Resource mobilization strategies and administrative structures
in the United Nations system

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Abstract

Successful resource mobilization has evolved into a key function for many present-day
international public administrations (IPAs). A large number of international organizations (IOs)
and their administrations depend to significant shares on often earmarked voluntary
contributions, requiring substantial efforts to maintain or even increase resource levels. These
dynamics are well-known to practitioners and have also received increased attention in
International Relations (IR) and Public Administration (PA) recently. However, little is still
known about what role the administrations of IOs play in developing or adapting resource
mobilization strategies and about how IPAs structure resource mobilization as a core function
internally and in wider organizational fields.

Based on theoretical and conceptual insights from Public Administration, International
Relations, Organizational Sociology, Public Management, and Public Policy we develop a
theoretical model to formulate expectations about the choice of different types of resource
mobilization strategies and the related administrative structures within the UN system. We then
present empirical evidence gathered from UN Joint Inspection Unit reports, official UN
documents and interviews with officials in UN, ILO, UNESCO and WHO, showing that
resource mobilization has indeed become increasingly centralized in the UN system. The paper
closes with a research outlook on our upcoming research on resource mobilization in IOs
involved in international refugee policy.

This paper presents insights and empirical data gathered in the context of the project
“Timescapes of International Administrations: Time Rules and Time Horizons of Planning and
Budgeting” (http://ipa-research.com/time) and its follow-up project “Resource Mobilization in
International Public Administration: Strategies for the Financing of International Public
Policy”, both funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) as part of the Research Unit
“International Public Administration” (http://ipa-research.com).
1. Introduction

The politics and administration of resources by, and through, international organizations (IOs) and their permanent administrative bodies – international public administrations’ (IPAs) – have received renewed theoretical, conceptual, and empirical attention in recent years (Goetz and Patz 2017 forthcoming; Michaelowa 2017 forthcoming; see also: Patz and Goetz 2017; Goetz and Patz 2016; Patz and Goetz 2015a, 2015b, 2016, 2017). In particular the increasing role of voluntary and earmarked contributions in the financing of IOs (Graham 2011, 2015, 2016; Graham and Thompson 2015; Bayram and Graham 2016) as well as the rise of trust funds and the increased channeling of bilateral aid through multilateral organizations (Reinsberg, Michaelowa and Eichenauer 2015; Reinsberg 2017a) have directed research interests towards a comparative study of IO finances, especially in the UN system, but also beyond (see, e.g., Engel 2015 on the African Union).

Several recent reports highlight the extent to which IOs have become reliant on a multitude of financial instruments to support their activities (Jenks and Topping 2016; Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation 2015). Assessed contributions that member states pay as IO membership fees and that are employed in pursuit of collectively agreed goals through traditional programming and budgeting are less and less central to the realization of policy ambitions beyond the nation state (OECD-DAC 2015). While alternative modes of IO funding are as old as the League of Nations (Ranshofen-Wertheimer 1945, 159) or even as old as the international unions preceding the League (Reinsch 1911, 163), the trend towards new modes of financing observed in the UN system, in particular, has raised questions about whether resource politics in IOs are changing the dynamics of multilateralism (Graham 2015; Graham 2017 forthcoming; Browne 2017 forthcoming). New questions also arise with regard to how this trend affects the provision of development finance by and through IOs (Nielson, Parks and Tierney 2017). Nevertheless, compared to the increased attention to international and global public policy-making over the past two decades (see the review by Bauman and Miller 2012) or to the attention to non-financial IO policy-making tools, including authority (e.g., Busch and Liese 2017; Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Eckhard 2012), the complex processes by which IOs acquire and allocate financial resources have remained underexplored.

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1 This introduction builds heavily on the first part of the forthcoming introduction by the authors (Goetz and Patz, 2017a) to the Special Issue of Global Policy titled “Resourcing International Organizations”.
Recent studies have demonstrated that resource mobilization has become a key administrative task, whether in the UN system (Patz and Goetz 2017) or in the EU (Patz and Goetz 2015a). In fact, some IOs’ core purpose is the mobilization or management of funds. For example, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is not linked to a single IO, but implements programmatic goals through other international governmental and non-governmental organizations to which its funds are directed (Graham and Thompson 2015). ‘Vertical funds’, such as GAVI (The Vaccine Alliance), are managed jointly by governments, IOs, and private actors. They are set up to mobilize funds from a variety of sources for specific policies (Future United Nations Development System 2015; Browne 2017 forthcoming). Private donors gain in importance in the financing of international action. In the World Health Organization (WHO), the Gates Foundation is now the second-largest donor, reflecting the evolution of globalized philanthropy (Martens and Seitz 2015, 2017 forthcoming). These dynamics have existed for longer, but have become more influential in recent years (Graham 2016). For example, UNICEF started raising funds through individual donations on a large scale from its early days, allowing it to work without assessed contributions from the UN budget (Morris 2010 [2004], 81-83). UNICEF co-finances projects operated by a number of UN agencies such as WHO. Funds with specific purposes are typically allocated within wider organizational fields, for instance in the domain of climate policy and climate finance (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2013; JIU 2015).

In this environment in which the resources of international organizations are not a given factor, but instead need to be mobilized and fundraised by the IOs as a whole, most often by their respective international administration(s), research attention has to be focused on the resource mobilization as a key administrative and organizational function. Following a research agenda that is focused on international bureaucracies and their role in international public policy making (Knill and Bauer 2016; Bauer, Knill and Eckhard 2017; Eckhard and Ege 2016), the key questions that we ask in this paper therefore are: What is the role of international public administrations (IPAs) in developing, deciding upon and implementing strategies of resource mobilization? What are the key options for resource mobilization strategies for IPAs, individually and collectively? And what factors are expected to shape the choice of resource mobilization strategies?

To answer these questions, we present, in Section 2, a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding resource mobilization by IPAs, followed in Section 3 by a conceptualization of resource mobilization strategies and first theoretical considerations on the factors shaping how IPAs design them. In Section 4, we provide an empirical overview over the evolution of the institutional dimension of resource mobilization strategies in the UN system based on key JIU
reports, additional UN documents and insights from expert interviews in the UN, ILO, WHO and UNESCO. After the summary in Section 5, our paper closes in the final section with an outlook into an empirical research programme on resource mobilization in international refugee policy.

2. Conceptualizing resource mobilization strategies of international public administrations (IPAs): a multidisciplinary approach

Combining theoretical and conceptual insights from multiple disciplines, recent studies find that international bureaucracies exert influence on international negotiations and global policy-making (for reviews see Liese and Weinlich 2006; Busch 2014; Eckhard and Ege 2016). This influence is documented in domains ranging from environmental policy (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2013) to peacekeeping (Weinlich 2014; Dijkstra 2015). With resources being a key factor for the ability of international bureaucracies to participate in global policy-making (Brosig 2017, 449; see the discussions Goetz and Patz 2017 forthcoming), understanding how international bureaucracies are able to mobilize resources is also key to better explaining IPA influence.

However, explaining resource mobilization in international organizations, and understanding the role of IPAs in this process, requires an approach that does not only “overcome the rather artificial disciplinary divide between International Public Administration and International Relations” (Ege and Bauer 2013, 145), but that goes further than that. Whereas the focus on international administrations indeed requires a firm base in Comparative Public Administration (see Patz and Goetz 2017), recent advances in the study of IPAs as a particular type of public administration (see edited volume by Bauer, Knill and Eckhard 2017) underline that research innovation in this field comes from a wider integration of research perspectives. For example, several recent studies have aspired to combine Public Administration and Public Policy approaches with topics traditionally covered only in International Relations to explain global policy dynamics (see the symposium by Stone and Ladi 2015). We therefore argue that various disciplines can provide conceptual contributions that allow capturing the role and influence of international public administrations on resource mobilization, both in their respective IOs and also in the wider policy domains that they are active in (see Figure 1 below).

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2 Note: Only one key WHO interview is explicitly referenced in this draft version.
Comparative Public Administrations as the key discipline directs the attention to IPAs as complex agents (Patz and Goetz 2017; see Graham 2014) and as bureaucracies with various degrees of autonomy (Bauer and Ege 2017) and authority (Busch and Liese 2017), with different styles (Knill et al. 2017) and with different network positions (Jörgens et al. 2017). International Relations contributes with its focus on complex principals and geopolitics that allow for an understanding of the particular environment in which IPAs work. Comparative Public Policy contributes the notion of problem structures that shape when and how resources need to be mobilized by IPAs. Public Management adds the concept of strategies, including the option to centralize or decentralize the resource mobilization function as a strategic choice. And Organizational Sociology directs the attention to organizational fields and inter-organizational relations, underlining that individual IPAs do not mobilize resources in a void but that they can cooperate with other IPAs and mobilize collectively or they can compete with other IPAs to gain attention from donors.

![Diagram](image)

**FIGURE 1.** Key conceptual contributions to the study of resource mobilisation by IPAs

In the following subsections, we discuss each of these contributions separately, before reflecting on the implications of these perspectives for the study of resource mobilization in the UN system in the next section.
Comparative Public Administration and IPA resource mobilization

The key contribution of comparative public administration for the understanding of resource mobilization by international public administrations is to underline that IPAs are not just actors in their own right (Barnett and Finnemore 2004), but that their internal structures matter. In a recent contribution, we have already argued that the interests of IPA leadership are one of the factors that shape the design of administrative structures tasked with the organization of budgeting and resource mobilization functions, and have shown that there is variation over time and across international organizations in the ways in which they design their resource administrations (Patz and Goetz 2017). Comparative Public Administrations also provides for our understanding of IPAs as autonomous actors, and the ability to raise their own resources is considered a key factor for autonomous action (Bauer and Ege 2017; Ege and Bauer 2017 forthcoming) and for the overall empowerment of international organizations (Heldt and Schmidtke 2017 forthcoming). In other words, the ways in which IPAs are able to mobilize resources are key for their power and potential independent influence on global policy-making. The strategies that they choose to ensure successful resource mobilization can be defining for their role in a complex global environment and in organizational fields in which they need to cooperate and compete with national governments, with other international organizations and with global and local non-governmental actors for attention and funding.

Public Management and strategic choices of IPAs

The term ‘strategy’ is widely used in political science, but we borrow an understanding grounded in Public Management as it allows for a conceptualization of IPAs as strategizing organizational actors. In this sense, an “[o]rganizational strategy can be broadly defined as the overall way in which an organization seeks to maintain or improve its performance” (Andrews et al. 2009, 62). With the (output) performance of IOs having come into focus recently (Tallberg et al. 2016), Public Management points us to organizational strategy as a central factor accounting for variation in the output performance of IOs and their IPAs. Starting from four ideal types of organizations based on their strategic orientation – prospectors, defenders, analyzers and reactors –, Andrews et al. (2009) have examined whether organizational centralization or decentralization improves performance in organizations that are at the extremes of what can be considered a continuum from prospectors to defenders. They hypothesize (ibid., 63) that prospectors should perform better with decentralized structures, while defenders would perform better with centralized structures. Translated to the terminology
of administrative styles (Knill et al. 2017), one could expect that more entrepreneurial IPAs choose to decentralize their resource mobilization, allowing for subunits to develop new ideas and try to find resources that match their needs, whereas more servant IPAs focus on centralized mobilization structures that are better to work with major donors and ensure that the interests of these key contributors are reflected in the overall organizational action. In any case, the question of the degree of centralization or decentralization of resource administration (Goetz and Patz 2016; Patz and Goetz 2017) is a key strategic choice that IPA can make in view of the external situation and the organizational fields in which they act.

**International Relations and the global context of resource mobilization**

One of the key differences of international public administrations to national administrations is the geopolitical environment in which they act. Geopolitics are the drivers of complex principal constellations in which states’ global security concerns, their historically rooted regional and global conflicts as well as the changing landscape of power structures define what is feasible and what is not, what is agreed priority and what are areas of persistent non-agreement creating mine-fields for IPAs to maneuver in. Geopolitics and the complex interests of member state principals affect the ability of IPAs to mobilize resources for controversial issues or for certain geographical destinations (Reynaud and Vauday 2009; Parizek 2016; for the geopolitics of refugee policy see Chimni 1998). In other words, whereas Comparative Public Administration and Public Management provide the concepts that could be considered dependent variables in an organization-specific, comparative approach, IR directs the attention to a system-wide factors, both global and regional, that can shape the collective environment of many international public administrations in their endeavor to mobilize resources. The notion of complex principals already introduced to budgeting and resource mobilization in individual IOs (Patz and Goetz 2017) becomes even more complex considering that states and their geopolitical interests affect different IOs in parallels, especially where the action of states in governing bodies or as donors are coordinated across different organizations. Regional crises such as war in Syria and the resulting significant increase in the refugee population create the need for resource-intensive actions by multiple international public administrations, from the European Commission to UNRWA, from UNICEF to the Arab League. At the same time, these crises are shaped by long-standing geopolitical conflicts that define which actors are involved or politically concerned, which donors will be ready to provide funding for what purposes, and which established and new strategies of resource mobilization are working.
Organizational Sociology and the organizational context of resource mobilization

Whereas traditional IR is able to identify many of the macro-phenomena shaping the global or regional environment in which IPAs develop and implement resource mobilization strategies, there is a growing realization that studying international organizations as “stand-alone governance actors” (Abott et al. 2015a, 7) does not provide enough “insight into how populations of organizations become viable (or fail), behave, and evolve” (Abott et al. 2016). Since the 1980s, conceptual and theoretical discussions on organizational fields have evolved considerably, and in many directions (see reviews in Wooten and Hoffman, 2008; Scott 2014, Ch. 8). This body of scholarship has shown that field-level analysis adds to the traditional study of “organization-level activity” by expanding the view to wider “[d]omains of contest, conflict, and change” and the “[d]ual-directional [interface] between field and organization” (selected from Table 8.1 in Scott 2014, 257). Most recently, a growing number of scholars have recognized the need to pay closer attention to the theoretical and empirical relevance of inter-organizational dynamics when studying global policy-making (see the new Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics edited by Biermann and Koops [2017]).

Resource dependency theory provides a key theoretical contribution to describe the link between factors describing inter-organizational structures and resource-related decisions of IOs and their IPAs (cf. Biermann and Harsch 2017; Brosig 2017), allowing for an understanding of IPAs as actors embedded in relational systems of resource exchange and mutual dependency. This directs attention away from single IOs and their IPAs, shifting focus to debates on international regimes and regime complexity (Betts 2009) or discussions about international public policies and the actors involved in these policies (Baumann and Miller 2012). Instead of being isolated units of analysis, IOs and their international bureaucracies are actors within organizational fields (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009; Vetterlein and Moschella 2014; Biermann and Siebenhüner 2013), forming populations of IOs within the framework of what is described as organizational ecology (Gehring and Faude 2014; Abott et al. 2016). The ‘organizational turn’ in the study of IOs (Ellis 2010) strengthens environmental, inter-organizational and organizational field perspectives.

The structure of organizational fields as well as organizational environment and ecology affect the actions and strategies of individual organizations in that field, including when it comes to resource-related decisions. Whereas defining the boundaries of organizational fields (Scott 2014, 228-35), multiple studies (Abott et al. 2016; Biermann and Siebenhüner 2013; Gehring and Faude 2014; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009) have identified a variety of (related) factors
such as the size of the population of organizations, types/classes of organizations, types of
relations between the organizations, density of the population, and overall structure of the field.
Accordingly, the degree of centralization of various organizational fields in which IOs are
active will be crucial in explaining their individual and collective resource mobilization
strategies. For example, whether there is one central IPA dominating a field and leaving only
niche issues to specialized IPAs or whether an issue is dealt with by a multitude of interrelated
and interdependent IPAs should clearly influence the individual and collective choices for
resource mobilization. These dynamics may be particularly important where multiple IOs/IPAs
interact in the same policy or geographical frame (i.e. ‘domain’).

Public Policy and domain-specific resource mobilization

The idea that certain inter-organizational dynamics will be most important where international
public administrations are active in the same domain suggest that understanding resource
mobilization strategies at international level requires a focus on international public policy-
making. Under the headline of “global public policy”, scholars have indeed started to look
towards policy-making beyond the nation state (Stone 2008). Here, global public policy is
defined as

“a set of overlapping but disjointed processes of public–private deliberation and
cooperation among both official state-based and international organizations and non-
state actors around establishing common norms and policy agendas for securing the
delivery of global public goods or ameliorating transnational problems” (Stone and Ladi
2015, 840)

Each policy domain, including in global policy-making, has its own subset of issues that are
considered part of the domain (Biermann and Siebenhüner 2013), even though drawing
boundaries can be challenging (Betts 2013). Recent debates about refugee policy as an
international public policy (Bauman and Miller 2012; Milner 2014; Miller 2014) underline this
multiplicity and interlinkage of actors involved in policy-making processes beyond the nation-
state.

Each of the issues in a policy domain implies a particular set of challenges for policy-makers
that they can seek to address through a mixture of tools. One key consideration relates to the
temporal characteristics of the policy problem. Some problems are permanent, others emerge
suddenly through crises; some are short-term, whilst others require responses with mid-range
of even open-ended time horizons; some allow a sequenced approach, whilst others necessitate
dealing with a multitude of issues at the same time. Policy characteristics can, accordingly, be expected to have a major influence on resource mobilization strategies. In extreme cases, certain characteristics of a problem may prevent the formation of strategies and only permit ad hoc responses.

IPAs and their officials are key actors trying to influence global public policy-making (cf. Eckhard and Ege 2016), for instance through the production of policy output (Tallberg et al. 2016), but also through (costly) operational activities. Where the policy challenges are large but the resources are scarce, IPA officials need to be able to raise resources, such as voluntary contributions, to address matters that they consider important in order to have an impact and, eventually, provide solutions to policy problems beyond the nation state. The ability to mobilize resources is one of the means by which IPAs influence the agenda of international public policy-making (as argued by Kellow and Carroll 2013, for the OECD). Whether or not IPAs do this proactively, as entrepreneurs, or whether they simply serve the policy interest of their respective principals may depend both on their individual styles (Knill et al. 2017) but also on the particular characteristics of the policy domain, its actors and the policy problems that IPAs face individually and collectively in this domain.

3. Towards a theoretical framework explaining IPA resource mobilization strategies

Above, we have summarized the key theoretical and conceptual contributions from five disciplines that provide for an understanding of the choices that international public administrations have when designing resource mobilization strategies of their respective international organizations. The various disciplines direct attention to the possible dimensions of resource mobilization strategies but also to the potential factors shaping the design of these strategies. Because of their relevance for other phenomena, the various factors expected to shape resource mobilization strategies are relatively well developed (see Eckhard and Ege 2016), but there is still lack of a conceptualization of the strategic options for resource mobilization strategies.

For the purpose of these first theoretical discussions, we there define “resource mobilization” broadly as

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\text{any process through which international public administrations, on their own or with others, seek to obtain financial resources that they can (1) employ for their own immediate functioning and survival (such as salaries for their staff or running costs for their offices) and that they can (2) allocate directly (by managing the resources}
\]
themselves) or indirectly (through the orchestration of resource flows from others to third actors) with the aim of achieving institutional or substantive policy goals.

This definition excludes any process of resource pooling at intergovernmental level that does not involve or imply international public administrations as the bureaucracies of international organizations. This is key for understanding the related definition of a “resource mobilization strategy” which we define as:

a set of formal or informal policy decisions through which (1) international public administrations define, alone or with others, resource needs for their own work and for addressing international public policy challenges, and through which (2) they put in place administrative arrangements that are expected to allow for the mobilization of resources that match their organizational or policy ambitions.

This definition excludes strategic decisions about the provision of resources for IPAs and international public policy-making made solely at the national or intergovernmental level, without IPA involvement. This does not exclude that IPAs define their resource mobilization strategies in relation to donor strategies, or that they may develop their own organizational strategies in cooperation with existing and potential providers of resources, but the key outcome that needs explanation are the choices that IPA make in shaping their own strategies. At this stage, we suggest a typological differentiation of potential resource mobilization strategies along three key dimensions, each with two or three sub-dimensions that reflect binary options from which IPAs can choose (see Table 1 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional strategy</th>
<th>Substantive strategy</th>
<th>Donor-related strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>admin. structure</td>
<td>policy orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organisational field</td>
<td>resource flexibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>temporal orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>donor diversity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>centralised mobilisation</td>
<td>resources follow mandate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitive mobilisation</td>
<td>core resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>short-term maximisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>major donors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decentralised mobilisation</td>
<td>policies follow resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperative mobilisation</td>
<td>earmarked resources</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>long-term sustainability</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>diverse donors</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>new donors</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e.g. private)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Typological differentiation of resource mobilization strategies

The **first dimension** concerns the way resource mobilization is organized, both within and across IPAs (‘institutional strategy’). These two sub-dimensions – how centralized is mobilization with an IPA and how cooperative is mobilization in an organizational field – results from the conceptual discussions relating to Public Administration, Public Management and Organizational Sociology. The **second dimension** concerns the policy-orientation of resource mobilization strategies (‘substantive strategy’), with three sub-dimensions resulting from the conceptual frames provided by Public Policy as well as recent discussion on the
resourcing international organizations (Goetz and Patz 2017 forthcoming). The key questions for the strategic choices in this dimension are: should funding follow needs or should IPAs focus on areas where funding is available? Should they focus on getting flexible resources to be adaptable to changing environments or should IPAs mobilize earmarked resources that match pre-defined needs? And: should IPAs prefer actions that increase short-term maximization of funding or should they aim at long-term sustainability even at the expense of potential resources that could be available in the short run? The third dimension relates to questions of where resources are coming from (‘donor-related strategy’), based on the notion of geopolitics in IR and broader, interdisciplinary discussions on IO resourcing (see also Goetz and Patz 2017 forthcoming). We consider that the strategic choices that IPAs can make along these three key dimensions and the seven sub-dimensions might be closely related. As a result, the 128 \(2^7\) potential types of resource mobilization strategies resulting from the conceptualization above may be reduced to a few common types that we find under certain conditions in the real world, or ideal types that we expect IPAs to choose.

Following the disciplinary perspectives discussed in the previous section, there can be a range of factors that should explain, which resource mobilization strategies IPAs choose. In a recent review of the literature, Eckhard and Ege (2016) have identified key factors that shape how IPAs can have an influence on policy-making. Since we consider the design of resource mobilization strategies a “policy decision” (see our definition above), we can adapt the most prevalent factors identified in Eckhard and Ege’s review for IPAs policy influence in the light of the broader disciplinary discussions in the previous section. Thus, we consider the following factors to shape IPA’s resource mobilization strategies:

a) **administrative factors**, i.e. the characteristics of IPAs, including their expertise, their entrepreneurial activity and leadership, as well as their internal structures and processes;

b) **policy-related environmental factors**, including the problem structure of the policy domain and the interests and relations of the various organizational actors in this domain; and

c) **situational environmental factors**, such as crises, uncertainty and deeply rooted power structures resulting from the geopolitical setting in which IPAs act.

These factors can influence resource mobilization strategies of individual international public administrations, but also the collective strategies of IPAs active in the same or in interrelated global policy domains and the resulting organizational fields (see Figure 2 below).
In the following section, we present first empirical insights on resource mobilization strategies in the UN system focused on this first key dimension of resource mobilization strategies (see Table 1 above) – institutional strategies – to highlight that this conceptualization provides a relevant starting point for the study of IPA resource mobilization.

4. Institutional strategies of resource mobilization in the United Nations system

In this section, we demonstrate how the various theoretical and conceptual perspectives presented in the previous section are relevant in the UN system, in particular with regard to the institutional dimension of resource mobilization structures. For this, we study the broad evolution of the resource mobilization function in the UN system in the past decade, comparing the findings from various UN documents published between 2007 and now, and additional insights gained from interviews made at the UN Secretariat, ILO, UNESCO and WHO in 2015 and 2016.

It is important to note that, whereas we have used a wide understanding of the concept “resource mobilization” (see definition above), this term is usually applied in the United Nations system only in relation to those activities aimed at raising voluntary funding, as opposed to the provision of regular (‘assessed’, ‘core’) funding that is provided by member states without additional mobilization efforts by the respective UN body. The empirical evidence discussed below reflects this terminology. However, there have been many occasions where member states failure to pay their regular contributions required the mobilization of additional (e.g. emergency) funding to cover lack of contributions. This underlines that, while the discussion below relates mainly to the mobilization of voluntary funding, a wider view on the resource mobilization function is required to fully understanding all dynamics of resource-related politics in UN organizations and other IOs, even those that seem to be regularized funding streams.
The evolution of resource mobilization strategies in the UN system

The need to mobilize resources, and the challenges connected to this task, have been key from the early days of the international unions, the League of Nations and the United Nations system (see literature review in Goetz and Patz 2017 forthcoming; see also discussion in the research outlook below). But whereas some UN bodies have had to deal with this particular function from the creation onwards, the changing funding dynamics in the UN system have put the need to develop resource mobilization strategies at the forefront of attention. In 2007, the UN’s Joint Inspection Unit, a key advisory body overseeing administrative developments both in individual UN organizations, but also in a system wide-perspective, presented the first comprehensive report on “Voluntary Contributions in United Nations System Organizations. Impact on programme delivery and resource mobilization strategies” (JIU 2007), which was followed up in 2014 with a more specific study on “An analysis of the resource mobilization function within the United Nations system” (JIU 2014).

Comparing different UN entities, the first report concluded that “corporate resource mobilization strategies that have been formally adopted by the legislative bodies are more common among the [UN] funds and programmes that rely fully or heavily on voluntary funding than among the specialized agencies” (JIU 2007, iv). This underlines how, before mobilizing (earmarked) voluntary contributions became an increasingly important task across the whole UN system, those UN bodies which already functioned based on flexible or earmarked voluntary support such as the funds and programmes (as opposed to the Specialized Agencies) already were forced to develop strategies early on. As for the future, the JIU predicted in 2007 that:

“With voluntary funding increasingly pervasive in the United Nations system, all organizations will find it increasingly necessary to develop such strategies.” (JIU 2007, iv)

We will focus on the key findings of the 2014 JIU report and additional document material to discuss in how far this prediction has become true.

Institutional strategies 1: Towards a centralization of resource mobilization structures?

Whereas in the mid-2000s, the JIU had observed a lack of central resource mobilization strategies in most UN organizations (see above), it concluded about ten years later that “[i]n
most cases, resource mobilization [was] a mix of centralized and decentralized strategies with a strong emphasis on coordination from the headquarters”. These mixed strategies seem to be the result of a “shift in programming and resource mobilization from headquarters to the field” in the early 2000s (UN 2005, §40), followed by a contrary push towards more centralized strategies coming from the JIU (2007) and others. However, the trend to create more and more centralized mobilization strategies, even alongside decentralized strategies at regional or country level, was not necessarily followed by the creation of centralized administrative structures of resource mobilization (see Table 2 below). The disconnect between the creation of centralized (corporate) strategies and the centralization of the resource mobilization function inside IPAs could be an indicator that the key factors identified above may have different effects on the various dimensions and elements of resource mobilization strategies. It could also be an indication of the different dynamics that lead to the creation of centralized strategies – which could be an initiative of member state donors – and the creation of centralized resource mobilization units, the creation of which may depend strongly on the preferences of executive heads of IPAs (cf. Patz and Goetz 2017).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Is there a centralized resource mobilization strategy?</th>
<th>Does the organization possess a dedicated centralized resource mobilization department/unit?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Secretariat</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA*</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICAO*</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>ILO*</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMO*</td>
<td>No**</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITC*</td>
<td>No**</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>ITU*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>No**</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-Women</td>
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<td>UNAIDS</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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<td>UNESCO*</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIPO*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMO*</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (Yes)</strong></td>
<td>15 out of 28 (53.6%)</td>
<td>17 out of 28 (60.7%)</td>
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</table>

Table 2. Centralization of resource mobilization strategies and centralization of resource mobilization units/departments in selected UN bodies in 2013/2014. Own compilation summarizing the information contained in JIU (2014, 31-40). UN bodies marked with * are IOs that are legally independent from the UN, i.e. either Specialized Agencies or Related Organizations (only IAEA). ** marks organizations where centralized strategies were under discussion in 2013/2014. Note: The existence of a centralized strategy and/or unit does not exclude additional decentralized strategies and/or units; for details see (JIU 2014).
One example for the shift towards centralized resource mobilization administration is the World Health Organization (WHO). WHO is the United Nation’s specialized agency with the highest share of voluntary contributions in their budget, requiring for active resource mobilization of around 80% of its biennial budget of about 4 billion US-. With the financial crisis of 2008 onwards that resulted in significant shortfalls of funding as donors could not provide the resources necessary to support the organization’s aspirational budget, it became clear that change had to happen. The most visible measures were the introduction of an integrated budget with upper limits for each of the organizations’ half a dozen core priority areas. This was an attempt to prevent that funding shortfalls in some priority areas of the budget would be confronted with over-mobilization in other areas, thereby undermining the collectively agreed priorities of the organization. This centralized approach to ensuring collective priorities also required the creation of a separate unit for resource mobilization, shifting this function from the overall planning unit, which is part of the management department of WHO, to directly serve WHO’s Director-General (Interview with WHO official, July 2015). In a highly fragmented organization such as WHO with very strong regional offices, such a strategic choice – centralizing the resource mobilization – underlines how important this function has become for ensuring the overall functioning of the organization.

Institutional strategies II: the dominance of competition?

The 2007 study by the UN Joint Inspection Unit found that “United Nations system organizations compete for voluntary funds, both among themselves and with other entities such as non-governmental organizations” (JIU 2007, iv). This observation underlines the notion that resource mobilization does indeed happen in ‘organizational fields’ in which there are only limited resources. This view was shared by the UN General Assembly, which stated in 2005 that “[f]und-raising throughout the [UN] system [was] often of a competitive nature, with the different fund-raising capacities of the funds, programmes and agencies competing” (UN 2005, §38). This observation was specified in the 2014 JIU report in which, based on a questionnaire to UN country resident coordinators around the world, it was found that there was “[c]ompetition among United Nations organizations” on the ground because there was, for example “no clear delineation of mandates” and also a “lack of direction from the headquarters of individual agencies for joint resource mobilization in country teams” (JIU 2014, 25). Just as 10 years earlier, the key problem still seemed to be that each agency had individual, bilateral relations with (groups of) donors who would end up financing multiple agencies based on their
national priorities, eventually “engaging more agencies than their comparative advantage or priorities defined by their governing bodies would justify” (UN 2005, §40). One of the consequences of these rather negative observations, including at country level where UN organizations should be seen as natural cooperation partners, is the development of a “Guide to Joint Resource Mobilization” as part of the “Standard Operating Procedures for Countries Adopting the ‘Delivering as One’ Approach” (UN Development Group 2014).

Despite the developments of strategic approaches towards more cooperative resource mobilization formulated at the UN system level (i.e. in the UN Development Group 2014), the reports by the UN itself and by the JIU still suggest an environment in which resource mobilization strategies of individual IOs and their IPAs in the UN system seem rather to follow a logic of competition for scarce resources than a logic of cooperation. The centralizing tendencies that we observed in WHO (see above) therefore could be an indication that, in the specialized organizational field in which WHO is active (i.e. global health policy), individual organizations do indeed react to competition with more powerful centralized mobilization capabilities. Where several niche international organizations, both inside the UN system (e.g. UNAIDS) but also outside the system (GAVI, the Global Fund) compete with a central IO such as WHO (see Browne 2017 forthcoming), the policy-focused but multi-issue IO and their administrations will thus need to react to ensure that donors keep seeing its added value.

One strategic option for large UN agencies facing increased competition from niche bodies but also seeing the risk of a fragmentation of global policy making could be to create new pooled funding mechanisms around certain topics where each organization can access some of the resources according to its specialization and added value. In the field of humanitarian aid, the creation of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in 2006 as well as of country-based pooled funds (CBPFs), both managed by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), are examples for such joint funding mechanisms from which multiple UN agencies and bodies can profit in short time “until the Consolidated Appeals Process can generate the bulk of the humanitarian aid funding” (Robinson, Oliveira and Kayden 2017, 3). However, there is very little understanding of the strategic choices for why and by whom these instruments are created, implemented and maintain, and what role international public administrations play in these processes. In other words, under what conditions cooperative mobilization strategies are developed, and when they become underpinned with their own administrative structures, such as joint administrative units or autonomous fundraising secretariats needs to be studied much more in detail.
5. Summary

Providing first answers to the questions raised in the introduction, we have found that resource mobilization has indeed become an increasingly central function of the work of international public administrations (IPAs) in the UN system. Whereas there is still quite some variation in the degree of centralization of resource mobilization strategies and in the administrative design of the resource mobilization function inside IPAs (see Table 2 above), the trend over the past decade seems to be a greater isomorphism in the UN system, at least on the surface. Nevertheless, observing the multiplication of trust funds and the bureaucratic interests that result from such a multiplication (cf. Reinsberg 2017b) indicates that centralizing and decentralizing tendencies coexist. The factors driving these trends seem to be, more and more, systemic and interorganizational, suggesting that key theoretical insights can be gained from organizational theory, in particular where it is concerned with field- and domain-wide factors and concepts such as cooperation and competition, niches and resource dependencies (see the many key contributions in the Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics edited by Biermann and Koops [2017]). The notion of the environments of international public administrations put forward in this perspective allows to bring in the various factors that are expected to shape both isomorphism and diversity, stability and change in the resource mobilization strategies and administrative structures that we observe, including those that scholars of International Relations and Public Policy would expect (geopolitics, domain-specific problem sets etc.). Public Administration and Public Management can provide a better understanding of how the various UN and other international public administrations react to these environmental factors. The key question then is whether these IPAs are the drivers of new strategies and (adaptation to) change, for example in a quest to develop solutions to global problems that no other actor, in particular states, is able or willing to provide, or whether they are simply servants adapting their strategies to the financial incentives and moods of a few major donors whose interest drive administrative dynamics in international organizations.

To provide answers to this questions, the next step for the empirical research on resource mobilization by international organizations is to test whether the conceptual ideas developed here are applicable to capture the dynamics in a particular policy domain. Whereas we expect that some of the trends we observe throughout the UN system, such as the mushrooming of centralized resource mobilization strategies, seem more general, the theoretical insights from organizational sociology suggest that many factors will play out in particular in specific policy areas where there is direct competition for resources but also potential for cooperation and joint
fundraising for causes of common concern for various specialized or multi-purpose international public administrations.

6. Research outlook: studying resource mobilization in international refugee policy

In order to understand the complexity of resource mobilization strategies, we thus need to study a domain that allows observations over time and across a variety of IPAs. International refugee policy constitutes such an established and complex international policy domain (Baumann and Miller 2012; Miller 2014; Milner 2014). Refugee policy is among the oldest IO policies, evolving in the pre-WWII League of Nations and ILO (Holborn 1939), and has continued to be an important concern in the post-WWII UN system (Malin 1947) until the present (e.g. Whitaker 2008, on competition for resources in the 1990s). Recent refugee crises have, once again, highlighted the long-standing challenges to IOs and IPAs when it comes to the financing of their operations (Easton-Calabria 2015).

The study of IO and IPA action in this domain usually focuses on the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Betts 2003, 2009, 2013; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012). UNHCR is only eligible for assessed funds from the core UN budget to finance its main administrative costs, about 2 per cent (Roper and Barria 2010). By its founding convention, the rest has to be funded through voluntary contributions. UNHCR has, thus, faced the challenge of mobilizing voluntary resources since it became operational (Betts, Loescher and Milner 2012, 96-100). Historically, this need to mobilize resources, including from private sources, has been central to refugee policy. The pre-WWII League of Nations’ High Commissioner had to rely on the resources of non-governmental actors for its operational activities (Holborn 1939). The post-WWII UNHCR also only survived its early years thanks to a donation of US-$ 3 million from the Ford Foundation (Gallagher 1989, 582).

In sum, refugee policy is a domain that allows us to study both long-term trends in resource mobilization by IPAs and their policy implications. It is also a policy affected by major geopolitical developments, from Cold War and Middle East conflicts to regional crises and wars resulting from (post-)colonial changes in various regions of the world. Finally, the “cluster approach” introduced in 2005, with lead agencies assigned for each major issue in humanitarian response, including for refugee crises (Betts 2013b, 184), has highlighted that refugee policy is a domain with a variety of major UN and other IOs involved. Over a dozen IOs, such as UNHCR or the International Organization for Migration (IOM), co-ordinate collective action
and deploy their respective IPAs on the ground. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) manages the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) as well as country-based pooled funds (CBPFs), which are used to finance many collective refugee-related humanitarian actions. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that current resource distribution mechanisms tend to favor the “largest UN emergency units with the best fundraising staff and project momentum - especially UNHCR and WFP” (Weiss 1998, 62).

As a next step, we will study these collective dynamics of resource mobilization and the related mobilization strategies to understand how IPA action affects the availability of funds in international refugee policy.
References


