CATEGORISATION
KEYWORDS
GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE
With increasing economic inequality, there is an intense search among policymakers as to how the market logic could be constrained. Traditionally, constitutional values were the guiding light to advance the public interest. Yet, there is a criticism that constitutional forms were created in liberal societies to limit democratic control over economic policies. Contemporary scholar Katharina Pistor (2019) showed that laws are rigged to maintain the hegemony of one economic class over the rest, whereas Brown (2015) argues that such neo-liberal policies eventually undermine democracy. These articulations force us to search for the reasons for the disjunction between constitutional promises and policy outcomes.
James Tully (2016) attempted to answer this divergence by showing the distinction between constituent power and constitutive power. First, constituent power reflects the particularistic identities within a society that often shape legal structures to their benefit, which can potentially undermine constitutional solidarity. Second, in many Global South nations, constitutive power has been influenced by the legacies of imperialism, embedding these post-colonial states into neoliberal economic orders. According to Tully, these entanglements limit the ability of constitutional frameworks to deal with economic forces and, thus, perpetuate inequality.
During ICPP3 in Singapore, three panels were organised on the interface of Law and Public Policy. Selected papers presented in those panels were published as a book, Transformative Law and Public Policy (Routledge, 2019). We are very keen on how this genre of scholarship is expanding by examining the relevance of Constitutional Economics for Public Policy. We adopt a political economy framework to understand how the constitutionality of both democracy and economic decisions are intertwined. These constitutionality questions can’t be understood without an examination of how the judiciary has given verdicts on the conflicts brought in front of it. Therefore, an interdisciplinary examination of law, politics and economics comes to the centre stage of these policy analyses.
In advancing justice, both philosophers and economists have examined the interface of law and economic decisions. Friedrich Hayek, Robert Nozick, and John Rawls have all expressed the centrality of law to protect property owners and to limit the power of the State, which harms individual liberty. Yet, a clear articulation of Constitutional Economics was achieved only by James Buchanan (1986) as the need to study the processes of rule-making that constrains the actors of policy making. The success of Western Capitalism is largely credited to the legal institutionalism that protects the liberty of individuals and firms, as well as the State's role in maintaining peace and order in society. This legal institutionalism has been promoted as ‘good governance’ across the world today. However, the rise of inequality has prompted a challenge to the basis of constitutional economics.
Key References
Brown, W. (2015) Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution, MIT Press.
Buchanan, J. (1986) The Constitution of Economic Policy (Nobel Prize Lecture).
Pistor, K. (2019) The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality, Princeton University Press.
Tully, J. (1995) Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge University Press.
CALL FOR PAPERS
Building on the momentum of the panels at ICPP3 in Singapore and the subsequent publication Transformative Law and Public Policy (Routledge, 2019), we seek to expand this scholarship by exploring the relevance of constitutional economics in addressing contemporary public policy challenges.
Traditionally, constitutional values have played a critical role in guiding the public interest and maintaining checks and balances on economic policies threatening democratic integrity. Modern critiques suggest that constitutions, often shaped in democracies and constitutions written by the propertied class, may not adequately challenge the forces driving economic inequality. This panel seeks to engage this tension, particularly in contexts marked by political and social inequalities. Many older democracies’ constitutions were written when not all sections of the population were constituents (e.g., the USA) or during times of emergency or dictatorship (e.g., Chile), making equality for all sections of the population a distant consideration. In many Global South nation-states, the constitutive power has been influenced by the legacies of imperialism and social stratification, embedding these post-colonial states into neoliberal economic orders. This entanglement limits the ability of constitutional frameworks to assert democratic control over economic forces, therefore perpetuating inequality.
We are looking for papers that attempt to answer questions in three tracks:
1) What kind of clash or convergence of ideas do we see in economic and legal institutional logic while addressing questions of inequality and diversity in policies?
2) How successfully have constitutional courts tested public interest questions in proposed legislation and policies? We seek in-depth analysis of success/failure stories from country contexts and comparative constitutional cases.
3) Both in the project of constitutional democracy and constitutional economics, the conflicts are between different types of rights. How do actors and institutions prioritise and mediate the conflicts between rights?
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ABSTRACT
Accordingly, this paper attempts to explore how constitutional economics and public policy interact with each other in matters of inequality and diversity within the contrasting, yet interlinked, contexts of Ethiopia and South Sudan. Drawing on my experience as a humanitarian professional in both South Sudan and Ethiopia, this paper interrogates how constitutional frameworks intersect with economic policies and institutional logics to shape public interest outcomes within post-conflict and development contexts.
Thus, Ethiopia became one of the most interesting case studies in the design of a constitutional framework of federalism that was to duly address ethnic diversity and regional autonomy in the beginning of the 1990s. Despite this, the Ethiopian model of federalism promotes economic inequality and political instability. The economic policies within such a framework normally promote state-led development at the cost of alienating vulnerable populations and furthering inequalities. This paper examines the experience of Ethiopia in managing conflicts between collective rights-ethnic self-determination-and individual rights-economic and social inclusion-and draws lessons on how constitutional economics can mediate these tensions.
In South Sudan, where I currently lead nutrition and public health assessments, the challenges are compounded by legacies of colonialism, civil war, and weak institutional capacity. The interim constitution of the country has yet to overcome the systemic inequalities that have entrenched their strong roots in the socio-economic fabric. Public policy decisions, especially on health and nutrition, often reflect a compromise between humanitarian imperatives and economic constraints rather than constitutional directives. Using examples of nutrition policies and their impacts on the most marginalized communities, this paper explores how constitutional courts and legal frameworks can more actively test the public interest in, and democratic accountability within, economic decision making.
The paper juxtaposes Ethiopia and South Sudan against three related critical questions, namely: (1) how do economic and legal institutional logics conflict or converge to address issues of inequality and diversity in the course of policy-making?; (2) the extent to which constitutional courts have succeeded or failed in these contexts to protect public interest in promoting equity; and (3) how do conflicts between rights-for example, right to development pitted against right to equality-get mediated by actors and institutions?
This paper contributes to the broader discussion of constitutional economics in the Global South by underlining the structural constraints brought about by state-building and neoliberal economic policies. In this regard, the constitutional framing of economic policy will need to be re-imagined as constitutions are enshrined with interests of the public, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected countries. The findings underline the importance of participatory governance, institutional accountability, and legal reform in securing transformative public policy outcomes.
In this regard, the paper engages the tensions not only in constitutional economics but also those that have concrete application value for policy practitioners, politicians, and scholars concerned with issues of inequality and diversity of contemporary public policy.
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Social rights, such as the right to live with dignity, are important freedoms. Nevertheless, many constitutional documents and jurisdictions do not recognize the constitutional status of social rights or tend to consider the scope of these rights as limited.
The paper introduces two approaches -economic negative constitutionalism and positive social constitutionalism. The former tends to reject the possibility of recognizing social rights as constitutional rights, while the latter posits that the state is under an obligation to actively recognize the constitutional status of social rights and to enable wide protection on them. Economic negative constitutionalism could be also characterized by recognizing only a limited scope of social rights, and by advancing economic liberal freedoms, such as freedom of occupation. The economic negative approach is based on the thought that the state has limited means at her disposal for the fulfilment of social rights.
When Israel was founded, a formal constitution was not adopted. Israel has been characterized since its establishment and in its first decades up until the end of the 1980s as an interventionist welfare state, in which human rights have not been considered as having a constitutional status. The loss of the 1977 elections by the Labor Party and an economic crisis during the 1980s have been followed by a decline in welfare-social beliefs.
At the beginning of the 1990s, two Basic Laws of human rights were constituted- Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law of Occupation. According to a ruling of the Supreme Court in 1995, these Basic Laws enjoyed a constitutional status[1]. This ruling came to be known as the constitutional revolution[2]. The court also ruled that it had the power to review legislation, potentially disqualifying unconstitutional laws.
Nevertheless, the introduction of these two laws came to be known as the emergence of a new economic order in Israel based on neoliberalism. These Basic laws included a limited list of rights and only liberal economic freedoms such as the right to property, and did not include any social rights. Even though different human rights were not included in the constitutional documents of the Basic Laws of human rights, the Supreme Court has recognized several right as derivative and as having a constitutional status.
The constitutional revolution in Israel was followed by development of economic negative constitutionalism. The economic negative constitutionalism is reflected in cases regarding welfare policies and reforms and legislation that affected social rights.
The paper focuses on cases of constitutionalism in the Israeli Supreme Court, regarding the right to live with dignity and the right to health, and explores the adoption of certain constitutionalism . It will also explore, in a comparative look, the adoption of a positive social approach in South Africa.
Based on the pathologies of the current jurisprudence, the paper draws on the lines for a suggested model regarding the interplay of social rights and constitutionalism.
[1] HCJ 6821/93 Bank Hamizrahi v Migdal 1995 PD 49(4) 221.
[2] Ran Hirschl, ‘The “Constitutional Revolution” and the Emergence of a New Economic Order in Israel’ (1997) 2(1) Israel Studies 136, 142–47.
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The increasing economic inequality presents a pressing challenge for policymakers, necessitating a reexamination of public policy through the lens of constitutional economics. This research addresses the problem of how existing constitutional frameworks can both constrain and shape economic policies, often perpetuating disparities rather than promoting equity. The primary research question investigates the effectiveness of constitutional economics in bridging the gap between legal structures and economic equity, particularly in democratic societies where foundational laws may favor certain economic classes. Findings reveal that while constitutional values are intended to safeguard public interests, they frequently fall short in addressing systemic inequalities. Contemporary critiques highlight that many constitutions, crafted by elite groups, may entrench existing power dynamics and hinder democratic control over economic policies. This disjunction between constitutional promises and actual policy outcomes raises critical concerns about the legitimacy of these frameworks in fostering equitable growth. Based on these findings, the study recommends a multi-faceted approach to reforming public policy through constitutional economics. First, it suggests revisiting and revising constitutional provisions to ensure they reflect contemporary social and economic realities. Second, fostering inclusive dialogue among diverse stakeholders can help reshape the narrative around economic rights and equity. Finally, implementing comparative institutional analysis can guide policymakers in evaluating the effectiveness of alternative constitutional arrangements in promoting fairer economic outcomes. By embracing these recommendations, policymakers can better align constitutional frameworks with the pursuit of economic equity, ultimately enhancing democratic governance and social justice.
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ABSTRACT
The advent of digital labour has revolutionized the way we work, interact, and conduct business. With the global architecture of digital labour, workers can collaborate across borders, and businesses can operate in multiple jurisdictions. However, this globalization of labour also raises critical questions about the applicability of constitutional protections and the value of justice in the digital age. Through this paper, I would like to draw attention to the new challenges in digital labour such as Jurisdictional complexities where digital labour often transcends national boundaries, making it challenging to determine which country's laws and constitutions apply. Worker exploitation- the gig economy and platform capitalism have created new forms of exploitation, including wage theft, lack of benefits, and precarious working conditions. Data protection and surveillance- digital labour relies heavily on data-driven technologies, raising concerns about data protection, surveillance, and workers' right to privacy. Automation and job displacement- the increasing use of artificial intelligence and automation in digital labour poses significant threats to job security and workers' livelihoods. As digital platforms transcend geographical boundaries, they create a borderless workforce, enabling multinational corporations to leverage cheap labour from developing nations like India. While this phenomenon fosters employment opportunities and economic integration, it simultaneously raises critical concerns regarding labour rights, fair wages, and the applicability of domestic constitutional safeguards. The Indian Constitution, with its emphasis on social justice, equality, and the right to livelihood under Articles 14, 19, and 21, faces significant challenges in regulating digital labour, which often operates in a legal gray area beyond traditional labour laws. This paper will also analyse -The Constitutional Value of Justice- which mainly focuses on Social Justice: Constitutions enshrine the principles of social justice, including the protection of workers' rights, equality, and non-discrimination. Human dignity- the value of human dignity is fundamental to constitutionalism, and digital labour must respect and uphold this value. Fair labour standards in which the constitution often provide for fair labour standards, including minimum wage, safe working conditions, and freedom of association. Accountability and transparency- constitutional justice demands accountability and transparency in governance and business practices, including those related to digital labour. To address the above-stated challenges posed by digital labour, we must rethink the relationship between globalization, constitutional jurisdiction, and the value of justice. This requires the international cooperation of governments, businesses, and civil society. They must collaborate to establish global standards for digital labour, ensuring consistency and fairness across jurisdictions. The constitutional innovation must be adapted to the changing nature of work and technology, incorporating new provisions that address the unique challenges of digital labour. The Worker-centered approach is where digital labour policies and practices must prioritize workers' rights, dignity, and well-being, recognizing the inherent value of human labour in the digital age. Hence, the main research question is- How do we navigate the Paradox of Digital with a balance of globalization with that of Constitutional Economics? Ultimately, the paradox of digital labour demands a nuanced and multifaceted approach, one that balances the benefits of globalization with the need for constitutional protections and the value of justice.
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UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL OUTLOOK TOWARDS DEVELOPMENTAL AID
Foreign aid plays a pivotal role in helping developing countries attain economic and welfare goals. In the recent past, literature exploring the role of human rights, good governance and GDP per capita on aid allocation, notes that economic health, education, government effectiveness, and literacy rate do not significantly impact aid distributions, however, GDP per capita of the recipient country does play a crucial role (Keramat et al., 2022) Understanding the donor behaviour over a significant period, the study highlighted that more aid attention has shifted towards Countries with higher levels of poverty and stronger policy rather than country size or debt burden, indicating the need to understand the policy and institutional environment in both donor and receipt countries, how the selectivity of aid operates, which can further help in enhancing aid effectiveness. (Claessens et al., 2009) Related works investigating how donors' ideologies influence foreign aid found that Left-wing governments were more likely to provide aid to autocratic than to democratic recipient countries and proposes it to be a significant case study for partisan politics which further can help in localising the aid. (Brech & Potrafke, 2014) Further, research also highlighted the need to understand ODA from a judicial standpoint and the lack of study done to understand the preferences for aid from a recipient perspective. (Hennessy et al., 2023) Airey, S. (2022). While delving into the nuances of understanding the political landscape and perspectives of donor and recipient country, as well as recipient interest in aid allocation, an area of research unexplored is the interplay of constitutional values of both donor and recipient country when receiving foreign aid. (Harding, 2019) (Bui, 2019)
This paper can be used as an essential knowledge source in investigating the flow of aid in Global South Countries from 2000-2024 [This time frame covers the overarching goals under MDGs, SDGs, COVID-19 world and post-Covid-19 era] using the foreign aid data by DAC to account for each aid by sector and the Constitution of the Global South Countries to address the following research questions.
1. How has the allocation of international aid across different sectors changed over the years?
2. Do the sectors receiving aid in Official Development Assistance (ODA) align with the constitutional values of Global South countries?
3. How do the constitutional values of recipient countries influence aid allocation?
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ABSTRACT
Constitutionalism, as a means to preserve democracy, is essentially a political project. Yet, challenges to democracy have manifested in spaces outside the political: in recent times, neoliberalism has established itself in domestic constitutions (Tushnet 2019), and the resulting inequality has hollowed out liberal democracy (Brown 2015). Challenges of this nature require a “thicker” reconceptualization of democracy facilitating citizens’ participation (beyond just elections) in democratic deliberation, through judicial protection of liberties (Dixon 2023). In a world shaped by global capital flows, economic inequality becomes a significant barrier to full democratic participation. Constitutional courts therefore play a critical role in negotiating the relation between neoliberalism and economic democracy.
During the founding moment of India’s constitution, the framers were cognizant of the vast socio-economic inequality among the population, but also recognised the democratic value in not freezing economic policy prescriptions into the document but leaving them to “be decided by the people themselves according to time and circumstances” (Rodrigues 2024). The result was the creation of the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) as Part IV of the Constitution, a broadly worded set of provisions with economic justice at their core, without being prescriptive of method or ideology. However, the DPSPs have been used been inconsistently used by Indian courts for economic justice (Bhatia 2017). The most recent example of this is the Supreme Court of India’s 2024 decision in Property Owners Association vs State of Maharashtra, on the interpretation of Article 39(b), a provision in the DPSP which permits the state to distribute "ownership and control of the material resources of the community…to subserve the common good".
We use this judgment to draw connections between how Article 39(b) has been interpreted by the Court since the commencement of the Constitution, and contemporaneous changes in economic ideology of the State mediated by international financial institutions and processes. We argue that while these changes have reduced the ability of citizens to effectively participate in decision-making, the court has not sufficiently accounted for them and consequently only responded to local impulses while interpreting the DPSP, without being alive to the influence of global politics in undermining the Indian constitutional economic project.
To this end, we divide the Indian constitutional economic journey into three phases. In the first phase (1950-70), the legislature and judiciary clashed, with the judiciary seeking to uphold private property rights in contrast to the legislative mandate of redistribution. In the second (1970-90) and third phase (1990-present), the judiciary remained committed to the State despite starkly different economic regimes. By analysing the different interpretations of Article 39(b) in relation to private property, this paper analyses how the tension between legal institutions and economic logic remains. In the Property Owners Association case, the judiciary upheld the State’s ideology of free market, while still carving out exceptions with its broad reading of Article 39(b). We conclude by suggesting that adopting a responsive framework of judicial review (Dixon 2023) might address some of these issues while maintaining fidelity to the constitutional vision of economic democracy.
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Amid growing economic inequality, debates on constitutional amendments in the Philippines center on economic liberalization, particularly easing foreign ownership restrictions in key industries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). While proponents argue that such reforms will stimulate economic growth, critics highlight deeper structural constraints such as corruption, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and weak rule of law (North, 1990; Rodrik, 2007). Drawing on constitutional economics (Buchanan, 1986), legal institutionalism (Pistor, 2019), and the distinction between constituent and constitutive power (Tully, 2016), this paper argues that the proposed constitutional changes reflect elite-driven policymaking, where economic and political elites manipulate legal frameworks to reinforce their dominance. As Brown (2015) suggests, neoliberal reforms framed as economic necessity often erode democratic accountability. Rather than addressing structural barriers to inclusive growth, these reforms risk deepening inequality by privileging entrenched interests while limiting broader democratic participation in economic policymaking.
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The neoliberal state has redefined the balance between economic imperatives and constitutional guarantees, raising critical questions about how rights are mediated in public policy. This paper investigates the role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in India under neoliberal governance, focusing on how the state navigates conflicts between rights such as freedom of association, expression, and its policy imperatives of economic growth and depoliticisation.
India has witnessed the rise of CSOs addressing socio-economic inequities and environmental challenges amid the retrenchment of the state’s developmental role (Chatterjee, 2004). However, regulatory mechanisms, particularly the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), have been used to constrain dissent and marginalise rights-based advocacy (Pistor, 2019). Prominent CSOs like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, CARE India, and Save the Children have faced targeted crackdowns under the pretext of safeguarding sovereignty and ensuring accountability. These cases highlight how the Indian state has increasingly used legal tools to restrict the operations of CSOs critical of its policies, particularly those advocating for marginalised communities and environmental sustainability.
Drawing on James Buchanan’s theory of constitutional economics (1986) and Wendy Brown’s critique of neoliberalism (2015), this paper will examine the institutional logics of neoliberal governance. It employs a multi-method approach: (1) case studies of targeted CSOs, (2) comparative analysis of regulatory trends in the Global South, including Brazil and Kenya, and (3) document analysis of court rulings, legislative debates, and constitutional provisions. In Brazil, environmental CSOs opposing deforestation have faced funding restrictions under similar pretexts (Bebbington et al., 2008). Kenya presents a comparable trajectory, where land rights organisations have been suppressed through restrictive legal provisions. These patterns reflect a shared institutional logic among post-colonial neoliberal states, where constitutional rights are subordinated to market imperatives and state sovereignty.
The findings will underscore the paradox of neoliberal governance: constitutional guarantees of freedom of association and expression preserved in form but undermined in practice; a trend which challenges the normative role of constitutions in protecting democratic values and enabling civic participation. By bridging theoretical insights from constitutional economics and empirical evidence from India and the Global South, this paper will emphasise the need to reimagine legal frameworks that safeguard civil society’s role in upholding democratic values while navigating the complexities of contemporary governance.
References:
- Bebbington, A., Hickey, S., & Mitlin, D. (2008). Can NGOs Make a Difference? The Challenge of Development Alternatives. London: Zed Books.
- Brown, W. (2015). Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Buchanan, J. M. (1986). The Constitution of Economic Policy. Nobel Prize Lecture.
- Chatterjee, P. (2004). The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Pistor, K. (2019). The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
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The intersection of constitutional economics and land governance remains a critical but underexplored dimension of public policy. Land valuation and expropriation, embedded within legal and economic frameworks, function as instruments of wealth concentration while exacerbating socio-economic inequalities. Constitutional frameworks, historically shaped by elite interests, facilitate dispossession through valuation and expropriation policies, often undermining claims to economic justice and democratic accountability.
While constitutional economics is intended to balance market efficiency with legal safeguards for the public good, in practice, constitutional commitments to property rights overwhelmingly prioritize market-driven valuation methodologies. This approach discounts the non-market values of land—historical, cultural, and social—rendering them secondary to exchange value. In the Global South, particularly in India, large-scale land acquisitions under the guise of development have led to extensive displacement and socio-economic disruption. Data from the Land Matrix (2021) reports that over 33 million hectares of land have been acquired globally through large-scale deals since 2000, though the actual scale of dispossession is likely greater. In India alone, between 24 and 48 cases of land grabs have been documented, revealing the systemic nature of land expropriation.
At the core of this crisis is the challenge of valuation. Economic theories frame land valuation within an exchange-use paradigm, yet these models fail to account for plural values—spiritual, ecological, and communal—central to the lived experiences of affected populations. How does one assign monetary worth to sacred sites, indigenous territories, or lands that sustain subsistence economies? This epistemic limitation reflects the structural biases of economic governance, where legal valuation methodologies reinforce market logics at the expense of social and ecological justice.
The constitutional legitimacy of expropriation is further entangled with economic power structures. As Katharina Pistor (2019) argues, legal codes systematically privilege elite interests, embedding economic inequality into law itself. In India, expropriation policies nominally serve public interest objectives such as infrastructure expansion and industrial growth, yet empirical evidence indicates that these mechanisms overwhelmingly benefit corporate actors while displacing marginalized communities with inadequate compensation. The role of the state in these transactions raises fundamental questions about the function of constitutional provisions in protecting economic rights and whether they genuinely serve the broader public.
A rethinking of constitutional economics requires alternative valuation methodologies and equitable expropriation policies. Drawing on solidarity-based economic frameworks, as articulated by Jessica Gordon Nembhard and Peter Kropotkin, constitutional structures must be reoriented toward redistributive justice rather than the entrenchment of elite control. Strengthening mechanisms that recognize plural valuations of land, alongside democratizing decision-making in land governance, is essential for mitigating dispossession and advancing an economic order rooted in equity and democratic accountability.
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Independent India’s persistent agrarian crisis reveals a contradiction between the principles of equity and justice enshrined in the constitution and the policy trajectory of the Indian State which is increasingly shaped by neoliberal market fundamentalism. The post-independence constitutional framework, most evidently in the Directive Principles of State Policy (Articles 38 and 39), positioned land redistribution as an essential component of addressing India’s acute social and economic inequalities. However, the incompleteness of land reform policies and their eventual disappearance from the policy agenda resulted in the failure to actualize these constitutional principles. Moreover, land ownership is still rooted in caste-based inequalities. This paper examines how the failure to orient economic policy towards fulfilling constitutional principles in rural India has perpetuated poverty and reduced access to productive resources.
Land reforms were unable to substantively address the economic and social consequences of colonial land tenure systems. This left small and marginal farmers, as well as landless laborers at a severe economic disadvantage. The green revolution as well, meant to ameliorate India’s agrarian crisis, primarily benefited only large landowners and amplified rural class divides. The subsequent liberalization of India’s agricultural sector in the 1990s and the recent farm laws further intensified the exclusion of smallholders, as market deregulation exposed them to volatile pricing without sufficient protective mechanisms The weakening of the Minimum Support Price (MSP) system and state procurement undermined the intent of Articles 39(b) and 39(c), which sought to ensure that resources serve public welfare rather than exacerbate inequality.
Judicial responses to pressing agricultural challenges are further evidence of the tensions between constitutional principles and economic liberalization, with courts usually siding with the latter. Landmark cases, such as K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011), are evidence of how courts have struggled to reconcile property rights with the redistributive principles of the constitution. While judicial interventions have occasionally supported state-led redistributive efforts, as in tenancy and land ceiling cases, they have largely exacerbated market-driven inequalities and been unable to provide protection to small landholders and landless labourers. The judicial reluctance to challenge market reforms is evidence of Katharina Pistor’s argument that legal systems often reinforce economic hierarchies rather than dismantling them. The shift heralded by India’s economic liberalization from state intervention towards privatization has resulted in the right to livelihood under article 21 being increasingly undermined. The rising costs of cultivation coupled with declining farmer revenues has resulted in widespread rural distress, sometimes leading to in farmer protests.
This paper aims to integrate legal, economic and historical perspectives to demonstrate that the failure of India’s economic policy to mitigate agrarian distress lies in its lack of alignment with constitutional principles. By examining this disjunction, the paper highlights the deep-rooted structural forces within India’s constitutional democracy that continue to sustain agrarian inequality, offering insight into the relationship between economic policy and constitutionalism in the global south.
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Chronic non-communicable diseases (NCDs) represent the main cause of premature mortality and illness in Ecuador, Colombia and in general in Latin America, and the world. During recent years, the incidence of NCDs has been increasing at a global and regional level, and this increase is directly related to the consumption of unhealthy products such as tobacco, alcohol, and ultra-processed edible and drinkable products.
Decisions on tax matters have an intrinsic relationship with the effective enjoyment of human rights and constitutional rights such as the right to health and food. Thus, within fiscal policy, tax policy is particularly relevant, as it can be designed and implemented in such a way as to encourage healthy choices to be the easiest and most preferred by people, modifying social and economic factors such as the low price of tobacco, alcohol or sugary drinks and other unhealthy foods. In this framework, healthy taxes are shown as a measure to reduce the consumption of ultra-processed products, whose consumption is associated with a greater risk of suffering from chronic non-communicable diseases such as cancer, hypertension, diabetes, etc.
In November, 2024, Colombia began to tax ultra-processed edible and drinkable products. This measure, which is framed within Law 2277 of 2022, has the main objective of encouraging the consumption, through a tax measure, of products that contribute to public health problems, thus seeking to promote more responsible consumption among citizens. This policy was sued before the Colombian Constitutional Court, alleging that it violated the constitutional principles of business freedom and competition, as well as the principle of equality. In Ecuador, the national executive issued Decree No. 635 of January 10, 2023, which modified the public tax policy that reduces the Special Consumption Tax (ICE in Spanisch) on, among other, alcoholic beverages and sweet beverages. Thus, the Constitutional Court had a lawsuit to annul the Decree, this action was led by civil society organizations, who allege that the decree puts the correct guarantee of constitutional rights at risk.
This article has two objectives: on the one hand, it presents the reasons why the State, through a healthy tax, in coordination with other public health measures, guarantees constitutional rights to health and food. On the other hand, it seeks to analyze the role that the Constitutional Courts had in those two countries, to safeguard public health measures. For this purpose, it will present a description of the pronouncements of international organizations on health and food, which support the application of the measure on human rights principles and obligations. Afterward, the article will explain why it is through a healthy tax, in articulation with other public health measures, that the State can confront NCDs, regional experiences of the healthy tax are mentioned. Finally, an analysis of these two cases will be presented, focusing on how the Constitutional Court argued in favor of the measures.
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The Chandrachud courts’ ruling in Property Owners Association and others v. State of Maharashtra and others (2024) has brought to the fore a debate on whether all private property could be treated as material resource of the community and therefore be subject to acquisition by the state under Article 39 of the Constitution of India. Central to the debate is the confluence and the divergence in the economic and legal institutional logic on inequality.
Past judicial decisions have leaned in favour of expansive state power to acquire private land and redistribute it in the interest of public welfare. This ruling rejects this notion as it reflects an outdated economic dogma considering that India has already made strides towards a mixed economy. Whereas economic logic prioritizes individual incentives, private property, and market efficiency, legal logic justifies the redistribution of wealth. This logic is enshrined in the directives given to the state. By ruling on the limited state power to acquire property, the court pressurizes the state towards identifying alternative modes of addressing inequalities, without undermining economic growth. This marks a paradigm shift in the judicial approach.
The present study seeks to explore the underlying tension between economic and legal institutional logic in the context of the above judgement and contributes to the ongoing discourse on constitutionalism. In this paper, the researchers delve into the concept of eminent domain, the changing dimensions of this doctrine and the competing and conflicting demands of private property rights on the one hand and the state's power to regulate and redistribute private property in the public interest on the other. It navigates the change in narrative from expansive state power to restricted and controlled state power, with the help of Constituent Assembly Debates and judicial decisions thereby offering a nuanced understanding of the state's role in addressing economic inequalities with economic democracy.
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Public Interest Litigation as a Tool for Social Change: The Role of Constitutional Courts in India, South Africa, and Kenya
Abstract
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) has emerged as a transformative legal mechanism, enabling judicial intervention in matters of public concern and facilitating social justice. Rooted in the principles of constitutionalism, fundamental rights, and judicial activism, PIL provides a platform for marginalized and underrepresented groups to seek legal remedies against state and non-state actors. This paper explores the role of constitutional courts in India, South Africa, and Kenya in advancing social change through PIL, highlighting their jurisprudential approaches, landmark judgments, and socio-political impact. India pioneered the evolution of PIL in the Global South, transforming its judiciary into a proactive guardian of rights and justice. The Supreme Court of India, through expansive interpretations of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution, has broadened access to justice and facilitated progressive reforms in environmental protection, gender rights, labor welfare, and socio-economic entitlements. Cases such as Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997), MC Mehta v. Union of India (1986), and People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) illustrate how PIL has reinforced the state’s accountability in governance and human rights protection. However, concerns about judicial overreach and the misuse of PIL for political and frivolous purposes remain pertinent. South Africa, with its post-apartheid constitutional framework, offers a distinct yet comparable trajectory of PIL. Anchored in a transformative Constitution and an independent judiciary, the South African Constitutional Court has wielded PIL to dismantle institutional inequalities and promote socio-economic rights. Landmark cases such as Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom (2000) and Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign(2002) underscore the court’s commitment to enforcing the right to housing and healthcare. Unlike India, where PIL emerged primarily through judicial activism, South Africa’s legal framework formally recognizes class actions and public interest litigation, allowing civil society organizations to play an active role in litigation-driven social change. Kenya’s constitutional evolution, particularly after the enactment of the 2010 Constitution, has also witnessed a growing role of PIL in enforcing constitutional rights and democratic accountability. The Kenyan judiciary has addressed issues such as electoral justice, environmental conservation, and human rights violations through PIL. Cases like Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v. Kenya Airports Authority (2021) highlight the courts’ role in protecting socio-economic rights, particularly housing rights, against forced evictions. However, challenges such as judicial independence, political interference, and resource constraints continue to shape the effectiveness of PIL in Kenya. By comparing these three jurisdictions, this paper examines the effectiveness of PIL as a tool for social change in different legal and political contexts. While India demonstrates an activist approach that has expanded judicial power, South Africa institutionalizes public interest litigation within a constitutional framework, and Kenya represents a hybrid model evolving within a young constitutional democracy. The paper concludes by addressing the challenges posed by judicial activism, separation of powers, and the accessibility of PIL mechanisms. It also offers recommendations for enhancing the role of PIL in deepening democracy, strengthening human rights enforcement, and ensuring accountability in governance. This comparative analysis contributes to the broader discourse on the role of constitutional courts in advancing justice through PIL, emphasizing its significance as a catalyst for legal and societal transformation in the Global South.
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ABSTRACT
Accordingly, this paper attempts to explore how constitutional economics and public policy interact with each other in matters of inequality and diversity within the contrasting, yet interlinked, contexts of Ethiopia and South Sudan. Drawing on my experience as a humanitarian professional in both South Sudan and Ethiopia, this paper interrogates how constitutional frameworks intersect with economic policies and institutional logics to shape public interest outcomes within post-conflict and development contexts.
Thus, Ethiopia became one of the most interesting case studies in the design of a constitutional framework of federalism that was to duly address ethnic diversity and regional autonomy in the beginning of the 1990s. Despite this, the Ethiopian model of federalism promotes economic inequality and political instability. The economic policies within such a framework normally promote state-led development at the cost of alienating vulnerable populations and furthering inequalities. This paper examines the experience of Ethiopia in managing conflicts between collective rights-ethnic self-determination-and individual rights-economic and social inclusion-and draws lessons on how constitutional economics can mediate these tensions.
In South Sudan, where I currently lead nutrition and public health assessments, the challenges are compounded by legacies of colonialism, civil war, and weak institutional capacity. The interim constitution of the country has yet to overcome the systemic inequalities that have entrenched their strong roots in the socio-economic fabric. Public policy decisions, especially on health and nutrition, often reflect a compromise between humanitarian imperatives and economic constraints rather than constitutional directives. Using examples of nutrition policies and their impacts on the most marginalized communities, this paper explores how constitutional courts and legal frameworks can more actively test the public interest in, and democratic accountability within, economic decision making.
The paper juxtaposes Ethiopia and South Sudan against three related critical questions, namely: (1) how do economic and legal institutional logics conflict or converge to address issues of inequality and diversity in the course of policy-making?; (2) the extent to which constitutional courts have succeeded or failed in these contexts to protect public interest in promoting equity; and (3) how do conflicts between rights-for example, right to development pitted against right to equality-get mediated by actors and institutions?
This paper contributes to the broader discussion of constitutional economics in the Global South by underlining the structural constraints brought about by state-building and neoliberal economic policies. In this regard, the constitutional framing of economic policy will need to be re-imagined as constitutions are enshrined with interests of the public, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected countries. The findings underline the importance of participatory governance, institutional accountability, and legal reform in securing transformative public policy outcomes.
In this regard, the paper engages the tensions not only in constitutional economics but also those that have concrete application value for policy practitioners, politicians, and scholars concerned with issues of inequality and diversity of contemporary public policy.
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Social rights, such as the right to live with dignity, are important freedoms. Nevertheless, many constitutional documents and jurisdictions do not recognize the constitutional status of social rights or tend to consider the scope of these rights as limited.
The paper introduces two approaches -economic negative constitutionalism and positive social constitutionalism. The former tends to reject the possibility of recognizing social rights as constitutional rights, while the latter posits that the state is under an obligation to actively recognize the constitutional status of social rights and to enable wide protection on them. Economic negative constitutionalism could be also characterized by recognizing only a limited scope of social rights, and by advancing economic liberal freedoms, such as freedom of occupation. The economic negative approach is based on the thought that the state has limited means at her disposal for the fulfilment of social rights.
When Israel was founded, a formal constitution was not adopted. Israel has been characterized since its establishment and in its first decades up until the end of the 1980s as an interventionist welfare state, in which human rights have not been considered as having a constitutional status. The loss of the 1977 elections by the Labor Party and an economic crisis during the 1980s have been followed by a decline in welfare-social beliefs.
At the beginning of the 1990s, two Basic Laws of human rights were constituted- Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law of Occupation. According to a ruling of the Supreme Court in 1995, these Basic Laws enjoyed a constitutional status[1]. This ruling came to be known as the constitutional revolution[2]. The court also ruled that it had the power to review legislation, potentially disqualifying unconstitutional laws.
Nevertheless, the introduction of these two laws came to be known as the emergence of a new economic order in Israel based on neoliberalism. These Basic laws included a limited list of rights and only liberal economic freedoms such as the right to property, and did not include any social rights. Even though different human rights were not included in the constitutional documents of the Basic Laws of human rights, the Supreme Court has recognized several right as derivative and as having a constitutional status.
The constitutional revolution in Israel was followed by development of economic negative constitutionalism. The economic negative constitutionalism is reflected in cases regarding welfare policies and reforms and legislation that affected social rights.
The paper focuses on cases of constitutionalism in the Israeli Supreme Court, regarding the right to live with dignity and the right to health, and explores the adoption of certain constitutionalism . It will also explore, in a comparative look, the adoption of a positive social approach in South Africa.
Based on the pathologies of the current jurisprudence, the paper draws on the lines for a suggested model regarding the interplay of social rights and constitutionalism.
[1] HCJ 6821/93 Bank Hamizrahi v Migdal 1995 PD 49(4) 221.
[2] Ran Hirschl, ‘The “Constitutional Revolution” and the Emergence of a New Economic Order in Israel’ (1997) 2(1) Israel Studies 136, 142–47.
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The increasing economic inequality presents a pressing challenge for policymakers, necessitating a reexamination of public policy through the lens of constitutional economics. This research addresses the problem of how existing constitutional frameworks can both constrain and shape economic policies, often perpetuating disparities rather than promoting equity. The primary research question investigates the effectiveness of constitutional economics in bridging the gap between legal structures and economic equity, particularly in democratic societies where foundational laws may favor certain economic classes. Findings reveal that while constitutional values are intended to safeguard public interests, they frequently fall short in addressing systemic inequalities. Contemporary critiques highlight that many constitutions, crafted by elite groups, may entrench existing power dynamics and hinder democratic control over economic policies. This disjunction between constitutional promises and actual policy outcomes raises critical concerns about the legitimacy of these frameworks in fostering equitable growth. Based on these findings, the study recommends a multi-faceted approach to reforming public policy through constitutional economics. First, it suggests revisiting and revising constitutional provisions to ensure they reflect contemporary social and economic realities. Second, fostering inclusive dialogue among diverse stakeholders can help reshape the narrative around economic rights and equity. Finally, implementing comparative institutional analysis can guide policymakers in evaluating the effectiveness of alternative constitutional arrangements in promoting fairer economic outcomes. By embracing these recommendations, policymakers can better align constitutional frameworks with the pursuit of economic equity, ultimately enhancing democratic governance and social justice.
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The advent of digital labour has revolutionized the way we work, interact, and conduct business. With the global architecture of digital labour, workers can collaborate across borders, and businesses can operate in multiple jurisdictions. However, this globalization of labour also raises critical questions about the applicability of constitutional protections and the value of justice in the digital age. Through this paper, I would like to draw attention to the new challenges in digital labour such as Jurisdictional complexities where digital labour often transcends national boundaries, making it challenging to determine which country's laws and constitutions apply. Worker exploitation- the gig economy and platform capitalism have created new forms of exploitation, including wage theft, lack of benefits, and precarious working conditions. Data protection and surveillance- digital labour relies heavily on data-driven technologies, raising concerns about data protection, surveillance, and workers' right to privacy. Automation and job displacement- the increasing use of artificial intelligence and automation in digital labour poses significant threats to job security and workers' livelihoods. As digital platforms transcend geographical boundaries, they create a borderless workforce, enabling multinational corporations to leverage cheap labour from developing nations like India. While this phenomenon fosters employment opportunities and economic integration, it simultaneously raises critical concerns regarding labour rights, fair wages, and the applicability of domestic constitutional safeguards. The Indian Constitution, with its emphasis on social justice, equality, and the right to livelihood under Articles 14, 19, and 21, faces significant challenges in regulating digital labour, which often operates in a legal gray area beyond traditional labour laws. This paper will also analyse -The Constitutional Value of Justice- which mainly focuses on Social Justice: Constitutions enshrine the principles of social justice, including the protection of workers' rights, equality, and non-discrimination. Human dignity- the value of human dignity is fundamental to constitutionalism, and digital labour must respect and uphold this value. Fair labour standards in which the constitution often provide for fair labour standards, including minimum wage, safe working conditions, and freedom of association. Accountability and transparency- constitutional justice demands accountability and transparency in governance and business practices, including those related to digital labour. To address the above-stated challenges posed by digital labour, we must rethink the relationship between globalization, constitutional jurisdiction, and the value of justice. This requires the international cooperation of governments, businesses, and civil society. They must collaborate to establish global standards for digital labour, ensuring consistency and fairness across jurisdictions. The constitutional innovation must be adapted to the changing nature of work and technology, incorporating new provisions that address the unique challenges of digital labour. The Worker-centered approach is where digital labour policies and practices must prioritize workers' rights, dignity, and well-being, recognizing the inherent value of human labour in the digital age. Hence, the main research question is- How do we navigate the Paradox of Digital with a balance of globalization with that of Constitutional Economics? Ultimately, the paradox of digital labour demands a nuanced and multifaceted approach, one that balances the benefits of globalization with the need for constitutional protections and the value of justice.
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UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL OUTLOOK TOWARDS DEVELOPMENTAL AID
Foreign aid plays a pivotal role in helping developing countries attain economic and welfare goals. In the recent past, literature exploring the role of human rights, good governance and GDP per capita on aid allocation, notes that economic health, education, government effectiveness, and literacy rate do not significantly impact aid distributions, however, GDP per capita of the recipient country does play a crucial role (Keramat et al., 2022) Understanding the donor behaviour over a significant period, the study highlighted that more aid attention has shifted towards Countries with higher levels of poverty and stronger policy rather than country size or debt burden, indicating the need to understand the policy and institutional environment in both donor and receipt countries, how the selectivity of aid operates, which can further help in enhancing aid effectiveness. (Claessens et al., 2009) Related works investigating how donors' ideologies influence foreign aid found that Left-wing governments were more likely to provide aid to autocratic than to democratic recipient countries and proposes it to be a significant case study for partisan politics which further can help in localising the aid. (Brech & Potrafke, 2014) Further, research also highlighted the need to understand ODA from a judicial standpoint and the lack of study done to understand the preferences for aid from a recipient perspective. (Hennessy et al., 2023) Airey, S. (2022). While delving into the nuances of understanding the political landscape and perspectives of donor and recipient country, as well as recipient interest in aid allocation, an area of research unexplored is the interplay of constitutional values of both donor and recipient country when receiving foreign aid. (Harding, 2019) (Bui, 2019)
This paper can be used as an essential knowledge source in investigating the flow of aid in Global South Countries from 2000-2024 [This time frame covers the overarching goals under MDGs, SDGs, COVID-19 world and post-Covid-19 era] using the foreign aid data by DAC to account for each aid by sector and the Constitution of the Global South Countries to address the following research questions.
1. How has the allocation of international aid across different sectors changed over the years?
2. Do the sectors receiving aid in Official Development Assistance (ODA) align with the constitutional values of Global South countries?
3. How do the constitutional values of recipient countries influence aid allocation?
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Constitutionalism, as a means to preserve democracy, is essentially a political project. Yet, challenges to democracy have manifested in spaces outside the political: in recent times, neoliberalism has established itself in domestic constitutions (Tushnet 2019), and the resulting inequality has hollowed out liberal democracy (Brown 2015). Challenges of this nature require a “thicker” reconceptualization of democracy facilitating citizens’ participation (beyond just elections) in democratic deliberation, through judicial protection of liberties (Dixon 2023). In a world shaped by global capital flows, economic inequality becomes a significant barrier to full democratic participation. Constitutional courts therefore play a critical role in negotiating the relation between neoliberalism and economic democracy.
During the founding moment of India’s constitution, the framers were cognizant of the vast socio-economic inequality among the population, but also recognised the democratic value in not freezing economic policy prescriptions into the document but leaving them to “be decided by the people themselves according to time and circumstances” (Rodrigues 2024). The result was the creation of the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) as Part IV of the Constitution, a broadly worded set of provisions with economic justice at their core, without being prescriptive of method or ideology. However, the DPSPs have been used been inconsistently used by Indian courts for economic justice (Bhatia 2017). The most recent example of this is the Supreme Court of India’s 2024 decision in Property Owners Association vs State of Maharashtra, on the interpretation of Article 39(b), a provision in the DPSP which permits the state to distribute "ownership and control of the material resources of the community…to subserve the common good".
We use this judgment to draw connections between how Article 39(b) has been interpreted by the Court since the commencement of the Constitution, and contemporaneous changes in economic ideology of the State mediated by international financial institutions and processes. We argue that while these changes have reduced the ability of citizens to effectively participate in decision-making, the court has not sufficiently accounted for them and consequently only responded to local impulses while interpreting the DPSP, without being alive to the influence of global politics in undermining the Indian constitutional economic project.
To this end, we divide the Indian constitutional economic journey into three phases. In the first phase (1950-70), the legislature and judiciary clashed, with the judiciary seeking to uphold private property rights in contrast to the legislative mandate of redistribution. In the second (1970-90) and third phase (1990-present), the judiciary remained committed to the State despite starkly different economic regimes. By analysing the different interpretations of Article 39(b) in relation to private property, this paper analyses how the tension between legal institutions and economic logic remains. In the Property Owners Association case, the judiciary upheld the State’s ideology of free market, while still carving out exceptions with its broad reading of Article 39(b). We conclude by suggesting that adopting a responsive framework of judicial review (Dixon 2023) might address some of these issues while maintaining fidelity to the constitutional vision of economic democracy.
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Amid growing economic inequality, debates on constitutional amendments in the Philippines center on economic liberalization, particularly easing foreign ownership restrictions in key industries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). While proponents argue that such reforms will stimulate economic growth, critics highlight deeper structural constraints such as corruption, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and weak rule of law (North, 1990; Rodrik, 2007). Drawing on constitutional economics (Buchanan, 1986), legal institutionalism (Pistor, 2019), and the distinction between constituent and constitutive power (Tully, 2016), this paper argues that the proposed constitutional changes reflect elite-driven policymaking, where economic and political elites manipulate legal frameworks to reinforce their dominance. As Brown (2015) suggests, neoliberal reforms framed as economic necessity often erode democratic accountability. Rather than addressing structural barriers to inclusive growth, these reforms risk deepening inequality by privileging entrenched interests while limiting broader democratic participation in economic policymaking.
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The neoliberal state has redefined the balance between economic imperatives and constitutional guarantees, raising critical questions about how rights are mediated in public policy. This paper investigates the role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in India under neoliberal governance, focusing on how the state navigates conflicts between rights such as freedom of association, expression, and its policy imperatives of economic growth and depoliticisation.
India has witnessed the rise of CSOs addressing socio-economic inequities and environmental challenges amid the retrenchment of the state’s developmental role (Chatterjee, 2004). However, regulatory mechanisms, particularly the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), have been used to constrain dissent and marginalise rights-based advocacy (Pistor, 2019). Prominent CSOs like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, CARE India, and Save the Children have faced targeted crackdowns under the pretext of safeguarding sovereignty and ensuring accountability. These cases highlight how the Indian state has increasingly used legal tools to restrict the operations of CSOs critical of its policies, particularly those advocating for marginalised communities and environmental sustainability.
Drawing on James Buchanan’s theory of constitutional economics (1986) and Wendy Brown’s critique of neoliberalism (2015), this paper will examine the institutional logics of neoliberal governance. It employs a multi-method approach: (1) case studies of targeted CSOs, (2) comparative analysis of regulatory trends in the Global South, including Brazil and Kenya, and (3) document analysis of court rulings, legislative debates, and constitutional provisions. In Brazil, environmental CSOs opposing deforestation have faced funding restrictions under similar pretexts (Bebbington et al., 2008). Kenya presents a comparable trajectory, where land rights organisations have been suppressed through restrictive legal provisions. These patterns reflect a shared institutional logic among post-colonial neoliberal states, where constitutional rights are subordinated to market imperatives and state sovereignty.
The findings will underscore the paradox of neoliberal governance: constitutional guarantees of freedom of association and expression preserved in form but undermined in practice; a trend which challenges the normative role of constitutions in protecting democratic values and enabling civic participation. By bridging theoretical insights from constitutional economics and empirical evidence from India and the Global South, this paper will emphasise the need to reimagine legal frameworks that safeguard civil society’s role in upholding democratic values while navigating the complexities of contemporary governance.
References:
- Bebbington, A., Hickey, S., & Mitlin, D. (2008). Can NGOs Make a Difference? The Challenge of Development Alternatives. London: Zed Books.
- Brown, W. (2015). Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Buchanan, J. M. (1986). The Constitution of Economic Policy. Nobel Prize Lecture.
- Chatterjee, P. (2004). The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Pistor, K. (2019). The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
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The intersection of constitutional economics and land governance remains a critical but underexplored dimension of public policy. Land valuation and expropriation, embedded within legal and economic frameworks, function as instruments of wealth concentration while exacerbating socio-economic inequalities. Constitutional frameworks, historically shaped by elite interests, facilitate dispossession through valuation and expropriation policies, often undermining claims to economic justice and democratic accountability.
While constitutional economics is intended to balance market efficiency with legal safeguards for the public good, in practice, constitutional commitments to property rights overwhelmingly prioritize market-driven valuation methodologies. This approach discounts the non-market values of land—historical, cultural, and social—rendering them secondary to exchange value. In the Global South, particularly in India, large-scale land acquisitions under the guise of development have led to extensive displacement and socio-economic disruption. Data from the Land Matrix (2021) reports that over 33 million hectares of land have been acquired globally through large-scale deals since 2000, though the actual scale of dispossession is likely greater. In India alone, between 24 and 48 cases of land grabs have been documented, revealing the systemic nature of land expropriation.
At the core of this crisis is the challenge of valuation. Economic theories frame land valuation within an exchange-use paradigm, yet these models fail to account for plural values—spiritual, ecological, and communal—central to the lived experiences of affected populations. How does one assign monetary worth to sacred sites, indigenous territories, or lands that sustain subsistence economies? This epistemic limitation reflects the structural biases of economic governance, where legal valuation methodologies reinforce market logics at the expense of social and ecological justice.
The constitutional legitimacy of expropriation is further entangled with economic power structures. As Katharina Pistor (2019) argues, legal codes systematically privilege elite interests, embedding economic inequality into law itself. In India, expropriation policies nominally serve public interest objectives such as infrastructure expansion and industrial growth, yet empirical evidence indicates that these mechanisms overwhelmingly benefit corporate actors while displacing marginalized communities with inadequate compensation. The role of the state in these transactions raises fundamental questions about the function of constitutional provisions in protecting economic rights and whether they genuinely serve the broader public.
A rethinking of constitutional economics requires alternative valuation methodologies and equitable expropriation policies. Drawing on solidarity-based economic frameworks, as articulated by Jessica Gordon Nembhard and Peter Kropotkin, constitutional structures must be reoriented toward redistributive justice rather than the entrenchment of elite control. Strengthening mechanisms that recognize plural valuations of land, alongside democratizing decision-making in land governance, is essential for mitigating dispossession and advancing an economic order rooted in equity and democratic accountability.
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Independent India’s persistent agrarian crisis reveals a contradiction between the principles of equity and justice enshrined in the constitution and the policy trajectory of the Indian State which is increasingly shaped by neoliberal market fundamentalism. The post-independence constitutional framework, most evidently in the Directive Principles of State Policy (Articles 38 and 39), positioned land redistribution as an essential component of addressing India’s acute social and economic inequalities. However, the incompleteness of land reform policies and their eventual disappearance from the policy agenda resulted in the failure to actualize these constitutional principles. Moreover, land ownership is still rooted in caste-based inequalities. This paper examines how the failure to orient economic policy towards fulfilling constitutional principles in rural India has perpetuated poverty and reduced access to productive resources.
Land reforms were unable to substantively address the economic and social consequences of colonial land tenure systems. This left small and marginal farmers, as well as landless laborers at a severe economic disadvantage. The green revolution as well, meant to ameliorate India’s agrarian crisis, primarily benefited only large landowners and amplified rural class divides. The subsequent liberalization of India’s agricultural sector in the 1990s and the recent farm laws further intensified the exclusion of smallholders, as market deregulation exposed them to volatile pricing without sufficient protective mechanisms The weakening of the Minimum Support Price (MSP) system and state procurement undermined the intent of Articles 39(b) and 39(c), which sought to ensure that resources serve public welfare rather than exacerbate inequality.
Judicial responses to pressing agricultural challenges are further evidence of the tensions between constitutional principles and economic liberalization, with courts usually siding with the latter. Landmark cases, such as K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011), are evidence of how courts have struggled to reconcile property rights with the redistributive principles of the constitution. While judicial interventions have occasionally supported state-led redistributive efforts, as in tenancy and land ceiling cases, they have largely exacerbated market-driven inequalities and been unable to provide protection to small landholders and landless labourers. The judicial reluctance to challenge market reforms is evidence of Katharina Pistor’s argument that legal systems often reinforce economic hierarchies rather than dismantling them. The shift heralded by India’s economic liberalization from state intervention towards privatization has resulted in the right to livelihood under article 21 being increasingly undermined. The rising costs of cultivation coupled with declining farmer revenues has resulted in widespread rural distress, sometimes leading to in farmer protests.
This paper aims to integrate legal, economic and historical perspectives to demonstrate that the failure of India’s economic policy to mitigate agrarian distress lies in its lack of alignment with constitutional principles. By examining this disjunction, the paper highlights the deep-rooted structural forces within India’s constitutional democracy that continue to sustain agrarian inequality, offering insight into the relationship between economic policy and constitutionalism in the global south.
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Chronic non-communicable diseases (NCDs) represent the main cause of premature mortality and illness in Ecuador, Colombia and in general in Latin America, and the world. During recent years, the incidence of NCDs has been increasing at a global and regional level, and this increase is directly related to the consumption of unhealthy products such as tobacco, alcohol, and ultra-processed edible and drinkable products.
Decisions on tax matters have an intrinsic relationship with the effective enjoyment of human rights and constitutional rights such as the right to health and food. Thus, within fiscal policy, tax policy is particularly relevant, as it can be designed and implemented in such a way as to encourage healthy choices to be the easiest and most preferred by people, modifying social and economic factors such as the low price of tobacco, alcohol or sugary drinks and other unhealthy foods. In this framework, healthy taxes are shown as a measure to reduce the consumption of ultra-processed products, whose consumption is associated with a greater risk of suffering from chronic non-communicable diseases such as cancer, hypertension, diabetes, etc.
In November, 2024, Colombia began to tax ultra-processed edible and drinkable products. This measure, which is framed within Law 2277 of 2022, has the main objective of encouraging the consumption, through a tax measure, of products that contribute to public health problems, thus seeking to promote more responsible consumption among citizens. This policy was sued before the Colombian Constitutional Court, alleging that it violated the constitutional principles of business freedom and competition, as well as the principle of equality. In Ecuador, the national executive issued Decree No. 635 of January 10, 2023, which modified the public tax policy that reduces the Special Consumption Tax (ICE in Spanisch) on, among other, alcoholic beverages and sweet beverages. Thus, the Constitutional Court had a lawsuit to annul the Decree, this action was led by civil society organizations, who allege that the decree puts the correct guarantee of constitutional rights at risk.
This article has two objectives: on the one hand, it presents the reasons why the State, through a healthy tax, in coordination with other public health measures, guarantees constitutional rights to health and food. On the other hand, it seeks to analyze the role that the Constitutional Courts had in those two countries, to safeguard public health measures. For this purpose, it will present a description of the pronouncements of international organizations on health and food, which support the application of the measure on human rights principles and obligations. Afterward, the article will explain why it is through a healthy tax, in articulation with other public health measures, that the State can confront NCDs, regional experiences of the healthy tax are mentioned. Finally, an analysis of these two cases will be presented, focusing on how the Constitutional Court argued in favor of the measures.
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The Chandrachud courts’ ruling in Property Owners Association and others v. State of Maharashtra and others (2024) has brought to the fore a debate on whether all private property could be treated as material resource of the community and therefore be subject to acquisition by the state under Article 39 of the Constitution of India. Central to the debate is the confluence and the divergence in the economic and legal institutional logic on inequality.
Past judicial decisions have leaned in favour of expansive state power to acquire private land and redistribute it in the interest of public welfare. This ruling rejects this notion as it reflects an outdated economic dogma considering that India has already made strides towards a mixed economy. Whereas economic logic prioritizes individual incentives, private property, and market efficiency, legal logic justifies the redistribution of wealth. This logic is enshrined in the directives given to the state. By ruling on the limited state power to acquire property, the court pressurizes the state towards identifying alternative modes of addressing inequalities, without undermining economic growth. This marks a paradigm shift in the judicial approach.
The present study seeks to explore the underlying tension between economic and legal institutional logic in the context of the above judgement and contributes to the ongoing discourse on constitutionalism. In this paper, the researchers delve into the concept of eminent domain, the changing dimensions of this doctrine and the competing and conflicting demands of private property rights on the one hand and the state's power to regulate and redistribute private property in the public interest on the other. It navigates the change in narrative from expansive state power to restricted and controlled state power, with the help of Constituent Assembly Debates and judicial decisions thereby offering a nuanced understanding of the state's role in addressing economic inequalities with economic democracy.
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Public Interest Litigation as a Tool for Social Change: The Role of Constitutional Courts in India, South Africa, and Kenya
Abstract
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) has emerged as a transformative legal mechanism, enabling judicial intervention in matters of public concern and facilitating social justice. Rooted in the principles of constitutionalism, fundamental rights, and judicial activism, PIL provides a platform for marginalized and underrepresented groups to seek legal remedies against state and non-state actors. This paper explores the role of constitutional courts in India, South Africa, and Kenya in advancing social change through PIL, highlighting their jurisprudential approaches, landmark judgments, and socio-political impact. India pioneered the evolution of PIL in the Global South, transforming its judiciary into a proactive guardian of rights and justice. The Supreme Court of India, through expansive interpretations of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution, has broadened access to justice and facilitated progressive reforms in environmental protection, gender rights, labor welfare, and socio-economic entitlements. Cases such as Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997), MC Mehta v. Union of India (1986), and People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) illustrate how PIL has reinforced the state’s accountability in governance and human rights protection. However, concerns about judicial overreach and the misuse of PIL for political and frivolous purposes remain pertinent. South Africa, with its post-apartheid constitutional framework, offers a distinct yet comparable trajectory of PIL. Anchored in a transformative Constitution and an independent judiciary, the South African Constitutional Court has wielded PIL to dismantle institutional inequalities and promote socio-economic rights. Landmark cases such as Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom (2000) and Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign(2002) underscore the court’s commitment to enforcing the right to housing and healthcare. Unlike India, where PIL emerged primarily through judicial activism, South Africa’s legal framework formally recognizes class actions and public interest litigation, allowing civil society organizations to play an active role in litigation-driven social change. Kenya’s constitutional evolution, particularly after the enactment of the 2010 Constitution, has also witnessed a growing role of PIL in enforcing constitutional rights and democratic accountability. The Kenyan judiciary has addressed issues such as electoral justice, environmental conservation, and human rights violations through PIL. Cases like Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v. Kenya Airports Authority (2021) highlight the courts’ role in protecting socio-economic rights, particularly housing rights, against forced evictions. However, challenges such as judicial independence, political interference, and resource constraints continue to shape the effectiveness of PIL in Kenya. By comparing these three jurisdictions, this paper examines the effectiveness of PIL as a tool for social change in different legal and political contexts. While India demonstrates an activist approach that has expanded judicial power, South Africa institutionalizes public interest litigation within a constitutional framework, and Kenya represents a hybrid model evolving within a young constitutional democracy. The paper concludes by addressing the challenges posed by judicial activism, separation of powers, and the accessibility of PIL mechanisms. It also offers recommendations for enhancing the role of PIL in deepening democracy, strengthening human rights enforcement, and ensuring accountability in governance. This comparative analysis contributes to the broader discourse on the role of constitutional courts in advancing justice through PIL, emphasizing its significance as a catalyst for legal and societal transformation in the Global South.
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