Participatory budgeting as an institutional innovation: a few hypotheses on PB expansion and diffusion

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Paper submitted for consideration for The International Conference on Public Policy
Singapore
Institutional innovation became one of the key concepts of democratic theory today (Habermas, 1994; Cohen, 1997; Fisher, 2000; Avritzer, 2002; Dryzek, 1996; 2000; 2006; Goodin, 1996; 2006; Smith, 2009; Mieg and Tofer, 2013; Spada, 2013; Rezende, 2015; Stub and Mendonça, 2016). The origins of institutional innovation are rooted in recent changes in contemporary democracies. On the one hand, in old and consolidated democracies of the North, changes in public policy in areas such as housing, environment and compensatory policies have generated innovations that increased the level of citizens participation and produced more efficient results (Fung and Wright, 2003; Fung, 2007; Fischer, 2000; Siriane and Friedland, 2001; Sintomer, 2007). At the same time, the idea of experimenting with democratic design acquired an important relevance through the proliferation of mini-publics (Smith, 2009; Fung, 2004; Parkinson, 2006; Manbridge et al, 2012).

Alongside the cases of institutional innovation in the North, democratization in Southern countries provided parallel cases of institutional innovation in new democracies, particularly the Latin American ones (Avritzer and Ramos, 2016; Faria and Ramos, 2013; Avritzer, 2013; Peruzzotti and Seele, 2010; Annunziata, 2011; Hevia and Isunza, 2010; Akerman, 2007). The Latin American cases and particularly the Brazilian case, have one similarity and one difference with the Northern cases: the similarity is that they are also strongly concentrated in policy innovations (Pires, 2011; Cambraia, 2014) and connected to social movements in important areas such as health and social assistance (Feres and Ramos, 2013; Petinelli, 2012). The difference is that they are connected with participatory mechanisms that are institutions in charge of producing decisions binding for the political system what makes them more effective but also more contentious (Avritzer, 2016).
The spread of institutional innovation both in old well-established democracies in the North as well as in new democracies in the South made innovation a very trendy phenomenon. Some experiences such as participatory budgeting became world famous and are practiced in all parts of the world (Allegretti, 2013; Sintomer, 2007; 2011). Other experiences such as mini-publics are in practice worldwide from Australia to British Columbia (Warren and Pearse, 2008). Even in the legal system, innovation has been introduced with highly ambiguous results (Avritzer and Marona, 2016). Thus, the issue in a moment of widespread diffusion of policy innovation is: are there limits to the positive aspects of political and institutional innovations or are innovations good per se?

This paper will try to answer this question by differentiating types of innovation, reasons for introducing innovation and the timing of political innovation and innovation diffusion. The first issue is perhaps the most important. The differentiation of types of innovation, a work carried out by only a few scholars (Hevia and Isunza, 2010), is important in order to know whether innovation serves to strengthen participation, to empower citizenship or to empower specific groups or corporations. I will argue that in many cases innovation can play the role of cooptation and disempowerment.

The second issue is areas of innovation. Innovation started in areas of public policy both in Northern and in Southern democracies. In the case of public policies, I will argue that innovation is most of the time a positive phenomenon that produces results such as a larger citizenship engagement or a better deliverance of public good (Fischer, 2000; 2013; Pires and Cambraia, 2010; Wampler, 2014). In addition to that I will argue that innovation in public policy, even when it does not work well, never poses dangers to democracy. These cases should clearly be distinguished from the cases of innovation in judicial institutions, one of the key areas in which innovation took
place in Latin America particularly in Brazil, but also in Bolivia and Colombia. This could be much more problematic, because the role of legal corporations in democracy cannot be compared with the role of engaged citizens.

In order to evaluate these cases and provide broader approach to them, I will define democratic innovation as the capacity of government to express political will and civil society inputs in several formats. Usually, these inputs are linked to the introduction and/or implementation of new designs for public policies, through which civil society and the state interact in order to democratize the state itself.

I will argue in the article that participatory innovation is the main case among different types of democratic innovations. Participatory innovation thrived in Southern democracies, in particular in those located in South America. The motive for concentration of innovation in South America is the process of constitution-making that took place after democratizations in the region (Avritzer et al, 2016 ). Constitution-making took place in Brazil (1988) among other countries.

Participation was introduced as an innovation in Brazil in different parts of the 1988 Constitution. Among the important changes introduced by the 1988 Constitution, we can point out a significant increase in forms of participation, all of them grounded on the idea of broader participation introduced in article 1.
Participatory innovations in Brazil: origins, effects and expansion

The most important institutional innovation that emerged in South America is participatory budgeting. I will use it to explain what is participatory innovation its potentials and problems. Participatory budgeting is a local practice of public deliberation on budget issues introduced in Porto Alegre in 1989 which was expanded first to 103 in 2003 and them to 201 cities in 2008 (Avritzer and Wampler, 2008). Most likely it is practiced in more than 300 Brazilian cities today. Participatory budgeting expanded to many parts of South America and generated a very successful case in Argentina in the city of Rosário (Annunziata, 2011, 2013). Participatory budgeting has been expanded to Europe and we see cases such as Portugal where the main phenomenon is the death of participatory budgeting. How can we evaluate the different experiences of PB?

Participatory budgeting (PB) is characterized by four elements: the first one is the delegation of sovereignty by elected mayors to a set of regional and thematic assemblies which operate through universal criteria of participation. Every citizen can participate and vote on budget issues in regional and thematic assemblies. The second characteristic is the combination within the participatory model of different elements of participation which belong to different participatory traditions, such as direct participation and election of councilors at the city level. The third element is the principle of self-regulation. The rules for participation and deliberation are defined by the participants themselves and are adapted or changed every year (Santos and Avritzer, 2002). The fourth element is an attempt of inverting priorities in the distribution of public goods through a combination of participation and technical decisions on whom should have access to public goods.
Participatory budgeting has had two main effects in Porto Alegre from 1990 to 2004: the first one was a sharp democratization of political practices. This democratization as I will show in chapter 3 involved the following aspects: more participation at the local level; a better information on state’s policies; transference of decision-making from the mayor to the P.B. council; learning of negotiation by grassroots actors and democratization of the access to public goods that has their offer de-concentrated in the urban space.

Two questions should be posed by a theory on political innovation or participatory innovation: the first one is to which elements should we attribute these results? The second is can we keep these characteristics in an expanded design? I will try to answer both questions in order to evaluate potentials and problems in the theory of institutional innovation in chapter three posing three criteria to evaluate success: the capacity to democratize state practices, the capacity to expand citizenship and the capacity to distribute public goods. It is my main point that participatory budgeting was successfully expanded out of Brazil keeping all these three elements as I will show in the experience in Rosario. It is also my point that important experiences such as Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo were unsuccessful because they could not resist to the political system drive to incorporate democratic innovation in a politics as usual scheme.

**Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte: understanding the process of innovation**

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a process of public deliberation on the allocation of budget resources first introduced by the Workers’ Party in Porto Alegre in 1990 and in Belo Horizonte in 1993. Participatory budgeting qualifies as an innovation in the conceptual sense advanced in the introduction, it changed administrative and political practices in order to better integrate citizens into the budget decision-making process.
By integrating citizens in decision making processes, participatory budgeting deepens democracy. One specific area of budget making is of key importance in participatory budgeting, the investment decision on the distribution of public goods. Public goods are very unevenly distributed in Brazilian cities due to the country’s authoritarian legacy. Improving the distribution of public goods through participation helps to struggle against inequality and deepen democracy. That is what Porto Alegre did when it introduced participatory budgeting. It helped to break a pattern of territorial exclusion of the poor instituted in the city by the authoritarian regime.

**The PB in Porto Alegre**

The PB in Porto Alegre involved the adaptation of the budget cycle to a cycle of regional assemblies, one round of intermediary meetings, and the year-round operation of a councilors’ body called the PB council. The process has a calendar and a relation between this calendar and civil associations dynamics. It begins every year in April, when the first round of district assemblies takes place. In this first stage, the population attends an assembly in each of the regions. Every first-round regional assembly is attended by the mayor, and a short account-settling process begins, with a description of the administrative implementation of the decisions made in the previous year. The floor is open for about an hour, during which citizens express themselves about what has been taking place, about possible disagreements with the administration, and about what should be done in the region in the coming year. Participation in these meetings is crucial because they constitute the basis for participation in the remaining parts of the process. Participation in these meetings is on a personal basis, but individuals throughout the registration process are required to demonstrate membership in voluntary associations.

This is the key innovation introduced by participatory budgeting, to bring the population of a large city to a neighborhood assembly to discuss the budget. This innovation is not in contradiction with what most of democratic theorist wrote about participation because they assumed that participation is possible and desirable at the very local level (Dahl, 1971;1980; Pateman, 1980). However, it already constituted a challenge in
terms of the politicization element that PB introduced in these assemblies. They discuss a city policy and connect a city policy with local participation. In addition to that the kind of actor that PB brings to these assemblies there is also a challenge to common wisdom in democratic theory. PB is a format that facilitates the engagement of two kinds of actors in the process: poor social actors and actors with a conception of democratic deepening\(^1\) that would facilitate the process of budget making. The centrality of poor urban actors in a process of participation was the first important contribution of PB to democratic innovation because it binds institutional participation with a regular practice at the grassroots level triggering a process of democratization of the local state.

The second stage of the PB is the intermediary meetings, having two responsibilities: ranking thematic priorities and deliberating about which public works the region will claim. Ranking is a process through which five of twelve types of public goods (pavement, sewage, legalization of urban property, organization of the city, housing, education, health and social assistance, transportation and circulation, leisure, sports, economic development, and culture) are selected as priorities. It involves two processes carried out earlier by the public administration: the evaluation of the population’s previous access to public goods and the classification of each of the city’s regions according to its population. Thus, two criteria are used in ranking: the first is previous access (and therefore present need). A table for classifying priorities assigns grades in inverse relation to previous access to a particular public good. According to the 1999 criteria, previous access to a public good of up to 80 percent leads to grade 1; up to 60 percent previous access, grade 2, and up to 20 percent, grade 5. The second criterion is the population of the region, and the third, the community’s own ranking of its priorities, again on a scale of 1 to 5. At the end of this process, a region can amass up to fifteen points if it previously had less than 20 percent access to a public good, chooses this good as a top priority, and has more than 120,000 inhabitants.

\(^1\) I would argue that thees actors part of them members of a party bureaucracy with democratic deepening intent is an undertheorized element of participatory budgeting by the literature. Very few scholars worked with that assuming a natural tendency to form a bureaucracy that deal with such issues. I remember having discussed this issue at length with the late Judith Tendler who always tried to connect in her work action and the organization of bureaucratic implementation. See Tendler, 1997.
Again, PB innovated in terms of democratic theory as it proposed to hierarchize the access to public goods. Many authors within democratic theory assume that hierarchization is one of the key elements of citizens actions in a democracy (Downs, 1956; Przeworski,1992). PB introduced it in a different way because hierarchization is not a technical process within democracy but rather a collective process made by the community or citizens assembly. It transforms an individual preference into a collectively forum for the discussion of preferences.

**The PB Council**

The PB council was inaugurated each July every year from 1990 to 2005. It created a budget proposal based on the rankings and decisions which took place in the intermediary meetings. The PB council then revises the final budget proposal elaborated by the Gaplan (the planning agency, detailed below) and mayor’s cabinet. In September, a final budget proposal is in place. The council also monitors the implementation of its decisions by the city’s administrative agencies during the year. PB broke two main paradigms in democratic theory as it introduced its council. The first one was the paradigm that participation should be local which is part of the work of almost all important democratic theorists. By scaling up participation PB broke with this paradigm showing that there are aggregative methods in processes of participation. In addition to that, it also broke with the view that participation could not be intertwined with representation. PB council is a representative institution in which representatives of participatory assemblies gather.

PB in Porto Alegre was highly successful for 15 years and continued to exist for another year until the city created a program called “Local Solidary Governance” (LSG). The discontinuing of PB with its substitution shows how powerful it became at the level of grassroots citizens. It also shows that its derailment was politically motivated and only took place because of the electoral defeat of the P.T. in Porto Alegre. However, the fact that it continues to exist in another format is also a measure of success (Montambeault, 2016).
Success in Porto Alegre needs to be differentiated from success in other cases even in Belo Horizonte that has had a larger longevity (Wampler, 2015). Success in Porto Alegre as the initial case was stronger and involved the three dimensions discussed above: the possibility of making the point that the budget can be democratized; the possibility of making the point that democratic solutions to city problems or even to the political problems that emerged during the PB process was better than a technocratic solution. And last, but not least success meant a demonstration effect in terms of political learning that involved all the cities on the outskirts of Porto Alegre and all large cities in Rio Grande do Sul. Thus, Porto Alegre’s success was a success of participatory method that inspired the diffusion of the experience.

**The PB in Belo Horizonte**

Participatory Budgeting has been in practice in Belo Horizonte since 1993. It involves three rounds of regional assemblies which lead to a regional forum of priorities. The first round of regional assemblies is similar to its counterpart in Porto Alegre, although it is more argumentative and less deliberative. The administration opens each assembly with a statement on what was decided in the previous year and an accounting of the current state of the implementation of previous decisions.

Belo Horizonte’s main role in the consolidation of PB was to show that PB as an innovation is flexible and adaptable. Belo Horizonte has had less participatory tradition than Porto Alegre (Wampler, 2015; Avritzer, 2009). However, it could also implement participatory budgeting though it never introduced a council with similar prerogatives. Belo Horizonte also played the role of making the point that PB could be introduced in average cities in need of participation in order to improve the access of the poor to public goods. Last but not least, Belo Horizonte introduced the idea that new innovations could be added to the initial format as long as they would contribute to the deliberative process. Caravanas das prioridades, priority caravan was the first among these innovations.
**Priorities Caravans**

“Priorities caravans” are a stage within the region in which members of the subregions negotiate among themselves regarding their different proposals. Each community which has proposed a public work to be included in the city budget visits other communities in order to evaluate their level of need. At the same time, different communities start to support one another’s claims, forming coalitions which will be decisive in the deliberative process.

**Evaluating the Process of Institutional Innovation within PB**

There is a general consensus in Brazil that the PB works better than the traditional methods of formatting the budget. Yet, there is no consensus on why it works better and how its main features were introduced. Some analysts attribute the success of the PB to the original participatory proposal introduced by the Workers’ Party, a position that has to be disqualified by later development in Brazil in which the P.T. distanced itself from participatory budgeting (Avritzer, 2017). Others consider it to be a product of many sources, tracing it to the actions of social movements.² In this section of the chapter, I analyze the origins of the PB and later I analyze the reasons for its diffusion.

The centrality of budget making within the distribution of public goods began with UAMPA—the federation of neighborhood associations—in Porto Alegre in the late 1980s. Neighborhood movements have been strong in Porto Alegre since the beginning of democratization.³ During the first popularly elected administration in Porto Alegre, led by the left-populist Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT) party, members of neighborhood associations demanded the right to monitor the activities of the local administration. In a 1986 meeting called to discuss the participatory policies proposed by the Collares administration, UAMPA’s deliberative council issued a document on popular participation in the city. This statement had three main points: (1) the identification of participation with “control of the definition of the city budget”; (2) the

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³ Ibid.
identification of budget making with the discussion of investment priorities in each neighborhood; and (3) the control and monitoring of budget implementation. UAMPA was not an isolated case in Brazil. Urban social movements and neighborhood movements pop up in several capitals of the Brazilian South and Southeast and played a key role in the expansion of participation. It is possible to state that a strong social movement behind PB is not a necessary condition for its success but facilitates a lot its implementation and creates the “natural” constituency for PB. It is also possible to show that these elements exist in many other countries. The case of the assembleas barriales in Argentina will be used to corroborate this point.

The Workers’ Party was part of the movement for the organizational autonomy of labor from the state and, at the same time, advocated an idea of participatory democracy more inspired by the Marxist conception of labor councils than by the trajectory of social movements in Brazil. Its program was a defense of local councils, which would generate city councils and furnish a worker-based form of parallel administration. The party had its first important victories in the local elections of 1988, when it elected the mayors of São Paulo and Porto Alegre, among other cities; in some cases, like that of São Paulo, it decided to practice something very similar to its workers’ councils proposal. Even in Porto Alegre, the conception which prevailed during the first year of Workers’ Party administration was deeply influenced by the idea that politics always involves the representation of particular interests and that the Workers’ Party should change only which particular interests prevailed within the local administration. It is possible to state that a left political party with a participatory proposal is a key component of participatory budgeting design. The P.T. is not the only case. Frente Amplia in Uruguay and the socialists in Argentina played a very similar role.


5 It is beyond the aims of this work to analyze the formation and evolution of the Workers’ Party. For an analysis of the movements which claimed labor autonomy in Brazil during the democratization process, see Leonardo Avritzer, Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2002). For an analysis of the formation of the Workers’ Party, see Margaret Keck, PT a logica da Diferenca [Workers Party: the logic of difference] (São Paulo: Atica, 1992).

The political decisions on participatory budgeting were made in an overlapping way during the first two years of Workers’ Party rule in Porto Alegre. From its inauguration, the Olívio Dutra administration tried to increase participation at-large. In the first year, most of the secretaries introduced some participatory elements in their health, education, and planning proposals. At the same time, in its first thirty days, the Olívio Dutra administration made the crucial decision to make the Coordination of Relations with the Community (CRC) responsible for centralizing all of the community’s claims. The CRC thus became central to the PB process. Although it had existed prior to 1989, the CRC’s role had been to provide city associations with tax exemption certificates (atestado de utilidade pública). Thus, four steps toward participatory budgeting overlapped in the beginning of the Dutra administration: the concern of urban social movements with budgetary control and with direct participation at the local level; the emphasis the Workers’ Party placed on participation and councils; the decentralized initiative of several secretaries, including the planning secretary, to encourage popular participation; and the idea, which emerged in the first thirty days, to centralize participation in the CRC. The last component is a governance design. Table 1 below summarizes the initiatives which led to the introduction of the elements of participatory budgeting.

Table 1. Overlap of elements for PB success

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<tr>
<th>Urban Social Movement</th>
<th>Political party</th>
<th>Design as a form of governance</th>
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<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre: Local assemblies and control of the population on budget decisions</td>
<td>Left political party which engages with a participatory tradition</td>
<td>A design for participation and transparency having a council at its center</td>
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The PB’s institutional design allows it to cope with administrative problems within the specific political culture of urban Brazil—a culture divided between clientelist and nonclientelistic, hybrid, and deliberative elements. Abers showed how the Extremo Sul neighborhood in Porto Alegre, which was dominated by clientelist politicians, found in the PB an incentive to move to more autonomous ways of claiming public goods. By her account, in the first year of the PB, Extremo Sul made a very long and disorderly list of demands, which consequently went unsatisfied. However, one improvement made in the neighborhood through the PB had a demonstration effect, leading the neighborhood to inquire about how to participate. Its increased willingness to do so led to a change in leadership. Neighborhood assemblies in Extremo Sul used to gather around eighty people; in the year after the change in leadership, the neighborhood assembly attracted 569 people and city investments started to pour into the area.

The experience of the Zila Spósito neighborhood in Belo Horizonte was similar. The neighborhood was formed when the construction of a new avenue made it necessary to relocate part of the population of another neighborhood. As the people arrived, water supply was irregular and there was no sewage or paved roads. In the first year of the Belo Horizonte PB, a few community leaders demanded sewage and pavement. They did not know how to proceed and thus failed to convince other participants of the priority of their claims. A change in the neighborhood association and the selection of

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8 Abers, “From Clientelism to Cooperation.”
9 Ibid., 520.
new leadership led them to much better organized participation in the next year, and their claims were included in the city PB plan for 1995.

The examples in both Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte show how institutions designed for public deliberation can have a positive effect in situations of previously existing deliberative inequalities: in Porto Alegre, inequality stemmed from the existence of clientelism in the neighborhood; in Belo Horizonte, it was the result of poor organizational skills. In both cases, a participatory design led the population to move from a situation of deliberative inequality to one in which they became equal members of a deliberative process. The PB thus helped to overcome two traditional mechanisms: hierarchical relations derived from the favor culture, and the practice of claiming goods through mediators, both replaced by associational interaction and free expression. It expresses the impact of participatory innovation on the political culture.

Belo Horizonte has had strong similarities with Porto Alegre and very interesting specificities. PB in Belo Horizonte has overlapping with some of the features of Porto Alegre’s PB and changed others. It maintained the two rounds of regional assemblies, one of the key characteristics of scaling up. Assemblies take place in the neighborhoods and are open entry assemblies. Delegates are elected in these assemblies in a very similar way to Porto Alegre. However, these assemblies to not lead to a Council a second important element of bottom-up format. The lack of an assembly made Belo Horizonte’s PB a bottom-up institution with a few power sharing elements. The administration has most of the prerogatives on the final format of the city budget. What makes Belo Horizonte a bottom-up format is the fact that decision on public works in the regional assemblies are final. Thus, it is less important in the expansion of participatory budgeting the initiative to methodologically reproduce the format t’n te political ability to empower citizens on the budget, a device that as I will show ahead hs been lacking in many cases of participatory budgeting diffusion.

Belo Horizonte’s PB also created a few new devices for the participatory process. The
first of them is an administrative device, an index to orient distribution of resources to the regions. The Index IQVU, Index for Urban Quality of Living goes in the same direction.

Two participatory institutions introduced by Belo Horizonte’s PB are completely new. One of them is an internal process of negotiation among the claimers of public goods, called the “priorities caravans.” In the stage in which each community has proposed a public project, the city starts a process of mutual visitation by each one of the communities to the other communities. This is an important moment in the deliberative process in which there is an evaluation by each one of the claimers on how needy its community is vis-a-vis other poor communities. On this basis, different communities start to support one another’s claims, forming coalitions which will be decisive in the deliberative process.

Belo Horizonte does not fully qualify as an expansion design because the introduction of the experience took place just a few years after Porto Alegre. However, it gives us important indications on what a successful expansion design should involve. Is should involve real prerogatives of budget making. Belo Horizonte shares this characteristic with Porto Alegre and both cities share these characteristics with other cities in South America such as Rosário. However, we will see below this is not a widespread characteristic in European cases. The second characteristic that both PB’s express is large scale participation. Large scale participation is important in order for the experimental dimension of participation to take place. It is impossible to make political participation relevant without large number of participants. Scaling up also becomes highly irrelevant in cases of low level of participation. Finally, there is the learning aspect that may perhaps apply to both cases. In the next two session of this chapter, I will evaluate how the relevant elements of innovation apply in the Brazilian cases of diffusion and I will later discuss the international cases.

Expansion of PB in Brazil
The expansion of PB was initially a local Brazilian phenomenon. The P.T. took advantage of the transparency and efficiency elements in PB to present itself as a party capable of producing good administrative practices. In order to make this argument more effective the P.T. introduced between 1997 and 2004 the P.B. experience in 103 cities. PB in this period was practiced in 5 among the ten largest cities in Brazil, São Paulo, Fortaleza, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre and Recife. The expansion of PB was a Workers Party agenda, proposed in electoral campaigns and able to gather large constituencies behind it. Still the results were very different motivated by political considerations, lack of civil society organization and administrative deficiencies. I will pick up two contrasting cases in Brazil to make the argument, the cases of São Paulo and Recife.

I approached the case of São Paulo’s participatory budgeting in length elsewhere (Avritzer, 2004; 2009). São Paulo (2000-2004) is a very interesting case because it fits into the narrative of Workers Party willingness to implement participation in order to present itself as a good and efficient government party yet the story is much more complicated. There have been strong political disputes around the implementation of participation because both the administration and strong sectors of the P.T. were not 100% in favor of P.B.

Participatory budgeting was introduced as a small pilot program in 2001, then fully implemented in 2002 with a structure that resembled Porto Alegre’s more than Belo Horizonte’s. Still in its first year PB decided only on investments in two areas, health and education. The first stage of participation in São Paulo encompassed assemblies in all 96 districts of the 31 regions or sub-prefeituras. There were two meetings in the districts, one informational and the other deliberative, leading to the election of delegates and councilors. The procedure for electing delegates was similar to other Brazilian cities like Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, with incentives for organization.

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11 São Paulo participatory budgeting was linked to the process of decentralization of the city. Decentralization law was approved in 2002 and from 2003 on participatory budgeting deliberations were linked to the organization of the 31 sub-prefeituras.
and a reduction of the weight of the already very organized sectors. The first observation in relation to PB in São Paulo is that is expressed from the very beginning a disjunction between the capacity of organizing assemblies at the regional level and the small commitment of the administration to incorporate more areas of public policy into PB. This is not only a problem that São Paulo will face. It has been faced by many other cities among them Recife and Buenos Aires. However, what I will argue below is that the solution given to this problem is key in both the success of PB or in its transformation of a disempowering form of political participation.

The most important innovation of the PB process in São Paulo was the composition of its council. São Paulo created a council with representatives of all 96 districts in addition to representatives of underrepresented groups such as gays and lesbians and the street population and specific issue areas. The 2003 PB Council had 61 councilors elected by the sub-regions, four councilors elected in each thematic area, plus two councilors representing vulnerable groups like gays and lesbians, blacks, street people, the elderly, and the handicapped. The city had one representative for each of the secretaries running social programs, although they could not vote. The format of PB Council in São Paulo allowed for more interaction between neighborhood associations and the poor, who are concentrated in the downtown part of the city, and, in this sense, it allowed the PB to tackle social issues. Participation in the PB grew steadily from 34,000 people in the first, pilot year to 55,000 in the second and 82,000 people in 2004, the last year of its operation.

Table 2: General Data on participation in Sao Paulo’s P.B.

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<td>participants</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
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</table>

12 This has been one of the sharpest criticisms of participatory budgeting. Investments in Brazilian cities typically involve only public works and leaves out what in Brazilian public accounting system is called custeio “operation expenses”. Social policies always involve increase in operation expenses that are decided outside the P.B.
Thus, in terms of its main characteristics, São Paulo PB was also a bottom-up form of participation. Open entry assemblies at the local level were the starting moment that continued with the election of a council. However, differently from Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, São Paulo’s PB has always been under the strong doubt on how deliberative its decision would be. In spite of the fact that PB decided on issues in the area of education and health, its decisions overlapped with other decisions taken both in participatory and non-participatory arenas. In the area of education, PB decisions overlapped with the decision of the administration to introduce CEU’s (Unified Centers of Education) and in the area of health PB decisions overlapped with the Health Councils decision to boost the Health Family Program. Therefore, the elements of the bottom-up institution were in place but overlapped with a decision by the administration of not giving full priority to the bottom-up process. In the end, it is possible to state that São Paulo’s PB worked only in selected neighborhoods and in selected areas.

Thus, we can summarize São Paulo’s PB problem in terms of insufficient commitment of the city in making it the key form of social policy and the later competition between PB and the educational and health programs linked to the mayor office. Thus, the charge of a failed experience is related both to the amount of resources invested by mainly due to the inability or unwillingness of the city to incorporate it into its key policies. São Paulo inaugurates a tradition that we will see is dominant in Europe and in some South American cities of compartmentalizing PB and insulating it from other policies. The issue that I will discuss in the concluding remarks of this chapter is: how to analyze cases in which the democratic deepening impulse of PB is downplayed by an administration
that sill want to carry it out for political reasons? In the concluding remarks of this chapter, I will analyze if PB in that case is an empowering democratic innovation.

Recife is a case worth analyzing too because it shares with São Paulo, the P.T.’s initiative to draw on good government innovations and diverts from São Paulo in terms of success of the results. Recife is an interesting case in terms of the preconditions of success of participation. It has had an experience of participatory budgeting in a liberal/conservative government, the administration of Roberto Magalhães. PB existed at that point almost as early as the introduction of PB in Porto Alegre as a device for collection of demands that were later selected by the mayor and played the role of a form of incorporation of popular leaders in government (Silva, 2003).

The election of the P.T. mayor João Paulo led to a challenging attempt to refurbish PB in Recife. The administration took the steps to emulate the organization of PB in Porto Alegre described above. Porto Alegre sent methodologist specialist that introduced city officials to the details of PB such as the regional assemblies and the election of a council. Interestingly however, Recife has had its own singularities and very soon moved to a proper process of making PB. The first particularity of Recife was the structure of its associative life. Many people already observed that the presence of few neighborhood associations in the city with a large number of constituencies diverting from the more horizontal pattern of neighborhood associations of the Brazilian South. These associations were usually connected to political parties and could not possibly fulfill the role of intermediaries between citizens and the state in a similar way that São Paulo and Recife did. Recife gave incentives for the formation of smaller associations or the participation of non-associated members. The most important innovation introduced by PB was a method of increasing the support of the population to different PB proposals. The city kept the centrality of the assemblies but kept ballots open for two

\[13\] The idea that PB is a methodology is largely diffused idea that led to the development of specialists in the methodology. These specialist travelled to many places to introduce newcomers to it both in Brazil and abroad. Methodology guides emerged, some of them sponsored by governments, other by NGO’s or international institutions. In my view what is behind the methodologies is the idea of expansion through learning within a network (Elkins and Simon, 2005).
additional days in central areas of the city. Citizens could not propose new infrastructure project but they could vote and alter the order of the 10 projects that received the most votes during the assembly. Thus, a new combination between participation and ballot vote emerged in Recife showing again that the key issue involved in participatory budgeting is adaptation of innovation to context (Avritzer, 2009).

Recife also gave an innovative solution to the issue of the place of PB within the administration, an issue that is highly contentious in all experiences of PB. The problem involved in the location of PB at the administrative level is that if PB stands in a higher position than other secretaries it triggers internal rivalry as the Porto Alegre case already showed (Avritzer, 2002). However, if PB is just a common secretary it needs the agreement of all other secretaries to implement assembly decisions what would eventually makes them less effective as it has happened in São Paulo, but aso in other cases. Thus, the nissue is not simple. Recife gave an intermediary solution to this issue by horizontally integrating not all secretaries but sill the ones in charge of social policies such as education, health and social assistance they were all integrated in the secretary of participatory budgeting and citizens participation (secretaria de orçamento participativo e gestão cidadã) (Barbosa da Siva and Teixeira, 2007).

PB in Recife was extremely successful\(^\text{14}\) in all three criteria that we posed above. First of all it was successful I its capacity to attract the population to regional assemblies. Regional assemblies initially took place in very improvised places such as tents assembled in precarious areas of the city. Since 2001 the city has sponsored the organization of 38 meetings in its 18 micro-regions, implementing the idea of regional and intermediary assemblies. The PB-Recife almost immediately generated a positive dynamic with the strong participation of the poor. In its first 27,000 year people participated with strong presence of participants in poor neighborhoods such as Casa Amarela and Vasco da Gama. 58% of participants in these regions have had links with

\(^\text{14}\) This statement means disagreeing with the assement made by Francoise Montambeault in her excellent book “Local participatory democracy in Latin America. I share with Francoise the framework for assessing success that both in her work and in my work is the capacity to democratize state and society relations. However, Montambeault uses one criteria to rank Recife as an intermediary case, the relation between participatory budgeting and P.T.’s constituency. For her, the autonomous criterion would be broken by the evidence of party incorporation of social actors, though I think the author has an important point
the neighborhood associations. In addition to that, PB-Recife implemented a strong program of cultural activities (Souza, 2002).

When we look into the long term results of Recife PB we also see important results in terms of the amount of the budget implemented through PB. Between 2001 (when the PB began) and 2010, some US 350 million was spent on projects and directly through the PB process. In the 2010, some 3,000 different public works and some 77 programs and projects were being implemented at a total budget cost of US160 million (Spink and Teixeira et al, 2011).

Recife PB as the other main reference experiences has had a major work implemented that became international reference, in the case of Porto Alegre Vila das Placas. In the case of Belo Horizonte Aglomerado da Serra and in the case of Recife, the urbanization of Brasília Teimosa. Brasilia Teimosa (stubborn Brasília) is a typical Brazilian slum. It was a squatters occupation in a highly valuable area of Recife still during he 50’s. Public administration tried many times to remove the squatters but it has never been able to overcome their resistance (Fortin, 2014). In the early 80’s, poor dwellers of other neighborhoods were relocated in Brasilia Teimosa. The dwellers created a movement called Teimosinho through which the population claimed improvements in an area that was constantly flooded by the sea. Brasilia Teimosa became a Zeis but it has never received the amount of resources it need to generate decent conditions for the poor.

Participatory budgeting made the urbanization of Brasilia Teimosa its priority. It introduced several inclusive policies in order to pursue the urbanization that required the temporary removal of up to 2,500 people. All those removed were given a rental aid to continue to live nearby and those who has skills were hired for the construction work (Oliveira, 2004). New 39 sq meters housing was constructed for the dwellers and new avenue stopped the flood creating new working conditions for the neighborhood. The Brasilia Teimosa project became a project reference on urbanization in Brazil and PB-Recife received international acknowledgment for the project. Brasília Teimosa

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15 The original data was in British pounds. I converted it using the exchange rate between dollar and british pounds at the time, 1.5 times.
received the Reinhard Mohn Award. It was visited by ex-president Lula and received a large piece coverage from the New York Times. Altogether the case of PB in Recife has been a successful case of expansion/diffusion because it managed to adapt PB to the city needs and political context and moreover because it has been able to innovate in the direction of PB many aim, namely, in the direction of using budget resources to improve participation and to improve the access of the poor to public goods.

The two most important cases of PB diffusion allow us to better understand which are the criteria for successful expansion/diffusion of P.B. The two cases may be exemplary in this regard, because they both are Brazilian cases and proximity is a criterion for successful diffusion (Elkins and Simons, 2005); the two cases are P.T. cases and were implemented roughly at the same time, a period in which the P.T. needed political acknowledgement for being able to produce good government. And last but not least, the two cases were implemented in cities with strong opposition to the P.T. by conservative parties, the liberals in Recife and PP/PSDB in São Paulo. Yet, Recife and São Paulo produced different results. Given all these similarities, what explains the difference?

In my view there are three differences between São Paulo and Recife that should be kept in mind in order to understand diffusion of participatory institutions. The case of São Paulo, as I pointed out in an early work, was disempowered by the city itself as soon as it faced its first problems linked to the lack of tradition of participation in some of the city regions and linked to low levels of participation that made the project politically vulnerable (Avritzer, 2009). In addition to that, São Paulo made health and education PB priorities but also has had major city programs for both areas outside PB. Recife faced the some problems such as initial low participation\(^{16}\) and strong opposition but use participatory institutional design to solve them. Thus, the mix between assembly and ballot vote introduced by Recife was a participatory response to low levels of participation and attendance of the assemblies in some neighborhoods. It shows that

\(^{16}\) Recife initial level of participation in 2001 was around 20,000 participants. It increased this number to an average of 40,000 people in 2002.
adaption of participatory budgeting can take place but it need to re-inforce some basic elements of the proposal, either participation or budget making itself.

The second issue is even more important and is connected to the link between the administration main projects and participatory budgeting. This connection was observed in the case of Porto Alegre by several scholars when the city tried to construct a major road and decided to take the proposal to participatory budgeting council. The debates on the perimetral construction in Porto Alegre played a key role in giving legitimacy to participatory budgeting. The same has happened with Brasilia Teimosa. Initially there has been a conflict in between the defenders of PB and the rules for the financing of the Zeis, the Special Zone for Social Interest. However, instead of the emerging conflict leading to disempowerment of PB it led to its strengthening.

Last but not least there is the issue of the relation with the political system. The political system may have three attitudes in relation to PB, to ignore it, to disempower it or to sponsor it. Since the P.T. was strongly supporting PB in the case of São Paulo, the option was to disempower PB, an option similar to he one taken in Bueno Aires a few year later by the kirchneristas.

São Paulo anticipated two difficulties that participatory policies would have in its diffusion process. The first one was the oppositional forces and the second opposition within the administration. When the two cases are associated it is very difficult to PB to survive unless it is a top priority of the administration. Recife is exactly that case and it shows that opposition to democratic innovation may be overcome with more innovations that democratize state and society relations (Montambeault, 2016). Table xx below systematizes the Brazilian cases and its categories will be used to analyze the expansion of PB.

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17 Brasilia Teimosa belonged to a very traditional program existent in Recife called Zeis, Zona Especial de Interesse Social. Zeis is a program in which Recife played a key role. Brasilia Teimosa xxx. However, the city administration has been able
Table 3: analyzing P.B. as a participatory innovation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>cities</th>
<th>How the institutional design was adapted to the new context</th>
<th>Relation with the administration main political projects</th>
<th>Political actors reaction to stalemates within PB</th>
<th>result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre</td>
<td>PB emerged having in mind the city context. Adaptation of the region to social actors demand help to make PB successful.</td>
<td>Direct relation with important projects channeled through PB such as the perimetral and Vila das Placas.</td>
<td>Support for the PB process</td>
<td>Successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte</td>
<td>PB emerged with an effectivity intention and votes of public works were final.</td>
<td>Direct relation with some urbanization of favaela’s projects</td>
<td>Small opposition to PB process</td>
<td>Successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo</td>
<td>PB emerged as an attempt to reproduce a successful local policy in another setting.</td>
<td>Major education and health programs were independent of PB</td>
<td>P.T. divided on the implementation</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recife</td>
<td>PB emerged as an attempt to reproduce successful local policy in another setting.</td>
<td>Support for the PB process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion: Democratic Innovation and Citizens’ Participation: a few theoretical remarks**

There is a large literature on the expansion of innovation (Weyland, 2007; Elkins and Simon, 2005; Sugiyama, 2008; Faria, Bandeira and Silva, 2016). Based on this literature it is possible to show the similarities and discrepancies involved in the diffusion of policy innovation and the diffusion of democratic and political innovations. The literature on policy innovation divides its approach according to external and internal pressures, the external being the one made by major economic and political actors, from
the financial system to international development agencies, a theory that applies to major policies such as pension reform and policies of large scope (Weyland, 2007).

Diffusion or expansion of a participatory or democratic innovation such as participatory budgeting follows a different logic that has overlapping with the policy innovation literature but also goes beyond it. First of all major economic actors are not dramatically interested in diffusion of participation which gives less weight to external factors. Even international institutions are not very much interested in the innovation in spite of signs of World Bank support for participatory budgeting that seems to be a interest in good governance rather than of deepening participation (Shah, 2007; Goldfrank, 2007;2012)\(^\text{18}\). However, other aspects of innovation such as learning, the belonging to a network or political identification operated in democratic innovations.

The characteristics of the cities that adopted PB are sometimes similar and sometimes different from the ones that made it known. Most of the cities that practice participatory budgeting in Brazil, Argentina (Europe and Asia and different cases) have formats that vary according to budget, participation, level of democracy and degree of support by the political systems as table 3 below shows

Table 05: analyzing P.B. as a participatory innovation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>cities</th>
<th>How the institutional design was adapted to the new context</th>
<th>Relation with the administration main political projects</th>
<th>Political actors reaction to stalemates within PB</th>
<th>result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre</td>
<td>PB emerged having in mind the city context. Adaptation of the region to</td>
<td>Direct relation with important projects channeled through PB</td>
<td>Support for the PB process</td>
<td>Successful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{18}\) Goldfrank shows that the World Bank has spend 280 million dollars in support for PB and PB related projects. (Goldfrank,2012:3). World Bank PB has a few characteristics, namely, the focus on budget transparency, the quantity of the budget amount employed a secondary element and the absent of any link between PB and the democratization of the political system.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte</td>
<td>PB emerged with an effectivity intention and votes of public works were final.</td>
<td>Successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo</td>
<td>PB emerged as an attempt to reproduce a successful local policy in another political setting</td>
<td>Failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recife</td>
<td>PB emerged as an attempt to reproduce successful local policy in another setting.</td>
<td>Successful in spite of empowering problem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the problem of expansion of participatory innovation is different from other public policies. In the case of participatory or democratic innovations, the bar should be the capacity to democratize state and society relations (Montambeault, 2016) or to
deepen democratic practices or to implement inclusionary policies.). This capacity is different from experience to experience and the success or failure of PB should be measure according this capacity and not according to the number of existing experiences as some authors have argued. In addition to that PB can become a name or a trade mark and usually it becomes a trade mark through a process of transmutation in which it become a form of governance but not a form of democratization of state and society relations (Wampler. 2016).

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