LIST OF PANELS

Public universities fulfill multiple functions. They provide teaching, professional training, advisement on policy and they produce research. From a funding perspective, they are peculiar creatures. They are largely subsidized through taxes, leading governments to ask them for accountability. At the same time, their expertise should lead them to choose how they allocate their research and teaching funds. This leaves very little room for governments to have their say on the way universities spend the money they receive. As an indirect steering mechanism, governments usually rely on a funding rule to allocate funds to each university. For instance, the provinces of Ontario, Québec and Manitoba (Canada) tie most of the provincial funding to student enrollment. In Norway and in Germany, funding is instead tied to graduation rates or other « performance » measures. Finally, in some (usually smaller) jurisdictions, funding is not tied to any measure, but is rather given in a lump-sum fashion.

The design of these funding rules generates incentives for universities to change their practices. By increasing the component of a funding rule tied to a given outcome, universities are indirectly steered into increasing that outcome. On the upside, enrollment-based rules may encourage universities to increase enrollment, completion-based rules may increase graduation rates and unconditional transfers may provide no incentives to universities. These upsides, however, can be conflicting and may not be the sole outcomes. For instance, universities may increase their efforts to recruit from other universities, reduce requirements for graduation or, in the case of unconditional transfers, reduce their teaching or research output. Depending on the formulas, universities may also change the proportion of funds they dedicate to research activities. This panel is about the study of the impact of funding formulas: comparative analysis, studies of the latest reforms, statistical analysis and other forms of study on the topic are more than welcome.

Public universities fulfill multiple functions. They provide teaching, professional training, advisement on policy and they produce research. From a funding perspective, they are peculiar creatures. They are largely subsidized through taxes, leading governments to ask them for accountability. At the same time, their expertise should lead them to choose how they allocate their research and teaching funds. This leaves very little room for governments to have their say on the way universities spend the money they receive. As an indirect steering mechanism, governments usually rely on a funding rule to allocate funds to each university. For instance, the provinces of Ontario, Québec and Manitoba (Canada) tie most of the provincial funding to student enrollment. In Norway and in Germany, funding is instead tied to graduation rates or other « performance » measures. Finally, in some (usually smaller) jurisdictions, funding is not tied to any measure, but is rather given in a lump-sum fashion.

The design of these funding rules generates incentives for universities to change their practices. By increasing the component of a funding rule tied to a given outcome, universities are indirectly steered into increasing that outcome. On the upside, enrollment-based rules may encourage universities to increase enrollment, completion-based rules may increase graduation rates and unconditional transfers may provide no incentives to universities. These upsides, however, can be conflicting and may not be the sole outcomes. For instance, universities may increase their efforts to recruit from other universities, reduce requirements for graduation or, in the case of unconditional transfers, reduce their teaching or research output. Depending on the formulas, universities may also change the proportion of funds they dedicate to research activities. 

This panel invites individuals to submit papers on the study universities' funding formulas. We welcome:

• Comparative analysis;
• Studies of reforms;
• Statistical analysis;
• Theoretical analysis.