P199 / Governance by and of Intermediaries

Topic : Governance, Policy Networks and Coalition

Chair : David Levi Faur (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Second Chair : Rotem Medzini (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE

Intermediaries have become increasingly important actors in domestic, European, and transnational governance. Regulatory regimes frequently rely on third-party certifiers, auditors, accreditation bodies, accounting firms, credit-rating agencies, standard-setting organizations, reporting regimes, rankings, gatekeepers, monitors, and whistleblowers. These actors may interpret rules, provide information, monitor conduct, verify compliance, certify performance, facilitate enforcement, and mediate relations among regulators, regulatees, beneficiaries, and wider publics.

This panel invites papers examining both governance by intermediaries and governance of intermediaries. Governance by intermediaries concerns the ways in which intermediary actors participate in the exercise of regulatory and governing authority. Governance of intermediaries concerns the arrangements through which intermediaries themselves are authorized, supervised, constrained, evaluated, made transparent, and held accountable.

The increasing reliance on intermediaries can expand regulatory capacity, mobilize expertise, improve information, facilitate monitoring, and strengthen compliance. At the same time, it raises important questions about delegation, autonomy, conflicts of interest, capture, legitimacy, transparency, responsibility, and democratic control. Where regulatory functions are distributed among public, private, professional, and hybrid actors, it may become difficult to determine who exercises authority, whose interests intermediaries serve, and who should be held responsible when governance fails.

The panel seeks theoretical, empirical, comparative, and methodological papers addressing the roles, functions, successes, failures, accountability, and transparency of intermediaries. Topics may include certification, verification, auditing, accreditation, monitoring, reporting, ranking, standard setting, delegation of regulatory tasks and authority, intermediary autonomy and discretion, conflicts of interest and capture, accountability and oversight mechanisms, and variation across countries, sectors, and regulatory regimes.

We particularly welcome papers that examine the legal and institutional mechanisms through which intermediaries are created, recognized, empowered, supervised, and sanctioned, as well as work on intermediaries in areas such as digital governance, environmental protection, finance, labor regulation, health, and artificial intelligence.

The panel aims to problematize rather than assume the effects of intermediation. Under what conditions do intermediaries enhance regulatory capacity, credibility, and public welfare? When do they generate opacity, dependency, or unaccountable authority? Which forms of transparency, verification, supervision, and accountability are appropriate for different intermediary functions?

More broadly, we invite papers that consider how an intermediation perspective may reshape theories of regulatory governance, delegation, private authority, accountability, state capacity, and democratic public policy.

CALL FOR PAPERS

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