Format

T14 . T14P01 - Conflict in Federal Systems in Para-diplomatic and International Relations

Local, Multi
PANEL CHAIR(S)
R. VENUGOPAL
Main chair
CATEGORISATION
POLICY TOPIC
Local, Multi
SECTOR
KEYWORDS
GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE
The study of international public policy interests through the lens of federalism theory requires cognizance of the “level of participation” question. When central governments pursue their extra-territorial interests, it is incumbent upon them to carefully consider whether constitutionally-assigned areas of jurisdiction between themselves and their constituent regional orders of government are implicated. In some cases, national constitutions assign concurrent jurisdiction over policy issues to the central and regional governments, or assign sole areas of jurisdiction, in a manner that engenders conflict between these orders of government when implementation is attempted. When regional governments attempt to pursue such interests on the international stage, the sub-discipline of “para-diplomacy” (see Michelmann and Soldatos, Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units, 1991” is particularly relevant.   The intra/ultra vires conundrum is exemplified by the Labour Conventions Case, 1937, in which the Government of Canada signed an international agreement in an area of provincial competence. After consideration by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Lord Atkin stated, “While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters she still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original structure.” His message was simple- the days in which the federal government could obligate the provinces in areas of their own jurisdiction through the adoption of foreign treaties were over. Despite Lord Atkins’ ruling however, “jurisdiction creep” (i.e., Canada’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol despite constitutionally-established and concurrent provincial jurisdiction) and other agenda-setting disconnects continue to have fractious effects.   While para-diplomacy has been examined from various conceptual and regional perspectives over the past 25 years or so, a unique area that requires deeper consideration relates to national and “subnational” orders of government having competing or concurrent jurisdictions. What happens when federal governments enter into international agreements impacting areas of provincial competence? What happens when federal government and regional governments are constitutionally-sanctioned to pursue interests in the same policy area? What happens if regional government pursuit of a particular policy interest on the international stage is limited or thwarted because it is a dependent on a policy variable under federal jurisdiction? For example, while Canadian provinces have concurrent jurisdiction over immigration policy with Ottawa, the federal government retains power over border security, ergo power of admittance of foreigners to Canada.   By examining this important yet underexplored area of public policy, the goal of this panel is to understand how various federal jurisdictions around the world have dealt with such “who does what outside the country” questions. The proposed panel seeks high quality submissions examining such questions and issues from a conceptual (i.e. multi-level/polycentric governance model…) or regional case study perspective.
CALL FOR PAPERS
The study of international public policy interests through the lens of federalism theory requires cognizance of the “level of participation” question. When central governments pursue their extra-territorial interests, it is incumbent upon them to carefully consider whether constitutionally-assigned areas of jurisdiction between themselves and their constituent regional orders of government are implicated. In some cases, national constitutions assign concurrent jurisdiction over policy issues to the central and regional governments, or assign sole areas of jurisdiction, in a manner that engenders conflict between these orders of government when implementation is attempted. When regional governments attempt to pursue such interests on the international stage, the sub-discipline of “para-diplomacy” (see Michelmann and Soldatos, Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units, 1991” is particularly relevant.   The intra/ultra vires conundrum is exemplified by the Labour Conventions Case, 1937, in which the Government of Canada signed an international agreement in an area of provincial competence. After consideration by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Lord Atkin stated, “While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters she still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original structure.” His message was simple- the days in which the federal government could obligate the provinces in areas of their own jurisdiction through the adoption of foreign treaties were over. Despite Lord Atkins’ ruling however, “jurisdiction creep” (i.e., Canada’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol despite constitutionally-established and concurrent provincial jurisdiction) and other agenda-setting disconnects continue to have fractious effects.   While para-diplomacy has been examined from various conceptual and regional perspectives over the past 25 years or so, a unique area that requires deeper consideration relates to national and “subnational” orders of government having competing or concurrent jurisdictions. What happens when federal governments enter into international agreements impacting areas of provincial competence? What happens when federal government and regional governments are constitutionally-sanctioned to pursue interests in the same policy area? What happens if regional government pursuit of a particular policy interest on the international stage is limited or thwarted because it is a dependent on a policy variable under federal jurisdiction? For example, while Canadian provinces have concurrent jurisdiction over immigration policy with Ottawa, the federal government retains power over border security, ergo power of admittance of foreigners to Canada.   By examining this important yet underexplored area of public policy, the goal of this panel is to understand how various federal jurisdictions around the world have dealt with such “who does what outside the country” questions. The proposed panel seeks high quality submissions examining such questions and issues from a conceptual (i.e. multi-level/polycentric governance model…) or regional case study perspective.