Format

P01. Policy Implementation Arrangements: Organizational, Structural and Managerial Aspects

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
PANEL CHAIR(S)
Fritz Sager
University of Bern
Main chair
Anat Gofen
Hebrew University
Second chair
CATEGORISATION
POLICY TOPIC
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
SECTOR
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KEYWORDS
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GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE

Since the groundbreaking argument made by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) about implementation as a separate component of public policy, numerous studies have focused on varied aspects of implementation arrangements, which ultimately allocate the position of different implementing agents in policy-delivery: either at the central government, in two-tier agencies, in street-level management or at the direct-delivery phase (e.g., Bardach 1977; Gassner and Gofen 2018; Weimer and Vining 2011). Either as formally designed or as exercised on-the-ground, the organization, structure and management of policy implementation define roles, allocate resources, facilitate relationships, and distribute decision power for the various implementing agents. Hence, implementation arrangements are of fundamental importance not only for policy outputs and outcomes, but also for the ways through which government is experienced and perceived by citizens. Moreover, implementation arrangements are definitely not 'fire and forget.' Rather, they require active maintenance, continuing reconsideration and on-going tuning to local circumstances because “[e]ven the most robust policy—one that is well designed to survive the implementation process—will tend to go awry” (Bardach 1977, 5).

Although implementation refers to all the activities executed by all levels of administration in all types of public organizations in order to carry out a formal policy decision (O’Toole 1986), three rather distinct perspectives guide its rich and varied scholarship: Within a top-down perspective, studies focus on the linkages between agencies and organizations at the local level as the main contribution for implementation success (Elmore 1979; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Sabatier 1986). Within a bottom-up perspective, studies focus on the actions of the staff engaged in direct-delivery, who adjust implementation efforts to the dynamic, unexpected, and ever changing street-level context (Gofen 2013; Lipsky 1980; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). Within public management perspective, studies focus on managerial functions, such as the translation of political decisions (e.g., Lynn et al. 2000), co-production (e.g., Alford 2002; Bovaird 2007), and upwards communication of ideas (e.g., Floyd and Wooldridge 1992).

Committed to theoretical and methodological pluralism, this panel welcomes papers that apply a wide range of approaches. Papers can focus on implementation arrangements as a theoretical framework, and address such questions as how to conceptualize and measure implementation arrangements and how to define its analytic dimensions. Papers can refer to various aspects of implementation arrangements, including organizational, structural and managerial, and address them as the dependent variable as well as the independent variable.

By encompassing contributions from various policy fields, diverse organizational settings and different theoretical frameworks, this panel attempts to bridge areas of explorations which are less likely to interact. Specifically, the aim of this panel is threefold. First, we seek to allow a more nuanced conceptualization of implementation arrangements, including their components and dimensions. Second, we aim to enable a wide-ranging discussion of the ways through which implementation arrangements both influence and influenced by additional aspects of the policy domain. Lastly, we strive to facilitate an opportunity for scholars who study policy implementation from different perspectives correspond and further develop a comprehensive approach to implementation research.

CALL FOR PAPERS

Policy implementation arrangements– both as formally designed and as exercised on-the-ground– ultimately allocate the position of different implementing agents in policy-delivery: either at the central government, in two-tier agencies, in street-level management or at the direct-delivery phase. Specifically, the organization, structure and management of policy implementation define roles, allocate resources, facilitate relationships, and distribute decision power for the various implementing agents. Implementation arrangements are therefore of fundamental importance not only for policy outputs and outcomes, but also for the ways citizens experience and perceive government. Moreover, implementation arrangements are not 'fire and forget,' but rather require maintenance, continuing reconsideration and active tuning to local circumstances.

Three perspectives guide the rich and varied literature: Within a top-down perspective, decision-making and implementation are considered two discrete stages and studies focus on the suitability between organizational arrangements and formal policy goals; Within a bottom-up perspective, policy is referred to as manifested by its implementation and studies address questions such as how do organizational constraints support/hinder implementers; Within public management perspective, attention has diverted from “implementation”—how a policy is being carried out— to “outcomes”— achieving policy goals, and studies explore the interrelation between managers/management, implementation arrangements and organizational performance.

Drawing on the well-accepted notion of implementation as a “black box” laying between “great expectations” and “ruined hopes,” this panel invites papers that shed light on implementation arrangements, either as formally designed or as in-effect practiced. Motivated to bridge areas of explorations that are less likely to interact, the panel is committed to theoretical and methodological pluralism and welcomes contributions from different conceptual frameworks, various policy fields, and diverse organizational settings. Our aim is facilitating a more nuanced implementation arrangements conceptualization, including their components and dimensions; a wide-ranging discussion of the ways through which implementation arrangements influence and influenced by additional aspects of the policy domain; and an opportunity for scholars who study implementation from different perspectives to correspond and further develop a comprehensive approach to implementation research. 

ACCEPTED
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01 - The temporal dimensions of large-scale policy change: balancing short-term needs and long-term goals
Carey Gemma (UNSW)
CO-AUTHORS
Adrian Kay (Universiti Brunei Darussalam)
ABSTRACT

Recent theories of how institutions change over time have challenged previous dichotomies between incremental and ‘big bang’ policy change, suggesting that multiple change processes can occur simultaneously. However, the implication of these insights for the capacity of contemporary governments to undertake transformative policy change are underexplored. In this paper we draw on theories of policy capacity and historical institutionalism to explore an inherent challenge in transformative policy implementation: the imperative for structures and practices to both achieve short term implementation solutions while also to retain the freedom and flexibility to meet desired policy outcomes in the future. Using the case study of the Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme, we argue that the long timeframes associated with transformative policy change leave reforms vulnerable to multiple mechanisms of change, which can ultimately derail larger policy aspirations. We suggest that governments need to develop a range of policy capacities to manage the dilemma of how to approach policy implementation that uses the notion of a ‘future’ to create a staged or multi-phase implementation schedule. These capacities include foresight capacity, reflective capacity and mitigation capacity.

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02 - Improving Implementation: Human Resources and Oversight
Lael Keiser (Truman School of Public Affairs, University of Missouri )
CO-AUTHORS
Cody Drolc (University of Missouri)
ABSTRACT

Policy implementation is fraught with challenges and problems (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). To increase the likelihood of successful implementation, governments need the capacity to respond.  However, research is not clear which factors increase the ability of the government to respond to implementation problems.
   
We are interested in the importance of the capacity of both public agencies and legislative institutions on the ability of government to respond to implementation problems. In order to improve implementation, governments need legislative institutions that have the capacity to monitor public agencies.  We argue that legislatures that are more professionalized with more staff and longer sessions will have greater capacity to monitor public agencies and create pressure to change. Similarly, public agencies need high human resource capacity to adapt to meet implementation challenges. We focus on staff pay, unionization, professional organization membership, and number of staff.  Interestingly, theory in this area provides contrary expectations for whether resources such as unionization and professionalization will make public agencies more or less responsive to problems. 
 
Using the case of Social Security Disability, we examine the moderating influence of legislative and agency capacity to responsiveness to poor performance. Backlogs in the Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income programs is a major implementation issue that has been continuously identified by the media and Congress in the past couple of decades. Our approach has the benefit of investigating bureaucracies all performing the same task with the same incentives but in U.S. states with different levels of legislative capacity and with different levels of agency capacity. We test how legislative and agency capacity influence responsiveness to disability backlogs using data on the number of determinations in state Disability Determination Services offices between 1990 and 2015. Contrasting prior studies on the detrimental effects of unions on bureaucratic responsiveness (e.g, Chen and Johnson 2015, Moe 2009), our findings suggest that unionization enhances responsiveness to disability claim backlogs. However, we fail to find evidence that legislative capacity has such a relationship. These findings highlight the importance of agency capacity over oversight in addressing implementation problems.

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03 - Ethnic and racial stereotypes and biases in frontline implementation: a systematic review of patterns and possible interventions
Eva Thomann (University of Exeter)
CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Eva Thomann (University of Exeter) e.thomann@exeter.ac.uk

Oliver James (University of Exeter) O.James@exeter.ac.uk

Thibaud Deruelle (University of Exeter) td327@exeter.ac.uk

 

The equal treatment of citizens is a fundamental principle of conventional models of good bureaucratic practice. Nevertheless, a persistent issue in frontline policy implementation is the prevalence of (conscious or unconscious) ethnic and racial stereotyping and bias leading to unjustified inequities in the everyday interactions between public servants and policy targets. A growing body of evidence looks into the resulting patterns of discrimination along ethnic or racial stereotyping, their institutional and behavioural sources. However, much less attention has been paid to the question of what can be effective interventions to address ethnic and racial bias in frontline implementation. This study argues that in answering this question, not only the public policy and public administration literatures but also the broader literatures from behavioural science offer important lessons. Accordingly, we conduct a systematic review of empirical studies in these fields. We offer unprecedented, comprehensive evidence about patterns of discrimination and actual and potential effects of possible interventions to address stereotyping and biases at the system, organizational, and individual level. We give indicative proposals for the contextual scope conditions for these effects.

 

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04 - Politicized policy implementation
Markus Hinterleitner (University of Munich)
CO-AUTHORS
Stefan Wittwer (ETH Zurich, Switzerland)
ABSTRACT

Politics in Western democracies has become more conflictual in recent decades. Phenomena such as polarization and populism bespeak a widespread tendency towards intensified and more conflictual interactions between political actors. Research on the policy consequences of intensified political conflict does usually not look beyond the political arena. In this article, we argue that the dominant focus on formal policy change is too narrow because it neglects changes in policy implementation, i.e. the day-to-day application of policies by front-line workers. We argue and demonstrate that, even in the absence of formal policy change, intensified political conflict can lead to consequential changes in policy implementation, as front-line workers and their political principals attempt to make policy implementation less scandal-prone and blameworthy.
We demonstrate the effect of political conflict on policy implementation in three policy areas in Switzerland that have recently experienced episodes of intensified political conflict: asylum policy, juvenile justice policy and child protection policy. Switzerland constitutes a unique setting for identifying the effect of political polarization on policy implementation. While the three policies are national policies and thus apply to the whole country, Switzerland features two major public and media spaces that are divided by language barriers. This provides us with a quasi-experimental setting, with one public space receiving the treatment (‘intensified political conflict’) and the other space serving as a control group.
We measure the treatment variable using data on media coverage and parliamentary debates after focusing events that resonated in only one of the public spaces. Based on time series cross-section analysis and qualitative interviews with front-line workers,
we are able to show how intensified political conflict leads to politicized policy implementation (PPI). PPI is a form of implementation that is significantly, if not predominantly, driven by front line workers’ motivation to shield the implementation level from the polarized conflict that is raging at the political level. In the analyzed cases, PPI manifests itself in particular patterns of age-assessments of asylum seekers, harsher sanctions for youth offenders, and more restrictive child protection measures. Our article demonstrates that research must analyze and take into account changes in policy implementation in order to fully capture the spectrum of policy consequences in response to intensified political conflict and populist pressure.

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05 - Implementation tactics as a trigger of policy change
Oliver Meza (Tecnologico de Monterrey)
CO-AUTHORS
Anat Gofen (Hebrew University)
Carlos Moreno-Jaimes (ITESO)
ABSTRACT

Roles of middle managers in general, and of street level managers (SLM) in particular, often refer to translating policy downward to the field and voicing relevant information upward to higher levels of management, relinquishing questions about their contribution to policy change by using their local context as a laboratory. To explore this overlooked role, our study suggests shifting attention to “implementation tactics,” defined here as the re-design of formal policy instruments SLMs exercise during implementation phase, in an attempt to reconcile implementation gaps identified within their local context in order to achieve formal policy goals. Implementation tactics that improve policy outcomes may directly affect formal design of policy instrument and at times even the reform of additional related policies. To demonstrate how implementation tactics trigger policy change, analysis focuses on the implementation of sidewalks parking ban in a street-level-organization (SLO) in Mexico and draws on multiple data sources, including semi-constructed interviews with the SLM and with three first-line managers, and a small questionnaire survey among the frontline workers who enforce the ban (N=20). Implementation tactics emerged as SLMs attempt to shift from a punishment paradigm to a civic education approach by directing frontline workers to issue warning-notices during parking bans enforcement interactions with citizens, and not fine-tickets, which was explicitly instructed in the formal policy as a sanction against parking on side-walks. Findings suggest that implementation tactics followed the noticing of two implementation gaps: potential abuse of frontline discretion and confrontational interactions between frontline workers and citizens. Effectiveness of implementation tactics was evidenced in the moderation of frontline workers-citizens’ interactions and in the decreased possibility for abuse of frontline discretion. Consequently, efforts have been invested to re-design policy instrument of parking ban policy as well as similar related policies in the local government.

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06 - Implementing collaborative governance: joining modern implementation arrangements and traditional structures
Wieke Blijleven (Tilburg University)
CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

During the past two decades, local governments across Europe, North America and Latin America have experimented extensively with citizen engagement in policy making and implementation, or even facilitating community initiatives that take on the implementation of public services (e.g. Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Osborne, 2010). Although there has been significant political and scholarly attention for this development towards collaborative governance and co-production, we know that earlier structures, roles and traditions of local government have not disappeared. These earlier organizational structures, rooted in traditional public administration and new public management, can pose a significant challenge for the public servants implementing collaborative policies at the street level, and the citizens they engage (Edelenbos, 2005; Durose, 2011; Tuurnas, 2015; Nederhand et al., 2018). In this paper, we explore what these organizational barriers look like in practice, and what interventions might be adopted to overcome them.
We conducted focus groups in ten different municipalities in the Netherlands, with in total 74 civil servants, involved in the co-creation and/ or co-production of policy. These focus groups provided insights into a present-day implementation gap (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973) by exploring how the implementation of policies and services by front-line workers and active citizens at the street level (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003), runs into trouble on the side of the internal organization. We found, firstly, that according to the civil servants, not formal rules and procedures form the main issue, but the compartmentalization of the municipal organization, and associated allocation of people, budgets and time along the lines of departments linked to specific policy areas. In addition, although management is generally supportive of co-creation, the actual accountability processes and performance measurement are still directed towards legal, financial and planning targets. Whereas collaborative implementation arrangements require openness and flexibility, the civil servants working at the front lines often experience difficulties getting their colleagues from the ‘back office’ involved, who may not feel the same urgency or do not feel the freedom to interpret rules and policies broadly, or spend time facilitating ideas and initiatives of active citizens.
Secondly, we found examples of integral cooperation and flexible budgets and mandates, that may help overcome these barriers. Even though flexibility seems to be key, this flexibility must be balanced by a clear vision on co-creation and co-production.

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07 - Top-down, bottom-up or something else? The experience of English local authorities in implementing national policy pilots
Stefanie Ettelt (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine)
CO-AUTHORS
Lorraine Williams (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine)
Nicholas Mays (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine)
ABSTRACT

Policy pilots have become a key strategy of governments for testing and implementing policy in England and elsewhere. There are clear attractions for governments to invest in policy pilots including the promise to minimise the risks associated with full scale implementation, the devolution of responsibility for implementation from the centre to participating localities, and the potential for learning and increased transparency through information sharing and evaluation. However, it is less clear why local organisations put themselves forward to participate in these national schemes and why some of them do so repeatedly despite the level of disruption to organisational processes and the ‘ruined hopes’ experienced by many of those who want to improve services locally (Ettelt and Mays, forthcoming).

 

This paper aims to explore the role of local implementers who participate in national pilot schemes, and investigate the effect of pilots on local organisations through interviews with directors of local authority social services (i.e. long-term care) in England. It explores the role of local authorities in national policy piloting, using three theoretically informed perspectives that we have used to analyse our data: (1) local implementers dominated by the centre and dependent on the whims of national policy-makers (‘top-down’); as (2) local policy actors who have a considerable degree of autonomy and who choose to participate as they see fit (‘bottom-up’); or as (3) public sector organisations that voluntarily subjugate themselves to the disciplinary power of the centre, a practice referred to as Anglo-governmentality (Miller and Rose, 2008; Ferlie and McGivern, 2014). This analysis will build on previous work that examined the purpose of policy piloting, and the confusion arising from the fact that national policy-makers, local implementers and external evaluators tended to have different, sometimes conflicting objectives for pilots and evaluations (Ettelt et al., 2015). The aim of this paper is to contribute to the emerging literature on policy piloting as a strategy for policy implementation and to understand better the tensions arising from using policy piloting as an approach to policy implementation.

 

References:

Ettelt S, Mays N, Allen P (2015): The multiple purposes of policy piloting and their consequences: Three examples from national health and social care policy in England. Journal of Social Policy 44 (2): 319-337.

Ettelt S, Mays N (forthcoming): Policy pilots as public sector projects. In: Hodgson D, Fred M, Bailey S, Hall P (eds.): The projectification of the public sector. New York/Abingdon Taylor and Francis: 19-34.

Ferlie E, McGivern G (2014): Bringing Anglo-governmentality into public management scholarship: the case of evidence-based medicine in UK health care. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 24: 59-83.

Miller P, Rose N (2008): Governing the present: administering economic, social and personal life. Cambridge, Polity Press.

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08 - Retain and Regain Institutional Capacity in Spatial Planning Processes: Closing the Gap between Plan Development and Implementation
Tim Busscher (University of Groningen)
CO-AUTHORS
Stefan Verweij (University of Groningen)
ABSTRACT

Over forty years ago, Wildavsky stated that “planning has become so large that the planner cannot encompass its dimensions [...]. Planning protrudes in so many directions, the planner can no longer discern its shape” (1973:127). Perhaps as a consequence, spatial planning literature has shown little interest in the distinctive nature of the different phases that constitute the planning process. In this paper, we argue that distinguishing between the plan development and plan implementation processes in planning helps to address and overcome the implementation problems that spatial planning processes encounter. More in particular we argue that the capacity to implement spatial plans depends on the institutional capacity that is built during plan development.

 

During plan development, different actors engage in collaborative processes in which intellectual, social, and political capital are built (Breukers & Wolsink, 2007; Healey et al., 2017). Intellectual capital refers to the exchange, inclusion, and exclusion of knowledge resources in collective processes. Social capital refers to the mutual trust, reciprocity and cooperative spirit in the network of relationships. Finally, political capital concerns the ability of actors to activate the other actors in the network to act collectively on a given issue.

 

The built capitals enable actors to collectively identify and define the planning challenge, and to formulate a plan to deal with it. The end of the plan development accumulates in the institutionalization of the plan and the built capital. This often takes shape in an institutional arrangement such as a contract or covenant that binds actors together in an organization. For example, the plan development for a highway corridor is followed by a contracting and procurement process resulting in a contract, creating a public-private partnership. Importantly, at that point, the nature of the planning process changes: the plan is defined as a project with concrete deadlines and measurable goals, the set of actors involved changes, and new types of relations are formed. The major risk is that this results in the loss of the intellectual, social, and political capital that was built in the plan development phase. The consequence is that this obstructs efficient and successful plan implementation.

 

In this paper, using primary data (documents, interviews) and secondary data (published case studies), we will comparatively analyze six Dutch water and infrastructure planning cases: the flood risk management projects Noordwaard, IJsseldelta, and Deventer as part of the Room for the River program (i.a., Busscher et al., 2017; 2018), the National Collaboration Program on Air Quality (i.a., Busscher, 2014), and the infrastructure development and management projects A2 Maastricht and A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein (i.a., Verweij, 2015). Our analysis shows (1) the gap between plan development and implementation, (2) how built capacity is lost, and how it can be (3a) regained or (3b) retained. Our study offers building blocks for an institutional design of the planning process that enables planners to organize the transition from plan development to implementation in such a way that built capacity is retained and can be deployed for successful implementation.

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09 - CAN POLICY SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FIX the POLICY-IMPLEMENTATION GAP?
Stephen Peckham (Centre for Health Services Studies, University of Kent)
CO-AUTHORS
Bob Hudson (University of Kent)
David Hunter (Newcastle University)
Redgate Sam (Newcastle University)
ABSTRACT

Background:

There is increasing awareness that policies do not succeed on their own merit. Observations of policy design at a macro level and policy implementation at meso/micro levels are depicting  a more complex, but more realistic, picture of the policy process. In 2014, the UK Government passed new social care  legislation, The Care Act, in England which introduced a new approach to supporting adults with social care needs, and the delivery of adult social care services. The Government recognised that implementation  would be complex, particularly given multi-level governance issues, and a decision was taken to provide an implementation support programme (ISP). The factors that shape and influence implementation are complex, multi-faceted and multi-levelled with public policies invariably resembling ‘wicked problems’ so-called because they are resistant to change, have multiple possible causes, and solutions that vary in place and time according to local context (Rittel and Webber 1973; Australian Public Service Commission 2012).   Research was, therefore, commissioned to establish whether this particular approach to implementation support was effective and examine whether other current and previous national ISPs provided additional insights to developing future ISPs . 

 

 Methods:

In order to understand more generally issues related to implementing national policy programmes at a local level, analysis of relevant theoretical and conceptual literature was undertaken alongside a review of relevant evaluations of previous policy programmes. This data was used to inform an analytical framework and set of criteria associated with successful policy implementation. In addition, empirical research focusing on the process and impact of the Care Act 2014 ISP at national, regional and local levels was undertaken. This included review of documentation related to the implementation support process, interviews with senior staff involved at national and regional levels, and six local case studies where interviews with senior managers, operational staff, local providers and service users/carers were undertaken.

 

Results

I Implementation of the Care Act built upon pre-existing and established policy consensus. This, linked to national and local governance structures, led to no reported challenge in terms of the legitimacy of the policy. A hallmark feature of the ISP was the development of stakeholder support. Strong and effective relationships at a national level were evident and clear stakeholder involvement in policy design and policy implementation was identified. We identified the key factors behind policy failure by exploring different approaches to supporting policy implementation arising from the Care Act ISP and those developed to support other policy programmes, and drawing on conceptual frameworks of McConnell (2015) and Matland (1995) by developing a tentative framework for assessing the role and effectiveness of ISPs. 

 

References:

Australian Government (2014), Policy Implementation, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Matland, R (1995), Synthesising the implementation literature: the ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 5(2), pp145-74

McConnell, A (2015), What is policy failure? A primer to help navigate the maze, Public Policy and Administration, 30(3-4) pp 221-242

Rittel, H.W. and Webber, M.M., 1973. Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy sciences, 4(2), pp.155-169.

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10 - Governing hybrid systems: Actor constellations and conditions for decentralized and centralized water infrastructures
Katrin Pakizer (Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology (ETH Zurich))
CO-AUTHORS
Eva Lieberherr (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)
ABSTRACT

Water systems are experiencing highly dynamic and conflicting societal demands and environmental challenges. The expanding yet at the same time ageing water infrastructures, which are typically governed by hierarchical structures, tend to lack the flexibility to adapt to population growth, continued urbanization and climate change-related challenges. The implementation of modular water systems, characterized by decentralization, automation and mass production, into centralized infrastructures could mitigate those challenges, enabling radically different and potentially more resource efficient and environmentally sustainable water management. Nonetheless, the existence of technological alternatives has not changed the continuous reliance on tried-and-true solutions. A central issue influencing the implementation of modular water is the existence of supportive governance arrangements.  However, there is little insight into the needed policy instruments and managing structures. For instance, it remains an open question whether centralized governance structures can be simply adapted or new tools and arrangements need to be developed for the integration of small modular units into a large centralized infrastructure. Some researchers argue that the type of governance ultimately depends on the scale of each infrastructure. However, this observation does not consider complex systems, leaving the question what type of governance arrangement is needed for governing simultaneously small- and large-scale (hybrid) water systems ultimately unanswered.
From a public management perspective, we investigate the governance configurations that enable the implementation of modular water systems and the socio-environmental context within which they exist. Through our previous research and the inclusion of new environmental governance theories, we identified relevant cases that have already implemented small modular systems into their established water infrastructure and determined potentially necessary instruments and mechanisms. In a first step, we identify the different governance arrangements in place for modular technology. For this analysis, we draw on Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and specifically on the action situation in order to map the actor constellation. We analyze the set of actors involved in the organization and management of the implemented systems, their positions (central government, arm’s length regulators, private actors) and their decisional competences. By providing an actor analysis we will shed light on the “shadow of hierarchy”-thesis and examine to what degree the premises of new environmental governance are currently employed in the water management of hybrid systems. In a second step, we use the set-theoretic approach of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) for the analysis of our case studies that we selected from an extensive literature review, testing whether regulatory instruments, incentives, information instruments, horizontal accountability and participationare sufficient and/or necessary conditions for the successful implementation of modular water systems. We accordingly model the complex causal relation of instruments and mechanisms that support or hinder successful policy implementation, in our case the simultaneous governing and organization of small- and large-scale water systems.

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11 - Implementing Cultural Public Policies through Social Organizations in Brazil: risks of bureaucratic backsliding
Leonardo Leite (Getulio Vargas Foundation - FGV EAESP)
CO-AUTHORS
Aldo Valentim (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul)
ABSTRACT

Implementing Cultural Public Policies through Social Organizations in Brazil: risks of bureaucratic backsliding

 

LEITE, Leonardo Queiroz. FGV-EAESP, Brazil.

VALENTIM, Aldo. UFRGS, Brazil.        

 

         In Brazil, the challenges of implementing public policies are rooted not only on historical processes and subsequent economic crises, but especially on the persistence of bureaucratic administration, with old organizational arrangements, anachronistic laws and rigidity in managing human and material resources. So, there is a belief that the State must intervene excessively with its general laws, focus on processes and excessive control by the courts, generating a state gigantism that creates an expensive, slow and inefficient public machine that jeopardizes the implementation of public policies and the delivery of good public services to the citizens.

 

         In an attempt to change this paradigm, in the wave of the philosophy of the New Public Management, centered on the idea of state efficiency, Minister Bresser Pereira during the 1st. Administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-1998), launched in the country the 1995 Managerial Public Management Reform which provoked, besides an intense debate, several changes in the structure of the state.

 

         To implement the changes, the Master Plan of the Reform of the State Apparatus (1995) presented the main guidelines to implement the Managerial Public Administration, in contrast with the bureaucratic paradigm. At the core of the reform was the division of functions in a structural model that attributed different types of management according to the nature of the function to be performed. Therefore, we had the idea of "exclusive activities of the State", activities that could be developed by private markets and activities that could be developed by society civil in cooperation with the so-called third sector.

 

         Therefore, what we call Social Organizations (SOs) were born. The main ideia of this new organizational entity was to separate financing and execution of public services through agreements signed by governments with nonprofit organizations, based on pre-defined targets and performance indicators. Inspired by the UK quangos, the SO model was essentially aimed at avoiding the rigidity of rules in the public sector (especially concerning purchasing and HR constraints) while improving performance.

 

         When it comes to cultural policies, there was no need for these activities to be committed to the traditional bureaucracy of the typical and exclusive activities of the state. They could perfectly continue to exist as public policies, but its management from now on should be carried out by vocational and qualified associations of the third sector.

 

         In this modality, the activities of the organization cease to be directly performed by the bureaucratic structure and methods and begin to dedicate itself exclusively in the search of results in the implementation of the policies that management, having as a better goal the better and with more quality delivery of these public services to the citizens.

 

         The impacts of the 1995 Brazilian Managerial Reform had repercussions at the subnational level, when states and municipalities have adopted such a model to manage a number of specific public policies, especially culture and health. In the State of São Paulo, the largest and most relevant of the federation, a Law in 1988 established the reform and the first management contracts were signed in 2004. Today, there are about 18 social organizations of culture, that manage 99 % of the culture programs of the Government of the State of São Paulo.

 

         However, nowadays this model is threatened by the conservatism of the organs of control and ideological bias in the discussions about the role of the state and ways of implementing public policies. With diverse norms, laws and decrees, the management model by social organizations is being forced to follow exclusive bureaucratic public administration procedures, putting in check a management model that aims to implement public policies, through partnership with civil society, allied to the agility, quality and the focus on the results instead of on the procedures.

 

         In this context, our proposal aims to present a brief overview of the Bresser reform and its impacts on subnational governments. To do that, we will analyze the specific case study of social organizations of culture in the State of Sao Paulo during 2004 to 2018, the period where a large number of projects were implemented following the SOs model, reflecting on the challenges faced by the model, especially the threat of bureaucratic backsliding. To do that, besides the literature review of theoretical and empirical elements of the management model, we intend to do documental analysis and semi-structured interviews with some key actors of the process.

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12 - Coordinating the policy process. The case of network coordinators in the forensic mental health sector.
Coralie Darcis (Université de Liège)
CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Contemporary health policies constitute a real challenge in terms of collaborations, in the sense that they request cross-sectoral or cross-organisational collaborations (Clavier & Gagnon, 2013; Crosby & Bryson, 2010) as an answer to complex societal problems (Daviter, 2017). Beside this, those new policies also show an evolution in the policy piloting process as an increasing responsibility is delegated to field actors for interpreting those policy plans, strengthening the role of local communities within the production of public action (Bureau & Sainsaulieu, 2011; Dubois & Orianne, 2012; Genard, 2007). Those new health policies open the doors for the emergence of new intermediary professional roles, including the network coordinators.

 

With this paper, our objective is to empirically illustrate and understand those coordinators’ place and role in the Belgian forensic mental health (FMH) policy piloting and implementation processes. The FMH policy shows a clear evidence regarding this twofold trend. Six mandated local networks gathering local stakeholders were created in order to (1) organise the development of (cross-) sectoral collaborations as well as to (2) implement the policy vision at the local level. For each network two coordinators were mandated by the public federal authorities.

 

This paper is based on a qualitative research combining three different methods of data collection. It includes policy and network document analysis, thirty-five semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from the FMH field and fifteen observations of (federal and network) meetings. This methodology allowed us to follow the implementation and construction processes of the FMH policy plan since 2016 at different levels of action.

 

Our research allowed us to understand that FMH coordinators play a key role regarding the twofold trend of contemporary health policies. The paper will show that they are sorts of “reform leaders” (Denis & Van Gestel, 2015), responsible for managing the implementation process. Each coordinator is both the “delegated translator” (Thunus, 2014) of a policy plan as well as the local stakeholders’ spokesperson. Furthermore, as for middle managers and boundary spanners, they are responsible for disseminating new ideas and knowledge across organisational and sectoral boundaries (Kimble, Grenier, & Goglio-Primard, 2010; Oldenhof, Stoopendaal, & Putters, 2016; Pichault & Schoenaers, 2012; Radaelli & Sitton-Kent, 2016). Coordinators are thus “more than passive linking pins, transmitting senior manager instructions unquestioningly down the organization” (Harding et al., 2014, p.1215).

 

This knowledge translation and sharing allow to articulate the different stakeholders’ visions, interests and to ‘align among differences’ (Quick & Feldman, 2014). Horizontally, the coordinator draws linkages between local actors, allowing him to produce a coordinated action. Vertically, the coordinator forms the link between street-level implementation actions and formal stated policy (Gofen, 2013) and thus ensure a continuous mutual adaption between ‘what is wanted’ and ‘what is done’. In conclusion, we aim to demonstrate that the coordinator thus emerges as one of the key players of contemporary policy making and implementing processes, to whom a certain political responsibility is indirectly transferred since they directly influence the production and the structuring of the public action.

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13 - Coordinating Air Quality in Mexico City
Roberto Rodríguez (Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po))
CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Contemporary policy coordination studies rely on the assumption that it emerges as a response to the problem of fragmented government action. The nature of public problems, decentralization processes and the proliferation of increasingly specialized agencies due to New Public Management (NPM) reforms strive the need for tackling the issue of a constantly fragmented government action (Bouckaert, Peters, & Verhoest, 2010; Cejudo & Michel, 2017). However, as scholars from different disciplines argue (Duran & Lazega, 2015; Feiock, 2013; Lindblom, 1965), coordination also has to acknowledge the set of mutual dependencies of the actors involved in policy implementation. That is, how their actions affect and get affected by others. This leads to analyze policy coordination in two levels: one institutional (fragmentations) related to the distribution of powers (what actors are allowed to do); and other relational, of mutual dependencies and determined by the strategic behavior of actors.
Drawing on the case of Air Quality Policy in Mexico City, the aim of the paper is to look at how these two dimensions have developed on the policy coordination processes through time, leading to different outputs. For that purpose, the institutionalization of such processes will be traced. The research question is: How and why does governance arrangements and the strategic behaviors of actors and organizations define the institutionalization of policy coordination in cities?
The argument is as follows: The shifts in governance arrangements change the distribution of powers by giving different attributions to actors at some point in time. In addition, actors are inherently dependent and they rely on how actors and organization strategically manage their resources. The interplay between both of them is what determines policy coordination.
Cities are an ideal place to witness the whole span of fragmentations and dependencies that take place in policy implementation because they have to deal with different governance levels: internal or local governance; vertical or multi level governance; and horizontal or metropolitan governance.
The research is carried out through a historical tracing of policy coordination processes in cities. Taking insights from Historical Institutionalism, it first looks for the changes on the formal distribution of powers through time. This is followed by the analysis on the interactions in policy implementation, mostly driven by literature from sociology of organizations. Data has been collected through interviews, laws, norms and policy documents.

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14 - The Implementation Regime - Lessons from Migration Policy Application in Europe
Tobias Eule (University of Bern)
CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

This paper examines how implementation is shaped in a multi-level, multi-actor 'regime'. It draws lessons from an extensive ethnographic study of the management of migrants with a precarious legal status in Europe, spanning seven countries and more than 20 institutional actors over four years (Eule, Borrelli, Lindberg and Wyss 2018). Here, implementation arrangements and variations in implementation outcomes are heavily influenced by certain distinguishable aspects - particularly the law, political interventions, organisational structures and agents' perspectives on and expectations towards these arrangements (see also Eule 2014). Furthermore, the the multi-layered, multi-level and multi-actor nature of migration control itself has an impact on policy application, with inherent contradictions and feedback effects that cannot be related to individual aspects that shape implementation arrangements. This results in perpetuated decision-making lags, people stuck in a bureaucratic limbo as well as heavily unpredictable outcomes. The paper thus suggests an implementation regime approach, chanelling the migration regime approach (Hess and Kasparek 2010; Pott, Rass, and Wolff 2018; Horvath, Amelina, and Peters 2017; Eule et al. 2018), that pays close attention to the contradictions of sense-making and disaggregation of power that occurs within implementation arrangements.

 

 

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15 - Policy clients or policy makers. Citizen agency and negotiated noncompliance at the street-level
Sergio A. Campos (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica (CIDE))
CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

The divergence between what is formally established in a policy and what actually happens has traditionally been defined in the literature as an implementation problem; however, there is still a lack of knowledge regarding the complexity of the phenomenon and the mechanisms behind this divergence. Particularly at the street-level it is necessary to understand what role citizens play in their encounters with the street-level bureaucrats (SLB) and the effect this encounters has on divergences. This paper uses the case of the Mexican Conditional Transfer Program Prospera to answer the question: How do the negotiations between SLB and program beneficiaries determine the differences at the street-level in the implementation of the program? Through in-depth interviews with SLB´s of health and education sectors, their supervisors and beneficiaries, as well as on-site observation during street-level interactions, I study how citizens and SLB negotiate (non)compliance with the rules and processes of program implementation. The hypotheses are: 1) the citizens are not passive but active actors and excercize their agency in their encounters with the SLB’s; 2) the street-level interaction between frontline workers and citizens takes place in a context of organizational gap, which causes a low degree of transparency and a high degree of discretion; 3) due to this organizational gap, there are different degrees of negotiation in terms of intensity and room for maneuver; and 4) the existence of this negotiation allows the actors, both SLB’s and citizens, to deal with the daily burdens imposed by the program. In that sense, the Prospera program is legitimized and remain working, not because the rules of implementation are fully complied with, but on the contrary, since the negotiation of compliance allows a flexible framework of action for the actors at the street level. This work contributes both to the implementation and non-compliance literature by arguing that citizens, just as the SLB’s, are policy makers, not policy takers and that they exercise agency in their encounters with the SLB to decide which rules and procedures to follow and which ones ignore depending on how that (non)compliance ease their own burden.

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16 - Organizational constraints in managing public service delivery
Lizet Kuitert (TU Delft)
CO-AUTHORS
Leentje Volker (University of Twente)
ABSTRACT

As public bodies are social-politically responsible for ensuring public value, they are expected to contribute to all kinds of values, for example social innovation, solidarity and the quality of the built environment. One way of achieving public value is by policy-delivery though direct product exchanges or by indirect exchanges of services and financing between individuals, companies, social institutions, and government. This way complex networks of multiple internal and external actors develop, which creates a situation in which public organizations must cope with different logics in often conflicting value systems. Strategies to address trade-offs in the management of policy implementation are key to business optimization and of great relevance to safeguarding public value. Therefore, in this paper we look into strategy alignment practices of a Dutch public client organization and the public-private project organization in which a new participatory procurement  strategy was implemented for a city park. We answer to the question: ‘How do multiple institutional logics coexist within public organizations and how are they balanced by decision makers while safeguarding public service delivery in the built environment?’

In an ethnographic case study research, we followed the project processes bottom-up and looked into the alignment with broader organizational goals. We studied the policy implementation on participation from within the organisation, exploring the potential of combining strategy- and performance management adopting a Public Value Management perspective. We also analysed the way that public actors approach value conflicts; via iterating responses of splitting and integration, or by acceptance, embracing conflicts via the strategy of “working through”. In the period from June 2017 until December 2018 we combined the fieldwork from the public value management perspective, consisting of (a) 10 semi-structured interviews with the alderman, municipal project-group members and intermediaries, (b) 4 months of observations at the urban management department and (c) documents analysis, including websites, commission letters and various municipal programs, with collecting data from the bottom-up project perspective by (a) 9 semi-structured interviews with different external public and private institutions, (b) observations of tender pool gatherings and resident panel meetings during a period of 19 months, and (c) document analysis including (local) media coverage and the project website.

Results indicate that responses to conflicting value systems were mostly individual and defensive. The processes in which structures such as schemas, rules, norms and routines are created become guidelines for the actions of individuals, creating certainty and legitimacy of actions within and between institutions. Especially the relatively strict public tendering regulations seem to ask for a high level of creativity of the project team within the municipal governance system in ensuring the public value as initially strived for. More informal ways of organising were only found as addition to the existing formal systems, preventing sustainable organisational maturing in handling the multi-level challenge of managing often conflicting policy goals. We should therefore expand our knowledge on combining ‘old’ and ‘new’ patterns of organizational governance in safeguarding public values.

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17 - Policy implementation arrangements in developing settings: The Mexican experience
Mauricio Dussauge (CIDE )
CO-AUTHORS
Maria del Carmen Pardo (CIDE)
ABSTRACT

Is implementation similar in developed and developing countries? And if not, why? Recent discussions on policy implementation and public management underline a number of important trends in implementation arrangements: a transition from government to governance (e.g. horizontal and network-based approaches; Hill and Hupe, 2014), the increase in collaborative policy implementation (Ansell, Sorensen, and Torfing, 2017), a more frequent use of information technologies (Dunleavy et al., 2006), and a growing involvement of private actors in public service provision (Thomann, Hupe, and Sager, 2017). Whether these trends  facilitate policy implementation or complicate implementation arrangements in accountability and other areas is subject to contestation. Yet the trends are mostly taken for granted as contemporary features in policy implementation in developed countries. 

 

However, the extent to which policy implementation in developing countries reflects the aforementioned trends is unclear. In these countries implementation would seem to remain mostly government-centred, with limited use of private actors, and scarce use of collaborative implementation arrangements and information technologies use. In order to show that, this paper takes nine implementation mini-cases from the Mexican experience. The cases touch on policy areas as varied as social policy, passport provision, civil service, and freedom of information, among others. We show how implementation arrangements in these areas have remained centred around governments and try to explain why that is the case. We also show that while traditional implementation "failures" are present in these cases, there are certain particularities in  countries such as Mexico that condition iomplementation processes. By looking a both policy implementation and implementation limitation in these mini-cases, we show how and why policy implementation is significantly different in developing settings.

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18 - Implementing Low-Carbon Policies - Housing Managers as Intermediary Actors
Juha Peltomaa (Finnish Environment Institute)
CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Implementing policies for sustainability transitions calls for intermediary actors that translate the policy aims into practical solutions. This is particularly important in cases where policies require application of new technologies, as technologies do not automatically lead to changes in practices. An example of such policies is installing apartment-level water meters that are nowadays required by regulation in Finland. Currently water consumption in blocks of flats is typically shared between all members of the housing cooperative based on a headcount, regardless of how much an individual consumes. The justifications of the new regulation include enabling fair, consumption based billing and saving of warm water. This suggests an underlying assumption that meters, when used for billing, will permanently reduce water and energy use.

Even though the regulation enables consumption based billing, the requirement can be formally fulfilled by just installing meters in each apartment but not using them for tracking water use or for billing. In the Finnish context, housing managers as well as the boards of housing cooperatives are in a crucial role when implementing policy requirements concerning the technologies applied in buildings. Housing managers often suggest to the housing cooperatives which solutions to implement and how. Thus, housing managers act as intermediaries between policy, technology, residents and their practices. .

In this study we explore the role of housing managers as intermediaries and their relationship to the different rationales such as economic, sustainability and equity issues that are used to justify decisions on how to implement the policy requirements in the practical level. Based on analysis of housing manager and representatives of housing cooperative interviews, we argue that housing managers put more emphasis on economic aspects, while representatives of housing cooperatives stress the equity aspects of apartment-level water metering and billing. Sustainability, i.e. achieving lower water and energy consumption, was given less importance in the context of apartment-level water metering.

The regulation is based on the assumption that apartment-level water meters provide a financial incentive for residents to consume less water, and that without it residents use more water than they need. The regulation does not pay attention to crucial intermediaries such as housing managers, whose interests may be in contradiction with the residents’, as housing managers strive for optimizing the costs for larger units of housing cooperatives. The case of apartment level metering raises questions on how the role of intermediaries should be considered in developing policies for change. By not specifying the actual use of a new mandatory technology the regulation provides space for innovative frontrunners, whereas others may use it as a loop hole to continue with the practices that the technology was supposed to change. In this case the technology simply becomes an additional burden in terms of investments and maintenance. Therefore one should, at the level of policy, consider how the implementation of a technology is expected to eventually facilitate a system level low-carbon transition and how the intermediaries can contribute to it.

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19 - Three years later: clinical managers’ perspectives on the implementation a decommissioning programme in a local health system in Sweden
Mio Fredriksson (Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Uppsala University)
CO-AUTHORS
Ulrika Winblad (Uppsala University )
ABSTRACT

Decommissioning is the planned process of removing, reducing or replacing healthcare services at the organisational level (Williams et al., 2017; Robert et al., 2014). Drivers for decommissioning are affordability, quality and cost-effectiveness (Harlock et al., 2017; Daniels et al., 2013), and it is an example of so-called ‘unpopular policies’ that people react strongly against (Starke, 2006). In 2014, Robert et al. explored factors and processes that facilitate the successful implementation of decisions to decommission healthcare services. They established that recommended best practices were the establishing of a strong leadership team, the engaging of clinical leaders from an early stage and the establishing of a clear rationale for change. These recommendations, however, focuses on the initial adoption, and so does the majority of implementation research in the health sciences. Yet, recently there has been a growing interest in the sustainability of implemented interventions in the health sector, where some researchers emphasize that interventions need to be continuously refined and improved within a constantly changing context, a proposition that is likely valid also for health policies such as decommissioning programmes.

 

In this study, we investigate from a sustainability perspective the implementation of an extensive decommissioning programme that started three years ago in one of the local health systems in Sweden. The programme was launched as a response to an acute – but long-lived – financial crisis. Interviews with 27 clinic managers were analysed inspired by the Dynamic Sustainability Framework that emphasizes continued learning and problem solving, ongoing adaptations between interventions and multi-level contexts, and expectations for ongoing improvement as opposed to diminished outcomes over time (Chambers et al., 2013). In the interviews, we find that many of the clinical managers responsible for enacting the changes considered the programme as static rather than something that was to be continuously refined in particular contexts. Changing and adapting the programme was rather seen as a sign of disloyalty against the other clinic managers and the leadership. Moreover, they all described a clear intensity drop after the first year. The clinic managers meant that the continued implementation was hindered by the fact that the programme was developed when the conditions in the local health systems were different. Some of them did not see the necessity of continued implementation, but rather saw other challenges as more important to tackle for the local health system to survive, primarily the increasing staff shortage. At the same time, it was clear that the clinic managers’ ‘thinking’ had changed, and that it had influenced a change in the culture at the clinics. The clinic managers had started to consider the budget and spending differently and involved the staff in efficiency improvements that changed their ways of working and treating patients. Some of these initiatives were regarded as highly sustainable. The study shows that the Dynamic Sustainability Framework may be used to analyse policy changes and not just health interventions, and may be a help when investigating the interrelation between managers/management, implementation arrangements and organizational performance.

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20 - Policy Mandates and Organizational Compliance: Internal, External, and Spatial Determinants of the Adoption and Implementation of Emergency Power Plans by Nursing Homes and Assisted Living Facilities
Alka Sapat (Florida Atlantic University)
CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Policy Mandates and Organizational Compliance: Internal, External, and Spatial Determinants of the Adoption and Implementation of Emergency Power Plans by Nursing Homes and Assisted Living Facilities

 

Organizational compliance in response to policy mandates may vary due to numerous factors, which include differences in ownership (public, private, or non-profit), regulatory environments, organizational practices, and other internal and external determinants. We analyze these issues with respect to the adoption of emergency preparedness power plans by nursing homes and assisted living facilities (ALFs) in response to a policy mandate following hurricane Irma, which hit Florida in September 2017. Due to that storm, power failures at a nursing home in South Florida led to the death of 14 nursing home residents. Following this disaster, nursing homes and ALFs were required by a gubernatorial emergency order and a state legislative mandate to adopt and implement emergency preparedness power plans. However, the level and timing of organizational compliance with this mandate have varied. Using logistic regression, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) visualization techniques, and spatial modeling, we analyze several independent variables affecting plan adoption and implementation. Determinants that are analyzed include: factors internal to the organization, such as ownership and organizational practices; external determinants such as the regulatory environment, responsiveness of county officials in approving plans, resource and supply-chain constraints, physical vulnerabilities; and spatial determinants (such as proximity to the coast, location in hurricane evacuation zones, and location in metropolitan areas). The findings are expected to suggest ways to improve the design of policy mandates to improve compliance and implementation. Insights will also be gathered into the efficacy of gubernatorial vs legislative policy adoption and the politics of policy implementation processes.

 

Keywords: Policy Adoption and Implementation, Organizational Compliance, Spatial Modeling, and Policy Design

 

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21 - Policy implementation through multi-level governance: opportunities and challenges
Mattia Casula (Università di Bologna)
CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Since the 1960s, political scientists had been interested in analysing if and how multilevel arrangements impact on policy implementation. This debate increased in the context of European integration where Multi-level Governance (MLG) become an instrument of policy implementation, since the implemention of several EU policies had required the elaboration of advanced multilevel governance systems to facilitate the achievement of policy objectives and targets. While the study of MLG received a great interest from a normative point of point, empirical studies that investigated if and how MLG really increases the quality of policy implementation had been limited and not always systematic. This article fits into this debate by investigating how MLG affects on policy implementation through the analysis of the implementation of four Italian and Spanish regional development programmes financed through the regional policy of the European Union (also known as Cohesion Policy). Cohesion policy implementation is a paradigm case of MLG: since the 1990s the management of EU-funded regional development programmes required the establishment of multi-level and multi-actor governance structures, and the implementation of the partnership and the regionalised programming principles. By presenting a pluri-annual qualitative empirical research on the implementation of four regional Operational Programmes characterized by different MLG arrangements and a different degree of decentralization for the management of the policy, this article shows the operation of different multi-level and multi-actor arragements across different policy stages and how they are able to increase the quality of policy implementation rather than to lead on implementation gaps. Doing so, different propositions based on a strong theoretical background are developed and they help in understanding the findings here presented.

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22 - Bridging the gap or a quantum leap? Explaining implementation mismatch in a participatory budgeting initiative
Cynthia Michel (Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE))
CO-AUTHORS
Guillermo Cejudo (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica (CIDE))
Oliver Meza (Tecnologico de Monterrey)
ABSTRACT

The attempt for understanding how policy implementation recreates “policy fiction” (Brodkin 2008) has relied on the idea that policies have one sole logic of intervention, which exists in the form of a coherent model of prescriptions followed by a consistent set of actions in order to attain the main policy objective. While scholars have labeled these implementation discrepancies as policy implementation gaps (Gofen, 2013; Hupe, 2014; May, 2012, 2015; O’Toole Jr., 2000). We extend this argument by stating that policy implementation involves more than one logic of intervention, as many as the existing relevant co-producing actors participating in the implementation process. These logics organize ideas and actions of those involved in the co-production of outcomes simultaneously in a way that obscures the many-fold logic of the policy intervention.

Participatory Budgeting (PB) initiatives offer examples on the several logics unveiled within policy implementation. Around the world, PB initiatives attempt to rebuild trust in governments, create new governance arrangements and address citizens’ needs and priorities. PB’s main assumption is that it serves these three purposes equally and therefore, all those involved, by doing their own individual implementation work, will contribute to their attainment. Challenges arise when PB’s main assumption is not met, and participants value the purposes differently.

We study the PB initiative implemented in 2017 by the government of Cananea, a municipality in Northern Mexico. This was an ambitious project, used by the Ministry of public administration as a pilot program for using participatory methods to allocate resources derived from extractive industries. Following a mixed methods research design (in depth interviews, focus groups and a survey), we show how contrasting expectations resulted in distinct meanings of success among the many types of participants and therefore different implementation logics. In charge of the initiative’s design were external actors (an international organization and the Ministry of territorial development); the municipal government and citizens in Cananea participated in a co-producing scheme. Their involvement was geared towards different goals. The designers were motivated by the idea that the collaborative process itself would result in increasing citizens’ trust in their government. Local officials assumed the initiative would allow them to better understand the needs of their voters and create new interactions with citizens. Cananea citizens thought of PB as a new way to meet their individual needs.These different logics clashed at several points during the implementation process affecting not only participants’ perception of the initiative but the general resulting outcomes.

 

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23 - Bottom-Up Policy Change: First Doing, then Deciding
Céline Mavrot (University of Lausanne)
CO-AUTHORS
Anat Gofen (Hebrew University)
ABSTRACT

Formal policy statement is considered the end of policy design and the beginning of policy implementation. Indeed, how implementation is structured and influenced “top-down” by the policy statement has been well-documented. To focus on the overlooked upward influence of implementation, termed here “policy by foot,” this study suggests shifting from the common perspective of implementers as reacting to a formal policy decision, to a “bottom-up” perspective, which allows uncovering the ways through which implementers’ actions shape formal policy adaptation. Demonstrating policy-by-foot” draws on cantonal tobacco control policies in Switzerland, which involve multiple implementers who operate within different organizational levels and settings. Policy-by-foot emerged as threefold process First, policy implementers facing political deadlock stretch the rules by playing with existing instruments in order to impulse policy change. Second, the policy decision is progressively made in a bottom up manner during the course of implementation. Third, formal policy statement may follow actual implementers’ actions in order to reconcile a dissonance between what is exercised on the ground and what is stated as formal policy. Shifting the focus to implementation-formation reciprocity, policy-by-foot not only accords with the re-emerging critique of their well-established distinction, but also provides theoretical and practical insights for bridging policy formation and implementation.  

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24 - Decision Heuristics, Governance and Public Policies’s Performance
Ludmila Bandeira (Penn State University)
CO-AUTHORS
Edgar Reyes junior (Universidade de Brasília - UnB)
ABSTRACT

This theoretical essay pretends to develop the hypothesis of how decision heuristics at public policy processes contribute to improve the decision-making process, leading to more rational decisions from public officials, impacting the reach of better results in public policy implementation. The hypothesis is based on the Theory of Bounded Rationality, Neo-institutionalism and Policy Analysis, and it is believed, therefore, that decision heuristics can explain the performance in public policies. It should be emphasized that the study of institutions requires the recognition of two background conditions: the condition of social foundation and the attributes of human actors. Thus, the present essay is developed considering both background conditions. The first section of the essay seeks to clarify the attributes of the human actors considered by the Theory of Bounded Rationality. This theory considers that individuals seek to be rational, however, are constrained by limited cognitive ability and incomplete information. This approach seeks to interpret human behavior as a result of the constraints imposed by a set of "appropriate rules or exemplary behaviors" that have cognitive and normative components. Thus, this theory presents the epistemological basis of this proposal and shows which visions of the world, individual and Society it is based upon. It is the logic that underlies the proposed analysis model, since it is based on the premise that the actors involved have bounded rationality and seek heuristics capable of bringing greater rationality to the processes of policy implementation. Starting from the definition that Public Policies are decisions, being what the State does in response to political challenges. We opted for the theoretical approach of Public Policies that deals with the interrelationship between political institutions, the political process and the contents of politics, the Policy Analysis. This approach aims at a better understanding of the increasingly interactive and dynamic relational complexity of the political-administrative system in action. Considering Policy Analysis's approach, Neo-institutionalism appears as the theoretical orientation that offers the set of premises to the proposed approach. This theoretical current emphasizes the relative autonomy of political institutions and is a theoretical alternative in which institutions return to assume the role of variables that explain the political dynamics of the actors on an empirical basis. It is in this context that the intention is to identify structuring elements of governance that can contribute to improve performance in public policies. Finally, Public Policy Governance is reached, understood as a model of coordination of certain institutional arrangements, which is the central aspect of our hypothesis, which seeks to explore the evidence that governance, as a rational heuristic of the decision-making process can generate positive impacts on the results achieved by public policies.

CO-AUTHORS
Adrian Kay (Universiti Brunei Darussalam)
ABSTRACT

Recent theories of how institutions change over time have challenged previous dichotomies between incremental and ‘big bang’ policy change, suggesting that multiple change processes can occur simultaneously. However, the implication of these insights for the capacity of contemporary governments to undertake transformative policy change are underexplored. In this paper we draw on theories of policy capacity and historical institutionalism to explore an inherent challenge in transformative policy implementation: the imperative for structures and practices to both achieve short term implementation solutions while also to retain the freedom and flexibility to meet desired policy outcomes in the future. Using the case study of the Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme, we argue that the long timeframes associated with transformative policy change leave reforms vulnerable to multiple mechanisms of change, which can ultimately derail larger policy aspirations. We suggest that governments need to develop a range of policy capacities to manage the dilemma of how to approach policy implementation that uses the notion of a ‘future’ to create a staged or multi-phase implementation schedule. These capacities include foresight capacity, reflective capacity and mitigation capacity.

CO-AUTHORS
Cody Drolc (University of Missouri)
ABSTRACT

Policy implementation is fraught with challenges and problems (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). To increase the likelihood of successful implementation, governments need the capacity to respond.  However, research is not clear which factors increase the ability of the government to respond to implementation problems.
   
We are interested in the importance of the capacity of both public agencies and legislative institutions on the ability of government to respond to implementation problems. In order to improve implementation, governments need legislative institutions that have the capacity to monitor public agencies.  We argue that legislatures that are more professionalized with more staff and longer sessions will have greater capacity to monitor public agencies and create pressure to change. Similarly, public agencies need high human resource capacity to adapt to meet implementation challenges. We focus on staff pay, unionization, professional organization membership, and number of staff.  Interestingly, theory in this area provides contrary expectations for whether resources such as unionization and professionalization will make public agencies more or less responsive to problems. 
 
Using the case of Social Security Disability, we examine the moderating influence of legislative and agency capacity to responsiveness to poor performance. Backlogs in the Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income programs is a major implementation issue that has been continuously identified by the media and Congress in the past couple of decades. Our approach has the benefit of investigating bureaucracies all performing the same task with the same incentives but in U.S. states with different levels of legislative capacity and with different levels of agency capacity. We test how legislative and agency capacity influence responsiveness to disability backlogs using data on the number of determinations in state Disability Determination Services offices between 1990 and 2015. Contrasting prior studies on the detrimental effects of unions on bureaucratic responsiveness (e.g, Chen and Johnson 2015, Moe 2009), our findings suggest that unionization enhances responsiveness to disability claim backlogs. However, we fail to find evidence that legislative capacity has such a relationship. These findings highlight the importance of agency capacity over oversight in addressing implementation problems.

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Eva Thomann (University of Exeter) e.thomann@exeter.ac.uk

Oliver James (University of Exeter) O.James@exeter.ac.uk

Thibaud Deruelle (University of Exeter) td327@exeter.ac.uk

 

The equal treatment of citizens is a fundamental principle of conventional models of good bureaucratic practice. Nevertheless, a persistent issue in frontline policy implementation is the prevalence of (conscious or unconscious) ethnic and racial stereotyping and bias leading to unjustified inequities in the everyday interactions between public servants and policy targets. A growing body of evidence looks into the resulting patterns of discrimination along ethnic or racial stereotyping, their institutional and behavioural sources. However, much less attention has been paid to the question of what can be effective interventions to address ethnic and racial bias in frontline implementation. This study argues that in answering this question, not only the public policy and public administration literatures but also the broader literatures from behavioural science offer important lessons. Accordingly, we conduct a systematic review of empirical studies in these fields. We offer unprecedented, comprehensive evidence about patterns of discrimination and actual and potential effects of possible interventions to address stereotyping and biases at the system, organizational, and individual level. We give indicative proposals for the contextual scope conditions for these effects.

 

CO-AUTHORS
Stefan Wittwer (ETH Zurich, Switzerland)
ABSTRACT

Politics in Western democracies has become more conflictual in recent decades. Phenomena such as polarization and populism bespeak a widespread tendency towards intensified and more conflictual interactions between political actors. Research on the policy consequences of intensified political conflict does usually not look beyond the political arena. In this article, we argue that the dominant focus on formal policy change is too narrow because it neglects changes in policy implementation, i.e. the day-to-day application of policies by front-line workers. We argue and demonstrate that, even in the absence of formal policy change, intensified political conflict can lead to consequential changes in policy implementation, as front-line workers and their political principals attempt to make policy implementation less scandal-prone and blameworthy.
We demonstrate the effect of political conflict on policy implementation in three policy areas in Switzerland that have recently experienced episodes of intensified political conflict: asylum policy, juvenile justice policy and child protection policy. Switzerland constitutes a unique setting for identifying the effect of political polarization on policy implementation. While the three policies are national policies and thus apply to the whole country, Switzerland features two major public and media spaces that are divided by language barriers. This provides us with a quasi-experimental setting, with one public space receiving the treatment (‘intensified political conflict’) and the other space serving as a control group.
We measure the treatment variable using data on media coverage and parliamentary debates after focusing events that resonated in only one of the public spaces. Based on time series cross-section analysis and qualitative interviews with front-line workers,
we are able to show how intensified political conflict leads to politicized policy implementation (PPI). PPI is a form of implementation that is significantly, if not predominantly, driven by front line workers’ motivation to shield the implementation level from the polarized conflict that is raging at the political level. In the analyzed cases, PPI manifests itself in particular patterns of age-assessments of asylum seekers, harsher sanctions for youth offenders, and more restrictive child protection measures. Our article demonstrates that research must analyze and take into account changes in policy implementation in order to fully capture the spectrum of policy consequences in response to intensified political conflict and populist pressure.

CO-AUTHORS
Anat Gofen (Hebrew University)
Carlos Moreno-Jaimes (ITESO)
ABSTRACT

Roles of middle managers in general, and of street level managers (SLM) in particular, often refer to translating policy downward to the field and voicing relevant information upward to higher levels of management, relinquishing questions about their contribution to policy change by using their local context as a laboratory. To explore this overlooked role, our study suggests shifting attention to “implementation tactics,” defined here as the re-design of formal policy instruments SLMs exercise during implementation phase, in an attempt to reconcile implementation gaps identified within their local context in order to achieve formal policy goals. Implementation tactics that improve policy outcomes may directly affect formal design of policy instrument and at times even the reform of additional related policies. To demonstrate how implementation tactics trigger policy change, analysis focuses on the implementation of sidewalks parking ban in a street-level-organization (SLO) in Mexico and draws on multiple data sources, including semi-constructed interviews with the SLM and with three first-line managers, and a small questionnaire survey among the frontline workers who enforce the ban (N=20). Implementation tactics emerged as SLMs attempt to shift from a punishment paradigm to a civic education approach by directing frontline workers to issue warning-notices during parking bans enforcement interactions with citizens, and not fine-tickets, which was explicitly instructed in the formal policy as a sanction against parking on side-walks. Findings suggest that implementation tactics followed the noticing of two implementation gaps: potential abuse of frontline discretion and confrontational interactions between frontline workers and citizens. Effectiveness of implementation tactics was evidenced in the moderation of frontline workers-citizens’ interactions and in the decreased possibility for abuse of frontline discretion. Consequently, efforts have been invested to re-design policy instrument of parking ban policy as well as similar related policies in the local government.

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

During the past two decades, local governments across Europe, North America and Latin America have experimented extensively with citizen engagement in policy making and implementation, or even facilitating community initiatives that take on the implementation of public services (e.g. Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Osborne, 2010). Although there has been significant political and scholarly attention for this development towards collaborative governance and co-production, we know that earlier structures, roles and traditions of local government have not disappeared. These earlier organizational structures, rooted in traditional public administration and new public management, can pose a significant challenge for the public servants implementing collaborative policies at the street level, and the citizens they engage (Edelenbos, 2005; Durose, 2011; Tuurnas, 2015; Nederhand et al., 2018). In this paper, we explore what these organizational barriers look like in practice, and what interventions might be adopted to overcome them.
We conducted focus groups in ten different municipalities in the Netherlands, with in total 74 civil servants, involved in the co-creation and/ or co-production of policy. These focus groups provided insights into a present-day implementation gap (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973) by exploring how the implementation of policies and services by front-line workers and active citizens at the street level (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003), runs into trouble on the side of the internal organization. We found, firstly, that according to the civil servants, not formal rules and procedures form the main issue, but the compartmentalization of the municipal organization, and associated allocation of people, budgets and time along the lines of departments linked to specific policy areas. In addition, although management is generally supportive of co-creation, the actual accountability processes and performance measurement are still directed towards legal, financial and planning targets. Whereas collaborative implementation arrangements require openness and flexibility, the civil servants working at the front lines often experience difficulties getting their colleagues from the ‘back office’ involved, who may not feel the same urgency or do not feel the freedom to interpret rules and policies broadly, or spend time facilitating ideas and initiatives of active citizens.
Secondly, we found examples of integral cooperation and flexible budgets and mandates, that may help overcome these barriers. Even though flexibility seems to be key, this flexibility must be balanced by a clear vision on co-creation and co-production.

CO-AUTHORS
Lorraine Williams (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine)
Nicholas Mays (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine)
ABSTRACT

Policy pilots have become a key strategy of governments for testing and implementing policy in England and elsewhere. There are clear attractions for governments to invest in policy pilots including the promise to minimise the risks associated with full scale implementation, the devolution of responsibility for implementation from the centre to participating localities, and the potential for learning and increased transparency through information sharing and evaluation. However, it is less clear why local organisations put themselves forward to participate in these national schemes and why some of them do so repeatedly despite the level of disruption to organisational processes and the ‘ruined hopes’ experienced by many of those who want to improve services locally (Ettelt and Mays, forthcoming).

 

This paper aims to explore the role of local implementers who participate in national pilot schemes, and investigate the effect of pilots on local organisations through interviews with directors of local authority social services (i.e. long-term care) in England. It explores the role of local authorities in national policy piloting, using three theoretically informed perspectives that we have used to analyse our data: (1) local implementers dominated by the centre and dependent on the whims of national policy-makers (‘top-down’); as (2) local policy actors who have a considerable degree of autonomy and who choose to participate as they see fit (‘bottom-up’); or as (3) public sector organisations that voluntarily subjugate themselves to the disciplinary power of the centre, a practice referred to as Anglo-governmentality (Miller and Rose, 2008; Ferlie and McGivern, 2014). This analysis will build on previous work that examined the purpose of policy piloting, and the confusion arising from the fact that national policy-makers, local implementers and external evaluators tended to have different, sometimes conflicting objectives for pilots and evaluations (Ettelt et al., 2015). The aim of this paper is to contribute to the emerging literature on policy piloting as a strategy for policy implementation and to understand better the tensions arising from using policy piloting as an approach to policy implementation.

 

References:

Ettelt S, Mays N, Allen P (2015): The multiple purposes of policy piloting and their consequences: Three examples from national health and social care policy in England. Journal of Social Policy 44 (2): 319-337.

Ettelt S, Mays N (forthcoming): Policy pilots as public sector projects. In: Hodgson D, Fred M, Bailey S, Hall P (eds.): The projectification of the public sector. New York/Abingdon Taylor and Francis: 19-34.

Ferlie E, McGivern G (2014): Bringing Anglo-governmentality into public management scholarship: the case of evidence-based medicine in UK health care. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 24: 59-83.

Miller P, Rose N (2008): Governing the present: administering economic, social and personal life. Cambridge, Polity Press.

CO-AUTHORS
Stefan Verweij (University of Groningen)
ABSTRACT

Over forty years ago, Wildavsky stated that “planning has become so large that the planner cannot encompass its dimensions [...]. Planning protrudes in so many directions, the planner can no longer discern its shape” (1973:127). Perhaps as a consequence, spatial planning literature has shown little interest in the distinctive nature of the different phases that constitute the planning process. In this paper, we argue that distinguishing between the plan development and plan implementation processes in planning helps to address and overcome the implementation problems that spatial planning processes encounter. More in particular we argue that the capacity to implement spatial plans depends on the institutional capacity that is built during plan development.

 

During plan development, different actors engage in collaborative processes in which intellectual, social, and political capital are built (Breukers & Wolsink, 2007; Healey et al., 2017). Intellectual capital refers to the exchange, inclusion, and exclusion of knowledge resources in collective processes. Social capital refers to the mutual trust, reciprocity and cooperative spirit in the network of relationships. Finally, political capital concerns the ability of actors to activate the other actors in the network to act collectively on a given issue.

 

The built capitals enable actors to collectively identify and define the planning challenge, and to formulate a plan to deal with it. The end of the plan development accumulates in the institutionalization of the plan and the built capital. This often takes shape in an institutional arrangement such as a contract or covenant that binds actors together in an organization. For example, the plan development for a highway corridor is followed by a contracting and procurement process resulting in a contract, creating a public-private partnership. Importantly, at that point, the nature of the planning process changes: the plan is defined as a project with concrete deadlines and measurable goals, the set of actors involved changes, and new types of relations are formed. The major risk is that this results in the loss of the intellectual, social, and political capital that was built in the plan development phase. The consequence is that this obstructs efficient and successful plan implementation.

 

In this paper, using primary data (documents, interviews) and secondary data (published case studies), we will comparatively analyze six Dutch water and infrastructure planning cases: the flood risk management projects Noordwaard, IJsseldelta, and Deventer as part of the Room for the River program (i.a., Busscher et al., 2017; 2018), the National Collaboration Program on Air Quality (i.a., Busscher, 2014), and the infrastructure development and management projects A2 Maastricht and A15 Maasvlakte-Vaanplein (i.a., Verweij, 2015). Our analysis shows (1) the gap between plan development and implementation, (2) how built capacity is lost, and how it can be (3a) regained or (3b) retained. Our study offers building blocks for an institutional design of the planning process that enables planners to organize the transition from plan development to implementation in such a way that built capacity is retained and can be deployed for successful implementation.

CO-AUTHORS
Bob Hudson (University of Kent)
David Hunter (Newcastle University)
Redgate Sam (Newcastle University)
ABSTRACT

Background:

There is increasing awareness that policies do not succeed on their own merit. Observations of policy design at a macro level and policy implementation at meso/micro levels are depicting  a more complex, but more realistic, picture of the policy process. In 2014, the UK Government passed new social care  legislation, The Care Act, in England which introduced a new approach to supporting adults with social care needs, and the delivery of adult social care services. The Government recognised that implementation  would be complex, particularly given multi-level governance issues, and a decision was taken to provide an implementation support programme (ISP). The factors that shape and influence implementation are complex, multi-faceted and multi-levelled with public policies invariably resembling ‘wicked problems’ so-called because they are resistant to change, have multiple possible causes, and solutions that vary in place and time according to local context (Rittel and Webber 1973; Australian Public Service Commission 2012).   Research was, therefore, commissioned to establish whether this particular approach to implementation support was effective and examine whether other current and previous national ISPs provided additional insights to developing future ISPs . 

 

 Methods:

In order to understand more generally issues related to implementing national policy programmes at a local level, analysis of relevant theoretical and conceptual literature was undertaken alongside a review of relevant evaluations of previous policy programmes. This data was used to inform an analytical framework and set of criteria associated with successful policy implementation. In addition, empirical research focusing on the process and impact of the Care Act 2014 ISP at national, regional and local levels was undertaken. This included review of documentation related to the implementation support process, interviews with senior staff involved at national and regional levels, and six local case studies where interviews with senior managers, operational staff, local providers and service users/carers were undertaken.

 

Results

I Implementation of the Care Act built upon pre-existing and established policy consensus. This, linked to national and local governance structures, led to no reported challenge in terms of the legitimacy of the policy. A hallmark feature of the ISP was the development of stakeholder support. Strong and effective relationships at a national level were evident and clear stakeholder involvement in policy design and policy implementation was identified. We identified the key factors behind policy failure by exploring different approaches to supporting policy implementation arising from the Care Act ISP and those developed to support other policy programmes, and drawing on conceptual frameworks of McConnell (2015) and Matland (1995) by developing a tentative framework for assessing the role and effectiveness of ISPs. 

 

References:

Australian Government (2014), Policy Implementation, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Matland, R (1995), Synthesising the implementation literature: the ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 5(2), pp145-74

McConnell, A (2015), What is policy failure? A primer to help navigate the maze, Public Policy and Administration, 30(3-4) pp 221-242

Rittel, H.W. and Webber, M.M., 1973. Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy sciences, 4(2), pp.155-169.

CO-AUTHORS
Eva Lieberherr (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)
ABSTRACT

Water systems are experiencing highly dynamic and conflicting societal demands and environmental challenges. The expanding yet at the same time ageing water infrastructures, which are typically governed by hierarchical structures, tend to lack the flexibility to adapt to population growth, continued urbanization and climate change-related challenges. The implementation of modular water systems, characterized by decentralization, automation and mass production, into centralized infrastructures could mitigate those challenges, enabling radically different and potentially more resource efficient and environmentally sustainable water management. Nonetheless, the existence of technological alternatives has not changed the continuous reliance on tried-and-true solutions. A central issue influencing the implementation of modular water is the existence of supportive governance arrangements.  However, there is little insight into the needed policy instruments and managing structures. For instance, it remains an open question whether centralized governance structures can be simply adapted or new tools and arrangements need to be developed for the integration of small modular units into a large centralized infrastructure. Some researchers argue that the type of governance ultimately depends on the scale of each infrastructure. However, this observation does not consider complex systems, leaving the question what type of governance arrangement is needed for governing simultaneously small- and large-scale (hybrid) water systems ultimately unanswered.
From a public management perspective, we investigate the governance configurations that enable the implementation of modular water systems and the socio-environmental context within which they exist. Through our previous research and the inclusion of new environmental governance theories, we identified relevant cases that have already implemented small modular systems into their established water infrastructure and determined potentially necessary instruments and mechanisms. In a first step, we identify the different governance arrangements in place for modular technology. For this analysis, we draw on Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and specifically on the action situation in order to map the actor constellation. We analyze the set of actors involved in the organization and management of the implemented systems, their positions (central government, arm’s length regulators, private actors) and their decisional competences. By providing an actor analysis we will shed light on the “shadow of hierarchy”-thesis and examine to what degree the premises of new environmental governance are currently employed in the water management of hybrid systems. In a second step, we use the set-theoretic approach of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) for the analysis of our case studies that we selected from an extensive literature review, testing whether regulatory instruments, incentives, information instruments, horizontal accountability and participationare sufficient and/or necessary conditions for the successful implementation of modular water systems. We accordingly model the complex causal relation of instruments and mechanisms that support or hinder successful policy implementation, in our case the simultaneous governing and organization of small- and large-scale water systems.

CO-AUTHORS
Aldo Valentim (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul)
ABSTRACT

Implementing Cultural Public Policies through Social Organizations in Brazil: risks of bureaucratic backsliding

 

LEITE, Leonardo Queiroz. FGV-EAESP, Brazil.

VALENTIM, Aldo. UFRGS, Brazil.        

 

         In Brazil, the challenges of implementing public policies are rooted not only on historical processes and subsequent economic crises, but especially on the persistence of bureaucratic administration, with old organizational arrangements, anachronistic laws and rigidity in managing human and material resources. So, there is a belief that the State must intervene excessively with its general laws, focus on processes and excessive control by the courts, generating a state gigantism that creates an expensive, slow and inefficient public machine that jeopardizes the implementation of public policies and the delivery of good public services to the citizens.

 

         In an attempt to change this paradigm, in the wave of the philosophy of the New Public Management, centered on the idea of state efficiency, Minister Bresser Pereira during the 1st. Administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-1998), launched in the country the 1995 Managerial Public Management Reform which provoked, besides an intense debate, several changes in the structure of the state.

 

         To implement the changes, the Master Plan of the Reform of the State Apparatus (1995) presented the main guidelines to implement the Managerial Public Administration, in contrast with the bureaucratic paradigm. At the core of the reform was the division of functions in a structural model that attributed different types of management according to the nature of the function to be performed. Therefore, we had the idea of "exclusive activities of the State", activities that could be developed by private markets and activities that could be developed by society civil in cooperation with the so-called third sector.

 

         Therefore, what we call Social Organizations (SOs) were born. The main ideia of this new organizational entity was to separate financing and execution of public services through agreements signed by governments with nonprofit organizations, based on pre-defined targets and performance indicators. Inspired by the UK quangos, the SO model was essentially aimed at avoiding the rigidity of rules in the public sector (especially concerning purchasing and HR constraints) while improving performance.

 

         When it comes to cultural policies, there was no need for these activities to be committed to the traditional bureaucracy of the typical and exclusive activities of the state. They could perfectly continue to exist as public policies, but its management from now on should be carried out by vocational and qualified associations of the third sector.

 

         In this modality, the activities of the organization cease to be directly performed by the bureaucratic structure and methods and begin to dedicate itself exclusively in the search of results in the implementation of the policies that management, having as a better goal the better and with more quality delivery of these public services to the citizens.

 

         The impacts of the 1995 Brazilian Managerial Reform had repercussions at the subnational level, when states and municipalities have adopted such a model to manage a number of specific public policies, especially culture and health. In the State of São Paulo, the largest and most relevant of the federation, a Law in 1988 established the reform and the first management contracts were signed in 2004. Today, there are about 18 social organizations of culture, that manage 99 % of the culture programs of the Government of the State of São Paulo.

 

         However, nowadays this model is threatened by the conservatism of the organs of control and ideological bias in the discussions about the role of the state and ways of implementing public policies. With diverse norms, laws and decrees, the management model by social organizations is being forced to follow exclusive bureaucratic public administration procedures, putting in check a management model that aims to implement public policies, through partnership with civil society, allied to the agility, quality and the focus on the results instead of on the procedures.

 

         In this context, our proposal aims to present a brief overview of the Bresser reform and its impacts on subnational governments. To do that, we will analyze the specific case study of social organizations of culture in the State of Sao Paulo during 2004 to 2018, the period where a large number of projects were implemented following the SOs model, reflecting on the challenges faced by the model, especially the threat of bureaucratic backsliding. To do that, besides the literature review of theoretical and empirical elements of the management model, we intend to do documental analysis and semi-structured interviews with some key actors of the process.

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Contemporary health policies constitute a real challenge in terms of collaborations, in the sense that they request cross-sectoral or cross-organisational collaborations (Clavier & Gagnon, 2013; Crosby & Bryson, 2010) as an answer to complex societal problems (Daviter, 2017). Beside this, those new policies also show an evolution in the policy piloting process as an increasing responsibility is delegated to field actors for interpreting those policy plans, strengthening the role of local communities within the production of public action (Bureau & Sainsaulieu, 2011; Dubois & Orianne, 2012; Genard, 2007). Those new health policies open the doors for the emergence of new intermediary professional roles, including the network coordinators.

 

With this paper, our objective is to empirically illustrate and understand those coordinators’ place and role in the Belgian forensic mental health (FMH) policy piloting and implementation processes. The FMH policy shows a clear evidence regarding this twofold trend. Six mandated local networks gathering local stakeholders were created in order to (1) organise the development of (cross-) sectoral collaborations as well as to (2) implement the policy vision at the local level. For each network two coordinators were mandated by the public federal authorities.

 

This paper is based on a qualitative research combining three different methods of data collection. It includes policy and network document analysis, thirty-five semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from the FMH field and fifteen observations of (federal and network) meetings. This methodology allowed us to follow the implementation and construction processes of the FMH policy plan since 2016 at different levels of action.

 

Our research allowed us to understand that FMH coordinators play a key role regarding the twofold trend of contemporary health policies. The paper will show that they are sorts of “reform leaders” (Denis & Van Gestel, 2015), responsible for managing the implementation process. Each coordinator is both the “delegated translator” (Thunus, 2014) of a policy plan as well as the local stakeholders’ spokesperson. Furthermore, as for middle managers and boundary spanners, they are responsible for disseminating new ideas and knowledge across organisational and sectoral boundaries (Kimble, Grenier, & Goglio-Primard, 2010; Oldenhof, Stoopendaal, & Putters, 2016; Pichault & Schoenaers, 2012; Radaelli & Sitton-Kent, 2016). Coordinators are thus “more than passive linking pins, transmitting senior manager instructions unquestioningly down the organization” (Harding et al., 2014, p.1215).

 

This knowledge translation and sharing allow to articulate the different stakeholders’ visions, interests and to ‘align among differences’ (Quick & Feldman, 2014). Horizontally, the coordinator draws linkages between local actors, allowing him to produce a coordinated action. Vertically, the coordinator forms the link between street-level implementation actions and formal stated policy (Gofen, 2013) and thus ensure a continuous mutual adaption between ‘what is wanted’ and ‘what is done’. In conclusion, we aim to demonstrate that the coordinator thus emerges as one of the key players of contemporary policy making and implementing processes, to whom a certain political responsibility is indirectly transferred since they directly influence the production and the structuring of the public action.

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Contemporary policy coordination studies rely on the assumption that it emerges as a response to the problem of fragmented government action. The nature of public problems, decentralization processes and the proliferation of increasingly specialized agencies due to New Public Management (NPM) reforms strive the need for tackling the issue of a constantly fragmented government action (Bouckaert, Peters, & Verhoest, 2010; Cejudo & Michel, 2017). However, as scholars from different disciplines argue (Duran & Lazega, 2015; Feiock, 2013; Lindblom, 1965), coordination also has to acknowledge the set of mutual dependencies of the actors involved in policy implementation. That is, how their actions affect and get affected by others. This leads to analyze policy coordination in two levels: one institutional (fragmentations) related to the distribution of powers (what actors are allowed to do); and other relational, of mutual dependencies and determined by the strategic behavior of actors.
Drawing on the case of Air Quality Policy in Mexico City, the aim of the paper is to look at how these two dimensions have developed on the policy coordination processes through time, leading to different outputs. For that purpose, the institutionalization of such processes will be traced. The research question is: How and why does governance arrangements and the strategic behaviors of actors and organizations define the institutionalization of policy coordination in cities?
The argument is as follows: The shifts in governance arrangements change the distribution of powers by giving different attributions to actors at some point in time. In addition, actors are inherently dependent and they rely on how actors and organization strategically manage their resources. The interplay between both of them is what determines policy coordination.
Cities are an ideal place to witness the whole span of fragmentations and dependencies that take place in policy implementation because they have to deal with different governance levels: internal or local governance; vertical or multi level governance; and horizontal or metropolitan governance.
The research is carried out through a historical tracing of policy coordination processes in cities. Taking insights from Historical Institutionalism, it first looks for the changes on the formal distribution of powers through time. This is followed by the analysis on the interactions in policy implementation, mostly driven by literature from sociology of organizations. Data has been collected through interviews, laws, norms and policy documents.

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

This paper examines how implementation is shaped in a multi-level, multi-actor 'regime'. It draws lessons from an extensive ethnographic study of the management of migrants with a precarious legal status in Europe, spanning seven countries and more than 20 institutional actors over four years (Eule, Borrelli, Lindberg and Wyss 2018). Here, implementation arrangements and variations in implementation outcomes are heavily influenced by certain distinguishable aspects - particularly the law, political interventions, organisational structures and agents' perspectives on and expectations towards these arrangements (see also Eule 2014). Furthermore, the the multi-layered, multi-level and multi-actor nature of migration control itself has an impact on policy application, with inherent contradictions and feedback effects that cannot be related to individual aspects that shape implementation arrangements. This results in perpetuated decision-making lags, people stuck in a bureaucratic limbo as well as heavily unpredictable outcomes. The paper thus suggests an implementation regime approach, chanelling the migration regime approach (Hess and Kasparek 2010; Pott, Rass, and Wolff 2018; Horvath, Amelina, and Peters 2017; Eule et al. 2018), that pays close attention to the contradictions of sense-making and disaggregation of power that occurs within implementation arrangements.

 

 

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

The divergence between what is formally established in a policy and what actually happens has traditionally been defined in the literature as an implementation problem; however, there is still a lack of knowledge regarding the complexity of the phenomenon and the mechanisms behind this divergence. Particularly at the street-level it is necessary to understand what role citizens play in their encounters with the street-level bureaucrats (SLB) and the effect this encounters has on divergences. This paper uses the case of the Mexican Conditional Transfer Program Prospera to answer the question: How do the negotiations between SLB and program beneficiaries determine the differences at the street-level in the implementation of the program? Through in-depth interviews with SLB´s of health and education sectors, their supervisors and beneficiaries, as well as on-site observation during street-level interactions, I study how citizens and SLB negotiate (non)compliance with the rules and processes of program implementation. The hypotheses are: 1) the citizens are not passive but active actors and excercize their agency in their encounters with the SLB’s; 2) the street-level interaction between frontline workers and citizens takes place in a context of organizational gap, which causes a low degree of transparency and a high degree of discretion; 3) due to this organizational gap, there are different degrees of negotiation in terms of intensity and room for maneuver; and 4) the existence of this negotiation allows the actors, both SLB’s and citizens, to deal with the daily burdens imposed by the program. In that sense, the Prospera program is legitimized and remain working, not because the rules of implementation are fully complied with, but on the contrary, since the negotiation of compliance allows a flexible framework of action for the actors at the street level. This work contributes both to the implementation and non-compliance literature by arguing that citizens, just as the SLB’s, are policy makers, not policy takers and that they exercise agency in their encounters with the SLB to decide which rules and procedures to follow and which ones ignore depending on how that (non)compliance ease their own burden.

CO-AUTHORS
Leentje Volker (University of Twente)
ABSTRACT

As public bodies are social-politically responsible for ensuring public value, they are expected to contribute to all kinds of values, for example social innovation, solidarity and the quality of the built environment. One way of achieving public value is by policy-delivery though direct product exchanges or by indirect exchanges of services and financing between individuals, companies, social institutions, and government. This way complex networks of multiple internal and external actors develop, which creates a situation in which public organizations must cope with different logics in often conflicting value systems. Strategies to address trade-offs in the management of policy implementation are key to business optimization and of great relevance to safeguarding public value. Therefore, in this paper we look into strategy alignment practices of a Dutch public client organization and the public-private project organization in which a new participatory procurement  strategy was implemented for a city park. We answer to the question: ‘How do multiple institutional logics coexist within public organizations and how are they balanced by decision makers while safeguarding public service delivery in the built environment?’

In an ethnographic case study research, we followed the project processes bottom-up and looked into the alignment with broader organizational goals. We studied the policy implementation on participation from within the organisation, exploring the potential of combining strategy- and performance management adopting a Public Value Management perspective. We also analysed the way that public actors approach value conflicts; via iterating responses of splitting and integration, or by acceptance, embracing conflicts via the strategy of “working through”. In the period from June 2017 until December 2018 we combined the fieldwork from the public value management perspective, consisting of (a) 10 semi-structured interviews with the alderman, municipal project-group members and intermediaries, (b) 4 months of observations at the urban management department and (c) documents analysis, including websites, commission letters and various municipal programs, with collecting data from the bottom-up project perspective by (a) 9 semi-structured interviews with different external public and private institutions, (b) observations of tender pool gatherings and resident panel meetings during a period of 19 months, and (c) document analysis including (local) media coverage and the project website.

Results indicate that responses to conflicting value systems were mostly individual and defensive. The processes in which structures such as schemas, rules, norms and routines are created become guidelines for the actions of individuals, creating certainty and legitimacy of actions within and between institutions. Especially the relatively strict public tendering regulations seem to ask for a high level of creativity of the project team within the municipal governance system in ensuring the public value as initially strived for. More informal ways of organising were only found as addition to the existing formal systems, preventing sustainable organisational maturing in handling the multi-level challenge of managing often conflicting policy goals. We should therefore expand our knowledge on combining ‘old’ and ‘new’ patterns of organizational governance in safeguarding public values.

CO-AUTHORS
Maria del Carmen Pardo (CIDE)
ABSTRACT

Is implementation similar in developed and developing countries? And if not, why? Recent discussions on policy implementation and public management underline a number of important trends in implementation arrangements: a transition from government to governance (e.g. horizontal and network-based approaches; Hill and Hupe, 2014), the increase in collaborative policy implementation (Ansell, Sorensen, and Torfing, 2017), a more frequent use of information technologies (Dunleavy et al., 2006), and a growing involvement of private actors in public service provision (Thomann, Hupe, and Sager, 2017). Whether these trends  facilitate policy implementation or complicate implementation arrangements in accountability and other areas is subject to contestation. Yet the trends are mostly taken for granted as contemporary features in policy implementation in developed countries. 

 

However, the extent to which policy implementation in developing countries reflects the aforementioned trends is unclear. In these countries implementation would seem to remain mostly government-centred, with limited use of private actors, and scarce use of collaborative implementation arrangements and information technologies use. In order to show that, this paper takes nine implementation mini-cases from the Mexican experience. The cases touch on policy areas as varied as social policy, passport provision, civil service, and freedom of information, among others. We show how implementation arrangements in these areas have remained centred around governments and try to explain why that is the case. We also show that while traditional implementation "failures" are present in these cases, there are certain particularities in  countries such as Mexico that condition iomplementation processes. By looking a both policy implementation and implementation limitation in these mini-cases, we show how and why policy implementation is significantly different in developing settings.

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Implementing policies for sustainability transitions calls for intermediary actors that translate the policy aims into practical solutions. This is particularly important in cases where policies require application of new technologies, as technologies do not automatically lead to changes in practices. An example of such policies is installing apartment-level water meters that are nowadays required by regulation in Finland. Currently water consumption in blocks of flats is typically shared between all members of the housing cooperative based on a headcount, regardless of how much an individual consumes. The justifications of the new regulation include enabling fair, consumption based billing and saving of warm water. This suggests an underlying assumption that meters, when used for billing, will permanently reduce water and energy use.

Even though the regulation enables consumption based billing, the requirement can be formally fulfilled by just installing meters in each apartment but not using them for tracking water use or for billing. In the Finnish context, housing managers as well as the boards of housing cooperatives are in a crucial role when implementing policy requirements concerning the technologies applied in buildings. Housing managers often suggest to the housing cooperatives which solutions to implement and how. Thus, housing managers act as intermediaries between policy, technology, residents and their practices. .

In this study we explore the role of housing managers as intermediaries and their relationship to the different rationales such as economic, sustainability and equity issues that are used to justify decisions on how to implement the policy requirements in the practical level. Based on analysis of housing manager and representatives of housing cooperative interviews, we argue that housing managers put more emphasis on economic aspects, while representatives of housing cooperatives stress the equity aspects of apartment-level water metering and billing. Sustainability, i.e. achieving lower water and energy consumption, was given less importance in the context of apartment-level water metering.

The regulation is based on the assumption that apartment-level water meters provide a financial incentive for residents to consume less water, and that without it residents use more water than they need. The regulation does not pay attention to crucial intermediaries such as housing managers, whose interests may be in contradiction with the residents’, as housing managers strive for optimizing the costs for larger units of housing cooperatives. The case of apartment level metering raises questions on how the role of intermediaries should be considered in developing policies for change. By not specifying the actual use of a new mandatory technology the regulation provides space for innovative frontrunners, whereas others may use it as a loop hole to continue with the practices that the technology was supposed to change. In this case the technology simply becomes an additional burden in terms of investments and maintenance. Therefore one should, at the level of policy, consider how the implementation of a technology is expected to eventually facilitate a system level low-carbon transition and how the intermediaries can contribute to it.

CO-AUTHORS
Ulrika Winblad (Uppsala University )
ABSTRACT

Decommissioning is the planned process of removing, reducing or replacing healthcare services at the organisational level (Williams et al., 2017; Robert et al., 2014). Drivers for decommissioning are affordability, quality and cost-effectiveness (Harlock et al., 2017; Daniels et al., 2013), and it is an example of so-called ‘unpopular policies’ that people react strongly against (Starke, 2006). In 2014, Robert et al. explored factors and processes that facilitate the successful implementation of decisions to decommission healthcare services. They established that recommended best practices were the establishing of a strong leadership team, the engaging of clinical leaders from an early stage and the establishing of a clear rationale for change. These recommendations, however, focuses on the initial adoption, and so does the majority of implementation research in the health sciences. Yet, recently there has been a growing interest in the sustainability of implemented interventions in the health sector, where some researchers emphasize that interventions need to be continuously refined and improved within a constantly changing context, a proposition that is likely valid also for health policies such as decommissioning programmes.

 

In this study, we investigate from a sustainability perspective the implementation of an extensive decommissioning programme that started three years ago in one of the local health systems in Sweden. The programme was launched as a response to an acute – but long-lived – financial crisis. Interviews with 27 clinic managers were analysed inspired by the Dynamic Sustainability Framework that emphasizes continued learning and problem solving, ongoing adaptations between interventions and multi-level contexts, and expectations for ongoing improvement as opposed to diminished outcomes over time (Chambers et al., 2013). In the interviews, we find that many of the clinical managers responsible for enacting the changes considered the programme as static rather than something that was to be continuously refined in particular contexts. Changing and adapting the programme was rather seen as a sign of disloyalty against the other clinic managers and the leadership. Moreover, they all described a clear intensity drop after the first year. The clinic managers meant that the continued implementation was hindered by the fact that the programme was developed when the conditions in the local health systems were different. Some of them did not see the necessity of continued implementation, but rather saw other challenges as more important to tackle for the local health system to survive, primarily the increasing staff shortage. At the same time, it was clear that the clinic managers’ ‘thinking’ had changed, and that it had influenced a change in the culture at the clinics. The clinic managers had started to consider the budget and spending differently and involved the staff in efficiency improvements that changed their ways of working and treating patients. Some of these initiatives were regarded as highly sustainable. The study shows that the Dynamic Sustainability Framework may be used to analyse policy changes and not just health interventions, and may be a help when investigating the interrelation between managers/management, implementation arrangements and organizational performance.

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Policy Mandates and Organizational Compliance: Internal, External, and Spatial Determinants of the Adoption and Implementation of Emergency Power Plans by Nursing Homes and Assisted Living Facilities

 

Organizational compliance in response to policy mandates may vary due to numerous factors, which include differences in ownership (public, private, or non-profit), regulatory environments, organizational practices, and other internal and external determinants. We analyze these issues with respect to the adoption of emergency preparedness power plans by nursing homes and assisted living facilities (ALFs) in response to a policy mandate following hurricane Irma, which hit Florida in September 2017. Due to that storm, power failures at a nursing home in South Florida led to the death of 14 nursing home residents. Following this disaster, nursing homes and ALFs were required by a gubernatorial emergency order and a state legislative mandate to adopt and implement emergency preparedness power plans. However, the level and timing of organizational compliance with this mandate have varied. Using logistic regression, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) visualization techniques, and spatial modeling, we analyze several independent variables affecting plan adoption and implementation. Determinants that are analyzed include: factors internal to the organization, such as ownership and organizational practices; external determinants such as the regulatory environment, responsiveness of county officials in approving plans, resource and supply-chain constraints, physical vulnerabilities; and spatial determinants (such as proximity to the coast, location in hurricane evacuation zones, and location in metropolitan areas). The findings are expected to suggest ways to improve the design of policy mandates to improve compliance and implementation. Insights will also be gathered into the efficacy of gubernatorial vs legislative policy adoption and the politics of policy implementation processes.

 

Keywords: Policy Adoption and Implementation, Organizational Compliance, Spatial Modeling, and Policy Design

 

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Since the 1960s, political scientists had been interested in analysing if and how multilevel arrangements impact on policy implementation. This debate increased in the context of European integration where Multi-level Governance (MLG) become an instrument of policy implementation, since the implemention of several EU policies had required the elaboration of advanced multilevel governance systems to facilitate the achievement of policy objectives and targets. While the study of MLG received a great interest from a normative point of point, empirical studies that investigated if and how MLG really increases the quality of policy implementation had been limited and not always systematic. This article fits into this debate by investigating how MLG affects on policy implementation through the analysis of the implementation of four Italian and Spanish regional development programmes financed through the regional policy of the European Union (also known as Cohesion Policy). Cohesion policy implementation is a paradigm case of MLG: since the 1990s the management of EU-funded regional development programmes required the establishment of multi-level and multi-actor governance structures, and the implementation of the partnership and the regionalised programming principles. By presenting a pluri-annual qualitative empirical research on the implementation of four regional Operational Programmes characterized by different MLG arrangements and a different degree of decentralization for the management of the policy, this article shows the operation of different multi-level and multi-actor arragements across different policy stages and how they are able to increase the quality of policy implementation rather than to lead on implementation gaps. Doing so, different propositions based on a strong theoretical background are developed and they help in understanding the findings here presented.

CO-AUTHORS
Guillermo Cejudo (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica (CIDE))
Oliver Meza (Tecnologico de Monterrey)
ABSTRACT

The attempt for understanding how policy implementation recreates “policy fiction” (Brodkin 2008) has relied on the idea that policies have one sole logic of intervention, which exists in the form of a coherent model of prescriptions followed by a consistent set of actions in order to attain the main policy objective. While scholars have labeled these implementation discrepancies as policy implementation gaps (Gofen, 2013; Hupe, 2014; May, 2012, 2015; O’Toole Jr., 2000). We extend this argument by stating that policy implementation involves more than one logic of intervention, as many as the existing relevant co-producing actors participating in the implementation process. These logics organize ideas and actions of those involved in the co-production of outcomes simultaneously in a way that obscures the many-fold logic of the policy intervention.

Participatory Budgeting (PB) initiatives offer examples on the several logics unveiled within policy implementation. Around the world, PB initiatives attempt to rebuild trust in governments, create new governance arrangements and address citizens’ needs and priorities. PB’s main assumption is that it serves these three purposes equally and therefore, all those involved, by doing their own individual implementation work, will contribute to their attainment. Challenges arise when PB’s main assumption is not met, and participants value the purposes differently.

We study the PB initiative implemented in 2017 by the government of Cananea, a municipality in Northern Mexico. This was an ambitious project, used by the Ministry of public administration as a pilot program for using participatory methods to allocate resources derived from extractive industries. Following a mixed methods research design (in depth interviews, focus groups and a survey), we show how contrasting expectations resulted in distinct meanings of success among the many types of participants and therefore different implementation logics. In charge of the initiative’s design were external actors (an international organization and the Ministry of territorial development); the municipal government and citizens in Cananea participated in a co-producing scheme. Their involvement was geared towards different goals. The designers were motivated by the idea that the collaborative process itself would result in increasing citizens’ trust in their government. Local officials assumed the initiative would allow them to better understand the needs of their voters and create new interactions with citizens. Cananea citizens thought of PB as a new way to meet their individual needs.These different logics clashed at several points during the implementation process affecting not only participants’ perception of the initiative but the general resulting outcomes.

 

CO-AUTHORS
Anat Gofen (Hebrew University)
ABSTRACT

Formal policy statement is considered the end of policy design and the beginning of policy implementation. Indeed, how implementation is structured and influenced “top-down” by the policy statement has been well-documented. To focus on the overlooked upward influence of implementation, termed here “policy by foot,” this study suggests shifting from the common perspective of implementers as reacting to a formal policy decision, to a “bottom-up” perspective, which allows uncovering the ways through which implementers’ actions shape formal policy adaptation. Demonstrating policy-by-foot” draws on cantonal tobacco control policies in Switzerland, which involve multiple implementers who operate within different organizational levels and settings. Policy-by-foot emerged as threefold process First, policy implementers facing political deadlock stretch the rules by playing with existing instruments in order to impulse policy change. Second, the policy decision is progressively made in a bottom up manner during the course of implementation. Third, formal policy statement may follow actual implementers’ actions in order to reconcile a dissonance between what is exercised on the ground and what is stated as formal policy. Shifting the focus to implementation-formation reciprocity, policy-by-foot not only accords with the re-emerging critique of their well-established distinction, but also provides theoretical and practical insights for bridging policy formation and implementation.  

CO-AUTHORS
Edgar Reyes junior (Universidade de Brasília - UnB)
ABSTRACT

This theoretical essay pretends to develop the hypothesis of how decision heuristics at public policy processes contribute to improve the decision-making process, leading to more rational decisions from public officials, impacting the reach of better results in public policy implementation. The hypothesis is based on the Theory of Bounded Rationality, Neo-institutionalism and Policy Analysis, and it is believed, therefore, that decision heuristics can explain the performance in public policies. It should be emphasized that the study of institutions requires the recognition of two background conditions: the condition of social foundation and the attributes of human actors. Thus, the present essay is developed considering both background conditions. The first section of the essay seeks to clarify the attributes of the human actors considered by the Theory of Bounded Rationality. This theory considers that individuals seek to be rational, however, are constrained by limited cognitive ability and incomplete information. This approach seeks to interpret human behavior as a result of the constraints imposed by a set of "appropriate rules or exemplary behaviors" that have cognitive and normative components. Thus, this theory presents the epistemological basis of this proposal and shows which visions of the world, individual and Society it is based upon. It is the logic that underlies the proposed analysis model, since it is based on the premise that the actors involved have bounded rationality and seek heuristics capable of bringing greater rationality to the processes of policy implementation. Starting from the definition that Public Policies are decisions, being what the State does in response to political challenges. We opted for the theoretical approach of Public Policies that deals with the interrelationship between political institutions, the political process and the contents of politics, the Policy Analysis. This approach aims at a better understanding of the increasingly interactive and dynamic relational complexity of the political-administrative system in action. Considering Policy Analysis's approach, Neo-institutionalism appears as the theoretical orientation that offers the set of premises to the proposed approach. This theoretical current emphasizes the relative autonomy of political institutions and is a theoretical alternative in which institutions return to assume the role of variables that explain the political dynamics of the actors on an empirical basis. It is in this context that the intention is to identify structuring elements of governance that can contribute to improve performance in public policies. Finally, Public Policy Governance is reached, understood as a model of coordination of certain institutional arrangements, which is the central aspect of our hypothesis, which seeks to explore the evidence that governance, as a rational heuristic of the decision-making process can generate positive impacts on the results achieved by public policies.