W20 / Local and Regional Govenace, Collaboration, and Policy Instrument Choices

Topic : Public Administration, Governance, Networks

Chair : Richard Feiock (Florida State University)

CALL FOR PAPERS

This workshop will examine an array of policy instruments and collaborative management mechanisms available to coordinate the actions of local governments to mitigate local and regional dilemmas of fragmented authority that characterize a federalist system and even unitary systems. Authority to address public problems can be fragmented vertically among levels of government, horizontally among local governments, or functionally among agencies and bureaus. Fragmented authority produces institutional collective action dilemmas when lack on integration results in spillovers or loss of scale economies. This workshop brings together research to understand these dilemmas and the collaborative mechanisms to mitigate them. Informal types of agreements impose fewer restrictions on participants because they are flexible, voluntary, and do not require local governments to give up autonomy but they are unlikely to be sustained if participants face “collaboration risks” of not being able to coordinate on a course of action, not being able to agree to division of costs, or not being able to prevent others from reneging or free riding following agreement.

Thus the aim of the workshop is to bring together scholars in urban affairs, public administration, and public policy to advance theory and practice of intergovernmental, inter-organizational, and intra-organizational collaboration. This workshop will present theoretically informed empirical papers that address the challenges of fragmented authority, emphasizing comparative perspectives.

ABSTRACT

The focus of this workshop is on how regional governance systems and intergovernmental collaboration relationships evolve and how they shape policy instrument selection and implementation. This workshop will both extend and develop, and challenge institutional collective action theories of local and regional policy. In doing so the research presented seeks to capture the political dynamics collaborative governance institutions and policy instruments throughout their life cycle.

W20 / Local and Regional Govenace, Collaboration, and Policy Instrument Choices

Chair : Richard Feiock (Florida State University)

Session 3Regional Governance in Practice

Wednesday, June 27th 09:00 to 12:15 (Barco Law - G46 (Groundfloor))

Discussants

Lachezar Anguelov (The Evergreen State College)

Stefan Wittwer (ETH Zurich, Switzerland)

Three Case Studies of Regional Collaboration between Community Water Systems in the U.S.

Katy Hansen (Duke University)

Water service provision in the United States manifests institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas. High fragmentation creates diseconomies of scale: over 80% of the 51,000 community water systems (CWSs) in the U.S. serve fewer than 3,300 people (EPA, 2015). Many small CWSs lack the technical, managerial, and financial (TMF) capacity to efficiently provide water services. For example, revenue from taxes and fees in communities with a narrow tax base is often insufficient to adequately invest in necessary infrastructure. Lack of TMF capacity threatens the availability of safe, reliable, and affordable water, with subsequent consequences for public and environmental health, as well as economic development.

This paper examines three case studies to analyze how and why CWSs collaborate regionally to mitigate ICA dilemmas. The management mechanisms and policy instruments to facilitate collaboration array according to the level of autonomy afforded to local CWSs (Feiock and Scholz, 2009). We select cases to profile mechanisms and instruments across this array, including a network of utilities in Hampton Roads, Virginia, a partnership between utilities in Tacoma, Washington, and a consolidation of utilities in Indianapolis, Indiana. We draw on the ICA framework to answer several specific questions for each case study: how did the mechanism or instrument evolve? what are the incentives for CWSs to participate? what are the information, negotiation, and enforcement costs? how do existing institutions and higher-level rules affect the development and implementation of the mechanism or instrument?

We show CWSs are incentivized to participate in regional collaboration to secure economic benefits, including reduced exposure to regulatory penalties, increased access to capital, and improved performance from economies of scale. Different types of management mechanisms and policy instruments yield different benefits. Developing and implementing regionalization mechanisms and instruments is difficult and costly. Higher-level rules from state and federal laws and regulations prevent CWSs from pursuing certain mechanisms and instruments.

Taking up a role in the labour market league: creating governance capacity for joint action

Petra Ophoff (Netherlands School of Public Administration)

When it comes to labour market issues and economic development, municipalities are only one player in the field of many public, private and third sector organizations. However, they are confronted with numerous interlocking developments on which they are expected to take decisive action, e.g. enhancing employment opportunities, improving the economy and lower unemployment rates, and solve to some extent the mismatch between supply and demand. Until recently, there were three government strategies in relation to the labor market. First, passive activation or supply-oriented, i.e. linking people to vacancies, via information systems and active guidance. In addition, there were more pro-active ways, for example government wide 'work-creation programs' with which they could give a certain region a boost. A third strategy was to

subsidize a local initiative (Aiken & Bode, 2009). Increasingly, labour market issues and economic development are seen as a regional governance quest, because such developments cross administrative, geographical, organizational and public borders.

At the same time, the focus of the academic literature and practice is also shifting towards the idea of collaborative governance, interactions and horizontal governance, instead of the government being the only legitimate or decisive player (Peters & Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998). This reflects the idea of 'governing without government' (Rhodes, 1996, p. 652) and 'governing beyond government' (Stoker, 1998, p. 19). In practice, in most Western countries the government is seen as one actor in a network of other players. In some regions this leads to public, private and societal actors setting up regional structures and networks to tackle labor market and economic challenges collectively. We see, in general three approaches, a competitive model: in which tasks are split up and organizations want to meet their own targets. Second, a complementary model: in which an agenda and capacity is developed together, and a laissez-faire model, in a which a municipality chooses not to act, but to play along.

In this paper we will address the central research question: how can municipalities, together with other parties, develop a policy agenda and governance capacity to tackle regional tasks related to the labour market?

In this paper we study ten different cases, half of them are focused on the labour market, and the other cases on economic development. These cases are networks, boards or structures set-up to tackle regional labour market issues. We study in-depth what events occurred in the labour market (in the broad sense) in the past and present, why and how the collaboration started and how the agenda and goals changed over time. Furthermore, we examine how the actor-constellation was formed, what kind of structure it got and how it acts as a collective and how it develops governance capacity. Governance capacity refers to "a new capacity for joint action that did not exist before and sustain or grow that capacity for the duration of the shared purpose" (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012, p. 14). We focus more specifically on the coordination efforts, the extent of resilience when faced with challenges, learning and blending resources. We conclude our paper with a reflection upon the results (and how they are perceived by the networks), with a specific focus on the contribution and the role of the municipality.

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The Unvarnished Truth about Large Cities' Representation in American Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs)

Jay Rickabaugh (University of Pittsburgh)

A wealth of scholarship normatively suggests that urban cities and counties in large metropolitan areas are under-represented in American cross-boundary organizations, leading to assumed inequities in funding distribution (Nelson, Sanchez, Wolf, & Farquhar, 2003; Orfield & Dawes, n.d.; Sanchez, 2006). However, much of the research on cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations is either based on snapshots in time or on a possibly outdated, broad assumption that the one-member, one-vote principle applies everywhere. This research seeks to rigorously test these assertions through an extensive, detailed coding of bylaws. The results indicate the myriad forms of representation center cities have, how their respective counties are allocated votes (where applicable), how deviated this representation is from population, and the variety of rules in place to account for this deviation.

The governance of cross-boundary organizations in the United States are structured much more like international organizations such as the European Union or UN Security Council than traditional American forms of government. Most of the traditional legislative forms of government in the United States that rely on one-person-one-vote do so through often highly gerrymandered districts that may ignore municipal and county boundaries. Cross-boundary organizations like Metropolitan Planning Organizations, Economic Development Districts, Regional Councils, and Councils of Governments blend a respect for the autonomy

of local government members with a respect for the differences in population. Like the Treaty of Lisbon, the "great powers" of a region often are entitled to stronger decision-making authority than smaller nations, but those smaller nations still retain enough power to collectively veto. Frug and Barron (2013) suggested that cross-boundary organizations adopt governance more like this, when in fact, many major metropolitan areas have. This is done through innovative processes for dual testing, population thresholds for additional representation, weighted voting rules, and multiple chambers.

This project has coded a random sample of Regional Intergovernmental Organization (RIGO) bylaws. RIGOs are a new classification of American cross-boundary intergovernmental organizations that provide stringent criteria to separate out the most significant, geographically broadest organizations with a wide policy agenda (Miller & Nelles, 2018). Cities in this sample with over 100,000 population include: Chicago, Nashville, Richmond, Philadelphia, Tampa, Atlanta, San Diego, Sacramento, Phoenix, Rochester (NY), Milwaukee and Austin. In many of these cases, these organizations also function as the federally recognized Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for the region. In the United States, MPOs are responsible for allocating federal transportation funding in coordinated, efficient ways that align with regional priorities. The governance arrangements of RIGOs are a product of population differences, state influence, and the negotiations among members.

Rather than relying on a current roster of representatives, the bylaws demonstrate which local governments have codified protections for membership, representation and appointment. I coded each local government member as the unit of analysis and recorded the number of representatives each was afforded, the number of votes (to account for weighted systems), and the constraints on who could be a representative (elected official, professional staff, citizen, etc.). The dataset also includes how many chambers the organization has and codes the one with the most specific criteria on population, geographic regions and/or political structure. Census populations from 2010 inform the relative weight of each local government. As a result, this database more directly reflects the outcome of the most recent negotiations for governance arrangements.

Using two formulas, I demonstrate that one-member-one-vote and population proportionality are not mutually exclusive; in fact, they are quite commonly blended together in the governance arrangements of RIGOs. There is tremendous variety and complexity in the regions themselves in size, resources, needs, geography and political culture. The logical outgrowth of that regional variety is baked into organizational governance arrangements. When combined with the influence of state legislation, negotiations among the parties involved, and shifts over time, there ought to be tremendous doubt on any broad, blanket statements about them. This paper will demonstrate how much more complicated the reality is, how these governance arrangements could affect the decisions they make and why these imbalances may be in place.

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W20 / Local and Regional Govenace, Collaboration, and Policy Instrument Choices

Chair : Richard Feiock (Florida State University)

Session 4Regional Land and Environmental Governance

Wednesday, June 27th 13:45 to 17:00 (Barco Law - G46 (Groundfloor))

Discussants

Jay Rickabaugh (University of Pittsburgh)

Katy Hansen (Duke University)

Political-Administrative Interactions in Inter-municipal Cooperation: the Case of Integrated Territorial Investments in Poland

Sylwia Borkowska-Waszak (University of Strathclyde, European Policies Research Centre)

Martin Ferry (University of Strathclyde)

Problem statement

This paper provides empirical insights into debates on inter-municipal cooperation in Europe. In particular, it draws attention to the interaction between political and administrative factors in implementing integrated economic development policies in functional urban areas that cut across municipal boundaries. The paper focuses on the case of Integrated Territorial Investments (ITI), a policy instrument introduced under European Union's Cohesion Policy (CP) for the period 2014-2020. One of the main motivations for ITI was the perceived fragmentation of CP funding. Evaluations of the policy have repeatedly noted how the strategic objectives of the policy have been undermined by competition and rivalry for funding, particularly at the local level where short-term political gains supersede longer-term strategic aims that are set out in programme documents to be implemented by programme authorities (Ferry, 2015; Kozak, 2016). A fundamental aim of ITI is to provide an incentive for municipalities to collaborate rather than compete for CP projects: an envelope of funding is set aside for integrated projects that cover functional urban areas. The paper assesses the extent to which this instrument overcomes the tensions and rivalries that exist between municipalities and, crucially, between different actors from political and administrative spheres.

Context

Researchers have acknowledged that public policies have recently become more politicised, and that political influence can create substantial obstacles to successful socio-economic development (Peters, 2013; Shepherd et al., 2014). They have noted these trends in particular in Central Eastern Europe (CEE) (Kopecký et al., 2016), where political influence can be exerted over public administrations which have comparatively limited institutional experience and capacity. CP seems to be an interesting case in this context, due to its substantial resources invested in CEE and consequent high political status. Numerous researchers have acknowledged political factors in CP implementation and effectiveness (i.e. Dotti, 2016; Milio, 2014; Swianiewicz et al, 2010). Within that, most studies highlight the negative effects of political involvement, particularly on the distribution of resources (i.e. Bachtler 2017; Bloom, Petrova, 2012; Bouda et al, 2013; Fazekas, Toth 2016). This creates a fruitful area for research on intergovernmental collaboration: What are the formal and informal rules that govern collaboration between municipalities involved in integrated territorial development? How do political and administrative agendas interact in this? To what extent can an instrument such as ITI provide incentives to ensure that this interaction stimulates genuine collaboration and integrated development?

Scope and methodology

The purpose of the research is to explore the role of political factors in the process of inter-municipal cooperation, and to explain the key processes and mechanisms involved. The research aims to understand and present the process of collaboration from the perspective of local and regional actors, based on a

constructivist-interpretivist approach. The main theoretical background is the Institutional Collective Action Framework (Feiock, 2013), including its adaptation to the European context (Tavares, Feiock, 2017). Within this, the research analyses inter-municipal collaboration within ITI implementation, including the role of political actors in resolving key ICA dilemmas (e.g. dealing with particular collaboration risks, transactions costs and deciding on formal and informal mechanisms ensuring the achievement of common goals). The research takes the case of ITI implementation in two Polish regions. CP funding is an important source of investment in Polish regions and locales and ITI creates an external incentive for potential collective benefit. Based on 3 months of participatory observation, 45 expert interviews and qualitative content analysis of policy documents, the research identifies arenas at different stages of joint policy implementation where political and administrative rationales interact, and highlights the formal and informal rules that govern this.

Originality and contribution

The paper aims to contribute to the theoretical basis and methodological approaches of research on inter-municipal cooperation. It will test an innovative combination of methods to study political influence on inter-municipal cooperation and policy implementation, drawing on organizational ethnography. Exploring resource allocation decisions at the micro-level provides concrete insights into the challenges of inter-municipal collaboration: how the interplay of political and administrative factors and motivations can influence ICA dilemmas and explain the choice of particular policy instruments and legal forms of collaboration. The case of ITI in Poland is especially interesting in this context, as the instrument was imposed ‘from above’ by the EU and the Polish government, but with some flexibility for municipalities to decide the legal form and scope of collaboration. Consequently, there are various ITI models with different transaction costs, providing excellent material for comparative analysis. Moreover, ITI created an unusual situation where collaboration is imposed, but is also incentivised: it does not require municipalities to give up decision-making power nor individual resources, as it provides an opportunity to jointly apply for external, EU-funded projects. Assessing the responses of municipalities and their political and administrative actors to these rules and incentives for collaboration in the CEE context can inform the development of the ICA Framework.

Using the policy instruments of NGOs to promote locally-led development and governance in Sri Lanka

Indi Akurugoda (University of Ruhuna, Sri Lanka)

For many years, the Sri Lankan political system has been strongly centralized, despite the many arguments against such centralization. Several attempts were made by successive governments to decentralize power after independence in 1948, with the anti-federalist reactions of some Sinhala nationalist groups rejecting any decentralization proposals, who argued that decentralization was a threat to the unitary state structure and state sovereignty and so would divide the country. The Tamil nationalist elements have long argued for a separate Tamil state.

Reforms to local government have been part of decentralization initiatives but have ended in failure, as occurred with the establishment of development councils in 1980. Although the provincial councils established later in 1987 included constitutionally recognized powers, these have never been transferred by central government. This has given rise to a central-local dilemma in which the centralization of power has served to undermine local government. This means that local government is then unable to determine its own polices, to use its policy processes to bring about locally-led development, or to address local community needs. The fragmentation of authority from the top to the bottom levels of government actively discourages collaboration or collective action.

The tsunami of 2004 and the end of the civil war in 2009 saw non-governmental organization (NGO) support and large amounts of foreign funding flow into Sri Lanka to assist in the recovery. The prominent feature of the aid management and distribution was the central government control over aid by directing them towards large scale construction projects at the expense of local needs. Moreover, the central government imposed strict restrictions on NGOs. Despite these restrictions, a number of NGOs have played an important role in promoting local development through interacting and coordinating with local governments and local communities.

This research examines how and why the foreign-originated and foreign-funded NGOs have used their policy instruments in overcoming the development and governance issues at the local government level. The developments in Sri Lanka following the tsunami and the civil war saw the important contribution made by these NGOs. The many problems central government created were due to a failure to incorporate and rely on the ‘expert’ knowledge and local capacity of local sources in addressing the enormous issues arising. This research indicates that by failing to incorporate the local and non-government actors in designing policy and implementing actions the outcomes for the recipients were seriously flawed. It is not a matter of arguing that one area of government should take precedence over another – in this case of central government over local sources – but rather that there is a key role for local communities, local governments

and non-governmental actors working together. Without an informed working relationship being formed among and between these relevant parties, outcomes will be seriously compromised. The crucial role of NGOs and local bodies require serious acknowledgement and implementation.

Based on the southern and eastern provinces in Sri Lanka, this research covers 12 local government bodies including municipal councils, urban councils and *Pradeshiya Sabhas*. Respondents were drawn from national, provincial and local level political representatives and administrative officials, NGO officials and community-based organization (CBO) representatives, and selected using snow-ball and purposive sampling methods. Certain key projects were observed and published sources were used to collect secondary data. The data was analyzed manually by categorizing under themes.

Under central government-centric policy processes, governments can ignore issues. For example, the lack of essential facilities such as water, electricity and interior roads were not addressed by centrally-led large scale construction projects. Even in the local government election campaigns, the local issues or community needs do not come forward as election slogans. There is a lack of securing people's participation in local government policy processes.

The findings revealed that the NGOs can and have played a positive role in mitigating central-local dilemmas altering the fragmented authority. Local government-NGO collaborations were found to have made an effective and significant contribution to fulfilling local level needs and empowering local government and local communities. The specific local issues, such as ethnic divisions and decisions about the use of local natural resources that have not been addressed through local government policies, received a special attention through the NGOs involvement.

This research shows that NGOs can and do promote a role for people in the policy process, by creating networks, helping to build CBOs and guiding local government representatives in obtaining people's participation in local policy processes. The research shows that where the relevant parties were involved creatively in addressing the local issues then the outcomes for the people were considerably enhanced. NGOs were found to be at the forefront of endeavours to address development and governance needs and achieve community objectives at the local level.

To Mitigate or to Adapt: Perceptions and Attitudes of Local Actors towards Green and Open Spaces in Urban Regions

Nicole Schmidt (Heidelberg University)

The local level has gained an increasing prominence in the climate change discourse in recent years. Municipalities are organizing themselves in various networks (Bansard et al., 2017; Tosun and Schoenefeld, 2017), preparing for the challenge that climate change represents for urban regions, and implying that the assumption of the mantra "mitigation is global, adaptation is local" is losing ground. Scholars argue that cities have mayors who exhibit the necessary leadership quality and the appropriate tools to address global problems such as climate change (Barber, 2013; Feiock and Coutts, 2013).

Accordingly, the question arises whether local actors perceive climate mitigation and adaptation measures differently: Do we observe variance across different types of actors (politicians, bureaucrats, citizens) in their preference for mitigation or adaptation measures?

The results of this study will be relevant for three reasons. First, it reveals local actors' preferences with regards to mitigation or adaptation in three municipalities in Germany, which so far have not been evaluated. Second, this paper seeks to empirically examine potential trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation measures in the context of green and open spaces in urban regions. Lastly, the article sheds light at whether local actors interact and/or coordinate their climate efforts with other levels of government, i.e. the regional level.

Certainly, local administrative bodies are equipped with the specific knowledge about its residents, including vulnerable populations, and critical infrastructure – in essence, the community's needs – but crucially, citizen or politicians might have different views on what constitutes the "appropriate" climate measures for a specific open or green space. For example, supporting the reduction of greenhouse gas production through dense and compact building developments would make sense in the context of mitigation. However, the high density of buildings in urban areas often contribute to an increase in temperatures (the so called "heath island" effect) (Frommer et al., 2011; Stone and Frumkin, 2010), so one would expect that citizens (in contrast to politicians and bureaucrats) prefer more loosely developed city structures. Examining such potential trade-offs and conflicts between different groups of actors lies at the heart of this study.

Building on works which examine the state of preparedness at the local level (e.g. Heidrich et al., 2013; Measham et al., 2011), this article also aims to highlight the importance of coordination between different levels of governments (Henstra, 2017; Nalau et al., 2015). Using original interview data (n=30) in addition to a household survey (n=390), the paper investigates the perception and attitudes of local politicians, bureaucrats and citizens in Heidelberg, Mannheim and Weinheim in a comparative manner. Having three

different city types in the same metropolitan region in the state of Baden-Württemberg further allows drawing assessments with respect to the regional level. The focus lies on investigating how different attitudes and perceptions impact the planning process for green and open spaces in urban regions in Germany.

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W20 / Local and Regional Govenace, Collaboration, and Policy Instrument Choices

Chair : Richard Feiock (Florida State University)

Session 5Interlocal Collaboration and Transaction Costs

Thursday, June 28th 09:00 to 12:15 (Barco Law - G46 (Groundfloor))

Discussants

David Miller (University of Pittsburgh)

Liming Suo (University of Electronic Science and Technology of China)

Promoting regional cross-border projects in fragmented authority: inter-cantonal cooperation in the implementation of a new regional policy in Switzerland

Stefan Wittwer (ETH Zurich, Switzerland)

Fritz Sager (University of Bern)

Regional policy with the aim of influencing economic processes in rural and peripheral regions plays an important role in states facing the challenge of rural depopulation and changes in economic structures. In order to better react to these challenges, Switzerland adopted a New Regional Policy (NRP) in 2006. The implementation in federalist Switzerland is fully delegated to the subnational units (Swiss “cantons”). This study examines the implementation of the policy and seeks to find explanations for the problems in attaining the goal of fostering inter-cantonal projects by voluntary inter-cantonal cooperation.

The general aim of the NRP is to help rural, mountainous and border areas to implement their development programs in order to create and keep jobs in the areas by a direct financial promotion of projects. A special focus lies on projects whose functional scope does not match with subnational institutional borders and hence requires collective action among cantons which follow different economic and regional development strategies, are in direct economic competition with each other and differ substantively regarding their size, financial resources and geographical context.

The aim of this study thus is to examine institutional collective action in the implementation of the NRP by analyzing data on 1248 projects and a survey with the responsible actors at the 22 subnational (cantonal) levels (full census) stemming from an evaluation report by Sager and Huegli (2013). Preliminary results indicate collective action problems and a loss of scale economies as only few implemented projects crossed cantonal borders and the vast majority of projects take place at a subcantonal level. Hence, we seek to find out which factors facilitated cooperation and the initiation of inter-cantonal projects. Did certain cantons cooperate more successfully with each other or are specific project-characteristics more reliable explanatory factors for successful voluntary subnational cross-border cooperation? Our research using original and fine-grained data at both project- and cantonal-level aims at contributing to the understanding of how fragmented authority in a federalist system can overcome institutional collective action dilemmas in the implementation of regional policies designed to promote rural regions across subnational borders.

The Life Cycle of Shared Service Delivery: Differentiating Opportunities, Goals, Collective Mechanisms, and Transaction Costs

Austin Aldag (Cornell University)

Mildred Warner (Cornell University)

A significant portion of the current literature on local government restructuring rests on theories of privatization, which are based on competition and cost savings, service-specific characteristics, and a static scheme of transaction costs. Nevertheless, this theoretical foundation is far too narrow for

intergovernmental relations in the highly fragmented municipal landscape within the United States. In fact, our research suggests that the focus on competition and cost savings may undermine sustainability in shared service agreements over time. Among local governments, inter-municipal cooperation, not privatization, is the growing reform. For regional governance systems to sustainably function, scholarship must examine these collective agreements and ponder how they evolve over time into the uncertain future which is filled in collaboration risks.

In this paper, we investigate the life cycle of a broad set of inter-municipal agreements, both nascent and long-standing, and ask what are the determinants of shared service agreement duration. We merge Feiock's institutional collective action (ICA) framework with Ostrom's core relationship thesis, and apply it to the municipal scale of public service cooperation. Our theoretical framework shows the evolution of shared service agreements throughout their life cycle. In doing so, our work helps refocus the literature's narrow attention away from cost savings and competition to the many values of cooperation, such as local government reciprocity and trust, improved service quality, and increased regional coordination.

To answer these important questions, we conducted a survey of all cities, counties, towns, and villages in New York State in 2013 to assess the level of sharing across 29 common public services. The length of shared service agreements varies between 1 to 80 years. What drives shared service agreement duration? Our multilevel linear regression model shows that sharing agreements fall along a cooperation continuum. As such, we identify opportunities, goals, collective mechanisms, and differing transaction costs for both shorter and longer term shared service agreements. We also merge our data with local budget data, and show the cost savings quickly erode overtime. Our findings may inform policy instrument selection and implementation for stable institutional collective action.

For shorter term agreements, they commence because of staff transitions and service disruptions, have the goal of cost savings, and evaluations in the short term are employed to ensure agreement execution. We argue that transaction costs, as a result, are higher at the start of shared service agreements. On the other hand, longer term shared service agreements build from institutional trust and reputation, have the goals of increased service quality and regional service coordination, and are often sustained through agreement formalization. Hence, transaction costs are lower for longer term shared service agreements. Additionally, our multilevel regression results, which groups 2,606 particular service agreements within 595 unique units of local government in New York State, show that both government level and agreement level variables drive agreement duration. Our analysis calls for new theories on shared services that build directly from the benefits of improved coordination, citizen interest, and service quality, not from normative theories based primarily on competition and costs.

Inte-rmunicipal Cooperation in the Balkans: Applying an Institutional Collective Action (ICA) Framework to investigate inter-municipal governance

Lachezar Anguelov (The Evergreen State College)

Haris Alibaši? (University of West Florida)

The Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework advances an opportunity to examine inter-municipal cooperation and regional governance structures in Europe (Feiock & Tavares, 2017). In this paper, we explore what determines the adoption of policy instruments to solve collective action dilemmas in Southeast Europe (the Balkans). In particular, we are interested in the following research question: what factors explain the choices between different mechanisms of cooperation? We use the ICA framework to operationalize policy tools regarding integration mechanisms, and degree of institutional scope. Accounting for historical, cultural, and institutional differences between these four countries, we examine how local political institutions and, community homogeneity affect the adoption of regional governance mechanisms. To test ICA propositions, first, we provide examples of collective action dilemmas from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Romania. Subsequently, we code policy instruments for integrating ICA dilemmas in these countries. Previous research has found that responses to ICA dilemmas have been remarkably different across countries and geographical regions and that a focus on the constitutional-legal framework, local institutions, and homogeneity within and between communities is warranted (Feiock & Tavares, 2017). This study contributes to the literature by examining the application of the framework in an often overlooked region: the Balkans. Previously researchers have utilized the framework to investigate regional governance arrangements in European settings: Finland, Norway, The Netherlands, France, Italy, Switzerland, Portugal, Belgium, and the United Kingdom to name a few. A study of the framework's utility in Southeast Europe is scant to non-existent. To fill this lacuna, we focus on four countries from the region: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Romania. We believe that examining local governance arrangements in these countries will provide us with rich contextual variation, but also allow us to operationalize a range of similarities and differences that can contribute to comparative studies of European countries as scholars strive to add to the consolidation of ICA as a theoretical framework.

W20 / Local and Regional Govenace, Collaboration, and Policy Instrument Choices

Chair : Richard Feiock (Florida State University)

Session 6Regional Governance Theory

Thursday, June 28th 13:45 to 16:00 (Barco Law - 118)

Discussants

Richard Feiock (Florida State University)

Austin Aldag (Cornell University)

The Asset Specificity, Measurability and Institutional Collective Action in Environmental Governance

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With the contiguity, contagion and overlap of the environment pollution in urban agglomeration, the negative externalities and spillovers have more significant influence. To achieve the goal of green environment shared-governance,local governments in urban agglomeration have strong motivation on interlocal collaboration. In institutional collective action framework(Feiock,2013), transaction cost and transaction risk are the main factors which affect the decision-making of local government. Accordingly, the asset specificity and measurability of the goods and services of the transaction affect the transaction cost and transaction risk. Due to the difference between asset specificity and measurability of the goods and services of the transaction, different cooperation contents make it necessary to adopt different forms of cooperation organizations, cooperation partners and forms of cooperation in order to obtain the benefits of cooperation in order to form different interlocal collaboration network structures. Thus, we put forward the hypothesis of the choice of behavior of environmental governance among local governments, and construct the relationship between asset specificity, measurability of the goods and services of the transaction and the interlocal collaboration networks in environmental governance.

With the continuous enrichment of regional cooperation research, the related research on the cooperation field and field characteristics has drawn attention (Feoick, 2009, 2013; Andrew, 2013) , and the regional cooperation in the field of environment has also become a hot study topic (Kraatz, MS, 1998; Liu J, Diamond J, 2008; Berardo, 2014; Yi H. et al., 2017). Scholars in the field of public administration and policy often think that the decisions which products and local services provide are determined by the characteristics of the goods and services (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Ferris & Graddy, 1986). Asset specificity and measurability of the goods and services of the transaction are two dimensions that influence transaction cost (Brown & Potoski, 2005; Carr et al., 2009; Feiock, 2007; Shrestha, 2010; Williamson, 1981, 1985). Andrew (2013) proposed that in order to minimize the risk of cooperation, local governments would choose different types of agreements based on the measurability of the goods and services, asset specificity, number of collaborators, homogeneity and geographical proximity. These two kinds of goods characteristics will affect the local governments' action by affecting the transaction costs and transaction risks, and ultimately form a different collaborative governance network.

Therefore, this paper focus on the relationship between the characteristics of goods and collaborative networks in environmental governance and how to improve the performance of environmental governance. According to the characteristics of the different attributes, this paper selects environmental governance in the air pollution control, water pollution control, soil pollution control as the research object to explore the local government collaboration network and governance performance differences. This paper chooses the urban agglomeration in the Yangtze River Delta, which is a typical collaborative region in China, as the analysis object, and takes the 2011-2017 Environmental policy text as the data source. Through exploring the collaborative network structure in different types of environmental governance, we propose the

collaboration of urban agglomerations for air pollution control, water pollution control and soil pollution control in China interlocal collaborative network structure, and possible ways to innovate its governance structure.

Key words: Asset Specificity; Collaboration Network; Environmental Governance

Parsing Regional Governing Space in Large Metropolitan Areas: Pittsburgh, Chicago, Boston, and Los Anegeles

David Miller (University of Pittsburgh)

Using five properties (membership, agenda, legitimacy, ambition and scale), we have classified most general purpose local government cross-boundary organizations in the United States as Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). Using the scale property we have furthered carved out 477 IGOs to be Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs). In some regions, there is only one IGO and in those cases so long as it fits our criteria it is automatically designated a RIGO. However, the presence of one or more IGOs within the footprint of a RIGO or in a region occurs frequently. In that case, after reviewing the properties of each of the IGOs we select the one (if any) that best fits as the RIGO.

It is common, particularly for the larger RIGOs, for there to also be several IGOs sharing the regional space. Typically, these IGOs represent local governments that came together to address issues that are unique to their particular part of the region. They share policy space with the RIGO and may or may not have a working relationship with each other. Indeed, the patterns of RIGO/IGO(s) distribution, functions, and interactions vary substantially.

RIGOs and IGOs serve vital roles and represent different interests that are complementary. A RIGO functions to represent the interests of the region as a whole while IGOs represent interests of parts of that region. There might be competition between those interests but not competition to be the voice for those interests. A RIGO speaks for regional interests and IGOs for subregional interests.

This paper explores those differences and the complementary nature of RIGO/IGOs relations is to look at four of the larger RIGOs – the Southwestern Pennsylvania Commission (SPC) in Pittsburgh, the Chicago Metropolitan Agency on Planning (CMAP), the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) in Boston and the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG).

Each of the regions have very different relationships between the RIGO and the IGOs. In Pittsburgh, that relationship is what we call arms-length as the two operate independently with minimal interaction. In Chicago, the relationship is cooperative co-existence with the presence of a strong advocacy group for the IGOs called the Chicago Mayor’s Caucus. In Boston, the relationship is what we refer to as internalized. IGOs function as committees within MAPC. In Southern California, the relationship is a partnership as both individual municipalities and their local associations of governments are members of SCAG.

The impact of public service capacity on municipal cooperation in Hungary

Éva Kovács (National University of Public Service)

Inter-municipal cooperation (hereinafter: IMC) is an important element of local government reforms across Europe. There is a growing attention both in academic literature and on governments’ reform agendas to examine the forms and results of different IMCs. This wide-spread phenomenon did not avoid Hungary either. There has been a long discussion since the early 90s – the establishment of the current local government system including almost 3200 local governments with extremely broad scope of responsibilities – on the adequate forms of IMC. Despite of this permanent debate and the introduction of many government policies intending to stimulate the greater cooperation on local level, the rationalities behind IMC and the factors that might trigger local governments to engage in increased cooperation with their neighbors have not been systematically analyzed yet. Hence, this study aims to explore what factors explain the different levels of cooperation among local governments. There is strong evidence underlined also by previous studies that service delivery infrastructure (organizational factors), spatial factors and economic constraints are significant drivers (or barriers) of IMC. Our study presents an analysis explaining the effect of these factors on the actual number of formalized IMCs among Hungarian local governments in the field of service delivery. In particular, we test the effect of three potential explanatory variables: local government size (as measured by the number of their inhabitants), the economic and the infrastructural capacity of local government. By this it provides a better understanding of the factors driving IMC. Based on the preliminary results of this study future empirical research should give more elaborated attention and a deeper understanding on how these factors might affect the cooperation arrangements and its results themselves.