Format

P07. The Political Economy of Public Policy

COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICY
PANEL CHAIR(S)
Matia Vannoni
King's College London, University of London
Main chair
Peter John
KCL
Second chair
CATEGORISATION
POLICY TOPIC
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICY
SECTOR
—
KEYWORDS
—
GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE

At its start, the study of public policy lacked unity, reflecting on the nature of the topic itself (John 2003). One major strand focused on the differences across policies: different instruments, different constraints and opportunities etc. The result was a descriptive study of public policy (e.g., policy taxonomies). The other strand was more concerned with the support of specific policies and their evaluation. The goal in this case was more normative, than analytical (Birkland 2015).

In the 1970s, public policy students became more concerned with explaining public policy, instead of categorising or evaluating it. Public policy theories started to emerge. Some theories focused on how ideas spread across countries and enter the political agenda (Hall 1993). Others were more concerned with the role of societal actors and their interaction with the public sector (Maass 1951). Others again studied the role of socio-economic change. Despite their focus on explaining public policy, these strands focused on single factors.

In the 1990s, the so called ‘synthetic approaches’ emerged, emphasising that ideas, socio-economic factors and policy networks interact with each other and affect policy dynamics: the multiple stream approach (Kingdon 1995), the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) and the punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). These approaches have dominated the discipline ever since, despite calls for an institutionalist/comparative turn.

In order to move the discipline forward, this panel seeks to capitalise on a recent trend in public policy: the use of economic models and methods that have already been applied to the study of international relations (IR) and comparative politics (John 2018). In the last decades, comparative politics and IR have embraced the use of advanced data gathering methods and statistical models. The use of text data has expanded rapidly in recent years (Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011; Lucas et al. 2015), with major examples including the detection of legislative agendas or topics and estimating the ideological positions of parties or single legislators. Attention in this area has recently moved from supervised approaches to unsupervised approaches, most notably machine learning. Also, the use of quasi-experimental research designs, such as natural experiments, instrumental variable approaches, difference-in-difference approaches etc., structural equations and spatial regression models has become common practice in comparative politics and IR . Finally, we have witnessed an increasing use of game theoretic models to drive the study of parties, voting behaviour, conflict and so on.

In the past years, some work has started to use these models and methods to study public policy topics. For instance, Bertelli and John (2012) use an economic theory of investment and Monte Carlo simulation to study uncertainty in policy prioritization in the UK. Kreppel and Oztas (2017) use a veto player model to study agenda setting in the EU. König and Mäder (2014) look at policy implementation in the EU with a strategic game between a central monitoring agency and multiple implementers.

CALL FOR PAPERS

We very much welcome papers on the following areas:

- Policy diffusion

- Agenda setting

- Public opinion

- Policy prioritization

- Policy networks

- Media and political attention

 

We are looking for papers that embody political economy approaches, such as advanced data gathering and statistical analysis methods, or contributions that use game theoretic models or make other theoretical contributions, or papers that mix both theory and empirics.

ACCEPTED
Format
01 - Democrats, Republicans and Macro-economic Policy: Evidence from U.S. State Session Laws, 1965-1998
Matia Vannoni (King's College London, University of London)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Do left-wing and right-wing parties respond differently to the economy? The partisanship
theory suggests that parties vary in the macro-economic policy they put in
place. Yet, this is still an open question. Current work, indeed, provides an incomplete
test of the partisan view, as it focuses exclusively on directly quantifiable indicators,
like tax rates. Here, we overcome this issue with a data-driven approach to recover the
‘effective’ macro-economic policy, namely the set of legal provisions in statutes which
might have an effect on the economy. Then, we isolate the changes in those legal provisions
driven by changes in the economy, thanks to a shift-share design, based on Bartik
(1994). We find that higher economic growth is associated with higher legislative detail
only under Democrat control. A topic model analysis suggests that Democrats tend to
react to economic booms by regulating more those areas associated with public spending.
Republicans instead react by regulating less those areas associated with taxes and
investment.

 

[co-authored with Elliott Ash and Massimo Morelli]

ACCEPTED
Format
02 - Public Mandates as Entrepreneurial Resources: Institutional Entrepreneurialism and Policy Change
Carolyn Tuohy (University of Toronto)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Defining institutional entrepreneurialism (IE) with clarity and explanatory power means specifying what we mean by both an “institution” and an “entrepreneur.” Following Thelen, institutions can be understood as sets of “collectively enforced expectations.” The concept of the entrepreneur needs to be true to its origin in the economics of private markets, as a particular type of agent who takes risks in conditions of uncertainty and who gambles that certain resources can be combined to yield greater value at some uncertain future state than they do in their current use. In the private sector such behaviour yields economic profit (or loss). This conceptualization can also illuminate behaviour in the public sector, and especially behaviour that spans public and private sectors, but only if it is wedded to considerations of power.

Control of a particular resource is a form of power, which can be deployed in the “collective enforcement” of expectations. IEs combine key bases of power, typically across the public and private sectors – such as state authority, capital, and skill – in new institutional arrangements. A public mandate can thus be understood as a particular type of resource, which under certain circumstances can be combined with other resources in entrepreneurial ways. The potential payoffs and penalties of doing so are the prospects of augmenting or eroding the entrepreneur’s power base – by advancing or retarding career and reputation, generating financial profit or loss, or augmenting or reducing standing and influence within the professional community. This paper will explore the circumstances that facilitate or inhibit this type of activity, especially during episodes of significant policy change, emphasizing in particular the levels of heterogeneity, autonomy, stakes and risk/uncertainty, and the particular constraints on both risk and profit implied by public mandates.

The behaviour of IEs can be understood as resulting from their principal power base in a particular type of resource: the “endowment” of authority, capital, or expertise with which the IE enters the arena. That base establishes the IE’s operating parameters - the bounds of legitimate authority, the availability of capital or the norms of the knowledge-based community. As IEs move beyond their “home” base to draw upon other types of resources, they must also address the incentives of those who control those resources. Hence the base from which, and the scope across which, these agents operate will have different implications for the dynamics of the arena. Drawing upon a qualitative comparison of cases in health care reform in four nations (the US, the UK, the Netherlands and Canada) the paper will argue that IEs emerging from bases of power within the public sector are more likely to be able to capitalize upon new public mandates than are those whose principal base is in private capital or professional skill.

ACCEPTED
Format
03 - The exit-voice trade-off and the decline of public services: a UK survey experiment
Peter John (KCL)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Experimental texts of Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice and loyalty (EVL) hypotheses for the effect of exit on service users’ voice are rare. We use a close reading of Exit, Voice and Loyalty to derive hypotheses about the impact of different exit options on voice. An ‘available alternatives’ hypothesis expects that voice will be higher when exit options are absent, and that increasing the number of exit options further reduces voice. An alternative, ‘effective voice’ hypothesis expects that users see voice as ineffective when there is no possibility of exit because providers have no incentive to respond to voice. We use a survey experiment with a scenario of a worsening of service performance of a local health general practitioner (GP) in the UK. We experimentally manipulate the number of exit options as: no exit options, an exit option to one other provider and exit options to multiple providers. We measure outcomes as the extent of voice, both individual and collective in response to these conditions, testing Dowding and John’s (2012; Dowding et al. 2000) hypothesis about type of voice. We test for the moderator of loyalty, measured by length of time at a GP practice, an investment factor previously identified as important in the exit-voice relationship (Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog 1992). We also analyse the dynamics of the response of the organisation to voice (responding or not responding to voice) and its consequences, a further part of th Hirschman framework. We find there is not a uniform treatment effect of exit options on voice, but heterogeneous impact through loyalty in the expected direction, mainly on collective voice. Responsiveness of the provider has a large impact on satisfaction of users, and lack of responsiveness increases exit. We conclude that the findings about the impact of lack of choice, and the role of loyalty, are consistent with the Hirschman theory as a conditional effect of exit on voice

ACCEPTED
Format
04 - Policy diffusion through multiple streams: The (non-)adoption of energy conservation building code in India
Nihit Goyal (Yale-NUS College)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Although policies that catalyze energy efficiency and climate change mitigation can be upscaled through policy diffusion, little is known about the mechanisms that trigger the diffusion of policy innovations despite much research on the topic. This is largely the result of fragmentation in research on policy diffusion and policy change, even though the two are closely interrelated. I address this dichotomy by conceptualizing policy diffusion using the multiple streams framework, which depicts the policy process as an interplay of the problem, policy, and politics streams. I apply this conceptualization to examine the state-level diffusion of energy conservation building code (ECBC) in India by combining dyadic event history analysis during 2012-18 with a process trace of ECBC adoption in the embedded case of the state of Andhra Pradesh. While the quantitative analysis is based on administrative data from diverse sources, the qualitative analysis is based on elite interviews, news reports, policy documents, and research articles. The dyadic analysis shows that ECBC diffusion was influenced by characteristics of the problem, policy, and politics streams – such as value added of construction in the gross domestic product, average electricity deficit, tax revenue as share of gross domestic product, per capita income, time since previous election, and party or coalition in government – in various states. Also, the process trace corroborates that subsequent adoption occurred when prior adoption elsewhere and external influences were used by entrepreneurs to exploit a window of opportunity and join the problem, policy, and politics streams in the state of Andhra Pradesh. I conclude that the multiple streams framework is useful for explaining policy diffusion and that practitioners and scholars interested in upscaling climate change mitigation should focus on the relationship between external policy activity and the internal streams of the policy process.

ACCEPTED
Format
05 - Go work, integrate well, and live healthy! Social regulation and welfare goals in policy change
Philipp Trein (University of Lausanne)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the link between social regulation and welfare goals in policy change. Therefore, I conceptualize how governments link social regulatory and behavioral policy instruments with cash transfers and services in three fields of social policy – immigration, public health, and unemployment. After that, I conduct a comparative empirical analysis of reform events in the three policy fields and thirteen countries, which is based on an original dataset of policy change towards integration and coordination reform events of the regulatory state and the welfare, in the period 1985-2014. In using multilevel time series regression analysis, I assess four theoretical mechanisms that could explain these reform events: the scope of the regulatory state, governmental power of left parties, qualities of the policy field, and the type of the welfare state. The paper shows that the configuration of a larger scope of regulatory institutions, left parties in government, external problem pressure, time as well as expenditure for the specific policy field explain policy change events aiming to coordinate and integrate social regulatory and behavioral elements with welfare goals. The article contributes to understanding the political economy of public policy as it analyzes under which conditions policymakers connect behavioral and regulatory policy instruments, which originate in economic theory and policy, with welfare state policies. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates how econometric methods, such as multilevel time-series regression can be used for comparative policy analysis.

ACCEPTED
Format
06 - Understanding public opinion towards basic income policy: a conjoint experiment
Rincón Leire (University of Barcelona)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

The objective of this paper is to explain under which conditions public opinion supports basic income policy, through the use of a conjoint experiment fielded in Finland and Spain. Conjoint experiments are increasingly used in political science to explain the multidimensionality of preferences towards different policies such as unemployment benefits (Gallego and Marx, 2016) or housing policy (Hankinson 2018). In the case of basic income, existing data and surveys cannot fully explain public opinion attitudes. On the one hand, current work has treated basic income as a unidimensional policy, asking the degree of support towards a specific definition of basic income. This jeopardizes comparison between surveys, but also confuses understanding the elements of the definition that individuals are thinking about when responding. In fact, we are unable of understanding what particular features respondents are thinking about, and which characteristics are more salient to them. Secondly, existing public opinion data does not provide a clear picture of individual preferences towards basic income policy and competing proposals. For instance, according to the last ESS round approximately 70% of individuals who support basic income, are also favorable to opposed measures such as reducing unemployment benefits if recipients fail to take up a lower paid job or unpaid work. Overcoming these limitations and understanding public opinion support for basic income remains a key challenge for academics and policy-makers alike in the 21st century. Basic income is not only an effective tool to deal with labor automatization, structural unemployment or welfare system inefficiencies, but it is also promising in terms of tackling gender equality, health and education rates, poverty traps, and ecological sustainability amongst others. Yet, a key obstacle for policy-makers is to understand public opinion support towards this policy. To advance knowledge in the field, we employ a conjoint experiment, which is increasingly used to understand multi-dimensional preferences and choices in various issues. Respondents are forced to choose between two competing policy proposals that vary in various dimensions. In this case, we present two related basic income schemes that vary in their conditionality, unit of recipient, funding mechanisms and quantity. By making respondents choose between these two alternatives we are able of understanding the trade-offs that individuals are confronted with when selecting between competing policy alternatives. Moreover, we are able of identifying preferred designs and how these vary across sociodemographic criteria. Because there is not one theory of preferences towards basic income policy, we rely on traditional political economy theories to hypothesis how each individual dimension shapes attitudes towards basic income policy. We field this experiment through Netquest, to a nationally representative sample of 2000 individuals in Spain and Finland, during the month of February 2019. Results will contribute to advancing the knowledge on attitudes towards basic income policy, but will also speak to the growing field of the multidimensionality of preferences of welfare state reform.

ACCEPTED
Format
07 - Explaining Gender Differences in Issue Attention
Laura Chaqués Bonafont (Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

The goal of this paper is to explain under what conditions female MPs get into the political debate about issues traditionally led by male Mps. Gender differences in issue attention are a common feature in most advanced democracies. For decades, women have occupied a marginal position in the debate of a large set of issues, especially those that are more rewarding in political terms. Female Mps are not leading the debate about the issues that most citizens identify as the most important issues for the nation, or those issues that capture the attention of the frontpages of newspapers. This is problematic, among other things, because it reduces female Mps capacity to represent a gender perspective in the political debate. Building from existing literature on agenda setting, descriptive representation and legislative careers, the paper explains how issue feminization varies across policy areas, time and political parties as a result of different factors, mainly: the presence of women in parliaments, agenda capacity, gender quotas, female leadership in the governmental and parliamentary arena and seniority. The empirical analysis relies on a comprehensive dataset of oral questions in Spain from 1982 to 2018 classified across policy areas using CAP methodology, and a dataset about the socioeconomic features of individual MPs developed by Qdem (www.q-dem.com).

 

ACCEPTED
Format
08 - Do I deserve what I get? How the social construction of deservingness affect the well-being of needy groups
Martin Baekgaard (Aarhus University)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Social construction theory (Schneider and Ingram 2005; Schneider and Sidney 2009) argues that constructions in the popular debate of social groups as being either deserving or undeserving of social welfare are absorbed by citizens and affect their orientations and civic participation (Bruch, Ferree and Soss 2010; Mettler and Soss 2004; Schneider and Ingram 1993). However, little is known about how and to what extent social constructions affect the well-being of people in those groups that are subject to socially constructions. To address this question, I connect social construction theory (Schneider and Ingram 1992) with literature on welfare encounters (Soss 1999) and the emerging literature on psychological costs experienced by beneficiaries of welfare benefits (Bhargava and Manoli 2016; Herd and Moynihan 2018; Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey 2015). I argue that benefit recipients experience psychological costs when they are negatively construed as being undeserving of social welfare in the public debate.

To test this theory, I use multiple experiments to examine experiences of psychological costs for welfare benefit recipients who are subject to discussions of deservingness. First, to establish the causal relationship in a controlled setting, I construct a survey experiment with 900 current welfare benefit recipients in Denmark. Subjects are randomly assigned to deservingness cues taken from popular media to estimate how such cues affect the extent to which they report experiencing psychological costs in the form of stigma, loss of autonomy, and stress.

Second, I take advantage of two quasi-experiments to examine effects in the field. In 2011 and 2012 Denmark’s generous welfare state faced an unprecedented public and political debate in the aftermath of two prominent media cases known as “Lazy Robert’ and “Poor Carina.” Following these cases, approximately four out of ten Danes changed their opinions on social assistance benefits, generally becoming less supportive (Hedegaard 2014).  To test the effects of changes in deservingness, I use highly valid individual level register data (more than one million observations) on all Danish social assistance benefit recipients in the years 2008-2017. I use a regression discontinuity design to estimate if social assistance benefit recipients were more likely to be diagnosed with stress and more likely to receive stress-reducing medication in the aftermath of the two incidents. Moreover, I compare the results from the regression discontinuity analysis with similar analyses of placebo groups that are unlikely to have been affected by the incidents to examine whether changes in the dependent variables can be observed mainly for the recipients of social assistance benefits, as I expect.

ACCEPTED
Format
09 - Dynamics of Policy Making: Productivity and Reversals
Asli Unan (King's College London)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

 

 

The literature on path dependence and credible commitment from political science contend that politicians commit to policies to avoid making time-inconsistent policy decisions (Levi 1997; Pierson 2000, Coffman et al. 2013). Policies are hard to create and often generate learning effects, but electoral competition and political polarization may distort policy choices, giving incumbents an incentive to experiment. This experimentation might produce stable policies or may end up in drifts (see Callander and Krehbiel 2014), inaction (see Majumdar and Mukand 2004) or reversals (see Buisseret and Bernhardt 2017). Reforms which led to the formation of policies, new bodies and agencies, therefore, may be reversed after some time even though their creation has been a long and painstaking process. One central mission of the literature on the political economy of reforms is to design policy reforms that have a low probability of reversal (Alesina and Drazen 1991); however, we don’t know much about the conditions under which a policy reversal occurs through electoral incentives. Why and when do politicians backtrack on policy reforms despite the resources spent and effort put for their implementation? This research explores this question by working through a formal theory of electoral competition. It demonstrates the conditions under which politicians produce policy reforms and repeals, depending on electoral incentives and ideological polarization. The empirical implications of the formal model is tested against U.S. policymaking data exploiting district-level heterogeneity.

 

ACCEPTED
Format
10 - Bureaucratic Control Reversed: The Influence of Independent Regulators on the Liberalisation of the Railways in Europe
Luca Bellodi (Università Bocconi)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Do bureaucratic bodies affect the decisions of elected politicians, and if so, under what conditions? In this paper, I propose that agencies with a stronger institutional capacity – i.e., endowed with more independence and competences – are more likely to influence legislation, and this effect is moderated by the characteristics of the market in which they operate. I develop a spatial model that shows that such agencies are more likely to draw the final legislative output closer to their ideal points. Empirically, I test this argument by looking at the impact of Independent Regulatory Authorities (IRAs) on the liberalisation of the railway industry in Europe, using the institutional capacity of IRAs in other network industries as instrumental variables. By employing computer-based text analysis techniques, I also introduce a novel approach to the estimation of IRAs’ ideal points, thus offering a flexible empirical strategy to measure the ideology of the bureaucracy and its influence on legislative outputs. The findings show that IRAs with stronger institutional capacity that regulate sufficiently liberalised markets are more likely to exert influence over legislation.

ACCEPTED
Format
11 - Inter-temporal Evidence on the Strategy of Populism
Giampaolo Lecce (Northwestern University)
CO-AUTHORS
Gloria Gennaro
Massimo Morelli
ABSTRACT

Campaigns are essential components of party competition and crucial to the functioning  of  democratic  politics.  For this reason, many scholars across the social sciences devote a large attention to political campaigns. One of the main goal in an electoral campaign is to influence the behavior of prospective voters, persuading them to show up at the polls and to make the right choice. Rhetoric can be seen as a tool that candidates use to persuade or mobilize voters to their advantage,  by strategically emphasizing issues in voters’ minds  (Sides  2006).  

 

In this paper, we investigate whether populist rhetoric becomes a strategic tool based on context, with the latter consisting of the characteristics of the audience. Specifically, we focus on the last US presidential campaign rallies and on the electoral platforms of candidates in the last congressional mid-term elections, and investigate the supply of populist rhetoric across candidates, time and space. We have 3 distinct sets of results. (i) First, we detect marked differences between presidential candidates in the last and previous elections back to 2004. (ii) Second, we identify some characteristics that can be credibly associated to populist candidates, and test whether these features can be detected also among the mid-term election candidates. (iii) Third, we find that the supply of populist rhetoric is tailored on socioeconomic characteristics of the rally audience, suggesting strategic behaviour on the supply of populism.

 

In line with the general objective of the panel we use text data to create a quantitative measure of populism. We produces two corpus, one for each part of the analysis, that are collection of text documents from each candidate. When analyzing the 2016 Presidential campaign, each document is a campaign speech, indexed by candidate, time and location. We collect all available public speeches for the two Presidential candidates starting from their official nomination (beginning of June 2016) to the election day (November 7, 2016). We collect 2016 Presidential Candidates' public speeches from the American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara. Further, we complement this database with additional speeches collected on Youtube and transcribed by the Google vocal recognition. We have 228 speeches in total, 98 speeches for Clinton and 130 for Trump.
We obtain information on the candidates to the House of representatives for the 2018 midterm elections by analyzing their official website. Here, each document is a candidate's electoral program published on the campaign website, indexed by candidate and location. For each candidate in each Congressional District, we extract her electoral manifesto.Moreover, we collected demographic information from their websites and alternative sources, to include classical demographic characteristics (gender, age, ethnicity, level of education) and political variables (party affiliation, previous political experience and whether she is an incumbent in the House).

ACCEPTED
Format
12 - Impacts of Transnational Coalition Networks on Domestic Policy Agenda Setting
Mark(Won Min) Seo (University of Ottawa)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Abstract

Numerous case studies document the impacts of transnational coalition networks on domestic policy agenda setting. Yet, scant literature quantitatively configure Putnam(1988)’s win-sets from the network theoretic approach. In this research, I quantitatively model how the bargaining outcomes resulted from coalition network games(assumedly between isolationists and transnational interest groups) affect the distribution of two social goods(i.g. stricter environmental standards measured in terms of numeric evaluation and domestic support for stronger national identity measured in terms of polls) in pure exchange economy. In doing so, I take into consideration James(2016)’s factors influencing Level 1 game between negotiators (audience costs, transaction costs, reformative costs) in configuring the contract curve. The pure exchange economy in my model is, however, three-dimensional reflecting the nature of diverging consensus among the members of network(thus, I add the third dimension of constructed reality of the problem measured in terms of media coverages). Based on the conditions, I hopefully quantitatively configure the threshold when the policy window opens for negotiators when taking into account the international standard(policy), domestic support for national identity(politics), and problematic reality constructed by media coverages(problem).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Citation

Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American political science review, 88(3), 577-592.

James, S. (2016). The domestic politics of financial regulation: Informal ratification games and the EU capital requirement negotiations. New Political Economy, 21(2), 187-203.

Kingdon, J. W. (1995). The policy window, and joining the streams. Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, 172-189.

Mo, J. (1994). The logic of two-level games with endogenous domestic coalitions. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(3), 402-422.

Morin, J. F. (2010). The two-level game of transnational networks: The case of the access to medicines campaign. International interactions, 36(4), 309-334.

Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International organization, 42(3), 427-460.

Przeworski, A. (2003). States and markets: a primer in political economy. Cambridge University Press.

ACCEPTED
Format
13 - Varieties of (regulatory) Capitalism: The political economy of the licensing state
Osheroff Yair (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Occupational License (OL) is a state regulation that restricts the practice of an occupation by requiring practitioners to hold a license to practice it. OL is one of the most common and influential labor market regulations, and considered to be part of the development of regulatory capitalism.

The concept of Varieties of Capitalism (henceforth: VoC), suggests a framework to analyze economic structures of modern capitalist economies according to their institutional settings. According to the framework, states can be located on a continuum between two ideal types of market economies: Liberal Market Economy and Coordinated Market Economy (CME). 

This study examines OL by using the suggested framework. While the political economy of OL illustrated mainly by the micro aspects of the phenomenon, its macroeconomic aspects were left underexplored. Examining it according to VoC that highlights factors in the state level addresses such caveat. It may also contribute to the development of VoC, for it lacks in its capacity to understand variance in regulatory governance.

To understand OL in light of VoC, I conduct a comparative research between the degree of OL in Germany, UK, France and Israel. These states reflect variance in the type of market economy according to the framework of VoC. The independent variable – the degree of OL – is composed by a combination of the number of licensed occupations in a state, and the restrictiveness of its OL regimes. The latter is indicated by representative occupations that are licensed in all states, that are measured according to a regulatory restrictiveness index I designed.

A preliminary study of the degree of OL shows significant differences between the states. The state with the most licensed 

I focus on three central features to the framework of VoC that may explain OL. One central feature is vocational education, which is considered to be more developed in CME than LME. Vocational education is an institution that sets a qualification standard of practitioners and control the supply and division of practitioners in the occupational market. It makes alternative institutions, as OL, that fulfill these functions redundant. Hence I hypothesize that the more developed is the vocational education system, the lower is the degree of OL.

Another central feature of VoC is trade union, which is considered to be more developed in CME than LME. Trade unions promote workers' conditions and maintain a division in the labor market between employers and employees. In an economy with developed unionization there would be less room to other institutions that protects workers' rights and maintain other cleavages in the market, as OL that promote practitioners' conditions and strengthen the cleavages among occupations, and between occupations and other actors in the market. Hence I hypothesize that the greater is the unionization of labor, the lower is the degree of OL.

The third feature of VoC I focus on is privatization, which is considered to be more extensive in LME than CME. Literature of regulatory governance points out that privatization is coupled with proliferation of regulatory institutions, while OL may be considered as such institution. Hence I hypothesize that the wider the privatization, the higher is the degree of OL.

 

ACCEPTED
Format
14 - Does Historical Land Inequality Attenuate the Positive Impact of India's Employment Guarantee Program?
Kartik Misra (University of Massachusetts Amherst)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

By providing 100 days of guaranteed employment to every rural household, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) can challenge the hegemony of the landed elite as major employers in the Indian countryside. This paper finds that the program is highly successful in raising wages and generating more public employment in districts that were not characterized by historically high levels of socio-economic inequality. In these districts, the increase in public employment crowds-out labor primarily from domestic work, reflected in increased women's participation in the program. However, high inequality in landownership adversely impacts the bargaining power of workers and the enforcement of their entitlements under NREGA. This is most evident when I examine the impact of employment guarantee on rural wages. These findings suggest that NREGA has not become a credible alternative to private employment in regions historically characterized by high levels of land inequality. I further examine changes in domestic and agricultural work in response to NREGA and find that in districts with lower historical land inequality, there is a reduction in the time spent in unpaid-domestic work which suggests greater participation by women in these districts.

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Do left-wing and right-wing parties respond differently to the economy? The partisanship
theory suggests that parties vary in the macro-economic policy they put in
place. Yet, this is still an open question. Current work, indeed, provides an incomplete
test of the partisan view, as it focuses exclusively on directly quantifiable indicators,
like tax rates. Here, we overcome this issue with a data-driven approach to recover the
‘effective’ macro-economic policy, namely the set of legal provisions in statutes which
might have an effect on the economy. Then, we isolate the changes in those legal provisions
driven by changes in the economy, thanks to a shift-share design, based on Bartik
(1994). We find that higher economic growth is associated with higher legislative detail
only under Democrat control. A topic model analysis suggests that Democrats tend to
react to economic booms by regulating more those areas associated with public spending.
Republicans instead react by regulating less those areas associated with taxes and
investment.

 

[co-authored with Elliott Ash and Massimo Morelli]

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Defining institutional entrepreneurialism (IE) with clarity and explanatory power means specifying what we mean by both an “institution” and an “entrepreneur.” Following Thelen, institutions can be understood as sets of “collectively enforced expectations.” The concept of the entrepreneur needs to be true to its origin in the economics of private markets, as a particular type of agent who takes risks in conditions of uncertainty and who gambles that certain resources can be combined to yield greater value at some uncertain future state than they do in their current use. In the private sector such behaviour yields economic profit (or loss). This conceptualization can also illuminate behaviour in the public sector, and especially behaviour that spans public and private sectors, but only if it is wedded to considerations of power.

Control of a particular resource is a form of power, which can be deployed in the “collective enforcement” of expectations. IEs combine key bases of power, typically across the public and private sectors – such as state authority, capital, and skill – in new institutional arrangements. A public mandate can thus be understood as a particular type of resource, which under certain circumstances can be combined with other resources in entrepreneurial ways. The potential payoffs and penalties of doing so are the prospects of augmenting or eroding the entrepreneur’s power base – by advancing or retarding career and reputation, generating financial profit or loss, or augmenting or reducing standing and influence within the professional community. This paper will explore the circumstances that facilitate or inhibit this type of activity, especially during episodes of significant policy change, emphasizing in particular the levels of heterogeneity, autonomy, stakes and risk/uncertainty, and the particular constraints on both risk and profit implied by public mandates.

The behaviour of IEs can be understood as resulting from their principal power base in a particular type of resource: the “endowment” of authority, capital, or expertise with which the IE enters the arena. That base establishes the IE’s operating parameters - the bounds of legitimate authority, the availability of capital or the norms of the knowledge-based community. As IEs move beyond their “home” base to draw upon other types of resources, they must also address the incentives of those who control those resources. Hence the base from which, and the scope across which, these agents operate will have different implications for the dynamics of the arena. Drawing upon a qualitative comparison of cases in health care reform in four nations (the US, the UK, the Netherlands and Canada) the paper will argue that IEs emerging from bases of power within the public sector are more likely to be able to capitalize upon new public mandates than are those whose principal base is in private capital or professional skill.

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Experimental texts of Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice and loyalty (EVL) hypotheses for the effect of exit on service users’ voice are rare. We use a close reading of Exit, Voice and Loyalty to derive hypotheses about the impact of different exit options on voice. An ‘available alternatives’ hypothesis expects that voice will be higher when exit options are absent, and that increasing the number of exit options further reduces voice. An alternative, ‘effective voice’ hypothesis expects that users see voice as ineffective when there is no possibility of exit because providers have no incentive to respond to voice. We use a survey experiment with a scenario of a worsening of service performance of a local health general practitioner (GP) in the UK. We experimentally manipulate the number of exit options as: no exit options, an exit option to one other provider and exit options to multiple providers. We measure outcomes as the extent of voice, both individual and collective in response to these conditions, testing Dowding and John’s (2012; Dowding et al. 2000) hypothesis about type of voice. We test for the moderator of loyalty, measured by length of time at a GP practice, an investment factor previously identified as important in the exit-voice relationship (Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog 1992). We also analyse the dynamics of the response of the organisation to voice (responding or not responding to voice) and its consequences, a further part of th Hirschman framework. We find there is not a uniform treatment effect of exit options on voice, but heterogeneous impact through loyalty in the expected direction, mainly on collective voice. Responsiveness of the provider has a large impact on satisfaction of users, and lack of responsiveness increases exit. We conclude that the findings about the impact of lack of choice, and the role of loyalty, are consistent with the Hirschman theory as a conditional effect of exit on voice

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Although policies that catalyze energy efficiency and climate change mitigation can be upscaled through policy diffusion, little is known about the mechanisms that trigger the diffusion of policy innovations despite much research on the topic. This is largely the result of fragmentation in research on policy diffusion and policy change, even though the two are closely interrelated. I address this dichotomy by conceptualizing policy diffusion using the multiple streams framework, which depicts the policy process as an interplay of the problem, policy, and politics streams. I apply this conceptualization to examine the state-level diffusion of energy conservation building code (ECBC) in India by combining dyadic event history analysis during 2012-18 with a process trace of ECBC adoption in the embedded case of the state of Andhra Pradesh. While the quantitative analysis is based on administrative data from diverse sources, the qualitative analysis is based on elite interviews, news reports, policy documents, and research articles. The dyadic analysis shows that ECBC diffusion was influenced by characteristics of the problem, policy, and politics streams – such as value added of construction in the gross domestic product, average electricity deficit, tax revenue as share of gross domestic product, per capita income, time since previous election, and party or coalition in government – in various states. Also, the process trace corroborates that subsequent adoption occurred when prior adoption elsewhere and external influences were used by entrepreneurs to exploit a window of opportunity and join the problem, policy, and politics streams in the state of Andhra Pradesh. I conclude that the multiple streams framework is useful for explaining policy diffusion and that practitioners and scholars interested in upscaling climate change mitigation should focus on the relationship between external policy activity and the internal streams of the policy process.

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the link between social regulation and welfare goals in policy change. Therefore, I conceptualize how governments link social regulatory and behavioral policy instruments with cash transfers and services in three fields of social policy – immigration, public health, and unemployment. After that, I conduct a comparative empirical analysis of reform events in the three policy fields and thirteen countries, which is based on an original dataset of policy change towards integration and coordination reform events of the regulatory state and the welfare, in the period 1985-2014. In using multilevel time series regression analysis, I assess four theoretical mechanisms that could explain these reform events: the scope of the regulatory state, governmental power of left parties, qualities of the policy field, and the type of the welfare state. The paper shows that the configuration of a larger scope of regulatory institutions, left parties in government, external problem pressure, time as well as expenditure for the specific policy field explain policy change events aiming to coordinate and integrate social regulatory and behavioral elements with welfare goals. The article contributes to understanding the political economy of public policy as it analyzes under which conditions policymakers connect behavioral and regulatory policy instruments, which originate in economic theory and policy, with welfare state policies. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates how econometric methods, such as multilevel time-series regression can be used for comparative policy analysis.

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

The objective of this paper is to explain under which conditions public opinion supports basic income policy, through the use of a conjoint experiment fielded in Finland and Spain. Conjoint experiments are increasingly used in political science to explain the multidimensionality of preferences towards different policies such as unemployment benefits (Gallego and Marx, 2016) or housing policy (Hankinson 2018). In the case of basic income, existing data and surveys cannot fully explain public opinion attitudes. On the one hand, current work has treated basic income as a unidimensional policy, asking the degree of support towards a specific definition of basic income. This jeopardizes comparison between surveys, but also confuses understanding the elements of the definition that individuals are thinking about when responding. In fact, we are unable of understanding what particular features respondents are thinking about, and which characteristics are more salient to them. Secondly, existing public opinion data does not provide a clear picture of individual preferences towards basic income policy and competing proposals. For instance, according to the last ESS round approximately 70% of individuals who support basic income, are also favorable to opposed measures such as reducing unemployment benefits if recipients fail to take up a lower paid job or unpaid work. Overcoming these limitations and understanding public opinion support for basic income remains a key challenge for academics and policy-makers alike in the 21st century. Basic income is not only an effective tool to deal with labor automatization, structural unemployment or welfare system inefficiencies, but it is also promising in terms of tackling gender equality, health and education rates, poverty traps, and ecological sustainability amongst others. Yet, a key obstacle for policy-makers is to understand public opinion support towards this policy. To advance knowledge in the field, we employ a conjoint experiment, which is increasingly used to understand multi-dimensional preferences and choices in various issues. Respondents are forced to choose between two competing policy proposals that vary in various dimensions. In this case, we present two related basic income schemes that vary in their conditionality, unit of recipient, funding mechanisms and quantity. By making respondents choose between these two alternatives we are able of understanding the trade-offs that individuals are confronted with when selecting between competing policy alternatives. Moreover, we are able of identifying preferred designs and how these vary across sociodemographic criteria. Because there is not one theory of preferences towards basic income policy, we rely on traditional political economy theories to hypothesis how each individual dimension shapes attitudes towards basic income policy. We field this experiment through Netquest, to a nationally representative sample of 2000 individuals in Spain and Finland, during the month of February 2019. Results will contribute to advancing the knowledge on attitudes towards basic income policy, but will also speak to the growing field of the multidimensionality of preferences of welfare state reform.

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

The goal of this paper is to explain under what conditions female MPs get into the political debate about issues traditionally led by male Mps. Gender differences in issue attention are a common feature in most advanced democracies. For decades, women have occupied a marginal position in the debate of a large set of issues, especially those that are more rewarding in political terms. Female Mps are not leading the debate about the issues that most citizens identify as the most important issues for the nation, or those issues that capture the attention of the frontpages of newspapers. This is problematic, among other things, because it reduces female Mps capacity to represent a gender perspective in the political debate. Building from existing literature on agenda setting, descriptive representation and legislative careers, the paper explains how issue feminization varies across policy areas, time and political parties as a result of different factors, mainly: the presence of women in parliaments, agenda capacity, gender quotas, female leadership in the governmental and parliamentary arena and seniority. The empirical analysis relies on a comprehensive dataset of oral questions in Spain from 1982 to 2018 classified across policy areas using CAP methodology, and a dataset about the socioeconomic features of individual MPs developed by Qdem (www.q-dem.com).

 

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Social construction theory (Schneider and Ingram 2005; Schneider and Sidney 2009) argues that constructions in the popular debate of social groups as being either deserving or undeserving of social welfare are absorbed by citizens and affect their orientations and civic participation (Bruch, Ferree and Soss 2010; Mettler and Soss 2004; Schneider and Ingram 1993). However, little is known about how and to what extent social constructions affect the well-being of people in those groups that are subject to socially constructions. To address this question, I connect social construction theory (Schneider and Ingram 1992) with literature on welfare encounters (Soss 1999) and the emerging literature on psychological costs experienced by beneficiaries of welfare benefits (Bhargava and Manoli 2016; Herd and Moynihan 2018; Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey 2015). I argue that benefit recipients experience psychological costs when they are negatively construed as being undeserving of social welfare in the public debate.

To test this theory, I use multiple experiments to examine experiences of psychological costs for welfare benefit recipients who are subject to discussions of deservingness. First, to establish the causal relationship in a controlled setting, I construct a survey experiment with 900 current welfare benefit recipients in Denmark. Subjects are randomly assigned to deservingness cues taken from popular media to estimate how such cues affect the extent to which they report experiencing psychological costs in the form of stigma, loss of autonomy, and stress.

Second, I take advantage of two quasi-experiments to examine effects in the field. In 2011 and 2012 Denmark’s generous welfare state faced an unprecedented public and political debate in the aftermath of two prominent media cases known as “Lazy Robert’ and “Poor Carina.” Following these cases, approximately four out of ten Danes changed their opinions on social assistance benefits, generally becoming less supportive (Hedegaard 2014).  To test the effects of changes in deservingness, I use highly valid individual level register data (more than one million observations) on all Danish social assistance benefit recipients in the years 2008-2017. I use a regression discontinuity design to estimate if social assistance benefit recipients were more likely to be diagnosed with stress and more likely to receive stress-reducing medication in the aftermath of the two incidents. Moreover, I compare the results from the regression discontinuity analysis with similar analyses of placebo groups that are unlikely to have been affected by the incidents to examine whether changes in the dependent variables can be observed mainly for the recipients of social assistance benefits, as I expect.

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

 

 

The literature on path dependence and credible commitment from political science contend that politicians commit to policies to avoid making time-inconsistent policy decisions (Levi 1997; Pierson 2000, Coffman et al. 2013). Policies are hard to create and often generate learning effects, but electoral competition and political polarization may distort policy choices, giving incumbents an incentive to experiment. This experimentation might produce stable policies or may end up in drifts (see Callander and Krehbiel 2014), inaction (see Majumdar and Mukand 2004) or reversals (see Buisseret and Bernhardt 2017). Reforms which led to the formation of policies, new bodies and agencies, therefore, may be reversed after some time even though their creation has been a long and painstaking process. One central mission of the literature on the political economy of reforms is to design policy reforms that have a low probability of reversal (Alesina and Drazen 1991); however, we don’t know much about the conditions under which a policy reversal occurs through electoral incentives. Why and when do politicians backtrack on policy reforms despite the resources spent and effort put for their implementation? This research explores this question by working through a formal theory of electoral competition. It demonstrates the conditions under which politicians produce policy reforms and repeals, depending on electoral incentives and ideological polarization. The empirical implications of the formal model is tested against U.S. policymaking data exploiting district-level heterogeneity.

 

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Do bureaucratic bodies affect the decisions of elected politicians, and if so, under what conditions? In this paper, I propose that agencies with a stronger institutional capacity – i.e., endowed with more independence and competences – are more likely to influence legislation, and this effect is moderated by the characteristics of the market in which they operate. I develop a spatial model that shows that such agencies are more likely to draw the final legislative output closer to their ideal points. Empirically, I test this argument by looking at the impact of Independent Regulatory Authorities (IRAs) on the liberalisation of the railway industry in Europe, using the institutional capacity of IRAs in other network industries as instrumental variables. By employing computer-based text analysis techniques, I also introduce a novel approach to the estimation of IRAs’ ideal points, thus offering a flexible empirical strategy to measure the ideology of the bureaucracy and its influence on legislative outputs. The findings show that IRAs with stronger institutional capacity that regulate sufficiently liberalised markets are more likely to exert influence over legislation.

CO-AUTHORS
Gloria Gennaro
Massimo Morelli
ABSTRACT

Campaigns are essential components of party competition and crucial to the functioning  of  democratic  politics.  For this reason, many scholars across the social sciences devote a large attention to political campaigns. One of the main goal in an electoral campaign is to influence the behavior of prospective voters, persuading them to show up at the polls and to make the right choice. Rhetoric can be seen as a tool that candidates use to persuade or mobilize voters to their advantage,  by strategically emphasizing issues in voters’ minds  (Sides  2006).  

 

In this paper, we investigate whether populist rhetoric becomes a strategic tool based on context, with the latter consisting of the characteristics of the audience. Specifically, we focus on the last US presidential campaign rallies and on the electoral platforms of candidates in the last congressional mid-term elections, and investigate the supply of populist rhetoric across candidates, time and space. We have 3 distinct sets of results. (i) First, we detect marked differences between presidential candidates in the last and previous elections back to 2004. (ii) Second, we identify some characteristics that can be credibly associated to populist candidates, and test whether these features can be detected also among the mid-term election candidates. (iii) Third, we find that the supply of populist rhetoric is tailored on socioeconomic characteristics of the rally audience, suggesting strategic behaviour on the supply of populism.

 

In line with the general objective of the panel we use text data to create a quantitative measure of populism. We produces two corpus, one for each part of the analysis, that are collection of text documents from each candidate. When analyzing the 2016 Presidential campaign, each document is a campaign speech, indexed by candidate, time and location. We collect all available public speeches for the two Presidential candidates starting from their official nomination (beginning of June 2016) to the election day (November 7, 2016). We collect 2016 Presidential Candidates' public speeches from the American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara. Further, we complement this database with additional speeches collected on Youtube and transcribed by the Google vocal recognition. We have 228 speeches in total, 98 speeches for Clinton and 130 for Trump.
We obtain information on the candidates to the House of representatives for the 2018 midterm elections by analyzing their official website. Here, each document is a candidate's electoral program published on the campaign website, indexed by candidate and location. For each candidate in each Congressional District, we extract her electoral manifesto.Moreover, we collected demographic information from their websites and alternative sources, to include classical demographic characteristics (gender, age, ethnicity, level of education) and political variables (party affiliation, previous political experience and whether she is an incumbent in the House).

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Abstract

Numerous case studies document the impacts of transnational coalition networks on domestic policy agenda setting. Yet, scant literature quantitatively configure Putnam(1988)’s win-sets from the network theoretic approach. In this research, I quantitatively model how the bargaining outcomes resulted from coalition network games(assumedly between isolationists and transnational interest groups) affect the distribution of two social goods(i.g. stricter environmental standards measured in terms of numeric evaluation and domestic support for stronger national identity measured in terms of polls) in pure exchange economy. In doing so, I take into consideration James(2016)’s factors influencing Level 1 game between negotiators (audience costs, transaction costs, reformative costs) in configuring the contract curve. The pure exchange economy in my model is, however, three-dimensional reflecting the nature of diverging consensus among the members of network(thus, I add the third dimension of constructed reality of the problem measured in terms of media coverages). Based on the conditions, I hopefully quantitatively configure the threshold when the policy window opens for negotiators when taking into account the international standard(policy), domestic support for national identity(politics), and problematic reality constructed by media coverages(problem).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Citation

Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American political science review, 88(3), 577-592.

James, S. (2016). The domestic politics of financial regulation: Informal ratification games and the EU capital requirement negotiations. New Political Economy, 21(2), 187-203.

Kingdon, J. W. (1995). The policy window, and joining the streams. Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, 172-189.

Mo, J. (1994). The logic of two-level games with endogenous domestic coalitions. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(3), 402-422.

Morin, J. F. (2010). The two-level game of transnational networks: The case of the access to medicines campaign. International interactions, 36(4), 309-334.

Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International organization, 42(3), 427-460.

Przeworski, A. (2003). States and markets: a primer in political economy. Cambridge University Press.

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

Occupational License (OL) is a state regulation that restricts the practice of an occupation by requiring practitioners to hold a license to practice it. OL is one of the most common and influential labor market regulations, and considered to be part of the development of regulatory capitalism.

The concept of Varieties of Capitalism (henceforth: VoC), suggests a framework to analyze economic structures of modern capitalist economies according to their institutional settings. According to the framework, states can be located on a continuum between two ideal types of market economies: Liberal Market Economy and Coordinated Market Economy (CME). 

This study examines OL by using the suggested framework. While the political economy of OL illustrated mainly by the micro aspects of the phenomenon, its macroeconomic aspects were left underexplored. Examining it according to VoC that highlights factors in the state level addresses such caveat. It may also contribute to the development of VoC, for it lacks in its capacity to understand variance in regulatory governance.

To understand OL in light of VoC, I conduct a comparative research between the degree of OL in Germany, UK, France and Israel. These states reflect variance in the type of market economy according to the framework of VoC. The independent variable – the degree of OL – is composed by a combination of the number of licensed occupations in a state, and the restrictiveness of its OL regimes. The latter is indicated by representative occupations that are licensed in all states, that are measured according to a regulatory restrictiveness index I designed.

A preliminary study of the degree of OL shows significant differences between the states. The state with the most licensed 

I focus on three central features to the framework of VoC that may explain OL. One central feature is vocational education, which is considered to be more developed in CME than LME. Vocational education is an institution that sets a qualification standard of practitioners and control the supply and division of practitioners in the occupational market. It makes alternative institutions, as OL, that fulfill these functions redundant. Hence I hypothesize that the more developed is the vocational education system, the lower is the degree of OL.

Another central feature of VoC is trade union, which is considered to be more developed in CME than LME. Trade unions promote workers' conditions and maintain a division in the labor market between employers and employees. In an economy with developed unionization there would be less room to other institutions that protects workers' rights and maintain other cleavages in the market, as OL that promote practitioners' conditions and strengthen the cleavages among occupations, and between occupations and other actors in the market. Hence I hypothesize that the greater is the unionization of labor, the lower is the degree of OL.

The third feature of VoC I focus on is privatization, which is considered to be more extensive in LME than CME. Literature of regulatory governance points out that privatization is coupled with proliferation of regulatory institutions, while OL may be considered as such institution. Hence I hypothesize that the wider the privatization, the higher is the degree of OL.

 

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

By providing 100 days of guaranteed employment to every rural household, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) can challenge the hegemony of the landed elite as major employers in the Indian countryside. This paper finds that the program is highly successful in raising wages and generating more public employment in districts that were not characterized by historically high levels of socio-economic inequality. In these districts, the increase in public employment crowds-out labor primarily from domestic work, reflected in increased women's participation in the program. However, high inequality in landownership adversely impacts the bargaining power of workers and the enforcement of their entitlements under NREGA. This is most evident when I examine the impact of employment guarantee on rural wages. These findings suggest that NREGA has not become a credible alternative to private employment in regions historically characterized by high levels of land inequality. I further examine changes in domestic and agricultural work in response to NREGA and find that in districts with lower historical land inequality, there is a reduction in the time spent in unpaid-domestic work which suggests greater participation by women in these districts.