CATEGORISATION
KEYWORDS
GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE
Local state capacity is usually explained as a combination of technocratic abilities of state agencies to implement policies, deliver services, raise resources and enforce laws. However, in developing countries like India, governance challenges range from quotidian issues of service delivery to situations of "polycrisis", where traditional challenges like limited capital, elite capture, clientelism and caste often entangle with emerging problems of climate change, digital disruption and sustainability. Beyond fixing and patching gaps, local state capacity has to be viewed as a fluid, politically negotiated concept, produced by the dynamic interactions of bureaucrats, political leaders, communities and emerging uncertainties. This panel aims to move beyond the traditional categorizations of local governance as "clientelistic versus programmatic" or "overly centralized versus ineffectively decentralized" towards more grounded explanations, by innovatively reconceptualizing the agency of local actors responding to emerging challenges in local governance.
CALL FOR PAPERS
Accordingly, the panel invites papers that explore
1. Relooking at local politicians not just as brokers seeking rents but also as political innovators who are able to map resources available from policies and schemes with local needs and community demands (Khemani 2019). In the emerging context of digital welfare regimes, research that identifies how such brokers navigate data constraints to effectively act as epistemic bridges between state institutions and local communities can shed insights on how these opportunities also develop local state capacity.
2. Relational state capacity (RSC), that can be activated based on everyday interactions and evolving relationships between local state agents, community leaders and citizens during systemic shocks, based mutual trust, cooperation, and collective action (Honig et al 2025). Contributions here demonstrate how and when the latent social resources within communities might be "activated" when traditional institutional capacities fail to solve public problems.
3. The role of performative governance in building local state capacity. When local bureaucrats cannot meet the expectations of citizens, they often resort to deployment of bureaucratic rituals and symbolism (Ding 2020). Research that explores how leaders from marginalized backgrounds use specific aspects of such "performative governance" to claim legitimacy and exercise authority can contribute to a nuanced understanding of how political opportunity emerging from symbolism can drive improvements in local state capacity.
4. The role of institutional bricolage and adaptation. Communities in India and the Global South are exposed to a variety of local development and welfare institutions (like Gram Panchayats, Cooperative Societies, monitoring committees etc). Institutional bricolage describes how people exposed to multiple institutional spaces may piece together bits and pieces of rules, norms, and resources from different institutions to form new, hybrid arrangements to solve local problems or respond to uncertainties (Cleaver 2002). Contributions can show how such "bricolage" builds local state capacities in despite institutional constraints.
References
Cleaver, F. (2002). Reinventing institutions: Bricolage and the social embeddedness of natural resource management. The European journal of development research, 14(2), 11-30.
Ding, I. (2020). Performative governance. World politics, 72(4), 525-556.
Honig, D., Krishnamurthy, M., & Sharma, R. K. (2025). Relational State Capacity: Conceiving of Relationships as a Core Component of Society’s Ability to Achieve Collective Ends. Johns Hopkins University.
Khemani, S. (2019). What is state capacity?. World bank policy research working paper, (8734).
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Conventional accounts of local politics in India often frame elected representatives as intermediaries driven primarily by patronage and rent-seeking. This paper challenges that narrow lens by examining how local politicians increasingly act as innovators and epistemic bridges within India’s rapidly expanding digital welfare architecture. Drawing on an in-depth qualitative case study from two districts in India, the paper shows how local leaders translate community needs into actionable data, navigate complex digital platforms, and adapt state capacity on the ground under conditions of uncertainty.
Over the past decade, India has built one of the world’s largest digital welfare ecosystems, anchored in Aadhaar-based identification, Direct Benefit Transfers, and mission-mode platforms such as PM-Gati Shakti, the Ayushman Bharat digital health infrastructure, and the e-Shram portal for informal workers. While these systems promise efficiency and scale, they often struggle with last-mile exclusion due to data gaps, digital illiteracy, and rigid eligibility criteria. This paper argues that local politicians play a critical but under-theorized role in mediating these failures, not merely as brokers of favors but as problem-solvers who generate local knowledge and institutional innovation.
The study focuses on gram panchayat and municipal ward leaders who actively reconfigure digital welfare delivery during periods of stress, including the COVID-19 pandemic and climate-induced shocks such as floods and heatwaves. Using interview data, administrative records, and field observations, the paper documents how these leaders mobilized informal enumerations of migrant workers missing from official databases, coordinated WhatsApp-based grievance tracking with frontline bureaucrats, and used symbolic authority to legitimize new enrollment drives for health insurance, pensions, and food security schemes. In several instances, elected representatives repurposed digital dashboards and public display boards to publicly map unmet needs, creating feedback loops that pushed local administrations to recalibrate targeting criteria.
These practices position politicians as epistemic bridges who connect lived experience with abstract digital systems. Rather than undermining state capacity, their interventions often enhanced it by activating relational state capacity, defined as trust-based cooperation between citizens, representatives, and officials. The paper highlights how political incentives such as electoral accountability and reputational gains motivated experimentation with digital tools, while also constraining excess discretion through public visibility. Importantly, innovation emerged not from formal policy design but from institutional bricolage, where leaders combined state platforms, social networks, and community norms to create hybrid governance solutions.
By reframing politicians as innovators rather than obstacles, the paper contributes to debates on local state capacity in the Global South. It demonstrates that digital governance does not depoliticize welfare delivery but instead reshapes political agency at the local level. The findings have broader implications for how scholars and policymakers understand the functioning of digital states, suggesting that capacity is not embedded solely in technology or bureaucracy, but is co-produced through politically mediated knowledge practices. This perspective calls for moving beyond technocratic evaluations of digital welfare toward a more relational and political understanding of how states actually work on the ground.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a small-scale qualitative study of frontline workers (FLWs) within India’s public administration, focusing on Anganwadi Workers (AWWs) and Anganwadi Helpers(AWHs) as key actors in the delivery of nutrition, health, and early childhood services under the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS, and Primary School teachers, and Panchayat Secretaries and Gram Rozgar Sahayaks. While the study does not aim for representativeness, it offers case-study–based insights into the organisational anatomy and everyday processes of last-mile governance, and into how frontline workers negotiate and navigate institutional constraints to persist in their work. Based on fieldwork in two village panchayats in Barwani district, Madhya Pradesh, the paper examines the condition of estrangement in which frontline workers operate—estranged from the state through hierarchical monitoring systems and infrastructural neglect, and distanced from communities through their role as delivery agents embedded in bureaucratic power relations. Drawing on theories of state capacity, social distance, and habitus, the paper argues that frontline work in India is shaped less by policy design than by historically sedimented administrative structures that constrain discretion, weaken institutional support, and produce performative compliance. Through the thick description of ethnographic case studies, the paper demonstrates how these conditions mediate service delivery and reshape the meaning of frontline work itself.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Systemic Displacement of Accountability: Informal Relationships and Local State Capacity in Indian Municipal Services
How does local state capacity emerge when formal institutional arrangements struggle to deliver accountability? This paper draws on 18 months of qualitative fieldwork in Nagpur, India, examining three municipal services, cleanliness, waste collection, and water supply, delivered through different modes (direct delivery, contracted-out, and public-private partnership). Using a relational conception of accountability, the study investigates how frontline service delivery actors (workers, supervisors, and managers), citizens, and elected representatives activate latent social resources when traditional institutional arrangements prove inadequate.
The research reveals that frontline service delivery actors operate within webs of formal and informal obligations, where six distinct social norms, including mitigation of systemic deficiencies, deference to political actors, and reciprocal exchange, create informal duty and accountability relationships operating alongside formal policy instruments. These norms constitute a form of institutional bricolage: frontline service delivery actors cobble together formal procedures, political directives, and social obligations to maintain service continuity despite severe systemic constraints including infrastructure inadequacy, staff shortages, and resource limitations.
Municipal councilors emerge not as rent-seeking brokers but as intermediaries who bridge both epistemic and political gaps between citizens and the administrative state. They pacify citizens when systemic constraints are genuine, translate demands into terms frontline managers can act upon, and deploy assertion-based and collective-action-based invocation manners when persuasion proves insufficient. This intermediary role intensifies when councilors' own authority as elected representatives is circumscribed and services are delivered through contractual or public-private partnership arrangements over which they have limited formal oversight. They create parallel informal channels precisely because they perceive formal grievance mechanisms as inadequate or as threats to their mediating role.
Citizens, similarly, are not passive recipients of services but strategic navigators of accountability channels. They assess which deficiencies warrant formal complaints versus direct contact, calculate when to approach frontline actors versus political intermediaries, and escalate from persuasion-based to assertion-based and collective-action-based invocation manners when initial efforts fail to yield remediation. They bypass formal digital complaint channels not out of ignorance but because experience teaches them that informal channels, like direct contact with frontline managers or appeals through councilors, yield faster and more reliable action.
This relational state capacity, when activated, produces a paradoxical outcome: continuous accountability interactions that generate extensive symptomatic remediation (temporary fixes) rather than substantive improvements addressing underlying systemic deficiencies. Because accounters focus on visible benefit deficiencies rather than the systemic deficiencies producing them, accountability becomes systemically displaced onto frontline service delivery actors who are held accountable for outcomes they lack authority to shape, what the paper terms the "authority-accountability gap". This challenges framings of local governance as either "clientelistic" or "programmatic": what emerges is a hybrid mode where informal relationships activate state capacity when formal arrangements prove inadequate, yet channel that capacity toward crisis management rather than institutional reform. Reconceptualizing local state capacity requires attending not only to what relational processes enable, but how they structure the displacement of accountability away from those with authority to address systemic deficiencies.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Historically, in India, waste management has not been given much importance in rural areas. Through decentralisation under the 73rd constitutional amendment, more responsibilities were given to the Gram Panchayats over several areas of service delivery, including village sanitation. There is a consensus that decentralised services, and therefore local action depends on local government’s ‘capacity’ which is its “ability to take and implement decisions” for providing effective services to the people (Jacob and Jacob, 2021).
Despite devolving more powers to Gram Panchayats, waste management in rural areas continues to be ineffective and unorganised. The rural local bodies face several challenges in managing the locally generated waste due to factors such as lack of sanitation personnel, lack of financial resources, and lack of support from the community. In several cities, urban local bodies have outsourced management to green companies under the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model, but this has not been adopted in rural areas due to resource constraints.
It has been argued that for decentralised service delivery to be effective, local state institutions “cannot work independently of or even against contradictory forces coming from the social structures within which they are embedded” (Crook and Manor, 1998). Following this idea, there is a case for Gram Panchayats to engage in partnerships with citizens and civil society to make local action more effective.
The convergence between Gram Panchayats and Self-Help Groups (SHGs) in implementing solid waste management (SWM) in rural Karnataka demonstrates the potential of gender mainstreaming in local governance. While on the one hand it aims to use the services of SHGs to enhance the capacity of GPs to deliver waste management services, it also promotes empowerment of women in rural areas by generating local economic opportunities. This approach is based on the idea that governance can be strengthened through partnerships between the state and community-based groups, where both make meaningful resource contributions.
In this context, the convergence model not only strengthens the local government’s capacity to deliver services but also promotes women as active agents in governance. However, it is important to recognise that this model is influenced by the broader social forces within which it operates. Two factors mediate the functioning of this model: first, the intersection of gender and class, given that SHG women predominantly come from marginalised socio-economic backgrounds; and second, the unequal power relationship between the GPs and SHGs.
Drawing on qualitative field insights from 40 GPs across 10 districts of Karnataka, this paper demonstrates how these factors shape the participation of SHGs in service delivery in SWM and mediates their access to resources, decision-making power, and negotiation with the GP. Overall, the paper argues that local state capacity should not be understood merely as an administrative attribute, but as a relational outcome shaped by interactions between the state and community.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Conventional accounts of local politics in India often frame elected representatives as intermediaries driven primarily by patronage and rent-seeking. This paper challenges that narrow lens by examining how local politicians increasingly act as innovators and epistemic bridges within India’s rapidly expanding digital welfare architecture. Drawing on an in-depth qualitative case study from two districts in India, the paper shows how local leaders translate community needs into actionable data, navigate complex digital platforms, and adapt state capacity on the ground under conditions of uncertainty.
Over the past decade, India has built one of the world’s largest digital welfare ecosystems, anchored in Aadhaar-based identification, Direct Benefit Transfers, and mission-mode platforms such as PM-Gati Shakti, the Ayushman Bharat digital health infrastructure, and the e-Shram portal for informal workers. While these systems promise efficiency and scale, they often struggle with last-mile exclusion due to data gaps, digital illiteracy, and rigid eligibility criteria. This paper argues that local politicians play a critical but under-theorized role in mediating these failures, not merely as brokers of favors but as problem-solvers who generate local knowledge and institutional innovation.
The study focuses on gram panchayat and municipal ward leaders who actively reconfigure digital welfare delivery during periods of stress, including the COVID-19 pandemic and climate-induced shocks such as floods and heatwaves. Using interview data, administrative records, and field observations, the paper documents how these leaders mobilized informal enumerations of migrant workers missing from official databases, coordinated WhatsApp-based grievance tracking with frontline bureaucrats, and used symbolic authority to legitimize new enrollment drives for health insurance, pensions, and food security schemes. In several instances, elected representatives repurposed digital dashboards and public display boards to publicly map unmet needs, creating feedback loops that pushed local administrations to recalibrate targeting criteria.
These practices position politicians as epistemic bridges who connect lived experience with abstract digital systems. Rather than undermining state capacity, their interventions often enhanced it by activating relational state capacity, defined as trust-based cooperation between citizens, representatives, and officials. The paper highlights how political incentives such as electoral accountability and reputational gains motivated experimentation with digital tools, while also constraining excess discretion through public visibility. Importantly, innovation emerged not from formal policy design but from institutional bricolage, where leaders combined state platforms, social networks, and community norms to create hybrid governance solutions.
By reframing politicians as innovators rather than obstacles, the paper contributes to debates on local state capacity in the Global South. It demonstrates that digital governance does not depoliticize welfare delivery but instead reshapes political agency at the local level. The findings have broader implications for how scholars and policymakers understand the functioning of digital states, suggesting that capacity is not embedded solely in technology or bureaucracy, but is co-produced through politically mediated knowledge practices. This perspective calls for moving beyond technocratic evaluations of digital welfare toward a more relational and political understanding of how states actually work on the ground.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a small-scale qualitative study of frontline workers (FLWs) within India’s public administration, focusing on Anganwadi Workers (AWWs) and Anganwadi Helpers(AWHs) as key actors in the delivery of nutrition, health, and early childhood services under the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS, and Primary School teachers, and Panchayat Secretaries and Gram Rozgar Sahayaks. While the study does not aim for representativeness, it offers case-study–based insights into the organisational anatomy and everyday processes of last-mile governance, and into how frontline workers negotiate and navigate institutional constraints to persist in their work. Based on fieldwork in two village panchayats in Barwani district, Madhya Pradesh, the paper examines the condition of estrangement in which frontline workers operate—estranged from the state through hierarchical monitoring systems and infrastructural neglect, and distanced from communities through their role as delivery agents embedded in bureaucratic power relations. Drawing on theories of state capacity, social distance, and habitus, the paper argues that frontline work in India is shaped less by policy design than by historically sedimented administrative structures that constrain discretion, weaken institutional support, and produce performative compliance. Through the thick description of ethnographic case studies, the paper demonstrates how these conditions mediate service delivery and reshape the meaning of frontline work itself.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Systemic Displacement of Accountability: Informal Relationships and Local State Capacity in Indian Municipal Services
How does local state capacity emerge when formal institutional arrangements struggle to deliver accountability? This paper draws on 18 months of qualitative fieldwork in Nagpur, India, examining three municipal services, cleanliness, waste collection, and water supply, delivered through different modes (direct delivery, contracted-out, and public-private partnership). Using a relational conception of accountability, the study investigates how frontline service delivery actors (workers, supervisors, and managers), citizens, and elected representatives activate latent social resources when traditional institutional arrangements prove inadequate.
The research reveals that frontline service delivery actors operate within webs of formal and informal obligations, where six distinct social norms, including mitigation of systemic deficiencies, deference to political actors, and reciprocal exchange, create informal duty and accountability relationships operating alongside formal policy instruments. These norms constitute a form of institutional bricolage: frontline service delivery actors cobble together formal procedures, political directives, and social obligations to maintain service continuity despite severe systemic constraints including infrastructure inadequacy, staff shortages, and resource limitations.
Municipal councilors emerge not as rent-seeking brokers but as intermediaries who bridge both epistemic and political gaps between citizens and the administrative state. They pacify citizens when systemic constraints are genuine, translate demands into terms frontline managers can act upon, and deploy assertion-based and collective-action-based invocation manners when persuasion proves insufficient. This intermediary role intensifies when councilors' own authority as elected representatives is circumscribed and services are delivered through contractual or public-private partnership arrangements over which they have limited formal oversight. They create parallel informal channels precisely because they perceive formal grievance mechanisms as inadequate or as threats to their mediating role.
Citizens, similarly, are not passive recipients of services but strategic navigators of accountability channels. They assess which deficiencies warrant formal complaints versus direct contact, calculate when to approach frontline actors versus political intermediaries, and escalate from persuasion-based to assertion-based and collective-action-based invocation manners when initial efforts fail to yield remediation. They bypass formal digital complaint channels not out of ignorance but because experience teaches them that informal channels, like direct contact with frontline managers or appeals through councilors, yield faster and more reliable action.
This relational state capacity, when activated, produces a paradoxical outcome: continuous accountability interactions that generate extensive symptomatic remediation (temporary fixes) rather than substantive improvements addressing underlying systemic deficiencies. Because accounters focus on visible benefit deficiencies rather than the systemic deficiencies producing them, accountability becomes systemically displaced onto frontline service delivery actors who are held accountable for outcomes they lack authority to shape, what the paper terms the "authority-accountability gap". This challenges framings of local governance as either "clientelistic" or "programmatic": what emerges is a hybrid mode where informal relationships activate state capacity when formal arrangements prove inadequate, yet channel that capacity toward crisis management rather than institutional reform. Reconceptualizing local state capacity requires attending not only to what relational processes enable, but how they structure the displacement of accountability away from those with authority to address systemic deficiencies.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Historically, in India, waste management has not been given much importance in rural areas. Through decentralisation under the 73rd constitutional amendment, more responsibilities were given to the Gram Panchayats over several areas of service delivery, including village sanitation. There is a consensus that decentralised services, and therefore local action depends on local government’s ‘capacity’ which is its “ability to take and implement decisions” for providing effective services to the people (Jacob and Jacob, 2021).
Despite devolving more powers to Gram Panchayats, waste management in rural areas continues to be ineffective and unorganised. The rural local bodies face several challenges in managing the locally generated waste due to factors such as lack of sanitation personnel, lack of financial resources, and lack of support from the community. In several cities, urban local bodies have outsourced management to green companies under the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model, but this has not been adopted in rural areas due to resource constraints.
It has been argued that for decentralised service delivery to be effective, local state institutions “cannot work independently of or even against contradictory forces coming from the social structures within which they are embedded” (Crook and Manor, 1998). Following this idea, there is a case for Gram Panchayats to engage in partnerships with citizens and civil society to make local action more effective.
The convergence between Gram Panchayats and Self-Help Groups (SHGs) in implementing solid waste management (SWM) in rural Karnataka demonstrates the potential of gender mainstreaming in local governance. While on the one hand it aims to use the services of SHGs to enhance the capacity of GPs to deliver waste management services, it also promotes empowerment of women in rural areas by generating local economic opportunities. This approach is based on the idea that governance can be strengthened through partnerships between the state and community-based groups, where both make meaningful resource contributions.
In this context, the convergence model not only strengthens the local government’s capacity to deliver services but also promotes women as active agents in governance. However, it is important to recognise that this model is influenced by the broader social forces within which it operates. Two factors mediate the functioning of this model: first, the intersection of gender and class, given that SHG women predominantly come from marginalised socio-economic backgrounds; and second, the unequal power relationship between the GPs and SHGs.
Drawing on qualitative field insights from 40 GPs across 10 districts of Karnataka, this paper demonstrates how these factors shape the participation of SHGs in service delivery in SWM and mediates their access to resources, decision-making power, and negotiation with the GP. Overall, the paper argues that local state capacity should not be understood merely as an administrative attribute, but as a relational outcome shaped by interactions between the state and community.
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