LIST OF WORKSHOPS

Policies demanding change from those same actors that implement them incur in a problematic situation of a special kind. Governments in such situations are said to face a super wicked problem (Peters, 2017). Anti-corruption policies among other types of policies, such as State power checks & balances, lie behind this label of problems. Characteristics of these problems include high political controversy and high cognitive challenges (Alford & Head, 2017). The former is needed to grant legitimacy to make a State-level intervention, and the latter is needed to understand how to solve a problem. A persuasive but technically sound narrative makes for effective policies (Giandomenico, 1989), but super-wicked problems are posed to solve an impossible conundrum: one where those who need to change may not be willing to be effective, and those who oversee policies’ design and implementation might like to open the possibility of failure. This is the case of anti-corruption policies in contexts of systemic corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; Marquette & Peiffer, 2018; Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013; Meza, Pérez-Chiqués, & Hernández, 2023), or corruption that has become pervasive, is normalized and socially and politically accepted, and that is sustained by cultural understandings and informal institutions (Arellano-Gault, 2018; Marquette & Peiffer, 2018; Rothstein, 2011. Under conditions where systemic corruption exists, promises to address this problem fall under a special kind of policy paradox (Stone, 2001).

This workshop aims to provide some light into the fundamental question of why and how polities where corruption is the rule establish anti-corruption policies? Hypotheses in the literature have brought forward some reasons -signaling, fire-alarm or insurance- (Schnell, 2018). However, these points of departure still offer ample room to explain the phenomenon for developing countries and the global south under policy theoretical lenses and/or neo-institutionalist perspectives (Fritzen, 2005). At the same time, the answers to the question will advance theoretical frameworks by looking at the particularities of a kind of policy/problem where a special kind of paradox persists. To name few examples:

The wickedness of problems may be closest related to the institutional capacity of the State, rather than its inherent wickedness. For instance, in the drug policy frameworks, the degree of wickedness of the problem is a result of the government structure and its institutional (in)capacity (Meza, Guerra & Corona, 2018). A theoretical proposition behind the design, structure, and form of anti-corruption policies is shaped by the extant capacity to address the political controversy and the cognitive challenge of solving problems.
Policy studies can also contribute to understanding the form of anti-corruption policies. In a policy subsystem, amid a policy debate, the timing of a series of corruption scandals --in this case an “endogenous” shock-- could jeopardize the stalemate between antagonist actors, rebalancing the equilibrium in favor of a coalition that produces a policy change or the adoption and implementation of a certain set of anti-corruption policies.
Scandals could serve as triggering events with positive feedback that, in line with the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, could break the stability of policies by producing change. Long-lasting equilibriums being breached by episodes in history, bringing sudden change, are explained by both the force of the uprising event combined with the inherent friction of the system; friction that is associated with its organizational features and capacities (Breunig & Koski, 2006; Flink, 2017).
Who is the policy target where corruption is systemic? How have the polities socially constructed the policy target (Schneider & Ingram 1993) of anti-corruption policies? In places where corruption is endorsed by the system, corruption becomes the main and most important form of social advancement; it is actually a peer-accepted strategy. Therefore, the cultural notion of “those who do not cheat do not advance” is brain-wired as a sound formal institution. What happens if such a cognitive appraisal of corruption is modified to allow people to revisit themselves as victims of these acts? A possibility to mitigate systemic corruption could pass through the social manipulation of the construction of policy targets, but is there any evidence of it in the real world?
 

Answers to the question around the reasons, extent, and implications of governments adopting anti-corruption policies is conditional to many factors that the workshop is hoping to contribute.

References

Alford, J., & Head, B.W. (2017). Wicked and Less Wicked Problems: A Typology and a Contingency Framework. Policy and Society, 36(3), 397-413.Arellano-Gault, D. (2018). ¿Podemos Reducir la Corrupción en México? Límites y Posibilidades de los Instrumentos a Nuestro Alcance, 2da edición, Ciudad de México: CIDE.

Breunig, C., & Koski, C. (2006). Punctuated Equilibria and Budgets in the American States. Policy Studies Journal, 34(3), 363–379. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2006.00177.x

Flink, C. M. (2017). Rethinking Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: A Public Administration Approach to Budgetary Changes. Policy Studies Journal, 45(1), 101–120. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12114

Fritzen, S. (2005). Beyond “Political Will”: How Institutional Context Shapes the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Policies, Policy and Society, 24:3, 79-96, DOI:10.1016/S1449-4035(05)70061-8

Majone, G., 1989. Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process. Yale University Press.

Marquette, H., & Peiffer, C. (2018). Grappling with the “Real Politics” of Systemic Corruption: Theoretical Debates versus “Real-World” functions. Governance, 31(3), 499–514.

Meza, O., Guerra, E., & Corona, G. (2018). Las Políticas de Drogas y el Estado: Una Aproximación para una Política de Mitigación de Riesgos. Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional Diciembre, 18, 19–29.

Meza, O., Pérez-Chiqués, E., & Martínez-Hernández, A. A. (2023). Framework to understand and address the systemic corruption in local governments. Revista de Administração Pública, 57, e2022-0346.

Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2006). Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment. Journal of Democracy, 17(3), 86–99.

Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail–Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem. Governance, 26(3), 449–471.

Peters, B. G. (2017). What is so Wicked about Wicked Problems? A Conceptual Analysis and a Research Program. Policy and Society, 36(3), 385–396.

Rothstein, B. (2011). The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Schneider, A., & Ingram, H. (1993). Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy. The American Political Science Review, 87(2), 334–347.

Schnell, S. (2018). Cheap Talk or Incredible Commitment?(Mis) Calculating Transparency and Anti‐Corruption. Governance, 31(3), 415–430.

Stone, D. (2001). Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. New York and London.

We call for research to understand and explain both why and how governments characterized by systemic corruption adopt anti-corruption policies. Some key questions that we invite researchers to answer are the following:

1. Why do polities under systemic corruption adopt, formulate, and implement anti-corruption policies?

2. What are the implications of anti-corruption policies being formulated under systemic corruption contexts, and what can explain the possibilities of failure or the possibilities of success?

3. What are the characteristics of anti-corruption policies under systemic corruption contexts, and how can their differences be explained?

Policies demanding change from those same actors that implement them incur in a problematic situation of a special kind. Governments in such situations are said to face a super wicked problem (Peters, 2017). Anti-corruption policies among other types of policies, such as State power checks & balances, lie behind this label of problems. Characteristics of these problems include high political controversy and high cognitive challenges (Alford & Head, 2017). The former is needed to grant legitimacy to make a State-level intervention, and the latter is needed to understand how to solve a problem. A persuasive but technically sound narrative makes for effective policies (Giandomenico, 1989), but super-wicked problems are posed to solve an impossible conundrum: one where those who need to change may not be willing to be effective, and those who oversee policies’ design and implementation might like to open the possibility of failure. This is the case of anti-corruption policies in contexts of systemic corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; Marquette & Peiffer, 2018; Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013; Meza, Pérez-Chiqués, & Hernández, 2023), or corruption that has become pervasive, is normalized and socially and politically accepted, and that is sustained by cultural understandings and informal institutions (Arellano-Gault, 2018; Marquette & Peiffer, 2018; Rothstein, 2011. Under conditions where systemic corruption exists, promises to address this problem fall under a special kind of policy paradox (Stone, 2001).

Oliver Meza 

Associate professor at the Institute for Research in Public Policy and Government at the University of Guadalajara. He is mostly interested in local government’s policy agendas, local governance and corruption. Recently he has developed work around public officials’ noncompliance (IPMJ), citizen dissatisfaction (PADM), corruption consolidation (PADM), institutional logics and implementation (Governance) frontline workers policy tactics (IJPA). In 2020, he was awarded for his research by the Mexican Science Academy. 

Elizabeth Pérez-Chiqués 

Assistant professor at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas’ (CIDE) Division of Public Administration. Her research agenda focuses on government corruption, public personnel management, and policy implementation. Recently, she has developed work on corruption consolidation (PADM), local corruption networks (Governance), informal personnel practices (ROPPA) and street-level work in environments of systemic corruption (PA&D).