P01 / Politics and Public Administration within Core Executives

Topic : POLICY FORMULATION, ADMINISTRATION AND POLICYMAKERS

Chair : Chris Eichbaum (Victoria University of Wellington, NZ)

Second Chair : Richard Shaw (Massey University)

GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE

For Aaron Wildavsky speaking truth to power was essential to the art and craft of the policy advisor. Within Westminster traditions, the notion of a constitutional public service is one in which non-elected policy actors are enjoined to provide free and frank advice, and their political principals to honour a bargain which respects the necessity of that advice, and enables the provision of it. Whether parliamentary or presidential, and whatever the underlying administrative tradition liberal democratic polities place value on advice decision-makers that is both responsive and responsible. Absent the latter one detects, if not the reality, then the risk of politicisation. This panel welcomes papers on any aspect of the confluence between politics and administration in contemporary democratic systems, including the activities and career trajectories of political actors, and particularly within the core executive.

CALL FOR PAPERS

Paper proposals are welcome from scholars in Public Administration, Public Policy and Political Science that seek to address - either conceptually or by reference to empirical research - the confluence of political and administrative actors within the core executive. The context may be parliamentary or presidential, and the proposals may be informed by or seek to illuminate any will 'administrative tradition(s)'.

As with panels at all three ICPP events to date, the intention will be to assess the interest of contributors in a special issue of a journal or similar.

P01 / Politics and Public Administration within Core Executives

Chair : Chris Eichbaum (Victoria University of Wellington, NZ)

Second Chair : Richard Shaw (Massey University)

Session 1Politics and Administration within the core executive

Thursday, June 27th 16:30 to 18:30 (MB 2.285)

Discussants

Kathy Brock (Queen's University)

The formalisation paradox - regulating ministerial advisors in in the UK, Denmark and Germany

Thurid Hustedt (Hertie School)

heidi salomonsen (aalborg)

The introduction of ministerial advisors and changes in the role of staff units vis-à-vis the line bureaucracy are among the most far-reaching changes in political–bureaucratic relationships in recent decades. Under which rules ministerial advisors operate, varies from country to country. However, jurisdictions such as the UK and Denmark that are famous for their informal administrative traditions struggle with formalising the rules to govern ministerial advisers and opt for various formal regulations, whereas in ‘usual formalisation-suspect’ Germany, advisory positions with direct access to the minister have emerged in an informal process hardly noticed outside federal government. Based on document analysis, this article investigates this ‘formalisation paradox’ and aims to explain variation in the degree of formalisation in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Germany.

The employment of public servants as political staff in Australia

Maria Maley (Australian National University)

Australia is one of the few countries in the Westminster tradition which permits its public servants to take leave in order to be employed as ministerial staff – in other words, to join the political cadre working in ministers’ offices - and later to return to the public service. This practice is viewed positively in Australia. Traditionally public servants have been seen as forming a significant element of those employed in ministers’ offices, though one which is currently in decline. However these views are anecdotal – the extent to which public servants are working as political staff is unknown.

To what degree political staff are public servants on leave, or have prior experience working within the public service, is significant for several reasons. There are current concerns about the level of knowledge and skills present in ministers’ offices and the degree of understanding of the public service and its distinct values; some argue deficits of capability and understanding have led to recent policy fiascos and politicisation. It is also suggested that there is a loss of faith by ministers in the capability and responsiveness of the public service, leading to less trusting, more distant and less collaborative relationships between ministers and departments. Some argue public servants having experience in ministers’ offices will lead to better partnerships.

The paper reports on an empirical study of the patterns of employment of public servants as ministerial staff in Australia over the period 2010-2017. The factors influencing these patterns include both supply and demand sides: the stages of a government’s life cycle; and deliberate strategies by different political parties in government. The paper also explores the demand side factors more deeply, drawing on qualitative data from interviews with ministers who worked in these governments. They reveal a range of different attitudes and approaches to employing public servants as political staff.

‘Life After Life’? An insight into the careers of the ‘special adviser’ in Ireland

Bernadette Connaughton (University of Limerick)

‘Special advisers’ have been an accepted feature of Irish government for several decades. Given their proximity to ministers and the level of trust placed in those appointed, they are regarded as having a lot of influence over the inner workings of government. An initial concern about this presence is whether their appointments would lead to a politicisation of the civil service. This apprehension focussed attention on issues like party membership, numbers of advisers appointed, and ensuring that advisers did not get involved in the line management of departments. Efforts to address such concerns have been deliberated in parliamentary committees and included in legislation, such as the Public Service Management Act 1997 and the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015. Research on Irish special advisers has also paid attention to their roles and contribution to the policy making process within and across departments. What has not featured to date is an overview of Irish special advisers’ careers – the before and after life of a special adviser. This paper will present an initial attempt to survey the qualifications and professional profile of special advisers along with their career course upon exiting the role. The paper will pay particular attention to the cadre of ministerial advisers serving in the 2011-2016 Fine Gael-Labour coalition.

Cabinetisation and de-cabinetisation in Napoleonic systems: a systematic literature review of the institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation of ministerial cabinets

Arthur Meert (KULeuven - Public Governance Institute)

Marleen Brans (KU Leuven)

Gouglas Athanassios (University of Exeter)

This systematic literature review seeks to frame research on the “(de)-cabinetisation” process observed in European countries sharing the Napoleonic tradition of administration.

Napoleonic countries, such as Belgium or France, unlike Westminster countries, have a long tradition of “cabinetisation”. Cabinetisation is ‘a process by which that part of the internal to government policy advisory system, which comprises ministerial offices, evolves towards or fully develops into a ministerial cabinet system’. In ministerial cabinet systems, once a Minister takes office, political staff or personal advisers, who do not belong to the administrative hierarchy, are hired. These cabinets members differ from a ‘regular’ civil servant as they are directly hired by the Minister, assumed to be sympathetic to his/her political view, and have responsibilities beyond a traditional advisory role.

In the last 25 years, researchers have observed a trend whereby Napoleonic administrative countries and political entities such as the European Commission have begun to question the size and prominence of ministerial cabinets in the core executive. This trend has been labelled a “decabinetisation” process. Single country case studies have addressed this process in Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and also in the European Commission. However, few studies have examined the trend in a comparative context.

The goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive and scientific overview of research that has been conducted on the (de)cabinetisation process within political systems of the Napoleonic tradition of Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, as well as of the European Commission. The literature review will focus on studies that address three main research questions:

- How is “cabinetisation” explained in Napoleonic systems?
- To what extent is the Napoleonic system of political advisors being “decabinetised”?
- How can the decabinetisation process be explained?

The review will be limited to cases (countries or political system) of Napoleonic tradition. It will focus on evidence that has been used to measure or explain (de)-cabinetisation. While “ministerial cabinets” and “ministerial cabinet advisers” are the main keywords for this research, other terms will include “policy advice politicization” and search terms such as “political advisers”, “politicization of administration”. The literature will include studies published in French, Greek, Italian, Spanish, Dutch and English (which all fall within the language remit of the co-authors of this paper).

This paper is of relevance to the panel on “Politics and Public Administration within Core Executives” as it examines political advisers in Napoleonic systems. Its comparative approach will contribute to a better understanding of (de)cabinetisation in Napoleonic systems as a whole and the changing role and status of

political advisors and ministerial cabinets. It may also contribute a better understanding of the opposite trend of cabinetisation, which one has arguably observed in Westminster countries since the 1970’s.

P01 / Politics and Public Administration within Core Executives

Chair : Chris Eichbaum (Victoria University of Wellington, NZ)

Second Chair : Richard Shaw (Massey University)

Session 2Politics and Administration within the core executive

Friday, June 28th 08:00 to 10:00 (MB S1.401)

Discussants

Ozge Uluskaradag (Concordia University)

What Shapes Policy Advice? Political Feasibility vs Expertise: The Case of France and Turkey

Ozge Uluskaradag (Concordia University)

Policy advice has been at the heart of scholarly debate of policy and public administration studies for decades. While early studies have focused on speaking truth to power (Wildavsky, 1979) model of policy advice to describe traditional advice provided by civil service, more contemporary studies argue that changing governance arrangements have multiplied the sources of policy advice (Radin, 2000) and led to “sharing truth with many actors of influence” (Prince, 2007). With such changes, the debate over political vs technical considerations that shape policy advice has also received renewed scholarly attention (see Craft and Howlett, 2012). Having such theoretical considerations in mind, this paper aims to shed light on how policy advice is shaped in health policy formulation in France and Turkey and what conditions give more weight to technical considerations over political feasibility and vice versa during policy formulation. Drawing on 82 in depth semi-structured interviews with civil servants, political advisers, experts, policy makers and civil society representatives, this paper argues that while the political considerations help shape policy advice coming from below in both cases, the role of expertise and technical knowledge plays a bigger role in shaping policy advice in more horizontal policy settings. In addition, examples from cases show that the expertise and former civil servant status of the political advisers play a role in prioritising technical considerations over political feasibility concerns at times, while also allowing governments to provide technical justifications for decisions that are made with a political motive. In addition, evidence shows that political advisers are not always involved in the policy process as expected, but only provide strategic advice to the minister.
These findings challenge the existing literature on the role of political advisers, who are often portrayed as “politization agents” that politicize the policy content (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2010). The cases also show that unlike some other studies that separates political advisers as experts vs partisans (Maley, 2000,2010), political advisers appear as technical experts with partisan ties. Thus, further attests to the close relationship between politics and administration.

Politico-administrative relationships and policy coordination: A comparison of Denmark, Norway and Sweden

Jostein Askim (Department of Political Science, Unversity of Oslo)

Kristoffer Kolltveit (Dept. of political science, University of Oslo)

Title: Politico-administrative relationships and policy coordination: A comparison of Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

Authors: Jostein Askim, Rune Karlsen & Kristoffer Kolltveit (University of Oslo)

The paper studies how configurations within the core executive affect policy coordination and, vice versa, how attempts to strengthen cross-policy coordination affect politico-administrative relationships. We

compare Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

The cross-country comparison is motivated by the assumption that effective cross-policy and cross-ministerial coordination is conditioned by some factors that are common for the three countries (e.g., mediatisation of politics, year-round campaigning), and by some that vary. Of particular interest is the degree of quasi-cabinetisation/administrative politicization (highest in Sweden, lowest in Denmark). We explore if ministerial advisers strengthen horizontalism (thus constituting a centrifugal force for the government) or if they amplify silo structures (- a centripetal force).

We are also interested in the impact on horizontalism of variance in the emphasis on individual ministerial responsibility for the actions of the government machinery (higher in Denmark and Norway than in Sweden). In extension of arguments made by Hart and Wille (2006)*, we explore how actors in the core executive in the Scandinavian countries interpret and react to incentives for politicians to shy away from individual ministerial responsibility, and related incentives for top bureaucrats to become cautious and take shelter in their silos.

Lastly, we are interested in arenas for cross-ministerial contact, at political and at top bureaucratic level. We study how these arenas affect coordination, and, not least, if they have side-effects on politico-administrative relations. On the latter point, Hart and Wille (2006, p. 141) argue that attempts to strengthen top bureaucrats' cross-ministry coordination can provoke counter-reactions from ministers: They dislike bureaucrats transferring loyalty from their minister's policy agenda to that of the government, thus driving a wedge between ministers and their top bureaucratic aides.

Empirically, we use primarily qualitative data from interviews with long-serving ministerial permanent secretaries in the three countries in 2018-19.

*t'Hart, P., & Wille, A. (2006). Ministers and Top Officials in the Dutch Core Executive: Living Together, Growing Apart? Public Administration, 84, 121–146.

Presidency and its Center: how policy coordination actually operates

Pedro Cavalcante (Brazilian Institute of Education, Development and Research (IDP))

Alexandre Gomide (National School of Public Administration (ENAP))

The paper's main goal is analyze how a center of government (CoG) actually operates as unit responsible for the coordination and strategic management of the presidential prioritized agenda. To do so, we investigate the case of a complex and dynamic democracy, Brazil - a multiparty presidentialism with several political, economic and social challenges to Executive's governance. The bulk of the literature of center of government comes from multilateral and control organizations. They, primarily, address to the CoG with a normative and prescriptive approach and based on different administrative realities. Besides, center of government is usually conceived as the panacea for all governance problems in the Executive branch. The particularities of the Brazilian political-institutional environment, such as coalition presidentialism, federalism, the autonomy of the internal and external control system and social participation in policymaking generate centrifugal effects, as governmental fragmentation. This poses additional challenges for the president's capacity to coordinate implementing his/her priority actions. In this context, some questions, regarding CoG actual framework, remain unanswered in the literature. Which units constitute a center of government and how did it change during administrations? What are the features of the CoG chain of command? What factors could explain the CoG changes? What are the resources (mechanisms and instruments) used to carry out the core functions of the center of government? To answer these questions, the paper synthesizes a research project that covers largely the issues highlighted in these questions between 1995 and 2014, i.e., over three different presidencies and five terms. As a result, the research's findings show that there is no perfect or ideal model of CoG, since the features and its operational patterns vary due to different causes, such as presidential styles, public policy goals, available coordination instruments, political and economic conjuncture, as well as by the rules that shape the actions within the federal government. Obviously, these efforts to propose best practices to improve government performance are important and appreciated. However, they do not always contribute to improving the governance of the Executive and its performance, particularly in scenarios of complexity, dynamism and urgency in the treatment of priority issues, as well as when political, institutional and administrative frameworks used as a reference are very different from the public sector's reality and practice.

Contestability and politicisation in the context of the core executive in Westminster systems

Chris Eichbaum (Victoria University of Wellington, NZ)

Richard Shaw (Massey University)

The story told in the growing literature on political advisers has many strands, one of which is that the global emergence of advisers appointed on the basis of partisan rather than merit considerations is a response to a pressing need amongst ministers for advice on partisan-political issues that is independent of the standing bureaucracy and may indeed provide an alternative and contestable perspective. According to this thinking political advisers offer a solution to a perennial conundrum posed by the fact that political executives require both responsive and responsible competence from those tasked with the provision of advice. Demand for expert advice which is sensitive to political considerations requires a balancing act on the part of civil servants but the risk of falling from the high wire, the logic goes, can be mitigated if political advisers are tasked with attending to the provision of partisan advice, thereby 'taking the politics out of it'. The institutional settlement is elegant: political staff attend to responsive competence freeing the civil service to concentrate on the provision of expert technical advice. Clarity about who is responsible for what is assured. But something is missing. The benign narrative that partisan staff innoculate the civil service against the distemper of politicization necessarily generates an important hypothesis, which is that the institutionalization of the partisan role will diminish the incidence of politicization in the civil service. To be sure, there are empirical studies containing qualified support for that hypothesis but that they tend to focus almost exclusively on the consequences of the agency of political advisers: civil servants' conduct in the context of the operating environment of the 'triangular executive' receives nothing like the same degree of scholarly attention. We do not yet have a complementary account of whether or not (and if so, how) bureaucrats have adapted their behaviour in response to the emergence of political advisers in executive government. Consequently, we remain unclear whether or not any such responses are consistent with the narrative that political advisers reduce risks to civil service impartiality. In short, an important chapter of the story remains unwritten. The purpose of this paper is to add a civil service voice to the debate regarding the impact of the advent of political advisers on civil service impartiality, and more gnerally the extent and drivers of politicizatiion. First, we provide a context by distinguishing between responsive and responsible competence, and by reviewing the impact that political advisers might have on the apportioning of responsibility for the provision of both kinds of advice. We then review the literature on the different modes of politicization, emphasizing functional politicization as our core theoretical implement. Third, using data generated from two major surveys of New Zealand public servants we explore the extent and drivers of politicization within the public/civil service. We conclude that, while the advent of political staff may, in and of itself, result in politicization (and while 'regulation' of political staff may assist in the mitigation and.or management of risk), the degree of risk appetite on the part of political principals and their senior administrative agents, and the specific institutional elements of the Public Service Bargain may conspire to produce an advisory dynamic in which responsive competence trumps constitutional responsibility.

P01 / Politics and Public Administration within Core Executives

Chair : Chris Eichbaum (Victoria University of Wellington, NZ)

Second Chair : Richard Shaw (Massey University)

Session 3Politics and Administration within the core executive

Friday, June 28th 10:30 to 12:30 (MB S1.401)

Discussants

Chris Eichbaum (Victoria University of Wellington, NZ)

Richard Shaw (Massey University)

Representative Bureaucracy: Passive and Active Representation in German Ministries and Agencies

Bastian Strobel (University of Kassel)

Sylvia Veit (University of Kassel)

Falk Ebinger (Vienna University of Economy and Business)

Modern political systems are systems of representation. For more than 700 years, since the foundation of the first “parliaments” in the middle-ages, the idea of representation, as an important part of legislative decision making, has been developed and evolved into a concept which is essential for modern democratic rule. In her famous study The Concept of Representation (1967) Hanna F. Pitkin distinguishes active and passive representation as different forms of political representation. While passive representation is foremost descriptive and asks for congruence between citizens and the representatives with regard to social characteristics like gender, ethnics or culture, active representation is defined as decision-making in favour of specific group interests.

In public administration research, representation within bureaucracy is a widely discussed topic (e.g. Kennedy 2014). Three propositions can be distilled out of the debate on representative bureaucracy theory (Andrews et al. 2016): First, it is assumed that individuals with shared personal characteristics (demographic background) share similar values (and interests) – even beyond a socialisation processes in organisations. Second, it is assumed that individuals in fact act on those values and interests and try to boost their relevance in everyday decisions (Meier and Morton 2015: 99; Yun 2018). Third, it is assumed that representativeness will boost public service performance. While significant progress has been made in the field, many questions remain to be answered by systematic and comparative research.

The paper proposed here is part of a comprehensive research project addressing questions of bureaucratic representation research for the most senior levels of the public bureaucracy in Germany. The research is based on survey data captured at the most recent replication of the sixth Political-Administrative Elite (PAE) survey in 2017 that was conducted by the authors.

In the paper, we ask to which degree the various forms of demographic characteristics considered in bureaucratic representation theory indeed influence role perceptions and decision-making behaviour of senior civil servants (SCS). To do so, we take a two-step approach. First, we map the various group affiliations of the SCS in our sample. Second, we use multivariate analyses to uncover the relation between passive and active representation and to identify possible mediators and qualifiers. We investigate in how far the idea of an active representation of specific societal interests is reflected in the civil servants’ perceptions and role images. Our analysis covers the effects of gender, social background (class), education, culture, age and religion on aspects as role perception, perception and approval of societal actors and the stance towards patronage politics. Controls are in place for hierarchical position, tasks and policy field. The aim is to put the full set of individual characteristics on the map and evaluate their weight in active representation work. In doing so, influential factors can be identified and potential gaps in active

representation highlighted. In particularly, the effect of an affiliation with under- or overrepresented groups is investigated.

The Blurred Boundaries of Policy Advice: Varieties of Relations in the Italian Core Executive

Andrea Lippi (Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Florence)

Maria Tullia Galanti (Università degli Studi di Milano)

Policy advice is experiencing increasing differentiation and hybridization between political, bureaucratic and advisory roles within and around core executives, both in Westminster and European countries (Craft and Halligan 2017; Hustedt and Veit 2017). Hybridization can invest both sides in these relations: advisors may act as politicians, but also bureaucrats may play a political role, while elected representatives may act as experts under certain circumstances.

What matters is the legitimation of the policy advice, and namely the reasons that bring politicians, bureaucrats and advisors to work together – ranging from personal trust, partisan ties or institutional affiliation, just to name a few (Galanti and Lippi 2018).

The forms of engagement within the core executive of advice among experts, politicians and bureaucrats thus the central question for research becomes how advising is bargained and shaped among actors inside core executives. National patterns thus emerge: while the Anglo-Saxon model is institutionalized with structured roles, the central European model is built upon less defined arrangements between experts and institutional actors.

Italy represents a case in point to describe policy advice practices in the light of their hybrid nature, for several reasons. First, the administrative Napoleonic tradition matches with a great variety in the levels of expertise and in the diffusion of policy knowledge at ministerial, but also at territorial levels (Dente 1997). Second, few studies are available on the politicization of policy advice as a specific type of patronage (Di Mascio and Natalini 2016). Third, there are have been recent attempts to create ad hoc policy units at the level of the core executive, thus showing an increasing request for experts' advice available "at arm length".

Our paper proposes to shed some light on the changing relationships between the demand and the offer of policy advice in the case of core executive in Italy. It investigates a sample of institutional policy advisors in different policy sectors (namely public research institutes as identified by a recent Italian law, n. 218 enacted in 2016). Documental analysis and in-depth interviews will be used to shed some light on the possible determinants of the different types of advice relations, e.g. the levels of institutionalization, the policy legacies, and the features of the specific policy network.

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Respecting the Bargain? The Trudeau Government and GIC Appointments

Kathy Brock (Queen's University)

Robert Shepherd (Carleton University)

According to the traditional view of public administration, a critical component of good policy formulation is the provision of frank and fearless advice to elected decisionmakers. This advice can be provided by permanent public officials or by the people selected by the elected governments to fill key and continuing posts. To work effectively, the relationship between the political executive and its senior officials must be based on trust and respect.

The Trudeau Liberals arrived in office in 2015 promising to reform the current process for appointing people

to government positions to ensure that it would be more transparent, fair and merit driven, resulting in good, independent policy advice and execution. However, by the end of 2017, CBC reported that the Trudeau government had set a new record for vacancies in government-in-council (GIC) appointments with a total of 594 positions vacant or occupied by someone beyond their set term. By the end of 2018, the record of appointments had improved but many key positions remain unfilled or “underfilled” (temporary or partial appointments). This situation has led to accusations that a critical component of good policy-making has been compromised.

This paper examines the government’s new GIC appointment process to determine whether the delay in government policy functionality is offset by the revisions to the process. Specifically, the paper answers the following research question:

Is there any substantive difference between the appointment policy or practice between the Harper government and the current Liberal one? The answer will pay particular attention to

a. how the meanings or understandings of "merit" have operated in both processes, and

b. whether the new appointments reflect a diversity of views and skills or tend towards an implicit partisan bias.

The analysis will be based on a comparison of the two processes and recent appointments using both primary documentation and key informant interviews.

This paper fits neatly with the theme of this panel because it examines the impact of the decisions and actions of elected political leaders on the ability of non-elected policy actors “to provide free and frank advice” and the operation of the “bargain which respects the necessity of that advice, and enables the provision of it.” By answering the research question, we are able to examine the extent to which this important relationship is becoming politicized and thus compromised despite promises to the contrary… or not.

What explains the rise and institutionalisation of political advisers in Westminster systems?: a systematic literature review

Heath Pickering (KU Leuven)

Marleen Brans (KU Leuven)

Gouglas Athanassios (University of Exeter)

The objective of this systematic literature review study is to collect, synthesise, and report an impartial summary of all studies/evidence within the narrow field of political advisers in the Westminster system. The specific research question is: What explains the rise, variability and consolidation of political advisers in the Westminster system? This question captures scholars’ key observations from the relatively mature field.

Since the 1980s, scholars have observed that countries in the Westminster administrative tradition, such as Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (which are the core focus of this study), have been experiencing growing numbers of political advisers. In Australia for example, federal ministerial staff increased from 155 in 1972 to 423 in 2015 (up 173 per cent). This increase, however, has not been uniform across all Westminster countries. In the UK, there were 88 special advisers in 2017.

In addition to evidence on the rise of political advisers, studies have found new patterns of consolidating partisan intervention in governing. Political staff have entrenched themselves within the core executive and influence policy. This trend has helped spur new research in the field, which is witnessing a re-emergence primarily focused on Westminster special adviser research.

To help map this re-emergence, the review nature of the study will contribute a comprehensive evaluation of political advisers, whom are key politico-administrative actors across the Westminster system. For this reason, the study is well placed to contribute to the ICPP Montreal Conference panel on Politics and Public Administration within Core Executives. Scholars in this panel will also benefit from the comparative advantage systematic reviews have over traditional literature reviews; that is, stricter methodological standards.

Systematic literature reviews are a method of making sense of large bodies of information. For this study, the findings will offer the opportunity to assess the types of studies carried out to date, and identify the theoretical, methodological, and country cases utilised. The findings will also identify where little to no relevant research has been done, and make reasonable conclusions about where new studies are needed. Given that the field of study is relatively mature, we expect the availability of rich studies will yield robust data.

To limit excess data, the review includes narrow parameters. The review will examine only Anglo-Westminster countries between 1970-2019, and include studies in which the primary unit of analysis are political advisers within the core executive. To capture all relevant literature, search terms will include commonly used terminology: Special Advisers, Ministerial Advisers, political staff, political appointee, Westminster, core executive, executive government, politico-administrative relations. The study will primarily be qualitative in nature. However, quantitative data will illustrate where and how previous studies were conducted.

P01 / Politics and Public Administration within Core Executives

Chair : Chris Eichbaum (Victoria University of Wellington, NZ)

Second Chair : Richard Shaw (Massey University)

Session 4Politics and Administration within the core executive

Friday, June 28th 14:00 to 16:00 (MB S1.401)

The lure of power: Career paths and considerations among policy professionals in Sweden

Niels Selling (Institute for Future Studies)

This paper analyses career paths and career considerations among policy professionals in Sweden. These political actors are employed by various organizations to do advocacy, craft policy, and give political advice. They constitute a heterogeneous set of actors, including political advisors in government offices, political support staff in parties, think-tankers, interest organization experts, and political consultants of various stripes.

The paper builds on a longitudinal data set in which the professionals' careers are mapped and interviews conducted over a six-year period. We found that (a) skills such as the ability to navigate the political system make policy professionals employable in a variety of organizations; (b) considerations regarding different aspects of power were central to their career decisions; and (c) the barriers in their labour market are related to ideological commitments, loyalties, and value hierarchies that make policy professionals reluctant to move anywhere their skills could take them.

Causal links between politicization of public service appointment and politicization of policy advice-A case study of Hong Kong

Wei Li (Huazhong University of Science and Technology)

Previous studies have identified a number of paths that link politicization of administrative appointment to politicization of policy advice. For instance, policy advisor appointment with backgrounds and attitudes different from those of civil service will lead to more influence of policy advice from outside the government (Perl and White, 2002). Compared to permanent civil servants, political executives put more emphasis on short-term political process or "fire-fighting" advice rather than long term steering or evidence-based policymaking (Craft and Howlett, 2013). In addition to directly offering policy advice influenced by partisan interests, political appointees may constrain civil servants' free, frank, and fearless advice by politically appointed advisors (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2008).

Hong Kong recently appointed more political officials to direct the executive government. The structural change has impacted traditional public service bargains and civil service values that can be traced back to British colonial era (Burns, Li and Peters 2013; Burns and Li 2015). By studying the impact of politicized appointment of top-echelon administrators and their advisors on the supply and use of policy advice in Hong Kong, this paper hopes to contribute to this body of literature in two ways. First, it aims to identify an alternative mechanism that links political appointment of administrators to politicization of policy advice, namely less independent policy advice by government-appointed external advisors. Second, the paper demonstrates that appointment of civil servants to be political officials will constrain the influence of external and alternative policy advice, and hence moderate politicization of policy advice. The paper is based on ongoing surveys and interviews of civil servants, political officials and government-appointed external advisors conducted in Hong Kong since 2016.

Key Words: politicization of public service appointment, politicization of policy advice, civil servants, political officials, Hong Kong

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Life Histories and Policy Practices: The Experience of Social Policy Workers in the Brazilian federal government.

Maria Stela Reis (University of Brasilia)

Rebecca Abers (Universidade de Brasília)

The purpose of this article is to present and analyze the results of a longitudinal study of the practices and attitudes of middle-level employees in Brazilian federal agencies responsible for social policy. Until 2013, Brazilian social policy was characterized by low pay, low qualifications and a precarious, unstable professional corps. Under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and his successor, Dilma Rousseff, federal government investment in social policy increased significantly, as did the commitment to professionalizing the bureaucracy. One move in this direction was the creation of the Social Policy Technical Analyst (ATPS – Analista Técnico de Política Social) career. In 2013, the government hired the first group of 825 ATPSs through a competitive civil service exam. The new employees were then placed in federal agencies responsible for health, social welfare, education, social security and related policies.

According to official discourse, creating the ATPS career would help build state capacity for promoting social policy. This study explores this proposition, by examining the changing attitudes and practices of this newly professionalized cohort of public employees. The paper presents the results of a two-stage study. In 2013, we conducted a survey of 69,45% of the incoming cohort (573 respondents) on their past professional experience and their attitudes and practices related to politics, policy making practices and citizen participation. A major focus was on how employees with different professional backgrounds valued and used technical knowledge, intra-governmental networking and connections with social actors. In February and March of 2019, we will repeat the survey, with additional questions about experience after joining the ATPS career. This comparison will allow us to explore how different experiences inside government affect the way workers think about the means and ends of social policy and how their behaviors (such as networking practices) change over time. The analysis will thus allow us to explore how political, administrative and institutional conditions influence the organizational culture of middle level bureaucrats, with a focus on how actors´ understandings of the policy process and of their own identities as government workers change over time.

How do Media Coverage and Legislators' Interpellations Influence the Tenure of Political Appointees and the Political-Executive Interactions in Taiwan?

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One of the key research questions regarding political appointees is agency heads' length of tenure. Since the frequent turnovers of heads of government agencies may disrupt the stability of the bureaucracy and hurt their interactive relationships with the senior executives, it is important to understand what factors could influence the tenure of a minister. Previous research have indicated that the tenure of a minister could be influenced by personal and institutional characteristics, but the function of media coverage and legislators' interpellation on the ministers' tenure has not yet attracted serious scholarly attention.

This article proposes that the number of times news report and legislators' interpellation are negatively related to the tenure of a minister. Examining the case of vibrant democracy in Asian, the authors utilize the 2000-2016 tenure data of chief executives of 28 ministries in Taiwan's central government, and collect the media reports and legislators' interpellation to examine such relationship. The OLS regressions are conducted in this study to test the hypothesis. In addition, the authors adopt in-depth interviews with informants such as former political appointees, reporters and scholars to explore the effect of excessive

ministerial turnover on the agencies, including the fitness between senior executives and political appointees.

This article will make contributions in three respects. First, by investigating the political management aspects of political appointees, this article will strengthen the analytic framework in executive leadership, especially in the context of Asian culture. Second, it will examine the impact on public organizations due to frequent mobility of ministers through qualitative analysis. Finally, the findings of this article will bring implications for institutional reform; hence it could be useful for practitioners in Taiwan and other countries as well.