LIST OF PANELS

Ten years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, where do we stand in terms of our academic understanding of the policy responses to the Great Financial Crisis? The issue of policy change after the crisis has focused much of the attention of public policy scholars, and elicited an intense academic debate. The severity of the crash, its worldwide repercussions, and its dramatic impact on economic activity were seen by many as promising radical change, away from austerity politics and financial self-regulation. In the early 2010s, however, scholars began addressing the non-linear relations between financial shock and radical change: they discussed the “resilience” and entrenchment of (neo)liberalism (Crouch 2011; Schmidt and Thatcher 2013; Blyth 2013), elaborated on the “status quo crisis” (Helleiner 2014), and shifted their investigations “from the question of what was changing to the question of whyso little change had taken place” (Mayntz 2012). Others pointed out that, even though change wasn’t comprehensive, it certainly was substantive in some areas. They emphasized how post-crisis financial regulation became more politicized, and how its reach extended (Helleiner and Pagliari 2010; Quaglia 2012); stressed the build-up of international and EU regulatory capacities (Quaglia 2014); showed how quantitative easing radically transformed the parameters of central banking (Claveau, Dietsch and Fontan 2018).
 
These works provide invaluable perspectives on the conditions and modalities of post-crisis policy change, but they somewhat shifted our scholarly attention away from the very process of policymaking during and after the crisis. As a consequence, we know very little about how government and policy experts concretely coped with this unexpected event of global proportions, which arguably shook their assumptions, beliefs, and policy routines.
 
This panel aims to map out government reactions to the 2007-2008 crisis across the world, with a focus on economic and financial policy responses (for a first approach, see Bermeo and Pontusson 2012). Its underlying assumption is that the processes, modalities and intensity of post-crisis policy change vary across issues, national contexts and policy levels (domestic, international, European). As such, the panel aims to move beyond the focus on policy outcomes (i.epolicy change and/or policy inertia) that characterizes much of the existing public policy literature on the financial crisis, and it invites papers that examine the actual processof policymaking during and in response to the Great Financial Crisis. This calls for the close examination and comparison of the politics, actors and processes of reform and/or of non-reform across cases and countries. Which policy actors were involved in crisis management and regulatory reforms? How did they build coalitions to promote certain policy agendas? Were these coalitions stable across time and issues? To what extent did they articulate different policy levels (domestic, international, European)? To what extent was the crisis used to promote new or old policy agendas? What are the specificities of decision-making in times of crisis, when pressures to “act fast” are felt exceptionally strongly? This panel invites papers examining the financial and economic policymaking process during and after the financial crisis from a variety of theoretical perspectives, but grounded in thorough empirical research. Single-case studies and comparative approaches are both welcome. Ultimately, the aim of this panel is to bring together scholars from different countries and theoretical approaches to assess and discuss what kind of insights the analysis of government reactions to the 2007-2008 financial crisis has to bring to the field of public policy analysis, and to open up new areas for future research.

Policy responses to the Great Financial Crisis have attracted a great deal of academic attention. As the severity of the crash seemed to hold the promise of radical policy change, away from austerity politics and financial self-regulation, public policy scholars specifically focused their efforts on understanding the conditions and modalities of post-crisis policy change and/or of policy inertia. Their focus on policy outcomes and policy change, however, somewhat shifted our scholarly attention away from the very process of policymaking during and after the crisis. As a consequence, we know very little about how government and policy experts concretely coped with this unexpected event of global proportions, which arguably shook their assumptions, beliefs, and policy routines.
 
This panel aims to map out government reactions to the 2007-2008 financial crisis across the world, with a focus on economic and financial policy responses.

It invites papers that further our understanding of policymaking in these distressed times, and that closely examine the politics, actors and processes of crisis management and post-crisis reform or non-reform, across issues and national contexts. Which policy actors were involved in crisis management and regulatory reforms? How did they build coalitions to promote certain policy agendas? Were these coalitions stable across time and issues? To what extent did they articulate different policy levels (domestic, international, European)? To what extent was the crisis used to promote new or old policy agendas? What are the specificities of decision-making in times of crisis, when pressures to “act fast” are felt exceptionally strongly? We welcome papers addressing financial and economic policy-making during and after the crisis from a variety of theoretical perspectives but grounded in thorough empirical research. Single-case studies and comparative approaches are both welcome. Ultimately, the aim of the panel is to provide a common forum for public policy scholars working on the Great Financial Crisis, and to initiate conversations about new areas for future research on the topic.