

## **The acknowledgment based on the difference: interseccional views for constructing evaluation tools of public policies**

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**Abstract:** Evaluating public policies in a way that considers intersectionality into the growing demands towards the acknowledgment of the multiple differences and differentiations of citizenship is a challenge for which there is a need of creating new evaluative methodologies. Based on the reflections of Avtar Brah (1996) about the construction of identity based on the difference encompassing four dimensions: difference as subjectivity, as a social relation, as experience, and, at last, as identity it aims to define them, develop them and sum them into lessons that might be useful to constructing public policies evaluation tools.

**Key-words:** Evaluation of public policies. Intersectionality. Difference. Identity. Citizenship.

### **Introduction**

A potent analysis of public policies, from a democratic point of view, requires approaches that allow the creation of capable tools to give a voice for all the actors involved, to cover all the complexity of their interests and opinions, providing access to the bigger recognition possible facing the challenge of differences of identities.

Identities are not built naturally. They are the result of multiple interacting processes of individual, social, symbolic, and cultural nature, in the fight for the consubstantiation of citizenship itself. Thus, building tools that make it possible to consider all these elements is not an easy task, but extremely necessary.

In Cartographies of Diaspora (1996), Avtar Brah, in her debate about identity, offers an important key to start thinking and operationalizing the recognition from the logic of difference. By working on distinguishing the differences, as part of identity construction, the author makes possible an integral vision about the citizens linked to the public policies in analysis, as regards the “[...] marcas sociais [que] são conhecidas como tendo mais

relevância que outras e como os eixos de classificação sempre contingentes, contextuais e relacionais são produzidos, objetivados e cristalizados na produção governamental de políticas direcionada para determinados sujeitos” (AGUIÃO, 2017, p. 9-10).

Brah (1996), by working with difference, advocates a vision built on the intersection of micro and macro levels of four analytic dimensions: difference as subjectivity, difference as social relation, difference as experience, and difference as identity. The first incorporates the decentralization and heterogeneity of the subjects themselves: they are not unique and fixed, but fragmented and dynamic. The social relation refers to how each dimension is constituted and organized within systematic relations through economic, cultural, political, and institutional discourses. This dimension of collective character is not disjointed from the previous one and vice versa. Experience, on the other hand, refers not to something presupposed, but to something that must be questioned. Thus, we can understand that the space of individuals' experience is a space of contestation: a discursive space in which there are, in each of the dimensions, different positions of the subjects and their respective inscribed subjectivities. Finally, identity brings together all the previous dimensions, articulating them, not in a simplifying way, but exploring their complexities and contradictions.

The paper proposes to take Brah's indications as a reference, in terms of dimension of analysis to understand the construction of identity by the logic of difference. From that point, using other authors, progress in a proposal that makes it possible to create tools for evaluation of public policies in an intersectional way.

Avtar Brah (1996) by considering the articulating speeches and the practices that are inserted in subjectivities, in social relations, and at the subjects' positions, works with the proposal of intersectionality, a method that we consider to be promising. A vision that seeks to be integrally and intrinsically established between the subjective and social levels, in a contextualized way, which takes into account the various forms of injustice that make up the logic of difference.

In this direction, the author is linked to other remarkable authors about intersectionality as Patricia Hill Collins (2000) and Kimberle Crenshaw (2002), whose denounce mainstream feminism in western societies, particularly in the USA, as insufficient by using just gender perspective to explain women's reality. Therefore, they

reveal different dimensions of inequalities and the necessity of articulating a vision that takes into account the multiple systems of differentiation that exist in local contexts (COSTA, 2013).

The paper focuses in to align the intersectional perspective and the recognition by difference perspective. Its fundamental purpose is to present one proposal that can contribute to the progress of evaluation of public policies methodologies, considering a more complex and complete approach to citizenship. It is the task that we will dedicate ourselves below, exploring, in the first three topics, the three dimensions of analysis of difference, indicated by Brah (1996) and developed in them, subjectivity, social relation, and experience that, together, makeup identity and, in the last topic, bringing together reflections that make it possible to consolidate methodological proposals that incorporate these elements in terms of evaluation of public policies, taking them into account intersectionally.

### **Difference as subjectivity**

Beginning with Brah's indications to understand subjectivity as the first analytical dimension of difference, the author defines it as "the site of processes of making sense of our relation to the world" (BRAH, 1996, p. 123). The Subjectivity dimension, according to her, should not be reduced to a completely subjective way, of an isolated subject, because it has an intrinsic relationship with the social context of the individual.

According to the author, the subject was perceived as something universal and alienated from their social and historical context and the European " Man " is the only narrator and the center of history. Some movements criticized this exclusive narrative, allowing a more plural and critical discourse on this issue, through "[...] projects of post-structuralism, feminism, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, and anti-racism[...]" (BRAH, 1996, p. 119).

However, despite having this criticism in common, the groups of these movements did not have guidelines that covered each other's central demands, proposing the problems of issues referring only to their group (BRAH,1996). Therefore, it was necessary to develop ways to facilitate the understanding of narratives from individuals who came from different experiences and who had different perspectives and needs (BRAH,1996).

To understand about these different narratives, it is essential to think about this subject in an integral and intersectional way.

Subjectivity is a central interest for Psychology, so some contributions from this area about this construct will be useful for improving the author's theory that we use as a reference.

Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934) makes a significant addition to understanding the formation of subjectivity. Precursor of Socio-Historical Psychology and having Marxism as a theoretical reference, Vygotsky criticized the positivism that permeates the Psychology of his time and the currents of this area that were divided into essentialist perspectives, ignoring consciousness, or subjectivist perspectives, that assume consciousness as something extrinsic to the objective context (ROSA; ANDRIANI, 2002).

Vygotsky proposes a new perspective on the object of study of Psychology, the human being, and the process of its development, breaking with dichotomous currents between internal-external, removing the subject from an individualizing perspective and inserting it in a socio-historical context (ELTINK, 2019). Through this dialectical relationship between the subject and the environment that, for Vygotsky (1986), the subjectivity of the individual is formed.

For Vygotsky, the subject is not passive in this environment but is an acting person, who transforms and is transformed by the context, and subjectivity occurs through this process (ELTINK, 2019). Molon (2011), professor and researcher in the area of Social Psychology and Educational Psychology, mentions that it is from this conception of the human being proposed by Vygotsky that Psychology becomes humanized, since the individual is perceived not as an occasional event, but as someone who lives within a system with social differences, occupying a unique place.

This relationship between the subject and the concrete world occurs through symbolic systems arising from culture and social relations. This symbolic system “[...] permite a apropriação de conceitos, valores e significados culturais” (ELTINK, 2019, p. 43). However, the human being subjectively appropriates these relationships with the external world, internalizing, signifying his experiences and himself, in a constant process of becoming (ROSA; ANDRIANI, 2002).

Regarding these contributions from the Socio-Historical Psychology theory, about this view of the individual and how subjectivity occurs, Bock, Furtado and Teixeira point out

Para a Psicologia Sócio-Histórica, não há como se saber de um indivíduo sem que se conheça seu mundo. Para compreender o que cada um de nós sente e pensa, e como cada um de nós age, é preciso conhecer o mundo social no qual estamos imersos e do qual somos construtores; é preciso investigar os valores sociais, as formas de relação e de produção da sobrevivência de nosso mundo, e as formas de ser de nosso tempo. (BOCK; FURTADO; TEIXEIRA, 1999, p. 93).

Another contribution of Vygotsky's theory is the emphasis on the importance he attaches to language and the relationship it has with thought, which differs from the way language was perceived in the Human Sciences (BRUNER, 1990). Vygotsky (1986) conducts a criticism, mentioning studies of his time, which carried out a separation between thought and language with affectivity and intellect. For Vygotsky, the attempt to separate these dimensions of life makes it impossible to understand human beings in an integrated way. About this question, Vygotsky (1986) mentions

Their separation as subjects of study is a major weakness of traditional psychology, since it makes the thought process appear as an autonomous flow of "thoughts thinking themselves," segregated from the fullness of life, from the personal needs and interests, the inclinations and impulses, of the thinker. [...]. Unit analysis points the way to the solution of these vitally important problems. It demonstrates the existence of a dynamic system of meaning in which the affective and the intellectual unite. It shows that every idea contains a transmuted affective attitude toward the bit of reality to which it refers. It further permits us to trace the path from a person's needs and impulses to the specific direction taken by his thoughts, and the reverse path from his thoughts to his behavior and activity. This example should suffice to show that the method used in this study of thought and language is also a promising tool for investigating the relation of verbal thought to consciousness as a whole and to its other essential functions. (VYGOTSKY, 1986, p.10-11).

Language, therefore, becomes how it is possible to understand subjectivity, as it is through language that the subject represents his reality (VYGOTSKY, 1962). This language, which is the result of a cultural context, materializes the meanings attributed by the subject that, according to Vygotsky (1986), must be analyzed by its semantic sense. Vygotsky also believes that the word is the key to the consciousness of this subject because, even if it is a culturally shared sign, "[...] cada um significa as palavras de uma maneira particular" (ROSA; ANDRIANI, 2002, p.275).

Corroborating with Vygotskian theories, the psychologist Jerome Bruner considers that the human being must be knowledge as a subject who is integrating into a Culture, and experiences the relation with his environment internally, in a singular way, in a dialectical relationship between subjective and objective. According to Bruner (1990), Psychology, as well as Human Sciences in general, should propose the interpretation of meanings and how this attribution of meaning occurs.

Bruner (1990) also criticizes how his area of study perceives the human being. About Cognitive Sciences, for example, he inquires whether the central concern should not be the understanding of how subjectivity is constituted. The mind, for Bruner (1990), should not be seen as a computational system, as it was understood until then by the Cognitive Sciences, but "[...] in the sense of intentional states like believing, desiring, intending, grasping a meaning " (BRUNER, 1990, p. 8).

Bruner (1990) proposes a Cultural Psychology that is interested in understanding and studying the individual and his actions from a conception of ssss, emphasizing how culture influences the formation of the subject. The author's Cultural Psychology proposes to explore the meanings attributed and must "[...] ser interpretativa e vai estar interessada nas formas através das quais os seres humanos produzem significados nos contextos culturais onde estão inseridos" (CORREIA, 2003, p.508) In addition, Bruner (1990) points out that Popular Psychology, which is the common sense of a given culture, is an important tool for understanding the subject.

According to Bruner (1990), the meanings and, consequently, subjectivity, are presented to the researcher through the narrative endowed with intentionality, which "[...]são sobre pessoas que agem em um cenário, e os acontecimentos devem ser pertinentes a seus estados intencionais enquanto estiverem atuando - com suas convicções, desejos, teorias, valores, e assim por diante." (BRUNER, 1991, p.7). Bruner (1991) believes that it is through the autobiographical narrative that the subject represents his reality and is involved in his own life story. The author explains how this relationship occurs, saying that

The heart of my argument is this: eventually, the culturally shaped cognitive and linguistic processes that guide the self-telling of life narratives achieve the power to structure perceptual experience, to organize memory, to segment and purpose-build the very "events" of a life. In the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we "tell about" our lives. And given the

cultural shaping to which I referred, we also become variants of the culture's canonical forms. (BRUNER, 2004, p.694).

Therefore, given the propositions of Avtar Brah (1996) about the recognition of difference as subjectivity, it can be said that the contributions of Psychology to the analytical goals of this article to develop them are fundamental since it is of an area of knowledge that concentrates on fundamental aspects of the analysis of human subjectivity. The propositions of Psychology, such as Jerome Bruner and Lev Vygotsky, are related with the Avtar Brah theory, of the effort to examine conceptual categories used in the theorization of difference, which led to difference as subjectivity, but at the same time, increased them.

Such an expansion can be observed from the moment when Avtar Brah (1996) does not propose more concrete components to use the category of subjectivity, and that is why the theories of Bruner (1990) and Vygotsky (1986) are applied as a way to advance in the composition of the category of difference as subjectivity in public policy evaluations.

As already exposed in this article, Vygotsky contextualizes human subjectivity in a socio-historical reality, disengaging it from an essentialist perspective (ROSA; ANDRIANI, 2002), as Bruner's propositions, who understands the human being from its insertion in cultural environments and subjectivity as a means by which sense is attributed to reality (BRUNER, 1990). In this sense, subjectivity as an analytical category proposed of Avtar Brah (1996), in a socio-historical context and linked to the individual's cultural environment, as theorized of Bruner (1991) and Vygotsky (1986), could be more easily operationalized and apprehended in intersectional evaluations of public policies through narrative, a process which the individual reports his social experience and, consequently, his subjective aspects.

### **Difference as social relation**

In addition to the subjectivity perspective, there is the difference as social relation perspective (BRAH, 2006). To Avtar Brah, this perspective is related with power concerns, because cultural, political and economic practices are power relations.

In order to progress on the Brah's proposition it is necessary to be on a solid base to have a deep comprehension of social relations. In this way, Sociology presents itself as the science with theoretical knowledge capable of understanding those relations, in

particular with the sociologists Erving Goffman (2013) and Pierre Bourdieu (1996).

Despite not having a direct debate between the authors, is it possible to notice some convergences between them. One example of that is the Durkheimian posture — that has interest in social structures. Furthermore, both the authors share the reproval for rigid theories about the social world (ARRIBAS, 2012).

Initially, it will be presented two of the principal works of Goffman: *Os quadros da experiência social: uma perspectiva de análise* (2012) e *Estigma* (2013). From the first work, Goffman (2012) formulate the *framing analysis* that says that the social actors are the result of interactions with social environment, been influenced by their own subjectivity, which means, Goffman presents an interpretive schema which reveals relation between the roles of actors to the detriment of the activity they perform and the environment in which they find themselves.

Still related with the first work, Goffman as heir of the symbolic interactionism used the concept of *self* for the comprehension of he calls person-role, since he has the understanding of *self* as constituted by the actor core before the actor assumes any role on social life, by doing that Goffman can bring human personality and the structures together. (HANGAI, 2012).

Goffman, in his other work *Estigma* (2013), seeks understanding about the formation and construction of this concept (stigma). For this, the author begins by recovering the history of the word stigma that comes from greek and was used to refer to body signs that would evidence something out of the ordinary (positive or negative) about the person's moral status that holds the signal (GOFFMAN, 2013).

When those signs are understood in the society as something different, it is possible that the society begins to see the carrier person as

[...] uma espécie menos desejável — num caso extremo, uma pessoa completamente má, perigosa ou fraca. Assim, deixamos de considerá-lo criatura comum e total, reduzindo-o a uma pessoa estragada e diminuída. Tal característica é um estigma. (GOFFMAN, 2013, p.12).

In this way, the word stigma is used as an attribute deeply derogatory. But, according to the author, it is needed a language of relations not of attributes. “Um atributo que estigmatiza alguém pode confirmar a normalidade de outrem, portanto ele não é, em si



mesmo, nem honroso nem desonroso” (GOFFMAN, 2013, p.13).

Goffman (2013) divides the stigma into two individual perspectives: the discredited (someone that carries its stigma visibly) and discreditable (someone that hides the stigma, but if it would be revealed the person would be discredited). Moreover, the stigmas that the discredited people carry could be:

Em primeiro lugar, há as **abominações do corpo** - as várias deformidades físicas. Em segundo, as **culpas de caráter individual**, percebidas como vontade fraca, paixões tirânicas ou não naturais, crenças falsas e rígidas, desonestidade, sendo inferidas a partir de relatos conhecidos de, por exemplo, distúrbio mental, prisão, alcoolismo, homossexualismo<sup>1</sup>, desemprego, tentativas de suicídio, desemprego e comportamento político radical. Finalmente, há os **estigmas tribais de raça, nação e religião**, que podem ser transmitidos através de linhagem e contaminar por igual todos os membros de uma família (GOFFMAN, 2013, p.14);<sup>2</sup>

Despite the understanding of stigma helps us to understand the dynamics of discrimination in social relations (relation of power), this vision focuses on the structure but does not explain how those markers<sup>3</sup> become stigmas, neither explains why some markers are positives and others don't.

Thus, the contribution of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1983) is fundamental. The sociologist, by moving away from phenomenology — that explores the relations between individuals but does not explain the structure, as the purely structuralist approaches — that privileges the objective structures independent of the conscience of individuals, seeks to understand beyond of *opus operatum* (product of relations), in other words, seeks to understand the *modus operandi* (the process that results in the product).

Bourdieu brings us the concept of *habitus*<sup>4</sup>, which is the way of perception that guides the behavior in face of a certain situation in which someone is inserted. (BOURDIEU, 2001). The habitus, besides being the result of systemic interaction between individual experience and historical collective experience also assumes, at the same time, a structural and structuring position, that conditions and drives representations and practices (BOURDIEU, 1980).

The habitus concept is directly related to another Bourdieu's (1983) concept, the concept of Fields<sup>5</sup>. To the author, Fields are structured spaces that have their logic, in a specific time, that have as the main characteristic the mutability as a result of the historical

variability that constitutes them, in addition to other particularities, such as structure, Doxa, laws, capital and set of assets (BOURDIEU, 2001). The Field, in a certain manner, sustains the *habitus*, while the *habitus* gives condition to the Field existence.

However, it will only be possible to understand those concepts if the concept of Capital from Bourdieu (1996) is understood. The author divides the idea of capital into two forms: economic capital and cultural capital. The first, as the name suggests, is related to purchasing power (amount of money). Meanwhile, the concept of Cultural Capital is more complex. It is related to culture accumulation that someone could have access to. For example, parents can transmit their knowledge or musical preference to their children. In this way, the educational structures (schools and universities) play an important role in transmitting cultural capital to people.

That said, it is possible to understand cultural capital in three ways, the incorporated, the objectified, and the institutionalized. The first is about the interiorization of knowledge by studying something. The objectified form is related to the possibility of transference (to give, to receive, or to buy), for example, someone can buy a ticket to watch a theater play or can receive a book as a gift. Lastly, the institutionalized form is related to the educational institutions, reinforcing their importance, because they can give diplomas and certificates that guarantee qualification and conclusion of studies. Those documents create a permanent connection between person and institution, for example, a former student of a renowned university will be marked forever by this institution.

In this manner, the educational institutions fulfill the role of crystallizing the structures, because the institutions adopt the meritocracy principle ignoring previous experiences and present experiences that someone still lives outside of the institutions' walls. It is important to say:

Assim, a instituição escolar, que em outros tempos acreditamos que poderia introduzir uma forma de meritocracia ao privilegiar aptidões individuais por oposição aos privilégios hereditários, tende a instaurar, através da relação encoberta entre a aptidão escolar e a herança cultural, uma verdadeira nobreza de Estado, cuja autoridade e legitimidade são garantidas pelo título escolar (BOURDIEU, 1996, p.39).

The example of educational institutions reveals the dynamics defended by Bourdieu,

in which the social actors inserted in their Fields are established by different capitals and by the *habitus*, architecting structured relations — internal in individuals and structuring relations — that drive other actions. To Bourdieu:

Tais esquemas classificatórios (estruturas estruturantes) são essencialmente o produto da incorporação de estruturas das distribuições fundamentais que organizam a ordem social (estruturas estruturadas). Sendo por conseguinte comuns ao conjunto dos agentes inseridos nessa ordem, eles viabilizam o acordo em meio ao desacordo de agentes situados em posições opostas (altas/baixas, visíveis/obscuras, raras/comuns, ricas/pobres etc.) e caracterizadas por propriedades distintivas, elas mesmas diferentes ou opostas no espaço social. Em outras palavras, são eles que fazem com que todos possam se referir às mesmas oposições (por exemplo, alto/baixo, elevado/baixo, raro/comum, leve/pesado, rico/pobre etc.). (BOURDIEU, 2001, p.119).

After the explanation about the classificatory system, by using it in the Brazilian reality it is possible to understand the reason why some places have just a kind of individual, in other words, why some places just have (or are mostly occupied by) whites, non-whites, rich, poor, etc.

In practice, Bourdieu formalizes these classification systems through structuralist investigations, which proceed according to the following method:

Marcação de um segmento do social com características sistêmicas (campo); construção prévia do esquema das relações dos agentes e instituições objeto do estudo (posições); decomposição de cada ocorrência significativa, característica do sistema de posições do campo (doxa, *illusio*...); análise das relações objetivas entre as posições no campo (lógica); análise das disposições subjetivas (*habitus*); construção de uma matriz relacional corrigida da articulação entre as posições (estrutura); síntese da problemática geral do campo (THIRY-CHERQUES, 2006, p.31).

This procedure, in addition to favoring the understanding of the positions occupied by the actors in the Field, demonstrates that Bourdieu (1979) believed that only by the praxiology<sup>6</sup> it would be possible to capture the phenomenon of "interiorization of exteriority and exteriorization of interiority".

The interiority that Bourdieu refers to is constituted by the Doxa — common sense shared by a group that lives the same reality (BOURDIEU, 2000, p. 3). Now, to work with how the structures — objective/subjective, inside/outside — are disposed of, there is the *Illusio*, which says:

[...] a noção de *illusio* reflete, como interesse em um campo, é uma cumplicidade e o ajustamento entre as estruturas mentais dos sujeitos (seu *habitus* ou suas disposições) e as estruturas objetivas (os próprios campos, suas regularidades, os alvos em jogo, as disputas), manifestados numa tendência à ação, ao investimento, que nasce desse acordo (AGUIAR, 2017, p. 231).

Given the dichotomy inside/outside, structural/structuring, it worth saying that the understanding of the social world and all relations that form the context were bound to the relations between the objectivity (Fields and Capital) and the subjective questions (*habitus* and *Doxa*), in other words, Bourdieu (1996), by relating the objective and subjective structures, reveals a classificatory system which generates certain social positions.

By using the *habitus* concept it is possible to have a better understanding of the stigma concept because it becomes possible to understand that stigma is also a social construction, therefore, it can be changed and is not seen uniformly by everyone. It is important to say that Goffman (2013) proposed the stigma as a generalized understanding in society.

This common understanding of the stigma inside the society is closely linked to the existing power relations because only through these relations is possible the existence of the common understanding and its maintenance. For example, some people suffer because they have "a bad musical taste". But a bad musical taste only exists because there is a good musical taste and this artificial differentiation serves to distinguish people with more or less cultural capital. Thus "[...] gosto torna-se, dessa forma, a expressão distintiva de uma posição privilegiada no espaço social, cujo valor distintivo determina-se objetivamente na relação com expressões engendradas a partir de condições diferentes" (BOURDIEU, 2007, p.56 apud MACIEL; MOURA, 2013, p.81).

Returning to Brah's (1996) perspective, the author proposes to understand Identity is necessary to understand social relation as difference and it is important to recognize that power relations are present in speeches and social practices. However, she does not go deep into this question. It is the merit of Goffman (with stigma) and Bourdieu (with *habitus*) which concepts help with the comprehension of behaviors that awaken sensations of adjustment and misfit, mainly from those who are repeatedly excluded.

Inspired by those thoughts PINTO and FERREIRA (2014) will demonstrate how was

the effort in Brazil to solve racism without solving it. The "solution" found was the creation of exaltation of miscegenation. In this way “[...] a ideologia de que a mestiçagem poderia ser uma forma de melhorar a descendência étnica do povo brasileiro, auxiliou a construir, no Brasil pós-abolição, o mito da democracia racial.” (PINTO; FERREIRA, 2014, p.259).

This myth, anchored in double miscegenation (cultural and biological), is responsible for the idea that white and non-white people in Brazil have the same opportunities, and the racism and bigotry occur in isolated moments, that's why it should be condoned for the sake of good coexistence. This speech allowed the dominant elites to mask the inequalities, interdicting the construction of non-white identities and culture (PINTO; FERREIRA, 2014). In other words, it was possible to maintain the stigma, the *habitus*, and the Field unchanged. Maintain the stigma because veiled racism is a power to forge identities and markers of social difference. The *habitus* maintained itself unchanged because the internalization of the racial democracy myth has survived until these days, reproducing the exclusion structures. Lastly, talking about the maintenance of the Field means everything has changed without changing anything. Because the social position of those who descend from subaltern peoples is not different today as it was in the past. They still are in the most impoverished and exploited stratum of Brazilian society.

### **The difference as experience**

The dimensions of subjectivity and social relations were described and developed in the previous topics of this article, therefore, in this section, it will be described the category of experience, in order to more accurately outline this analytical dimension in the perspective of difference having as a basis Avtar Brah's propositions (1996).

In the first place, we can consider that Brah affirmed there is no finished or ready subject in the Cartographies of Diaspora (1996), to whom the experiences simply happen, once “[...]the experience is the local of production of the subject (BRAH, 1996, p. 115)”, which is the result of cultural construction, besides the social. This way, experience does not reflect the truth as well, on the contrary, it is the space of contestation, in which the subjects and subjectivities are being inscribed, reiterated or repudiated (BRAH, 1996). For

this reason, it is not possible to separate this place from the Culture or to affirm that it is something transparent or liable of unique interpretation, once people recognize that reality is structured by the process of value signification.

In this direction, if every person has its own social and cultural construction and both reflect each other in the way that one interprets reality, one concludes that values will be present in any form of analysis, including the ones with scientific stamp. This affirmation makes the discussion about the researcher point of view and how one must position oneself in order to observe experiences that are not particular and might not relate to their symbolic universe. In order to develop a better understanding of this topic, Anthropology makes up a relevant way, which is capable of contributing to this theme, as well as to refining the glance over the experience.

Having Clifford Geertz (1973) as a starting point, a researcher that studied the relation between culture and the Other, it is possible to divide the experience on two analytical fields, that is, the “close experience” and the “distant experience”. The first one corresponds to the experience of the individual that is part of a culture, which is able to define what others think, see and imagine, besides being able to almost spontaneously comprehend the feelings and world view of the others. On the other hand, distant experience is featured by those who do not belong to the Culture, analysing it by distance, as an anthropologist and cultural specialist.

This way, Geerts understands that “the native’s point of view”, expression created by the author in his famous essay *From the Native’s Point of View* (1983), the ethnographer will not feel the other experience, living what assembles itself to a new experience, since it is not possible to experience what others seen as their own experiences.

This point is important when it comes to building an analytical tool to the public policies because the interpretation of those who regard a culture from the outside will be basically different from the experience of those who live it as a member, which makes it an important factor to consider when planning the evaluation of a public policy. Thus, it is important to consider the lens the evaluator is putting over the analysed culture, avoiding the creation of inconscient bias.

Going back to Brah's line of thought, the author explores the interconnections between the individual and collective in a relevant way to this discussion. To this author, when it comes to "difference as experience", it is the result of historical power because the ways of differentiation that mark the difference are shown in oppressions such as class, racism, homophobia, and others that have developed in diverse situations and times. Despite this, it was due to the questionings inside the feminisms areas that put the political level as something political and the view of reality as something not given that experience became the object of discussion (BRAH, 1996).

Though these interconnections are possible, the experience meets their limits in the fact that it is a social construction, a "[...] practice of making sense, both symbolically and narratively, as a struggle over material conditions and meaning [...]" (BRAH, 1996, p. 115). Thus, experience is a space of contestation: a discursive place in which the different, the different subject positions and the subjectivity are inscribed, reiterated and repudiated. In this sense, the questions of ideological matrices or signification and representation fields take part into the formation of different subjects and the political, economical and cultural processes that inscribe social variable experiences (BRAH, 1996). In this point, Brah resumes the need to distinguish the difference inside the collective history of personal experience, because this last one is marked by the cultural construction of the person, whilst the first one is built on the signification of diary local relations (BRAH, 1996).

In a similar direction, Bondía (2002) argues that experience is something particular, unrepeatable and finite since it is an elaboration of what happens to us, despite it having or not a sense. The author argues that

O acontecimento é comum, mas a experiência é para cada qual sua, singular e de alguma maneira impossível de ser repetida. O saber da experiência é um saber que não pode separar-se do indivíduo concreto em quem encarna [...] Se o experimento é genérico, a experiência é singular. Se a lógica do experimento produz acordo, consenso ou homogeneidade entre os sujeitos, a lógica da experiência produz diferença, heterogeneidade e pluralidade (BONDÍA, 2002, p. 27-28).

In this direction, considering what has been presented, Suely Kofes (1994) interprets the narrated experiences, building, therefore, a relation between the subject that narrates and the one that listens, this last one being affected by the narrative itself. The

job of the anthropologist proposes, besides the “understanding” of this narration and experience, articulating with the social reality (without opposing it to the structure and the life), relating a voice to other narratives, creating a collective of experiences. Therefore, the narrative becomes fundamental to understand the lived experience. Thus, synthesizing the thought of Suely Kofes:

[...] as histórias de vida estarão sendo consideradas como: fontes de informação (falam de uma experiência que ultrapassa o sujeito que relata); como evocação (transmitem a dimensão subjetiva e interpretativa do sujeito); como reflexão (contêm uma análise sobre a experiência vivida). (KOFES, 1993, p. 120).

The narrative is also present in Turner's vision, presented by Kofes in a text of 2015:

Em Turner, a experiência é intrinsecamente relacionada à narrativa, revelando-se como estrutura (conectando momentos distintos: percepções, evocações do passado, associações de eventos e sentimentos vividos, emergência de significações e valores) em sua expressão. Para ele, a expressão da experiência seria a unidade estrutural da experiência [...] o que não é o mesmo que a experiência como empiricamente observável ou pré-narrativa. A expressão da experiência (a experiência narrada) conectaria eventos e afecções, incorporando e germinando significações e valores. (KOFES; MANICA, 2015, p. 34).

It is useful, then, to understand in a deep manner the five moments that compose the narrative to Victor Turner (apud DAWSEY, 2005): (I) the happening in the level of perception; (II) the evocation of images and experiences from the past; (III) the remembrance of emotions related to past; (IV) the articulation of past and present, leading to the discovery and building of the sense; and (V) the expression of this experience, fulfilling a performance.

This division is made having Dilthey proposals as a basis, in a text made up by Turner (1986). According to Turner, Dilthey saw the experiences as something processed in different stages:

Moreover, they [experiences] involved in their structuring at every moment and phase not simply thought structuring but the whole human vital repertoire of thinking, willing, desiring, and feeling, subtly and varyingly interpenetrating on many levels. A cognitive Occam's razor, reducing all to bloodless abstractions (if one can visualize a bloodless razor), would simply make no human sense here (TURNER, 1986, p. 35)

Thus, the experiences begin with the feeling of pain or pleasure that irrompes and evokes precedents and past similarities that might be conscious or unconscious. Then, these experiences offered the contours to which is being lived in the present. To Dilthey,



according to Turner's view, it does not matter if this past is real or mythical, because structurally the question is meaning not value, once the values are related to the present (TURNER, 1986). In the words of the analyst, "[...] the point is whether meaningful guidelines emerge from the existential encounter within a subjectivity of what we have derived from previous structures or units of experience in living relation with the new experience." (TURNER, 1986, p. 36).

Moreover, when it comes to the liaison between present and past and the complexity of the construction of experience, the phenomenologist philosopher Merleau-Ponty offers some important insights by pointing out that the experience is not trivial. To the author, life is not a stream of stories and experiences and, therefore, there is a specific power of remembrance (ALKIMIM, 2016). Thus, Merleau-Ponty assures that the past is a memory of a lived state of conscience, the future becomes a projection of these memories (BARBOSA, 2003).

Furthermore, according to the argument developed by the psychologist and master in Sociology Márcio Ferreira Barbosa, the concrete validation of the past experience is not only related to time, "[...]the own memory shows us that time is not funded in states of consciousness, but it is in primordial experience" (BARBOSA, 2003, p. 31-32). The primordial experience would be the glimpse of the past, an exemplary and primordial manifestation of human experience (BARBOSA, 2003).

To Merleau-Ponty the present is important, the present moment is important so a fact can flow from the past. The individual lives many happenings. In this intertwining of experiences and perceptions there is a meaning to specific acts of the past that comes up in the present. In this sense, the author highlights the remarkable experience of conserved perception, a held moment that will be recorded by the price of its meaning to the individual (BARBOSA, 2003).

Se um determinado odor me proporciona repentinamente uma sensação de prazer experimentada há muito tempo atrás, é todavia no presente que essa percepção invade meus órgãos sensoriais, é no presente que eu a experimento. A mancha amarela no meu livro me faz pensar no passado, naquele dia em que derramei o meu café, mas a mancha em si mesma eu a percebo agora, é neste momento em que abro o livro que certos influxos nervosos percorrem meu corpo. Por si mesmos esses traços não remetem ao passado. Se eu encontro neles signos de algum acontecimento anterior é porque tenho, por outras vias, o sentido do passado, é porque trago em mim essa significação (BARBOSA, 2003, p.32).

Back to Turner's analysis of the construction of experience, after the moment of past experience remembrance, there is a stage in which the need of giving sense to what was caused by pain or by pleasure, converting what was lived in an experience (TURNER, 1986). After, in the last stage, it arises the need of communicating what was learned with the experience, because "[...] We are social beings, and we want to tell what we have learned from experience" since "[...] Self and not self, ego and egolessness, assertion and altruism, meet and merge in signifying communication" (TURNER, 1986, p. 37).

Therefore, it can be said that experience is unique to each subject and, by giving voice to those who live it, it is possible to understand its specificity, according to both Turner (1986) and Brah (1996). Nevertheless, it is worth considering that the interpretations are plural, since the experience of the Other is intangible (GEERTZ, 1973). Thus, taking Brah (1996) and the other authors as a basis, it is possible to consider that social relations compose the experience of the being, together with the subjectivity that is intrinsic in a tangled of memories and perceptions. This way, through the narrative of the subject, experience becomes more palpable, turning itself into a resource in the process of evaluating public policies.

### **Lessons to creating an assessment tool to evaluate public policies**

It is possible to highlight the importance of the narrative as a fundamental resource of the proposal one intends to forward in this article by gathering in this last topic lessons learned in the previous ones, based on the perspective of the recognition on the logic of the difference in intersectional terms.

Since the reflections of Brah (1996), as well as the ones from the quoted authors, are aligned to Bruner's propositions (1990) who considers the debate about narrative as a fundamental methodology to Human Sciences based on the debate about subjectivity. Quoting this author, Paiva (2008) mentions the contributions of this methodology to qualitative research, because through this narrative it becomes possible to gather information about a determined phenomenon and provide the meanings given by subjects about this event. Furthermore, Mattingly, Lutkehaus e Throo (2008) point out that Bruner's narrative methodology also purveys subjective aspects about the expectations related to

its surroundings. When it comes to the narrative, it "[...] (1) *delimits and routinizes the ordinary*, (2) *limits and defines the possible*, and (3) *offers a means to makes sense of breaches or violations to what is otherwise culturally expected*" (MATTINGLY; LUTKEHAUS; THROO, 2008, p. 14).

Narita (2006) corroborates the perception about the narrative methodology and its contribution in order to understand this subjective character of the research. Narita (2006, p. 26) also points out the importance of collecting quantitative data, "[...] como condição de escolaridade, ocupação, renda familiar, religião, estado civil, constelação familiar, mudanças (econômicas, culturais, migrações)", since this type of support script provides informations that might not appear in open questionnaires. The author also mentions that the comprehension of the subjective meanings might be qualitatively done throughout the narrative, which enriches the collected information. For instance,

Ao invés de simplesmente se perguntar qual a religião do sujeito, e obter uma resposta formal e às vezes não verídica, podemos conhecer a história da religiosidade do indivíduo, as crenças, as mudanças de credo e suas repercussões em sua subjetividade. Da mesma forma, ao invés de simplesmente sabermos se o sujeito tem o ensino primário ou o ensino médio, podemos – através da narrativa – conhecer sua vida escolar, suas dificuldades passadas e seus anseios futuros (NARITA, 2006, p. 26)

Thé and Santos (2019) chose the narrative approach with the aim of establishing the possibilities of this kind of approach more directly in what relates to the evaluation of public policies, greatly on what corresponds to subjectivity. Nevertheless, the authors also bound the importance of the cultural, social and political contexts in order to understand the public policies, both for the actors involved in them and for the own impact these components have over the policies. Thus, Thé and Santos (2019) claim that this narrative approach has a micro, medium and macro evaluative character:

Uma vez que, enquanto as narrativas e trajetórias [os] sujeitos (gestores, demandantes e participantes) recebem um tratamento de nível micro, os contextos e as lógicas de formulação e reformulação das políticas públicas são tratados no nível macro. Enquanto no nível mesmo está a política a ser avaliada, seu operativo-institucional e os encaminhamentos da mesma. (THÉ; SANTOS, 2019, p. 226).

These authors' considerations make it clear that the dimension of subjectivity affects the other dimensions and it is also, at the same time, affected by them. In these terms,

the aspects related to the social relations make up relevant elements for the effort of doing public policy evaluations. That is, the evaluations will not be able to understand the relations of power that cross all the social tissue without being able to understand the agents' *habitus* and its position in the field, as well as the stigmas involved. These elements are certainly collected by the narrative methodology that also supplies objective aspects in their interconnections with the subjectivity beyond being captured by qualitative and qualitative strategies.

Bourdieu (1996) elucidates this question by showing how apparently close or distant groups behave in different manners according to their positioning in the field built by the *habitus*. For instance, the author considers throughout the comparison of entrepreneurs, college professors, liberal professionals and company workers that the first three are in opposition to the last one in which relates to this field, since the hypothesis is that they have less economic and cultural capital than the others. However, when one changes the angle of the analysis, Bourdieu also points out that it is possible that college professors oppose entrepreneurs and liberal professionals due to their relatively higher cultural capital, but not necessarily in terms of economic capital.

In this direction, the narrative helps to understand the behaviors of the agents. Goffman, besides Bourdieu, both authors used in this article in addition to the propositions of Avtar Brah (1996) regarding the dimension of the difference as a social relation, do not focus on the question of the narrative. However, it is possible to notice the role of this methodology in their works.

Under Goffman's (2013) perspective the stigmatized person can interact with the stigma in several ways, for example, self-hate, using the stigma as a walking stick (using the stigma as excuses for his or her insufficiency), or still inverting roles, for example, when a blind person says that a "normal" person cannot see what is going on in his or her life. According to Bourdieu (1996), the narrative would be the way that someone can make sense of yourself because the person would try to do a logical and chronological sequence about yourself. However, the author highlights that this approach has its limitations because it is easy to lose chronological track of history.

The perspective behind the example of the businessman, the professor, the liberal professional, and the factory worker will reveal the positions that could not be so clear or suitable. On this account,

A cada classe de posições corresponde uma classe de *habitus* (ou de gostos) produzidos pelos condicionamentos sociais associados à condição correspondente e, pela intermediação desses *habitus* e de suas capacidades geradoras, um conjunto sistemático de bens e de propriedades, vinculadas entre si por uma afinidade de estilo. (BOURDIEU, 1996, p.21)

Thus, the comprehension of social gradations becomes essential in order to understand the social relations in their own complexity. Understanding these gradations implies that agents influence the structures that influence them: structuring structured structures, as claimed by Bourdieu (2001). Therefore, making up a good public policy, as well as evaluating it as reliably as possible, implies in understanding this constant movement of the agents of the Field, who are influenced by their own *habitus*.

In the same direction, when it comes to the lessons learned regarding experience and that deeply connect with the previous dimensions, one can say that it is in the communication process that experience finds its last stage, and, hence, it is not recommended to abstract this factor when analysing it to public policy assessment goals. Thereby, the idea is to collect public policy users personal testimonies, based on Queiroz observations (1986, apud RIGOTTO, 1998). According to the author, it is necessary to consider the existence of the interviewer subjectivity both from the deponent and the interviewer. Besides that, the familiar inheritance and the deponent 's society must be included in the analysis in order to understand whatever is cultural or a result of the group in which the person was born, which are the individual characteristics and which values are involved (RIGOTTO, 1998).

The concept of positioning in the Discourse Analysis can be a very relevant method in order to analyse the collected testimonies, since it “[...] se refere ao status socioeconômico ‘dos quais a sociologia pode descrever o feixe de traços objetivos característicos’ (MAINGUENEAU, 1998, p. 93). Besides it, the concept of imaginary formations can be used to this goal, once it denotes “[...] a imagem que os participantes do discurso ‘fazem de seu próprio lugar e do lugar do outro’” (MAINGUENEAU, 1998, p. 93).

Furthermore, in order to understand all the important aspects posed by Rigotto (1998), the question of context is also relevant, since it refers to the sum of “[...] participantes, lugar, momento e fim, [...] os saberes dos participantes sobre o mundo, seus saberes respectivos de um sobre o outro, um saber sobre o plano de fundo cultural da sociedade de onde emerge o discurso” (MAINGUENEAU, 1998, p. 33). Nevertheless, context is not an easy-to-learn device to those who live the distant experience. Its comprehension is done through the representations implied in the discourse - therefore its importance.

Based on these elements, that is, on the incorporation of the concepts of positioning, imaginary formations and context, it might be possible to develop public policy assessment tools that include the several desired dimensions present above. The effort of these tools would be the densification of the evaluative analysis based on the consideration of what is symbolic, imaginary and the self-representation, with the aim of comprehending the several stages of the experience throughout the symbols and signs that can be identified through Discourse Analysis techniques.

According to Orlandi (1994, p. 53), linguist and pioneer in the use of this type of analysis in Brazil,

[...] o discurso supõe um sistema significante, mas supõe também a relação deste sistema com sua exterioridade já que sem história não há sentido, ou seja, é a inscrição da história na língua que faz com que ela signifique. Daí os efeitos entre locutores. E, em contrapartida, a dimensão simbólica dos fatos.

The dimension of the sign referred to by Orlandi (1994) is especially relevant inside this system of significance due to its useful contribution to the comprehension. Roughly speaking, signs are the junction between the signifier, which is the representation of the word, and the signified, which is the concept that bases the formation of the object image. These signs are not separated from the outside, as already mentioned, they carry a historical and ideological dimension, about which Orlandi (1994, p. 56) claims that

Se é assim para o sujeito, também a relação com o mundo é constituída pela ideologia; a ideologia é vista como o imaginário que medeia a relação do sujeito com suas condições de existência. No discurso, o mundo é apreendido, trabalhado pela linguagem e cabe ao analista procurar apreender a construção discursiva dos referentes. A ideologia é, pois, constitutiva da relação do mundo com a linguagem, ou melhor, ela é condição para essa relação.

In this sense, in order to present an itinerary that contributes to the comprehension of experience in tools to evaluate public policies and includes all the aspects previously presented, it is proposed the summary board below. The first column regards the four stages of experience according to Turner (1986), the second one puts together the points of view of different authors in order to contribute to the Turner and, the last column, regards indicators that can be analysed to delimit the difference as experience:

**Figure 1:** Summary of the experience analysis

<b>Stages of experience (TURNER, 1986)</b>	<b>Related aspects (other authors)</b>	<b>Indicators</b>
Perception event	Imaginary and symbolic universe, their desires and necessities	Production conditions - Where, when, how, with who
Images and past experiences	Biological inheritance, what is cultural, and what is a product of the group the person was born in, in which networks of sociability, power, and counterpower	Social formation - where was born, where was raised, which are the important historical events in the period
Experiences recall	Self-representation and representation that the person does of their surroundings	Choice of words, symbols, and signs
Construction of meanings	Attribution of meaning	Identification of symbols and signs by the speech analysis
Experience expression	Created images	Text Analysis - Representations in Symbols and Signs

**Source:** Prepared by the authors (2020).

Despite being focused on the question of the experience, this frame might be used as a reference to public policy evaluation as well as a thinking tool to comprehend the dimensions of the difference that are inextricably associated. Then having the several aspects of the experience, its related stages and indicators, it appears to be of utmost

importance that evaluators consider not only questions closed on previous created categories, which are practical when it comes to collect and analysis, but limited when it regards the voice of its deponents. This voice needs to be urgently listened and understood, inside their differentiations, complexities, and an interseccional focus, whether the goal is overcoming and effectuation of citizenship, as claimed by Bilge. quoted by Hirata who gives us an excellent closure to this proposal:

A interseccionalidade remete a uma teoria transdisciplinar que visa apreender a complexidade das identidades e das desigualdades sociais por intermédio de um enfoque integrado. Ela refuta o enclausuramento e a hierarquização dos grandes eixos da diferenciação social que são as categorias de sexo/gênero, classe, raça, etnicidade, idade, deficiência e orientação sexual. O enfoque interseccional vai além do simples reconhecimento da multiplicidade dos sistemas de opressão que opera a partir dessas categorias e postula sua interação na produção e na reprodução das desigualdades sociais. (HIRATA, 2014, *apud* BILGE, 2009 p. 70).<sup>7</sup>

## NOTES

1 - The author uses the term *homossexualismo*, however the correct form to use it in Portuguese is *homossexualidade*. The suffix "*ismo*" refers to illness. The homosexuality was disregarded as an illness by the Brazilian Federal Council of Medicine in 1985 and by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1990.

2- Our highlights.

3 - The markers on the text refer to the social markers of difference that are used to analyze situations of inequality and hierarchy to help in the understanding of the relations of gender, sexuality, class, and color. (HIRANO, 2019).

4 - The spelling of *habitus* is always written in italics following the author's way of writing.

5- The spelling of Fields concept was capitalized to differentiate it from the word fields. This choice was made by the authors.

6 - A methodology that seeks to elucidate the logical structure of human action.

7 - Excerpt from Bilge (2009), translated by Hirata, in *Gênero, classe e raça: Interseccionalidade e consubstancialidade e relações sociais* (2014).

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