W04. The Paradox of AntiCorruption Policy Formulation, Adoption, and Implementation in Contexts of Systemic Corruption
Policy & PoliticsCATEGORISATION
KEYWORDS
GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE
Policies demanding change from those same actors that implement them incur in a problematic situation of a special kind. Governments in such situations are said to face a super wicked problem (Peters, 2017). Anti-corruption policies among other types of policies, such as State power checks & balances, lie behind this label of problems. Characteristics of these problems include high political controversy and high cognitive challenges (Alford & Head, 2017). The former is needed to grant legitimacy to make a State-level intervention, and the latter is needed to understand how to solve a problem. A persuasive but technically sound narrative makes for effective policies (Giandomenico, 1989), but super-wicked problems are posed to solve an impossible conundrum: one where those who need to change may not be willing to be effective, and those who oversee policies’ design and implementation might like to open the possibility of failure. This is the case of anti-corruption policies in contexts of systemic corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; Marquette & Peiffer, 2018; Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013; Meza, Pérez-Chiqués, & Hernández, 2023), or corruption that has become pervasive, is normalized and socially and politically accepted, and that is sustained by cultural understandings and informal institutions (Arellano-Gault, 2018; Marquette & Peiffer, 2018; Rothstein, 2011. Under conditions where systemic corruption exists, promises to address this problem fall under a special kind of policy paradox (Stone, 2001).
This workshop aims to provide some light into the fundamental question of why and how polities where corruption is the rule establish anti-corruption policies? Hypotheses in the literature have brought forward some reasons -signaling, fire-alarm or insurance- (Schnell, 2018). However, these points of departure still offer ample room to explain the phenomenon for developing countries and the global south under policy theoretical lenses and/or neo-institutionalist perspectives (Fritzen, 2005). At the same time, the answers to the question will advance theoretical frameworks by looking at the particularities of a kind of policy/problem where a special kind of paradox persists. To name few examples:
The wickedness of problems may be closest related to the institutional capacity of the State, rather than its inherent wickedness. For instance, in the drug policy frameworks, the degree of wickedness of the problem is a result of the government structure and its institutional (in)capacity (Meza, Guerra & Corona, 2018). A theoretical proposition behind the design, structure, and form of anti-corruption policies is shaped by the extant capacity to address the political controversy and the cognitive challenge of solving problems.
Policy studies can also contribute to understanding the form of anti-corruption policies. In a policy subsystem, amid a policy debate, the timing of a series of corruption scandals --in this case an “endogenous” shock-- could jeopardize the stalemate between antagonist actors, rebalancing the equilibrium in favor of a coalition that produces a policy change or the adoption and implementation of a certain set of anti-corruption policies.
Scandals could serve as triggering events with positive feedback that, in line with the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, could break the stability of policies by producing change. Long-lasting equilibriums being breached by episodes in history, bringing sudden change, are explained by both the force of the uprising event combined with the inherent friction of the system; friction that is associated with its organizational features and capacities (Breunig & Koski, 2006; Flink, 2017).
Who is the policy target where corruption is systemic? How have the polities socially constructed the policy target (Schneider & Ingram 1993) of anti-corruption policies? In places where corruption is endorsed by the system, corruption becomes the main and most important form of social advancement; it is actually a peer-accepted strategy. Therefore, the cultural notion of “those who do not cheat do not advance” is brain-wired as a sound formal institution. What happens if such a cognitive appraisal of corruption is modified to allow people to revisit themselves as victims of these acts? A possibility to mitigate systemic corruption could pass through the social manipulation of the construction of policy targets, but is there any evidence of it in the real world?
Answers to the question around the reasons, extent, and implications of governments adopting anti-corruption policies is conditional to many factors that the workshop is hoping to contribute.
References
Alford, J., & Head, B.W. (2017). Wicked and Less Wicked Problems: A Typology and a Contingency Framework. Policy and Society, 36(3), 397-413.Arellano-Gault, D. (2018). ¿Podemos Reducir la Corrupción en México? Límites y Posibilidades de los Instrumentos a Nuestro Alcance, 2da edición, Ciudad de México: CIDE.
Breunig, C., & Koski, C. (2006). Punctuated Equilibria and Budgets in the American States. Policy Studies Journal, 34(3), 363–379. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2006.00177.x
Flink, C. M. (2017). Rethinking Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: A Public Administration Approach to Budgetary Changes. Policy Studies Journal, 45(1), 101–120. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12114
Fritzen, S. (2005). Beyond “Political Will”: How Institutional Context Shapes the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Policies, Policy and Society, 24:3, 79-96, DOI:10.1016/S1449-4035(05)70061-8
Majone, G., 1989. Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process. Yale University Press.
Marquette, H., & Peiffer, C. (2018). Grappling with the “Real Politics” of Systemic Corruption: Theoretical Debates versus “Real-World” functions. Governance, 31(3), 499–514.
Meza, O., Guerra, E., & Corona, G. (2018). Las Políticas de Drogas y el Estado: Una Aproximación para una Política de Mitigación de Riesgos. Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional Diciembre, 18, 19–29.
Meza, O., Pérez-Chiqués, E., & Martínez-Hernández, A. A. (2023). Framework to understand and address the systemic corruption in local governments. Revista de Administração Pública, 57, e2022-0346.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2006). Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment. Journal of Democracy, 17(3), 86–99.
Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail–Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem. Governance, 26(3), 449–471.
Peters, B. G. (2017). What is so Wicked about Wicked Problems? A Conceptual Analysis and a Research Program. Policy and Society, 36(3), 385–396.
Rothstein, B. (2011). The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Schneider, A., & Ingram, H. (1993). Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy. The American Political Science Review, 87(2), 334–347.
Schnell, S. (2018). Cheap Talk or Incredible Commitment?(Mis) Calculating Transparency and Anti‐Corruption. Governance, 31(3), 415–430.
Stone, D. (2001). Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. New York and London.
CALL FOR PAPERS
We call for research to understand and explain both why and how governments characterized by systemic corruption adopt anti-corruption policies. Some key questions that we invite researchers to answer are the following:
1. Why do polities under systemic corruption adopt, formulate, and implement anti-corruption policies?
2. What are the implications of anti-corruption policies being formulated under systemic corruption contexts, and what can explain the possibilities of failure or the possibilities of success?
3. What are the characteristics of anti-corruption policies under systemic corruption contexts, and how can their differences be explained?
ABSTRACT
Policies demanding change from those same actors that implement them incur in a problematic situation of a special kind. Governments in such situations are said to face a super wicked problem (Peters, 2017). Anti-corruption policies among other types of policies, such as State power checks & balances, lie behind this label of problems. Characteristics of these problems include high political controversy and high cognitive challenges (Alford & Head, 2017). The former is needed to grant legitimacy to make a State-level intervention, and the latter is needed to understand how to solve a problem. A persuasive but technically sound narrative makes for effective policies (Giandomenico, 1989), but super-wicked problems are posed to solve an impossible conundrum: one where those who need to change may not be willing to be effective, and those who oversee policies’ design and implementation might like to open the possibility of failure. This is the case of anti-corruption policies in contexts of systemic corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; Marquette & Peiffer, 2018; Persson, Rothstein & Teorell, 2013; Meza, Pérez-Chiqués, & Hernández, 2023), or corruption that has become pervasive, is normalized and socially and politically accepted, and that is sustained by cultural understandings and informal institutions (Arellano-Gault, 2018; Marquette & Peiffer, 2018; Rothstein, 2011. Under conditions where systemic corruption exists, promises to address this problem fall under a special kind of policy paradox (Stone, 2001).
BIOGRAPHICAL PRESENTATION
Oliver Meza
Associate professor at the Institute for Research in Public Policy and Government at the University of Guadalajara. He is mostly interested in local government’s policy agendas, local governance and corruption. Recently he has developed work around public officials’ noncompliance (IPMJ), citizen dissatisfaction (PADM), corruption consolidation (PADM), institutional logics and implementation (Governance) frontline workers policy tactics (IJPA). In 2020, he was awarded for his research by the Mexican Science Academy.
Elizabeth Pérez-Chiqués
Assistant professor at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas’ (CIDE) Division of Public Administration. Her research agenda focuses on government corruption, public personnel management, and policy implementation. Recently, she has developed work on corruption consolidation (PADM), local corruption networks (Governance), informal personnel practices (ROPPA) and street-level work in environments of systemic corruption (PA&D).
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives implemented in India since independence and to determine why, despite a strong anti-corruption framework, these initiatives have not been able to reduce corruption in the nation. Yet while scholars have developed several anti-corruption policies, but have only partially adopted. The paper makes the claim that the degree and scope of corruption in the nation demonstrate that it is a systemic issue rather than an individual one. The article comes to the conclusion that institutional reforms, by themselves, cannot effectively combat corruption in India due to its systemic character after conducting a comparative analysis of various anti-corruption strategies taken in various nations. In order for Indian policymakers to recognize the relationship between rising levels of corruption and the deepening crisis of democracy, the paper also advocates making connections between corruption and democracy. Therefore, it is stated that in order to combat corruption effectively, it is crucial to see it as a breach of democratic norms, principles, and practices. Transparency International, a global civil society organization dedicated to fighting corruption, has acknowledged this. In order to maintain accountability and reduce corruption, it is necessary to look for policies that go beyond institutions and emphasize effective citizen participation.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Corruption is a dynamic phenomenon whose conceptualization is socially and politically constructed through discourses legitimized and reproduced mainly by political actors in power. Thus, anti-corruption policies have also been constructed through political discourse. In the context of systemic corruption, corruption control policies are used as political instruments to damage the image of opposition groups, to show genuine interest in addressing a public problem that is often relevant to citizens, and even to deal with corruption scandals. However, anti-corruption policies are often ineffective for two main reasons: the original contradiction and the Icarus paradox. First, in countries with systemic corruption, the actors who should support, develop, and consolidate anti-corruption policies are those who benefit most from the corrupt system. Hence, they tend to sabotage any anti-corruption policy that affects their status quo. Second, when an anti-corruption effort is effective, it is likely to be questioned and eventually dismantled by the actors in power, as some members of the group in power are usually involved in corruption networks and scandals. Simultaneously, if an anti-corruption policy does not show any results, it will also be criticized and eliminated, as it will be considered expensive and futile.
Consequently, anti-corruption policies under systemic corruption face constant internal and external political pressure. As a result, this generates constant policy changes and ineffectiveness, because even if solid policies exist, they hardly remain in time. Therefore, this article analyzes two cases that illustrate anti-corruption policy dilemmas: the creation of the National Anti-Corruption System in Mexico and the International Commission against Corruption and Impunity in Guatemala. While both cases are not policies by themselves, the cases are policy instruments; thus, they illustrate the constant challenges that anti-corruption efforts face in the context of systemic corruption and why they often fail. In this article, we review the formation process, their changes, and their current state and observe and outline some patterns based on these dilemmas.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Corruption is a critical issue related to national welfare and good governance. In 2015, the United Nations announced the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 16), with the theme "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels," one of the goals being "to substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms." This aims to achieve peace, justice, and strong institutions through a series of anti-corruption measures.
In recent years, there has been a growing focus on enhancing gender equality in political roles, with advocates pushing for greater participation of women in politics to improve governance quality. The premise suggests that promoting gender equality, particularly by elevating the role of women in public office, could inherently lead to more ethical and transparent governance. However, this assumption raises critical questions: Does simply adding more women to politics guarantee better governance, or are there more complex factors at play that could result in unexpected outcomes? This inquiry sets the stage for a deeper exploration of gender dynamics in the fight against corruption.
Moreover, with the international trend towards gender education equality, changes in production structures, the transformation of women's roles, and their increased contribution to the workplace, "gender mainstreaming" and "gender impact assessment" have become crucial in government decision-making processes. In Taiwan, with the progress in women's rights and gender equality, the proportion of female legislators has exceeded forty percent. The government emphasizes that all departmental legal cases and governance plans must undergo gender impact assessments, and gender equality is a significant consideration in public sector employment. These developments reflect the achievements in gender equality and highlight the importance and opportunities for discussing gender differences in corruption.
Despite the abundant research on corruption, there still exist many debates in the field, particularly concerning gender differences in corruption. The World Bank has pointed out an interesting phenomenon: compared to men, women are less susceptible to corruption in the public sector. Generally, increasing the political or administrative participation in public life of women can facilitate improving the integrity of the government. However, this argument lacks empirical evidence. The academic world is divided on issues such as whether women are less tolerant of corruption than men, whether women are more incorruptible than men, and whether women are less likely to give or accept bribes than men. To delve deeper into these issues, this study designed surveys and behavioral simulations, such as hypothetical bribery scenarios, to understand the underlying factors we aim to explore.This study surveys civil servants in the Taiwanese public sector, collecting a sample of 649 individuals, to analyze the personal motivations and potential constraints related to gender and corruption, including risk assessments of corruption, workplace role expectations, motivations for holding office, positions within power structures, network relationships, and the formation of tolerance towards corruption. This research not only helps understand the effects of gender mainstreaming policies in the Taiwanese public sector within Chinese society but also hopes to provide crucial insights for the international community in policy planning and human resource management in the public sector.
Keywords: Gender Mainstreaming, Corruption Tolerance, Integrity Governance, Public Sector, Behavioral Experiments
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
During recent months, municipalities in Chile have been at the center of the corruption scandals. Its media coverage has fallen into judicialization or personalization o 'administrative crimes' according to the profile of the authorities and officials involved. However, there are factors that explain the emergence of corruption that are nothing anecdotal. The paper suggests a socio-political approach to identify these factors.Through a qualitative methodology and using primary and secondary sources, such as: verdicts of the Comptroller General, review of press releases, analysis of the legislative measures of the central Government, a bibliographic review of articles on corruption, and interviews in depth to various local actors. These factors associated with local corruption are organized as follows: heterogeneity of state capabilities, decentralization processes and their insertion into local politics (thanks to informal networks and local intermediaries), the parliamentarization of politics, weak controls at the local level and the presence of political dynasties. It is concluded that one of the major problems faced in the local reality revolves around the fact that the measures implemented in these areas have followed a logic of partialization and fragmentation, which has undermined the success of the new regulations at the municipal and regional level.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Do audits have any effect on the behavior of local governments? Once a government is audited, does its compliance improve? Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) state that “the economic success of countries differs because of differences between their institutions, [that is] the rules that influence how the economy works and the incentives that motivate people.” But rules only make sense if they actually cause some change in the behavior of the parties. Not all rules are consolidated in institutions or cause the desired effect (March and Olsen, 2006; Helmke and Levistky, 2006). Knowledge needs to be created about how the rules are enforced. The phenomenon of intergovernmental compliance is the center of a live debate between different literatures. For example, explanations from public management seek to compare different management styles to explain compliance (Ebinger and Geissler, 2021; Hendrick, 2011; Smith, 2012). Other approaches point out that compliance is adopted as part of conditions or obligations to which certain countries or subnational units must respond, for example, regional trade integration processes (Hadjiisky, Pal and Walker, 2017; Dussauge, 2020; Bronić, Jerinić , Klun, Ott and Rakar 2021). There are also currents that explain compliance based on considerations about the functioning of local democracies (Weingast, 2014; Berliner, 2016; Alt, Lassen and Rose, 2006). Another explanation, the most widespread, comes from economic theory and focuses on the broad, specific and coercive nature of the rules that support the agreements. According to this approach, the use of audits presupposes that the executors of public spending are individuals or organizations, they are rational actors and, therefore, they are subject to incentives, one of which consists of avoiding a sanction. Audits operate as assurance mechanisms that, through the threat of punishment, seek to increase the cost of engaging in misconduct. The audit, thus, is configured as the vehicle through which the rule generates the desired behavior. This article seeks to test this assumption and aims to quantify the effect of audits on the financial compliance of local governments in Mexico. To this end, a panel was built for 2,463 Mexican municipal governments in the period 2014-2020 for the largest public infrastructure investment fund in the country and, through a two-way fixed effects model, it seeks to identify the existence of some effect of the processes review on municipal financial compliance. Preliminarily, there is evidence of a negative and modest effect of the audit on compliance, which seems to suggest that the administrative environment has adapted to the review processes and they soon lose their effect. Furthermore, there is evidence of a lagged effect of audits that seems to manifest itself after a process of stabilization of the rules. This work can contribute to the panel to the extent that it analyzes a widely extended anti-corruption policy whose effects we do not know in a country where corruption is systemic.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Recent studies[1] have shown the limits of the dominant view of corruption promoted by the institutional economics approach to address this phenomenon when the latter is not marginal but systemic. Despite this shift in scholarly work, anticorruption policies continue to be supported by the dominant view of corruption in various States where corruption assumes systemic proportions. This article focuses on the case of Brazil. The starting point of the analysis is the late 1990s when fundamental transformations were promoted in its control systems. The article finds that Brazil has aligned itself with the international anticorruption agenda, focusing on the agent model. Institutionally, it has strengthened the role of its control agencies, especially the Federal Police, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union. The agencies expanded their networks and were able to organize actions directly aimed at combating corruption crimes and money laundering. Among these actions, the Operation Car Wash stands as the most prominent. While the Operation was met with popular support amidst a narrative of bringing forth a solution for the corruption problem in Brazil, this ambitious goal ultimately failed and revealed deep inconsistencies. This result points to the question of the (in)sufficiency of institutional mechanisms for overcoming the problem of systemic corruption. Considering the case, the article creates a general model for understanding and dimensioning systemic corruption. The model is based on the relational approach and aims to analyze the relations of influence and dependence that transit in the field of power. This study adopts Tocqueville's Collective Action Theory and Bourdieu's reflexive sociology to comprehend the phenomenon of systemic corruption. Its hypothesis is that heteronomic influence between the fields that make up what Bourdieu calls the "field of power" can make the State incapable of materializing the symbolic imperative of the personal disinterest of public agents. This work's challenge is to measure the relations of influence and dependence that give rise to enough heteronomy to cause systemic corruption. The model instrumentalization will embrace the methodology of Godet and Durance's strategic perspective, whose analytical tool is used as a matrix analysis.
Research questions:
1. How does Tocqueville's collective action theory approach, anchored in the modeling of relational sociology, overcome the institutionalist approach of anticorruption policies to address the problem of systemic corruption contexts?
2. How can matrix analyses of power relations contribute to formulating and implementing anticorruption policies?
Methodology
The methodology includes a literature review for modeling, statistical techniques, secondary data and indicators to explain and measure the struggles and dysfunctions in the field of power that cause systemic corruption in the case study.
The article dialogues directly with two questions brought forth by this workshop. First, "What are the implications of anticorruption policies being formulated under systemic corruption contexts, and what can explain the possibilities of failure or the possibilities of success?". Secondly, "What are the characteristics of anticorruption policies under systemic corruption contexts, and how can their differences be explained?".
[1] Rothstein(2007); Stefes(2007); Rothstein&Teorell(2015); Mungiu-Pippidi(2013, 2015)
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Abstract: Public policies are the result of the processes that take place within political systems. The particularity of systems in which corruption has been consolidated is that these systems produce two types of outputs, the first during and at the end of the public policy process that benefits those actors involved in the corruption networks. The latter as returns that translate into legitimation and support for the corrupt system that reaffirms its consolidation (inputs). Based on the above assumptions, the research proposes a typology of subnational political systems defined by their effects on public policies. The research defines four dimensions of analysis: a) quality of public policies; (b) structure of municipal public administration; c) opacity-transparency: d) checks and balances (C&B), which are articulated according to the Corruption Consolidation Framework developed by Meza and Pérez-Chiqués (2020). The research discusses the relationship between the dynamics of corruption consolidation with each dimension, starting from the fact that in themselves they configure a systemic and multidimensional phenomenon. The results show the effect of the consolidation of corruption on public policies. In doing so, the analysis makes it possible to identify five general types of subnational political systems: 1) governance; 2) consolidation of corruption (supplementary networks); 3) consolidation (dysfunctional) of bureaucratic corruption (administrative networks); 4) (functional) consolidation of elite corruption (specialized networks); 5) Initiative consolidation of corruption. The research concludes with a theoretical proposal of the modes of consolidation of corruption under a methodological framework that highlights comparative observation in dissimilar realities.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Unfortunately, corruption is not new in Brazilian daily life, with fraud being one of its means of execution. Federal public higher education institutions (Ifes) do not go through this context unscathed. However, it is possible to combat it by strengthening control bodies, implementing compliance tools and especially anti-corruption policies. The objective of the work is to evaluate the existence, adoption, implementation, quality and transparency of the measures and control mechanisms adopted to prevent fraud and corruption in the main activities of a federal public higher education institution in Brazil. With the research question: why approve anti-corruption policies in an academic environment and what are their consequences. Furthermore, by promoting a culture of integrity, the research results will be able to improve existing policies, reducing the risk of acts of corruption and fraud occurring, as well as increasing the ability to detect and remediate irregularities that may occur. The research will adopt a qualitative approach, allowing a detailed analysis of the perspectives, values and experiences of the actors involved, using the documentary technique that will provide the collection and analysis of a variety of institutional documents, reports, policies and other relevant records, aiming to deepen the understanding the dynamics related to the formulation, adoption and implementation and dissemination of anti-corruption policies in contexts of systemic corruption, especially in an academic environment. The subject is related to the theme “the paradox of anticorruption policy formulation, adoption, implementation in contexts of systemic corruption” as it discusses the adoption of integrity measures for the promotion, prevention, detection and investigation of acts of fraud and /or corruption, practiced by public or private agents in the use of federal public resources.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
El proyecto de investigación se concentra en la permanencia de la corrupción pese a la implementación de reformas de transparencia por más de tres décadas. A partir de la década de los noventa, como derivación de la Crisis Asiática de 1997, los organismos internacionales difundieron la transparencia como un paradigma para combatir la corrupción. La literatura teórica y empírica afirma la relación positiva entre ambos conceptos. Sin embargo, el Índice de Percepción de la Corrupción 2023 señala que en varios países que asumieron tempranamente reformas de transparencia, la corrupción se mantiene por varios años. Frente a este problema, nos cuestionamos ¿por qué la transparencia no controla la corrupción? El estudio adopta las recomendaciones de Mungiu-Pippidi y Heywood (2020) acerca de estudiar la corrupción en un área de políticas públicas. De esta manera se escogió al sector salud por ser un área sensible a la corrupción, tanto por su relación con la vida de las personas, la asimetría de información, la alta convergencia de actores y la cantidad de recursos movilizados (Hussmann 2020).
Para realizar el estudio, se aplicó el protocolo de investigación realista del Laboratorio de Políticas Comparadas de Flacso Ecuador, que incluye seis pasos: Aproximación a la política sectorial, Teorización del mecanismo causal, Diseño de test empíricos, Selección de caso mediante QCA, Análisis de congruencia y Estudio de caso a profundidad.
El objetivo de la investigación es identificar la desviación de un mecanismo causal que vincula la adopción de objetivos de transparencia con el control de la corrupción, para responder por qué la teoría no se cumple. La hipótesis señala una incoherencia en el modo de gobernanza que impidió la institucionalización de la transparencia. Para probarlo, se utilizó el marco analítico del diseño de políticas, junto con una metodología mixta que incluye process tracing y formalización bayesiana.
Los resultados y conclusiones, por ahora, continúan desarrollándose.
Referencias
Hussmann, Karen. 2020. Corrupción en el sector salud. Recomendaciones prácticas para
donantes. Sl: U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre; Chr. Michelsen Institute.
https://docplayer.es/209030761-Corrupcion-en-el-sector-salud.html
Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina y Paul M. Heywood. 2020. A research agenda for studies of corruption.
Cheltenham; Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
The internal control as an anticorruption instrument in México: a municipal perspective through policy regime perspective
The investigation seeks to answer why the internal control of municipal public administrations has been unable to prevent and combat corruption. Supposedly, internal control would contribute to generate environments of administrative improvement that, consequently, would make it possible to ensure, in a reasonable manner, the fulfillment of institutional objectives, the safeguarding of public resources and the prevention of corruption - as a first line defense-. However, the results have been not positive: corruption, failure to meet institutional objectives and inappropriate use of public resources persist. Given such a situation —and recognizing the internal control as a key piece (but insufficient in itself) to combat corruption, as well as the political and administrative context of the municipalities in Mexico— the research hypothesis is that the current “policy regimen” (governmental arrangement to address a public problem) that accompanies this mechanism or instrument of administrative improvement, presents deficiencies that distort its original meaning and, consequently, reduce or limit – substantially – its capabilities to fight against corruption, mainly through its prevention.
The research strategy responds to an exploratory design, as its purpose is to offer an approximate vision of the relationship between the internal control policy regime. Given this exploratory nature, the research uses flexible criteria for the selection of cases, taking into consideration aspects such as: i) the level of development of administrative capabilities - based on the Administrative Development Degree Subindex of the Municipal Institutional Development Index published by the Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF)—, and ii) the available resources (temporary and economic) to carry out this investigation.
Currently, research studies that empirically addresses the issues of internal control and public policy regime, linked to the phenomenon of corruption, are incipient and rare in the literature. Hence, this research is a novel exercise, but it will require greater efforts to strengthen the working hypothesis; either by expanding the number of cases to be studied, deepening and improving the comparative study of cases or incorporating other levels of government (such as state levels, for example).
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this submission is to answer the second question: What are the implications of anti-corruption policies being formulated under systemic corruption contexts, and what can explain the possibilities of failure or success?
In 2015 Mexico underwent a series of large caliber reforms aimed at strengthening the fight against corruption, the span of these reforms included the federal Constitution and the enactment or amendment of seven Federal Laws. Eventually all 32 states were obliged to mirror these reforms at state level and coordinate under a National Anticorruption System, where member institutions acquire the obligation to draft and implement a common anti-corruption policy. One of the most challenging features of these reform included a national presidency bestowed upon a Citizen Committee indirectly appointed by the Senate under a competitive and open process, organized and sanctioned by nine prominent scholars and activists.
Understandably, even if not openly, several cabinet member heads, members of the System, were not accustomed to coordinating within an institutional body led by a citizen without a bureaucratic appointment. This lack of familiarity and the challenges posed by citizens acting independently lead to political bickering and sabotage maneuvers by political parties, governors, and congressman, severely maiming the perspectives of this model. This paper aims to describe some of these informal strategies deployed by political actors, advising reforms that could help un bypassing them.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Roberto Moreno (SESNA), Jorge Acevedo (SESNA), Dionisio Zabaleta (SESNA)
There is a body of academic and journalistic literature that describes the institutional weaknesses of Mexico’s National Anticorruption System to effectively articulate strategies for preventing, detecting, and punishing corruption acts. While at the macro level, a system of such nature requires high levels of commitment and political will for its operation, the role played by institutions at the meso level is essential for promoting and crystallizing policy instruments on a national scale.
Consequently, this paper stems from a practitioner's perspective, aiming to explain the role played by the Executive Secretariat of the National Anticorruption System - and its local counterparts - in promoting mechanisms of collaboration, negotiation, and intergovernmental regulation that have allowed for the crystallization of a standardized public policy vision in a context of high authority fragmentation; as well as advancing in the consolidation of a key mechanism of the Mexican anticorruption strategy, namely, the National Digital Platform. The article proposes to delve deeper into the role of institutional leadership and network management as schemes that enable the mobilization of systems that are seemingly designed not to function.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives implemented in India since independence and to determine why, despite a strong anti-corruption framework, these initiatives have not been able to reduce corruption in the nation. Yet while scholars have developed several anti-corruption policies, but have only partially adopted. The paper makes the claim that the degree and scope of corruption in the nation demonstrate that it is a systemic issue rather than an individual one. The article comes to the conclusion that institutional reforms, by themselves, cannot effectively combat corruption in India due to its systemic character after conducting a comparative analysis of various anti-corruption strategies taken in various nations. In order for Indian policymakers to recognize the relationship between rising levels of corruption and the deepening crisis of democracy, the paper also advocates making connections between corruption and democracy. Therefore, it is stated that in order to combat corruption effectively, it is crucial to see it as a breach of democratic norms, principles, and practices. Transparency International, a global civil society organization dedicated to fighting corruption, has acknowledged this. In order to maintain accountability and reduce corruption, it is necessary to look for policies that go beyond institutions and emphasize effective citizen participation.
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ABSTRACT
Corruption is a dynamic phenomenon whose conceptualization is socially and politically constructed through discourses legitimized and reproduced mainly by political actors in power. Thus, anti-corruption policies have also been constructed through political discourse. In the context of systemic corruption, corruption control policies are used as political instruments to damage the image of opposition groups, to show genuine interest in addressing a public problem that is often relevant to citizens, and even to deal with corruption scandals. However, anti-corruption policies are often ineffective for two main reasons: the original contradiction and the Icarus paradox. First, in countries with systemic corruption, the actors who should support, develop, and consolidate anti-corruption policies are those who benefit most from the corrupt system. Hence, they tend to sabotage any anti-corruption policy that affects their status quo. Second, when an anti-corruption effort is effective, it is likely to be questioned and eventually dismantled by the actors in power, as some members of the group in power are usually involved in corruption networks and scandals. Simultaneously, if an anti-corruption policy does not show any results, it will also be criticized and eliminated, as it will be considered expensive and futile.
Consequently, anti-corruption policies under systemic corruption face constant internal and external political pressure. As a result, this generates constant policy changes and ineffectiveness, because even if solid policies exist, they hardly remain in time. Therefore, this article analyzes two cases that illustrate anti-corruption policy dilemmas: the creation of the National Anti-Corruption System in Mexico and the International Commission against Corruption and Impunity in Guatemala. While both cases are not policies by themselves, the cases are policy instruments; thus, they illustrate the constant challenges that anti-corruption efforts face in the context of systemic corruption and why they often fail. In this article, we review the formation process, their changes, and their current state and observe and outline some patterns based on these dilemmas.
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Corruption is a critical issue related to national welfare and good governance. In 2015, the United Nations announced the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 16), with the theme "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels," one of the goals being "to substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms." This aims to achieve peace, justice, and strong institutions through a series of anti-corruption measures.
In recent years, there has been a growing focus on enhancing gender equality in political roles, with advocates pushing for greater participation of women in politics to improve governance quality. The premise suggests that promoting gender equality, particularly by elevating the role of women in public office, could inherently lead to more ethical and transparent governance. However, this assumption raises critical questions: Does simply adding more women to politics guarantee better governance, or are there more complex factors at play that could result in unexpected outcomes? This inquiry sets the stage for a deeper exploration of gender dynamics in the fight against corruption.
Moreover, with the international trend towards gender education equality, changes in production structures, the transformation of women's roles, and their increased contribution to the workplace, "gender mainstreaming" and "gender impact assessment" have become crucial in government decision-making processes. In Taiwan, with the progress in women's rights and gender equality, the proportion of female legislators has exceeded forty percent. The government emphasizes that all departmental legal cases and governance plans must undergo gender impact assessments, and gender equality is a significant consideration in public sector employment. These developments reflect the achievements in gender equality and highlight the importance and opportunities for discussing gender differences in corruption.
Despite the abundant research on corruption, there still exist many debates in the field, particularly concerning gender differences in corruption. The World Bank has pointed out an interesting phenomenon: compared to men, women are less susceptible to corruption in the public sector. Generally, increasing the political or administrative participation in public life of women can facilitate improving the integrity of the government. However, this argument lacks empirical evidence. The academic world is divided on issues such as whether women are less tolerant of corruption than men, whether women are more incorruptible than men, and whether women are less likely to give or accept bribes than men. To delve deeper into these issues, this study designed surveys and behavioral simulations, such as hypothetical bribery scenarios, to understand the underlying factors we aim to explore.This study surveys civil servants in the Taiwanese public sector, collecting a sample of 649 individuals, to analyze the personal motivations and potential constraints related to gender and corruption, including risk assessments of corruption, workplace role expectations, motivations for holding office, positions within power structures, network relationships, and the formation of tolerance towards corruption. This research not only helps understand the effects of gender mainstreaming policies in the Taiwanese public sector within Chinese society but also hopes to provide crucial insights for the international community in policy planning and human resource management in the public sector.
Keywords: Gender Mainstreaming, Corruption Tolerance, Integrity Governance, Public Sector, Behavioral Experiments
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During recent months, municipalities in Chile have been at the center of the corruption scandals. Its media coverage has fallen into judicialization or personalization o 'administrative crimes' according to the profile of the authorities and officials involved. However, there are factors that explain the emergence of corruption that are nothing anecdotal. The paper suggests a socio-political approach to identify these factors.Through a qualitative methodology and using primary and secondary sources, such as: verdicts of the Comptroller General, review of press releases, analysis of the legislative measures of the central Government, a bibliographic review of articles on corruption, and interviews in depth to various local actors. These factors associated with local corruption are organized as follows: heterogeneity of state capabilities, decentralization processes and their insertion into local politics (thanks to informal networks and local intermediaries), the parliamentarization of politics, weak controls at the local level and the presence of political dynasties. It is concluded that one of the major problems faced in the local reality revolves around the fact that the measures implemented in these areas have followed a logic of partialization and fragmentation, which has undermined the success of the new regulations at the municipal and regional level.
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Do audits have any effect on the behavior of local governments? Once a government is audited, does its compliance improve? Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) state that “the economic success of countries differs because of differences between their institutions, [that is] the rules that influence how the economy works and the incentives that motivate people.” But rules only make sense if they actually cause some change in the behavior of the parties. Not all rules are consolidated in institutions or cause the desired effect (March and Olsen, 2006; Helmke and Levistky, 2006). Knowledge needs to be created about how the rules are enforced. The phenomenon of intergovernmental compliance is the center of a live debate between different literatures. For example, explanations from public management seek to compare different management styles to explain compliance (Ebinger and Geissler, 2021; Hendrick, 2011; Smith, 2012). Other approaches point out that compliance is adopted as part of conditions or obligations to which certain countries or subnational units must respond, for example, regional trade integration processes (Hadjiisky, Pal and Walker, 2017; Dussauge, 2020; Bronić, Jerinić , Klun, Ott and Rakar 2021). There are also currents that explain compliance based on considerations about the functioning of local democracies (Weingast, 2014; Berliner, 2016; Alt, Lassen and Rose, 2006). Another explanation, the most widespread, comes from economic theory and focuses on the broad, specific and coercive nature of the rules that support the agreements. According to this approach, the use of audits presupposes that the executors of public spending are individuals or organizations, they are rational actors and, therefore, they are subject to incentives, one of which consists of avoiding a sanction. Audits operate as assurance mechanisms that, through the threat of punishment, seek to increase the cost of engaging in misconduct. The audit, thus, is configured as the vehicle through which the rule generates the desired behavior. This article seeks to test this assumption and aims to quantify the effect of audits on the financial compliance of local governments in Mexico. To this end, a panel was built for 2,463 Mexican municipal governments in the period 2014-2020 for the largest public infrastructure investment fund in the country and, through a two-way fixed effects model, it seeks to identify the existence of some effect of the processes review on municipal financial compliance. Preliminarily, there is evidence of a negative and modest effect of the audit on compliance, which seems to suggest that the administrative environment has adapted to the review processes and they soon lose their effect. Furthermore, there is evidence of a lagged effect of audits that seems to manifest itself after a process of stabilization of the rules. This work can contribute to the panel to the extent that it analyzes a widely extended anti-corruption policy whose effects we do not know in a country where corruption is systemic.
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Recent studies[1] have shown the limits of the dominant view of corruption promoted by the institutional economics approach to address this phenomenon when the latter is not marginal but systemic. Despite this shift in scholarly work, anticorruption policies continue to be supported by the dominant view of corruption in various States where corruption assumes systemic proportions. This article focuses on the case of Brazil. The starting point of the analysis is the late 1990s when fundamental transformations were promoted in its control systems. The article finds that Brazil has aligned itself with the international anticorruption agenda, focusing on the agent model. Institutionally, it has strengthened the role of its control agencies, especially the Federal Police, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Union. The agencies expanded their networks and were able to organize actions directly aimed at combating corruption crimes and money laundering. Among these actions, the Operation Car Wash stands as the most prominent. While the Operation was met with popular support amidst a narrative of bringing forth a solution for the corruption problem in Brazil, this ambitious goal ultimately failed and revealed deep inconsistencies. This result points to the question of the (in)sufficiency of institutional mechanisms for overcoming the problem of systemic corruption. Considering the case, the article creates a general model for understanding and dimensioning systemic corruption. The model is based on the relational approach and aims to analyze the relations of influence and dependence that transit in the field of power. This study adopts Tocqueville's Collective Action Theory and Bourdieu's reflexive sociology to comprehend the phenomenon of systemic corruption. Its hypothesis is that heteronomic influence between the fields that make up what Bourdieu calls the "field of power" can make the State incapable of materializing the symbolic imperative of the personal disinterest of public agents. This work's challenge is to measure the relations of influence and dependence that give rise to enough heteronomy to cause systemic corruption. The model instrumentalization will embrace the methodology of Godet and Durance's strategic perspective, whose analytical tool is used as a matrix analysis.
Research questions:
1. How does Tocqueville's collective action theory approach, anchored in the modeling of relational sociology, overcome the institutionalist approach of anticorruption policies to address the problem of systemic corruption contexts?
2. How can matrix analyses of power relations contribute to formulating and implementing anticorruption policies?
Methodology
The methodology includes a literature review for modeling, statistical techniques, secondary data and indicators to explain and measure the struggles and dysfunctions in the field of power that cause systemic corruption in the case study.
The article dialogues directly with two questions brought forth by this workshop. First, "What are the implications of anticorruption policies being formulated under systemic corruption contexts, and what can explain the possibilities of failure or the possibilities of success?". Secondly, "What are the characteristics of anticorruption policies under systemic corruption contexts, and how can their differences be explained?".
[1] Rothstein(2007); Stefes(2007); Rothstein&Teorell(2015); Mungiu-Pippidi(2013, 2015)
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Abstract: Public policies are the result of the processes that take place within political systems. The particularity of systems in which corruption has been consolidated is that these systems produce two types of outputs, the first during and at the end of the public policy process that benefits those actors involved in the corruption networks. The latter as returns that translate into legitimation and support for the corrupt system that reaffirms its consolidation (inputs). Based on the above assumptions, the research proposes a typology of subnational political systems defined by their effects on public policies. The research defines four dimensions of analysis: a) quality of public policies; (b) structure of municipal public administration; c) opacity-transparency: d) checks and balances (C&B), which are articulated according to the Corruption Consolidation Framework developed by Meza and Pérez-Chiqués (2020). The research discusses the relationship between the dynamics of corruption consolidation with each dimension, starting from the fact that in themselves they configure a systemic and multidimensional phenomenon. The results show the effect of the consolidation of corruption on public policies. In doing so, the analysis makes it possible to identify five general types of subnational political systems: 1) governance; 2) consolidation of corruption (supplementary networks); 3) consolidation (dysfunctional) of bureaucratic corruption (administrative networks); 4) (functional) consolidation of elite corruption (specialized networks); 5) Initiative consolidation of corruption. The research concludes with a theoretical proposal of the modes of consolidation of corruption under a methodological framework that highlights comparative observation in dissimilar realities.
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Unfortunately, corruption is not new in Brazilian daily life, with fraud being one of its means of execution. Federal public higher education institutions (Ifes) do not go through this context unscathed. However, it is possible to combat it by strengthening control bodies, implementing compliance tools and especially anti-corruption policies. The objective of the work is to evaluate the existence, adoption, implementation, quality and transparency of the measures and control mechanisms adopted to prevent fraud and corruption in the main activities of a federal public higher education institution in Brazil. With the research question: why approve anti-corruption policies in an academic environment and what are their consequences. Furthermore, by promoting a culture of integrity, the research results will be able to improve existing policies, reducing the risk of acts of corruption and fraud occurring, as well as increasing the ability to detect and remediate irregularities that may occur. The research will adopt a qualitative approach, allowing a detailed analysis of the perspectives, values and experiences of the actors involved, using the documentary technique that will provide the collection and analysis of a variety of institutional documents, reports, policies and other relevant records, aiming to deepen the understanding the dynamics related to the formulation, adoption and implementation and dissemination of anti-corruption policies in contexts of systemic corruption, especially in an academic environment. The subject is related to the theme “the paradox of anticorruption policy formulation, adoption, implementation in contexts of systemic corruption” as it discusses the adoption of integrity measures for the promotion, prevention, detection and investigation of acts of fraud and /or corruption, practiced by public or private agents in the use of federal public resources.
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El proyecto de investigación se concentra en la permanencia de la corrupción pese a la implementación de reformas de transparencia por más de tres décadas. A partir de la década de los noventa, como derivación de la Crisis Asiática de 1997, los organismos internacionales difundieron la transparencia como un paradigma para combatir la corrupción. La literatura teórica y empírica afirma la relación positiva entre ambos conceptos. Sin embargo, el Índice de Percepción de la Corrupción 2023 señala que en varios países que asumieron tempranamente reformas de transparencia, la corrupción se mantiene por varios años. Frente a este problema, nos cuestionamos ¿por qué la transparencia no controla la corrupción? El estudio adopta las recomendaciones de Mungiu-Pippidi y Heywood (2020) acerca de estudiar la corrupción en un área de políticas públicas. De esta manera se escogió al sector salud por ser un área sensible a la corrupción, tanto por su relación con la vida de las personas, la asimetría de información, la alta convergencia de actores y la cantidad de recursos movilizados (Hussmann 2020).
Para realizar el estudio, se aplicó el protocolo de investigación realista del Laboratorio de Políticas Comparadas de Flacso Ecuador, que incluye seis pasos: Aproximación a la política sectorial, Teorización del mecanismo causal, Diseño de test empíricos, Selección de caso mediante QCA, Análisis de congruencia y Estudio de caso a profundidad.
El objetivo de la investigación es identificar la desviación de un mecanismo causal que vincula la adopción de objetivos de transparencia con el control de la corrupción, para responder por qué la teoría no se cumple. La hipótesis señala una incoherencia en el modo de gobernanza que impidió la institucionalización de la transparencia. Para probarlo, se utilizó el marco analítico del diseño de políticas, junto con una metodología mixta que incluye process tracing y formalización bayesiana.
Los resultados y conclusiones, por ahora, continúan desarrollándose.
Referencias
Hussmann, Karen. 2020. Corrupción en el sector salud. Recomendaciones prácticas para
donantes. Sl: U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre; Chr. Michelsen Institute.
https://docplayer.es/209030761-Corrupcion-en-el-sector-salud.html
Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina y Paul M. Heywood. 2020. A research agenda for studies of corruption.
Cheltenham; Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
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The internal control as an anticorruption instrument in México: a municipal perspective through policy regime perspective
The investigation seeks to answer why the internal control of municipal public administrations has been unable to prevent and combat corruption. Supposedly, internal control would contribute to generate environments of administrative improvement that, consequently, would make it possible to ensure, in a reasonable manner, the fulfillment of institutional objectives, the safeguarding of public resources and the prevention of corruption - as a first line defense-. However, the results have been not positive: corruption, failure to meet institutional objectives and inappropriate use of public resources persist. Given such a situation —and recognizing the internal control as a key piece (but insufficient in itself) to combat corruption, as well as the political and administrative context of the municipalities in Mexico— the research hypothesis is that the current “policy regimen” (governmental arrangement to address a public problem) that accompanies this mechanism or instrument of administrative improvement, presents deficiencies that distort its original meaning and, consequently, reduce or limit – substantially – its capabilities to fight against corruption, mainly through its prevention.
The research strategy responds to an exploratory design, as its purpose is to offer an approximate vision of the relationship between the internal control policy regime. Given this exploratory nature, the research uses flexible criteria for the selection of cases, taking into consideration aspects such as: i) the level of development of administrative capabilities - based on the Administrative Development Degree Subindex of the Municipal Institutional Development Index published by the Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF)—, and ii) the available resources (temporary and economic) to carry out this investigation.
Currently, research studies that empirically addresses the issues of internal control and public policy regime, linked to the phenomenon of corruption, are incipient and rare in the literature. Hence, this research is a novel exercise, but it will require greater efforts to strengthen the working hypothesis; either by expanding the number of cases to be studied, deepening and improving the comparative study of cases or incorporating other levels of government (such as state levels, for example).
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The purpose of this submission is to answer the second question: What are the implications of anti-corruption policies being formulated under systemic corruption contexts, and what can explain the possibilities of failure or success?
In 2015 Mexico underwent a series of large caliber reforms aimed at strengthening the fight against corruption, the span of these reforms included the federal Constitution and the enactment or amendment of seven Federal Laws. Eventually all 32 states were obliged to mirror these reforms at state level and coordinate under a National Anticorruption System, where member institutions acquire the obligation to draft and implement a common anti-corruption policy. One of the most challenging features of these reform included a national presidency bestowed upon a Citizen Committee indirectly appointed by the Senate under a competitive and open process, organized and sanctioned by nine prominent scholars and activists.
Understandably, even if not openly, several cabinet member heads, members of the System, were not accustomed to coordinating within an institutional body led by a citizen without a bureaucratic appointment. This lack of familiarity and the challenges posed by citizens acting independently lead to political bickering and sabotage maneuvers by political parties, governors, and congressman, severely maiming the perspectives of this model. This paper aims to describe some of these informal strategies deployed by political actors, advising reforms that could help un bypassing them.
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Roberto Moreno (SESNA), Jorge Acevedo (SESNA), Dionisio Zabaleta (SESNA)
There is a body of academic and journalistic literature that describes the institutional weaknesses of Mexico’s National Anticorruption System to effectively articulate strategies for preventing, detecting, and punishing corruption acts. While at the macro level, a system of such nature requires high levels of commitment and political will for its operation, the role played by institutions at the meso level is essential for promoting and crystallizing policy instruments on a national scale.
Consequently, this paper stems from a practitioner's perspective, aiming to explain the role played by the Executive Secretariat of the National Anticorruption System - and its local counterparts - in promoting mechanisms of collaboration, negotiation, and intergovernmental regulation that have allowed for the crystallization of a standardized public policy vision in a context of high authority fragmentation; as well as advancing in the consolidation of a key mechanism of the Mexican anticorruption strategy, namely, the National Digital Platform. The article proposes to delve deeper into the role of institutional leadership and network management as schemes that enable the mobilization of systems that are seemingly designed not to function.
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