CATEGORISATION
KEYWORDS
GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE
Over the last two decades, studies of regulation in general, and regulatory agencies and regulatory instruments in particular, have gained currency among international public policy scholars (Baldwin et al., 2010; Levi-Faur, 2011; Lodge and Wegrich, 2012). In developed countries, debates on topics such as regulatory quality, regulatory impact assessments, and the reputation and independence of regulatory agencies are frequent in the literature (Radaelli and De Francesco, 2007; Dunlop and Radaelli, 2016; Bianculli et al., 2015; Coglianese, 2017). Regulation is becoming ever more central to public policymaking in almost any policy area, from competition policy to artificial intelligence, with environmental regulation, industrial safety, utilities regulation and many other policy fields in between.
In developing and transitional regions, such as Latin America, these topics have also attracted attention from scholars (González, 2017; Pavón, 2018; Elizondo and Dussauge-Laguna, 2018).Most regulatory debates, however, still focus on questions such as whether the "regulatory state" and "regulatory capitalism" are useful conceptual devices (Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2015); or on whether administrative legacies and political conditions are conducive to credible regulatory arrangements (Lodge et al., 2017). There are still significant concerns over the relationship between regulation and development, either on the effect of regulations on national development, or about how existing institutions condition the development of effective regulations (Dubash and Morgan, 2013; Cunha et al., 2017). At the same time, regulatory innovations, toolkits, and "best practices" are being actively diffused by international organisations and scholars.
The design and implementation of regulation and regulatory institutions is particularly challenging in developing and transitional settings due to enduring national features, such as low accountability and trust, widespread corruption and state capture, limited bureaucratic professionalisation, and strong pressures from interest groups. Therefore, certain political and administrative conditions that are present in developed countries, such as the rule of law, regulatory capacity, and high levels of regulatory compliance, may not fully (if at all) exist in developing and transitional countries.
This panel seeks to broaden our understanding on how regulation and regulatory institutions are designed and implemented in developing and transitional settings. We want to explore to what extent theoretical and analytical advances in the field of regulation are helpful to explain regulatory transformations in non-developed political systems. Similarly, we also look for ongoing research that contributes to theoretical developments, showing how the study of regulatory experiences in developing countries may inform wider international debates.
References:
Alejandra Elizondo & Mauricio I. Dussauge-Laguna (2018), La Agencia de Seguridad, Energía y Ambiente: una nueva institución del Estado mexicano, CIDE-ASEA-PIRCE.
Andrea C. Bianculli, Xavier Fernández-i-Marin & Jacint Jordan (2015), Accountability and Regulatory Governance, Palgrave.
Andrés Pavón (2018), “Agencies’ formal independence and credible commitment in the Latin American regulatory state: A comparative analysis of 8 countries and 13 sectors”, Regulation & Governance, early view.
Bruno Queiroz Cunha, Ana Karine Pereira & Alexandre de Ávila Gomide (2017), “State capacity and utilities regulation in Brazil: Exploring bureaucracy”, Utilities Policy, 49.
Camilo González (2017), “Measuring and comparing the distribution of decision-making power in regulatory arrangements of the telecommunication sector in Latin America”, Utilities Policy, 49.
Cary Coglianese (ed.) (2017), Achieving Regulatory Excellence, The Brookings Institution Press.
Claire A. Dunlop & Claudio M. Radaelli (2016), Handbook of Regulatory Impact Assessment, Edward Elgar.
Claudio M. Radaelli & Fabrizio de Francesco (2007), Regulatory quality in Europe, Manchester University Press.
David Levi-Faur (ed.) (2011), Handbook on the Politics of Regulation, Edward Elgar.
Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur (2005), “The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America: Sectoral and National Channels in the Making of a New Order”, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences.
Martin Lodge & Kai Wegrich (2012), Managing Regulation, Palgrave.
Martin Lodge, Christian Van Stolk, Julia Batistella-Machado, Daniel Schweppenstedde y Martin Stepanek (2017), Regulation of logistics infrastructure in Brazil, RAND.
Navroz K. Dubash & Bronwen Morgan (eds.) (2013), The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South, Oxford University Press.
Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge (eds.) (2010), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation, Oxford University Press.
CALL FOR PAPERS
Regulation, regulatory agencies and regulatory instruments are becoming extremely relevant in developing countries. We welcome paper proposals that either use existing theoretical debates and analytical frameworks to study the experience of regulation in developing settings, or use empirical experiences from developing countries to broaden international debates on subjects such as:
a. The diffusion of the “regulatory state” and “regulatory capitalism” models across developing regions
b. The design and implementation of regulatory tools, such as risk management, performance-based regulation, regulatory impact assessment, inspection toolkit, or algorithms
c. The measurement of regulatory agencies’ independence
d. The study of reputation in regulatory agencies
e. The analysis of capture in regulatory policy making
f. The spread of better regulation policy agendas
g. The processes through which alleged “best practices” are adopted and adapted
h. The place that accountability and conflicts of interest have in regulatory processes
i. The importance of emerging methodologies and techniques, such as crowd sourcing, social engagement, or artificial intelligence
We welcome qualitative, quantitative, mixed-methods, historical, and comparative studies that touch on one or more countries, one or more policy areas, and one or more regulatory agencies or instruments.
In addition to our panel discussions, we will discuss with participants the potential publication of revised versions of the papers in the form of an edited collection and/or a special journal issue.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
While the quality of agencies’ performance and policy choices are usually subject to ex-post oversight controls from the legislative and executive branches, the legal and statutory procedures followed by agencies to enforce the law are commonly subject to judicial review of administrative actions. Judicial supervision represents a relevant analytical instrument to understand failures in the implementation of regulatory polices, as courts have the formal authority to set aside an agency’s choice issued under an unlawful process as well as the faculty to instruct an agency to reformulate an erratic decision. This study therefore sets out to explain why regulatory agencies fail to comply with legal and procedural standards in the process of implementing policies.
A relevant body of literature explains the causes of policy failures and poor implementation as a result of biases in organizational attention, which rests on a theoretical foundation of bounded rationality embedded in the decision making processes of public organizations. Moreover, recent advances within the study of executive politics and public management have developed the notion of ‘blind spots’ as the unknown inability to detect and process potentially critical information that might be fundamental to prevent poor policy implementation. Drawing upon this strand of research, this study explores the presence of ‘blind spots’ that lead to poor implementation of regulatory policies, using judicial review cases against regulatory agencies as a source of information to examine implementation failures.
This investigation analyzes administrative actions issued by the National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH) which were ruled as unlawful by Judicial Tribunals. Data for this study was collected under a content analysis of judicial review appeals filed against policy decisions issued by the regulators between 2008 and 2017. The examination consists of a deductive latent coding analysis to verify and classify organizational ‘blind spots’ under three theoretical categories: tunnel vision, imperious immediacy of interests and standard operating procedures.
The research aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the causes of policy implementation failures of regulatory agencies in developing and transitional settings such as the Mexican institutional context, which only few years ago experienced a paradigmatic change of approach to regulate the national hydrocarbons and electrical energy markets. The importance of this study is twofold: firstly, it introduces a measurable characterization of “failure” inherent to attributes of policy implementation rather to normative labels applied by stakeholders and political principals to assess an agency’s performance, and secondly it presents empirical evidence to verify the recent advances in public administration scholarship which provide theoretical insights relevant for a better understanding of bureaucratic behavior under organizational and political constraints.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the Regulatory Governance arrangements in the telecommunications and energy sectors in several Latin American countries. This is done to capture the effect of these regulatory arrangements on the results of these sectors. Particularly in price and market coverage.
The reason to study regulatory governance arrangements is that it is believed that variations on these aspects (such as the level of coordination autonomy, or accountability) affect the functioning of the regulatory agencies and ultimately the quality of their work. Consequently, variations on the regulatory quality can have a positive or negative effect on the regulated sector.
Although, today there is sufficient research that has sought to study Regulatory Governance characteristics, there are far fewer efforts that aim to relate these characteristics to regulatory quality (exception are Koop and Hanretty, 2017; Gutiérrez, 2003; Jordana and Rosas, 2014). Likewise, little research tries to compare this effect among Latin American countries.
Therefore, this research will allow me to evaluate to what extent the way in which regulation is institutionally organized has an effect on the specific results of the regulated sector. Furthermore, since this research considers several features of Regulatory Governance (which is rare in current research), it is possible to see which of these regulatory design features is more relevant to explain the specific outcome of a sector.
The analysis is done on 10 Latin American countries between the year 2000 and 2018. In the 10 countries, I collect information of four Regulatory Governance indicators, namely: the independence of the regulator, the level of accountability of the regulator, the coordination between different actors with regulatory functions and the regulatory capacity of the regulator. Similarly, an indicator of prices and coverage of the two sectors, for each of the years included in the study was collected.
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an analysis of regulatory transfer, development and adaptation within the transitioning economy of South Africa. The study involves the design, development and implementation of a regulatory accreditation program aimed at lifting the safety performance, compliance and business efficiency of truck operators in South Africa. Examining regulatory development and implementation through a process of policy transfer allows for a more explicit identification of factors that shape regulatory design and practice. In this case study a heavily state directed program of accreditation and compliance operating in Australia undergoes significant modification and redesign to achieve similar regulatory effect in the South African context. The case highlights, how in transitioning settings, the requirement to deal with local cultural and contextual issues results in innovative regulatory governance, design and delivery frameworks. While the state remains an important player in lending legitimacy and authority to regulatory schemes, this study highlights the important role industry can play in partnering with government in delivering effective regulation. This is a qualitative study drawing on interviews and participant observation with industry and government officials involved in the South African trucking industry.
The paper commences with a short overview of the need for regulation in the trucking sector and the challenge for transitioning states in achieving effective enforcement and compliance in this industry. The global diffusion of policy ideas and regulatory models, as well as the integration of global markets within the trucking industry results in the general disbursement of operational and compliance norms for the sector. However, local context, resource constraints and regulatory capacity make simple and direct adoption of diffused regulatory models challenging and unlikely. Discussion then provides an outline of the objectives and design of the South African regulatory scheme. This is followed by an analysis of sector characteristics (industry and regulatory) that are specifically shaped by the transitioning context. This includes limited enforcement, corruption, poor industry compliance with regulated limits and standards, and the broader integration and exposure to the competitive pressures of global markets. Discussion then explores the design and development of the regulatory scheme including innovative regulatory features that make use of market players and business incentives to impact on industry compliance. The analysis considers the diffusion of regulatory capitalism as a frame for understanding regulatory change. Here we see a rebalancing of the role of the state and the role of markets to achieve regulatory effect. The analysis explores why this might be the case in transitioning economies and the implications and policy challenges of engaging markets and major industry players to take up a greater role in regulation (monitoring, compliance and enforcement). What are the implications for regulatory institutions and their ongoing development in a context where markets are drawn on to have a major impact on regulatory compliance and enforcement? In particular, what does this mean for the regulatory state and its ongoing development within transitioning economies? The paper concludes with comment on the broader implications of the findings for industry regulation and models of regulatory practice.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Policymakers in developing and emerging economies frequently rely on foreign models when crafting or reforming public policies, even when their motivation for reform might be purely domestic. Relying on foreign models in policymaking take different forms, such as outright copy and pasting of international templates, or selectively borrowing aspects of foreign models or recommendations of international organizations. And there might be a variety of reasons why policymakers in these countries rely on foreign models. They may be pressured to do so by powerful states and international organizations, by competition for trade and investment with other states, they may aspire to learn from the successes and failures of other countries to address a domestic policy problem, or they may imitate other countries in order to gain legitimacy in the international system.
The literatures on diffusion and policy transfer have dealt with some of these questions, such as the factors leading countries to borrow from foreign models. They have put less emphasis, however, on the policy process of the country that does the borrowing, which has meant that some questions have not been thoroughly studied. For instance: how much will policymakers rely on foreign models? What type of borrowing will they do (copy-pasting from foreign legislation or selective borrowing)? How much effort will they make to adapt the borrowed model to the domestic context? These questions are important not only for understanding the policymaking or reform process in developing and emerging countries, but also for generating insights into what kind of borrowing might create better policy results.
This paper attempts to answer some of these questions by focusing on the policy process in emerging countries that rely on foreign models. In particular I try to link policymakers' reasons for relying on foreign models (pressure from powerful countries/economic competition/learning/emulation) to the type of foreign borrowing that policymakers will engage in (copy and paste vs. more selective borrowing). My expectation is that policymakers adopting or reforming a policy under foreign pressure or under a desire to gain legitimacy are likely to engage in more direct forms (copy-paste) of borrowing, whereas economic competition and a desire to learn from others to solve a concrete policy problem will result in more selective borrowing (or even no borrowing after an analysis of foreign models) and greater attention to the borrowed model's fit with the local context.
I explore these arguments with a case study of reforms to the Chilean competition (antitrust) law. Chile adopted a law to protect competition in 1959, and reformed this law in 1973, 2003, 2009 and 2016. Focusing on the last three of these reforms, I explore policymakers’ reasons for relying on foreign models, the extent to which they borrowed from them and the way in which they did so in these three reform episodes. Even though the empirical analysis is focused on a single country and single policy area, the paper takes advantage of multiple episodes of reform over time to explore the variation in motivations, forms and outcomes of policy borrowing.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Safety regulation is a new topic for the oil and gas industry in Mexico. The recent creation of ASEA, the Mexican Agency for Industrial Safety and the Environment in the Oil and Gas Industry, generated an opportunity to develop a regulatory framework that created new instruments and adapted existing ones to manage risks. By law, the Agency must design, implement, monitor and sanction regulations related to environment protection and industrial safety. Its intention was to transit towards a more flexible, management oriented, regulatory framework.
We classify environmental regulatory instruments for the Oil and Gas industry in Mexico. Adapting a conceptual framework developed for classifying high hazard industries’ regulatory instruments (Coglianese, 2010, National Academy of Sciences, 2018), we assessed the regulatory regime adopted by ASEA. Our aim is to categorize the new regulatory design, considering two dimensions: the object of the regulation (means or ends), and the scope of implementation (micro versus macro). Previous classifications distinguished between technology-based regulations versus performance-based instruments. More recently, management-based regulation entered the analyses as a third regulatory strategy. These definitions, however, often generated confusion and debate.
We conclude that the Agency tends to use macro-means instruments, which is consistent with its formal statements. We also found, however, that more prescriptive micro-means instruments assist the Agency in defining strict requirements when needed.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the effects of public policy regarding fostering competition in the markets for telecommunications services, which is one of the core objectives of the regulation of this sector (2013-2018), due to its effects on prices, in the adoption of the services, the quality thereof, in addition to providing more legal certainty for investment.
In addition, it examines the public policy on digital inclusion: his constitutional amendments raised the issue of access to broadband as a fundamental right. This policy made particular emphasis on the most vulnerable sectors and emphasized not only access but also the adoption of these technologies.
For more than two decades (1990-2013), prior to the enactment of the regulatory reform (2013), there were failures resulting from a weak institutional framework and a marked imbalance of power between the regulatory authorities and the operators of the dominant conglomerate in the market.
Utility regulation in developing countries faces problems fundamentally different from those in advanced economies. Evidence suggests that this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries (Estache, 2009; Tirole, 2009, Laffont, 2015).
The Telecommunications Reform (2013) established a new regulator, the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT, as per its acronym in Spanish), with the power and autonomy to regulate competition in the telecommunications and broadcasting service markets. It also proposed a new generation of universal coverage or digital inclusion. Specialized courts were created, and an amendment to the law on Amparo (court order) was made to avoid any immediate revocation of the decisions made by the regulator.
The paper specifically analyzes the variations registered in the concentrations of telecommunication services markets and their effects on prices. Secondly, it examines the effect of the policies associated with the Reform in terms of the promotion of infrastructure development as a policy of digital inclusion or universal service.
Additionally, this paper analyzes the potential effects of the Reform on the adoption of the aforementioned services by a wider sector of the population. The proof of the success of a reform and the operation of the institutions that sustain it lies in the increase in coverage and the adoption of quality telecommunication services.
In order to identify the variation in concentration levels in the telecommunication services markets by the main operator (Incumbent), we use the Herfindahl Hirschman Index. 2013-2018. In addition, an analysis is made of the changes observed in investment by the participants in the market, before and after the regulatory reform was implemented.
The public policy of digital inclusion analyses the evolution of the “México Conectado” (Mexico Connected) program, whose objective was the provision of free public access to broadband Internet and the deployment of the Wholesale Shared Network. The latter is the main public-private project telecommunication infrastructure development project.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the evolution and practice of environmental federalism in Nigeria by means of a literature review with complementary primary research. Based on the institutional dimensions of environmental federalism including the constitutional and legal bases of environmental policies, related fiscal activities, and the organizational characteristics of environmental agencies, I conclude that Nigeria’s environmental federalism is characterized by a dominance of the federal government on all those dimensions. A specific look into how Nigeria manages petroleum, water, and land resources, lead me to the same conclusions. Arguing that federal government dominance is sub-optimal, I recommend local government empowerment, which I argue can both improve the country’s environmental outcomes and address the legitimate fears of how environmental resource management is linked to ethnic conflict.
This study of environmental federalism is an important contribution to the field for several reasons. First, the Nigerian context offers an opportunity for inquiry into a practice of federalism that differs in several ways from the cogent comparative research on environmental federalism involving mostly developed Western democracies. Related is the fact that Nigeria is one of only four federal countries on a continent of 54, so our knowledge of African environmental federalism is closely tied to our understanding of how it works in Nigeria. Finally, with regionally concentrated resources like oil in the south, forests in the west, coal in the east, and rivers running through the middle belt, Nigeria offers a unique picture of how mode of governance and resource management can maximize or disregard the potential of natural resources for the good of the people in the immediate as well as extended environment.
In addition to the relevance of this study to the general field of environmental federalism, this study fits the panel in several ways. The panel is interested in single country studies of developing countries and this study of the Nigerian context is both. Also, the study specifically discusses the governance of water and land resources, and makes interesting observations about horizontal government relationships that arise therein. Lastly, in my discussion of oil resource governance, I highlight the role and activities of multinational companies which are private actors that continue to heavily influence the policy process regarding oil and petroleum resources in Nigeria.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Goals and standards promoted by International Organizations, understood as soft regulation[1], influence countries endogenous policy-making decisions and co-exist with formal regulatory regimes and local rule systems. Without being a supra-national authority, changing the behavior of States seems like a daunting task for organizations formed by other autonomous organizations. “Meta-organizations” face a control paradox: their members might have more power and resources than them, making coercion and the use of monetary incentives complicated (Ahrne, G; & Brunsson, N. 2008; Zamudio, L; Arellano, D & Culebro, J. Eds. 2016).
Meta-organizations such as the United Nations might use soft regulation instruments instead, because reputational incentives, handled through symbolic and intersubjective social structures have been effective in changing the behavior of States across jurisdictions and before uncertainty, high probability of failure, diffuse interests, irrationality and even institutional fragility (Anaya, A. 2013; Ahrne, G; & Brunsson, N. 2008).
Drawing from International Relations, Public Administration and Regulation theories as well as Organization Theory and Public International Law, this paper identifies mechanisms used by the United Nations to influence social policy-making processes in Mexico through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), understood as soft regulation. The paper explains instruments and causal mechanisms used by the United Nations and the Mexican government to support MDGs since Mexico signed the Millennium Declaration (when the goals were not yet explicitly formulated and accompanied by concrete indicators) until 2015, when the targets had become official indicators for evaluating social policy and the country had become a regional leader promoting best practices to achieve them.
Documentary evidence is provided that in Mexico, MDGs were adopted through political and symbolic mechanisms based on diplomacy and its “logic of appropriateness”. They were accepted because the United Nations granted the country freedom to comply and adapt the targets and because Mexico accepted a lot of responsibility and visibility in search for a better status in the meta-organization. Assimilating the MDGs faced administrative changes and several instances of failure; however, the incremental use of organizational elements typical of “hard regulation” such as monitoring (by the United Nations Development Program) and the need to report progress to the General Assembly of the United Nations allowed for continuity and eventually success.
Sources for this abstract:
Ahrne, G; & Brunsson, N. (2008). Meta-organizations. Cheltenham:Edward Elgar.
Anaya, A (2013). Los regímenes internacionales de derechos humanos en América Latina. Legler, T, Santa Cruz, A & Zamudio, L. Introducción a las Relaciones Internacionales: América Latina y la Política Global. México: Oxford University Press.
Djelic, M.L. & Sahlin-Anderson, K (Eds.) (2006) Transnational Governance. Institutional Dynamics of Regulation. Cambridge University Press: UK.
Zamudio, L; Arellano, D & Culebro, J. Eds. (2016) Puentes, fronteras y murallas disciplinarias en torno a las organizaciones internacionales. CIDE:Distrito Federal.
[1] Soft-regulation is defined here as standards, indexes, certification schemes or global rules that produce effects but lack an element of coercion. They are adopted voluntarily and stem from a legitimized act of power (Töller, A. 2011; Mörth, U. in Djelic, M.L. & Sahlin-Anderson, K, 2006).
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Over the past three decades, competition policy has been embraced by governments and parliaments around the world. Moreover, in most countries, the enforcement of competition rules is the responsibility of a designated competition authority that is organisationally separate from the core executive (e.g., Jordana et al. 2011). Yet, particularly in developing and transitional countries, the formal creation of a competition authority does not guarantee that competition rules are actually enforced. Indeed, in many of these countries, there is a time lag between the formal creation of an authority and the actual enforcement of the rules by the authority; in some cases, more than ten years. Building on new data on enforcement in developing and transitional countries around the world, this paper seeks to explain the variation in time it takes for a newly created competition authority to start enforcing the competition rules. Existing studies of regulatory enforcement tend to emphasise the lack of capacity and resources and the lack of expertise in the field of competition policy. This paper takes these explanations into consideration, but also focuses on the impact of political constraints; in particular, ideological opposition to the political-economic model that competition policy represents. Thus, the paper seeks to contribute to a broader understanding of the determinants of regulatory enforcement in developing and transitional countries.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Background
While the past decade has seen both an increase in private provision of health services and a discussion on the differences between public and private sector organizations (goal ambiguity, competitive pressures, red tape etc.), there is no clear evidence which suggests that private sector health organizations outperform public sector health organizations. Health guidelines are important for ensuring uniformity and quality of care for clients, yet little attention has been giving to understanding, which of these sectors, public or private, is more likely to possess national health guidelines. We hypothesize that government health facilities in low and middle-income countries are more likely to possess national health guidelines for two reasons. First, given red tape in the public sector, health facilities managed by the government are required to comply with rules and regulations, including guidelines. Second, public health officials are more likely to be aware of the guidelines as the government either sets the guidelines or is in closer contact with organizations who communicate these guidelines. Given poor regulation across the health sectors in developing countries, it is plausible that these guidelines are not enforced across the entire health system.
Methods
We use pooled cross sectional data from the Service Provision Assessment surveys to understand the relationship between the managing authority of a health facility, government versus private, and if the facility reports the presence of national health guidelines for maternal and child health, communicable, and non-communicable diseases. We restrict our sample to several African (Haiti (2013), Tanzania (2015), Malawi (2014), Senegal (2015)) and South Asian countries (Bangladesh (2014)) and focus on health facilities that have both inpatient and outpatient service available. We also control for several confounding variables (number of workers with training and supervision, routine quality assurance meetings, location in an urban area, user fees, if the facility is connected to an electricity grid, and year). We cluster standard errors by country.
Results
Health facilities managed by the government are more likely to possess guidelines for maternal and child health, and communicable diseases, except HIV, as compared to privately managed health facilities. In terms of guidelines for maternal and child health, health facilities managed by the government have 71 percent, 33 percent, and 53 percent, higher odds of reporting the presence of guidelines for family planning (p<0.001), antenatal care (p<0.05), and IMPAC (p<0.05), respectively. For communicable diseases, health facilities managed by the government have 69 percent, 67 percent and 66 percent higher odds of reporting the presence of guidelines for malaria (p<0.05), tuberculosis (p<0.001),), and sexually transmitted infections (p<0.001) respectively. We do not find a statistically significant difference between public and private health facilities in reporting the presence of national guidelines for HIV and non-communicable diseases.
Discussion
Our findings suggest that inspite of criticisms, public health facilities outperform private health facilities in reporting the presence of national guidelines. This finding suggests that these sectors have comparative strengths in different areas of service provision. We also note variation across health conditions and disease categories. We suspect this difference might be due to the attention communicable diseases have received vis-à-vis non-communicable diseases on the global health agenda. Our findings imply a need to improve regulation of the health system to ensure uniformity and consistency in service provision.
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ABSTRACT
Regulation and regulatory capacity have become central themes in the study of development. In development contexts, such as Latin America, much debate focuses on what kind of regulatory institutions and frameworks should be devised to cope with changing markets, to encourage economic and social development, and to address emerging risks. Such questions are of course not just reserved to the context of development. After all, regulation everywhere is said to be ‘in crisis’, given growing dissatisfaction with the performance of (privatised) providers of public services, with the conduct of regulatory agencies in dealing with market actors and consumers, and with the performance of different regulatory technologies. Similarly, regulation is fundamentally about trade-offs between questions of efficiency, fairness and redundancy. However, the context of development offers particularly critical insights into the underlying pre-requisites for regulation to support development and to navigate the inherent trade-offs and blind-spots in all systems of regulation. Furthermore, this sense of crisis is particularly pronounced in the area of development where the theoretical prominence of principal-agent and credible commitment based approaches has been empirically shown to be problematic.
This paper will look at how various bodies of literature have explored the relationships that exist between regulation and development. These include the international literature on regulation, the economics literature on regulation and development, and the literature on the rise of regulation in the global south. The paper will discuss two main questions: how does regulation affect development; and how does a developing setting seems to affect regulation. The paper will then try to abstract an analytical model on the relationships between regulation and development, and it will use it to analyse the Mexican case. The paper will conclude with some recommendation on how to further scholarship on the subject.
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ABSTRACT
Levi-Faur (2013) claims that states are inherently polymorphic, and that it would be unrealistic to demand that regulatory regimes conformed fully to the text-book depoliticized depiction of the regulatory State. A case in point for understanding polymorphism in practice seems to be Brazil in the early 21st century, where political swings have forcedly brought regulatory state and developmental state institutions to coexist. Thus, the paper aims to explore changes carried out by the former Brazilian presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, both from the centre-left Workers’ Party (PT, in Portuguese), in the regulatory regime inherited from previous administrations led by president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, from the centre-right Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB, in Portuguese). The paper therefore will seek to unravel institutional changes occurred in the internal design and governance dynamics of the Brazilian regulatory regime up until 2016, exploring in particular the interrelation between the central government and autonomous regulatory agencies. The paper draws on historical institutionalism as well as insights from organizational theory so as to interpret the internal dynamics of the operation of the regulatory state during the times when a statist governmental agenda dominated in the country. We hypothesize that continuity at the macro-level, which was a clear element throughout the non-radical PT governments, have not stopped the Workers' Party from endogenously reshuffling the regulatory regime, including its regulatory agencies. The question would then be whether endogenous changes were functionally and effectively carried out, fostering a fruitful kind of polymorphism, or rather if what has unfolded during the PT years suggests confusion, failure, and clumsy pilling up, something more akin to an amorphic State - or simply a precarious format of polymorphism.
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ABSTRACT
Because “regulatory delivery” is a new word, there could be a perception that this is something that could be desirable for advanced economies and regulatory systems, and would not belong to the basic building blocks of economic development, to the fundamental institutions that enable it. This would be a mistake, and it would be wrong to think that “better regulatory delivery” is not important for developing countries or “emerging” economies.
First, because regulatory delivery includes processes, procedures and institutions that have their first roots in the distant past, and often have grown to be considered fundamental functions of the state, there are only very rare countries where they are not significant in terms of staff employed, as well as citizens, consumers and businesses affected. Research shows that structures specifically created to control and enforce definite rules – or technical staff appointed to make sure that those rules were implemented – started early on in History.
Though there are some rare countries where regulatory delivery institutions (“regulators”, “inspectorates”, etc.) function on limited resources due to ongoing or recent conflict, most countries tend to have a significant part of their government staff and procedures pertaining to regulatory delivery. Experience shows that the size of the regulatory delivery system is generally not related to the income level of countries, and even fragile and post-conflict States have substantial resources and a number of structures devoted to regulatory inspections, customs, licensing and so on.
Furthermore, in many developing countries and emerging economies, the number of licenses and permits that apply to businesses, the number of approvals needed to trade, the frequency of controls etc. tends to be very high – at least in some sectors or for some types of businesses. In others, limited resources may constrain the number of controls, but heavy procedures mean that the number of formal businesses is small, and most operate at varying degrees of informality, which in turn limits access to credit, growth potential etc. There is also a widespread relationship between excessively burdensome regulatory delivery procedures and corruption. This has been evidenced in several reports by international organizations and academic research. There is evidence that corruption linked to regulatory delivery issues goes all the way up either to avoid problems during on-site visits, obtain licenses more rapidly, or get “outsourced” regulatory delivery such as Pre-Shipment Inspections contracts.
Thus, this paper develops the hypothesis that regulatory delivery is as relevant to low-income and middle-income countries as it is to higher-income ones, in particular to many (if not necessarily all) fragile and post-conflict and countries, as “good” regulatory delivery is needed to create trust, and “bad” regulatory delivery can harm recovery and create additional tensions. Once this hypothesis is confirmed, the paper will focus on the response to the following questions: how can (and should) regulatory delivery be improved in developing and emerging economies? Are the issues, and possible remedies, similar to those found in high-income countries? Are the priorities similar? Can experiences be transposed – and, if so, with which adjustments?
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ABSTRACT
Over the last decade, Iran has experienced a large policy change in regulatory governance. This paper aims to explore how coalition creation has shaped this policy change and facilitated the formation of the regulatory network in Iran. Historically, market regulation was a periphery task of the government in Iran and delivering services to citizens directly or via contract was at the heart of what most government agencies. Following the recent advances in the concept of governance in Iran, specialized governmental organizations were developed and focused on regulatory tasks. In particular, some state regulatory organizations such as Consumer and Producer Protection Organization (CPPO), National Competition Council (NCC) and Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) were established. The foundation of these organizations, however, is a small step towards the establishment of a regulatory network in Iran. The General Policies of Article 44 of the Constitution, pertaining in 2005 can be considered as a milestone in formation of a comprehensive regulatory system in Iran. Despite this large step, formation of a regulatory system faced lots of frictions. An insightful case is the NCC which is established in 2008 following the Law on Implementation of General Policies of Article 44. Although NCC was authorized to establish a series of sectoral independent regulators, over a decade all the efforts for this purpose failed.
Later on and following some policy changes, the way to establish regulatory bodies facilitated notably. In this paper, we try to shed light on the main aspects of these policy changes.
As we discuss, we attribute a large part of frictions in the path of regulatory formation to the failure of policy coalition. Respectively, efforts to resolve this problem had a large contribution in facilitating the formation of sectoral regulators.
In general, policy is made through a complex process where hundreds of participants interact in the context of interdependent political environments with nested institutional arrangements, uneven power relations, and uncertain scientific and technical information about problems and alternative solutions. In line with Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier, 1999) and Policy Paradigm (Hall, 1993) perspectives, and as we discuss, coalition creation plays the main role in this regulatory change in Iran. Central to that coalition creation was an epistemic community of social science graduates in Sharif University of Technology. Academic researches and conferences, building networks, impacts on legal frameworks and code of conducts and formation of Governance and Policy Think Tank made this coalition impressive. This coalition could be effective in changing the process of sectoral regulatory authority establishment by the NCC and other authorities. This is mainly occurred in the first step in energy, audiovisual and pension fund sectors.
References:
Hall, P. A. (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic policymaking in Britain. Comparative politics, 275-296.
Sabatier, P. A. (1999). Fostering the development of policy theory. Theories of the policy process, 2, 321-336.
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ABSTRACT
The complementary approach in Public Policy: Behavioral and Standard perspective of Law and Economics.
Abstract
In public policy studies, behavioral and standard perspective of law and economics are complementary approaches to explain public problems and to theorize design of public policy. To support this thesis, we discuss the work of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler on “endowment effect” in Coase theorem (1990) and the first analysis of the behavioral approach to law and economics (Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler 1998) that show both the scientific explanation and the theoretical assumptions of two prospects are shared. We use the methodology of the “Scientific Research Programmes” (Lakatos 1969) for analyzing the complementarity of these perspectives because this methodology helps us to understand their limits and the common insights of the approaches.
The principal results are that behavioral law and economics is a complementary prospect of the standard perspective: It is not a substitute paradigm, and the use of behavioral law and economics imperatively involves the study of standard law and economics. These theoretical contributions come from an original formulation of behavioral and standard perspective of law and economics as “Scientific Research Programme” (Lakatos 1969).
As far as public policy is concerned, the first conclusion is that it is not necessary to choose one theory over another “because it appears to produce the best results or the most scientific approach” (Cairney 2013, 1). Instead of rejecting one theory, the contrast of insights with scientific standard demonstrate the complementary aspects of the approaches. The second conclusion is both behavioral and standard perspectives of law and economics are useful to design regulation, because each approach addresses the focus of the regulator in different ways, but these perspectives are complementary.
Keywords: Law and Economics; Economic analysis of Law; Public Policy; Behavioral Economics; Epistemology; Scientific Research programmes; Positivism.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Entrepreneurship development in China has entered a golden era since
mass entrepreneurship and innovation was promoted as the new national economic
development strategy recently. Along with its remarkable development, the uneven
spatial distribution of entrepreneurship in Chinese cities has also attracted growing
scholarly attention. Existing studies have mainly focused on industrial clusters,
agglomeration economies and embedded social-cultural milieu at urban/regional level
to explain the spatial dynamics of entrepreneurial entry. These supply-side factors are
found to be inadequate to understand entrepreneurship development in urban China
where a large share of entrepreneurs are necessity entrepreneurs because of a lack of
alternative employment outlets. Using 2013 Chinese household income project
(CHIP) data, this paper investigates the city and individual-level determinants of
entrepreneurial entry in Chinese cities. It identifies the presence of size-biased
industrial policy and the degree of urban housing boom as important forces
discouraging entrepreneurship in urban China. The study highlights the complex
nature and dynamics of urban entrepreneurship in Chinese transitional economy. Key words: entrepreneurship; industrial policy; real estate market; housing price;
urban China
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ABSTRACT
While the quality of agencies’ performance and policy choices are usually subject to ex-post oversight controls from the legislative and executive branches, the legal and statutory procedures followed by agencies to enforce the law are commonly subject to judicial review of administrative actions. Judicial supervision represents a relevant analytical instrument to understand failures in the implementation of regulatory polices, as courts have the formal authority to set aside an agency’s choice issued under an unlawful process as well as the faculty to instruct an agency to reformulate an erratic decision. This study therefore sets out to explain why regulatory agencies fail to comply with legal and procedural standards in the process of implementing policies.
A relevant body of literature explains the causes of policy failures and poor implementation as a result of biases in organizational attention, which rests on a theoretical foundation of bounded rationality embedded in the decision making processes of public organizations. Moreover, recent advances within the study of executive politics and public management have developed the notion of ‘blind spots’ as the unknown inability to detect and process potentially critical information that might be fundamental to prevent poor policy implementation. Drawing upon this strand of research, this study explores the presence of ‘blind spots’ that lead to poor implementation of regulatory policies, using judicial review cases against regulatory agencies as a source of information to examine implementation failures.
This investigation analyzes administrative actions issued by the National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH) which were ruled as unlawful by Judicial Tribunals. Data for this study was collected under a content analysis of judicial review appeals filed against policy decisions issued by the regulators between 2008 and 2017. The examination consists of a deductive latent coding analysis to verify and classify organizational ‘blind spots’ under three theoretical categories: tunnel vision, imperious immediacy of interests and standard operating procedures.
The research aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the causes of policy implementation failures of regulatory agencies in developing and transitional settings such as the Mexican institutional context, which only few years ago experienced a paradigmatic change of approach to regulate the national hydrocarbons and electrical energy markets. The importance of this study is twofold: firstly, it introduces a measurable characterization of “failure” inherent to attributes of policy implementation rather to normative labels applied by stakeholders and political principals to assess an agency’s performance, and secondly it presents empirical evidence to verify the recent advances in public administration scholarship which provide theoretical insights relevant for a better understanding of bureaucratic behavior under organizational and political constraints.
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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the Regulatory Governance arrangements in the telecommunications and energy sectors in several Latin American countries. This is done to capture the effect of these regulatory arrangements on the results of these sectors. Particularly in price and market coverage.
The reason to study regulatory governance arrangements is that it is believed that variations on these aspects (such as the level of coordination autonomy, or accountability) affect the functioning of the regulatory agencies and ultimately the quality of their work. Consequently, variations on the regulatory quality can have a positive or negative effect on the regulated sector.
Although, today there is sufficient research that has sought to study Regulatory Governance characteristics, there are far fewer efforts that aim to relate these characteristics to regulatory quality (exception are Koop and Hanretty, 2017; Gutiérrez, 2003; Jordana and Rosas, 2014). Likewise, little research tries to compare this effect among Latin American countries.
Therefore, this research will allow me to evaluate to what extent the way in which regulation is institutionally organized has an effect on the specific results of the regulated sector. Furthermore, since this research considers several features of Regulatory Governance (which is rare in current research), it is possible to see which of these regulatory design features is more relevant to explain the specific outcome of a sector.
The analysis is done on 10 Latin American countries between the year 2000 and 2018. In the 10 countries, I collect information of four Regulatory Governance indicators, namely: the independence of the regulator, the level of accountability of the regulator, the coordination between different actors with regulatory functions and the regulatory capacity of the regulator. Similarly, an indicator of prices and coverage of the two sectors, for each of the years included in the study was collected.
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an analysis of regulatory transfer, development and adaptation within the transitioning economy of South Africa. The study involves the design, development and implementation of a regulatory accreditation program aimed at lifting the safety performance, compliance and business efficiency of truck operators in South Africa. Examining regulatory development and implementation through a process of policy transfer allows for a more explicit identification of factors that shape regulatory design and practice. In this case study a heavily state directed program of accreditation and compliance operating in Australia undergoes significant modification and redesign to achieve similar regulatory effect in the South African context. The case highlights, how in transitioning settings, the requirement to deal with local cultural and contextual issues results in innovative regulatory governance, design and delivery frameworks. While the state remains an important player in lending legitimacy and authority to regulatory schemes, this study highlights the important role industry can play in partnering with government in delivering effective regulation. This is a qualitative study drawing on interviews and participant observation with industry and government officials involved in the South African trucking industry.
The paper commences with a short overview of the need for regulation in the trucking sector and the challenge for transitioning states in achieving effective enforcement and compliance in this industry. The global diffusion of policy ideas and regulatory models, as well as the integration of global markets within the trucking industry results in the general disbursement of operational and compliance norms for the sector. However, local context, resource constraints and regulatory capacity make simple and direct adoption of diffused regulatory models challenging and unlikely. Discussion then provides an outline of the objectives and design of the South African regulatory scheme. This is followed by an analysis of sector characteristics (industry and regulatory) that are specifically shaped by the transitioning context. This includes limited enforcement, corruption, poor industry compliance with regulated limits and standards, and the broader integration and exposure to the competitive pressures of global markets. Discussion then explores the design and development of the regulatory scheme including innovative regulatory features that make use of market players and business incentives to impact on industry compliance. The analysis considers the diffusion of regulatory capitalism as a frame for understanding regulatory change. Here we see a rebalancing of the role of the state and the role of markets to achieve regulatory effect. The analysis explores why this might be the case in transitioning economies and the implications and policy challenges of engaging markets and major industry players to take up a greater role in regulation (monitoring, compliance and enforcement). What are the implications for regulatory institutions and their ongoing development in a context where markets are drawn on to have a major impact on regulatory compliance and enforcement? In particular, what does this mean for the regulatory state and its ongoing development within transitioning economies? The paper concludes with comment on the broader implications of the findings for industry regulation and models of regulatory practice.
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ABSTRACT
Policymakers in developing and emerging economies frequently rely on foreign models when crafting or reforming public policies, even when their motivation for reform might be purely domestic. Relying on foreign models in policymaking take different forms, such as outright copy and pasting of international templates, or selectively borrowing aspects of foreign models or recommendations of international organizations. And there might be a variety of reasons why policymakers in these countries rely on foreign models. They may be pressured to do so by powerful states and international organizations, by competition for trade and investment with other states, they may aspire to learn from the successes and failures of other countries to address a domestic policy problem, or they may imitate other countries in order to gain legitimacy in the international system.
The literatures on diffusion and policy transfer have dealt with some of these questions, such as the factors leading countries to borrow from foreign models. They have put less emphasis, however, on the policy process of the country that does the borrowing, which has meant that some questions have not been thoroughly studied. For instance: how much will policymakers rely on foreign models? What type of borrowing will they do (copy-pasting from foreign legislation or selective borrowing)? How much effort will they make to adapt the borrowed model to the domestic context? These questions are important not only for understanding the policymaking or reform process in developing and emerging countries, but also for generating insights into what kind of borrowing might create better policy results.
This paper attempts to answer some of these questions by focusing on the policy process in emerging countries that rely on foreign models. In particular I try to link policymakers' reasons for relying on foreign models (pressure from powerful countries/economic competition/learning/emulation) to the type of foreign borrowing that policymakers will engage in (copy and paste vs. more selective borrowing). My expectation is that policymakers adopting or reforming a policy under foreign pressure or under a desire to gain legitimacy are likely to engage in more direct forms (copy-paste) of borrowing, whereas economic competition and a desire to learn from others to solve a concrete policy problem will result in more selective borrowing (or even no borrowing after an analysis of foreign models) and greater attention to the borrowed model's fit with the local context.
I explore these arguments with a case study of reforms to the Chilean competition (antitrust) law. Chile adopted a law to protect competition in 1959, and reformed this law in 1973, 2003, 2009 and 2016. Focusing on the last three of these reforms, I explore policymakers’ reasons for relying on foreign models, the extent to which they borrowed from them and the way in which they did so in these three reform episodes. Even though the empirical analysis is focused on a single country and single policy area, the paper takes advantage of multiple episodes of reform over time to explore the variation in motivations, forms and outcomes of policy borrowing.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Safety regulation is a new topic for the oil and gas industry in Mexico. The recent creation of ASEA, the Mexican Agency for Industrial Safety and the Environment in the Oil and Gas Industry, generated an opportunity to develop a regulatory framework that created new instruments and adapted existing ones to manage risks. By law, the Agency must design, implement, monitor and sanction regulations related to environment protection and industrial safety. Its intention was to transit towards a more flexible, management oriented, regulatory framework.
We classify environmental regulatory instruments for the Oil and Gas industry in Mexico. Adapting a conceptual framework developed for classifying high hazard industries’ regulatory instruments (Coglianese, 2010, National Academy of Sciences, 2018), we assessed the regulatory regime adopted by ASEA. Our aim is to categorize the new regulatory design, considering two dimensions: the object of the regulation (means or ends), and the scope of implementation (micro versus macro). Previous classifications distinguished between technology-based regulations versus performance-based instruments. More recently, management-based regulation entered the analyses as a third regulatory strategy. These definitions, however, often generated confusion and debate.
We conclude that the Agency tends to use macro-means instruments, which is consistent with its formal statements. We also found, however, that more prescriptive micro-means instruments assist the Agency in defining strict requirements when needed.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the effects of public policy regarding fostering competition in the markets for telecommunications services, which is one of the core objectives of the regulation of this sector (2013-2018), due to its effects on prices, in the adoption of the services, the quality thereof, in addition to providing more legal certainty for investment.
In addition, it examines the public policy on digital inclusion: his constitutional amendments raised the issue of access to broadband as a fundamental right. This policy made particular emphasis on the most vulnerable sectors and emphasized not only access but also the adoption of these technologies.
For more than two decades (1990-2013), prior to the enactment of the regulatory reform (2013), there were failures resulting from a weak institutional framework and a marked imbalance of power between the regulatory authorities and the operators of the dominant conglomerate in the market.
Utility regulation in developing countries faces problems fundamentally different from those in advanced economies. Evidence suggests that this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries (Estache, 2009; Tirole, 2009, Laffont, 2015).
The Telecommunications Reform (2013) established a new regulator, the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT, as per its acronym in Spanish), with the power and autonomy to regulate competition in the telecommunications and broadcasting service markets. It also proposed a new generation of universal coverage or digital inclusion. Specialized courts were created, and an amendment to the law on Amparo (court order) was made to avoid any immediate revocation of the decisions made by the regulator.
The paper specifically analyzes the variations registered in the concentrations of telecommunication services markets and their effects on prices. Secondly, it examines the effect of the policies associated with the Reform in terms of the promotion of infrastructure development as a policy of digital inclusion or universal service.
Additionally, this paper analyzes the potential effects of the Reform on the adoption of the aforementioned services by a wider sector of the population. The proof of the success of a reform and the operation of the institutions that sustain it lies in the increase in coverage and the adoption of quality telecommunication services.
In order to identify the variation in concentration levels in the telecommunication services markets by the main operator (Incumbent), we use the Herfindahl Hirschman Index. 2013-2018. In addition, an analysis is made of the changes observed in investment by the participants in the market, before and after the regulatory reform was implemented.
The public policy of digital inclusion analyses the evolution of the “México Conectado” (Mexico Connected) program, whose objective was the provision of free public access to broadband Internet and the deployment of the Wholesale Shared Network. The latter is the main public-private project telecommunication infrastructure development project.
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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the evolution and practice of environmental federalism in Nigeria by means of a literature review with complementary primary research. Based on the institutional dimensions of environmental federalism including the constitutional and legal bases of environmental policies, related fiscal activities, and the organizational characteristics of environmental agencies, I conclude that Nigeria’s environmental federalism is characterized by a dominance of the federal government on all those dimensions. A specific look into how Nigeria manages petroleum, water, and land resources, lead me to the same conclusions. Arguing that federal government dominance is sub-optimal, I recommend local government empowerment, which I argue can both improve the country’s environmental outcomes and address the legitimate fears of how environmental resource management is linked to ethnic conflict.
This study of environmental federalism is an important contribution to the field for several reasons. First, the Nigerian context offers an opportunity for inquiry into a practice of federalism that differs in several ways from the cogent comparative research on environmental federalism involving mostly developed Western democracies. Related is the fact that Nigeria is one of only four federal countries on a continent of 54, so our knowledge of African environmental federalism is closely tied to our understanding of how it works in Nigeria. Finally, with regionally concentrated resources like oil in the south, forests in the west, coal in the east, and rivers running through the middle belt, Nigeria offers a unique picture of how mode of governance and resource management can maximize or disregard the potential of natural resources for the good of the people in the immediate as well as extended environment.
In addition to the relevance of this study to the general field of environmental federalism, this study fits the panel in several ways. The panel is interested in single country studies of developing countries and this study of the Nigerian context is both. Also, the study specifically discusses the governance of water and land resources, and makes interesting observations about horizontal government relationships that arise therein. Lastly, in my discussion of oil resource governance, I highlight the role and activities of multinational companies which are private actors that continue to heavily influence the policy process regarding oil and petroleum resources in Nigeria.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Goals and standards promoted by International Organizations, understood as soft regulation[1], influence countries endogenous policy-making decisions and co-exist with formal regulatory regimes and local rule systems. Without being a supra-national authority, changing the behavior of States seems like a daunting task for organizations formed by other autonomous organizations. “Meta-organizations” face a control paradox: their members might have more power and resources than them, making coercion and the use of monetary incentives complicated (Ahrne, G; & Brunsson, N. 2008; Zamudio, L; Arellano, D & Culebro, J. Eds. 2016).
Meta-organizations such as the United Nations might use soft regulation instruments instead, because reputational incentives, handled through symbolic and intersubjective social structures have been effective in changing the behavior of States across jurisdictions and before uncertainty, high probability of failure, diffuse interests, irrationality and even institutional fragility (Anaya, A. 2013; Ahrne, G; & Brunsson, N. 2008).
Drawing from International Relations, Public Administration and Regulation theories as well as Organization Theory and Public International Law, this paper identifies mechanisms used by the United Nations to influence social policy-making processes in Mexico through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), understood as soft regulation. The paper explains instruments and causal mechanisms used by the United Nations and the Mexican government to support MDGs since Mexico signed the Millennium Declaration (when the goals were not yet explicitly formulated and accompanied by concrete indicators) until 2015, when the targets had become official indicators for evaluating social policy and the country had become a regional leader promoting best practices to achieve them.
Documentary evidence is provided that in Mexico, MDGs were adopted through political and symbolic mechanisms based on diplomacy and its “logic of appropriateness”. They were accepted because the United Nations granted the country freedom to comply and adapt the targets and because Mexico accepted a lot of responsibility and visibility in search for a better status in the meta-organization. Assimilating the MDGs faced administrative changes and several instances of failure; however, the incremental use of organizational elements typical of “hard regulation” such as monitoring (by the United Nations Development Program) and the need to report progress to the General Assembly of the United Nations allowed for continuity and eventually success.
Sources for this abstract:
Ahrne, G; & Brunsson, N. (2008). Meta-organizations. Cheltenham:Edward Elgar.
Anaya, A (2013). Los regímenes internacionales de derechos humanos en América Latina. Legler, T, Santa Cruz, A & Zamudio, L. Introducción a las Relaciones Internacionales: América Latina y la Política Global. México: Oxford University Press.
Djelic, M.L. & Sahlin-Anderson, K (Eds.) (2006) Transnational Governance. Institutional Dynamics of Regulation. Cambridge University Press: UK.
Zamudio, L; Arellano, D & Culebro, J. Eds. (2016) Puentes, fronteras y murallas disciplinarias en torno a las organizaciones internacionales. CIDE:Distrito Federal.
[1] Soft-regulation is defined here as standards, indexes, certification schemes or global rules that produce effects but lack an element of coercion. They are adopted voluntarily and stem from a legitimized act of power (Töller, A. 2011; Mörth, U. in Djelic, M.L. & Sahlin-Anderson, K, 2006).
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Over the past three decades, competition policy has been embraced by governments and parliaments around the world. Moreover, in most countries, the enforcement of competition rules is the responsibility of a designated competition authority that is organisationally separate from the core executive (e.g., Jordana et al. 2011). Yet, particularly in developing and transitional countries, the formal creation of a competition authority does not guarantee that competition rules are actually enforced. Indeed, in many of these countries, there is a time lag between the formal creation of an authority and the actual enforcement of the rules by the authority; in some cases, more than ten years. Building on new data on enforcement in developing and transitional countries around the world, this paper seeks to explain the variation in time it takes for a newly created competition authority to start enforcing the competition rules. Existing studies of regulatory enforcement tend to emphasise the lack of capacity and resources and the lack of expertise in the field of competition policy. This paper takes these explanations into consideration, but also focuses on the impact of political constraints; in particular, ideological opposition to the political-economic model that competition policy represents. Thus, the paper seeks to contribute to a broader understanding of the determinants of regulatory enforcement in developing and transitional countries.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Background
While the past decade has seen both an increase in private provision of health services and a discussion on the differences between public and private sector organizations (goal ambiguity, competitive pressures, red tape etc.), there is no clear evidence which suggests that private sector health organizations outperform public sector health organizations. Health guidelines are important for ensuring uniformity and quality of care for clients, yet little attention has been giving to understanding, which of these sectors, public or private, is more likely to possess national health guidelines. We hypothesize that government health facilities in low and middle-income countries are more likely to possess national health guidelines for two reasons. First, given red tape in the public sector, health facilities managed by the government are required to comply with rules and regulations, including guidelines. Second, public health officials are more likely to be aware of the guidelines as the government either sets the guidelines or is in closer contact with organizations who communicate these guidelines. Given poor regulation across the health sectors in developing countries, it is plausible that these guidelines are not enforced across the entire health system.
Methods
We use pooled cross sectional data from the Service Provision Assessment surveys to understand the relationship between the managing authority of a health facility, government versus private, and if the facility reports the presence of national health guidelines for maternal and child health, communicable, and non-communicable diseases. We restrict our sample to several African (Haiti (2013), Tanzania (2015), Malawi (2014), Senegal (2015)) and South Asian countries (Bangladesh (2014)) and focus on health facilities that have both inpatient and outpatient service available. We also control for several confounding variables (number of workers with training and supervision, routine quality assurance meetings, location in an urban area, user fees, if the facility is connected to an electricity grid, and year). We cluster standard errors by country.
Results
Health facilities managed by the government are more likely to possess guidelines for maternal and child health, and communicable diseases, except HIV, as compared to privately managed health facilities. In terms of guidelines for maternal and child health, health facilities managed by the government have 71 percent, 33 percent, and 53 percent, higher odds of reporting the presence of guidelines for family planning (p<0.001), antenatal care (p<0.05), and IMPAC (p<0.05), respectively. For communicable diseases, health facilities managed by the government have 69 percent, 67 percent and 66 percent higher odds of reporting the presence of guidelines for malaria (p<0.05), tuberculosis (p<0.001),), and sexually transmitted infections (p<0.001) respectively. We do not find a statistically significant difference between public and private health facilities in reporting the presence of national guidelines for HIV and non-communicable diseases.
Discussion
Our findings suggest that inspite of criticisms, public health facilities outperform private health facilities in reporting the presence of national guidelines. This finding suggests that these sectors have comparative strengths in different areas of service provision. We also note variation across health conditions and disease categories. We suspect this difference might be due to the attention communicable diseases have received vis-à-vis non-communicable diseases on the global health agenda. Our findings imply a need to improve regulation of the health system to ensure uniformity and consistency in service provision.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Regulation and regulatory capacity have become central themes in the study of development. In development contexts, such as Latin America, much debate focuses on what kind of regulatory institutions and frameworks should be devised to cope with changing markets, to encourage economic and social development, and to address emerging risks. Such questions are of course not just reserved to the context of development. After all, regulation everywhere is said to be ‘in crisis’, given growing dissatisfaction with the performance of (privatised) providers of public services, with the conduct of regulatory agencies in dealing with market actors and consumers, and with the performance of different regulatory technologies. Similarly, regulation is fundamentally about trade-offs between questions of efficiency, fairness and redundancy. However, the context of development offers particularly critical insights into the underlying pre-requisites for regulation to support development and to navigate the inherent trade-offs and blind-spots in all systems of regulation. Furthermore, this sense of crisis is particularly pronounced in the area of development where the theoretical prominence of principal-agent and credible commitment based approaches has been empirically shown to be problematic.
This paper will look at how various bodies of literature have explored the relationships that exist between regulation and development. These include the international literature on regulation, the economics literature on regulation and development, and the literature on the rise of regulation in the global south. The paper will discuss two main questions: how does regulation affect development; and how does a developing setting seems to affect regulation. The paper will then try to abstract an analytical model on the relationships between regulation and development, and it will use it to analyse the Mexican case. The paper will conclude with some recommendation on how to further scholarship on the subject.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Levi-Faur (2013) claims that states are inherently polymorphic, and that it would be unrealistic to demand that regulatory regimes conformed fully to the text-book depoliticized depiction of the regulatory State. A case in point for understanding polymorphism in practice seems to be Brazil in the early 21st century, where political swings have forcedly brought regulatory state and developmental state institutions to coexist. Thus, the paper aims to explore changes carried out by the former Brazilian presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, both from the centre-left Workers’ Party (PT, in Portuguese), in the regulatory regime inherited from previous administrations led by president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, from the centre-right Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB, in Portuguese). The paper therefore will seek to unravel institutional changes occurred in the internal design and governance dynamics of the Brazilian regulatory regime up until 2016, exploring in particular the interrelation between the central government and autonomous regulatory agencies. The paper draws on historical institutionalism as well as insights from organizational theory so as to interpret the internal dynamics of the operation of the regulatory state during the times when a statist governmental agenda dominated in the country. We hypothesize that continuity at the macro-level, which was a clear element throughout the non-radical PT governments, have not stopped the Workers' Party from endogenously reshuffling the regulatory regime, including its regulatory agencies. The question would then be whether endogenous changes were functionally and effectively carried out, fostering a fruitful kind of polymorphism, or rather if what has unfolded during the PT years suggests confusion, failure, and clumsy pilling up, something more akin to an amorphic State - or simply a precarious format of polymorphism.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Because “regulatory delivery” is a new word, there could be a perception that this is something that could be desirable for advanced economies and regulatory systems, and would not belong to the basic building blocks of economic development, to the fundamental institutions that enable it. This would be a mistake, and it would be wrong to think that “better regulatory delivery” is not important for developing countries or “emerging” economies.
First, because regulatory delivery includes processes, procedures and institutions that have their first roots in the distant past, and often have grown to be considered fundamental functions of the state, there are only very rare countries where they are not significant in terms of staff employed, as well as citizens, consumers and businesses affected. Research shows that structures specifically created to control and enforce definite rules – or technical staff appointed to make sure that those rules were implemented – started early on in History.
Though there are some rare countries where regulatory delivery institutions (“regulators”, “inspectorates”, etc.) function on limited resources due to ongoing or recent conflict, most countries tend to have a significant part of their government staff and procedures pertaining to regulatory delivery. Experience shows that the size of the regulatory delivery system is generally not related to the income level of countries, and even fragile and post-conflict States have substantial resources and a number of structures devoted to regulatory inspections, customs, licensing and so on.
Furthermore, in many developing countries and emerging economies, the number of licenses and permits that apply to businesses, the number of approvals needed to trade, the frequency of controls etc. tends to be very high – at least in some sectors or for some types of businesses. In others, limited resources may constrain the number of controls, but heavy procedures mean that the number of formal businesses is small, and most operate at varying degrees of informality, which in turn limits access to credit, growth potential etc. There is also a widespread relationship between excessively burdensome regulatory delivery procedures and corruption. This has been evidenced in several reports by international organizations and academic research. There is evidence that corruption linked to regulatory delivery issues goes all the way up either to avoid problems during on-site visits, obtain licenses more rapidly, or get “outsourced” regulatory delivery such as Pre-Shipment Inspections contracts.
Thus, this paper develops the hypothesis that regulatory delivery is as relevant to low-income and middle-income countries as it is to higher-income ones, in particular to many (if not necessarily all) fragile and post-conflict and countries, as “good” regulatory delivery is needed to create trust, and “bad” regulatory delivery can harm recovery and create additional tensions. Once this hypothesis is confirmed, the paper will focus on the response to the following questions: how can (and should) regulatory delivery be improved in developing and emerging economies? Are the issues, and possible remedies, similar to those found in high-income countries? Are the priorities similar? Can experiences be transposed – and, if so, with which adjustments?
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Over the last decade, Iran has experienced a large policy change in regulatory governance. This paper aims to explore how coalition creation has shaped this policy change and facilitated the formation of the regulatory network in Iran. Historically, market regulation was a periphery task of the government in Iran and delivering services to citizens directly or via contract was at the heart of what most government agencies. Following the recent advances in the concept of governance in Iran, specialized governmental organizations were developed and focused on regulatory tasks. In particular, some state regulatory organizations such as Consumer and Producer Protection Organization (CPPO), National Competition Council (NCC) and Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) were established. The foundation of these organizations, however, is a small step towards the establishment of a regulatory network in Iran. The General Policies of Article 44 of the Constitution, pertaining in 2005 can be considered as a milestone in formation of a comprehensive regulatory system in Iran. Despite this large step, formation of a regulatory system faced lots of frictions. An insightful case is the NCC which is established in 2008 following the Law on Implementation of General Policies of Article 44. Although NCC was authorized to establish a series of sectoral independent regulators, over a decade all the efforts for this purpose failed.
Later on and following some policy changes, the way to establish regulatory bodies facilitated notably. In this paper, we try to shed light on the main aspects of these policy changes.
As we discuss, we attribute a large part of frictions in the path of regulatory formation to the failure of policy coalition. Respectively, efforts to resolve this problem had a large contribution in facilitating the formation of sectoral regulators.
In general, policy is made through a complex process where hundreds of participants interact in the context of interdependent political environments with nested institutional arrangements, uneven power relations, and uncertain scientific and technical information about problems and alternative solutions. In line with Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier, 1999) and Policy Paradigm (Hall, 1993) perspectives, and as we discuss, coalition creation plays the main role in this regulatory change in Iran. Central to that coalition creation was an epistemic community of social science graduates in Sharif University of Technology. Academic researches and conferences, building networks, impacts on legal frameworks and code of conducts and formation of Governance and Policy Think Tank made this coalition impressive. This coalition could be effective in changing the process of sectoral regulatory authority establishment by the NCC and other authorities. This is mainly occurred in the first step in energy, audiovisual and pension fund sectors.
References:
Hall, P. A. (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic policymaking in Britain. Comparative politics, 275-296.
Sabatier, P. A. (1999). Fostering the development of policy theory. Theories of the policy process, 2, 321-336.
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ABSTRACT
The complementary approach in Public Policy: Behavioral and Standard perspective of Law and Economics.
Abstract
In public policy studies, behavioral and standard perspective of law and economics are complementary approaches to explain public problems and to theorize design of public policy. To support this thesis, we discuss the work of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler on “endowment effect” in Coase theorem (1990) and the first analysis of the behavioral approach to law and economics (Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler 1998) that show both the scientific explanation and the theoretical assumptions of two prospects are shared. We use the methodology of the “Scientific Research Programmes” (Lakatos 1969) for analyzing the complementarity of these perspectives because this methodology helps us to understand their limits and the common insights of the approaches.
The principal results are that behavioral law and economics is a complementary prospect of the standard perspective: It is not a substitute paradigm, and the use of behavioral law and economics imperatively involves the study of standard law and economics. These theoretical contributions come from an original formulation of behavioral and standard perspective of law and economics as “Scientific Research Programme” (Lakatos 1969).
As far as public policy is concerned, the first conclusion is that it is not necessary to choose one theory over another “because it appears to produce the best results or the most scientific approach” (Cairney 2013, 1). Instead of rejecting one theory, the contrast of insights with scientific standard demonstrate the complementary aspects of the approaches. The second conclusion is both behavioral and standard perspectives of law and economics are useful to design regulation, because each approach addresses the focus of the regulator in different ways, but these perspectives are complementary.
Keywords: Law and Economics; Economic analysis of Law; Public Policy; Behavioral Economics; Epistemology; Scientific Research programmes; Positivism.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Entrepreneurship development in China has entered a golden era since
mass entrepreneurship and innovation was promoted as the new national economic
development strategy recently. Along with its remarkable development, the uneven
spatial distribution of entrepreneurship in Chinese cities has also attracted growing
scholarly attention. Existing studies have mainly focused on industrial clusters,
agglomeration economies and embedded social-cultural milieu at urban/regional level
to explain the spatial dynamics of entrepreneurial entry. These supply-side factors are
found to be inadequate to understand entrepreneurship development in urban China
where a large share of entrepreneurs are necessity entrepreneurs because of a lack of
alternative employment outlets. Using 2013 Chinese household income project
(CHIP) data, this paper investigates the city and individual-level determinants of
entrepreneurial entry in Chinese cities. It identifies the presence of size-biased
industrial policy and the degree of urban housing boom as important forces
discouraging entrepreneurship in urban China. The study highlights the complex
nature and dynamics of urban entrepreneurship in Chinese transitional economy. Key words: entrepreneurship; industrial policy; real estate market; housing price;
urban China
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