

# **Comparing integrated urban regeneration in France and the United States: is there a European model versus an American one?**

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## **Abstract:**

Since 1991, France has launched a specific policy for its poorest neighborhoods. Since 1992, the United States is engaged into the regeneration of its neglected public housing. Ten years after, since 2003, the largest plan of regeneration of low-income neighborhoods is being implemented in France. Since 2000, Chicago is implementing the largest program of urban renewal in its public housing neighborhoods. The similarities between the French and American cases are striking. Both countries target poverty deconcentration and “social mixing”. Those two cases are comparable with many other national programs being implemented in Europe (UK, Germany, Spain, Netherlands...). In addition, the French program has benefited from European funds for its implementation. Through this paper, we will show that public policies integration through urban renewal programs are not specific to the European Union. It will also question the significance of the European Union model in the French case, arguing that the French program is set up at the national level rather than through European programs until recent days; putting therefore into perspective the significance of the European integrated model. However, the European integrated model seems to be put into practice through significant reforms at the national level into urban renewal programs since 2012.

Based on a strong fieldwork conducted from 2012 to 2014 throughout France (from Paris to Cayenne in French Guyana) and in Chicago, the paper will first come back on the European integrated model before presenting the French and American programs of urban regeneration. Both cases will be presented based on their institutions, their actors, their instruments, their goals and their successes/weaknesses. The paper will show that the American urban development is not that different from the European model and even more integrated than the French model. As a matter of fact, the American model of urban regeneration is strongly based on the intertwining of economic and urban policies (housing, transportation...), while French policies are strongly sectorial. However, we will show that integration is one the main goals of the current reform of the 2015-2024 national urban renewal program. In the same way, we will analyze the current reforms being implemented in the US under Obama administration in favor of new integrated program such as the Neighborhood Choice program. Finally, this paper will interrogate the rationale and difficulties of implementing integrated urban development in the two countries in the light of the European model of integrated urban development.

## **Foreword**

This paper is part of a PhD dissertation on the implementation of urban renewal programs in the metropolitan areas of Paris and Chicago. The PhD is built on three axes of research: a neo-institutional analysis of the change in urban renewal programs and public housing policies in the United States and France from the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to 2000; a study of the governance of the urban renewal programs at the national and metropolitan levels and an examination of the implementation of four projects in the metropolises of Paris and Chicago, looking notably at collaborative governance and the participation of beneficiaries into the projects. 115 interviews have been conducted from January 2013 to July 2014 in both Chicago and Paris. In addition, this PhD has been funded through a professional grant from a public policy consulting firm, which made possible to conduct a process of action-research throughout France with missions in Metropolitan France and French Guyana.

The research question interrogates the significance of implementation in order to understand the discrepancies between public policy goals and their results. Many researches have shown that the results of urban renewal programs were limited in terms of economic and social outcomes. We argue that those studies have the tendency to reconstruct the intentionality of public policies, following a critical perspective. For instance, the paradigm of “social mixing” by politicians would be a false reality that fools the debate on urban and social cohesion. This PhD argues that implementation matters and questions the three axes mentioned earlier in interaction with implementation. How institutional settings influence implementation and how implementation influences institutional settings? Why governance matters for implementation and what implementation does to governance structures? How public beneficiaries are inscribed into policy implementation and what is the impact of their participation on implementation? This paper is part of the second axis on governance.

## **Introduction: integrated programs of urban regeneration in low-income areas**

Since 1991, France has launched a specific policy called “*politique de la ville*” (*City Policy*) dedicated to the growth and redevelopment of its poorest neighborhoods. This policy has been first experimented from the late 1970s to the end of the 1980s with the objective to improve public policies in urban, social and economic development in deprived neighborhoods. Since then, the different governments in place have transformed this specific policy. First designed in 1991 under the Presidency of Mitterrand, it was the object of a significant reform under the government of Juppé under President Chirac in 1996. The City Policy targets specific low-income neighborhood whose map is set by the Ministry in charge. In 2000, a law, the National Law on Solidarity and Urban Renewal, emphasized the goal of “social mixing” in the housing market, forcing municipalities of more than 3,500 inhabitants to develop a minimum of 20% public housing (Avenel, 2005). Public housing in France is divided between three types: housing for the poorest, housing for the poor and lower middle classes and housing for middle classes (Driant, 2009). The objective of “social mixing” has since then driven housing policies in France, especially in poor neighborhoods (Houard, 2009). In this context, Jean-Louis Borloo, Minister of the *politique de la ville* defined in 2003 the largest program of urban renewal ever attempted since the 1950s and 1960s and the operations of slum upgrading that led to the building of large housing estates (*grands ensembles*) up to the beginning of the 1970s (1973 and the reform Towers and Blocks [*Tours et Barres*]). The urban renewal program targets the City policy neighborhood. 200 neighborhoods were targeted originally, but it is more than the double of neighborhoods that took part of the program (Epstein, 2013).

The goal of the national urban renewal program of 2003 was two-fold: first, demolish neglected distressed public housing and rebuild new mixed-income communities in order to enforce neighborhood attractiveness and in the end social mixing – what can be called a form of “institutionalized gentrification” of public housing neighborhood; second, to integrate low-income neighborhoods into the fabric of cities (to “trivialize” them) in order to engage into a virtuous process of urban, economic and social development of those spaces and their inhabitants. From 2003 to 2014, this program made possible the regeneration of 490 neighborhoods (around 4 million inhabitants) for a public investment of 12.35 billion of euros and a general investment of 47 billion euros (Donzelot et al., 2012). In this paper, we will see that this program has been designed through a national paradigm that is comparable but not similar to the European one that has been enforced since the Leipzig Charter notably in 2007. Investments in urban renewal have been thought as a social investment strategy (Palier, Palme and Morel et al. 2012), but the investments in social and economic projects were limited. Indeed, as one of the reports of the agency in charge of the evaluation of the national urban

renewal program states the urban space is considered as a frame for social, cultural and economic development. Urban renewal projects should be grounded on economic, social and cultural development programs.<sup>1</sup> Those projects have therefore an urban focus but the final ambition is to engage in an integrated development of those low-income neighborhoods. The report goes even further in setting the objective to “go from the renewal of neighborhoods to urban regeneration of territories”<sup>2</sup>.

Urban renewal projects are built upon contract between municipalities and a national agency on urban renewal (*ANRU, Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine*, which gathers different public partners) in charge of the allocation and track of invested funds. Those projects are parallel to contracts between the State and those same municipalities. These contracts have been changed many times from the 1990s to 2006 where Borloo, still minister of City Policy but also of employment and housing, decided to create a new contract, called “Urban Contract of Social Cohesion”, administered by a new agency parallel to the ANRU: the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equality of Opportunity (*Agence pour la cohésion sociale et l'égalité des chances - Acsé*). The dichotomy between urban renewal projects and social cohesion contracts created a dualism between social and economic investments in low-income neighborhoods on the one hand and infrastructure and housing upgrading or renewal on the other.

The program of 2003-2014 is under reform since the beginning of Hollande Presidency in 2012. As a matter of fact, the French President has engaged its government into a reform of the City Policy and the related urban renewal program. The geography of the targeted neighborhoods has been transformed in order to target only 1,300 neighborhoods instead of 2,200 neighborhoods inscribed into the former City Policy from 2006 to 2014. A new national urban regeneration program has been designed thanks to this reform. The reform foresees that all urban renewal projects should be integrated into a unique City Contract between the State and local authorities. Those contracts should be built upon three pillars of actions designed by the central State: social cohesion, urban renewal and living environment upgrading, and finally economic development and employment. The French government has also decided to dedicate 10% of the European Structural funds to the 1,300 neighborhoods targeted by the National City Policy. While those European funds will be invested into projects, mainly infrastructure projects but also targeting job creation and growth, the European agenda of integrated development seems marginal compared to the strong national paradigm that is

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<sup>1</sup> « L'espace urbain n'est qu'un support, un cadre certes indispensable, mais qui devrait être conçu au service de projets économiques, sociaux et culturels. Ce doit être un outil au service de projets de développement. Avant d'élaborer des projets de rénovation urbaine, cela suppose d'élaborer préalablement des programmes de développement économique, social et culturel, afin de prendre en compte les contraintes liées à la localisation des quartiers et à leur configuration, et d'exploiter au mieux les ressources dont ils disposent et les capacités de leurs habitants. » (p. 135, CES ANRU, 2013)

<sup>2</sup> « Passer de la rénovation des quartiers au renouvellement des territoires » (p. 141, CES ANRU, 2013)

being implemented. In addition, while the model of integrated renewal is strongly advocated by national (and European) actors, the sectorial division of public policies renders difficult their “integration” based on a spatial project of (re)development. Social, economic and urban sectors have different administration; different objectives and different way of looking at the problem of low-income neighborhood. In addition, the actors of each sector tend not to know each other, which leads to the difficult implementation of the national and European goals of integration. We will see that implementation matters in two ways for integrated urban renewal projects: first because of the administrative and institutional arrangements that complicate integrated programs; second because actors involved into the implementation of those programs do not have the same interpretation of the problem they are tackling and therefore the same representation of the ways to respond to it.

The first goal of this paper is therefore to be critical on the realities of the implementation of European and national goals of integrated urban renewal. The second goal is to question the European model of integrated urban renewal. Is it really specific? It will be argued that this model of urban redevelopment is not European-specific. It is also present in the United States where economic development and urban regeneration go hand-in-hand. The similarities in the goals of urban renewal projects in France (and Europe) and the United States make us wonder if there is any specificity of the European integration model in the end. We will conclude that the main difference in this matter is not a European versus American opposition, but an opposition of welfare states. This makes us wonder of the actual significance of European level integrated policies in a context where national welfare state regimes strongly matter.

After this long introduction on the French context, we will present the American model of integrated urban regeneration and its subsequent programs. Then, we will question the convergence of European and American models of integrated urban regeneration. Finally, we will analyze the significance of implementation of those programs in the two contexts, looking more specifically at two case studies. All this will lead us to the conclusion that integrated development is not European-specific but that the realities of implementation of those global programs face two kind of implementation issues: first, an administration and specific public policy issue (integrated programs face the realities of multilevel governance and sectorial division of public policies); second, actors in charge of the implementation of those programs, aiming at common goal of social mix and mixed-use redevelopment, are not in line with the goals that are set at the (European and) national level and both the problems at stake and the ways to solve them are reinterpreted by actors. The first argument is therefore based on institutional arrangements and the practices of actors within multi-level and multi-

actor governance in the boundary of a certain welfare state regime. The second argument is that actors have their own interpretations of the problems and goals of the integrated urban renewal programs leading to some contentious representations of the issues at stake.

## **1. The French and American models of urban renewal in comparison with the European paradigm of integrated development**

The similarities between the French and American urban renewal programs in the 2000s are striking (Kirzbaum, 2009). Both countries target poverty deconcentration (Popkin et al. 2004; Galster, 2007; Vale, 2010) or “social mixing” (Gilbert, 2011; Houard et al., 2012). The goals of poverty concentration and social mixing respond to a similar ambition: regenerate distressed neighborhoods to enhance attractiveness and encourage the settlement of upper-class households in low-income neighborhoods. It serves both as a way to “fight” poverty and a means of spatial and economic regeneration of neglected and stigmatized neighborhoods. Following this perspective, Chaskin, Joseph and Webber (2007) saw different ways to look at the mechanisms of urban upgrading and poverty concentration to enhance community development. First, through the interactions of households with different background and following a network theory, it would be a way to enhance social mobility of the poorest households that will have access to new networks and therefore resources thanks to their new neighbors with higher incomes and social status. Second, it would be a way to enforce a form of social control of the middle class upon the lower strata. Then, it would be a way to put an end to the intergenerational poverty cycle in which some households would be embedded. Finally, it would be a way to improve economic investments in the regenerated neighborhoods and therefore contribute to a virtuous cycle of job creation and growth that should benefit the poorest. Those four principles stress the way urban renewal has been designed both as a social policy and an urban policy. The regeneration of low-income neighborhoods, mainly public housing ones, should contribute to the upward social mobility of low-income households with weaker social and economic networks.

As mentioned earlier, the French national urban renewal program has been designed in 2003 but is inscribed into a larger policy targeting the poorest neighborhoods of France: the City Policy, institutionalized in 1991 after more than a decade of experiments in deprived neighborhoods. The largest American urban renewal program, called HOPE VI (Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere), was designed in 1992. It led notably to the creation of the largest urban renewal program for public housing in the history of the US in Chicago: the Chicago Plan for Transformation. This Plan was designed by Mayor Daley in 2000 and is

being implemented since then. It should have been over in 2010, but the subprime crisis hit harshly the program and local conflicts delayed its implementation.

HOPE VI is a Federal response to the 1989 report of the Commission of Severely Distressed Public Housing. This commission indeed reported the lack of maintenance of public housing units and the high concentration of poverty in those neighborhoods that encouraged social conflicts and high levels of crime in certain neighborhoods. HOPE VI aims at demolishing distressed public housing in order to create mixed-income neighborhoods (Goetz, 2003 and 2011); that is to say neighborhood composed of a third of public housing, a third of affordable housing and a third of market units (Fraser and Nelson, 2008). Following a New Urbanism agenda (Allen 2001; Talen, 2002), the urban renewal projects should create mixed-income and mixed-use neighborhoods, which should be better integrated into the larger urban environment of American inner cities. HOPE VI was created after years of retrenchment of the Federal State from programs of social upgrading of poor neighborhood (Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstom, 2004). Indeed, since Nixon Presidency, the Federal Administration has encouraged local governments to tackle the issues of urban poverty. Nixon, in 1973, declared a moratorium on Federal investments targeting housing and urban development. His vision, which will not be contradicted by any of his followers, was that the Federal State should not be at the forefront of investments within low-income neighborhoods (Orlebeke, 2000). Local governments were accountable for the urban and social cohesion of cities. Nixon put on the agenda the necessity to decrease Federal investments in favor of public housing construction and let local governments designed their own policy against urban poverty. His follower Ford signed the Housing reforms that Nixon envisioned. Indeed, in 1974, the Housing and Community Development Act, drafted by Nixon and signed by Ford, created the program Section 8. Section 8 is a program of housing voucher through which low-income families can have access to private market housing and benefit from a voucher to help them pay the difference between what they can pay and the rent. In addition, the 1974 Act created the Community and Development Grant (CDBG) program. This Federal program targets certain neighborhoods in order to encourage their urban and economic redevelopment. Through targeted investments and projects, the objective is to help low-income neighborhood catch up with the rest of the city in which they are. This program is still ongoing and is the longest Federal program administered by the Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD).

HOPE VI was therefore the largest program of urban renewal, but the American Federal State is in charge of a multiplicity of other programs. Thus, Clinton who enforced HOPE VI, created the same year the program EZ-RC-EC (for Empowerment Zone-Enterprise Communities-Renewal Communities). The EZ-RC-EC program was enacted in 1993 for 72

urban areas and 33 rural communities and extended to 161 areas since then. It aims at engaging initiatives for the economic and urban renewal of certain communities. There is a strong integration of economic and urban goals through this program. If HOPE VI targets mainly the regeneration of public housing and its direct living environment, the programs CDBG and EZ-RC-EC aim to improve the economic environment in those distressed urban areas in order to encourage a comprehensive process of development. The idea is that: if there is economic development, there will be investments for the general improvement of neighborhoods. This differentiation between economically-driven programs of urban regeneration and housing-oriented programs of urban renewal is essential and has an impact on the governance of those programs. Indeed, HOPE VI grants are administrated by local office of HUD and granted to local housing authorities accountable for the management and maintenance of public housing (and Section 8 vouchers, called today Housing Choice Vouchers). The grants EZ-RC-EC and CDBG are also administrated by HUD but granted directly to entitled municipalities and not to their housing authorities. This has an impact on the way those programs can contribute to either a housing strategy within the public housing estate or participate to a strategy of general integrated development of low-income neighborhoods within targeted cities. One thing is nevertheless crucial; both kind of programs aim at integrated development and it is only the entry focus that differs.

Chicago is a good exampl. Chicago is the most segregated cities and its public housing estate has been depicted as the worst in America. As many sociologists have shown (Wilson, 1987; Massey and Denton, 1993; Curley, 2005), the poverty concentration and racial segregation in Chicago has strong effects of the potential social mobility of low-income (black) communities and has led to a high level of criminality in some neighborhoods (Sampson, 2012). Mayor Richard M. Daley, mayor from 1989 to 2011, designed in 1999 the Chicago Plan for Transformation. The Plan aims at the demolition of 38,000 and the building of 25,000 new public housing units within mixed-income communities (Bennett et al., 2006). The decrease in the number of units was a way to end vacancy one the one hand, and to increase the number of housing vouchers on the other. Chicago, through its Housing Authority (CHA – Chicago Housing Authority) benefited from the program of HOPE VI grants and decided to let the implementation of urban renewal project in the hand of private actors through Public-Private-Partnerships in each neighborhood<sup>3</sup>. The CHA benefited also from the Moving to

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<sup>3</sup> **Interview February 27<sup>th</sup>, 2014 of Julia Stash** : “I think public private partnership is essential. I mean... if you are looking at... if you wanna change the dynamic of housing, eliminate the notion of concentrated poverty, bring the rigor and market incentives and savvy of private developers into play in a development, you have a public private partnership. The fact is that the public entity would not have enough money, no matter what. And, the public entity certainly wouldn't have enough money to build the non – public portions of the development. So, what is the way to do it? You solicit and attract private developers who are willing to take on the design, build and management of a site, so that they are able to go and tap into their own capital sources, the conventional financing sources. CHA puts its money to support the development of the public housing unit and then, the good is that... it has been proven that the housing authority has not been able to maintain its property to a high standard. So, have the authority managing these properties, the likelihood that it would have been managed at a private manager standard was

Work program<sup>4</sup>, a Federal incentive through which capital funds and operating funds can be used at the discretion of the housing authority. This funding opportunity made possible a general public investment of 1.5 billion dollars for the Plan. In addition, Chicago is an entitlement jurisdiction both for the CDBG and EZ-RC-EC general programs. Those streams of revenues go directly to the municipality and not to the housing authority. Thus, there are two strategies at stake in Chicago: a specific strategy for public housing neighborhoods regeneration and a general strategy – limited to certain poor neighborhoods obviously – of urban and economic growth. The public housing renewal projects are implemented by private actors that contracted with the CHA under the control of HUD. The other programs are managed by the municipality under the control of HUD.

The integration of urban and economic goals is crucial in the America political agenda. One can take as an example the fact that the Cook County Department in charge of urban renewal projects in the county of which Chicago is part of, is called Housing and Economic Development. This relation between economic and housing goals is crucial in the way the Metropolitan Region of Chicago is today considered. The Cook County Housing and Economic Development Department is one of the first governmental institutions to encourage a consolidated comprehensive approach of development, trying to break from the administrative Federal boundaries and go toward inter-agency programs favoring integrated development.<sup>5</sup>

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zero. So how can private partners manage those sites with their own standards in order to satisfy the people who have made the choice to move into those neighborhoods? You are much more likely to have a neighborhood that is better for everyone, because they want to keep people as market rate renters or owners. So obviously, public housing residents benefit from this higher standard management, that is mandated by other residents in the development.”

<sup>4</sup> **Interview March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2014 Chicago Commissioner of Planning and Development Department:** “Moving to Work made a number of fundamental changes. At this time, the authority was both the owner and the manager of its property. Under MTW we were able to turn the authority into a real estate asset manager and then put out of all the management and operational responsibilities through third party contracts to private real estate companies. Doing we were able to 1500 staff position inside the authority and they get a much leaner bureaucracy that it had been and to put private real estate operators is much more accountable for the operations. Secondly, going along with that then, really for the first time, CHA was able to put budgets together for each of the developments rather than a blanket budget for the whole authority. So we will be able to see just how well we were doing, the authority was doing with financial controls... how well the private managers were doing and make a comparison among the private managers as to how was doing a better job at what price per unit. So that was a very important change. The third change was that the CHA provided social services. This one proved to be the most difficult one. The authority... prior to this had been spending around 75/90 dollars toward social services and it had social service operations run by the authority in each of the development. After this, the idea was to find private operators, private service providers who had the expertise and could work closely with private managers on providing those kinds of services. It became “family works”. That was the hardest one to put up together because the private managers were not adopted to work with social service providers who were separate organizations and it was not clear how to provide those services to people. Of course, finally, the biggest change that we physically change the way to provide housing. Instead of having ghettoized high-rise structures, the idea was to create mixed-income communities that would mirror better a typical Chicago neighborhood.”

<sup>5</sup> **Interview February 10<sup>th</sup>, 2014 Michael Jasso, Cook County Housing and Economic Development Director:** “What we are trying to do on our consolidated plan is to some degree reflect those things that we think are implementable over a five year plan... and many of these plans are really broad, some of them are more specific, some of them have key objectives, for instance the Chicago plans are less on key implementation so... to balance that, and one of the things we are doing is to create lots of community outreach... we had a survey tool that we have been having... and right now we are in a big input phase, we are a number of things that are given from CMAP... CMAP is our technical advisor on the development of the plan... they provided a grant to do that... we are doing two plans right now, the consolidated plan and the comprehensive economic development strategy... one is required by HUD, the other by the department of commerce... Cook County was unique in this and one of the first jurisdictions to consolidate those two plans into one consolidated plan... even if one is more on economic development and the other is more on entitlement usage coming from HUD, we are trying to create a document that will be accepted by both, commerce and HUD... the differences is that our consolidated plan for cook county only speaks to suburban cook county and not the city of Chicago...”

## **2. Are we going toward a converging agenda in Europe and the US then?**

### **The governance of urban renewal programs in France and the United States**

The notion of “integrated development” is not new in Europe. The Treaty of Rome of 1957 already favored a “harmonious development” in order to help the equality between regions and their convergence. Years later, the European Spatial Development Perspective set up in Potsdam in 1999 enforces a strategy for a balanced and sustainable development of territories, emphasizing the notion of “integration”. The programs Urban I and II in the periods 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 (Carpenter, 2006) followed in a sense the principle of integrated development. However, the Leipzig Charter on sustainable European cities of 2007 really grounded the European agenda in favor of integrated development. Set up the same year that the Lisbon Treaty, it grounds three broad objectives: “(1) to initiate a political debate in their states on how to integrate the principles and strategies of the Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities into national, regional and local development policies, (2) to use the tool of integrated urban development and the related governance for its implementation and, to this end, establish any necessary framework at national level and (3) to promote the establishment of balanced territorial organization based on a European polycentric urban structure.” In 2010, a report of the European Economic and Social Committee argues for “the need to apply an integrated approach to urban regeneration” and calls for a “new urban renaissance”. Following the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union that led to the 2008 Marseille statement by the ministers in charge of urban development for the implementation of the Leipzig Charter, the Spanish Presidency put a great deal of attention on the “integrated regeneration” of European cities. This integration is multi-level and multi-sectorial. It is based on the idea of the need of (1) greater interrelations of global, national, regional, local and neighborhood-level actions and (2) more inter-sectorial actions based on spatial development. Space is the common denominator of a global strategy of development; linking economic, urban and social policies. This strategy has to be implemented through a collaborative governance of actors at different levels and in different sectors. The four pillars of the toolkit for integrated development (environment, social, economic, governance) were enforced by the Toledo Declaration in accordance with the Strategy 2020 and tested in 66 cities of 23 countries up to 2012. The test concluded that “the test cities agree that the use of the RFSC stimulates to consider new approaches in sustainable and integrated urban development (63%), improves their capacity to develop and implement sustainable and integrated urban development (61 %) and will accelerate sustainable and integrated urban development

(58%).” Rennes, Nancy, Lille-Roubaix, La Rochelle, Le Creusot and Bordeaux were part of this experiment.


But what remains at the national level of those experiments that benefited a few cities? It is hard to say. However, one thing is sure; this experiment has encouraged the development of the Integrated Territorial Approach under the European growth Strategy 2020 for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive development. In addition, it has been beneficial for the extension of the URBACT program. However, the Leipzig Charter seems to have been more of an intention rather than a real converging strategy for European countries and cities. Thus, even if France complies with the European agenda set up by the Leipzig Charter and the 2020 Strategy, it seems that the programs of urban renewal are still country-specific. The National Program of Urban Renewal has thus been extended through a new version called National Program of Urban Regeneration 2015-2024. The public funds invested in those large programs are for the most part national and not European. European Funds come as complementary financial instruments to the general streams of revenues coming from the National Agency of Urban Renewal (ANRU). This agency gathers the General Office on Equality of Territories (inter-ministerial committee for the equal growth of territories); the Ministry of Housing; the National Social Union for Habitat (public housing authorities federation); the *Caisse des dépôts* (French national financial organization under the control of the Parliament – the “financial armed wing” of the French government); the institution “Housing Action” (that gathers financial contributions by firms to the efforts on housing). The Ministry of Overseas Territories can take part of discussions when necessary.

French urban renewal projects were piloted by mayors up the reform of 2014. Municipalities with a project submitted an application to the ANRU in order to set up a convention between the two. The agency defined strict rules on the way the convention should be designed, the governance to enforce, the planning rules to follow (for instance, the obligation to offer a choice of a decent relocation place to residents with the objective of 50% within the regenerated neighborhood and 50% outside of the neighborhood, following the ambition of social mixing). Social mix is the main goal encouraged by the agency. The diversification of housing is crucial and the evaluation of projects is severe on this point. The participation of inhabitants is mandatory, but the evaluation on this criterion is limited.

The urban renewal projects are piloted by Mayors but are based on a strong partnership of local actors and notably public housing authorities (*bailleurs sociaux*). Those authorities are indeed strongly involved as the operations are on their own property. Their involvement in the process is essential not only for the decision-making process but also for the financing of the project; their financial contribution being essential.

The life of a project is strongly influenced by the rules of the new public management with an important focus on the evaluation of the projects. *In itinere* and final evaluations are

mandatory. Local strategic integrated plans were defined in relation to the “ending convention”. Mayors are in charge of this evaluation with the collaboration and advise (not to say control) of the Local State (*préfecture*). Below is presented the life cycle of a urban renewal project under the National Program of Urban Renewal 2003-2014:



Local urban renewal projects are therefore based on a bounding convention between the ANRU and municipalities in partnership with the prefecture, regional, departmental and local actors. European Funds can be allocated as complementary financial instruments to those projects, but they are always marginal, which leads to a marginal orientation of the European goals in the process of decision-making and implementation of those projects.

Urban renewal programs were enforcing the dual paradigm of social mixing and mixed-use development. Public infrastructures, transports and railroad investments and improvement of retail stores were part of those programs with the idea to better link neglected neighborhoods to the overall city in which they are. The idea was to put an end to the stigmatization of some neighborhoods. In principle, those programs should have been designed in accordance with the local initiatives under the City Policy (*politique de la ville*). For the period 2000-2006, municipalities whose certain neighborhoods were targeted by this policy had to contract with the State on the basis of a social and economic project of redevelopment of low-income neighborhoods; the contract was called “City Contract” a name that would be reused with the 2014 reform. Starting 2006, a new kind of contract was enforced; called CUCS (*Contrat Urbain de Cohésion Sociale* – Urban contract of social cohesion). Those contracts targeted five main themes: education, health, sports and culture, security and delinquency prevention and economic development / employment. The idea was to have stronger investments of those sectorial public policies in those specific neighborhoods. While this contract was triennial and should have ended in 2009, it was extended up to 2014.




### National institutions and their contractual relations with municipalities under the City Policy and the National Urban Renewal Program (up to 2014)

This dichotomy between urban renewal projects and City Policy contracts led to strong criticisms by activists and researchers (Bernard, 2007; Kirzbaum, 2009; Genestier, 2010; Lelévrier, 2010; Epstein, 2013; Kokoreff and Lapeyronnie, 2013). The City Policy has been depicted by a failure in terms of social mixing and upward social mobility by many, especially central institutional in charge of its evaluation (Cour des comptes, 2012; CES ANRU 2010 and 2013). Taking into account those criticisms, President Hollande declared he wanted to reform the City Policy. From 2012 to 2014, François Lamy, minister of City Policy from May 16<sup>th</sup>, 2012 to March 31<sup>st</sup>, 2014, engaged into a national debate around the reform of the City Policy. This reform led to the law of February 21<sup>st</sup>, 2014 which states that the targeted neighborhoods should be revised and that the urban renewal project and the City policy contracts should be merged into one contract at the inter-municipal level<sup>6</sup>. “Inter-municipalities” (*intercommunalités*) are local governmental institutions in charge of the collaborative work of a set of municipalities. The unique contracts should therefore be integrated and built upon three interacting pillars (economic, social, urban). They should engage a collaborative work and governance between actors of different level (State/*préfecture*, region, department, local actors and partners<sup>7</sup>) for the development of low-income neighborhoods. The 2014 law also establishes that a new National Program of Urban Regeneration (and not renewal) will be established from 2015 to 2024 with a public investment of 5 billion euros for 200 national-interest neighborhoods (83% of the budget) and 200 regional-interest communities (17% of the budget). The Ministry of City Policy signed

<sup>6</sup> It should be mentioned that overseas territories also have to create City Policy contract but they can do it at the municipal level and not inter-municipal one. Indeed, the Ministry of City Policy had established the fact that those territories did not have the sufficient engineering to establish non-municipal contracts. Those territories are often forgotten in the analysis of French City Policy as the problems they face are stronger than in the metropolitan territory. However, City Policy applies. In French Guyana for instance, the inter-municipal government of “Centre Littoral” around the municipality of Cayenne has decided to create both municipal contracts and an inter-municipal one. It should be noted also that there is here significant problem in the application of national and European policies on those territories knowing the specific problems they face. One striking example related to sustainable laws on heat isolation for housing that are applied in Guyana while the weather is completely different.

<sup>7</sup> Family Allocation Office, Employment structures, Regional agency for health, Chamber of Craft and Trade, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Regional agency for culture...

with all the main ministries<sup>8</sup> triennial conventions of objectives through which each ministry agrees to target low-income neighborhood in priority for their sectorial investments. Those national inter-ministerial conventions should then be transposed within the City Contract at the local level in order to engage an integrated project. In addition, triennial conventions were signed with some crucial partners such as *Pôle emploi* (employment agency) or the *Caisse des Dépôts* (armed financial institutions of the State) and with some large private firms.



### **National institutions and their contractual relations with inter-municipalities under the City Policy and the National Urban Renewal Program (from 2015)**

The reform of 2014 is therefore emphasizing an integrated development. However, this process of integration isn't new. Indeed, the 2000-2006 City Contracts were already following the same structure. However, the implementation of the 2000-2006 did not lead to a real "integration" of sectorial policies. It seems therefore crucial to look at the implementation of those integrated contracts in order to understand if there is a real integration of sectorial public policies.

Thus, there was a limited impact of the European model of Leipzig in the French policies targeting low-income neighborhoods regeneration. The charter did not lead to any

<sup>8</sup> Ministry of Health and Social policies, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Employment, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice,...

institutional or instrumental change in the policies targeting low-income neighborhoods. Moreover, one can also be skeptical about the actual integration of public policies through the projects of urban renewal. The first reason is that urban renewal projects were separated from questions of social and economic investments. The second is that the interactions and the collaborative governance of the bureaucrats in charge of the implementation of those programs were highly limited. The reform of 2014 shows however a return of the paradigm of integration in France. This paradigm is not specific to Europe as we have seen through the different American programs, but this seems ever truer when we consider the Federal program Choice Neighborhood, launched in 2010 after the end of HOPE VI that lasted from 1992 to 2010.

As HUD presents it, the program Choice Neighborhoods is focused on three core goals: housing, people and neighborhood. The idea of this program, experimented for the first time in 2010 and extended to new neighborhoods nationwide, was to respond to the criticisms of HOPE VI where the urban focus in interaction with economic interests led to the diminishing of social considerations. Through a “comprehensive approach to neighborhood transformation”, the objective is to tackle issues in housing deterioration, educational attainment, intergenerational social mobility, employment, safety and local infrastructures upgrading. The program is implemented through a “Transformation plan” that is collaborative and involves a great deal philanthropic organizations. In Chicago, the City has delegated the implementation to a non-profit organization, Preserving affordable housing, which is in charge of gathering local community development actors and organizations in the neighborhood of Woodlawn, in the south side of the city. This first experiment in Chicago illustrates the still limited impact of the integrated program Choice Neighborhood<sup>9</sup> compared to HOPE VI for instance. This program is symbolic of the retrenchment of the Federal State and its reliance of the third sector in terms of social upgrading of low-income neighborhoods. Indeed, the program is based on a financial incentive to mobilize third-sector actors and sustain their activity rather than publicly target urban poverty. This model illustrates the liberal welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990) of the United States; what Gilbert (1989) even called the “enabling state”, meaning a state that make individuals and third sector

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<sup>9</sup> **Interview March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2014 Chicago Commissioner of Planning and Development Department** “Hum... so there is one already the Choice program, an interagency program. We go one grant in Chicago. And... but it’s right... the program is run by HUD so you’re meeting HUD requirements but there are subsets... for instance, a security aspect... It is a new attempt... will it work? I don’t know. Bureaucracies are a very difficult time working on integrated program. We have some instances in the city with programs where we have task forces ... there are multiple agencies on those task forces and do work well. The question is ... at a larger more comprehensive approach such as Choice neighborhood... do Federal agencies will be able to work well enough to put something together, I don’t know... the question mark on this is out. It’s not the desire and motivations at the Federal level that the problem is, but it’s at the ground level. Can a neighborhood be able to respond .... How can a neighborhood respond? The best way for a neighborhood to respond is if you have clearcut responsibilities at the Federal level... and the people will have very clearcut responsibilities at the government level. So, and... that becomes a problem, particularly in the Federal government, in part because the laws that govern each of the different agencies that ... where they can’t see their agency through another agency in any program and that ultimately becomes a problem. For instance if the justice department can’t see its authority through HUD, the administrator of the problem, on a particular community security problem, then you’re dealing with them indirectly anyhow. So having an integrated program, you need one administrator, one manager.”

community-based organizations accountable for social programs. While the French and American programs of low-income neighborhoods regeneration follow quite similar goals, the programs are embedded into divergent strategy and different welfare states. If the urban renewal program and its complementary national urban regeneration program started in 2015 illustrate the inscription of French politics into a social investment strategy (Morel, Palier, Palme, 2012<sup>10</sup>), the American model of integrated development is different in nature, based on a liberal welfare state regime.

The last Federal program in place is the program Promise Zone. This experimental interagency program aims at developing integrated projects working notably on educational opportunities, economic activity, criminality and public health. The program was experimented since 2014 in five cities. However it is too soon to actually provide a clear analysis of those programs, even if some actors in housing are quite skeptical around its potential implementation<sup>11</sup>. It seems however that the program is appreciated by the Federal administration as the program has been extended in 2015 to eight new neighborhoods throughout the country.

### **3. The key of divergence, why implementation matters**

The principles of integration appear to be shared in Europe and the United States. Nonetheless, we argue that those principles face significant implementation issues. We have first seen that the implementation of integration models set at the European level is facing national policy specificities and their ambition is therefore diminished by the national institutional arrangements in the case of France. Furthermore, as Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) proved it: the more chains of delegations there are, the least significant the results of public policies will be in accordance with policy objectives. This is highly true in the multi-level transcription of European models at the micro-level within low-income urban regeneration projects. The European model is counterbalanced by national institutional arrangements, but those national institutional arrangements are also facing difficulties of transcription from national to metropolitan and even more local levels. For instance, while the

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<sup>10</sup> Social investment strategy would be the result of a converging agenda in Europe based on a third way between a Keynesian and a neoclassic economic perspective since the Lisbon Treaty according to the authors.

<sup>11</sup> **Interview February 27<sup>th</sup>, 2014 of Julia Stash:** “Sometimes I feel that integration is good and sometimes I feel that it is really complicating. Are you actually asking a housing owner or manager to be fully responsible for non housing outcomes of residents? That’s a complicated thing. Some of those new programs like Promise Neighborhoods are very complex, you have to take on everything at once: health, school... and sometimes this complexity drags the project down. There was a whole era where people thought that everything was coming from housing. I think that’s naïve. But I also think that there is an emerging and strong literature around... not so much neighborhoods effects... but positive outcomes in neighborhoods viability. So I’m a mixed mind today. Sometimes I say, let’s get the housing right, people’s ability to actually take advantage of other programs is much more diminished. If they are worried of physical conditions, it’s very hard... but sometimes I think that it’s very good to think of transit and stuff like that... they have done some progress, but it’s still a single agency... it’s not good enough yet to play out positively on the ground. The motive is right, but sometimes I think let’s just get the housing right. So I’m two minds there.”

ANRU has set up a national model of urban renewal projects following the objective of social mixing, local actors have to appropriate the rules, norms and planning processes set up by the national agency. In addition, those local actors might not agree upon the national goals that are set based on their local context. That is the case with Paris for instance. Indeed, the ANRU model has mainly been designed as a response to the crisis in the suburbs of Paris with large high-rises and public housing estates. The rationale of social mixing applies to the issues of high poverty concentration in those suburban neighborhoods. However, this model does not really apply to the Capital of France. Indeed, Paris is rich. It is composed of some public housing neighborhoods at its outskirts and in the north-east of the City, but according to the local actors in charge of the implementation of urban renewal projects within the capital, the goal of social mixing is not appropriate to the Parisian context. There is therefore a different perception of what the problem to solve is according to the context in which a project is implemented.

In order to study the implementation of integrated programs and its relation with governance issues (Le Galès, 1998; Pierre, 2011; Digaetano and Strom, 2003), we will focus on two sets of questions on two cases, one in Paris in the neighborhood of Porte Montmartre and one in Chicago in the community of Lathrop Homes. In conclusion, we will compare the two cases in order to question how an understanding of implementation matters is crucial to better understand the realities and difficulties of integrated programs.

The first section of each case will focus on the institutional arrangements and practices that constitute the governance of the program. The second section will focus on the representations and interpretations of actors of the problem they are dealing with and the use of the political instruments that they are in charge of. For this second question, the notion of “social mixing” in France and “mixed-income community” in the United States will be at the heart of the analysis as this comparable objective follows the concept of integrated regeneration of low-income neighborhood. We will therefore show that those two components of implementation (practices of actors and representations/interpretations of actors) are similarly significant in the understanding of the difficulties that face integrated programs.

### **3.1. Urban renewal in the metropolis of Paris: the example of Porte de Montmartre**

Paris Porte de Montmartre is a small neighborhood at the northern periphery of Paris in the 18<sup>th</sup> district. It is composed of 100% of public housing. A project of urban renewal has been

designed in July 2007 under a convention with the ANRU that targets a large portion of the northern periphery of Paris from *Porte Pouchet* to *Porte de Clignancourt* (see following map). The public housing authority (Paris Habitat), which owns all the property, is in charge of the project management by delegation of the City of Paris. This delegation was easy, knowing that the President of Paris Habitat was the deputy mayor on housing for the Parisian central City Hall.

All urban renewal programs under an ANRU convention are part of what the City of Paris called the “large program of urban renewal” (GPRU) that targets 11 neighborhoods, whose 6 have been granted funds from the national urban renewal program of the ANRU. The GPRU was designed in the first year of the mandate of Delanoë, mayor from 2001 to 2014. This program represents one action of the Local Housing Program of the city (PLH – *Programme local de l’habitat*). The articulation between the city program for housing and urban renewal programs are limited, as those urban renewal projects represent a marginal portion of the city at its periphery.




### **3.1.1. Governance of integrated programs of urban regeneration in Paris**

The governance of Parisian urban renewal projects is complex as the City is divided into 20 district city halls with their own mayors and elected officials. In addition, the city of Paris, due to its size, is a large bureaucratic machine where interactions of services and departments are difficult. There is therefore a double burden in the Parisian administration: a multiplicity of levels of decision-making in a vertical process and a multiplicity of actors at the horizontal level working on different policy sectors. All this contributes to the first brake to integrated development: administrative boundaries and the subsequent sectorial policies division.

The main involved actors are:

- The central City Hall that has to give the Local State (*prefecture*) and to the central institutions (ANRU and Ministry of City Policy) constant updates on the projects
- The central City Hall which is in charge of the implementation of the GPRU through a dual pilotage of the Department of Urbanism and the Department of City Policy under the coordination of the General Secretariat of the Central City Hall
- The district (*arrondissement*) City Hall that is partner of each project
- Public housing authorities are in charge, with the Department of Urbanism of the Central City Hall, of urban renewal project management
- Public housing authorities are in charge of relocation processes in relation to local development teams who are under the administration of the Central City Hall City Policy Department and are responsible of City policy initiatives

From 2006 up to 2014, one convention of urban renewal and one urban contract for social cohesion (CUCS) were signed for each neighborhood under the City Policy and subject to a regeneration project.



Integration under the urban renewal convention was institutionally designed through a dual perspective from the department of urbanism and the department of City Policy. In theory, the department of City Policy was in charge of the relationship with other departments of the central city hall (notably the department of economic development and employment or the department of education). In practice, those relationships are marginal, not to say inexistent.<sup>12</sup>

While politicians think that this partnership of the Departments of Urbanism and City Policy is efficient as the chief of staff of the elected official in charge of City Policy mentioned<sup>13</sup>, this is not the vision of the administration and the bureaucrats within both the central city hall and local administrations. The chief of staff mentioned that the technical expertise of urban renewal project created *de facto* an unbalanced relation between the two directions; which is

<sup>12</sup> Interview February 11th, 2013 Coordinator of urban renewal projects for the Department of City Policy: « La répartition sur le renouvellement urbain des missions c'est peu ou prou à la direction urbanisme le pilotage et la coordination des acteurs du projet urbain, le suivi financier et côté DPVI c'est la mise en œuvre des dispositifs GPU, le travail sur l'insertion au travers des clauses d'insertion et le logement, le suivi du relogement quand il y en a, avec aussi en ce qui la DPVI la programmation d'un certain nombre d'équipements et un travail de concertation qui est menée de part et d'autre avec un travail réglementaire plutôt mené à la direction de l'urbanisme mais en s'appuyant sur la connaissance de proximité des équipes de développement local et les équipes de développement des initiatives en lien avec les mairies d'arrondissement pour des actions d'information des habitants en plus grande proximité pour faire plus et aller au-delà de la concertation réglementaire. Bon c'est un peu un champ qui est copiloté dans ce champ d'action, l'idée est d'avoir un copilotage, c'est-à-dire d'avoir une réunion régulière par ces deux directions. Le fait que les deux directions rapportent au sommet de l'administration et auprès des élus sur l'avancement des projets et de suivi des conventions avec l'ANRU là où les territoires ont fait l'objet de conventions, sachant que le GPRU c'est 11 sites, 13 aujourd'hui et que il y a au total 6 quartiers qui ont fait l'objet de conventions ANRU. »

<sup>13</sup> Interview May 22th, 2013 Chief of Staff of the Deputy Mayor on City Policy: « Dans la mesure où à Paris le GPRU est copilotée, les deux adjointes travaillent ensemble, les deux directions travaillent ensemble, j'ai pas le sentiment qu'on ait été d'un côté l'urbain, d'un côté le social. On a de fait marié les deux dans nos projets. En effet dans certains cas... c'est peut-être du côté de l'Etat avec l'ANRU, hyper technique, hyper financier et honnêtement parfois pas toujours sur... enfin... dans des postures l'amenant parfois à oublier le fonds... on a passé des heures en revue de projet à s'expliquer sur des points très précis, aux chiffres à l'unité près avec le préfet sur les revues de projet... On a signé une convention ANRU et il y a des rendez-vous réguliers normaux, mais il y a un contrôle tatillon... On était avec le préfet, les maires d'arrondissement, l'adjoint, souvent l'adjoint logement, un représentant de l'adjointe urbanisme et on était à compter le nombre de logements recréés... à un niveau rase motte, pour s'assurer, ce que je peux comprendre, que les subventions liées à telle ou telle opération était bien due, mais on perdait le sens du projet. »

something that technicians acknowledge as a member of the General Secretariat of the Central City Hall declared<sup>14</sup>, there is an urban bias consubstantial to urban renewal project even if they are charged of a strong social component. According to this bureaucrat, the bias is not only due to the nature of public interventions where the department of urbanism has more to say, but also due to administrative – not to say political - reasons. Indeed, according to her, it is easier to show urban outcomes rather than a compilation of small studies on non-tangible and visible initiatives. In addition, as one of the bureaucrat of the State office (*Préfecture*) of Paris mentioned, there is a strong heaviness in the process of implementation through integrated program. For him, the fact that there is a co-pilotage of the departments of urbanism and City Policy is a problem because it makes things twice as hard in terms of administration.<sup>15</sup>

Her comment is even clearer in the words of a member of the Department of City Policy in charge of economic development and employment in low-income neighborhoods<sup>16</sup>. She declares that the questions of economic development and employment, while actions are inscribed into the City Policy was not implemented at all in Paris up to her arrival. Since then, she considers that her work is diminished by the Department of Economic Development and Employment leading even to personal tensions between the bureaucrats of the two Departments. According to her, those tensions are not only the effect of administrative

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<sup>14</sup> **Interview April 17<sup>th</sup>, 2013, Member of the General Secretariat in charge of the GPRU:** « Il y a un certain déséquilibre entre direction politique de la ville et direction de l'urbanisme. Par exemple, dans une revue de projet à la préfecture, il nous restait des financements. La direction de l'urbanisme, elles, ces opérations sont lancées. En revanche, la DPVI, qui est plus une direction de projet où les gens ont l'habitude de se creuser la tête pour avoir des idées ; eux ils sont arrivés avec plein d'idées d'études à mener. Mais l'Etat était frileux, ne voyant pas l'utilité directe de ces études diverses. (...) Il y a un biais sur l'urbain qui vient selon moi du schéma administration, car donner des subventions pour du dur c'est plus facile d'attester du service rendu. Politiquement, c'est plus vendeur. Donc je pense qu'il y a une raison administrative à ce biais urbain. »

<sup>15</sup> **Interview Local State of 2013 :** « La ville a un pilotage en binôme. Il y a toujours sur ces projets un chef de la direction d'urbanisme et un chef de la DPVI. Avec Chloé, SG qui a une vision transversale. Donc pour les chefs de projet PMC ils ont compris que j'étais un interlocuteur crédible et favorable à leur projet et pareil au Secrétariat Général. Donc ça c'était au tout début, mais ça a pris un an. C'est très long, et c'est pénible ! C'est l'intérêt du poste que d'avoir un interface de haut niveau. Côté ville ou côté ANRU tout est décidé auprès du directeur opérationnel mais c'est lourd. Administrativement. Même sur des trucs tout bêtes, monter une réunion avec les partenaires, on a tous des calendriers de ministres donc c'est trois mois. Pour avoir une réunion en janvier, ta réunion elle est en mars et elle est pas conclusive en mars et ta décision interviendra en juin. C'est très lourd ça et c'est compliqué ça. Ce n'est pas une question de nombre d'acteurs, car c'est assez raccourci je trouve, mais c'est le niveau décisionnel. Bien sûr au quotidien avec Chloé on ne met pas trois mois à se voir mais quand la décision doit être prise, c'est très lourd avec les problèmes d'agenda et de calendrier. Bon après il y a le côté français de réunionite aigue. Il faut qu'on se voit et il n'y a pas forcément besoin de ça. On peut faire par téléphone ou mail. Mais on est ici... même si je suis d'une culture équipement et on est côté ANRU, il y a la politique du parapheur... ce n'est pas une virgule, je préfère un point-virgule, ça redescend... il y a une lourdeur administrative du fait du corps préfectoral »

<sup>16</sup> **Interview March 6<sup>th</sup>, 2013:** « Je suis en charge du développement économique et emploi ici. C'était un sujet pas du tout investi par la maison et par la politique de la ville en général. Mais à Paris en tout cas pas du tout. (...) Quand on a démarré, on a créé une feuille de route... J'avais la chance en arrivant du cabinet de C. Sauter d'avoir vu de l'intérieur la direction, en plus j'étais conseillère technique, à un moment où s'élaborait le programme départemental d'insertion... J'avais organisé à la demande de C. Sauter les assises de l'insertion de l'hôtel de ville, j'avais appréhendé le jeu d'acteurs, le tissu local... et j'avais une vraie écoute du côté de la direction du développement économique en la personne de la direction qui concevait tout à fait l'utilité d'une mission thématique sur l'emploi et le dév éco à la DPVI... considérant que depuis une direction centrale sectorielle comme la sienne, la force de frappe, l'impact, la capacité d'action à l'échelle locale était extrêmement limité... et que donc c'était très utile de son point de vue à elle et pendant quelques mois on a fabriqué et construit ensemble. D'autant plus, que quand j'avais travaillé au cabinet... il se trouve que cette personne, qui était énarque, j'avais beaucoup travaillé avec elle quand j'étais à la DIV, elle était au ministère d'emploi... on avait galéré ensemble... on avait une complicité... je la retrouve par hasard, elle est sous-directrice, je suis au cabinet, on a un bon rapport, ça se passe bien. Et puis elle s'en va... et le directeur... elle n'était que sous-directrice... le directeur lui était complètement indifférent, pour pas dire hostile de ce qui se passait à la DPVI... ça n'existait même pas pour lui... ce n'était pas rentré dans son périmètre... il traitait ça avec un certain mépris... indifférence, mépris, voire vivait ça comme une concurrence, du poil à gratter qui venait s'occuper de l'impact de ses politiques et des liens... Donc... compliqué ! »

boundaries but also difficult inter-personal relations. Indeed, she used to work hand-in-hand with the former head of the Department of Economic Development but the relations with her new colleagues in this Department put an end to the collaborative work that she encouraged. Thus, the effects of sectorial divisions are dual: administrative on the one hand and interpersonal on the other.

In addition, as a member of the Department of Urbanism declared that the department of urbanism is really the one handling all the urban renewal projects while the Department of City Policy is in charge of “social animation”<sup>17</sup>. The interactions between the two Department is more an institutional one rather than a project one. The interaction is therefore a one of façade rather than an actual integrated process of urban regeneration. Thus, one of the elected officials of the 18<sup>th</sup> district City Hall admitted not knowing at all what the difference was between a Social cohesion contract and an Urban renewal project, stating that urbanism was the one driving the policy action of the City Hall.<sup>18</sup>

The interrelationships and trust between departments at the central city hall are therefore strongly limited. There are even clear conflicts between the different departments: the department of city policy having the feeling to be depreciated by the department of economic development for instance. There is first a division between sectors of public policy. Actors from different policy departments tend not to work one with the other either because they don't know each other with no real times of interactions or because of interpersonal conflicts or finally because they don't have the same “language”. For instance, urban planners and social service don't use the same concepts while some actors do not know how other policy sectors are working.

Those administrative and sectorial differences are reinforced by some conflicts of representations on the problem at stake between actors from different level (national-city-local) on the one hand but also between actors from different sectors at the same level of governance. The manoeuver of local actors and street-level bureaucrats is therefore to take into account as the multiplicity of levels of governance. We will take the example of the goal of social mixing to illustrate this point.

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<sup>17</sup> **Interview May 22nd, 2013 Chief of Urban Projects, Department of Urbanism:** « La direction urbanisme est en charge des projets urbains. On est tenu de travailler avec la DPVI qui s'occupe de l'animation sociale (...) mais parfois j'ai l'impression qu'on est pas sur la même longueur d'ondes. »

<sup>18</sup> **Interview April 25th, 2013, Deputy Mayor of the 18th District City Hall:** « Je dois vous avouer que je ne sais pas ce qu'ils font à la DPVI et je ne vois pas la différence avec ce qu'on fait. Attendez, moi j'ai commencé avec les ilots sensibles, après on a eu DSQ, après DSU... et à chaque fois il y avait des nuances, après il y a eu le CUCS et celui qui a trouvé ça ... puis le GPRU, le PRU... tout ça c'est dans la même logique... vous avez l'air de me dire qu'il y a une grande différence entre le PRU et le CUCS, moi je veux bien mais je la vois pas mais je suis pas dans les services... eux ils doivent savoir la différence... car il y a des cases où telle choses va là et pas là mais bon quelle importance ?!»

### 3.1.2. Social mixing in Paris: what do you mean?

This first element of discrepancy between the ambition of integration and its realities is reinforced by the fact that national actors and local actors do not consider the problems at stake in the same way. This is even true between actors from a District City Level and a micro-level within neighborhood. As one of the Parisian urban renewal manager declared: “we don’t do social mixing in Paris, we have social mixing at the city level, there is no need to do it at the neighborhood level”<sup>19</sup>. This vision is sustained by members of the local development team in Porte de Montmartre who declare that the goal of social mixing is not appropriate to the French capital. They prefer following the ambition of creating “a welcoming neighborhood” in which low-income families can find a place to live and a network of actors and appropriate policies thanks to which they could reach upward social mobility and maybe leave the neighborhood.<sup>20</sup>

The notion of social mixing is ambiguous in the Parisian case knowing the housing pressure under which the city operates. In addition and more generally, the notion of social mixing is ambivalent in the French case as it is in the public housing estate that this goal is followed. Social mixing goes therefore through the diversification of public housing types and not the diversification between private and public housing as in the American case for instance. As elected deputy director on housing and urbanism of the 18<sup>th</sup> District City Hall mentioned<sup>21</sup>, the goal of social mixing highlights two contentious perspectives between people who say that social mixing means gentrifying, and those who say that looking at only public housing leads to the creation of ghettos. He concludes by saying: “if both is said, it means that reality is in the middle and that we’re maybe in the truth”.

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<sup>19</sup> **Phone interview with a urban planner of the City of Paris in charge of an urban renewal project, February 18th, 2013.**

<sup>20</sup> **Interview March 4<sup>th</sup>, 2013 Local Development Team:** « Nous on n’est pas dans un objectif de mixité sociale. Si vous voulez savoir, le titre de notre enjeu pour le projet de territoire c’était « une offre de ressources pour la construction de parcours ». On l’avait formulé ainsi pour parler de « quartier d’accueil » ici. On l’avait formulé ainsi pour signifier que c’était un quartier d’accueil et ça a été refusé par la mairie du 18<sup>ème</sup>. (...) On veut donner l’image d’un quartier qui va évoluer en termes de population. Et nous on pense que ce quartier doit offrir aux personnes vulnérables des outils et une offre que ce soit en matière d’insertion, scolaire, tout ce qu’on veut... pour ensuite peut-être ils partent du quartier. Pourquoi pas ? Ou au moins rester dans un mieux-être mais on n’est pas pour changer les habitants du quartier et on ne pense pas que l’objectif de mixité sociale soit 1/ juste et 2/ réalisable. Réalisable pourquoi ? Parce que les HBM on ne va pas les démolir, ils sont classés ; ce sont les loyers les moins chers de Paris car ce sont des petites parcelles donc même si on arrive à requalifier un petit peu le logement, on ne changera pas fondamentalement le logement. En tout cas, s’ils commencent à tout requalifier, on va être très vigilants afin qu’ils n’augmentent pas les loyers de manière démesurée. (...) dès qu’on parle de mixité sociale, ce qui est très drôle, c’est quelque chose qui est en soi mieux, mais alors ça sous-entend que quand il y a de la mixité, ça se passe mieux : NON, c’est juste l’image du quartier qui change. (...) Ça a été tellement dur sur cette histoire de mixité sociale. C’est un truc qui me met en colère car les habitants qui ont intégré qu’ils vivaient dans un quartier de pauvres et qu’ils vivaient dans un quartier de voyous et du coup qu’il ne fallait pas mettre leurs enfants à l’école par exemple, alors qu’au quotidien ils parlent à leur voisin et ils s’entendent bien ; mais le discours est tellement dur... »

<sup>21</sup> **Interview April 25th, 2013, Deputy Mayor of the 18th District City Hall :** « La mixité sociale dans un secteur comme celui-ci, c’est une toute petite dose qui va être mixte. On est dans un secteur avec 100% de logements sociaux entre le boulevard des Maréchaux et le périph et du logement social uniforme en plus, l’équivalent du PLUS. Quand on intervient dans les quartiers ici ou ailleurs dans le 18ème, on mixte dès le départ : on a du PLS, du PLUS et du PLAI. Donc quand vous mettez ça dans un immeuble, vous mettez structurellement la mixité en marche sur la base du loyer qu’ils peuvent payer. (...) Alors bien sûr on a des gens qui disent « vous êtes en train de bobôiser » et il y a d’autres qui disent « vous êtes en train de ghettoïser », mais si on dit les deux c’est que peut être on est dans le bon. »

The example of the goal of social mixing is highly contentious. Its implementation in Paris is controversial as the person in charge of the GPRU at the department of City Policy mentioned<sup>22</sup>. According to her, the Parisian large project of urban renewal was not in line with governmental objectives, but the goal of social mixing became more and more embedded into political discourse of Parisian elected officials even if it doesn't really apply. There was a first discrepancy between the Parisian vision of urban regeneration and the vision of the government under the Law of 2000 on social solidarity and even more under the 2003 national urban renewal program. However, elected officials have integrated this goal as a one to follow through years. This is true at the district level where the elected official declared that social mixing (in public housing units) was his ultimate goal. However, this conflict between district, municipal and national levels is weaker than the tensions between local actors and municipal ones on this goal. Members of the local development team and local organizations tend to refuse the goal of social mixing and for them integrated urban renewal program should not follow this ambition but rather the ambition of upward social and spatial mobility and living environment upgrading.<sup>23</sup> Social mixing is considered as a normative goal that denigrates the living environment of low-income households.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, the multiplicity of levels of choices and actors involved in the implementation of urban renewal (national, central city hall, district city hall, local team, project managers...)<sup>25</sup> leads

<sup>22</sup> **Interview of February 11th, 2013 Urban renewal project manager at the department of City Policy :** « Le GPRU ça date de 2003, enfin 2002 les grandes orientations plutôt générales et études et puis 2003 la formalisation des projets de territoire et en fait ce que je reconstitue et qui était pas forcément clair au départ pour moi c'est qu'en fait à cette époque résolument l'approche des orientations était... portait pas forcément sur la mixité sociale et l'approche de ces quartiers était de dire qu'ils avaient pâti d'un héritage urbain un peu difficile, peu d'attentions ont été accordés à ces quartiers, peu d'investissements, moins d'entretien qu'ailleurs... voilà il s'agissait avant tout d'avoir une politique de rattrapage et une politique de développement en s'appuyant sur les potentialités de ces quartiers et leur nouveau rôle à jouer en lien avec les communes riveraines... et donc il y avait une approche assez forte en termes de mixité fonctionnelle mais qui était aussi une façon de gérer la proximité du périphérique qu'on retrouve dans tous ces quartiers, mais je pense que le propos... ce que j'en déduis de plusieurs propos... c'est que l'approche c'était résolument une politique qui était assez en opposition à la politique gouvernementale de l'époque qui était de dire on va pas faire de la mixité sociale en démolissant du logement social et en relogant ailleurs pour faire venir de nouvelles populations... ça se comprend à Paris car il y avait pas la volonté de démolir du logement social mais plutôt la volonté d'en construire et il y a eu des efforts importants dans ce sens... mais aussi pour dire ce qui compte c'est qu'on apporte de la dignité dans ces quartiers en leur offrant un niveau de services et de qualité urbaine qui soit la même que partout ailleurs à Paris et donc... et c'est ce qu'on voit dans les programmes, il y a très peu de diversification de l'habitat. »

<sup>23</sup> **Interview April 16th, 2013 with the local organization Sierra Prod:** « En fait, la mixité sociale, on pourrait la définir comme ça : elle existe à partir du moment où on a le choix ! Ici les gens ils ont pas le choix... L'objectif c'est « chasser les pauvres »... Le quartier avait besoin de renouveau d'habitation, les tours et la rue Gérard de Nerval avaient jamais eu de rénovation... et les équipements collectifs c'était du préfab, c'était du provisoire qui a duré 30ans... après il y a des gens pauvres et on veut faire de la mixité sociale, mais c'est du blabla et personne n'y croit... (...) La mixité sociale c'est d'avoir des gens qui restent dans le quartier avec un nouveau regard, une nouvelle façon de vivre... s'impliquer dans le quartier, vivre avec le quartier... on a eu un exemple d'une association, le petit Ney, qui a voulu faire de la mixité sociale, mais le mélange des genres ne sait pas... ce que j'espère c'est d'avoir un nouveau regard, qu'on reste pas qu'entre nous... il faut ouvrir et mélanger cette population qui ne se mélange pas, et c'est dommage... Donc c'est pas forcément des nouvelles personnes qui viennent mais c'est aussi se mélanger... quand tu sais que y'a des gens de la rue du poteau qui doivent venir à l'école et qu'ils viennent pas, que c'est que des gamins d'ici, c'est la mairie qui est responsable... le quartier a la réputation d'une mauvaise école... c'est ça la mixité sociale et là on l'a fait pas... et on parle à nous de faire de la mixité sociale alors qu'elle commence à l'école ! (...) Ici c'est pas Saint Denis, La Courneuve pour les médias... mais la rénovation elle est comme là bas. La souche des gens qui habitent dedans, c'est la même... on nous dit que ça va faire de la mixité, mais c'est du pipo, ça n'existera pas que ce soit à Porte Montmartre ou la Courneuve, on ne fait pas de la vraie mixité sociale. C'est la même chose ! »

<sup>24</sup> **Interview February 26th, 2013 Centre de ressource politique de la ville:** « C'est ce que vivent les gens : quand ils entendent mixité sociale par la rénovation urbaine, ils disent « ça veut dire qu'on est pas assez bien pour habiter là ? ». »

<sup>25</sup> **Interview May 14th, 2013 with a resident of Porte Montmartre:** « On en est là dans ce quartier et donc tous les gens qui habitent ici qui sont eux en plein désarroi, ils se disent c'est un quartier où il y a de la souffrance. On ne peut pas être bien. On nous a mis ici car c'est notre vie. On pousse. On vous a mis là. Et c'est pour ça que la politique de la ville a besoin de nous pour faire remonter ces informations. Dire attention. Attention il y en a peut-être un peu trop de problèmes. Quand on voit dans els

to stronger implementation discrepancies. The intention of integration set up at the national level between the ANRU and the Ministry of City Policy with the final ambition of social mixing doesn't find any reality at the local level in the representations of street-level bureaucrats on what they should do and why they should do it. There is a difference between the institutional frame of urban renewal project and the realities of their implementation.<sup>26</sup>

The Parisian case has illustrated three crucial points on why implementation matters. First, integrated programs put a heavy administrative and bureaucratic burden through collaborative governance structures. This is rendered even harder due to sectorial divisions and interpersonal conflicts within administration that are sometimes not based on mutual trust and shared interests. Secondly, integrated programs face discrepancies due to the chains of implementation (and continuous decision-making processes) from one level of administration to another. Finally, they face the fact that actors in charge of the implementation of those programs all have a certain representation of the problem they are tackling and therefore have different interpretations on how to respond to it. Each actor considers integrated programs through the prism of the policies they have in charge which can lead either to conflicts between actors or division of their work.

We will now consider the case of Lathrop Homes in Chicago in order to compare the significance of implementation of integrated programs following a comparable goal in two different institutional and political contexts.

### 3.2. Urban renewal programs in Chicago

In this section, we will not focus on the program Choice Neighborhood that is still experimental in the city of Chicago. We will focus mainly on the Chicago Plan for Transformation and less on the CDBG programs; not on the EZ-EC-RC program here. In order to illustrate our point, we will study the case of Lathrop Homes. Lathrop Homes is a

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immeubles qu'on concentre les gens à problème, c'est pas ça la mixité sociale. Mixité sociale, ce sont des gens qui ont un niveau de vie différent, qui viennent se mélanger aux autres mais qui ne partent pas au bout de 6 mois. Ce sont des gens qui vont rester 10-15-20-30ans. Mais nous sommes dans un système de vie en France où les gens qui ont de l'argent, ils ont fait leur ghetto à eux et les pauvres ils sont ensemble. Il n'y a plus de mixité sociale. Mixité sociale ça veut dire que les gens se mélangent. Bon quand je dis ça ce n'est pas spécifique à ce quartier, c'est la vie qui a voulu ça. Et je trouve que maintenant, comme des centaines de milliers de personnes, que ce mélange de populations n'existe plus nul part. »

<sup>26</sup> **Interview May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2013 Chief of staff of the Deputy Director on the Metropolis of Paris:** "C'est compliqué de définir la mixité sociale. Je sais pas. Pour moi, c'est permettre à des populations de tous niveaux, de toutes classes, de toutes catégories sociales, de vivre dans un même espace, de vivre ensemble. C'est presque un peu utopiste, parce que la mixité sociale... à Belleville les gens vivent pas ensemble. Pour avoir travaillé sur ces questions là et sur des questions de renouvellement et traitement de l'habitat indigne, il y a un côté hypocrite dans ce côté mixité sociale. Les bobos qui habitent rue de la fontaine au roy, ils ne mettent pas leurs gamins dans les écoles du quartier, parce que... ben voilà. Je suis assez critique par rapport à ce côté un peu... on va investir des quartiers, c'est bien on contribue à la mixité sociale, mais en fait non... oui on gentrifie ça c'est sûr mais non on se mélange pas, parce qu'ils ne fréquentent pas les mêmes bars. Le coup des gamins est le plus significatif. Dans les écoles... quand on se balade au marché on a l'impression que c'est mélangé, mais quand on va à la sortie des écoles, les petits blacks ou les petits arabes car les blancs vont plus au centre ou des écoles qui sont mieux cotées qui ont une meilleure réputation. C'est un peu caricatural mais bon ça existe. Voilà la mixité sociale, c'est un objectif génial, c'est sûr, mais honnêtement je ne pense pas que c'est évident de la faire fonctionner, quand on met des gens que parfois tout oppose ensemble, ça va pas forcément fonctionner très bien et la mixité sociale n'est pas non plus forcément un objectif ultime. "

community of 900 public housing units in the north side of the city of Chicago. This development has been created in the period of New Deal and is one of only two public housing developments in this area of the city with Cabrini Green, nationally famous of its high level of deterioration. The project of urban renewal of Lathrop is part of the Chicago Plan for Transformation and began with the relocation of the most part of the population in 2001. Up to 2010, not much happened in the neighborhood as it was not considered as a top priority under the Chicago Housing Authority Plan in comparison with high-rises like Cabrini or Robert Taylor (Venkatesh, 2002). In 2010, a private consortium was designated for the implementation of the demolition of units and the construction of a new “mixed-income community” following the principle of a third public housing, a third affordable housing and a third private units. Today, the project is under construction after the rejection by local residents and non-profit organizations of the different projects that were presented to them. Their grievances are double: first, keep affordable housing in the northern part of the city and second, preserve the historic heritage of the development.


### **3.2.1. The governance of integrated programs of urban renewal in the windy city**

The Chicago Plan for Transformation was designed in 2000 and began its implementation in 2001 in Lathrop and in 21 other public housing communities. The objectives of the plan were diverse: to demolish deteriorated high-rises, to avoid poverty concentration and to tackle the issue of vacancy within the public housing estate.


The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) is in charge of the implementation of the Plan. The CHA is responsible both for the management of public housing units and of the section 8 (housing choice) vouchers. The CHA, after years of corruption, was managed by the federal department on housing and urban development (HUD) from 1995 to 2000. In 2000, Mayor Daley, also called “the boss” in reference of his “machine politics” style of government, set up an agreement with HUD to take over the CHA and design the Plan for Transformation. Up to now, the CHA is an independent institution that only has to report to HUD, but the informal control of the city office is still significant.

The Chicago city hall is divided into several departments. The Planning and Economic Development Department is in charge of all projects of urban regeneration in the city. This department is divided into three bureaus on housing, economic development and land use/zoning. The office of budget and management is in charge of the distribution of CDBG

grants throughout the different departments. The department of planning and economic development got around 42% of the 94.5 million dollars CDBG funds in 2014.




**Distribution of CDBG funds by department in 2014 in the city of Chicago including positions and salaries (Author's treatment of financial record by the City of Chicago)**



**Governance structure and institutional arrangements for the implementation of the Chicago Plan for Transformation and CDBG programs**

The City of Chicago is divided into 50 wards (whose map has been changed in 2012). Each ward is run by a local alderman who seat at the city council. Lathrop Homes is divided into two different wards: the ward 1 and the ward 32.



**Ward map of Chicago and focus on the community of Lathrop (Source : city of Chicago)**

For each project of urban renewal, a working group is settled at the neighborhood level. This working group gathers local stakeholders, city-level representatives, members of the private consortium in charge of the implementation, members of the management office of the property and some non-profit organizations in charge of social services (Heartland Alliance at Lathrop) and members of Habitat Company and Business and Professionals for the Public Interest. Those two last organizations are present due to a case – the Gautreaux case – under which the CHA was accused of corruption and mismanagement and therefore needed a receivership. The two institutions were those receivers who controlled CHA actions up to 2012, end of the receivership.

The representatives of HUD are also invited to take part of the working group but they don't come to them. The evaluation and reporting on the programs compiled by the CHA at the city-level are the only tools through which public investments from HUD are controlled. The involvement of the Federal State at the local level is therefore limited and the goals of "integrated development" set up at the national level are therefore marginally controlled.

Local stakeholders gather the aldermen (who can seat on the working group even if their presence in Lathrop was marginal according to the working group minutes); local organizations and residents. Residents are gathered into a Local Advisory Council composed of elected residents in charge of the defense of public housing residents' interests.

The working group designates the private consortium and follows as well as votes on every decision in terms of planning and implementation of the urban renewal project. The city office, even if invited, is not present. The non-profit organization are in charge of the social services but as one representative of Heartland Alliance declared the social services that are today implemented into the neighborhood are not sufficient enough to allow a smooth process of integration of newcomers and the development of social cohesion with remaining public housing residents<sup>27</sup>.

The urban renewal project is a mixed-use project with strong incentives for the economic revitalization of the neighborhood. Commercials and retail stores are therefore part of the program and there is a strong tension by residents to see to whom the jobs will be. The coordination of the Plan for Transformation is therefore strongly community-based and driven by private actors. The integration of economic, social and urban goals are therefore limited to the realities of private interests. Private actors are the one in charge of the economic and urban regeneration of neighborhoods while non-profit actors are involved into the social component of those integrated urban renewal programs. While this collaborative governance seems to work in theory with clear roles for every type of actors and a shared working group for debates and collaborations, the tensions around the project make the project hard to implement. The project gathers actors with different interests and perspectives on the problem that is at stake and the solutions to solve them. The debate around “mixed-income” is therefore crucial and illustrates this point.

### **3.2.2. The debate around “mixed-income” at Lathrop Homes**

The principle of “mixed-income”<sup>28</sup> follows the New Urbanism principle with the idea that interactions between social groups from different backgrounds and social status are beneficial for all and especially for the lower classes that can expand their network and follow a form of role-modeling under the social control of upper classes. Julia Stash, chief of staff of Mayor Daley, was the one to draft the Plan for Transformation under this rationale in 1999/2000. She defines “mixed-income” under the logic of poverty deconcentration and presents it as a

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<sup>27</sup> **Interview March 11<sup>th</sup>, 2014 Heartland Alliance representative in charge of Lathrop:** “At Lathrop homes, we had a debate whether there is an optimal mix of incomes from a policy perspective. The research seems to indicate it’s inconclusive. And it depends on the surrounding community, its market dynamic, and it’s really how you define success. If you think success is serving as many low income people as possible, then you’re gonna have a very different income mix. Having said all that, I guess my vision for mixed income is less about percentages of different incomes, but more on a well-managed property in a good real estate market, a possible interaction across incomes, so having a good design that promotes that and an important aspect is good community services, where that promotes that interaction. And I don’t think it does now.”

<sup>28</sup> **Interview HUD May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2014:** “Our definition is to move away from the traditional housing project that will have only low income people. The ideal development will be the one with mixed incomes. The definition says what it is.”

“social experiment”. Indeed, the rationale of mixed-income began being experimented in the 1990s as a counter-framework of the Athens Charter of urban planning. New Urbanism consists of the development of mixed-use and mixed-income neighborhoods in place of large public housing developments. Stash agrees with the fact that this “social experiment” has not shown clear results in terms of social mobility. However, she argues that the demolition of high-rises and the creation of regenerated urban spaces is a great accomplishment of the Plan for Transformation even if the Plan is not over yet as it should have been<sup>29</sup>.

The rationale of mixed-income (parallel to the one of mixed-use redevelopments) is therefore a transcription of an urban program into a social policy for integrated development. The division into third was thought as a third way between the logic of deconcentration of poverty in 100% public housing neighborhoods and the objective to offer affordable housing to families. The idea was to break the cycle of stigmatization, from which public housing suffered and to encourage the settlement of new middle and upper-income households.<sup>30</sup>

As the Commissioner on Planning and Development of the City of Chicago declared, there is also a financial aspect into the choice for 1/3-1/3-1/3. Indeed, each component of the mixed-income community is made possible through different financial tools: the public housing part is made possible through HOPE VI grants and general public housing funds; the affordable piece is rendered possible through low-income tax credits that private developers can receive and the private part is in the hands of private developers<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>29</sup> **Interview February 27<sup>th</sup>, 2014 of Julia Stash:** “So first of all why mixed income... mixed income at that time [1999] was an example of practice ahead of evidence... What was the alternative? Is the alternative to perpetuate concentration of poverty because there was plenty of evidence about the deteriorating effect of concentration of poverty? There are two ways to do deconcentration of poverty, you can help people to move into less segregated neighborhoods which was all about the Gautreaux decision and MTO... or, on the sites of former public housing, you can create a sort of social experiment... you can create developments which have a mixed income character. So both of those of things were part of what was going on at that time... So mixed income was the antidote, even though the evidence was not fully there that it would do all the things that people hoped it would do: increase job opportunities for low income people just because they will be proximate to people who have jobs and connections and could maybe drag low income people into their networks... all those hopes have not been fully born out...”

<sup>30</sup> **Interview February 10<sup>th</sup>, 2014 Michael Jasso, Cook County Housing and Economic Development Director:** I don’t a third, a third, a third is the critical factor. I think it was specifically mixed income; a model was 1/3; 1/3; 1/3 yes... but the rationale was one of the ways to break down some of the issues that surround economically depressed neighborhoods: more crimes, less supportive structures... so having more balanced communities with families less reliant on social services it is a belief that the effect will be to create perceived balanced community and there will be less stigmatization of being in public housing. A couple of things were critical: it’s not only public housing, but you also make public housing indistinguishable... so there is no stigma in being in those units versus other units... Having families that are not dependent on social services will help to develop market rate opportunities: employment, retail... and get greater access to that... but it was also important to have social services, public housing is not only about the building, it’s very symptomatic of everything else: the social structure, the family structure... I think one of the things that has been realized over the past 20 years, not only in Chicago, which is a transformation from public housing to mixed income, but first of all, the developments that succeed better are the ones that have a great preponderance of market-rate housing. Because it’s a greater obstacle that many of us believe of changing the perception of those communities of public housing. Don’t forget, a third, a third, a third means that you still have 2/3 for the lower income strata.

<sup>31</sup> **Interview March 20<sup>th</sup>, 2014 Chicago Commissioner of Planning and Development Department:** “There is nothing sacred of a third-third-third, it was a working guideline that had to deal with both the kind of social environment we are trying to create and the way to finance the structure. So, it was ... it had three sources ... four sources of financing: you had public housing financing available, originally you had private financing for market-rate and you had the low-income tax credit available... there was other funds through the city... TIF, HOME... but what really drove the developments was really HOPE VI and other public housing funds, LIHTC and private funds... under public housing, you’re gonna have income limits up to 80% of median; under LIHTC your income limits are lower at 60%, but it doesn’t carry an operating subsidy so you have to find people below 60% that can pay they rent. And private market renters... so the contours of 1/3-1/3-1/3 was driven by those kinds of finance... those three principle streams of revenues and the requirements of those sources of finances. And there was also the notion... on the social

As we have seen, integrated development relies on two components: a focus on social, economic and urban issues (policies), and a governance that allows a collaborative work and interactions between actors from different policy sectors. However, it seems that local governments externalize their responsibility for the implementation of integrated programs. Private developers are in charge of urban and economic projects within new mixed-income communities. Non-profit actors are responsible for social services. While, the final ambition is one of social and economic development and upward social mobility of low-income households breaking the cycle of intergenerational poverty in which some families are embedded, it seems that those different actors have different interests and perspectives on the mixed-income projects. Some argue that the whole project of mixed-income has never been fully born due to the divergence in interests and interpretations of the goals of those programs.<sup>32</sup>

At Lathrop, the private developer has a strong paternalistic view on the work it is accomplishing<sup>33</sup>. The vice-President of Related Midwest, at the head of the consortium in charge of the Lathrop mixed-income project, declares thus that the urban renewal project is a way to show the path toward self-sufficiency to low-income households. This vision is shared with the Chicago Housing Authority but some members of the organization are nevertheless more careful on the actual results of the “social experiment” being implemented<sup>34</sup>.

Some local organizations and residents do not share this view from developers and the CHA. Indeed, local organizations such as the Chicago Housing Initiative and some residents notably elected residents from the Local Advisory Council consider that the mixed-income project is a way for private developers to have access to valuable land. It is true that Lathrop Homes is today at the heart of valuable land in Chicago<sup>35</sup>. Lathrop takes part of the Logan Square

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side that you wanted to have again... an environment that was reflective of a Chicago neighborhood, where you will have this kind of mix of incomes and so between the financing and the idea of the neighborhood that you want to create that we came up with this division... but again there is no particular magic with 1/3-1/3-1/3.”

<sup>32</sup> **Interview January 24<sup>th</sup>, 2014 Executive Director Residents’ journal *We the people media*:** “The whole mixed income concept, because on the one hand it is a very popular idea that people put forward and on the other hand it’s never really implemented. I can’t think of one site where it has really been implemented.”

<sup>33</sup> **Interview November 26<sup>th</sup>, 2013 Related Midwest:** “I believe in the Plan for transformation. I live it. I couldn’t do my job otherwise. I think that there is nothing better than taking an area of the real estate picture that has been totally ignored and treated as second-third class citizens and knocking down the incredibly bit-up round-down buildings and putting up new. Putting these residents together with condo owners close to them... the goal is to make finally somebody financially responsible so they can get out of public housing. It shows them the steps, what life could be for them if they work on it, it offers them programming and opportunities to get there. So that’s all great.”

<sup>34</sup> **Interview February 6<sup>th</sup>, 2014 CHA representative:** “They wanted low-rise developments. And they didn’t want to get a new concentration of poverty, that’s how the all idea of mixed income came. I don’t think that there is any empirical evidence that it is beneficial or that it works, but they studied the existing developments and looked at the fact that there was no diversity in those neighborhoods, so they figured it could be good to have some diversity there. But remember, it is a big experiment and we are still in the middle of it, so we are not sure if this is gonna work.”

<sup>35</sup> **Interview February 27<sup>th</sup>, 2014 Vice-President Lathrop Local Advisory Council:** “The land of Lathrop is very valuable, you have tons of retails, you have market-rate housing, you have this great surrounding community. Here is the reason. (He draws a map with \$\$\$\$ around Lathrop). We don’t have concentrated poverty here. We have all races and ethnicities!

- Races are not money, are they?

- Yes right. We have mixed-income... as a construction worker I don’t do as much as a person that work at Walgreen... you have a nurse, you have some that work at Target... the mixed-income scenario is already there! The market-rate housing is not right! If you have a \$1 million home here and a \$15,000 home here, it’s not right.”

community that is today under rapid gentrification<sup>36</sup>. The tensions between private developers and the CHA on one side and local activists and residents on the other are the reason why the project of integrated mixed-income development at Lathrop is stopped for more than three years. Trust is limited between actors who view different interests in the project.

Furthermore, these tensions on the mixed-income project are reinforced by the involvement of local aldermen into the process of continuous decision-making that is implementation. The aldermen of Ward 1 and 32 do not have the same vision on the project. If Alderman Moreno Chief of Staff (Ward 1)<sup>37</sup> says that they subscribe to the mixed-income project, Alderman Waguespack chief of staff (Ward 32) declares that his ward doesn't<sup>38</sup>. The political tension between the two elected officials has been brought up to the attention of the CHA executive director and the city council through direct letters that the Alderman published on his website.

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<sup>36</sup> **Interview February 8<sup>th</sup>, 2014 Logan Square Neighborhood Association – part of Chicago Housing Initiative:** “We are opposed to the whole mixed-income idea. First, we feel that it is very wasteful, if you look at Lathrop and the surrounding community, there is no need for market-rate developments, the area has been saturating with market-rate developments: condos,... Secondly, the area is facing an enormous challenge in terms of maintaining housing that is affordable for low-income families. Thirdly, and this is something we learned more formerly in the last years as we read the studies on the mixed-income redevelopments, the results are not overwhelmingly positive; putting people next to each other doesn't build necessarily a diverse and successful community, so I think that's part of it. And as we ... another reason is that part of the historic crisis of the CHA, part of the historic injustice, is that so many public housing units were built in neighborhoods that were almost entirely African-American, very poor. Very few units existed in the north side and white communities. Here you have this opportunity to either save or remove public housing from a predominantly white part of the city so we look at the opportunities for public housing families.... There are public housing developments in areas that have very few opportunities, shop opportunities, connections... and you have Lathrop where you had in the mix of good public transit, with shopping and grocery opportunities and so there seems to us a place essentially, what we have been lacking is good management and good storage of the housing... but public housing in this area there are all kinds of opportunities that those families can take part of. So there are several reasons as you can see and I think that the CHA and BPI, the law group that works closely with them, they would focus on the site of Lathrop itself and they would that it's a concentration pocket of poverty and we have to make it disappear, but the problem with this analysis is that if you look more broadly, the barriers around Lathrop is a zone of affluence and gentrification and if you look at the map of Chicago, we have vast parts of the city that are separated from each other and lack opportunities... so that idea that Lathrop has to be for its own good, that you have to put 45% market-rate development is looking at the micro-level; looking at the trees but not the forest!”


<sup>37</sup> **Interview February 5<sup>th</sup>, 2014 Alderman Moreno Chief of Staff:** “The CHA declared that future developments will be mixed income and we subscribe to that because we feel that mixed income projects will be more sustainable: socially, economically, we believe that you can't have 100% concentration of poverty, you want to have a mix of residents, socially economically mix. You have some rental housing for working professionals who can't afford to live in the area, public housing... the alderman has said that we need more affordable housing for workers (30 to 60% of AMI). And then you have the market rate rentals and maybe purchase. It's a mix. It's good to have a mix of individuals. You have a neighborhood who are lower economic means, working class component and home owners, we think that's the right formula going forward.”

<sup>38</sup> **Interview February 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2014 Alderman Waguespack Chief of Staff:** “A third, a third, a third has nothing to do with how they would get along, it's driven by the market, they looked at the situation in the mid-1990s and you have in 1995/1996, the city had lost population, especially young professionals that went to the suburbs and suddenly it changed... people want to go to the city... people want to live close to bars, with young people... and no new housing units was build because they had no demand, but suddenly you have a large demand for condos and the CHA is looking at that landscape and says “well, if we do this a third, a third, a third, they would be young professionals that could buy, because that's the only thing they can afford, paying 400,000 for a one bedroom condo here they could pay 300.000 for a one bedroom condo.” So you had all those buyers here, and the value has started to get appreciated 10/15% a year and then they could move when they sell out. Those buyers are today gone... this all notion that the market continues to go up and that you can use that money that you got because your all neighborhoods shot up, that has disappeared, so a third a third a third doesn't work anymore... so today there is not a lot of people that want to select a mixed income community. And now Related is saying that the new ratio is 80/20... that's the ratio now... and the president of Related Midwest wants a new balance... 80/20 instead of a 1/3 1/3 1/3 it has nothing to do with the sociology of it, it has nothing to do with the right mix for a healthy neighborhood, that has nothing to do with it, it's all driven by the housing market and anybody that doesn't admit that, conveniently doesn't want to admit or just doesn't understand. There is no research that shows that you should have a certain mix and that the market rate people rob off on the public housing people and they start to live in a health community... the research that is out right is one that says that basically if you build housing that look like prisons, you cannot be surprised that people act like convicts. Even HUD itself, they have this paper, defensible paper. ... no you have 100 families and you don't know what is the acceptable or not, they don't have the self-policing situation so you have problems... obviously there are a lot of other problems but if there is any kind of research that says what to build and how to build, let me know... So today we want to fight the new plan with a high rise.”

## Conclusion: implementing integrated programs of urban regeneration

Implementation is a continuous process of decision-making. It is a process of change from policy objectives to policy results/outcomes. This analysis of this phase is crucial in order to actually understand the realities of integrated development. As a matter of fact, policy intentions do not always result in similar outcomes.

When comparing the Chicago and Parisian cases, we see common trends of implementation failures of integrated development programs. Discrepancies between the intention (of integration) and the outcomes (of divided un-integrated actions) are the result of vertical and horizontal factors.



On the vertical line, we see:

- a multiplicity of actors that are involved in the top-down chains and levels of implementation and it appears that the European Union is one of this actors with less significance than national welfare regimes
- a division between public policy sectors/administrations that is difficult to dismantle and becomes stronger based on the different levels of implementation

On the horizontal line, we see:

- a multiplicity of representations of the goals that are followed based on different expertise and interests
- a factor of trust between actors at each level of implementation or even simpler a factor of mutual knowledge of actors (indeed some actors do not know each other)

In the end implementation is the crucial phase that reinforces institutional matters. Two factors are crucial: practices and governance structures on the one hand and interpretations/representations in relation to interests and trusts of actors on the other.

Comparable doesn't mean similar. The American and French programs are inscribed into different welfare regimes and have different scales while they target the common goals of integrated development and social mixing. The debates around "social mixing" in France and "mixed-income development" in the US are of the same nature even if the content of debate is country-specific, notably based on the involvement of the national/Federal state into local welfare programs. It seems that national welfare states differences are therefore more significant than a differentiation between European and American models of integrated development.

The French urban renewal programs of 2003-2014 were not strongly influenced by the Leipzig recommendations of 2007. The division between social and economic development on the one hand and urban renewal on the other was institutional with two different agencies working on the same neighborhoods. The reform of 2014 in France tends to emphasize the principle of integrated development, but the division into sectors of public policies blocks the implementation of this rationale of political action. Actors of different sectors tend not to work collaboratively and sometimes mistrust one another.

The American model of urban renewal seems more integrated than the French one in a sense because its social component has been externalized to non-profit organizations. If urban renewal projects are implemented by private actors by delegation of public institutions, social programs are at the charge of the third sector and community development actors.

Finally, institutional arrangements and governance structures frame integrated programs. Nevertheless, looking at implementation of those programs makes us consider the limits of those kinds of programs that face strong difficulties in moving from policy and political intentions to reality with clear outcomes and results.

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