P10. Bad Governance and Public Management Problems in the Developing World: Frameworks, Evidence and Cases
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICYCATEGORISATION
KEYWORDS
GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE
Governance, in modern states, is problematic, particularly in democratic institutional frameworks. Adding to ‘normal’ difficulties inherent to the complexity of steering multiple sets of institutions within public opinions shifts and legal frameworks boundaries, polities are strained by tensions and conflicts arising from the very nature of economic and social issues. States are under intense and recurrent demands, with limited state capacity and restricted options. Public administration is always under substantial stress and intense pressures. Good and bad government can be understood as “success” in key political arenas, or merely as political survival of a governing coalition.
Certainly many -if not all- of these problems are universal, as the present shows with some clarity. But they tend to become more dramatic in countries where life conditions of most citizens are considered either insufficiently decent or too unequal, therefore straining governance to higher levels of conflict, usually within less performant economic systems and lower levels of state autonomy and capacity. The central question the panel wishes papers to address is: Are there public management problems specific to this “developing world”? And if so, what, where and when?
The workshop evolves from the interest to continue the discussion started at the 2018 Pittsburgh workshop Bad Governance, State Capacity Deficits and Public Policy Management Problems in Developing Countries: What Do We Know? In that workshop, we received papers dealing with public policy analysis strategies capable of detecting state management issues during the “management-intense” phases of public policy design and implementation; as well as papers studying specific cases of “bad” or “unsuccessful” public management.
The rich discussion that ensued dealt with the reasons underlying low performances of state agencies in all sectors and levels of government; low, insufficient or unstable impacts, relative to public and expert expectations; and legally and/or ethically objectionable ways and procedures. Among many political scientists, these governance problems are likely to be attributed to “bad politics”, assuming the public policy process is a somewhat mechanical outcome of political arrangements and decisions. In other cases, they are attributed to “error”, assuming political regimes, governments and governing coalitions, or even specific figureheads, actually plan and implement strategies according to their interests and will.
Yet, for researchers interested in the organizational problems of public policy, and the meanders of decision-making and management, a challenging handful of question derives from cases of unsuccessful policies. Classical policy analysis defined “good” governance as timely and cost-efficient solutions to problems (Lasswell, 1951; Lindblom, 1959), although it was soon acknowledged that the very nature of problems -let alone the solutions- vary according to interests and cognitive maps (Wildavsky, 1979). Within the political regimes where policy sciences developed -democracies, or more precisely, “polyarchies” (Dahl, 1971)- a considerable variety of interests and cognitive maps are tolerated, as long as basic sets of rules are respected, essentially: the rights to do politics, to maintain free flows of information, and to avoid excessive concentration of political power. In such regimes, “good” needs to carry an acceptable degree of “common”.
Other public policy students directed their attention to “governance” and “state capacity”, as (more or less related) ideas capable of providing frameworks to answer questions about state performances and public policy results. At least since the provoking works of Michael Mann (1997, 1998, 2012 and 2013) comparative studies aimed at resuming Max Weber’s reasoning on states (1977), looking for keys to understand their success and failure as political organizations producing material and symbolic forms of power. If in Mann, infrastructural power is the effective combination of key sources of social power through political means (1997 and 2012), the question is how to get this combination, particularly when it does not seem to come out of contingency.
Some of these studies worked on the classical idea of “good government” (Rosanvallon, 2015) or “governance” (Mayntz), in at least two senses: the ways in which policies are conducted in arenas or political regimes where power is not concentrated (Bovens, t'Hart & Peters, 2001; Benz & Papadopoulos, 2006; Peters & Pierre, 2006; all drawing on numerous previous authors); or the ways in which problems affect state performance (Tobelem, 1992; Evans, 1995; Grindle, 1996; ibidem). Most studies in this direction tended to look, at the same time, at institutional and operational, political and administrative dimensions of public policy, and invited to look into (though not necessarily did) the actual implementation processes (Saetren, 2005).
On this issue of “public management”, within a relatively abundant literature (see Lynn, 2005 y 2006; and Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004 y 2009; for general approaches), key debates tended to identify the specificity of public management (Barzelay, 1992); its changes through time (Hood, 1991; Frederickson, 1996); the problems of bureaucratic organizations that are, at the same time, subjects, stake-holders and objects of public policies (Moe, 1989; Olsen, 2005 and 2008); the issue of human resources, public service and civil service (Ingraham, 2005; Derlien & Peters, 2008); or the problem of inadequacy and obsolescence of public policy tools facing rapidly changing public problems (Dror, 2001).
Closer to our interests, Bovens, t'Hart y Peters (2001) searched for patterns of success and failure, for selected European countries, in what they labelled governance capacities. Isolating relevant public policy fields where national and European Union collided, they traced the way in which national state agencies intervened. Interestingly, they identified significant asymmetries in the assessment of “success” and “failure” to programmatic achievements (relative to the actual problems policies supposedly attacked) and to political achievements (relative to the perceptions the public had on such “attacks”). “Success” was to be used only if the asymmetry between these two assessments was low enough. Although none of the factors underlying success and failure found were common enough to establish general patterns capable, key factors found were institutional “embeddedness” or propension to negotiation and agreement between different sectors and levels of government (as in Evans, 2005); favourable contingency, as in “solutions finding problems” (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1989); “windows of opportunity (Kingdon, 2010); capacities in civil service (Cohen, 1993); and “advocacy coalitions” (Sabatier, 1998).
In the same direction, Martin Painter and Jon Pierre (2015) suggested to speak of policy capacity as the ability to adequately combine classical elements of state capacity, political and administrative, achieving governing capacities. While policy capacities depend on stocks of resources moving in essentially contingent ways, governing capacities generate and accumulate adequate quantities and qualities of resources, controlling flows and pointing them toward desired directions, thus producing the expected outputs and outcomes (Painter & Pierre, 2015: 3-4). The effectiveness of these governing capacities can be measured through performance indicators and normative criteria, and in so doing, research can point to instruments and tools that recurrently (although not systemtically or mechanically) orient flows in successful ways, and can become key support systems for governments.
The proposed panel wishes to continue this discussion focusing on cases coming from the developing world, around the following key questions. On what conceptual/normative basis do we speak of good and bad governance, and what is the specific role of public administration in it? Is there specificity in the developing world’s public administration issues, relative to “universal” state management problems? Are there patterns on which comparative studies can shed light, on developing countries public policy issues like inadequate strategic decision-making, or unethical management -corruption, in a wider sense? Are there frameworks of analysis that can be used to understand public administration issues in developing countries, regardless of sectors or political regimes?
References
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Benz, Arthur & Papadopoulos, Yannis (editores) (2006): Governance and Democracy. Comparing national, European and international experiences; Routledge, New York.
Benz, Arthur & Papadopoulos, Yannis (2006): "Governance and Democracy: Concepts and Key Issues"; in Benz & Papadopoulos (op. cit.).
Bovens, Mark; t'Hart, Peter & Peters, Guy (2001): "Analysing governance success and failure in six European states"; in Bovens, Mark; t'Hart, Peter & Peters, Guy (editores): Success and Failure in Public Governance: A Comparative Analysis; Edward Elgar, Cheltenham-Northampton.
Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos (1977): Estado e Subdesenvolvimento Industrializado; Editora Brasiliense, São Paulo.
Cohen, Michael; March, James & Olsen, Johan (1972): "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice"; in Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 17, N° 1.
Cohen, Steven (1993): "Defining and Measuring Effectiveness in Public Management"; in Public Productivity & Management Review, Vol. 17, N° 1.
Dahl, Robert (1971): Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition; New Haven-London, Yale University Press.
Derlien, Hans-Dietrich & Peters, Guy (2008): The State at Work; Volume 1: Public Sector Employment in Ten Western Countries; Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Dror, Yehezkel (2001): The Capacity to Govern. A Report to the Club of Rome; Frank Cass, London-Portland.
Evans, Peter (1995): Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation; Princeton University Press.
Ferlie, Ewan; Lynn, Laurence Jr. & Pollitt, Christopher (editors) (2005): The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, Oxford University Press.
Frederickson, H. George (1996): "Comparing the Reinventing Government Movement with the New Public Administration"; in Public Administration Review, Vol. 56, No. 3.
Grindle, Merilee (1996): Challenging the State. Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa; Cambridge University Press.
Hood, Christopher (1991): "A Public Management for All Seasons?"; in Public Administration, Vol. 69.
Ingraham, Patricia (2005): "Striving for Balance. Reforms in Human Resources Management"; in Ferlie et altrii (op. cit.).
Kingdon, John (1995): Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies; Harper-Collins, Nueva York.
Lasswell, Harold (1951): ‘The policy orientation’, in Lerner, Daniel & Lasswell, Harold (editores): The Policy Sciences; Stanford University Press.
Lindblom, Charles (1959): “The science of 'muddling through'”; en Public Administration Review Vol. 19, N° 2.
Lynn, Laurence Jr. (2005): "Public Management: A Concise History of the Field"; in Ferlie et altrii (op. cit.).
Lynn, Laurence Jr. (2006): Public Management: Old and New; New York & London, Routledge.
Mann, Michael (1997): The sources of social power. Volume I: A history of power from the beginning to AD 1760; Cambridge University Press [1986].
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March, James & Olsen, Johan (1989): Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, Free Press, Nueva York.
Mayntz, Renate (2006): “Governance en el Estado moderno” [2003]; in POSTData N° 11.
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Olsen, Johan (2005): "Maybe It Is Time To Rediscover Bureaucracy"; in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory N° 16.
Olsen, Johan (2008): "The Ups and Downs of Bureaucratic Organization"; in Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 11.
Painter, Martin y Pierre, Jon (2005): Challenges to State Policy Capacity. Global Trends and Comparative Perspectives; Houndmills, Palgrave-Macmillan.
Peters, Guy & Pierre, Jon (2006): "Governance, Accountability and Democratic Legitimacy"; in Benz & Papadopoulos (op. cit.).
Pollitt, Christopher & Bouckaert, Geert (2004): Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis; Oxford University Press.
Pollitt, Christopher & Bouckaert, Geert (2009): Continuity and Change in Public Policy and Management; Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Rosanvallon, Pierre (2015): Le bon gouvernement; Paris, Seuil.
Sabatier, Paul (1998): "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and
Relevance for Europe", in Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 5, N° 1.
Saetren, Harald (2005): "Facts and Myths about Research on Public Policy
Implementation: Out-of-Fashion, Allegedly Dead, But Still Very Much Alive and Relevant"; in Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 33, N° 4.
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CALL FOR PAPERS
Governance, in modern states, is problematic, particularly in democratic institutional frameworks. Adding to ‘normal’ difficulties inherent to the complexity of steering multiple sets of institutions within public opinions acceptance and legal frameworks boundaries, polities are strained by tensions and conflicts arising from the very nature of economic and social issues. States are under intense and recurrent demands, with limited state capacity and restricted options. Public administration is always under substantial stress and intense pressures. Good and bad government can be understood as “success” in key political arenas, or merely as political survival of a governing coalition.
Certainly many -if not all- of these problems are universal, as the present shows with some clarity. But they tend to become more dramatic in countries where life conditions of most citizens are considered either insufficiently decent or too unequal, therefore straining governance to higher levels of conflict, usually within less performant economic systems and lower levels of state autonomy and capacity.
The panel welcomes papers addressing the following central question: Are there public management problems specific to the “developing world”? Within this wide area of questions, we wish to provide a place to discuss the following issues, as well as other reasonably related to them:
- Conceptual perspectives and discussions on bad governance and mismanagement in developing countries.
- Comparative and case studies of bad governance and mismanagement in developing countries crossing sectors, levels and regions.
- Conceptual perspectives and comparative studies addressing similarities and differences between bad governance and mismanagement in developing countries and the “developed” world.
- Analytical and research strategies capable of detecting state capacity deficits and/or public policy issues in developing countries.
- Studies aiming to trace the relationship between specific public management issues and political regimes.
We intend to organize the discussion around “key” subjects, so we encourage participants proposing papers to make efforts to reasonably adapt their current research production to these issues.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Poverty and social inequality are two of the most enduring problems Mexico has faced for decades, which have justified the creation of several social policy strategies to cope with them. Although the design and funding of the most important poverty alleviation programs have historically been centralized, subnational governments have become important players, as they have launched their own initiatives to address the needs of populations that federal programs do not reach, such as urban transportation for students, subsidies for people with disabilities, scholarships for indigenous communities, and many others. In 2014, the total number of social programs funded and operated by Mexico’s 32 state governments was around 2,500. By “social program”, I understand programs delivering services or subsidies with the aim of improving the wellbeing of disadvantaged groups or ensuring the fulfillment of fundamental social rights. However, the consequences of these programs on social development have been very limited and, often, contrary to the goals that were originally envisaged. What explains social policy failure at the subnational level in Mexico? Is it a problem of policy implementation incapacity or rather a question of wrong policy formulation? In this paper I argue that the meager results of subnational social policies can be explained by its fragmentation (Koschinsky, & Swanstrom, 2001; Pollit, 2003) and lack of coherence (Cejudo & Michel, 2016). In other words, in their attempt to cover so many different populations, social programs have failed to provide precise responses to the needs of specific social segments. Furthermore, the design of social programs is often based on false beliefs rather than on evidence and causal reasoning (Majone, 1989), which produces a policymaking approach in which problems, participants and solutions are disjointed (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 1984). I illustrate my argument using the case of Jalisco, the fourth most populated state in the country, combining insights obtained from a social programs dataset as well as from in-depth analyses of specific state-level social programs.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Why are some policies more “successful” than others? Public policy scholars have traditionally argued that policy goals attainment depends on bureaucrats and politicians’ abilities or state structural capacities. These claims, however, have fallen short to identify alternative variables leading to a successful result. This paper, building on the emerging theoretical corpus of “reputation theory”, provides an alternative explanation to the determinants of a “policy success”. I argue that reputation building operates as the principal incentive for a politician to deliver results. Given that policy implementation involves a higher risk of failure than potential benefits, tenured politicians might opt for the comfort zone rather than uncertain enterprises, while newcomers face higher incentives to build their reputations. To test this claim, this paper uses a mixed methods approach involving a panel regression analysis and interviews with policymakers, concerning educative policy outputs in Peru and Bolivia. Education policy has been at the core of these countries’ priorities for decades and, amid recent electoral processes, politicians of both sides have employed educative “successful experiences” as a currency to demonstrate commitment and ability to deliver. Results show that both in Peru and Bolivia newcomers are associated with significantly better policy outputs than tenured (already reputed) politicians.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
This paper proposes an atypical response to the panel’s central question. It argues that an usually ignored but increasingly relevant set of governance problems specific to the ‘developing world’ stems from China’s expansion and, more specifically, from certain features of its massive use of development assistance.
A ‘myth’ has developed about the ‘no strings attached’ nature of this assistance. Using the case study of the Caribbean as well as comparisons with similar situations in Central America and Africa, this paper proposes a critical re-reading of a reality that everybody is accustomed to watch through the reassuring but distorting lens of academic routine. It argues that Beijing actually uses the incentive of its development assistance in order to impose political, economic, and social conditionalities. The latter are integral parts of a complex process of international socialization that allows China to construct a cognitive and normative space conducive to a new regional order which should be politically friendly, economically profitable, and socially open to its government, companies, and citizens.
The problem is that each of the three conditionalities includes aspects that are detrimental to the good governance and the very democracy of the recipient country. The least damaging is the political one, well summarized by a respondent as ‘no Taiwan; no Tibet; no Tiananmen Square.’ Besides preventing the target states from making their own foreign policy choices, it compels them to hide their concerns for the situation of human rights in China. This is hardly good news for a vocal democracy, but at least it should not affect its governance.
The situation is very different in the case of economic conditionality. Its first component is ‘tied aid,’ i.e. China’s imposition of its own contractors, labor, and materials for all infrastructure projects supported by its loans. This obviously prevents Global South governments from protecting their own firms and workers, which for poor and small countries is a very serious issue. The second component is represented by the Beijing-imposed secretive government-to-government negotiations and undisclosed agreements that are specific to China’s development assistance interactions with the Caribbean and other similar regions. Frequently, they result in very serious failures of the Chinese-built infrastructure projects; always, they encourage high level corruption and endanger democratic policies and practices in the recipient country.
Within its social conditionality, China does not allow states that depend on its development assistance to regulate the inflow and the economic activities of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants. In many developing countries, these newcomers are active and highly successful in retail trade, groceries, Chinese restaurants, and casinos. Critically, they displace similar locally owned small businesses, which has frequently led to frustration, protests, and even riots. In certain cases, a gap has emerged between the state and the society that rejects its pro-Chinese policies.
The paper argues that the negative impact of China’s conditionalities on the good governance of Caribbean and, more generally, Global South countries represents a globalization-related systemic constraint that needs to be taken into consideration by any student of the developing world.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Although Argentina shows better human development standards compared to most of middle and low income countries, it shares with the latter, several political, socio-economic and techno-organizational factors that significantly and negatively affect de quality of a great number of policies. With the long run purpose of contributing to the conceptual and empirical debate on policy mismanagement in developing countries, this paper will focus on the poor results of transport policies over the past 25 years, identifying the major factors behind this failure: political and policy styles, weakening of state and policy capacities, and economic volatility, among others.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Institutional reforms are ubiquitously applied in developing countries to improve government capabilities (Andrews, Pritchett, & Woolcock, 2012). However, evidence indicates that efforts to curb anti-corruption in Malawi, strengthen the justice sector in South Sudan, or support decentralization programmes in Uganda, consistently failed to address reform objectives (Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2005). The investment in institutional reforms globally and their dismal performance have elicited numerous explanations by development experts and academics with examples ranging from challenging contexts to lack of political will. However, none of these reasons seems to offer specific answers to why reforms in developing contexts continue to fail (Evans, Peter; Rauch, 1999; Grindle, 2007). An explanation advanced by Matt Andrews and others seems to go further to provide an alternative model to introducing reforms that is a departure from approaches currently being applied. Andrews (2014) proposes an alternative model called Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) which is argued to produce best practice reforms in developing countries if they are crafted as a response to locally identified problems, undertaken in an iterative fashion through experimentation and learning, involving multiple agents and producing hybrid solutions that are locally owned, understood and implemented. In developing countries, meeting challenges to development are largely dependent on the effectiveness of the state to undertake its core functions. Strengthening institutional capability and performance of the state to deliver these functions becomes of paramount interest to reform suppliers however if the reforms are not addressing locally relevant problems, and have little political traction then evidence suggests that the recipient countries will adapt these reforms only in the spirit of compliance leading to less than satisfactory changes in the conditions set out to be addressed (Andrews et al., 2012). This paper uses new institutional theory and an interdisciplinary approach derived from the fields of political science, sociology and management to understand the introduction of key institutional reforms (Management Performance Assessment Tool -MPAT) related to improving public sector performance in Uganda and South Africa. These country environments contend with structurally limiting conditions, consequences of a series of state failures for instance apartheid in South Africa and conflict in Uganda (Alam et al., 2016; Andrews and Bategeka., 2013) and more recently, their governments have struggled with underperforming economies and governance challenges. Using an institutional ethnography research design, the paper explores ideas emerging from institutional economics covering concepts of institutional logics, institutional entrepreneurship, isomorphism and decoupling. at the introduction stage of the MPAT in each country. Findings from this paper provides insights on the conditions under which reforms are introduced, how different agents were engaged in the process and what the implications are for future value of the reform.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Understanding Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) requires explaining whether, why, and how it responds differently to
particular variables (i.e., institutional) compared to other developing regions. This study contributes to this
exercise and adds to the recent research comparing development processes and outcomes between SSA and
Southeast Asia (SEA). According to these studies, based on SEA experience, good governance “as defined by
donors” should not be regarded as a prerequisite for development success in SSA. This study calls this view into
question by examining the relationship between governance and development performance in SSA and SEA
from 1995–2015. It defines good governance according to the governance effectiveness (GE) indicator of the
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. It focuses on development performance as progress in the
Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Program. It uses the hybrid (or within-between)
random effects model, which accounts for heterogeneity. The study finds a positive and significant association
between improvements in GE in a given period and development progress in the subsequent period. The results
also reveal considerable variations in the relationship between governance and development across countries,
suggesting the importance of context. The paper concludes by providing some recommendations for institutional
reform and further research on governance and development.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
In principle, metropolitan areas are designed to allow the interaction of different levels of government and other actors to tackle the critical problems of their jurisdictions (Aligica & Tarko, 2011; V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). Despite the high level of urbanization and the rapid rate of growth of metropolitan cities in Latin America, research on how metropolitan areas implement policies across policy issues is lacking (de Mattos, 2010). Understanding what patterns of interaction between policy actors produce more effective implementation is essential to inform policies related to the Sustainable Development Goals that require collaborations between government and non-government actors (Sachs, 2012).
In this research, we study the performance of the metropolitan area of Quito considering three main issues related to collaboration between policy actors in this polycentric system. First, drawing from Lubell (Lubell, 2008), we explore if institutional distance influences the patterns of collaboration among policy actors. Preliminary findings show that levels of government that share policy problems do not tend to collaborate. Instead, local governments at the lowest levels (parishes) collaborate with the national level more often. Second, drawing from Andersson and Ostrom (Andersson, 2003; Andersson & Ostrom, 2008), we study how specific structures of incentives for collaboration shape the patterns of interactions observed. Findings show a more frequent presence of actors from the third-sector and grassroots organizations in patterns where the lower and higher levels of government collaborate independent of the availability of economic resources available at the local level. Third, we study the effectiveness of the patterns of collaboration. Preliminary findings show that patterns of collaboration where a higher number of levels of government interact, do not tend to generate a higher perception of effectiveness, regardless of the policy issue. On the contrary, higher levels of perceived effectiveness correspond to the simpler patterns of interaction and take place where policy issues do not demand interaction with neighboring jurisdictions.
This research uses data collected via a standardized questionnaire with representatives at the parish-level of government in the Metropolitan District of Quito. We interviewed a total of 33 representatives between July and December 2018. The questionnaire was designed to elicit the ego-centric network of each parish. We calculated correlation coefficients for the association between the main variables of interest, and we considered a wide array of control variables for each case.
These findings suggest that the current metropolitan design of Quito is not promoting interactions between actors at the local level, which in principle, could be a disadvantage to implementing SDG-related policies. However, local governments and other local actors find ways to implement SDG-related policies that have high levels of perceived effectiveness in their jurisdictions. This research contributes to the emerging literature on polycentricity in developing countries by looking into the implementation of a wide array of policy issues and using primary data on existing interactions rather than imputing interactions from secondary sources (see Heikkila & Weible, 2018).
Aligica, P. D., & Tarko, V. (2011). Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond.Governance, 25(2), 237–262. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01550.x
Andersson, K. (2003). What Motivates Municipal Governments? Uncovering the Institutional Incentives for Municipal Governance of Forest Resources in Bolivia. The Journal of Environment & Development, 12(1), 5–27. http://doi.org/10.1177/1070496502250435
Andersson, K. P., & Ostrom, E. (2008). Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective. Policy Sciences, 41(1), 71–93. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-007-9055-6
de Mattos, C. A. (2010). Globalización y metamorfosis metropolitana en América Latina. De la ciudad a lo urbano generalizado. Revista De Geografía Norte Grande, 81–104.
Heikkila, T., & Weible, C. M. (2018). A semiautomated approach to analyzing polycentricity. Environmental Policy and Governance, 28(4), 308–318. http://doi.org/10.1002/eet.1817
Lubell, M. (2008). Familiarity Breeds Trust: Collective Action in a Policy Domain. The Journal of Politics, 69(1), 237–250. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00507.x
Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C. M., & Warren, R. (1961). The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry. American Political Science Review,55(04), 831–842. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400125973
Sachs, J. D. (2012). From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals. The Lancet, 379(9832), 2206–2211. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60685-0
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Politics is frequently “noise” in public policy analytical models, particularly when pointing to public management and state capacities. Agendas, choices, decision-making and implementation problems are presented as if analysis and planning, based on information and technique, were capable of providing adequate public-value oriented design and problem-solving, independently of political circumstances. Yet “normality” seems to be quite the opposite. Intent, in public policy, looks more like a complex mixture of technical considerations and political circumstances, as well as public policy processes seem incremental (as in hazardous and chaotic). In this paper, I put forward a strategy to make sense of this complex mixtures. Based on evidence coming from a compared public policy processes in Argentina (2007-2015), the papers isolates “points of collision” between management and politics, from which a number of problematic patterns are derived. The aim of the paper is to provide insight to common state management problems in countries strained by political conflict, legitimacy deficits and/or insufficient state capacity. The insight may be used to isolate failures in the understanding of state management problems in conflict-prone polities, as well as to design more accurate responses to them.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Meeting the increasingly complex and dynamic demands of today’s society is a constant challenge for public governance. The expectations of different social groups change rapidly, requiring flexible and innovative institutions and instruments that can adapt and provide timely responses.
However, according to a growing number of critics of “excessive control” in Brazil, when public managers try to innovate and flexibilize they meet auditing requirements that hamper their scope for action, limiting the provision of public policies, or even rendering them unfeasible. Those critics sustain that restrictions and fines turn public managers reluctant to formulate innovative policies or make implementation decisions that depart from routine. Hence, institutions get “frozen” by a model of static (and bad) governance that replicates the same decisions over and over, regardless of the circumstances.
Just as there are advocates for more flexibility and room for honest error in public governance, there are also those who are averse to risk and not so willing to change. This group includes auditors and, most importantly, the general public, which in Brazil strongly mistrusts the government and fears corruption, as shown by opinion polls like the Latinobarometer. Considering their mistrust and fear, Brazilian citizens are probably more prone to reducing the power of government institutions than to increasing their discretionary power to make decisions that depart from the ordinary.
In this context, is it possible to reach a balance between a healthy mistrust in public managers and a higher receptivity to new ways of solving the problems posed for governance in the public sector?
This paper will analyze the case of an attempt to strike such balance, concerning a piece of legislation passed last year in Brazil[1]. The formal justification for the bill[2] approved by the National Congress stated that its goal was to reconcile the evolution of public governance – that is, of the many new types of organizational arrangements and solutions that have emerged in the last decades – with a legal norm that dates back to 1942 (the law that regulates the application of other laws in Brazil).
Stakeholders in favor of the new law nicknamed it the “law of legal certainty”, whilst those against it called it the “law of impunity”. The lobbying battle between them to influence the president during the sanctioning period is at the center of the analysis in this paper. The assumption that the president (as head of the branch of government responsible for public management) would sanction the new law without any changes did not hold.
Even though the tension between public management and control is not exclusive to Brazil, it seems that in developed countries the national courts of audit were at first concerned with checking the legality of public expenditures, and only shifted attention to the efficiency of government at a later stage, when legality was virtually universal. In Brazil, the move happened before achieving that stage, generating further controversy.
Sources for this paper include legislative and lobbying group documents and texts published by the media.
[1] Law 13.655/2018.
[2] PL 7.448/2017.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Whether and how to discipline corrupted officials is always a thorny problem for developing countries. Factors like information asymmetry, state weakness, collective actions among bureaucrats, and international donor’s intervention are often cited as causes for the failure of anti-corruption efforts in these countries (Persson, et.al., 2013; Doig, et.al., 2007). The situation could be even worse if a developing country happens to be governed by an authoritarian government. As predicted by the selectorate theory (De Mesquita, et.al, 2005), an authoritarian government may tolerate corruptions to maintain a winning coalition that is necessary for its survival (Svolik, 2012).
China seems to provide to an exception for its large-scale anti-corruption campaign since President Xi took office in 2012 (Manion, 2016). Available data show that more than 1.4 million public officials have been disciplined between 2012 to 2017. Among them includes over 240 senior officials directed managed by the central government. In many ways, such unprecedented anti-corruption efforts show that the communist party in China (CPC) must have overcome many barriers as listed by extant literature.
An oft-cited factor accounting for China’s seemingly success is CPC’s unchallenged top-down authority and hence the capacity in managing its bureaucrats (Perry, 2007; Rothstein, 2015). With such capacity at hands, the CPC could adeptly remove, investigate and punish corrupted officials. We find this capacity thesis unsatisfactory. For one, same top-down authority in the past has not yielded success of similar scale in previous anti-corruption movement. For the other, the seemingly strong top-down authority in China is often weakened by the fragmented government structure (Lieberthal, 1992), contradiction of multiple policy goals (O’Brien and Li, 1999) and bureaucratic norms (Mei and Pearson, 2014; 2017).
We propose to understand China’s anti-corruption campaign through the lens of paternalistic relation between the Party and the corrupted officials. Tolerance towards corrupted officials before the latest anti-corruption campaign showed the Party’s paternalistic love. Ironically, the seemingly harsh anti-corruption campaign may also be a sign of love; tough love is still love.
Empirically, this paper works to show that paternalistic relation affects the severity of punishment imposed on corrupted officials. A corrupted official may be considered as corrupted in his/her political loyalty or in his/her professional integrity. Our hypothesis is that officials considered as politically corrupted are likely to be punished more severely as compared to those corrupted professionally. We use court decision of sentence on corrupted officials to measure the severity of punishment. We use a novel dataset to find out the extent to which an official is considered politically corrupted or professionally corrupted. In China, the CPC conducts internal investigations on officials suspected for corruption before their cases are transferred to the court. Such internal investigation usually concludes with public denigration on these suspects if found guilty. With the help of content analysis on the denigration notes, we could tell from the text sentiments whether an official is considered as politically corrupted or professionally corrupted. Our sample is 880 corrupted senior officials in China at or above city-bureau level.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
The corruption is defined as the absence of integrity in someone who holds a position of trust (Berumen & Hegemann, 2011). As such, it harms society and the economy negatively impacting the institution of the state and compliance with legal regulations (Dickel & Graeff, 2018). In Latin America and especially in Peru, this is an evil of old that has plagued all governments and economic activities of scale. Corrupt actors involved in various scandals have desolated the hopes of a country that continues to seek to develop through work and trust in its representatives. People have understood the message and are resigning themselves to scandals, without understanding the terrible consequences for future generations. Using manipulation, legal devices and repression, corruption has been making its way through the country for many years, leaving aside the great difficulties we face such as poverty, instability, scarcity of opportunities and weakness of institutions and neutralizing the efforts of those who fight for a better Peru. Despite the efforts being made with programs and policies, those at the margins of economic progress feel that they are not part of the development of society.
In recent years, Peru has been the site of large-scale corruption scandals. Mentioning some of them: Vladivideos (Vladimiro Montesinos), Petro audios (tapes), Narcoindultos (Pardon for drug dealers granted by Alan García), Comunicore (Mayor of Lima Castañeda Lossio), Ecoteva Case (Former President Alejandro Toledo), Red Orellana (Rodolfo Orellana), Panama Papers, Odebrecht Case, CNM Audios, and the list goes on. Legal reforms have been weak due to poor implementation of anti-corruption policies within state institutions. This has led to a diminishing citizen confidence in national politics. On the other hand, the corruption perception index not only affects public opinion, but also has social, economic, demographic, and cultural consequences.
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ABSTRACT
Bad governance, defined to include governments that are ineffective and inefficient, not transparent, not responsive to the people, not held accountable for their actions, inequitable and exclusive to the elites, non-participatory, do not follow the rule of law and lacking policies that are consensus driven, continues to be seen as the main impediment for significant economic growth to improve the welfare of people in developing countries. It is such bad governance that led to the development of good governance [good enough governance] by the international community and the International Financial Institutions for these countries. The assumption had been that good governance, will change the outlook of government and people in general, as the latter could assert themselves in the policy making process and demand accountability from public officials
Over the years, however, the success of good governance initiatives continues to be limited with the seemingly rise in corruption and bad policies in these countries. Different explanations continue to be deduced for the existence of bad governance in these countries, with a number of scholars focusing on what may be described as the traditional society with traditional values that are inimical to good governance in liberal democracies. However, as noted by Moore (2001), “bad governance’ is neither inherent in the culture or traditions of the people of poor countries nor a product of poverty. It is rather the result of the ways in which state authority in the South has been constructed – and is being maintained – through economic and political interactions with the rest of the world.”
Most of these explanations for bad governance have, however, focused on the political aspect of governance with limited examination of public management, despite the fact that public management was one of the cardinal points of the World Bank’s good governance idea. This limited literature, has also examined what may be described as bureaucratic corruption and the lack of bureaucratic capacity, which continues to affect the performance of state institutions. Unfortunately, a neglected area in this literature is the examination of the relationship between Boards of Directors and Chief Executives Officers of public sector institutions within the broader framework of corporate governance.
In this paper, our intention is to contribute to the discussion on bad governance through corporate governance and its impact on employee performance by looking at the relationship between boards of directors and chief executives of two major state institutions in Ghana. Our interest in this area emanates from the important role of boards and CEOs in public management. Unfortunately, in the last few years, conflicts between some boards and CEOs have become rampant in some organisations and have even spilled into the public domain. Consequently, the question we intend to answer is: what has been the impact of the conflict between boards and CEOs on employee performance in Ghana’s public sector?
We attempt to answer this question through a mixed method approach and a focus on two organizations, the Office of the Auditor-General and the Ghana Cylinder Manufacturing Company Limited.
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ABSTRACT
Foreign agencies have been more actively sharing the resource burden of global investigations of corruption. As a recently revealed case (“operation Car Wash”), Brazilian firms paid a record-setting penalty of over $3.5 billion to resolve a bribery case involving American, Brazilian and other authorities [1]. Such firms had earned a similar amount in government contracts in exchange for $788 million in bribes paid in the scope of more than 100 construction projects in 10 Latin American countries (Argentina; Brazil; Colombia; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Guatemala; Mexico; Panama; Peru; and Venezuela [2]) as well as two African ones from 2001 to 2016.
While it is difficult to deny the success of anti-corruption efforts represented by national and global corruption investigations, it is at the same time easy to realize that when such investigations involve powerful and high profile politicians (from the most diverse political spectrums), several interest groups engage in advocacy work politicizing a technical and complex issue that simultaneously encompasses law, policy, and management, with the huge additional challenge of involving not only the Executive, but also the Judiciary and Legislative Branches.
This paper probes further to examine the politicization of institutions, asking to what extent this problem is restricted to emerging democracies/economies, or does it also affect the advanced ones? More specifically, what is the role of mainstream/social media, fake news, prosecutors (the “prosecutor politician”?) [3], and judges [4] in such politicization of corruption investigations, and how all these players and others can influence the electorate in contexts of institutional crises and change political landscapes?
This paper addresses these issues in selected countries all of which were involved in Operation Car Wash since 2014 in a comparative exercise that examines reactions across countries hit by the Car Wash in the period of 2014 to 2018. It builds upon evidence to identify policy and legal decisions that could prevent politicization from affecting the corruption investigations themselves, or at least mitigate the effects of such politicization over other fundamental democratic institutions.
The first draft of this paper will be presented at the "XV Conferencia Red INPAE 2019", to take place in Concepción, Chile, April 23-26, 2019.
[1] JONES, J. et al. “Uptick In Coordinated US-Brazil Anti-Corruption Enforcement”, Law360, 03/10/17. Available at https://www.law360.com/articles/894350/uptick-in-coordinated-us-brazil-anti-corruption-enforcement, access on 10/30/18.
[2] OXFORD ANALYTICA. “Latin America: Odebrecht probe claims regional victims”, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 01/26/17. Available at https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/GA217572/Latin-America-Odebrecht-probe-claims-regional-victims, access on 10/30/18; DW. “Brazil’s judiciary hunts corrupt politicians”, Top Stories – Latin America, 02/19/17. Available at https://www.dw.com/en/brazils-judiciary-hunts-corrupt-politicians/a-37622772, access on 10/30/18.
[3] TONRY, M. “Prosecutors and Politics: A Comparative Perspective”, Crime and Justice, Vol. 41, No. 1 (August 2012), pp. 1-33. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666975?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents, access on 10/30/18; SAWYER, W.; CLARK, A. “New data: The rise of the ‘prosecutor politician’”, Prison Policy Initiative Blog, 07/13/17. Available at https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/07/13/prosecutors/, access on 10/30/18.
[4] RIBEIRO, D.; CORDEIRO, N.; GUIMARAES, D. “Interface between the Brazilian Antitrust, Anti-Corruption, and Criminal Organization Laws: The Leniency Agreements”. NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas, vol. 22, 2016, pp. 111-117, 151-156, 167-169. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710448.
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ABSTRACT
Poverty and social inequality are two of the most enduring problems Mexico has faced for decades, which have justified the creation of several social policy strategies to cope with them. Although the design and funding of the most important poverty alleviation programs have historically been centralized, subnational governments have become important players, as they have launched their own initiatives to address the needs of populations that federal programs do not reach, such as urban transportation for students, subsidies for people with disabilities, scholarships for indigenous communities, and many others. In 2014, the total number of social programs funded and operated by Mexico’s 32 state governments was around 2,500. By “social program”, I understand programs delivering services or subsidies with the aim of improving the wellbeing of disadvantaged groups or ensuring the fulfillment of fundamental social rights. However, the consequences of these programs on social development have been very limited and, often, contrary to the goals that were originally envisaged. What explains social policy failure at the subnational level in Mexico? Is it a problem of policy implementation incapacity or rather a question of wrong policy formulation? In this paper I argue that the meager results of subnational social policies can be explained by its fragmentation (Koschinsky, & Swanstrom, 2001; Pollit, 2003) and lack of coherence (Cejudo & Michel, 2016). In other words, in their attempt to cover so many different populations, social programs have failed to provide precise responses to the needs of specific social segments. Furthermore, the design of social programs is often based on false beliefs rather than on evidence and causal reasoning (Majone, 1989), which produces a policymaking approach in which problems, participants and solutions are disjointed (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 1984). I illustrate my argument using the case of Jalisco, the fourth most populated state in the country, combining insights obtained from a social programs dataset as well as from in-depth analyses of specific state-level social programs.
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ABSTRACT
Why are some policies more “successful” than others? Public policy scholars have traditionally argued that policy goals attainment depends on bureaucrats and politicians’ abilities or state structural capacities. These claims, however, have fallen short to identify alternative variables leading to a successful result. This paper, building on the emerging theoretical corpus of “reputation theory”, provides an alternative explanation to the determinants of a “policy success”. I argue that reputation building operates as the principal incentive for a politician to deliver results. Given that policy implementation involves a higher risk of failure than potential benefits, tenured politicians might opt for the comfort zone rather than uncertain enterprises, while newcomers face higher incentives to build their reputations. To test this claim, this paper uses a mixed methods approach involving a panel regression analysis and interviews with policymakers, concerning educative policy outputs in Peru and Bolivia. Education policy has been at the core of these countries’ priorities for decades and, amid recent electoral processes, politicians of both sides have employed educative “successful experiences” as a currency to demonstrate commitment and ability to deliver. Results show that both in Peru and Bolivia newcomers are associated with significantly better policy outputs than tenured (already reputed) politicians.
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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes an atypical response to the panel’s central question. It argues that an usually ignored but increasingly relevant set of governance problems specific to the ‘developing world’ stems from China’s expansion and, more specifically, from certain features of its massive use of development assistance.
A ‘myth’ has developed about the ‘no strings attached’ nature of this assistance. Using the case study of the Caribbean as well as comparisons with similar situations in Central America and Africa, this paper proposes a critical re-reading of a reality that everybody is accustomed to watch through the reassuring but distorting lens of academic routine. It argues that Beijing actually uses the incentive of its development assistance in order to impose political, economic, and social conditionalities. The latter are integral parts of a complex process of international socialization that allows China to construct a cognitive and normative space conducive to a new regional order which should be politically friendly, economically profitable, and socially open to its government, companies, and citizens.
The problem is that each of the three conditionalities includes aspects that are detrimental to the good governance and the very democracy of the recipient country. The least damaging is the political one, well summarized by a respondent as ‘no Taiwan; no Tibet; no Tiananmen Square.’ Besides preventing the target states from making their own foreign policy choices, it compels them to hide their concerns for the situation of human rights in China. This is hardly good news for a vocal democracy, but at least it should not affect its governance.
The situation is very different in the case of economic conditionality. Its first component is ‘tied aid,’ i.e. China’s imposition of its own contractors, labor, and materials for all infrastructure projects supported by its loans. This obviously prevents Global South governments from protecting their own firms and workers, which for poor and small countries is a very serious issue. The second component is represented by the Beijing-imposed secretive government-to-government negotiations and undisclosed agreements that are specific to China’s development assistance interactions with the Caribbean and other similar regions. Frequently, they result in very serious failures of the Chinese-built infrastructure projects; always, they encourage high level corruption and endanger democratic policies and practices in the recipient country.
Within its social conditionality, China does not allow states that depend on its development assistance to regulate the inflow and the economic activities of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants. In many developing countries, these newcomers are active and highly successful in retail trade, groceries, Chinese restaurants, and casinos. Critically, they displace similar locally owned small businesses, which has frequently led to frustration, protests, and even riots. In certain cases, a gap has emerged between the state and the society that rejects its pro-Chinese policies.
The paper argues that the negative impact of China’s conditionalities on the good governance of Caribbean and, more generally, Global South countries represents a globalization-related systemic constraint that needs to be taken into consideration by any student of the developing world.
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ABSTRACT
Although Argentina shows better human development standards compared to most of middle and low income countries, it shares with the latter, several political, socio-economic and techno-organizational factors that significantly and negatively affect de quality of a great number of policies. With the long run purpose of contributing to the conceptual and empirical debate on policy mismanagement in developing countries, this paper will focus on the poor results of transport policies over the past 25 years, identifying the major factors behind this failure: political and policy styles, weakening of state and policy capacities, and economic volatility, among others.
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ABSTRACT
Institutional reforms are ubiquitously applied in developing countries to improve government capabilities (Andrews, Pritchett, & Woolcock, 2012). However, evidence indicates that efforts to curb anti-corruption in Malawi, strengthen the justice sector in South Sudan, or support decentralization programmes in Uganda, consistently failed to address reform objectives (Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2005). The investment in institutional reforms globally and their dismal performance have elicited numerous explanations by development experts and academics with examples ranging from challenging contexts to lack of political will. However, none of these reasons seems to offer specific answers to why reforms in developing contexts continue to fail (Evans, Peter; Rauch, 1999; Grindle, 2007). An explanation advanced by Matt Andrews and others seems to go further to provide an alternative model to introducing reforms that is a departure from approaches currently being applied. Andrews (2014) proposes an alternative model called Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) which is argued to produce best practice reforms in developing countries if they are crafted as a response to locally identified problems, undertaken in an iterative fashion through experimentation and learning, involving multiple agents and producing hybrid solutions that are locally owned, understood and implemented. In developing countries, meeting challenges to development are largely dependent on the effectiveness of the state to undertake its core functions. Strengthening institutional capability and performance of the state to deliver these functions becomes of paramount interest to reform suppliers however if the reforms are not addressing locally relevant problems, and have little political traction then evidence suggests that the recipient countries will adapt these reforms only in the spirit of compliance leading to less than satisfactory changes in the conditions set out to be addressed (Andrews et al., 2012). This paper uses new institutional theory and an interdisciplinary approach derived from the fields of political science, sociology and management to understand the introduction of key institutional reforms (Management Performance Assessment Tool -MPAT) related to improving public sector performance in Uganda and South Africa. These country environments contend with structurally limiting conditions, consequences of a series of state failures for instance apartheid in South Africa and conflict in Uganda (Alam et al., 2016; Andrews and Bategeka., 2013) and more recently, their governments have struggled with underperforming economies and governance challenges. Using an institutional ethnography research design, the paper explores ideas emerging from institutional economics covering concepts of institutional logics, institutional entrepreneurship, isomorphism and decoupling. at the introduction stage of the MPAT in each country. Findings from this paper provides insights on the conditions under which reforms are introduced, how different agents were engaged in the process and what the implications are for future value of the reform.
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ABSTRACT
Understanding Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) requires explaining whether, why, and how it responds differently to
particular variables (i.e., institutional) compared to other developing regions. This study contributes to this
exercise and adds to the recent research comparing development processes and outcomes between SSA and
Southeast Asia (SEA). According to these studies, based on SEA experience, good governance “as defined by
donors” should not be regarded as a prerequisite for development success in SSA. This study calls this view into
question by examining the relationship between governance and development performance in SSA and SEA
from 1995–2015. It defines good governance according to the governance effectiveness (GE) indicator of the
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. It focuses on development performance as progress in the
Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Program. It uses the hybrid (or within-between)
random effects model, which accounts for heterogeneity. The study finds a positive and significant association
between improvements in GE in a given period and development progress in the subsequent period. The results
also reveal considerable variations in the relationship between governance and development across countries,
suggesting the importance of context. The paper concludes by providing some recommendations for institutional
reform and further research on governance and development.
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ABSTRACT
In principle, metropolitan areas are designed to allow the interaction of different levels of government and other actors to tackle the critical problems of their jurisdictions (Aligica & Tarko, 2011; V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). Despite the high level of urbanization and the rapid rate of growth of metropolitan cities in Latin America, research on how metropolitan areas implement policies across policy issues is lacking (de Mattos, 2010). Understanding what patterns of interaction between policy actors produce more effective implementation is essential to inform policies related to the Sustainable Development Goals that require collaborations between government and non-government actors (Sachs, 2012).
In this research, we study the performance of the metropolitan area of Quito considering three main issues related to collaboration between policy actors in this polycentric system. First, drawing from Lubell (Lubell, 2008), we explore if institutional distance influences the patterns of collaboration among policy actors. Preliminary findings show that levels of government that share policy problems do not tend to collaborate. Instead, local governments at the lowest levels (parishes) collaborate with the national level more often. Second, drawing from Andersson and Ostrom (Andersson, 2003; Andersson & Ostrom, 2008), we study how specific structures of incentives for collaboration shape the patterns of interactions observed. Findings show a more frequent presence of actors from the third-sector and grassroots organizations in patterns where the lower and higher levels of government collaborate independent of the availability of economic resources available at the local level. Third, we study the effectiveness of the patterns of collaboration. Preliminary findings show that patterns of collaboration where a higher number of levels of government interact, do not tend to generate a higher perception of effectiveness, regardless of the policy issue. On the contrary, higher levels of perceived effectiveness correspond to the simpler patterns of interaction and take place where policy issues do not demand interaction with neighboring jurisdictions.
This research uses data collected via a standardized questionnaire with representatives at the parish-level of government in the Metropolitan District of Quito. We interviewed a total of 33 representatives between July and December 2018. The questionnaire was designed to elicit the ego-centric network of each parish. We calculated correlation coefficients for the association between the main variables of interest, and we considered a wide array of control variables for each case.
These findings suggest that the current metropolitan design of Quito is not promoting interactions between actors at the local level, which in principle, could be a disadvantage to implementing SDG-related policies. However, local governments and other local actors find ways to implement SDG-related policies that have high levels of perceived effectiveness in their jurisdictions. This research contributes to the emerging literature on polycentricity in developing countries by looking into the implementation of a wide array of policy issues and using primary data on existing interactions rather than imputing interactions from secondary sources (see Heikkila & Weible, 2018).
Aligica, P. D., & Tarko, V. (2011). Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond.Governance, 25(2), 237–262. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01550.x
Andersson, K. (2003). What Motivates Municipal Governments? Uncovering the Institutional Incentives for Municipal Governance of Forest Resources in Bolivia. The Journal of Environment & Development, 12(1), 5–27. http://doi.org/10.1177/1070496502250435
Andersson, K. P., & Ostrom, E. (2008). Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective. Policy Sciences, 41(1), 71–93. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-007-9055-6
de Mattos, C. A. (2010). Globalización y metamorfosis metropolitana en América Latina. De la ciudad a lo urbano generalizado. Revista De Geografía Norte Grande, 81–104.
Heikkila, T., & Weible, C. M. (2018). A semiautomated approach to analyzing polycentricity. Environmental Policy and Governance, 28(4), 308–318. http://doi.org/10.1002/eet.1817
Lubell, M. (2008). Familiarity Breeds Trust: Collective Action in a Policy Domain. The Journal of Politics, 69(1), 237–250. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00507.x
Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C. M., & Warren, R. (1961). The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry. American Political Science Review,55(04), 831–842. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400125973
Sachs, J. D. (2012). From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals. The Lancet, 379(9832), 2206–2211. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60685-0
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ABSTRACT
Politics is frequently “noise” in public policy analytical models, particularly when pointing to public management and state capacities. Agendas, choices, decision-making and implementation problems are presented as if analysis and planning, based on information and technique, were capable of providing adequate public-value oriented design and problem-solving, independently of political circumstances. Yet “normality” seems to be quite the opposite. Intent, in public policy, looks more like a complex mixture of technical considerations and political circumstances, as well as public policy processes seem incremental (as in hazardous and chaotic). In this paper, I put forward a strategy to make sense of this complex mixtures. Based on evidence coming from a compared public policy processes in Argentina (2007-2015), the papers isolates “points of collision” between management and politics, from which a number of problematic patterns are derived. The aim of the paper is to provide insight to common state management problems in countries strained by political conflict, legitimacy deficits and/or insufficient state capacity. The insight may be used to isolate failures in the understanding of state management problems in conflict-prone polities, as well as to design more accurate responses to them.
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ABSTRACT
Meeting the increasingly complex and dynamic demands of today’s society is a constant challenge for public governance. The expectations of different social groups change rapidly, requiring flexible and innovative institutions and instruments that can adapt and provide timely responses.
However, according to a growing number of critics of “excessive control” in Brazil, when public managers try to innovate and flexibilize they meet auditing requirements that hamper their scope for action, limiting the provision of public policies, or even rendering them unfeasible. Those critics sustain that restrictions and fines turn public managers reluctant to formulate innovative policies or make implementation decisions that depart from routine. Hence, institutions get “frozen” by a model of static (and bad) governance that replicates the same decisions over and over, regardless of the circumstances.
Just as there are advocates for more flexibility and room for honest error in public governance, there are also those who are averse to risk and not so willing to change. This group includes auditors and, most importantly, the general public, which in Brazil strongly mistrusts the government and fears corruption, as shown by opinion polls like the Latinobarometer. Considering their mistrust and fear, Brazilian citizens are probably more prone to reducing the power of government institutions than to increasing their discretionary power to make decisions that depart from the ordinary.
In this context, is it possible to reach a balance between a healthy mistrust in public managers and a higher receptivity to new ways of solving the problems posed for governance in the public sector?
This paper will analyze the case of an attempt to strike such balance, concerning a piece of legislation passed last year in Brazil[1]. The formal justification for the bill[2] approved by the National Congress stated that its goal was to reconcile the evolution of public governance – that is, of the many new types of organizational arrangements and solutions that have emerged in the last decades – with a legal norm that dates back to 1942 (the law that regulates the application of other laws in Brazil).
Stakeholders in favor of the new law nicknamed it the “law of legal certainty”, whilst those against it called it the “law of impunity”. The lobbying battle between them to influence the president during the sanctioning period is at the center of the analysis in this paper. The assumption that the president (as head of the branch of government responsible for public management) would sanction the new law without any changes did not hold.
Even though the tension between public management and control is not exclusive to Brazil, it seems that in developed countries the national courts of audit were at first concerned with checking the legality of public expenditures, and only shifted attention to the efficiency of government at a later stage, when legality was virtually universal. In Brazil, the move happened before achieving that stage, generating further controversy.
Sources for this paper include legislative and lobbying group documents and texts published by the media.
[1] Law 13.655/2018.
[2] PL 7.448/2017.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Whether and how to discipline corrupted officials is always a thorny problem for developing countries. Factors like information asymmetry, state weakness, collective actions among bureaucrats, and international donor’s intervention are often cited as causes for the failure of anti-corruption efforts in these countries (Persson, et.al., 2013; Doig, et.al., 2007). The situation could be even worse if a developing country happens to be governed by an authoritarian government. As predicted by the selectorate theory (De Mesquita, et.al, 2005), an authoritarian government may tolerate corruptions to maintain a winning coalition that is necessary for its survival (Svolik, 2012).
China seems to provide to an exception for its large-scale anti-corruption campaign since President Xi took office in 2012 (Manion, 2016). Available data show that more than 1.4 million public officials have been disciplined between 2012 to 2017. Among them includes over 240 senior officials directed managed by the central government. In many ways, such unprecedented anti-corruption efforts show that the communist party in China (CPC) must have overcome many barriers as listed by extant literature.
An oft-cited factor accounting for China’s seemingly success is CPC’s unchallenged top-down authority and hence the capacity in managing its bureaucrats (Perry, 2007; Rothstein, 2015). With such capacity at hands, the CPC could adeptly remove, investigate and punish corrupted officials. We find this capacity thesis unsatisfactory. For one, same top-down authority in the past has not yielded success of similar scale in previous anti-corruption movement. For the other, the seemingly strong top-down authority in China is often weakened by the fragmented government structure (Lieberthal, 1992), contradiction of multiple policy goals (O’Brien and Li, 1999) and bureaucratic norms (Mei and Pearson, 2014; 2017).
We propose to understand China’s anti-corruption campaign through the lens of paternalistic relation between the Party and the corrupted officials. Tolerance towards corrupted officials before the latest anti-corruption campaign showed the Party’s paternalistic love. Ironically, the seemingly harsh anti-corruption campaign may also be a sign of love; tough love is still love.
Empirically, this paper works to show that paternalistic relation affects the severity of punishment imposed on corrupted officials. A corrupted official may be considered as corrupted in his/her political loyalty or in his/her professional integrity. Our hypothesis is that officials considered as politically corrupted are likely to be punished more severely as compared to those corrupted professionally. We use court decision of sentence on corrupted officials to measure the severity of punishment. We use a novel dataset to find out the extent to which an official is considered politically corrupted or professionally corrupted. In China, the CPC conducts internal investigations on officials suspected for corruption before their cases are transferred to the court. Such internal investigation usually concludes with public denigration on these suspects if found guilty. With the help of content analysis on the denigration notes, we could tell from the text sentiments whether an official is considered as politically corrupted or professionally corrupted. Our sample is 880 corrupted senior officials in China at or above city-bureau level.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
The corruption is defined as the absence of integrity in someone who holds a position of trust (Berumen & Hegemann, 2011). As such, it harms society and the economy negatively impacting the institution of the state and compliance with legal regulations (Dickel & Graeff, 2018). In Latin America and especially in Peru, this is an evil of old that has plagued all governments and economic activities of scale. Corrupt actors involved in various scandals have desolated the hopes of a country that continues to seek to develop through work and trust in its representatives. People have understood the message and are resigning themselves to scandals, without understanding the terrible consequences for future generations. Using manipulation, legal devices and repression, corruption has been making its way through the country for many years, leaving aside the great difficulties we face such as poverty, instability, scarcity of opportunities and weakness of institutions and neutralizing the efforts of those who fight for a better Peru. Despite the efforts being made with programs and policies, those at the margins of economic progress feel that they are not part of the development of society.
In recent years, Peru has been the site of large-scale corruption scandals. Mentioning some of them: Vladivideos (Vladimiro Montesinos), Petro audios (tapes), Narcoindultos (Pardon for drug dealers granted by Alan García), Comunicore (Mayor of Lima Castañeda Lossio), Ecoteva Case (Former President Alejandro Toledo), Red Orellana (Rodolfo Orellana), Panama Papers, Odebrecht Case, CNM Audios, and the list goes on. Legal reforms have been weak due to poor implementation of anti-corruption policies within state institutions. This has led to a diminishing citizen confidence in national politics. On the other hand, the corruption perception index not only affects public opinion, but also has social, economic, demographic, and cultural consequences.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Bad governance, defined to include governments that are ineffective and inefficient, not transparent, not responsive to the people, not held accountable for their actions, inequitable and exclusive to the elites, non-participatory, do not follow the rule of law and lacking policies that are consensus driven, continues to be seen as the main impediment for significant economic growth to improve the welfare of people in developing countries. It is such bad governance that led to the development of good governance [good enough governance] by the international community and the International Financial Institutions for these countries. The assumption had been that good governance, will change the outlook of government and people in general, as the latter could assert themselves in the policy making process and demand accountability from public officials
Over the years, however, the success of good governance initiatives continues to be limited with the seemingly rise in corruption and bad policies in these countries. Different explanations continue to be deduced for the existence of bad governance in these countries, with a number of scholars focusing on what may be described as the traditional society with traditional values that are inimical to good governance in liberal democracies. However, as noted by Moore (2001), “bad governance’ is neither inherent in the culture or traditions of the people of poor countries nor a product of poverty. It is rather the result of the ways in which state authority in the South has been constructed – and is being maintained – through economic and political interactions with the rest of the world.”
Most of these explanations for bad governance have, however, focused on the political aspect of governance with limited examination of public management, despite the fact that public management was one of the cardinal points of the World Bank’s good governance idea. This limited literature, has also examined what may be described as bureaucratic corruption and the lack of bureaucratic capacity, which continues to affect the performance of state institutions. Unfortunately, a neglected area in this literature is the examination of the relationship between Boards of Directors and Chief Executives Officers of public sector institutions within the broader framework of corporate governance.
In this paper, our intention is to contribute to the discussion on bad governance through corporate governance and its impact on employee performance by looking at the relationship between boards of directors and chief executives of two major state institutions in Ghana. Our interest in this area emanates from the important role of boards and CEOs in public management. Unfortunately, in the last few years, conflicts between some boards and CEOs have become rampant in some organisations and have even spilled into the public domain. Consequently, the question we intend to answer is: what has been the impact of the conflict between boards and CEOs on employee performance in Ghana’s public sector?
We attempt to answer this question through a mixed method approach and a focus on two organizations, the Office of the Auditor-General and the Ghana Cylinder Manufacturing Company Limited.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Foreign agencies have been more actively sharing the resource burden of global investigations of corruption. As a recently revealed case (“operation Car Wash”), Brazilian firms paid a record-setting penalty of over $3.5 billion to resolve a bribery case involving American, Brazilian and other authorities [1]. Such firms had earned a similar amount in government contracts in exchange for $788 million in bribes paid in the scope of more than 100 construction projects in 10 Latin American countries (Argentina; Brazil; Colombia; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Guatemala; Mexico; Panama; Peru; and Venezuela [2]) as well as two African ones from 2001 to 2016.
While it is difficult to deny the success of anti-corruption efforts represented by national and global corruption investigations, it is at the same time easy to realize that when such investigations involve powerful and high profile politicians (from the most diverse political spectrums), several interest groups engage in advocacy work politicizing a technical and complex issue that simultaneously encompasses law, policy, and management, with the huge additional challenge of involving not only the Executive, but also the Judiciary and Legislative Branches.
This paper probes further to examine the politicization of institutions, asking to what extent this problem is restricted to emerging democracies/economies, or does it also affect the advanced ones? More specifically, what is the role of mainstream/social media, fake news, prosecutors (the “prosecutor politician”?) [3], and judges [4] in such politicization of corruption investigations, and how all these players and others can influence the electorate in contexts of institutional crises and change political landscapes?
This paper addresses these issues in selected countries all of which were involved in Operation Car Wash since 2014 in a comparative exercise that examines reactions across countries hit by the Car Wash in the period of 2014 to 2018. It builds upon evidence to identify policy and legal decisions that could prevent politicization from affecting the corruption investigations themselves, or at least mitigate the effects of such politicization over other fundamental democratic institutions.
The first draft of this paper will be presented at the "XV Conferencia Red INPAE 2019", to take place in Concepción, Chile, April 23-26, 2019.
[1] JONES, J. et al. “Uptick In Coordinated US-Brazil Anti-Corruption Enforcement”, Law360, 03/10/17. Available at https://www.law360.com/articles/894350/uptick-in-coordinated-us-brazil-anti-corruption-enforcement, access on 10/30/18.
[2] OXFORD ANALYTICA. “Latin America: Odebrecht probe claims regional victims”, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 01/26/17. Available at https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/GA217572/Latin-America-Odebrecht-probe-claims-regional-victims, access on 10/30/18; DW. “Brazil’s judiciary hunts corrupt politicians”, Top Stories – Latin America, 02/19/17. Available at https://www.dw.com/en/brazils-judiciary-hunts-corrupt-politicians/a-37622772, access on 10/30/18.
[3] TONRY, M. “Prosecutors and Politics: A Comparative Perspective”, Crime and Justice, Vol. 41, No. 1 (August 2012), pp. 1-33. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/666975?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents, access on 10/30/18; SAWYER, W.; CLARK, A. “New data: The rise of the ‘prosecutor politician’”, Prison Policy Initiative Blog, 07/13/17. Available at https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/07/13/prosecutors/, access on 10/30/18.
[4] RIBEIRO, D.; CORDEIRO, N.; GUIMARAES, D. “Interface between the Brazilian Antitrust, Anti-Corruption, and Criminal Organization Laws: The Leniency Agreements”. NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas, vol. 22, 2016, pp. 111-117, 151-156, 167-169. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710448.
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