LIST OF PANELS

In federal states, authority over and responsibility for public policies is divided between two orders of government (the federal government and the constituent units). The assignment of responsibilities to different levels of government requires vertical and even horizontal coordination because decisions taken by one level can generate consequences over citizens from another one. (Schnabel, 2020). Given the overlapping action of the central and subnational spheres in most policy areas, interactions among the different governments are necessary for policy coordination (Hueglin & Fenna, 2015) to coordinate policy. Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) are crucial for the ability of federal systems to deliver public services.

The operation of IGR is shaped by politics, the character of public policies, as well as fiscal and managerial issues regarding public service provision. Since these bonds involve spheres of authority and power regarding territorial politics, the kind of resulting arrangement can induce more negotiation, bargain, and cooperation to seek mutual benefits or, on the contrary, create conflicts between the different governmnts, for instance over resources and jurisdiction (Agranoff, 2001).

The main challenge of federal states is to develop well-functioning IGR and formalize interactions between governments. Against this backdrop, most federations have established intergovernmental councils to put IGR on a more reliable footing.

Welfare State expansion after World War II (Obinger, Leibfried, & Castles, 2005) further increased the need for coordination of policymaking in federal systems to reconcile the coexistence between autonomy and interdependence that shapes federations and their decision-making process. To promote equity while also responding to regional differences in need, preferences, and demand, federations combined centralized processes (such as financing, regulation, and induction) with decentralized and autonomous implementation of public policies.

This panel intends to explore experiences of federalism and IGR arrangements in public welfare policies. It explores how federations organize the relationship between different levels of government. The main objective is to discuss and compare What mechanisms help federations coordinate the delivery of public welfare policy? How should they be designed? What challenges arise?”. More specifically, it examines whether IGR instruments are a useful to tool to balance national equity and regional differences by facilitating cooperation between different spheres of government in the implementation of public welfare policies.

References

Agranoff,  R.  (2001).  Managing within the matrix:  Do  collaborative intergovernmental  relations  exist?  Publius:  The Journal of Federalism,  31(2),  31–56.  doi: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a004895

Hueglin, T.  O.,  &  Fenna,  A.  (2015).  Comparative federalism:  A systematic inquiry.  Toronto, ON:  University  of  Toronto  Press.

Obinger, H.,  Leibfried,  S.,  &  Castles,  F.  G.  (2005).  Federalism and the welfare state:  New world and  European  experiences.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.

Schnabel, J.  (2020).  Managing interdependencies in federal  systems:  Intergovernmental  councils  and  the  making  of  public  policy.  Cham:  Palgrave

Macmillan.

This panel invites research on any of these issues that contribute to knowledge on federalism and public welfare policies.

How do intergovernmental forums of political leaders, senior civil servants, or other governmental political actors deal with shared problems? Taking this issue into account, two analytical questions are important: (1) the direction of the interaction between involved actors – top-down, bottom-up, or horizontal – and if there is a hierarchy among them; (2) the motivation for the installation of IGR forums: to influence other federal entities, preserve jurisdictional autonomy from external interferences, coordinate actions, exchange information, or share knowledge; (3) the level of formalization and legal rules: legislative institutions and mechanism, and institutionalization and role of the federal and subnational governments; (4) the distribution of authority (dual or functional division of powers; degree of de/centralization and evolution (incl. recentralization, federal preemption).

These four topics may affect in different ways the functioning of federalism as well as the design and implementation of public welfare policies. To avoid that governments unilaterally solve problems affecting many federal actors, intergovernmental arrangements can contribute to safeguarding federalism as well as the federal stability.

We invite scholars to submit papers which analyze how federal design and IGR arrangements enable organize public welfare policies in order to increase our knowledge about this topic.

We welcome:

-          case studies focused on highlighting the functioning of federal arrangements and how they can help to improve the implementation of public welfare policies.

-          comparative empirical papers oriented to analyze the design and operation of IGR in different countries and the wat they affect the results obtained in policy implementation and decision-making.

-          theoretical papers aiming at improving the knowledge on federalism, IGR and public welfare policies.