LIST OF PANELS

The diffusion of liberal market-based systems since the end of the cold war transformed national economic governance. Worldwide, policy reforms in favour of liberalization have been adopted in a wide range of sectors, such as finance, trade, utilities, etc. The adoption of liberalization policies is typically accompanied with institutional reforms promoting technocratic and de-politicized regulatory governance, in particular through the creation of regulatory agencies operating at arm’s length from the executives (Jordana et al. 2011). While much of the work on market governance through regulatory agencies has focused on democratic or democratizing settings in building new theoretical frameworks, these developments in non-democratic settings have received much less attention. Yet, in autocratic settings too, liberal policies have been adopted and the institutions in charge of economic governance are often not strictly controlled by the executive and enjoy varying degrees of autonomy in managerial, organizational and administrative domains (Apaydin 2018, Koop 2020). The goal of this panel is to unpack the transformation of economic governance in authoritarian contexts, by bringing together scholars to initiate a discussion for conceptualizing and theorizing these processes.

At first sight, the diffusion of liberal policies and de-politicized market governance seems ill-suited to autocratic regimes where the rent-seeking behaviour of the ruling elite shall require keeping the economy under control. Yet, recent work suggests that the global diffusion of economic liberal policies and the corresponding institutions for market regulatory have also pervaded autocratic settings. This raises many questions. What does market governance in autocratic contexts look like? To what extent do authoritarian regimes download vs adapt (or divert) the institutional blueprints promoted by international investors and actors? What are the factors pushing autocratic regimes to adopt market governance institutions? What kind of relationships between ruling elites and regulatory agencies can we observe? To what extent do the former try and manage to control the latter? What are the consequences of the transformation of economic governance on autocratic regimes themselves? Do these economic institutions have feedback effects on the elite’s capacity to extract the rent and consolidating their power? These issues are obviously subject to empirical variation and we are particularly interested in exploring their different manifestations.

The transformation of economic governance in the face of liberalization processes in autocratic settings has remained largely overlooked, by both scholars working on market regulation and governance and specialists of economic policies in autocratic settings. On the one hand, the knowledge that we have accumulated on regulatory governance has been built based on an empirical field constituted almost exclusively of democratic countries. Investigating these issues in non-democratic contexts promises to deliver new insights on the diffusion, the manifestation, explanatory factors and impacts of regulatory governance. On the other hand, specialists of economic policies in authoritarian settings have rather focused on direct government interventions in the marketplace (Ross 2001, Bellin 2004, Posusney 2004). Turning the spotlight on economic governance will provide new insights on the functioning of autocratic regimes and improve in particular our understanding of the mechanisms underpinning autocratic survival.

Apaydin, F. (2018). Regulating Islamic banks in authoritarian settings: Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates in comparative perspective. Regulation & Governance, 12(4), 466-485.
 
Bellin, E. (2004). The robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in comparative perspective. Comparative politics, 139-157.

Jordana, J., Levi-Faur, D., & i Marín, X. F. (2011). The global diffusion of regulatory agencies: Channels of transfer and stages of diffusion. Comparative political studies, 44(10), 1343-1369.

Koop, C., & Kessler, P. (2020). Keeping control of regulation? Domestic constraints on the creation of independent authorities in emerging and developing economies. Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12523

Posusney, M. P. (2004). Enduring authoritarianism: Middle East lessons for comparative theory. Comparative Politics, 127-138.

Ross, M. L. (2001). Does oil hinder democracy?. World politics, 325-361.

To address these questions, we want to constitute a group of scholars working on market regulation and governance in authoritarian settings. We are primarily interested in those sectors that have typically been subject to liberalization processes in the last decades. Obvious cases are utilities (electricity, telecommunications, water, postal services), areas related to the financial sector (banking, securities, insurances, etc.) as well as transversal economic reforms directly related to market making dynamics such as the creation of competition authorities. Other sectors that are related to markets or economic governance will also be considered. Specifically, we expect studies focusing on autocratic settings. This category is understood loosely. Papers that focus on countries that are in a grey zone between democracies and autocracies or that evolving towards (or away from) authoritarianism are also welcome as long as autocratic characteristics of the country under study are a relevant dimension of the analysis. The same applies to comparisons between democratic and autocratic cases. In terms of questions, we are very open. Papers addressing the dynamics of market governance in autocratic settings, their determinants, or their impact are all welcome. Whereas comparative studies will be particularly appreciated (both based on large or small-n), single case studies are also welcome.