LIST OF WORKSHOPS

Public accountability and responsiveness of policy decisions are core tenets of representative democracy. However, in contemporary democracies, many key policy decisions are taken by independent agencies (or non-majoritarian institutions), including regulators and central banks (Vibert 2007). These bodies are deliberately located outside core government structures and operate at arm’s length from politics, which is said to enable them to commit more credibly to long-term policy objectives such as economic stability and development (e.g., Miller and Whitford 2016). As they are not part of the traditional chain of delegation in democracies (cf. Strøm et al. 2003), they are largely insulated from their (political) principals and are not expected to be responsive to democratic input, or at least not in the traditional sense (cf. Rauh and Van der Veer 2024). Therefore, they are often said to suffer a “democratic deficit” (see, e.g., Maggetti 2010).

Yet, independence from government departments and politicians does not mean that independent agencies are completely detached from politics and the wider public or disembedded from democratic systems. On the one hand, the bodies are still subject to oversight mechanisms and may act transparently and provide (voluntary) account to different types of account-holders. On the other hand, they may still (seek to) act responsively towards the wider public, even if this does not take the form of full-fledged policy responsiveness.

First of all, as regards accountability, independent agencies are often subject to various processes ensuring that their conduct is adequately scrutinized by elected policymakers. These processes can take the form of regular hearings or the obligation to publish their policy decisions, annual reports, and accounts, thus also contributing to transparency. Most democratic systems allow parliamentary committees to hold hearings of the organizations' key decision-makers, not only to ask about their decisions and strategies, but also to question them before they are appointed (e.g., Matthews 2020). While politicians cannot normally overrule the decisions of independent agencies, they do pass judgment, give guidance, and decide on resources, appointments, and statutory provisions (Koop and Scotto di Vettimo 2024).

Evidence on parliamentary scrutiny of independent agencies is mixed. Such scrutiny faces classic challenges of parliamentary accountability – competition for attention and information asymmetries between expert officials and less specialized parliamentarians (Schillemans and Busuioc 2015; Schonhardt-Bailey 2013, 2022). Scholars also highlight “forum drift,” where formal account holders choose not to hold agents to account, placing accountability deficits with principals rather than bureaucrats (Schillemans and Busuioc 2015; Brandsma 2013; Matthews 2020). Similarly, research on central banks shows that political disincentives and limited information hinder effective oversight (Tucker 2018). Yet other studies note parliamentary engagement and learning (Collignon and Diessner 2016) and show that partisanship and deliberation vary by context (Ferrara et al. 2021; Schonhardt-Bailey 2022).

Furthermore, independent agencies actively render account to the wider public via a number of actions and initiatives. In part, they are obliged to do so, but many organizations go above and beyond what is required by engaging in voluntary account-giving (e.g., Koop, 2014; De Boer 2023), and in some cases are actually more transparent than ministerial counterparts (Thatcher 2002). For instance, independent agencies may explain their policy decisions in press conferences, news releases, and speeches (e.g., Binder 2017; Koop 2014; Rauh 2023). In this way, they give accounts of their actions and decisions to their stakeholders and to the public at large.

Additionally, the organization’s statutes prescribe what sort of information and explanation needs to be publicly shared (Koop 2011). Such public information and accounts are often discussed in the media, who represent an additional forum for “soft” accountability alongside legislative oversight (e.g., Koop and Scotto di Vettimo 2023).

Secondly, though insulated from electoral pressures, independent agencies may still be responsive to the wider public, even if not in the sense of policy decisions following public preferences. Research has traditionally focused on the extent to – and the way in – which these bodies engage with their relevant expert stakeholders (for instance, their regulatees) and fulfil engagement requirements imposed by their political principals. Yet, a growing strand of research has paid more attention to how the communication of independent bodies actually targets or responds to the wider public.

Research shows that although independent agencies are insulated from electoral pressures, they display communicative and even output responsiveness (Maor 2020; Gilad et al. 2015; Maor and Sulitzeanu‐Kenan 2016). Rather than changing policy choices, they adjust communication and activity levels in response to public perceptions and reputational pressures. Studies of central banks reveal that voluntary account-giving expands and becomes more audience-oriented under reputational stress (e.g., Moschella and Diodati 2020; Müller and Braun 2021). In such cases, communication is simplified and reframed around social and distributive impacts, reflecting efforts to sustain legitimacy and public trust.

Against this background, the workshop examines patterns of accountability and responsiveness of independent agencies in contemporary democracies. It explores when and why stronger accountability emerges, focusing on the individual and contextual factors shaping the type and quality of parliamentary scrutiny – such as the salience and public visibility of agencies, the expertise of account holders, and reputational pressures from the surrounding environment. In an era of growing populism and politicization (Clift and Rosamond 2024), we also ask how vote-seeking representatives adapt their account-holding practices to attract media attention and electoral rewards.

Turning to responsiveness, the workshop investigates the extent and conditions under which independent agencies’ communications and policy actions reflect wider public priorities. We expect factors like salience and reputational pressure, as well as threats from populist governments (Gavin and Manger 2022), to play a key role. Finally, we consider how agencies balance responsiveness to stakeholders with adherence to their mandate-related goals.

By bridging insights from complementary yet so-far not so connected fields of agency accountability and policy and communicative responsiveness, the workshop will contribute to the scholarly debate about the position of governance by independent agencies in democratic systems, including reflections on the democratic embeddedness of the organizations, and how they navigate the current contestation and representational demands in contemporary democratic systems.

Possible papers:

Arnzen, C., Kaler, L., and Moffitt, S. "Subnational Independent Agencies: SELPAs and the Politics of Expertise in Special Education Governance"

Bellodi, L., Morelli, M., Spenkuch, J., Teso, E., Vannoni, M. and Xu, G. “Personnel is Policy: Delegation and Political Misalignment in the Rulemaking Process”

Maor, M. “Understanding Bureaucratic Reputational Collapse: Varieties, Dynamics, and Consequences”

Masciandaro, D. and Moschella, M. Title to be confirmed

Romelli, D., Farvaque, E. and Stanek, P. “Lame Duck Central Bankers”

Scotto di Vettimo, M. and Koop, C. “Do societal priorities matter for the agenda of independent central banks?”

van der Veer, R., Rauh, C. and Bertsou, E. “Preferences for representation and responsiveness in international bureaucracies: a survey experiment”

References:

Binder, S. (2017). Fed speak on main street: Central bank communication and household expectations. Journal of Macroeconomics, 52, 238–251.

Brandsma, G. (2013). Controlling Comitology. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Clift, B. and Rosamond, B. (2024). Technocratic reason in hard times: the mobilisation of economic knowledge and the discursive politics of Brexit. New Political Economy, 29(6), 886-899.

Collignon, S. and Diessner, S. (2016). The ECB’s monetary dialogue with the European Parliament: Efficiency and accountability during the Euro crisis? Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(6), 1296–1312.

De Boer, T. (2023). Why do public agencies seek accountability? The role of audiences. Public Administration, 101(3): 865-883.

Ferrara, F. M., Masciandaro, D., Moschella, M., and Romelli, D. (2021). Political voice on monetary policy: Evidence from the parliamentary hearings of the European Central Bank. European Journal of Political Economy, 74, 102143.

Gavin, M. and Manger, M. (2022). Populism and de facto central bank independence. Comparative Political Studies, 56(8), 1189-1223.

Gilad, S., Maor, M. and Bloom, P.B.-N. (2015). Organizational reputation, the content of public allegations, and regulatory communication. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 25(2), 451-478.

Koop, C. (2011). Explaining the accountability of independent agencies: The importance of political salience. Journal of Public Policy, 31(2), 209–234.

Koop, C. (2014). Theorizing and explaining voluntary accountability. Public Administration, 92(3), 565–581.

Koop, C. and Scotto di Vettimo, M. (2023). How do the media scrutinise central banking? Evidence from the Bank of England. European Journal of Political Economy, 77, 102296.

Koop, C. and Scotto di Vettimo, M. (2024). Non-majoritarian institutions, media coverage, and “reinforced accountability”. Governance, 37(2), 599-617.

Maggetti, M. (2010). Legitimacy and accountability of independent regulatory agencies: A critical review. Living Reviews in Democracy, 2, 1-9.

Maor, M. (2020). Strategic communication by regulatory agencies as a form of reputation management: A strategic agenda. Public Administration, 98(4): 1044-1055.

Maor, M., and Sulitzeanu-Kenan, R. (2016). Responsive change: Agency output response to reputational threats. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 26(1), 31-44.

Matthews, F. (2020). Parliamentary scrutiny of executive patronage: The relationship between institutional norms, reputation and accountability. Public Administration, 98(3), 625-642.

Miller, G.J. and Whitford, A.B. (2016). Above Politics: Bureaucratic Discretion and Credible Commitment. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Moschella, M. and Diodati, N. (2020). Does politics drive conflict in central banks’ committees? Lifting the veil on the European Central Bank consensus. European Union Politics, 21(2), 183-203.

Müller, M. and Braun, C. (2021). Guiding or following the crowd? Strategic communication as reputational and regulatory strategy. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 31(4), 670-686.

Rauh, C. (2023). Clear messages to the European public? The language of European Commission press releases 1985–2020. Journal of European Integration, 45(4):683–701.

Rauh, C. and Van der Veer, R. (2024). Responsiveness. In Brandsma, G.-J., editor, Handbook on    European Union Public Administration, pages 362–376. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Schillemans, T. and Busuioc, M. (2015). Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 25(1), 191-215.

Schonhardt-Bailey, C. (2013). Deliberating American monetary policy: A textual analysis. MIT Press.

Schonhardt-Bailey, C. (2022). Deliberative Accountability in Parliamentary Committees. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Strøm K., Müller W.C., and Bergman T. (2003). Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Thatcher, M. (2002). Regulation after delegation: Independent regulatory agencies in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6): 954–972.

Tucker, P. (2018). Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the     Regulatory State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Vibert, F. (2007). The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

The democratic embeddedness of independent agencies: Analysing responsiveness and accountability

This workshop seeks to address a number of questions related to patterns of accountability and responsiveness of independent agencies in contemporary democracies. We will explore the conditions under which we observe stronger accountability of independent agencies, including the individual and contextual determinants of the type and quality of scrutiny that parliamentarians perform. For instance, we may hypothesise that features such as the salience and ‘publicness’ of the agency matter, but also the background of the account holder (e.g., relevant expertise and experience), and (reputational) pressure from the agency’s environment. Furthermore, in a period of growing populism and politicization of governance by independent agencies, the workshop will also explore whether and how vote-seeking representatives adapt their account-holding practices in order to attract media attention and, possibly, electoral rewards.

Then, moving to responsiveness, the workshop also seeks to shed light on the extent to which, and conditions under which, independent agencies’ communicative and policy actions target or respond to wider public priorities or sensitivities, and in what ways they do that. Again, we expect features such as salience and reputational pressure to matter, with greater threats also coming from populist governments. Additionally, we aim to investigate how independent agencies combine responsiveness to specific stakeholders with their mandate-related priorities and activities.

The workshop is also open to contributions that broaden the topic of bureaucratic responsiveness or politicization of legislative oversight of independent technocratic bodies beyond the focus described above. For instance, we would welcome papers that explore the relationship between independent agencies and democratic systems – including in terms of what we should and can expect from accountability and responsiveness – from a political theoretical perspective.   

By bridging insights from complementary yet so-far not so connected fields of agency accountability and policy and communicative responsiveness, the workshop will contribute to the scholarly debate about the position of governance by independent agencies in democratic systems, including reflections on the democratic embeddedness of the organizations, and how they navigate the current contestation and representational demands in contemporary democratic systems.

This workshop examines the democratic embeddedness of independent agencies, focusing on how they remain accountable and responsive despite institutional insulation from electoral politics. While such bodies - like regulators and central banks - are designed to ensure credibility and long-term policy stability, they face growing scrutiny over their legitimacy and responsiveness in an era of politicization and populism. The workshop explores when and why accountability is stronger, how parliamentary oversight varies across contexts, and how vote-seeking representatives use accountability forums for political purposes. It also investigates how agencies respond to public expectations through communication, transparency, and reputational management. By bringing together research on accountability, responsiveness, and bureaucratic legitimacy, the workshop seeks to advance understanding of how independent agencies navigate contemporary demands for representation and trust within democratic systems.

First chair -  Michele Scotto di Vettimo

Michele is a Research Associate/Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in the Department of Political Economy at King’s College London. Previously, he worked as Research Fellow in the Department of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Exeter. Michele studies public opinion and the responsiveness of non-majoritarian institutions and technocratic bodies. He is particularly interested in methodologies like quantitative text analysis, machine learning algorithms and item response approaches. His current project is about decision-making in the European Council.

Michele obtained his PhD in Political Science from the King’s College London. He is also member of the Italian Political Science Association (SISP), the Political Science Association of the United Kingdom (PSA), and of the Quantitative and Computational Text Analysis Association (COMPTEXT).

Second chair - Christel Koop

Christel Koop is a Professor of Political Economy at King’s College London in the United Kingdom. Her research focuses on regulation, central banking, and other areas of economic policy making, both at the national and EU-level. She is particularly interested in the independence, accountability, responsiveness, and legitimacy of arm’s length bodies, and in the recent politicisation of arm’s length governance, especially but not only under populist governments. Over the past years, she has, among other things, published on the multi-pronged accountability of central banks, citizen engagement by independent regulatory agencies (including in its digital forms), and priority setting by the European Commission. The picture that her research presents is one of arm’s length bodies that may take their policy decisions independently, but that are far from fully disembedded from the wider political system and its key concerns. Christel holds a BA and MPhil degree in political science from Leiden University, in the Netherlands, and obtained her PhD degree in political and social sciences from the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. Before joining King’s College London, she was Fellow in Public Policy and Administration at the London School of Economics and Political Science.