LIST OF PANELS

The goal of this panel is to explore both theoretically and empirically how we can reconcile the need for ‘coordination’ (to solve complex policy problems), with group and unit ‘autonomy’, within federal and multilevel governance systems. We know the potential for autonomy, be it from the majority, or another level of government, is challenged in old and emerging federal systems by the need for (vertical and horizontal) coordination. We also know that increasing or decreasing autonomy is a risk factor throughout diverse and complex contexts.

For Robert Dahl (1986, 114), the standard definition of a federal democracy “is a system in which some matters are exclusively within the competence of certain local units—cantons, states, provinces—and are constitutionally beyond the scope of the authority of the national government; and when certain other matters are constitutionally outside the scope of the authority of the smaller units” (emphasis added). While this underlying logic explains both the purpose and practice of federalism in many of our federations, our central question is: Does it still hold true for contemporary federal systems and their societies, and if not, why?

Reconciling federalism’s potential to offer multiple levels of government, and territorial groups, self-rule within their jurisdictions, with the context of contemporary policy challenges, has been relatively understudied. Empirically as scholars of federalism, we know that increasing, or decreasing levels of autonomy is a risk factor throughout diverse and complex contexts in both old and emerging federations. We need, however, to deepen our understanding of how we can operationalize ‘autonomy’ in multilevel systems, or at least promote its potential, in practice, without exacerbating the risks and challenges that such promotion may provoke. We suggest that federalism and multi-level contexts require diverse mechanisms that can both promote and counter-balance autonomy as a means to developing effective forms and procedures for democratic cooperation.

It is of utmost importance that we analyse and explain why some federations generate cooperative behaviour, thus generating both democratic stability and progressive policy outcomes, while others generate instability by transforming states (provinces) into dissenters, rivals, and even challengers of national policy objectives. One easily forgets that the origins of federalism were to force people and groups who would prefer not to sit down together, to come to the table in order to compromise, and to collaborate for the sake of the collective good; be it security-, economically-, or welfare-oriented.

The goal of this panel is to explore both theoretically and empirically how we can reconcile the need for ‘coordination’ (to solve complex policy problems), with group and unit ‘autonomy’, within federal and multilevel governance systems. We know the potential for autonomy, be it from the majority, or another level of government, is challenged in old and emerging federal systems by the need for (vertical and horizontal) co-ordination. We also know that increasing or decreasing autonomy is a risk factor throughout diverse and complex contexts. Can policy mechanisms bridge autonomy with the need for joint-action to key policy problems?

We invite papers that seek to understand how we can both promote and offset the potentially negative effects of autonomy, vis-a-vis diverse policy mechanisms that may offer a means to developing effective forms and procedures for democratic cooperation. Each participant should aim to show how autonomy manifests itself in federal systems from either a theoretical, empirical, or comparative perspective. Questions to be considered as topical for this panel are: How has unit/group autonomy been promoted or constrained through joint policy-action? How do governments within federal systems interact over the design and implementation of policy in highly topical areas such as security, the environment, immigration, where the optimal distribution of authority is blurred? Which mechanisms promote the compromise that is necessitated to solve many contemporary policy problems? How do newly emerging federations in Africa and Asia design policies that simultaneously promote both autonomy and country-wide solidarity? How can federal and multi-level system design policy that protects the rights of non-territorial minorities such as many indigenous peoples?