LIST OF WORKSHOPS

A critical aspect of political life is the inability or unwillingness of individuals and decision-makers to respond proportionally to new information. A manifestation of this phenomenon is policy overreaction, defined as a policy that “impose[s] objective and/or perceived social costs without producing offsetting objective and/or perceived benefits” (Maor, 2012, 235), and policy overinvestment, which occurs “when government overinvests in a single policy instrument beyond its instrumental value in achieving a policy goal” (Jones et al., 2014, 149).

The study of overreaction in politics and policy offers a unique insight into modern political reality. Global and domestic threats coupled with publics that are relatively skeptical about politicians and political institutions and rising negativity and populism in democratic politics imply that policy overshooting is increasingly required for the public to perceive policy action as sufficient and politicians as competent, at least in the short term. Not only has overreaction been a focal point for political actors seeking decisive and swift policy change in times of real or manufactured crisis, but such action has time and time again also made a dramatic impact on the direction and the character of policy and politics. A classic example is the U.S. response to 9/11. It is, therefore, an exciting time for research on overreaction in politics and policy.

The study of overreaction is theoretically meaningful because it contributes to our basic understanding of fundamental processes. The insight of the punctuated equilibrium theory—that policy responses oscillate between periods of underreaction to the flow of information coming from the environment into the system and overreaction due to disproportionate information processing (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993)—implies that policy overreaction is the norm rather than the rarity.

The study of overreaction in politics and policy is also practically important because, under certain conditions, such a response creates substantial value for policymakers. Indeed, there has recently been a conceptual turn whereby overreaction has been re-entering the political and policy lexicons as a type of intentional choice, as part of the newly-emerging disproportionate policy perspective (Maor, 2017a). This perspective comprises strategic explanations which revolve around the idea that at times overreactions in politics and policy reflect intentional choices which may be carefully developed, meticulously debated, executed as planned, and successful in achieving the intended goals, especially during crises involving panic and public fears. It challenges psychological explanations that put all overreactions down to errors, derived from overconfidence and other misconceptions of risks (Janis, 1989; Jervis, 1976; Walker & Malici, 2011; Maor, 2012), human cognitive and emotional architectures which are the underpinnings of disproportionate information processing (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005), and socio-psychological dynamics in small decision-making groups (Janis, 1982; Mintz & Wayne, 2016; ‛t Hart et al., 1997). It also challenges institutional explanations which put all overreaction down to errors derived from institutional values, procedures, myths, and routines (Peters et al., 2017).

This workshop aims to advance the study of overreaction in politics and policy by building on the disproportionate policy perspective; studies of endogenous disjoint change, as well as on advances in the study of framing, emotions, social contagion, policy bubbles, elite decision-making, and new institutionalism. We aim to advance the disciplines of political science and policy sciences by highlighting a conceptual turn whereby the concept of overreaction is re-entering the policy lexicon as a type of intentional policy choice rather than a policy error, as well as by suggesting ways by which strategic and institutional explanations of overreaction can incorporate behavioral findings.  

We are seeking conceptual, empirical and methodological papers that revolve around the following questions: What are the conceptual foundations, analytical anatomy, and the conceptual reach of these explanations? What models could be developed in order to understand endogenously produced disjointed change in public policy? What are the implications of the disproportionate policy perspective for better understanding intentional overreaction in politics and policy? To what extent can individual cognitive processes help us understand changes at the aggregate level? What is the role of emotions and emotional entrepreneurs in overreaction? How can institutional and strategic explanations of overreaction in politics and policy blend findings from studies of human cognition and decision-making? How do policymakers balance between overreaction rhetoric and doctrine, or between selective and non-selective modes of policy overreaction, and what are the implications of such strategic choices? How are policy issues framed in policy overreaction speeches in order to reach out to the targeted audience? What rewards do politicians and bureaucrats receive from overreaction? How does the concept of policy bubbles enhance our understanding of policymaking?

The workshop will bring together participants at different stages of their careers, working in different areas of the political sciences and other disciplines on experimental and non-experimental research. The workshop directors have already approached researchers working in these areas who have indicated their willingness to participate. It is our hope that the workshop will yield an edited volume or a special edition of a journal.

References

Baumgartner, F. R. (2017). Endogenous disjoint change. Cognitive Systems Research, 44, 69–73.

Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1993). Agendas and instabilities in American politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Janis, I. L. (1982). Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign-policy decisions and fiascos. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. First published in 1972.

Janis, I. L. (1989). Crucial decisions. Leadership in policymaking and crisis management. New York: The Free Press.

Jervis, R. (1976). Perceptions and misperceptions in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Jones, B.D. (2017). Behavioral Rationality as a Foundation for Public Policy Studies. Cognitive Systems Research 43: 63-75.

Jones, B. D., & Baumgartner, F. R. (2005). The Politics of attention: How government prioritizes problems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jones, B. D., Thomas III, H. F., & Wolfe, M. (2014). Policy bubbles. Policy Studies Journal, 42, 146–171.

Maor, M. (2012). Policy overreaction. Journal of Public Policy, 32(3), 231–259.         

Maor, M. (2014a). Policy bubbles: Policy overreaction and positive feedback. Governance, 27(3), 469–487.

Maor, M. (2016). Emotion-driven negative policy bubbles. Policy Sciences, 49(2), 191–210.

Maor, M. (2017a). The implications of the emerging disproportionate policy perspective for the new policy design studies. Policy Sciences, 50(3), 383-398.

Maor, M. (2017b). Rhetoric and doctrines of policy over- and underreactions in times of crisis. Policy & Politics, doi: 10.1332/030557317X14843233064353.

Maor, M. (2017c). Disproportionate policy response. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.168.

Maor, M. (2017d). Policy overreaction doctrine: From ideal-type to context-sensitive solution in times of crisis. In M. Howlett & I. Mukherjee (eds.), Handbook of Policy Formulation (pp. 539-553). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Maor, M. (2017e). Policy entrepreneurs in policy valuation processes: The case of the coalition for environmentally responsible economies. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, doi: 10.1177/2399654417700629.           

Maor, M., Tosun J., & Jordan, A. (2017). Proportionate and disproportionate policy responses to climate change: Core concepts and empirical applications. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, doi: 10.1080/1523908X.2017.1281730.

Mintz, A., & Wayne, C. (2016). The polythink syndrome: U.S. foreign policy decisions on 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and ISIS. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Peters, G., Jordan, A., & Tosun, J. (2017). Over-reaction and under-reaction in climate policy: An institutional analysis. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, doi: 10.1080/1523908X.2017.1348225.

'T Hart, P., Stern, E. K., & Sundelius, B. (Eds.) (1997). Beyond groupthink: Political group dynamics and foreign policy-making. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Walker, S. G., & Malici, A. (2011). U.S. presidents and foreign policy mistakes. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

A critical aspect of political life is the inability or unwillingness of individuals and decision-makers to respond proportionally to new information. One manifestation of this phenomenon is overreaction (Maor 2012) or overinvestment (Jones et al. 2014). The premises underlying this workshop is that the study of overreaction in politics and policy is theoretically meaningful because it contributes to our basic understanding of fundamental processes, such as the oscillation of policy between periods of under- and overreaction to the flow of information coming from the environment into the system (Baumgartner & Jones 1993), and it is practically important because, under certain conditions, such a policy response creates substantial value for policymakers (Maor 2017a). But we still lack a thorough understanding of the processes by which this type of elite decision-making occurs and is managed, and we still lack clarity regarding how that value is created.

Although research examining overreaction in politics and policy remains at an early stage, it is clear that it largely develops along three paths. The first path comprises psychological explanations which put all overreactions down to errors derived from cognitive biases and constraints on information processing, as well as socio-psychological dynamics in small decision-making groups (Janis 1982, 1989; Jervis 1976; Jones & Baumgartner 2005; Maor 2012; Mintz & Wayne 2016; ‛t Hart et al. 1997; Walker & Malici 2011). The second path comprises newly-emerging institutional explanations which put all overreaction down to errors derived from institutional values, procedures, myths, and routines (Peters et al., 2017). The third path comprises newly-emerging strategic explanations which revolve around the idea that at times overreactions in politics and policy reflect intentional choices which may be carefully developed, meticulously debated, executed as planned, and successful in achieving the intended goals, especially during crises involving panic and public fears (Maor 2017a,b,c,d,e).

This workshop aims to advance the study of overreaction in politics and policy by building on the disproportionate policy perspective as well as on advances in the study of endogenous disjoint change, framing, emotions, social contagion, policy bubbles, elite decision-making, and new institutionalism. We are seeking conceptual, empirical and methodological papers that revolve around the following questions: What are the conceptual foundations, analytical anatomy, and the conceptual reach of these explanations? What models could be developed in order to understand endogenously produced disjointed change in public policy? What are the implications of the disproportionate policy perspective for better understanding intentional overreaction in politics and policy? To what extent can individual cognitive processes help us understand changes at the aggregate level? What is the role of emotions and emotional entrepreneurs in overreaction? How can institutional and strategic explanations of overreaction blend findings from studies of human cognition and decision-making? How do policymakers balance between overreaction rhetoric and doctrine, and between selective and non-selective modes of policy overreaction, and what are the implications of such choices? How are policy issues framed in policy overreaction speeches in order to reach out to the targeted audience? What rewards do politicians and bureaucrats receive from overreaction?

A critical aspect of political life is the inability or unwillingness of individuals and decision-makers to respond proportionally to new information. One manifestation of this phenomenon is overreaction. The insight of the punctuated equilibrium theory—that policy responses oscillate between periods of underreaction to the flow of information coming from the environment into the system and overreaction due to disproportionate information processing—implies that policy overreaction is the norm rather than the rarity. Although research examining overreaction in politics and policy remains at an early stage, it is clear that it largely develops along three paths. The first path comprises psychological explanations which put all overreactions down to errors derived from cognitive biases and constraints on information processing, as well as socio-psychological dynamics in small decision-making groups. The second path comprises newly-emerging institutional explanations which put all overreaction down to errors derived from institutional values, procedures, myths, and routines. The third path comprises newly-emerging strategic explanations which revolve around the idea that at times overreactions in politics and policy reflect intentional choices which may be carefully developed, meticulously debated, executed as planned, and successful in achieving the intended goals, especially during crises involving panic and public fears. This workshop aims to advance the study of overreaction in politics and policy by building on the disproportionate policy perspective; studies of endogenous disjoint change, as well as on advances in the study of framing, emotions, social contagion, policy bubbles, elite decision-making, and new institutionalism. We aim to advance the disciplines of political science and policy sciences by highlighting a conceptual turn whereby the concept of overreaction reenters the policy lexicon as a type of intentional policy choice rather than a policy error, and by suggesting ways by which strategic and institutional explanations of overreaction can incorporate behavioral findings.  

Moshe  Maor is Professor of Political Science at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and holder of the Wolfson Family Chair in Public Administration. His current research interests focus on disproportionate policy response and bureaucratic politics, especially bureaucratic reputations. His books include Political Parties and Party Systems (Routledge, 1997) and Parties, Conflicts and Coalitions in Western Europe (Routledge and LSE, 1998). Among the volumes he has edited is Organizational Reputation in the Public Sector (co-edited with A. Waeraas; Routledge, 2015). He has also published numerous articles in peer-reviewed journals including J-PART, Governance, Policy Sciences, Journal of Public Policy, Policy & Politics, Environment and Planning C, Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, Disasters, Public Administration, and Public Administration Review. He is currently researching an ISF-funded project on government responses to policy bubbles.

Professor Jones’ research interests center on the study of public policy processes, American governing institutions, and the connection between human decision-making and organizational behavior. Jones has published articles in the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, the American Journal of Political Science, Policy Studies Journal, and many other professional journals. He has served on the editorial boards of the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, the Policy Studies Journal, Economic Development Quarterly, Governance, Political Psychology, and State and Local Government Review. He has served as President and Vice President of the Midwest Political Science Association, on the Executive Council of the American Political Science Association, and President of the APSA’s Organized Section on Urban Politics. Jones has received National Science Foundation Grants totaling more than $2,650,000. Jones directs the US Policy Agendas Project, now housed at the University of Texas. In 2003 Jones was awarded the Herbert A. Simon Award for Contributions to the Study of Public Administration; in 2013 he received the Norton Long Career Achievement Award in Urban Politics.  He holds an honorary doctorate from Aarhus University in Denmark. Jones’ books include Politics and the Architecture of Choice (2001) and Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics (1994), both winners of the APSA Political Psychology Section Robert Lane Award; The Politics of Information (co-authored with Frank Baumgartner, 2015), winner of awards from the American Academy of Public Administration and International Public Policy Association; The Politics of Attention (co-authored with Frank Baumgartner, 2005); Agendas and Instability in American Politics (co-authored with Frank Baumgartner, 1993; Second Edition 2009), winner of the 2001 Aaron Wildavsky Award for Enduring Contribution to the Study of Public Policy of the American Political Science Association’s Public Policy Section and The Politics of Bad Ideas (co-authored with Walt Williams, 2008).