of outdated laws and policies. Even countries that have significant domestic legislative and regulatory drafting capacity will occasionally seek external advice in order to compare their own drafts with the practices of other countries on specific topics. This paper seeks to examine the extent to which substantive legal advice provided by intergovernmental organizations as technical assistance differs depending upon the provider (for example, whether it matters whether the delivery of advice is done by a treaty body secretariat or not), and assesses the extent to which developing countries are conscious of those biases when they request technical assistance.

Methodologically, this research paper examines the range of advice on topics such as intellectual property, investment and competition that have been provided to policy makers of developing countries by different multilateral agencies. Efforts are made to select countries that have received advice from more than one organizational actor on a given issue. On the supply side, the intent will be to draw upon advisory reports published by the secretariats of international organizations, including, for example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) series on Investment Policy Reviews, and Competition Policy Peer Reviews; the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Investment Policy Reviews; and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Policy Reviews, among others. On the demand side, this review is complemented by a survey of the extent to which those requesting advice in developing countries are conscious of policy bias when they ask for advisory services. While evaluation questionnaires are frequently carried out at the conclusion of isolated technical assistance activities conducted by bilateral and multilateral agencies (such as workshops), there has to date been no broad-based survey of how beneficiaries view intergovernmental service providers relative to other sources of similar advice.