CATEGORISATION
KEYWORDS
GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE
Policy termination or dismantling has received little attention in the policy literature, conceptually and empirically. Eugene Bardach (1974) identified policy termination as an important phenomenon that had been “wholly neglected by political scientists and scholars” because it is both rare and difficult to study. Work on policy termination since then has been sporadic and remains disconnected from the broader policy literature. There are several reasons for this, beginning with the apparent infrequency of actual cases – if we use a binary classification of termination or non-termination. Moreover, because termination usually imposes losses, it is inherently unpopular, and most attempts to abolish policies fail. Policymakers are more likely to bend to the pressure of mobilized opponents or obfuscate to deflect blame than countenance political reprisal for such decisions. However, although outright termination may be rare, policies are jettisoned in many other ways. Governments worldwide have engaged in the politics of austerity for decades, starting in the 1990s with social policy retrenchment (Pierson, 1994). States have also pursued deregulation in a wide range of sectors, from taxation to environment, in the service of smaller government and the ostensible exigencies of globalization. Finally, Jacob Hacker’s (2004) concept of policy drift captures the many instances of gradual but inexorable policy decay that have occurred through political gridlock, partisan maneuvering, and deliberate inaction.
Bauer and Knill (2014) suggest that a focus on policy dismantling or downsizing as a particular form and direction of policy change may be a more fruitful approach than the study of termination as a distinct phenomenon. Dismantling as a form of policy change opens a broader range of termination-type processes for analysis, ranging from retrenchment and deregulation to drift and abandonment, as well as outright abolishment, that lead to policy outputs similar to termination. It also enables meaningful engagement with other strands of the policy literature to revive the moribund study of termination both conceptually and empirically. For example, the welfare state retrenchment literature offers useful insights into how, when, and under what conditions policy dismantling is likely to succeed. It maps the institutional and path dependent dynamics that make policy change difficult and explores policy feedback effects on the motivations and resources of groups to organize and resist change. More recent work on austerity following the 2008 recession highlights the importance of political discourse in justifying cutbacks (“we’re in this together”) and softening resistance by appealing to emotions such as fear and hope. Finally, the coronavirus pandemic brings to the fore questions about the role of punctuation and crisis events in shifting some policy trajectories toward termination.
Policy termination is an essential feature of policy change, and likely to become even more important going forward. A global recession following the coronavirus pandemic, an energy crisis resulting from Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the multiple facets of global warming are just some of the reasons that pressure to rationalize and redirect public resources will grow.
The goal of this panel is to further explore how and under what conditions policies are terminated or dismantled. The key question underpinning the panel is: how can we better understand and explain policy termination in policy analysis?
Bardach, E. (1976). Policy termination as a political process. Policy Sciences, 7(2), 123–131.
Bauer, M. W., & Knill, C. (2014). A conceptual framework for the comparative analysis of policy change: Measurement, explanation and strategies of policy dismantling. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 16(1), 28–44.
Hacker, J. S. (2004). Privatizing risk without privatizing the welfare state: The hidden politics of social policy retrenchment in the United States. American Political Science Review, 98(2), 243-260.
Pierson, P. (1994). Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment. Cambridge University Press.
CALL FOR PAPERS
This panel encourages discussion on an issue that is extremely prevalent in the policy making process, but which has received less attention by policy scholars. In so doing, we are interested in filling the many research gaps in the literature on policy termination and hope to expand its scope and impact as an area of research that should be of concerned for all.
We invite papers that contribute to conceptual development and theorizing about the nature of policy termination, offer empirical comparative or single case studies that analyze these dynamics in more detail, and/or propose methodological insights for such studies. We are particularly interested in studies from across the globe to understand whether and how policy termination of all types varies in different political, economic, and geographic contexts.
Papers may address some of these themes/broad questions:
1. Empirical analysis of termination through dismantling, including analysis of:
· Detailed single or comparative case studies of termination and/or dismantling
· Political, partisan, or ideological factors that influence dismantling
· Contextual social, economic, or political factors that enable or hinder dismantling
· Policy design features, such as instruments or sectoral characteristics, that influence dismantling decisions or processes
· Sunset clauses and policy termination
2. Theoretical and conceptual work exploring:
· Conceptual definitions of policy termination, as distinct from other forms of policy change
· New theoretical perspective(s) or insights on termination
· Insights from existing policy literatures, such as policy feedback, institutionalism, path dependency, and ideas, on policy dismantling
· Insights from the broader literature on politics and political behaviour, including political ideology and partisanship, for understanding and explaining how and why actors engage in policy termination, including dismantling
· The place of policy termination in the policy cycle
We intend to publish papers presented in a special issue of a journal or as an edited book collection.
We propose to host this panel onsite.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Rise of Family Rewards. In recent years, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have become progressively popular in low-, lower-middle, and upper-middle income countries, although an attempt was made to replicate this type of program in the United States. In 2007 the Centre for Economic Opportunity of the New York City Mayor's Office initiated the first CCT program in the US: The Opportunity NYC–Family Rewards. The program was explicitly modelled on Mexico's Oportunidades. It was aimed at low-income families in six of New York City's most disadvantaged communities—two each in the boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan. Most beneficiaries were single parent (mother) families, black and Hispanic.
Length of Operation. Family Rewards operated for three years (2007–2010) and delivered cash rewards in the domains of children's education, preventive healthcare, and parental employment.
Program Operation and Outcomes. To adjust this CCT for a high-income country urban context, three crucial modifications were needed. First, Family Rewards was devised to complement existing government policies, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, which used incentives to encourage work. Second, incentives were delivered insofar as beneficiaries met numerous conditionalities. In its second iteration, however, the number of conditionalities had to be diminished. Third, Family Rewards offered incentives regarding parental employment in addition to children's education and preventive health consultations. The large number of conditionalities in Family Rewards, including parental employment, echoed the deserving/undeserving poor debate that surrounds welfare policy in the U.S. In fact, the program had many critics even before its implementation. The program did produce some positive effects such as a reduction in the poverty rate in the targeted population. However, the post program effects on education and health control tended to fade. The effects on employment faded even before the incentives ended.
Program Termination. CCT Family Rewards was cancelled after three years of operation, its’ outcomes were mixed at best. It has been difficult to obtain public information regarding the motives for the termination of the program. Of particular interest is how the target population felt about such termination. However, we can ascertain that the cancellation was due to: (a) The program was implemented in the form of an experiment; and (b) The federal funding was matched by private contributions. Regarding the beneficiaries’ views about the program’s termination, I was informed by the Mayor’s Office of Economic Opportunity in a private communication, that participants who enrolled were aware of the length of the intervention from the start. It is noteworthy that CCTs in most other countries have become political sensitive issues. Once in place, governments have found it difficult to terminate them.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
How do governmental organizations that risk elimination deal with policy termination? In this paper, we zoom in on Belgian provinces that are sandwiched between central (i.e., international/European/federal/ regional) levels on the one hand and the local on the other. Over the last years, their co-existence in the crowded intergovernmental system has been repeatedly questioned, not at least due to the increasing number of networks, partnerships and amalgamations among cities and municipalities within as well as across provincial boundaries (Wayenberg et al., 2022). What termination decisions do these intermediaries take? A first, preliminary analysis amongst several northern provinces points out nothing new. After all, only a limited number of the decisions adopted by provincial councils over the first four years of their current six-year legislative period (2018-2024) explicitly have to do with (partially or completely) ending policies. More so, when varying them towards intensity and span (see De Leon, 1978; Ferry & Bachtler, 2013), these decisions primarily concern specific, well-aligned measures and projects rather than further-reaching policy programs, goals, or even complete functions. So, at first sight, the threat of being eliminated does not drive provinces to distinct termination behavior. But is this really the case? And if so, what other drivers then play a role (such as financial reasons, governmental (in)efficiencies, changing political ideology, policy paradigm shifts or (lack of) learning (see Zaki & Wayenberg, 2023; Keulen & Kroeze, 2021; O’Neill et al. 2018)?
In this paper, we explore termination decisions at the provincial level in Belgium. We look for patterns amongst them (e.g., do provinces decide to stop externally initiated projects rather than those being launched by themselves?) and test their prevalence (does the risk of being eliminated force provinces towards a strong(er) intergovernmental stance and why (not)?). By means of content analysis of provincial country reports in combination with a series of exploratory interviews, we aim at better understanding policy as well as organizational termination. Repeatedly, both fields of study have been approached in isolation (Adam & Bauer, 2018), and with empirically grounded as well as theoretically- embedded insights, we thus seek to bridge them more.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
The study of policy dismantling has gained relevance within the analysis of public policies. The perspectives from which the topic is approached include explanations of why dismantling occurs, the institutional constraints and opportunities to carry out these actions, the strategies actors follow to achieve dismantling, and the outcomes of dismantling (Bauer & Knill, 2014; Bauer et al.,2012). However, more is needed to know about the actions of other government actors in the face of decommissioning processes in multilevel governance contexts (Jordan, Bauer, and Green-Pedersen, 2013). This article addresses policy dismantling in the framework of the federalist arrangement, where governments at different levels may take over the instruments of a national policy in a situation of "reduction, decrease or diminution" (Jordan et al., 2013; p. 795). For this purpose, the case of the Childcare Program to Support Working Mothers (PEI for its Spanish acronym), a social program that aims to provide childcare services for those families in a condition of economic vulnerability, is selected.
With the entry of a new party in government in 2018, PEI began a process of dismantling. First, there was a reduction in the size of the beneficiary population. Subsequently, instead of offering care spaces in subsidized daycare centers, it opted for direct economic transfers to beneficiary families so that they would assume the care work. In this scenario, some local governments decided to offer continuity to the program, albeit with variations in each district. Studying the dismantling of PEI allows us to answer what the discourses and strategies implemented by local governments as resistance to dismantling a national policy are. While existing literature highlights the strategies of governments to abandon specific policies (Bauer et al., 2012; Pollex & Lenschow, 2020), this paper contributes to recognizing the motivations of local governments to reconfigure the dismantling carried out from the national level in a federalist context.
The research strategy is qualitative, with interviews directed to policymakers (municipal presidents and personnel in charge of implementing the childcare program at the local level) and a review of documentary archives. The objectives are: 1) to know the motivations that led local governments to continue the PEI, 2) to identify the strategies adopted to assume the provision of new services, 3) to identify the reconfiguration (direction) of the dismantling in each case in terms of intensity and density of the PEI. Out of a total of 1,383 municipalities that had daycare affiliated with PEI, the cases to be analyzed are 9. There are two reasons for this selection. First, they have managed to grant some continuity to PEI's care services. Second, because of their characteristics, they allow us to inquire into the hypotheses from which we started concerning the motivations of these actors: gender political representation and the role of municipalities led by groups opposed to the federal government.
References
Bauer, M. y Knill, C. (2014). A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Policy Change: Measurement, Explanation and Strategies of Policy Dismantling, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 16:1, 28-44, DOI: 10.1080/13876988.2014.885186
Bauer, M., Green-Pedersen, C., Héritier, A., y Jordan, A. (2012). Dismantling public policy: Preferences, strategies, and effects. OUP Oxford.
Jordan, A., Bauer, M. W., & Green-Pedersen, C. (2013). POLICY DISMANTLING. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(5), 795–805. doi:10.1080/13501763.2013.77109
Pollex, J. y Lenschow, A. (2019). Many faces of dismantling: Hiding policy change in non-legislative acts in EU environmental policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-21.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
What happens when a policy stops being in effect? What impact would the elimination of government interventions, the termination of policy instruments, or a reduction in the scope or intensity of public programs have on individuals? This is an old debate that has its roots in the literature on policy termination and has been revived in both developed and developing nations experiencing the scaling back of social benefits, the dismantling of environmental protections, or the repeal of social programs by populist or semi-authoritarian governments.
Whether discussing policy termination, dismantling, or disenrollment, the literature is divided into those who examine the causes of dismantling –why is it decided to terminate a policy? (Green Pedersen 2004), and the processes of dismantling –how does dismantling happen? (Knill and Bauer 2014). Much less attention has been given to the consequences of policy dismantling –what effects, direct or indirect, does the disappearance of policies have?
In this paper, we aim to connect the analyses of the policy-making process (i.e., how, and why do policies cease to exist?) with the examination of its consequences, both immediate and indirect. We argue that the study of policy dismantling as a type of policy change requires incorporating the manifold manifestations of its effects: impacts on the target population, feedback effects, the direct outcomes in the bureaucracies that implement the dismantled policy, and the reconfiguration of the policy mix. We develop a model that attempts to link a typology of policy dismantling with these types of effects. We use the hypothetical dismantling of a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program to exemplify how each of the policy dismantling modes leads to different effects.
In sum, we argue that when a policy experiences low changes in the inclusion criteria and low changes in the number of instruments, this dismantling mode will lead to impacts only on the target population. When the policy experiences high changes in the targeting but low changes in the instruments, the dismantling will affect the target population but will also lead to feedback effects. The third dismantling mode occurs when a policy faces low changes in the inclusion criteria but high changes in the number/characteristics of instruments. This dismantling mode should lead to effects on the target population, as well as on the implementing organization and the policy mix. Finally, the fourth mode happens when a policy experiences high changes in the inclusion criteria and high changes in the number/characteristics of instruments, which should activate the four effects we identify.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Why and how do policymakers undertake acts of administrative reorganisation in response to crises? Bureaucratic development can be a long process of slow, piecemeal institutional evolution (Mahoney and Thelen 2009) and incremental adjustment, but it is also shaped by sudden events - such as crises - that draw attention towards specific issues and problems and act as catalysts for institutional and policy disruption. This paper considers the mechanisms that connect crises with shifts towards administrative reorganisation in government, with specific attention to organisational termination. Crises can reveal information that helps political decision makers learn about an organisation’s performance and its fidelity in new ways. Learning from crises and other rare, discrete events is presumed an important part of how political decision makers arrive at decisions concerning reorganisation and termination (Carpenter and Lewis 2004. However, insights into how these political actors behave, learn and mobilise in response to crises are largely unincorporated into termination and reorganisation research. What happens during crises and how these dynamics might shape the processes of reorganisation and termination remain unexplored.
This paper goes some way towards addressing this gap. It theorises three different mechanisms - learning, agenda-setting and blame management - to help explain this process. Each mechanism draws on contrasting models of political and bureaucratic behaviour to explain why and how decision makers might pursue reorganisation and termination in response to crisis events. To test these mechanisms in action, this paper examines the case of Public Health England (PHE), an English public health executive agency that was terminated and replaced during the COVID-19 pandemic. This detailed single case study applies Bayesian process tracing (Fairfield and Charman 2022) to adjudicate between each mechanism and help explain why PHE was terminated, using data gathered from interviews and other primary and secondary materials. Fieldwork is currently in progress and fuller findings will be presented in due course.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Public policies are difficult to terminate. Theories of comparative politics and public polices provide various explanations of why policies survive attempts to terminate them. Public policy theory has suggested feedbacks as a factor maintaining policies despite calls to terminate them. The path dependency literature is focused on identifying feedbacks that produce self-reinforcing reproduction of policy. From such a perspective, policy termination would require some sort of shock that creates a critical juncture. By pointing towards the role of negative and self-undermining feedbacks, recent developments within the feedback literature have provided new and more nuanced perspectives on feedbacks and how they influence policy evolution. This opens up new avenues for analysing policy termination.
The fact that full-scale policy termination is a relatively rare phenomenon does not mean, however, that the concept is obsolete in policy studies. Recent research argues that that negative feedbacks can become undermining at some points and result in termination of policy. However, empirical research shows that termination of policy may not be full-scale. Rather, negative feedback may terminate parts of policy while other parts are retained. In recent articles, Skogstad (2017; 2020) argues that feedbacks can be mixed. This can occur when policy is designed to serve multiple purposes. It is argued in this paper that single purpose policies may also generate mixed feedbacks as each instrument of a policy mix generates distinct feedbacks. The paper applies the concept of mixed feedbacks to explain why particular instruments in a policy mix may be terminated as a result of negative feedbacks which at some point become self-undermining.
To substantiate the theoretical argument, the evolution of Danish nitrogen pollution regulation over almost three decades is used to illustrate how negative feedback may result in instrument termination. The policy has the single purpose of reducing nitrogen leaching from agricultural production. As it has been composed of a mix of policy instruments, it has generated mixed feedbacks. The major instrument up until 2015 was a nitrogen application standard (essentially a non-tradable nitrogen quota for each farm). While the instrument initially produced feedbacks that were positive, feedbacks increasingly became negative as the instrument was frequently recalibrated. This resulted in increasing regulatory costs for farmers, which eventually led to an almost complete termination of the instrument. It still exists but only as penalty measure. The case shows that when feedbacks from a major instruments become negative and eventually self-undermining, instrument termination is likely to happen.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Since the Treaty, environmental policy has been characterized by a solid political expansion and EU environmental legislation has grown from a few dozen laws in the 1970s to over 400 (Delreux and Happaerts 2016). Environmental overregulation has been at the center of debate (Majone 1999), because of the overload of administrative burdens for businesses stemming from European regulation; thus, in 2007, the EU Commission launched an Action program for dismantling public policies and reducing red tape for businesses (Jordan, et al., 2013). The term policy dismantling - coined by Pierson (1994)- originates in the pioneering analyses carried out by Brewer (1974) and Behn (1978) on policy termination and the complete termination of policies.
Acknowledging the European environmental dismantling policy, the Italian national government adopted a single environmental authorization provision with the aim to replace seven different authorizations; the effect of this simplification action at the subnational levels produced a jeopardized implementation among the Italian regions.
The empirical contribution of the paper consists in assessing whether the environmental policy has been effectively dismantled at the Italian regional level. By comparing a bunch of dimensions (regulatory, administrative, procedural, and enforcement capacities) related to the Italian regions, the research will show that some unexpected consequences like a further expansion of the policy or an inertial response to the implementation request have strongly undermined the initial objectives of the European Commission action.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Vandna Bhatia, Carleton University
Frank Ohmeng, Concordia University
In recent years, we have seen the rise in policy or program termination from governments all around the world. The height of policy termination was in the 1980s with the emergence of the new public management and the mantra of shrinking government’s role in society. In this context, justifications for policy and program termination were premised on assumptions of rational, evidence-driven evaluations of societal costs and benefits. However, we know that in the real world of policy making, many other factors intervene and influence the process, with the general consensus that termination is difficult and examples of it are few and far between. One factor that has received little attention in this literature is political ideology and partisanship. DeLeon (1997:2207) has long argued that ideological and political factors trump economic and efficiency arguments in termination decisions: “when ideology sounds its own peculiar call, the exercise become somewhat easier as ideological politics…have a chance of trumping budgetary politics and government efficiency.”
As an ideology, populism is a significant force in political and policy discourse, on both sides of the political spectrum. On the right, non-radical populist discourse is premised on economic liberalism, casting the economic well-being of ‘the people’ against corrupt elites and greedy ‘special interests’ in cahoots with government insiders. The study of the impact of populism discourses on democratic governance has typically focused on institutions, with less attention to how it affects the policy process. Dussauge-Laguna (2022) posits that termination in populist policymaking may be more frequent and more discretionary than otherwise, consistent with deLeon’s observations that ideological arguments facilitate policy termination.
In this paper, we analyze policy termination using the lens of ideological discourse, focusing specifically on several termination decisions of the newly elected government in the province of Ontario, Canada in 2018. The Ontario Progressive Conservative Party (OPCP) came to power with “A Plan for the People” that promised to champion middle-class, hardworking taxpayers and small business entrepreneurs against entrenched government insiders (Budd 2020). The OPCP vowed to cut taxes, reduce waste, and put money back into the pockets of taxpayers. Once in government, the OPCP used this populist neoliberal discourse to frame and justify termination of several policies, including some that were not directly targeted during the election campaign. Our analysis of the termination of Ontario’s Universal Basic Income (UBI) pilot and the provincial carbon cap-and-trade policy offers a case study of the impact of populist discourse on policy termination, and fleshes out some theoretical propositions about how ideology – particularly populist ideology – facilitates the termination process.
Budd, B. (2020). The people’s champ: Doug Ford and neoliberal right-wing populism in the 2018 Ontario provincial election. Politics and Governance, 8(1), 171-181.
DeLeon, P. (1997). Afterward: the once and future state of policy termination. International Journal of Public Administration, 20(12), 2195-2212.
Dussauge-Laguna, M. I. (2022). The promises and perils of populism for democratic policymaking: the case of Mexico. Policy Sciences, 55(4), 777-803.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Rise of Family Rewards. In recent years, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have become progressively popular in low-, lower-middle, and upper-middle income countries, although an attempt was made to replicate this type of program in the United States. In 2007 the Centre for Economic Opportunity of the New York City Mayor's Office initiated the first CCT program in the US: The Opportunity NYC–Family Rewards. The program was explicitly modelled on Mexico's Oportunidades. It was aimed at low-income families in six of New York City's most disadvantaged communities—two each in the boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan. Most beneficiaries were single parent (mother) families, black and Hispanic.
Length of Operation. Family Rewards operated for three years (2007–2010) and delivered cash rewards in the domains of children's education, preventive healthcare, and parental employment.
Program Operation and Outcomes. To adjust this CCT for a high-income country urban context, three crucial modifications were needed. First, Family Rewards was devised to complement existing government policies, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, which used incentives to encourage work. Second, incentives were delivered insofar as beneficiaries met numerous conditionalities. In its second iteration, however, the number of conditionalities had to be diminished. Third, Family Rewards offered incentives regarding parental employment in addition to children's education and preventive health consultations. The large number of conditionalities in Family Rewards, including parental employment, echoed the deserving/undeserving poor debate that surrounds welfare policy in the U.S. In fact, the program had many critics even before its implementation. The program did produce some positive effects such as a reduction in the poverty rate in the targeted population. However, the post program effects on education and health control tended to fade. The effects on employment faded even before the incentives ended.
Program Termination. CCT Family Rewards was cancelled after three years of operation, its’ outcomes were mixed at best. It has been difficult to obtain public information regarding the motives for the termination of the program. Of particular interest is how the target population felt about such termination. However, we can ascertain that the cancellation was due to: (a) The program was implemented in the form of an experiment; and (b) The federal funding was matched by private contributions. Regarding the beneficiaries’ views about the program’s termination, I was informed by the Mayor’s Office of Economic Opportunity in a private communication, that participants who enrolled were aware of the length of the intervention from the start. It is noteworthy that CCTs in most other countries have become political sensitive issues. Once in place, governments have found it difficult to terminate them.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
How do governmental organizations that risk elimination deal with policy termination? In this paper, we zoom in on Belgian provinces that are sandwiched between central (i.e., international/European/federal/ regional) levels on the one hand and the local on the other. Over the last years, their co-existence in the crowded intergovernmental system has been repeatedly questioned, not at least due to the increasing number of networks, partnerships and amalgamations among cities and municipalities within as well as across provincial boundaries (Wayenberg et al., 2022). What termination decisions do these intermediaries take? A first, preliminary analysis amongst several northern provinces points out nothing new. After all, only a limited number of the decisions adopted by provincial councils over the first four years of their current six-year legislative period (2018-2024) explicitly have to do with (partially or completely) ending policies. More so, when varying them towards intensity and span (see De Leon, 1978; Ferry & Bachtler, 2013), these decisions primarily concern specific, well-aligned measures and projects rather than further-reaching policy programs, goals, or even complete functions. So, at first sight, the threat of being eliminated does not drive provinces to distinct termination behavior. But is this really the case? And if so, what other drivers then play a role (such as financial reasons, governmental (in)efficiencies, changing political ideology, policy paradigm shifts or (lack of) learning (see Zaki & Wayenberg, 2023; Keulen & Kroeze, 2021; O’Neill et al. 2018)?
In this paper, we explore termination decisions at the provincial level in Belgium. We look for patterns amongst them (e.g., do provinces decide to stop externally initiated projects rather than those being launched by themselves?) and test their prevalence (does the risk of being eliminated force provinces towards a strong(er) intergovernmental stance and why (not)?). By means of content analysis of provincial country reports in combination with a series of exploratory interviews, we aim at better understanding policy as well as organizational termination. Repeatedly, both fields of study have been approached in isolation (Adam & Bauer, 2018), and with empirically grounded as well as theoretically- embedded insights, we thus seek to bridge them more.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
The study of policy dismantling has gained relevance within the analysis of public policies. The perspectives from which the topic is approached include explanations of why dismantling occurs, the institutional constraints and opportunities to carry out these actions, the strategies actors follow to achieve dismantling, and the outcomes of dismantling (Bauer & Knill, 2014; Bauer et al.,2012). However, more is needed to know about the actions of other government actors in the face of decommissioning processes in multilevel governance contexts (Jordan, Bauer, and Green-Pedersen, 2013). This article addresses policy dismantling in the framework of the federalist arrangement, where governments at different levels may take over the instruments of a national policy in a situation of "reduction, decrease or diminution" (Jordan et al., 2013; p. 795). For this purpose, the case of the Childcare Program to Support Working Mothers (PEI for its Spanish acronym), a social program that aims to provide childcare services for those families in a condition of economic vulnerability, is selected.
With the entry of a new party in government in 2018, PEI began a process of dismantling. First, there was a reduction in the size of the beneficiary population. Subsequently, instead of offering care spaces in subsidized daycare centers, it opted for direct economic transfers to beneficiary families so that they would assume the care work. In this scenario, some local governments decided to offer continuity to the program, albeit with variations in each district. Studying the dismantling of PEI allows us to answer what the discourses and strategies implemented by local governments as resistance to dismantling a national policy are. While existing literature highlights the strategies of governments to abandon specific policies (Bauer et al., 2012; Pollex & Lenschow, 2020), this paper contributes to recognizing the motivations of local governments to reconfigure the dismantling carried out from the national level in a federalist context.
The research strategy is qualitative, with interviews directed to policymakers (municipal presidents and personnel in charge of implementing the childcare program at the local level) and a review of documentary archives. The objectives are: 1) to know the motivations that led local governments to continue the PEI, 2) to identify the strategies adopted to assume the provision of new services, 3) to identify the reconfiguration (direction) of the dismantling in each case in terms of intensity and density of the PEI. Out of a total of 1,383 municipalities that had daycare affiliated with PEI, the cases to be analyzed are 9. There are two reasons for this selection. First, they have managed to grant some continuity to PEI's care services. Second, because of their characteristics, they allow us to inquire into the hypotheses from which we started concerning the motivations of these actors: gender political representation and the role of municipalities led by groups opposed to the federal government.
References
Bauer, M. y Knill, C. (2014). A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Policy Change: Measurement, Explanation and Strategies of Policy Dismantling, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 16:1, 28-44, DOI: 10.1080/13876988.2014.885186
Bauer, M., Green-Pedersen, C., Héritier, A., y Jordan, A. (2012). Dismantling public policy: Preferences, strategies, and effects. OUP Oxford.
Jordan, A., Bauer, M. W., & Green-Pedersen, C. (2013). POLICY DISMANTLING. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(5), 795–805. doi:10.1080/13501763.2013.77109
Pollex, J. y Lenschow, A. (2019). Many faces of dismantling: Hiding policy change in non-legislative acts in EU environmental policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-21.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
What happens when a policy stops being in effect? What impact would the elimination of government interventions, the termination of policy instruments, or a reduction in the scope or intensity of public programs have on individuals? This is an old debate that has its roots in the literature on policy termination and has been revived in both developed and developing nations experiencing the scaling back of social benefits, the dismantling of environmental protections, or the repeal of social programs by populist or semi-authoritarian governments.
Whether discussing policy termination, dismantling, or disenrollment, the literature is divided into those who examine the causes of dismantling –why is it decided to terminate a policy? (Green Pedersen 2004), and the processes of dismantling –how does dismantling happen? (Knill and Bauer 2014). Much less attention has been given to the consequences of policy dismantling –what effects, direct or indirect, does the disappearance of policies have?
In this paper, we aim to connect the analyses of the policy-making process (i.e., how, and why do policies cease to exist?) with the examination of its consequences, both immediate and indirect. We argue that the study of policy dismantling as a type of policy change requires incorporating the manifold manifestations of its effects: impacts on the target population, feedback effects, the direct outcomes in the bureaucracies that implement the dismantled policy, and the reconfiguration of the policy mix. We develop a model that attempts to link a typology of policy dismantling with these types of effects. We use the hypothetical dismantling of a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program to exemplify how each of the policy dismantling modes leads to different effects.
In sum, we argue that when a policy experiences low changes in the inclusion criteria and low changes in the number of instruments, this dismantling mode will lead to impacts only on the target population. When the policy experiences high changes in the targeting but low changes in the instruments, the dismantling will affect the target population but will also lead to feedback effects. The third dismantling mode occurs when a policy faces low changes in the inclusion criteria but high changes in the number/characteristics of instruments. This dismantling mode should lead to effects on the target population, as well as on the implementing organization and the policy mix. Finally, the fourth mode happens when a policy experiences high changes in the inclusion criteria and high changes in the number/characteristics of instruments, which should activate the four effects we identify.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Why and how do policymakers undertake acts of administrative reorganisation in response to crises? Bureaucratic development can be a long process of slow, piecemeal institutional evolution (Mahoney and Thelen 2009) and incremental adjustment, but it is also shaped by sudden events - such as crises - that draw attention towards specific issues and problems and act as catalysts for institutional and policy disruption. This paper considers the mechanisms that connect crises with shifts towards administrative reorganisation in government, with specific attention to organisational termination. Crises can reveal information that helps political decision makers learn about an organisation’s performance and its fidelity in new ways. Learning from crises and other rare, discrete events is presumed an important part of how political decision makers arrive at decisions concerning reorganisation and termination (Carpenter and Lewis 2004. However, insights into how these political actors behave, learn and mobilise in response to crises are largely unincorporated into termination and reorganisation research. What happens during crises and how these dynamics might shape the processes of reorganisation and termination remain unexplored.
This paper goes some way towards addressing this gap. It theorises three different mechanisms - learning, agenda-setting and blame management - to help explain this process. Each mechanism draws on contrasting models of political and bureaucratic behaviour to explain why and how decision makers might pursue reorganisation and termination in response to crisis events. To test these mechanisms in action, this paper examines the case of Public Health England (PHE), an English public health executive agency that was terminated and replaced during the COVID-19 pandemic. This detailed single case study applies Bayesian process tracing (Fairfield and Charman 2022) to adjudicate between each mechanism and help explain why PHE was terminated, using data gathered from interviews and other primary and secondary materials. Fieldwork is currently in progress and fuller findings will be presented in due course.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Public policies are difficult to terminate. Theories of comparative politics and public polices provide various explanations of why policies survive attempts to terminate them. Public policy theory has suggested feedbacks as a factor maintaining policies despite calls to terminate them. The path dependency literature is focused on identifying feedbacks that produce self-reinforcing reproduction of policy. From such a perspective, policy termination would require some sort of shock that creates a critical juncture. By pointing towards the role of negative and self-undermining feedbacks, recent developments within the feedback literature have provided new and more nuanced perspectives on feedbacks and how they influence policy evolution. This opens up new avenues for analysing policy termination.
The fact that full-scale policy termination is a relatively rare phenomenon does not mean, however, that the concept is obsolete in policy studies. Recent research argues that that negative feedbacks can become undermining at some points and result in termination of policy. However, empirical research shows that termination of policy may not be full-scale. Rather, negative feedback may terminate parts of policy while other parts are retained. In recent articles, Skogstad (2017; 2020) argues that feedbacks can be mixed. This can occur when policy is designed to serve multiple purposes. It is argued in this paper that single purpose policies may also generate mixed feedbacks as each instrument of a policy mix generates distinct feedbacks. The paper applies the concept of mixed feedbacks to explain why particular instruments in a policy mix may be terminated as a result of negative feedbacks which at some point become self-undermining.
To substantiate the theoretical argument, the evolution of Danish nitrogen pollution regulation over almost three decades is used to illustrate how negative feedback may result in instrument termination. The policy has the single purpose of reducing nitrogen leaching from agricultural production. As it has been composed of a mix of policy instruments, it has generated mixed feedbacks. The major instrument up until 2015 was a nitrogen application standard (essentially a non-tradable nitrogen quota for each farm). While the instrument initially produced feedbacks that were positive, feedbacks increasingly became negative as the instrument was frequently recalibrated. This resulted in increasing regulatory costs for farmers, which eventually led to an almost complete termination of the instrument. It still exists but only as penalty measure. The case shows that when feedbacks from a major instruments become negative and eventually self-undermining, instrument termination is likely to happen.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Since the Treaty, environmental policy has been characterized by a solid political expansion and EU environmental legislation has grown from a few dozen laws in the 1970s to over 400 (Delreux and Happaerts 2016). Environmental overregulation has been at the center of debate (Majone 1999), because of the overload of administrative burdens for businesses stemming from European regulation; thus, in 2007, the EU Commission launched an Action program for dismantling public policies and reducing red tape for businesses (Jordan, et al., 2013). The term policy dismantling - coined by Pierson (1994)- originates in the pioneering analyses carried out by Brewer (1974) and Behn (1978) on policy termination and the complete termination of policies.
Acknowledging the European environmental dismantling policy, the Italian national government adopted a single environmental authorization provision with the aim to replace seven different authorizations; the effect of this simplification action at the subnational levels produced a jeopardized implementation among the Italian regions.
The empirical contribution of the paper consists in assessing whether the environmental policy has been effectively dismantled at the Italian regional level. By comparing a bunch of dimensions (regulatory, administrative, procedural, and enforcement capacities) related to the Italian regions, the research will show that some unexpected consequences like a further expansion of the policy or an inertial response to the implementation request have strongly undermined the initial objectives of the European Commission action.
CO-AUTHORS
ABSTRACT
Vandna Bhatia, Carleton University
Frank Ohmeng, Concordia University
In recent years, we have seen the rise in policy or program termination from governments all around the world. The height of policy termination was in the 1980s with the emergence of the new public management and the mantra of shrinking government’s role in society. In this context, justifications for policy and program termination were premised on assumptions of rational, evidence-driven evaluations of societal costs and benefits. However, we know that in the real world of policy making, many other factors intervene and influence the process, with the general consensus that termination is difficult and examples of it are few and far between. One factor that has received little attention in this literature is political ideology and partisanship. DeLeon (1997:2207) has long argued that ideological and political factors trump economic and efficiency arguments in termination decisions: “when ideology sounds its own peculiar call, the exercise become somewhat easier as ideological politics…have a chance of trumping budgetary politics and government efficiency.”
As an ideology, populism is a significant force in political and policy discourse, on both sides of the political spectrum. On the right, non-radical populist discourse is premised on economic liberalism, casting the economic well-being of ‘the people’ against corrupt elites and greedy ‘special interests’ in cahoots with government insiders. The study of the impact of populism discourses on democratic governance has typically focused on institutions, with less attention to how it affects the policy process. Dussauge-Laguna (2022) posits that termination in populist policymaking may be more frequent and more discretionary than otherwise, consistent with deLeon’s observations that ideological arguments facilitate policy termination.
In this paper, we analyze policy termination using the lens of ideological discourse, focusing specifically on several termination decisions of the newly elected government in the province of Ontario, Canada in 2018. The Ontario Progressive Conservative Party (OPCP) came to power with “A Plan for the People” that promised to champion middle-class, hardworking taxpayers and small business entrepreneurs against entrenched government insiders (Budd 2020). The OPCP vowed to cut taxes, reduce waste, and put money back into the pockets of taxpayers. Once in government, the OPCP used this populist neoliberal discourse to frame and justify termination of several policies, including some that were not directly targeted during the election campaign. Our analysis of the termination of Ontario’s Universal Basic Income (UBI) pilot and the provincial carbon cap-and-trade policy offers a case study of the impact of populist discourse on policy termination, and fleshes out some theoretical propositions about how ideology – particularly populist ideology – facilitates the termination process.
Budd, B. (2020). The people’s champ: Doug Ford and neoliberal right-wing populism in the 2018 Ontario provincial election. Politics and Governance, 8(1), 171-181.
DeLeon, P. (1997). Afterward: the once and future state of policy termination. International Journal of Public Administration, 20(12), 2195-2212.
Dussauge-Laguna, M. I. (2022). The promises and perils of populism for democratic policymaking: the case of Mexico. Policy Sciences, 55(4), 777-803.
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