Format

P02. Policy transfer in the ‘Asian century’: When Asia exports policies to the rest of world

COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICY
PANEL CHAIR(S)
Giulia Romano
Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), University Duisburg-Essen
Main chair
Kidjie Saguin
University of Melbourne
Second chair
CATEGORISATION
POLICY TOPIC
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICY
SECTOR
—
KEYWORDS
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GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE

The 21st century is touted as the period where the center of world shifts back to Asia. The popular and scholarly discourse around the ‘rise of Asia’ has been predicated around the “ubiquitous and inevitable” unraveling of the dogmas and traditions in public policy based on Western standards (Bice and Sullivan 2014, 539). The lessons drawn from the management of the COVID-19 is set to turbocharge the deepening of the ‘Asian Century’ and highlight what the world can learn from Asian pandemic response (Abbas and Michael 2020; Patel and Sridhar 2020). These developments prompt new critical thinking about ability of mainstream policy theories to account for heterogeneity in cultural and administrative values, and to explain how the difference in formal and informal institutions influence actions of individual policy actors (Van der Wal 2015, Van der Wal and Yang 2015). It provides a critical proxy for sparking our thinking about how these contemporary challenges may “revolutionize public policy: how it is defined, what it addresses, and how it is implemented and managed” (Bice and Sullivan 2014, 540).

 

No concept is more important to re-appraise than policy transfer. Defined broadly as the adoption of public policies from one jurisdiction to another, policy transfer studies have historically focused on policy transfers occurring in the Northern hemisphere and among Western countries (Jacoby 2000, Marsh and Sharman 2009). While recent studies illustrate the dynamics of policy transfers in the ‘rest’ of the world (e.g. Dussauge Laguna, 2013; Common 2017; Liu and Wang 2018; Romano 2020), how Asian countries export policies out of the region remain largely unexamined. Studies from Latin American scholars have illustrated the role and contribution of regional powers such as Brazil (Porto de Oliveira 2017; de Sa e Silva 2017), or countries such as Colombia (Montero 2017) in the global diffusion of policy models like participatory budgeting and conditional cash transfers. Systematic understanding of the broader diffusion patterns from Asia continues to patchy because studies tend to focus on city-to-city transfer of various economically advanced states like Singapore, Japan and South Korea (Pow 2014, Lee and Hwang 2012). Lesser known are policy transfers from China (Porto de Oliveira and Romano 2022), despite the activism of the country in diffusing its policy ideas, models and approaches, already from the early decades of the PRC. Even less well known are policy transfers from countries that are commonly seen as importers of public policies, such as the Philippines, who recently became active in spreading its migration management model (Saguin and Shivakoti 2022).

 

This proposed panel aims to interrogate policy transfer from Asia to the rest of the world. It is motivated by the need to appraise the applicability of policy transfer theories in understanding how and why Asian countries disseminate policies and models both in the region and in other parts of the world. Ultimately, it asks the question, is there an Asian-style of policy transfer (Saguin and Sha 2021)? How can we modify policy transfer studies to accommodate such style?

 

The panel will take place onsite.

CALL FOR PAPERS

Given that policy transfer is a widely researched topic across disciplines, this panel is envisioned to be interdisciplinary.  We encourage papers that approach policy transfer from various disciplinary lenses – policy mobilities, policy assemblages, policy diffusion and policy circulation – to examine how policies that originate from Asia is challenging our contemporary understanding of public policy. Single case studies, comparative case analyses and descriptive historical analyses are most welcome, specially if the paper addresses one or more of the following research questions:

 

1.    What are the specific strategies Asian countries do adopt in promoting their ‘recipes’ to the rest of world? How are they unique or different from contemporary examples?

2.    Why are these countries promoting their solutions? What narratives accompany the promotion of solutions?

3.    Which actors and agencies are involved in their promotion? Are the actors actually uniquely configured?

4.    Are the objects (e.g. ideas, instruments, institutions) they transfer different from what we have already observed?

5.    What is the impact of these transfers? Does the fact that some Asian countries can be considered as developing countries make it easier to transfer their solutions?

 

These are just some of the preliminary questions this panel aims to answer. The goal is to start building the blocks for a comparative conversation that allows us to better understand the phenomena of policy transfer and to contribute to theoretical development through the consideration of regions that have been ‘under the radar’ for a long time. For this reason, we invite papers that focus on Asian countries as exporters of policy solutions and that can answer some of the questions outlined above.

ACCEPTED
Format
01 - Situational Differences, Learning Autonomy and Policy transfer: The movement of the river chief system in China
David Dolowitz (University of Liverpool)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Much has been written about policy learning and transfer over the past 20-years.  However little of this has examined the role of transfer within China. We propose to start addressing this by linking the concept of learning in the movement of the river chief system from its original setting in Wuxi to Suqian, Nantong, Suzhou and Huzhou. To do this we will examine learning in relation to situations that have allowed local agents to act autonomously in the transfer and learning processes and compared them to situations where local agents were acting under some form of coercion to engage in transfer.  Based on the findings from our cases we argue that despite what is often presented, when transfer involves a high degree of learning and local adaptation successful outcomes are not guaranteed.  Similarly, despite situations where local agents were ‘forced’ into a copy of a model, there is no guarantee that it will result in failure.  As such, not only must learning be examined in the transfer process but so to must be the situational circumstances surrounding the transfer and the receiving system.

ACCEPTED
Format
02 - The making of “Digital Pakistan” with Chinese tools : a case study of technology transfers along China’s Digital Silk Roads
Nowmay Opalinski (Université Vincennes Saint-Denis (Paris VIII))
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Under the so-called “Digital Silk Road”, infrastructure building and exportation of ICT systems and services are progressively expanding China’s influence in the digital realm. In different parts of the Global South Chinese companies have succeeded in becoming local authorities’ favored partner in their quest for digitalization. Pakistan is at the forefront of this trend since the much-advertised CPEC framework also entails ICT investments impacting the core structure of Pakistan’s Internet such as fiber-optic networks, safe city systems, data center etc.

 

The purpose of this paper will be to map out the processes of technology transfers coming from China to Pakistan by identifying the agents showcasing the Chinese ICT solutions, disclosing their motivations, and their integration in domestic and international structures in China and Pakistan. Moreover, an historical overview of Chinese ICT ventures in Pakistan is necessary to explain why the country is a historical testing ground for Chinese tech companies looking for internationalization since the end of the 1990’s.

 

We will try to answer the following research questions: How are Chinese tech companies becoming unavoidable partners in Pakistan’s quest for digitalization? How do they adapt their corporate practices to the local landscape?

 

Based on more than 50 interviews conducted in Pakistan from March to June 2022, this paper wishes to contribute to the literature of South-to-South policy transfers following the research framework formulated in Giulia Romero and de Oliveira’s Brazil and China in Knowledge and Policy Transfer (2021) disclosing the agents, their motivations, the structures involved as well as the timeline of the transfers.

 

We also wish to add another perspective to the study of policy transfers by expanding the scope of the reflection to the subdomain of digital technology transfers. Whereas policy transfer studies usually focus on governmental institutions, public and private companies are the main engine of technology transfers with specific practices which need to be further investigated.

 

Our analysis tends to go against the mainstream view that the Chinese government is the main craftsman behind the success of Chinese technical standard exports abroad. On the contrary our field investigations showed that locals’ agency plays a pivotal role in the adoption of Chinese technological tools.

 

Through a case-by-case analysis of Chinese companies ventures in Pakistan we will see how Chinese ICT companies use Pakistan as their laboratory and how they constantly must negotiate and bargain with local actors to materialize their prospects. Our empirical results highlight that Chinese companies’ responses depend on their corporate structure (public/private companies) and their outreach capabilities to Chinese state institutions at different levels (state/provincial-level).

 

Another major outcome of our research is the disclosure of local intermediaries’ key role in connecting Chinese companies to their Pakistani clients. Because of the absence of a long-established and sizeable Chinese overseas community in Pakistan these actors are the main facilitators of technology transfers and even sometimes contribute to the tailoring of Chinese technical tools to local needs. Finally, bidirectional transfers occur, giving a complex picture of technology transfers, with a hybridization of Chinese solutions within the Pakistani context.

ACCEPTED
Format
03 - Policy transfers along the Belt and Road Initiative: exploring the case of smart city transfer to Duisburg
Giulia Romano (Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), University Duisburg-Essen)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Many articles and books have already been written on the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but only recently has research been oriented towards the analysis of its effects on the ground. In particular, recent research by urban geographers has begun to explore the impacts of the BRI on the cities situated on its transport corridors. Among them, some studies suggested that the BRI is also supporting the diffusion of Chinese models of urbanisation. Taking a cue from this literature, this article aims to explore these questions through the angle of policy transfer studies. The method chosen is the analysis of a single case study: the collaboration between the Chinese company Huawei and the city of Duisburg (Germany) for smart city development. Its analysis helps derive some lessons on the possibility of the BRI to transmit urban knowledge and policies from China, especially to Western countries. As a matter of fact, this project was not implemented as originally intended by the cooperating partners, resulting in a sort of 'failed transfer'. Communication challenges and different ways of working have made a more intense collaboration between the Chinese company and the administration of the German city difficult. While some of the ideas proposed by Huawei have been picked up later by the local administration, none of the projects pertaining to smart city development has been implemented with the help of the Chinese company. These findings suggest that cultural factors and effective communication may significantly matter in the policy transfer process, and require that we study them more closely in the analysis of policy transfer processes.

ACCEPTED
Format
04 - Lost in Transfer – African Interpretations of China’s Foreign Policy Discourse
Georg Lammich (Universität Duisburg-Essen)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

China's normative influence on African policy and politics requires recognition of the different dynamics of discourse and practice in the Chinese and African settings. Much attention has been paid to how China has restructured its Africa policy over the years and to deciphering China's rhetorical adjustments that reflect a more viable approach to African realities. This does not always mean that African actors have responded to, or even taken note of, these changes. There are several factors that prevent African governments from simultaneously adapting to China's policy shifts. In some cases, these factors are intrinsic, based on the domestic priorities of African policymakers who have come to terms with a particular interpretation of China's role on the continent and see no advantage in adjusting their policies. In other cases, the discrepancy stems from the complexity of the discourse itself. The character of Chinese foreign policy, with its layered discourses and encapsulated meanings, underpinned by figurative and symbolic semantics and written in a logographic system, complicates the literal but also ideational translation of concepts emerging in China into monosomic terms. Political concepts that are well understood by Chinese academics and politicians can thus change their character and meaning when transferred to the African context. The vague nature (at least from the outside) of many of these concepts promoted by Beijing leaves a lot of room for interpretation, which African governments use to shape their own priorities as they see fit.

ACCEPTED
Format
05 - The Philippines as a Developmental Migration State: From Exporting Migrant Workers Labour to Exporting Migration Policies
Richa Shivakoti (Toronto Metropolitan University)
CO-AUTHORS
Kidjie Saguin (University of Melbourne)
ABSTRACT

Just as the global movement of people intensifies, so does the transfer and diffusion ofpolicies for migration control. Emerging economies have turned to labour exportation policies as a deliberate development strategy, driving up the demand for the adoption of ‘successful’ policies or ‘best practices’ to promote and regulate labour migration. Why and how such transnational movement of policies in labour migration occur remain largely under-researched. Much of the field has been concerned primarily with examining how migration governance structures or global agreements establish converging policies towards controlling labour migration at the receiving country. Less attention goes to understanding how labour sending countries have become the source of migration policies.

 

This article explores why a commonset of labour migration practices diffused among large labour sending countries. It uses the Philippines as a country case of a source of these practices as evidenced by the diffusion of some elements of the Philippine model of labour migration to other parts of Asia (e.g. Nepal). The article compares three labour migration policies by the Philippine government that had been adopted elsewhere by other migrant-sending nations: mainstreaming of migration into development plans, pre-departure orientation seminars (PDOS) and the migrant worker welfare fund. The comparison is done to determine why and which elements of the migration policies were borrowed. The paper proceeds as a contribution to the policy diffusion and transfer literature as well as migration policy studies. It conceptualizes a transnational marketplace ofideas where labour migration export policies–its ideas, goals and instruments–are shared, contested and translated. It then develops an actor-oriented framework to explaining why certain ideas are adopted. The framework is applied in the case of Philippines as a policy-exporting country. Preliminary results point to the transfer of more abstract policy knowledge rather than the specific instruments and indicate that some of these policies were shared as ‘best-practices’ through regional and international forums and international agencies facilitated the active referencing to the Philippines as a source of labour migration policies. This article highlights the role of various policy actors–government agencies, civil society organizations and private agencies–in legitimizing the spread of ‘successful’ labour migration policies

ACCEPTED
Format
06 - China’s nature-based solutions in the global South - Examples from Asia, Africa, and Latin America
Niklas Weins (Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University)
CO-AUTHORS
Annah Zhu (Wageningen University)
Tyler Harlan (Loyola Marymount University)
Jin Qian (Wageningen University)
ABSTRACT

China increasingly engages in environmental diplomacy through south-south cooperation across the developing world. Since 2019, the rise of the discourse of Nature-based Solutions (NbS) within this cooperation has been exponential. Coined just over ten years ago, NbS refers to the underexplored potential of leveraging the natural world to address global socio-environmental challenges. The concept finds particular resonance in China, where it demonstrates strong parallels with the domestically-pioneered concept of Ecological Civilization – the ruling paradigm when it comes to all realms of Chinese environmental governance. Building on the global discourse, NbS has been adapted to the Chinese context, creating what some call “Chinese-style” NbS that prioritize large-scale interventions and ecological engineering over grassroots preservation. China’s NbS are not only being pursued domestically, but also increasingly abroad through its Belt and Road Initiative. From Southeast and Central Asia to Africa and Latin America, this article surveys Chinese-led or financed projects that fall under the broad umbrella of NbS. We provide a comparative analysis of these interventions – or the conspicuous lack of such interventions – to show the current status and future prospects for China’s growing sphere of influence when it comes to advancing NbS in the global South. We find that China’s embrace of this concept in environmental diplomacy is directly related to the potential for NbS to serve as a tool for helping China’s vision of an Ecological Civilization “go global.” The consonance between the rhetoric NbS and Ecological Civilization, combined with the global reach of NbS, provides a powerful platform for taking Chinese environmental discourse to the global level.

ACCEPTED
Format
07 - Unpacking the “Many Chinas”: Provincial Specialization, State-Business Relations and Power Plants in Africa
Tianyi Wu (University of Oxford)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Chinese provincial actors have influenced the energy investment in Africa substantially, transferring domestic development models abroad yet few studies have probed into these processes. Conventional thinking is that China’s power plant building development model in Africa is predominantly controlled by strategies devised by the central government and executed by other actors. This paper argues that the models, motives and preferences diverge between China’s central and provincial actors. Based on a database of 84 power plants invested in and built by Chinese elements and a case study of power plant in Africa, this paper reveals a tendency of provincial specialization in combustion-based and hydropower power plant building in Africa. In comparison, central-level control persists in directing the development of the renewable energy industry internationally. Underpinned by notions of ‘de facto federalism’ and ‘provincial state-business alliance’, the analysis draws attention to the autonomy of provincial actors in interpreting central directives and advancing local interests when possible. Essentially, China in Africa is governed by not one but multiple parallel state-business relations.

 

Chinese capital has become a cornerstone for the continent’s energy provision in Africa.  With a total of over USD 30 billions of investment between 2000 to 2016, China has become the largest investor in the energy sector in Africa.  Between 2010 and 2015, China has contributed to 30% of newly added electricity capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The increasingly proactive engagement of China has invigorated substantial discussion on the electricity strategy of China and its ramifications for the continent.  It remains a controversial debate between those interpreting the role of China in Africa from a self-interested, rapacious, and neo-colonial perspective  and those who view China as offering new opportunities and widening policy space in productive sectors and infrastructure building.   

 

Empirical evidence seems to be ambivalent in supporting both of the claims as Chinese investments are visible in both ‘black and green’  energy. Chinese investment in global renewable power plants accounted for more than $44 billion in 2017, an increase of $12 billion from 2016.  In Africa, Chinese investment in green energy (wind, solar, biomass and geothermal) has accounted for 18% of the total project number.  Between 2010 to 2020, an increase of USD1.3 billion investment was in solar, wind and geothermal energy.  Financial commitment seems to correspond with the green ambition of the Chinese leadership’s green ambition. Emphasis on energy transition prevails in high-level political pledges, national strategies, i.e. Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), South-South Cooperation Fund on Climate Change, and regional partnership memorandums, i.e. China-Africa 10 major cooperation areas.  Meanwhile, notable Chinese investment in conventional energy continues if not expands. Chinese electricity investments in coal remains ranking the first (24.5 GW) among all types of electricity investment (81GW), whilst inputs in renewable energy, including wind (7.2GW) and solar (3.1GW), remain within the margin.  Globally, China’s investments in renewable energy also went down by 8% in 2019, which led to doubts on how committed China was to its energy transition plan.  

 

How can we understand the nature of Chinese engagement in the power plant building in Africa? Conventional thinking is that China’s agenda in Africa is predominantly controlled by strategic agendas devised by the central government and executed by other actors.  Following this logic, how can we reconcile the ‘neo-colonial’ and ‘benevolent’ tendencies that co-exist in the strategic agendas? If Chinese strategic agendas are largely guided by resource-seeking and market interests, how can we account for the increasing investment in renewable energy, a sector in which Chinese companies do not have substantial competitive advantages over European and American counterparts.  If these investments are politically driven, why has the financial commitment been unable to sustain along with the political pledges?

 

This paper argues that the motives and preferences for building power plants diverge between China’s central and provincial actors. Based on a database of 84 power plants invested in and built by Chinese elements, a case study of combustion- , hydropower- and renewable energy-based power plant building, this article reveals a tendency of provincial specialization in combustion- and hydro-based power plant building in Africa. In comparison, central-level control persists in directing the development of the renewable energy industry domestically and internationally.

ACCEPTED
Format
08 - Does opinion - WTO's stance on India's anti-dumping policy - really matter?
VARTIKA ARORA (Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay)
CO-AUTHORS
Krishnan Narayanan
ABSTRACT

Does opinion - WTO's stance on India's anti-dumping policy - really matter?

 

India’s foreign trade policy has considerably evolved in past 70 years. The trade policy choices reflect the changing rationale for using trade barriers over the period of time. Among many trade instruments, in past 25 years, anti-dumping measure has been used extensively. And during this period, India has become the most prolific user of anti-dumping, an alternative to tariff barriers. India has filed 17% of the total global antidumping petitions i.e., 1100 out of 6489 cases between 1995 to 2021. Out of which chemical and allied industries comprise around 40.9% followed by resins and plastics industries (14.4%), targeting products mainly from China. India's anti-dumping policy has been scrutinized and questioned by other Member states in the WTO's Trade Policy Review Report followed by the meeting. Till date seven Review Reports have been published by the Secretariat, beginning 1993 and latest report released in November 2020. In an effort to link TPR with the subsequent modifications to the foreign trade policy, limited public policy literature and approaches are available [DiCaprio and Gallagher (2006), Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), Shaffer (2014)] And for India, closest study to the chosen area is by Mate (2019).

The purpose of the paper is studying the various documents of the TPRM – The Secretariat Report, Note by the Government, Minutes of the Meeting - on India in particular anti-dumping mechanism; content analysis methodology is used for the document examination. The analysis provides insights about the Member states' viewpoint as well as India's position on AD. Member states: Fairly new to this mechanism as against the developed nations, India has resorted to AD measures quite frequently. During the TPR meetings, India has been frequently questioned on the logical basis for initiating high number of AD investigations targeting particular sectors and particular countries like China, Republic of Korea, and EU.

India: During first three rounds of the TPRM, India repeatedly raised concern about the developed countries extensively using AD instrument against specific Indian export items while India having a miniscule share (~1%) in the total world trade. However, in the next four TPRM rounds situation changed wherein India has to reason the extensive usage of AD mechanism. However, India’s reply has remained nearly static in every review which undermines India’s rational for choosing AD mechanism to prevent domestic injury

Hence, it can be said that India’s AD policy has been built upon its experiences with the developed countries as well as a need to increase its share in global exports. India’s AD policy stance is justified by trickle-down economics – let domestic industries file petition, and the products subjected to AD duty might open an opportunity for existing and new domestic players to engage in international trade. But, AD mechanism as a policy choice is double-edged sword, protecting domestic producers from unfair trade practices but will also most likely to make them inefficient if they are guarded for long with the possibility of retaliatory action from the trading partners.

 

 

ACCEPTED
Format
09 - China Model 2.0 and tackling social inequality: Targeted poverty alleviation in rural China
Shiwei Chen (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
CO-AUTHORS
Hong Liu (Nanyang Technological University)
ABSTRACT

The resurgence of attention to the China model appeared in early 2020s, and a growing body of literature focus on the export of the model to other developing countries. Our paper provides new evidence to argue that China is moving to the 2nd phase of economic development – to tackle the widening social inequality between rural and urban regions, coastal areas and inlands, as well as Han majority and ethnic minority frontiers, which needs to be scrutinized and re-theorized. In this article, we conduct policy analysis and draw on an ethnographic study in a rural North China ethnic minority region of the implementation of Targeted Poverty Alleviation (TPA) to propose a framework to comprehend the China Model 2.0. It challenges classical theories in political economy by allowing unconventional coexistence of free-market and authoritarian state with continuous economic growth. What is the mechanism that balances the economic freedom and political control to mediate both economic growth and political stability? One of the consequences of economic growth is increasing social inequality, and components of civil society such as social welfare divisions, NGOs and charity organizations play an important role in helping the poor in democratic countries. However, in a one-party dominant country, individual and local agencies outside of the government body that can vastly mobilise resource and have sufficient impact on a large population have usually seen as a potential threat to the political stability of its ruling, so the existence of such influential actors is unlikely to be tolerated. In this context, who takes up the role in reducing inequality and cares for the population in the bottom of the economic structure? This article illustrates the mechanism by delving into the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation (jingzhun fupin, TPA) at the ethnic minority frontier in the borderland between China, North Korea and Russia. The grassroot governors’ role in the China Model is highlighted. We argue that the economic development model in China cannot be studied alone as an economic policy but need to be examined as part of a larger political project. Only by interrogating politics and economics as one domain, we can fully grasp the essence of the China model and think about the influence of such policy transfer beyond the Chinese border.

ACCEPTED
Format
10 - Revisiting the political economy of fuel subsidy reforms: Lessons from Indonesia’s experience
Muhamad Rosyid Jazuli (University College London, University of London)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

This study aspires to examine the Indonesian fuel subsidy reform trajectory, considered complex, dilemmatic, and multi-dimensional. In the literature, there are active debates about whether the subsidies strengthen or weaken policy areas, such as economic competitiveness, fiscal flexibility, environmental issues, and national politics. Most ‘Western’ scholars argue that trimming the subventions should be a policy priority. However, they also posit that once the subsidies are in place, administrations of many countries, including Indonesia, often find it hard to reduce, let alone eliminate, them, thanks to the policy’s ‘peculiar political economy’ (Skovgaard & van Asselt, 2019; Timperley, 2021; Yusuf et al., 2017). Starting during the economic crisis in 1998, Indonesia’s fuel subsidy reforms are deemed a vibrant, excellent research case with both successful and unsuccessful episodes. Existing studies about Indonesia’s fuel subsidy reforms have stated that politics play a pivotal role in the reform policy outcomes. Little, if none, has endeavored to dig into the practical politics of the reforms empirically, for instance, by analyzing the discursive debates surrounding the reform trajectory. Using a political economy lens, mainly inspired by (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014), this study attempted to pursue such a research avenue and revisit the underpinning circumstances that shape the trajectory. This case examination attempts, importantly, to reimagine the reform trajectory as it is, as opposed to as it should be as prescribed by the existing ‘Western’ literature.

Through a discursive analysis, this study analyzed dozens of selected, relevant news articles (1998-2019) from two credible media outlets in Indonesia. The media, in the Indonesian policymaking context, plays a role as a policy debate arena—a role significantly different from that of somewhere else, like in the West. While answering the research questions, the analysis reimagines the reform trajectory alongside various actors involved. This study argues that Indonesia remains tinkering, if trapped, with the ups and downs of its reform trajectory that keeps being rife with or locked-in economic and political tensions. There has been, for instance, an unchanged, deep-seated belief that fuel subsidies are underserved, if constitutional, right of the people. This study argues that, of course, reforming, mainly reducing, fuel subsidies is an important policy target for developing nations, to be specific Indonesia. However, it is indicated that, in general, not-yet politically and economically viable countries may continuously reject subsidy reform proposals, not because the proposed policy is terrible, but naturally and contextually, the policy will not work in such a jurisdiction context. The Indonesian case shows that it is vital to reveal and understand the political and economic underpinnings of the nations before rushing to provide policy prescriptions. As of the panel, this study is expected to contribute to the understanding of “how policies that originate from Asia is challenging our contemporary understanding of public policy,” and to “theoretical development through the consideration of regions (through Indonesia’s experience) that have been ‘under the radar’ for a long time.”

ACCEPTED
Format
11 - The Model of the Developer State Put to the Test of Emergence Policies in Africa: The Case of Cameroon
Chepelin Boris ANGUISSA BEKONO (University of Yaounde 2, CERDAP, Cameroon)
CO-AUTHORS
Pierre Yvan Belinga Meka (University of yaoundé 2, )
ABSTRACT

Title : "The Model of the Developer State Put to the Test of Emergence Policies in Africa: The Case of Cameroon"

 

Summary :

 

Since the end of the "Washington Consensus", new paradigms have emerged in the field of development. After a period dominated by neoliberal, market-centric ideology, these paradigms now attribute a role to the state as the engine of development. The success encountered by this model of State in the countries of East and South-East Asia in the 1970s affected by the oil crises, will encourage the other developing countries in Latin America and recently in Africa to adopt this model to achieve their Emergence objectives. Cameroon, like all the other countries of the continent, in search of its development model, by continuing to experiment with development models designed elsewhere, will also adopt the model of the developing State, to try to get out of the slump in which its economy isstill stuck. However, the elites of this country, as in most other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, popularize and exploit the rhetoric of "emergence" through major structuring projects, for the purpose of legitimizing the governing regime. And given the mixed results of emergence projects, the neo-patrimonial character of governance, the resurgence of corruption, etc., this article seeks to understand whether the model of the developmental state as it has observed elsewhere (particularly in Asia) can serve as apanacea for the achievement of Cameroon's development objectives by Horizon 2035. This reflection tends to analyze the Developer State as a model of development inspired by the "Asian Tigers" in the 1970s and its African transformation giving rise to what we will call a Developer State "Made in Africa" ​​by doing a case study on Cameroon. And to do this, we will appeal to the theory of games and that of public action in order to understand how the games of actors in the implementation of Emergence policies provide information on the dynamics of the developmentalist State in Cameroon. . 

 

Keywords: Developing State, Emergence Policy, Governance, Cameroon. 

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Much has been written about policy learning and transfer over the past 20-years.  However little of this has examined the role of transfer within China. We propose to start addressing this by linking the concept of learning in the movement of the river chief system from its original setting in Wuxi to Suqian, Nantong, Suzhou and Huzhou. To do this we will examine learning in relation to situations that have allowed local agents to act autonomously in the transfer and learning processes and compared them to situations where local agents were acting under some form of coercion to engage in transfer.  Based on the findings from our cases we argue that despite what is often presented, when transfer involves a high degree of learning and local adaptation successful outcomes are not guaranteed.  Similarly, despite situations where local agents were ‘forced’ into a copy of a model, there is no guarantee that it will result in failure.  As such, not only must learning be examined in the transfer process but so to must be the situational circumstances surrounding the transfer and the receiving system.

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Under the so-called “Digital Silk Road”, infrastructure building and exportation of ICT systems and services are progressively expanding China’s influence in the digital realm. In different parts of the Global South Chinese companies have succeeded in becoming local authorities’ favored partner in their quest for digitalization. Pakistan is at the forefront of this trend since the much-advertised CPEC framework also entails ICT investments impacting the core structure of Pakistan’s Internet such as fiber-optic networks, safe city systems, data center etc.

 

The purpose of this paper will be to map out the processes of technology transfers coming from China to Pakistan by identifying the agents showcasing the Chinese ICT solutions, disclosing their motivations, and their integration in domestic and international structures in China and Pakistan. Moreover, an historical overview of Chinese ICT ventures in Pakistan is necessary to explain why the country is a historical testing ground for Chinese tech companies looking for internationalization since the end of the 1990’s.

 

We will try to answer the following research questions: How are Chinese tech companies becoming unavoidable partners in Pakistan’s quest for digitalization? How do they adapt their corporate practices to the local landscape?

 

Based on more than 50 interviews conducted in Pakistan from March to June 2022, this paper wishes to contribute to the literature of South-to-South policy transfers following the research framework formulated in Giulia Romero and de Oliveira’s Brazil and China in Knowledge and Policy Transfer (2021) disclosing the agents, their motivations, the structures involved as well as the timeline of the transfers.

 

We also wish to add another perspective to the study of policy transfers by expanding the scope of the reflection to the subdomain of digital technology transfers. Whereas policy transfer studies usually focus on governmental institutions, public and private companies are the main engine of technology transfers with specific practices which need to be further investigated.

 

Our analysis tends to go against the mainstream view that the Chinese government is the main craftsman behind the success of Chinese technical standard exports abroad. On the contrary our field investigations showed that locals’ agency plays a pivotal role in the adoption of Chinese technological tools.

 

Through a case-by-case analysis of Chinese companies ventures in Pakistan we will see how Chinese ICT companies use Pakistan as their laboratory and how they constantly must negotiate and bargain with local actors to materialize their prospects. Our empirical results highlight that Chinese companies’ responses depend on their corporate structure (public/private companies) and their outreach capabilities to Chinese state institutions at different levels (state/provincial-level).

 

Another major outcome of our research is the disclosure of local intermediaries’ key role in connecting Chinese companies to their Pakistani clients. Because of the absence of a long-established and sizeable Chinese overseas community in Pakistan these actors are the main facilitators of technology transfers and even sometimes contribute to the tailoring of Chinese technical tools to local needs. Finally, bidirectional transfers occur, giving a complex picture of technology transfers, with a hybridization of Chinese solutions within the Pakistani context.

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Many articles and books have already been written on the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but only recently has research been oriented towards the analysis of its effects on the ground. In particular, recent research by urban geographers has begun to explore the impacts of the BRI on the cities situated on its transport corridors. Among them, some studies suggested that the BRI is also supporting the diffusion of Chinese models of urbanisation. Taking a cue from this literature, this article aims to explore these questions through the angle of policy transfer studies. The method chosen is the analysis of a single case study: the collaboration between the Chinese company Huawei and the city of Duisburg (Germany) for smart city development. Its analysis helps derive some lessons on the possibility of the BRI to transmit urban knowledge and policies from China, especially to Western countries. As a matter of fact, this project was not implemented as originally intended by the cooperating partners, resulting in a sort of 'failed transfer'. Communication challenges and different ways of working have made a more intense collaboration between the Chinese company and the administration of the German city difficult. While some of the ideas proposed by Huawei have been picked up later by the local administration, none of the projects pertaining to smart city development has been implemented with the help of the Chinese company. These findings suggest that cultural factors and effective communication may significantly matter in the policy transfer process, and require that we study them more closely in the analysis of policy transfer processes.

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

China's normative influence on African policy and politics requires recognition of the different dynamics of discourse and practice in the Chinese and African settings. Much attention has been paid to how China has restructured its Africa policy over the years and to deciphering China's rhetorical adjustments that reflect a more viable approach to African realities. This does not always mean that African actors have responded to, or even taken note of, these changes. There are several factors that prevent African governments from simultaneously adapting to China's policy shifts. In some cases, these factors are intrinsic, based on the domestic priorities of African policymakers who have come to terms with a particular interpretation of China's role on the continent and see no advantage in adjusting their policies. In other cases, the discrepancy stems from the complexity of the discourse itself. The character of Chinese foreign policy, with its layered discourses and encapsulated meanings, underpinned by figurative and symbolic semantics and written in a logographic system, complicates the literal but also ideational translation of concepts emerging in China into monosomic terms. Political concepts that are well understood by Chinese academics and politicians can thus change their character and meaning when transferred to the African context. The vague nature (at least from the outside) of many of these concepts promoted by Beijing leaves a lot of room for interpretation, which African governments use to shape their own priorities as they see fit.

CO-AUTHORS
Kidjie Saguin (University of Melbourne)
ABSTRACT

Just as the global movement of people intensifies, so does the transfer and diffusion ofpolicies for migration control. Emerging economies have turned to labour exportation policies as a deliberate development strategy, driving up the demand for the adoption of ‘successful’ policies or ‘best practices’ to promote and regulate labour migration. Why and how such transnational movement of policies in labour migration occur remain largely under-researched. Much of the field has been concerned primarily with examining how migration governance structures or global agreements establish converging policies towards controlling labour migration at the receiving country. Less attention goes to understanding how labour sending countries have become the source of migration policies.

 

This article explores why a commonset of labour migration practices diffused among large labour sending countries. It uses the Philippines as a country case of a source of these practices as evidenced by the diffusion of some elements of the Philippine model of labour migration to other parts of Asia (e.g. Nepal). The article compares three labour migration policies by the Philippine government that had been adopted elsewhere by other migrant-sending nations: mainstreaming of migration into development plans, pre-departure orientation seminars (PDOS) and the migrant worker welfare fund. The comparison is done to determine why and which elements of the migration policies were borrowed. The paper proceeds as a contribution to the policy diffusion and transfer literature as well as migration policy studies. It conceptualizes a transnational marketplace ofideas where labour migration export policies–its ideas, goals and instruments–are shared, contested and translated. It then develops an actor-oriented framework to explaining why certain ideas are adopted. The framework is applied in the case of Philippines as a policy-exporting country. Preliminary results point to the transfer of more abstract policy knowledge rather than the specific instruments and indicate that some of these policies were shared as ‘best-practices’ through regional and international forums and international agencies facilitated the active referencing to the Philippines as a source of labour migration policies. This article highlights the role of various policy actors–government agencies, civil society organizations and private agencies–in legitimizing the spread of ‘successful’ labour migration policies

CO-AUTHORS
Annah Zhu (Wageningen University)
Tyler Harlan (Loyola Marymount University)
Jin Qian (Wageningen University)
ABSTRACT

China increasingly engages in environmental diplomacy through south-south cooperation across the developing world. Since 2019, the rise of the discourse of Nature-based Solutions (NbS) within this cooperation has been exponential. Coined just over ten years ago, NbS refers to the underexplored potential of leveraging the natural world to address global socio-environmental challenges. The concept finds particular resonance in China, where it demonstrates strong parallels with the domestically-pioneered concept of Ecological Civilization – the ruling paradigm when it comes to all realms of Chinese environmental governance. Building on the global discourse, NbS has been adapted to the Chinese context, creating what some call “Chinese-style” NbS that prioritize large-scale interventions and ecological engineering over grassroots preservation. China’s NbS are not only being pursued domestically, but also increasingly abroad through its Belt and Road Initiative. From Southeast and Central Asia to Africa and Latin America, this article surveys Chinese-led or financed projects that fall under the broad umbrella of NbS. We provide a comparative analysis of these interventions – or the conspicuous lack of such interventions – to show the current status and future prospects for China’s growing sphere of influence when it comes to advancing NbS in the global South. We find that China’s embrace of this concept in environmental diplomacy is directly related to the potential for NbS to serve as a tool for helping China’s vision of an Ecological Civilization “go global.” The consonance between the rhetoric NbS and Ecological Civilization, combined with the global reach of NbS, provides a powerful platform for taking Chinese environmental discourse to the global level.

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

Chinese provincial actors have influenced the energy investment in Africa substantially, transferring domestic development models abroad yet few studies have probed into these processes. Conventional thinking is that China’s power plant building development model in Africa is predominantly controlled by strategies devised by the central government and executed by other actors. This paper argues that the models, motives and preferences diverge between China’s central and provincial actors. Based on a database of 84 power plants invested in and built by Chinese elements and a case study of power plant in Africa, this paper reveals a tendency of provincial specialization in combustion-based and hydropower power plant building in Africa. In comparison, central-level control persists in directing the development of the renewable energy industry internationally. Underpinned by notions of ‘de facto federalism’ and ‘provincial state-business alliance’, the analysis draws attention to the autonomy of provincial actors in interpreting central directives and advancing local interests when possible. Essentially, China in Africa is governed by not one but multiple parallel state-business relations.

 

Chinese capital has become a cornerstone for the continent’s energy provision in Africa.  With a total of over USD 30 billions of investment between 2000 to 2016, China has become the largest investor in the energy sector in Africa.  Between 2010 and 2015, China has contributed to 30% of newly added electricity capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The increasingly proactive engagement of China has invigorated substantial discussion on the electricity strategy of China and its ramifications for the continent.  It remains a controversial debate between those interpreting the role of China in Africa from a self-interested, rapacious, and neo-colonial perspective  and those who view China as offering new opportunities and widening policy space in productive sectors and infrastructure building.   

 

Empirical evidence seems to be ambivalent in supporting both of the claims as Chinese investments are visible in both ‘black and green’  energy. Chinese investment in global renewable power plants accounted for more than $44 billion in 2017, an increase of $12 billion from 2016.  In Africa, Chinese investment in green energy (wind, solar, biomass and geothermal) has accounted for 18% of the total project number.  Between 2010 to 2020, an increase of USD1.3 billion investment was in solar, wind and geothermal energy.  Financial commitment seems to correspond with the green ambition of the Chinese leadership’s green ambition. Emphasis on energy transition prevails in high-level political pledges, national strategies, i.e. Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), South-South Cooperation Fund on Climate Change, and regional partnership memorandums, i.e. China-Africa 10 major cooperation areas.  Meanwhile, notable Chinese investment in conventional energy continues if not expands. Chinese electricity investments in coal remains ranking the first (24.5 GW) among all types of electricity investment (81GW), whilst inputs in renewable energy, including wind (7.2GW) and solar (3.1GW), remain within the margin.  Globally, China’s investments in renewable energy also went down by 8% in 2019, which led to doubts on how committed China was to its energy transition plan.  

 

How can we understand the nature of Chinese engagement in the power plant building in Africa? Conventional thinking is that China’s agenda in Africa is predominantly controlled by strategic agendas devised by the central government and executed by other actors.  Following this logic, how can we reconcile the ‘neo-colonial’ and ‘benevolent’ tendencies that co-exist in the strategic agendas? If Chinese strategic agendas are largely guided by resource-seeking and market interests, how can we account for the increasing investment in renewable energy, a sector in which Chinese companies do not have substantial competitive advantages over European and American counterparts.  If these investments are politically driven, why has the financial commitment been unable to sustain along with the political pledges?

 

This paper argues that the motives and preferences for building power plants diverge between China’s central and provincial actors. Based on a database of 84 power plants invested in and built by Chinese elements, a case study of combustion- , hydropower- and renewable energy-based power plant building, this article reveals a tendency of provincial specialization in combustion- and hydro-based power plant building in Africa. In comparison, central-level control persists in directing the development of the renewable energy industry domestically and internationally.

CO-AUTHORS
Krishnan Narayanan
ABSTRACT

Does opinion - WTO's stance on India's anti-dumping policy - really matter?

 

India’s foreign trade policy has considerably evolved in past 70 years. The trade policy choices reflect the changing rationale for using trade barriers over the period of time. Among many trade instruments, in past 25 years, anti-dumping measure has been used extensively. And during this period, India has become the most prolific user of anti-dumping, an alternative to tariff barriers. India has filed 17% of the total global antidumping petitions i.e., 1100 out of 6489 cases between 1995 to 2021. Out of which chemical and allied industries comprise around 40.9% followed by resins and plastics industries (14.4%), targeting products mainly from China. India's anti-dumping policy has been scrutinized and questioned by other Member states in the WTO's Trade Policy Review Report followed by the meeting. Till date seven Review Reports have been published by the Secretariat, beginning 1993 and latest report released in November 2020. In an effort to link TPR with the subsequent modifications to the foreign trade policy, limited public policy literature and approaches are available [DiCaprio and Gallagher (2006), Natsuda and Thoburn (2014), Shaffer (2014)] And for India, closest study to the chosen area is by Mate (2019).

The purpose of the paper is studying the various documents of the TPRM – The Secretariat Report, Note by the Government, Minutes of the Meeting - on India in particular anti-dumping mechanism; content analysis methodology is used for the document examination. The analysis provides insights about the Member states' viewpoint as well as India's position on AD. Member states: Fairly new to this mechanism as against the developed nations, India has resorted to AD measures quite frequently. During the TPR meetings, India has been frequently questioned on the logical basis for initiating high number of AD investigations targeting particular sectors and particular countries like China, Republic of Korea, and EU.

India: During first three rounds of the TPRM, India repeatedly raised concern about the developed countries extensively using AD instrument against specific Indian export items while India having a miniscule share (~1%) in the total world trade. However, in the next four TPRM rounds situation changed wherein India has to reason the extensive usage of AD mechanism. However, India’s reply has remained nearly static in every review which undermines India’s rational for choosing AD mechanism to prevent domestic injury

Hence, it can be said that India’s AD policy has been built upon its experiences with the developed countries as well as a need to increase its share in global exports. India’s AD policy stance is justified by trickle-down economics – let domestic industries file petition, and the products subjected to AD duty might open an opportunity for existing and new domestic players to engage in international trade. But, AD mechanism as a policy choice is double-edged sword, protecting domestic producers from unfair trade practices but will also most likely to make them inefficient if they are guarded for long with the possibility of retaliatory action from the trading partners.

 

 

CO-AUTHORS
Hong Liu (Nanyang Technological University)
ABSTRACT

The resurgence of attention to the China model appeared in early 2020s, and a growing body of literature focus on the export of the model to other developing countries. Our paper provides new evidence to argue that China is moving to the 2nd phase of economic development – to tackle the widening social inequality between rural and urban regions, coastal areas and inlands, as well as Han majority and ethnic minority frontiers, which needs to be scrutinized and re-theorized. In this article, we conduct policy analysis and draw on an ethnographic study in a rural North China ethnic minority region of the implementation of Targeted Poverty Alleviation (TPA) to propose a framework to comprehend the China Model 2.0. It challenges classical theories in political economy by allowing unconventional coexistence of free-market and authoritarian state with continuous economic growth. What is the mechanism that balances the economic freedom and political control to mediate both economic growth and political stability? One of the consequences of economic growth is increasing social inequality, and components of civil society such as social welfare divisions, NGOs and charity organizations play an important role in helping the poor in democratic countries. However, in a one-party dominant country, individual and local agencies outside of the government body that can vastly mobilise resource and have sufficient impact on a large population have usually seen as a potential threat to the political stability of its ruling, so the existence of such influential actors is unlikely to be tolerated. In this context, who takes up the role in reducing inequality and cares for the population in the bottom of the economic structure? This article illustrates the mechanism by delving into the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation (jingzhun fupin, TPA) at the ethnic minority frontier in the borderland between China, North Korea and Russia. The grassroot governors’ role in the China Model is highlighted. We argue that the economic development model in China cannot be studied alone as an economic policy but need to be examined as part of a larger political project. Only by interrogating politics and economics as one domain, we can fully grasp the essence of the China model and think about the influence of such policy transfer beyond the Chinese border.

CO-AUTHORS
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ABSTRACT

This study aspires to examine the Indonesian fuel subsidy reform trajectory, considered complex, dilemmatic, and multi-dimensional. In the literature, there are active debates about whether the subsidies strengthen or weaken policy areas, such as economic competitiveness, fiscal flexibility, environmental issues, and national politics. Most ‘Western’ scholars argue that trimming the subventions should be a policy priority. However, they also posit that once the subsidies are in place, administrations of many countries, including Indonesia, often find it hard to reduce, let alone eliminate, them, thanks to the policy’s ‘peculiar political economy’ (Skovgaard & van Asselt, 2019; Timperley, 2021; Yusuf et al., 2017). Starting during the economic crisis in 1998, Indonesia’s fuel subsidy reforms are deemed a vibrant, excellent research case with both successful and unsuccessful episodes. Existing studies about Indonesia’s fuel subsidy reforms have stated that politics play a pivotal role in the reform policy outcomes. Little, if none, has endeavored to dig into the practical politics of the reforms empirically, for instance, by analyzing the discursive debates surrounding the reform trajectory. Using a political economy lens, mainly inspired by (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014), this study attempted to pursue such a research avenue and revisit the underpinning circumstances that shape the trajectory. This case examination attempts, importantly, to reimagine the reform trajectory as it is, as opposed to as it should be as prescribed by the existing ‘Western’ literature.

Through a discursive analysis, this study analyzed dozens of selected, relevant news articles (1998-2019) from two credible media outlets in Indonesia. The media, in the Indonesian policymaking context, plays a role as a policy debate arena—a role significantly different from that of somewhere else, like in the West. While answering the research questions, the analysis reimagines the reform trajectory alongside various actors involved. This study argues that Indonesia remains tinkering, if trapped, with the ups and downs of its reform trajectory that keeps being rife with or locked-in economic and political tensions. There has been, for instance, an unchanged, deep-seated belief that fuel subsidies are underserved, if constitutional, right of the people. This study argues that, of course, reforming, mainly reducing, fuel subsidies is an important policy target for developing nations, to be specific Indonesia. However, it is indicated that, in general, not-yet politically and economically viable countries may continuously reject subsidy reform proposals, not because the proposed policy is terrible, but naturally and contextually, the policy will not work in such a jurisdiction context. The Indonesian case shows that it is vital to reveal and understand the political and economic underpinnings of the nations before rushing to provide policy prescriptions. As of the panel, this study is expected to contribute to the understanding of “how policies that originate from Asia is challenging our contemporary understanding of public policy,” and to “theoretical development through the consideration of regions (through Indonesia’s experience) that have been ‘under the radar’ for a long time.”

CO-AUTHORS
Pierre Yvan Belinga Meka (University of yaoundé 2, )
ABSTRACT

Title : "The Model of the Developer State Put to the Test of Emergence Policies in Africa: The Case of Cameroon"

 

Summary :

 

Since the end of the "Washington Consensus", new paradigms have emerged in the field of development. After a period dominated by neoliberal, market-centric ideology, these paradigms now attribute a role to the state as the engine of development. The success encountered by this model of State in the countries of East and South-East Asia in the 1970s affected by the oil crises, will encourage the other developing countries in Latin America and recently in Africa to adopt this model to achieve their Emergence objectives. Cameroon, like all the other countries of the continent, in search of its development model, by continuing to experiment with development models designed elsewhere, will also adopt the model of the developing State, to try to get out of the slump in which its economy isstill stuck. However, the elites of this country, as in most other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, popularize and exploit the rhetoric of "emergence" through major structuring projects, for the purpose of legitimizing the governing regime. And given the mixed results of emergence projects, the neo-patrimonial character of governance, the resurgence of corruption, etc., this article seeks to understand whether the model of the developmental state as it has observed elsewhere (particularly in Asia) can serve as apanacea for the achievement of Cameroon's development objectives by Horizon 2035. This reflection tends to analyze the Developer State as a model of development inspired by the "Asian Tigers" in the 1970s and its African transformation giving rise to what we will call a Developer State "Made in Africa" ​​by doing a case study on Cameroon. And to do this, we will appeal to the theory of games and that of public action in order to understand how the games of actors in the implementation of Emergence policies provide information on the dynamics of the developmentalist State in Cameroon. . 

 

Keywords: Developing State, Emergence Policy, Governance, Cameroon.