Format

P05. Populism and Bureaucracy – Institutional and Ideological Dynamics in Governance

POLICY, POLITICS AND POLITICAL REGIME
PANEL CHAIR(S)
Kutsal Yesilkagit
Leiden University
Main chair
B. Guy Peters
University of Pittsburgh
Second chair
Jon Pierre
Dept of Political Science, University of Gothenburg
Third chair
CATEGORISATION
POLICY TOPIC
POLICY, POLITICS AND POLITICAL REGIME
SECTOR
—
KEYWORDS
—
GENERAL OBJECTIVES, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE

General Objective


This panel examines the multifaceted interaction between populist movements and bureaucratic institutions, focusing on how institutional structures and populist ideologies jointly shape this relationship. While populism often challenges bureaucratic stability, the impact of populism varies significantly based on both the ideological leanings of the movement (right-wing, left-wing, or otherwise) and the specific political-institutional frameworks—such as federal versus unitary, presidential versus parliamentary systems, and centralised versus decentralised administrative structures.

 

By investigating how populist movements with distinct ideological aims interact with various institutional settings, the panel seeks to understand how these combined factors influence bureaucratic integrity, adaptability, and resistance. This dual approach will clarify the conditions under which populist movements either reshape or reinforce bureaucratic norms and practices across different national contexts.

 

 

Research Question


The central research question guiding this panel is:

 

How do the combined effects of institutional configurations and ideological orientations of populist movements influence the interaction between populism and bureaucracy, and what implications do these dynamics hold for governance and administrative resilience?

 

Key sub-questions include:

 

- How do federal and unitary systems affect the pathways through which populist movements, depending on their ideological orientations, interact with and challenge bureaucratic institutions?


- In what ways do presidential and parliamentary regimes influence the strategies used by left- and right-wing populists in their engagements with bureaucracies?


- How does administrative centralisation or decentralisation mediate the influence of ideologically varied populist movements on the stability and adaptability of bureaucratic institutions?


- How do party system structures (single-party vs. multi-party) impact populist engagement with bureaucracy, and do these effects differ between left- and right-wing populists?

 

 

Justification of Scientific Relevance


The recent global surge in populism has highlighted the vulnerability of bureaucratic institutions to political disruption, yet the role of ideological and institutional factors in shaping this vulnerability remains under-explored. Right-wing populists often seek to minimize bureaucratic intervention, emphasizing deregulation and nationalism, while left-wing populists may advocate for reforms aimed at promoting social equity through bureaucracy. However, these ideological aims are conditioned by the specific institutional settings in which populists operate, influencing whether they can bypass, reshape, or co-opt bureaucratic structures to align with their agendas.

 

This panel brings a comparative perspective to this under-researched area, examining how the interplay between institutional structures and ideological orientations affects the populism-bureaucracy relationship. By integrating ideological and institutional factors, this panel aims to identify patterns that explain the resilience or susceptibility of bureaucracies to populist influence. The findings are pertinent for both scholars and policymakers, offering insights on how institutional design can either buffer or amplify the effects of ideologically varied populist movements.

CALL FOR PAPERS

We invite scholars to submit empirical, theoretical, or methodological papers that explore the interaction between populism and bureaucracy through a dual focus on ideological orientation and institutional context. Papers may address, but are not limited to, the following themes:

 

- Case studies on how ideologically distinct populist movements have attempted to challenge or co-opt bureaucratic institutions within different institutional structures.


- Comparative analyses of bureaucratic resilience in countries with varying institutional configurations (e.g., federal vs. unitary, presidential vs. parliamentary) and the contrasting approaches of left- and right-wing populists within these frameworks.


- Theoretical or empirical explorations of how left-wing populist governance, often advocating social equity reforms, impacts bureaucracy differently than right-wing populist agendas, which may emphasise deregulation and nationalism.


- Studies on how multi-party and two-party systems shape the influence of ideologically distinct populist movements on bureaucratic institutions.


- Investigations into how centralised versus decentralised bureaucratic structures respond to the pressures of both left- and right-wing populist movements, with regional case studies on populist influence in local versus national governance.

 

We welcome submissions from diverse fields, including public administration, political science, public policy, and comparative politics, that offer new insights into how the combined forces of institutional design and ideological orientation shape bureaucratic governance in populist contexts.

 

ACCEPTED
Format
01 - The Politics of Turnover During Democratic Backsliding: Evidence from Brazil’s Civil Service
João V. Guedes-Neto (FGV EBAPE)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

This study investigates the effects of far-right populism on bureaucratic turnover during the administration of President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. Using segmented regression within an interrupted time series (SR-ITS) framework, it identifies distinct shifts in retirement and resignation trends across federal civil service sectors, with a focus on Bolsonaro’s attacks against the bureaucracy, his contentious pension reform and its political aftermath. This paper’s findings highlight a critical transformation in bureaucratic behavior during periods of democratic backsliding, situating Brazil’s experience within broader debates on the interplay between populism and institutional resilience.

 

The analysis reveals stark contrasts between bureaucratic turnover before Bolsonaro’s election and the years following his assumption of power. During Bolsonaro’s first year in office (2019), voluntary retirements surged, particularly in social policy sectors, reflecting bureaucrats’ urgency to secure benefits under pre-reform rules. This sharp increase was driven not only by economic considerations but also by ideological pressures, as Bolsonaro’s administration targeted social welfare policies and their implementing agencies. For many civil servants, early retirement became a means to avoid complicity in policies they found professionally and ethically untenable. By contrast, in the years preceding Bolsonaro’s administration, retirement trends remained stable, reflecting the typical patterns of an insulated and protected civil service.

 

Voluntary resignations displayed an opposite trajectory. In Bolsonaro’s first year, resignation rates dropped, likely reflecting bureaucrats’ cautious approach to an uncertain political and economic environment. However, this hesitation eroded in subsequent years as Bolsonaro’s illiberal governance style—marked by attacks on technical expertise and professional norms—created untenable working conditions. By 2020, resignations began rising sharply, particularly among those in the social policy sector, where Bolsonaro’s policies directly undermined the sector’s core values. This delayed but pronounced rise in resignations underscores the cumulative effects of prolonged political and ideological conflict within the civil service.

 

The study’s findings emphasize the dynamic and politically contingent nature of turnover decisions in developing countries. Unlike in more stable democracies, where turnover is often shaped by personal characteristics, policy reforms, or organizational conditions, Brazil’s experience demonstrates how abrupt political transitions can profoundly disrupt these patterns. The surge in retirements and delayed rise in resignations reflect a dual response to Bolsonaro’s administration—an initial retreat by those eligible to exit and a later exodus by those unable to endure prolonged institutional degradation.

 

Methodologically, this study employs SR-ITS analysis to isolate the effects of Bolsonaro’s political transition and pension reform on turnover trends. By examining data across seven policy sectors, it identifies sectoral vulnerabilities, particularly in social policy, where turnover rates deviated most significantly from pre-Bolsonaro patterns. These findings underscore the role of sector-specific targeting in shaping bureaucratic responses to populist governance.

 

In conclusion, this study contributes to the understanding of how populist administrations influence bureaucratic turnover, highlighting the interplay between political pressures, institutional change, and individual agency. It demonstrates that in contexts of democratic backsliding, bureaucratic turnover serves as both a symptom and a consequence of governance challenges, offering insights into the resilience and vulnerability of public institutions under populist regimes.

ACCEPTED
Format
02 - Party Institutionalization and Ministers’ Cabinet Careers in Presidential Democracies
Dong Lee (Sungkyunkwan University)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

How does the institutionalization of parties affect presidential cabinet management? The comparative literature on party organizations in presidential democracies suggests that there is a trade-off between political support and technical competence in choosing political insiders versus outsiders as ministers. Yet, how this trade-off can vary according to party institutionalization is much less understood. In this article, we argue that institutionalized parties pose greater challenges but offer more opportunities to presidential cabinet management. As parties surrounding presidents become more institutionalized, presidents feel greater pressure to accommodate their demands, but they also create a sizable pool of talent within organizations. Our analysis of original data on more than 1,500 ministers’ cabinet careers in Asia shows that the more institutionalized parties become, the more likely political insiders are retained in and the less likely they exit from cabinets than political outsiders. This finding suggests that presidential cabinets are managed by a different set of rules according to the levels of party institutionalization.

 

ACCEPTED
Format
03 - Balancing distance and connectedness: policy advisory bodies in a context of science resistance
Alyt Damstra (University of Amsterdam)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

The relation between policy advisory bodies and national governments is characterized by a delicate balance between autonomy and control (Verschuere, 2007; Hegger 2017). For policy advisory bodies that work at arm’s length, this balancing act is illustrated by the somewhat contrived descriptions of their position, such as ‘embedded autonomy’ or ‘bounded freedom’ (Bressers, 2022). In order to effectively provide the national government with advise, both sollicited and unsollicited, these semiautonomous governmental bodies must operate autonomously but also need to organise a certain level of connectedness with policymakers and politicians (Wesseling & Hoppe, 2020).

 

In this paper, I argue that the dual task of keeping a distance and organizing connectedness has become more challenging due to two broad developments that contribute to a context of science resistance. First, the transformation of the information environment has deprived scientific expertise from its self-evident authority (Van Aelst et al., 2017). In a context of abundant supply and changing curated flows (Thorson & Wells, 2016), scientific expertise and journalistic products have lost ground to more entertaining and personalized content. The rise of alternative media and social media platforms has fueled the spread of disinformation and conspiracy theories (Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019; Levendusky, 2018). Characterized by antisystemness (Holt, 2018), these accounts frequently question the integrity of scientists. Second, the past decades witnessed the global rise of populist movements. In West-European countries, this rise has prominently been driven by populism at the (radical) right end of the political spectrum (see popu-list.org). Populism depicts society as divided between the people (pure) versus the elite (corrupt), and assumes that politics is about popular sovereignty at any cost (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018). Populism tends to crititize traditional epistemic authorities. Experts, as part of the elite, are typically accused of being politically biased, which undermines the scientific legitimacy of the knowledge they produce (Ruzza & Trenz, 2022). Together, these developments have gradually altered the force field in which policy advisory bodies operate.  

 

This paper explores the implications of this changing context for the dual task of keeping a distance and organizing connectedness for policy advisory bodies. More specifically, I look at two policy advisory bodies in the Netherlands: The Advisory Council on Migration ( Adviesraad Migratie) and The Netherlands Scientific Climate Council (Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad). Both councils translate (scientific) expertise into policy advise related to issue domains that are highly politicized. The current far right government, with the populist Freedom Party being the largest party in government, has thus far shown limited receptivity to external advise or expertise. This is illustrated by the far-reaching asylum policy proposals that the government presented in 2024 without consulting the Advisory Council on Migration.

 

To obtain a better understanding of this dimension of the populism-bureaucracy relationship, I conduct interviews with council members and staff working for both advisory bodies. Questions pertain to the organization of both independence and connectedness, the challenges that science resistance presents for both ends and what is needed for these organizations to maintain their function in the future.

ACCEPTED
Format
04 - Populism and Bureaucracy in Italy During the Meloni Government (2022-2024)
Fabrizio Di Mascio (Università di Torino)
CO-AUTHORS
Anna Malandrino (Università di Torino)
Alessandro Natalini (University Parthenope)
ABSTRACT

This paper explores the evolving dynamics of public service bargains in Italy under the Meloni government (2022–2024), the first explicitly right-wing government in the country’s republican history. Using a historical-institutionalist approach, the study examines how populist political strategies—emphasizing political loyalty over competence—have
transformed the interaction between political leadership and bureaucracy. We address the panel’s central research question by analyzing how the Meloni government’s ideological orientation, combined with Italy’s Napoleonic administrative tradition, influenced political control mechanisms and eroded bureaucratic autonomy. The findings
highlight that institutional configurations, such as entrenched legalism, facilitated incremental changes in public service bargains.
These changes were achieved through the strategic conversion of rules initially designed to enhance technical expertise, redirecting them to entrench political loyalty instead.

Our analysis engages with the panel's sub-questions by detailing how ministerial reorganizations and appointment practices were leveraged to consolidate political control, examining how these strategies unfolded in Italy’s parliamentary regime. Methodologically, the research combines archival analysis with process tracing, offering insights into the
long-term effects of populist governance on administrative adaptability. The findings contribute to broader debates on the implications of populism for governance, with particular attention to the structural and ideological constraints shaping the resilience of
bureaucratic institutions under populist rule.

ACCEPTED
Format
05 - Populisms and Bureaucracy: Insights from the Italian Case
Paolo Graziano (SPGI - Università di Padova)
CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

The paper focuses on the relationship between populism and public administration, with a specific reference to the Italian case in the past decade when the so-called populist parties became increasingly relevant. The key research question is: are there key differences in the understanding and evaluation of public administration in the electoral manifestos and ruling of exclusionary and inclusionary populist parties? After a brief introduction, the first section focuses on the notion of populism, and introduces the variants of populist parties (exclusionary vs. inclusionary). The secondo section focuses on the link between populism and public administration and identifies some research hypotheses to be applied to the Italian case. The third section investigates empirically the electoral manifestos 2013-2022 of the current four major populist parties (Fratelli d’Italia, Lega/Lega per Salvini Premier, Popolo della Libertà/Forza Italia, Movimento Cinque Stelle) in order to identify the policy preferences in terms of public administration reforms. The fourth section will analyse the various ‘populist governments’ (2018-2025) in order to verify if specific public administration reforms have been formulated and/or adopted. A discussion concludes.

ACCEPTED
Format
06 - Populism, Anti-bureaucratism, and Middle Class Demands for Participatory Democracy in Sri Lanka
Rajni Gamage (National University of Singapore)
CO-AUTHORS
Harindra Dassanayake (Muragala l Centre for Progressive Politics and Policy)
ABSTRACT

This paper studies the ways in which governments try to respond to increased demands for citizens’ participation in institutions of democracy and decision-making, and how governments negotiate these demands through various institutional arrangements in an attempt to legitimize themselves when the electorate is susceptible to waves of populism. We map how, like many countries in the South Asian region, the consumption-driven growth model that post-2005 governments followed in Sri Lanka resulted in a significant expansion of the middle class to become an electoral critical mass in the post-war Sri Lankan political landscape. Through a discourse analysis of the victorious political forces that brought about regime changes in 2015, 2019, 2022, and 2024, we trace how the catch-all phrase ‘system change’ manifests populist demands of this newly-emerged aspirational middle class, and embodies anti-establishment and anti-bureaucratic sentiments—often articulated in popular discourse as corrupt politicians and inefficiency of the public service. The latest national flagship initiative of the new, left-leaning Dissanayake government, ‘Clean Sri Lanka’, represents the latest iteration of this trend. 

 

One of the key demands of this aspirational critical mass of voters is increased civic participation decision-making in administrative structures, particularly at the local level. The culmination of this demand was manifested when, during the Aragalaya (mass street protests) in 2022, parallel civic structures from local (people’s councils) to national (national council) levels were advanced by revolutionary parties and groups with significant public buy-in. Since the end of the war, successive governments have responded by attempting to establish parallel civic mechanisms—such as Jana Sabha (2011, 2023) and Grama Shakthi (2016)—that were aimed at enhancing community engagement but ultimately served as instruments for consolidating political power.  Mapping how these initiatives have repeatedly failed, this paper analyses the policy discontinuity and bureaucratic resistance that have led to their failure from a perspective of elite competition, and how they created the space for anti-establishment, populist politics, as evident in recent efforts to conflate the public sector and civic space.

ACCEPTED
Format
07 - Regulating Truth: The Role of Bureaucracy in Populist Control Over Digital Speech
Yashas P R (Christ University)
CO-AUTHORS
anurag mehra (Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay)
PRERNA YADAV (Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay)
ABSTRACT

This paper examines how multi-party systems shape populist engagement with bureaucracy, comparing the distinct pathways through which India’s right-wing populist government and Brazil’s left-wing populist government institutionalize ideological control through fake news regulation. While both operate within multi-party political environments, their approaches to embedding ideology into bureaucracy differ based on their political strategies and state structures.

 

In India, the BJP-led right-wing populist government has utilized its electoral dominance and executive centralization to reshape digital governance through bureaucratic restructuring. The IT Rules 2021 grant the executive direct oversight of content moderation, allowing bureaucratic agencies to enforce state-aligned narratives while maintaining the appearance of regulatory neutrality. This model reflects a top-down engagement, where bureaucracy is instrumentalized to consolidate centralized control over digital spaces.In contrast, Brazil’s left-wing populist government under Lula operates in a highly fragmented multi-party system, requiring a coalition-based bureaucratic approach. The Fake News Bill (PL 2630/2020) embeds misinformation regulation within judicial and independent regulatory bodies. By leveraging institutional legitimacy through judicial activism and bureaucratic oversight councils, Brazil’s left-wing populists embed ideological influence within procedural mechanisms, ensuring regulatory control while avoiding overt political centralization.

 

This study employs process tracing to analyze how these fake news laws developed, were framed, and possible institutionalization in both countries. By reconstructing the sequence of legislative debates, government justification and media narratives. It identifies the plausible strategic embedding of ideological narratives into regulatory frameworks. Despite ideological differences, both models reinforce populist legitimacy by leveraging bureaucratic authority to control digital information flows while maintaining the appearance of democratic oversight. These findings suggest that populism's relationship with bureaucracy is less about ideology and more about structural power consolidation, where the institutional context determines whether control is centralized or diffused through regulatory networks.

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

This study investigates the effects of far-right populism on bureaucratic turnover during the administration of President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. Using segmented regression within an interrupted time series (SR-ITS) framework, it identifies distinct shifts in retirement and resignation trends across federal civil service sectors, with a focus on Bolsonaro’s attacks against the bureaucracy, his contentious pension reform and its political aftermath. This paper’s findings highlight a critical transformation in bureaucratic behavior during periods of democratic backsliding, situating Brazil’s experience within broader debates on the interplay between populism and institutional resilience.

 

The analysis reveals stark contrasts between bureaucratic turnover before Bolsonaro’s election and the years following his assumption of power. During Bolsonaro’s first year in office (2019), voluntary retirements surged, particularly in social policy sectors, reflecting bureaucrats’ urgency to secure benefits under pre-reform rules. This sharp increase was driven not only by economic considerations but also by ideological pressures, as Bolsonaro’s administration targeted social welfare policies and their implementing agencies. For many civil servants, early retirement became a means to avoid complicity in policies they found professionally and ethically untenable. By contrast, in the years preceding Bolsonaro’s administration, retirement trends remained stable, reflecting the typical patterns of an insulated and protected civil service.

 

Voluntary resignations displayed an opposite trajectory. In Bolsonaro’s first year, resignation rates dropped, likely reflecting bureaucrats’ cautious approach to an uncertain political and economic environment. However, this hesitation eroded in subsequent years as Bolsonaro’s illiberal governance style—marked by attacks on technical expertise and professional norms—created untenable working conditions. By 2020, resignations began rising sharply, particularly among those in the social policy sector, where Bolsonaro’s policies directly undermined the sector’s core values. This delayed but pronounced rise in resignations underscores the cumulative effects of prolonged political and ideological conflict within the civil service.

 

The study’s findings emphasize the dynamic and politically contingent nature of turnover decisions in developing countries. Unlike in more stable democracies, where turnover is often shaped by personal characteristics, policy reforms, or organizational conditions, Brazil’s experience demonstrates how abrupt political transitions can profoundly disrupt these patterns. The surge in retirements and delayed rise in resignations reflect a dual response to Bolsonaro’s administration—an initial retreat by those eligible to exit and a later exodus by those unable to endure prolonged institutional degradation.

 

Methodologically, this study employs SR-ITS analysis to isolate the effects of Bolsonaro’s political transition and pension reform on turnover trends. By examining data across seven policy sectors, it identifies sectoral vulnerabilities, particularly in social policy, where turnover rates deviated most significantly from pre-Bolsonaro patterns. These findings underscore the role of sector-specific targeting in shaping bureaucratic responses to populist governance.

 

In conclusion, this study contributes to the understanding of how populist administrations influence bureaucratic turnover, highlighting the interplay between political pressures, institutional change, and individual agency. It demonstrates that in contexts of democratic backsliding, bureaucratic turnover serves as both a symptom and a consequence of governance challenges, offering insights into the resilience and vulnerability of public institutions under populist regimes.

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

How does the institutionalization of parties affect presidential cabinet management? The comparative literature on party organizations in presidential democracies suggests that there is a trade-off between political support and technical competence in choosing political insiders versus outsiders as ministers. Yet, how this trade-off can vary according to party institutionalization is much less understood. In this article, we argue that institutionalized parties pose greater challenges but offer more opportunities to presidential cabinet management. As parties surrounding presidents become more institutionalized, presidents feel greater pressure to accommodate their demands, but they also create a sizable pool of talent within organizations. Our analysis of original data on more than 1,500 ministers’ cabinet careers in Asia shows that the more institutionalized parties become, the more likely political insiders are retained in and the less likely they exit from cabinets than political outsiders. This finding suggests that presidential cabinets are managed by a different set of rules according to the levels of party institutionalization.

 

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

The relation between policy advisory bodies and national governments is characterized by a delicate balance between autonomy and control (Verschuere, 2007; Hegger 2017). For policy advisory bodies that work at arm’s length, this balancing act is illustrated by the somewhat contrived descriptions of their position, such as ‘embedded autonomy’ or ‘bounded freedom’ (Bressers, 2022). In order to effectively provide the national government with advise, both sollicited and unsollicited, these semiautonomous governmental bodies must operate autonomously but also need to organise a certain level of connectedness with policymakers and politicians (Wesseling & Hoppe, 2020).

 

In this paper, I argue that the dual task of keeping a distance and organizing connectedness has become more challenging due to two broad developments that contribute to a context of science resistance. First, the transformation of the information environment has deprived scientific expertise from its self-evident authority (Van Aelst et al., 2017). In a context of abundant supply and changing curated flows (Thorson & Wells, 2016), scientific expertise and journalistic products have lost ground to more entertaining and personalized content. The rise of alternative media and social media platforms has fueled the spread of disinformation and conspiracy theories (Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019; Levendusky, 2018). Characterized by antisystemness (Holt, 2018), these accounts frequently question the integrity of scientists. Second, the past decades witnessed the global rise of populist movements. In West-European countries, this rise has prominently been driven by populism at the (radical) right end of the political spectrum (see popu-list.org). Populism depicts society as divided between the people (pure) versus the elite (corrupt), and assumes that politics is about popular sovereignty at any cost (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018). Populism tends to crititize traditional epistemic authorities. Experts, as part of the elite, are typically accused of being politically biased, which undermines the scientific legitimacy of the knowledge they produce (Ruzza & Trenz, 2022). Together, these developments have gradually altered the force field in which policy advisory bodies operate.  

 

This paper explores the implications of this changing context for the dual task of keeping a distance and organizing connectedness for policy advisory bodies. More specifically, I look at two policy advisory bodies in the Netherlands: The Advisory Council on Migration ( Adviesraad Migratie) and The Netherlands Scientific Climate Council (Wetenschappelijke Klimaatraad). Both councils translate (scientific) expertise into policy advise related to issue domains that are highly politicized. The current far right government, with the populist Freedom Party being the largest party in government, has thus far shown limited receptivity to external advise or expertise. This is illustrated by the far-reaching asylum policy proposals that the government presented in 2024 without consulting the Advisory Council on Migration.

 

To obtain a better understanding of this dimension of the populism-bureaucracy relationship, I conduct interviews with council members and staff working for both advisory bodies. Questions pertain to the organization of both independence and connectedness, the challenges that science resistance presents for both ends and what is needed for these organizations to maintain their function in the future.

CO-AUTHORS
Anna Malandrino (Università di Torino)
Alessandro Natalini (University Parthenope)
ABSTRACT

This paper explores the evolving dynamics of public service bargains in Italy under the Meloni government (2022–2024), the first explicitly right-wing government in the country’s republican history. Using a historical-institutionalist approach, the study examines how populist political strategies—emphasizing political loyalty over competence—have
transformed the interaction between political leadership and bureaucracy. We address the panel’s central research question by analyzing how the Meloni government’s ideological orientation, combined with Italy’s Napoleonic administrative tradition, influenced political control mechanisms and eroded bureaucratic autonomy. The findings
highlight that institutional configurations, such as entrenched legalism, facilitated incremental changes in public service bargains.
These changes were achieved through the strategic conversion of rules initially designed to enhance technical expertise, redirecting them to entrench political loyalty instead.

Our analysis engages with the panel's sub-questions by detailing how ministerial reorganizations and appointment practices were leveraged to consolidate political control, examining how these strategies unfolded in Italy’s parliamentary regime. Methodologically, the research combines archival analysis with process tracing, offering insights into the
long-term effects of populist governance on administrative adaptability. The findings contribute to broader debates on the implications of populism for governance, with particular attention to the structural and ideological constraints shaping the resilience of
bureaucratic institutions under populist rule.

CO-AUTHORS
—
ABSTRACT

The paper focuses on the relationship between populism and public administration, with a specific reference to the Italian case in the past decade when the so-called populist parties became increasingly relevant. The key research question is: are there key differences in the understanding and evaluation of public administration in the electoral manifestos and ruling of exclusionary and inclusionary populist parties? After a brief introduction, the first section focuses on the notion of populism, and introduces the variants of populist parties (exclusionary vs. inclusionary). The secondo section focuses on the link between populism and public administration and identifies some research hypotheses to be applied to the Italian case. The third section investigates empirically the electoral manifestos 2013-2022 of the current four major populist parties (Fratelli d’Italia, Lega/Lega per Salvini Premier, Popolo della Libertà/Forza Italia, Movimento Cinque Stelle) in order to identify the policy preferences in terms of public administration reforms. The fourth section will analyse the various ‘populist governments’ (2018-2025) in order to verify if specific public administration reforms have been formulated and/or adopted. A discussion concludes.

CO-AUTHORS
Harindra Dassanayake (Muragala l Centre for Progressive Politics and Policy)
ABSTRACT

This paper studies the ways in which governments try to respond to increased demands for citizens’ participation in institutions of democracy and decision-making, and how governments negotiate these demands through various institutional arrangements in an attempt to legitimize themselves when the electorate is susceptible to waves of populism. We map how, like many countries in the South Asian region, the consumption-driven growth model that post-2005 governments followed in Sri Lanka resulted in a significant expansion of the middle class to become an electoral critical mass in the post-war Sri Lankan political landscape. Through a discourse analysis of the victorious political forces that brought about regime changes in 2015, 2019, 2022, and 2024, we trace how the catch-all phrase ‘system change’ manifests populist demands of this newly-emerged aspirational middle class, and embodies anti-establishment and anti-bureaucratic sentiments—often articulated in popular discourse as corrupt politicians and inefficiency of the public service. The latest national flagship initiative of the new, left-leaning Dissanayake government, ‘Clean Sri Lanka’, represents the latest iteration of this trend. 

 

One of the key demands of this aspirational critical mass of voters is increased civic participation decision-making in administrative structures, particularly at the local level. The culmination of this demand was manifested when, during the Aragalaya (mass street protests) in 2022, parallel civic structures from local (people’s councils) to national (national council) levels were advanced by revolutionary parties and groups with significant public buy-in. Since the end of the war, successive governments have responded by attempting to establish parallel civic mechanisms—such as Jana Sabha (2011, 2023) and Grama Shakthi (2016)—that were aimed at enhancing community engagement but ultimately served as instruments for consolidating political power.  Mapping how these initiatives have repeatedly failed, this paper analyses the policy discontinuity and bureaucratic resistance that have led to their failure from a perspective of elite competition, and how they created the space for anti-establishment, populist politics, as evident in recent efforts to conflate the public sector and civic space.

CO-AUTHORS
anurag mehra (Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay)
PRERNA YADAV (Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay)
ABSTRACT

This paper examines how multi-party systems shape populist engagement with bureaucracy, comparing the distinct pathways through which India’s right-wing populist government and Brazil’s left-wing populist government institutionalize ideological control through fake news regulation. While both operate within multi-party political environments, their approaches to embedding ideology into bureaucracy differ based on their political strategies and state structures.

 

In India, the BJP-led right-wing populist government has utilized its electoral dominance and executive centralization to reshape digital governance through bureaucratic restructuring. The IT Rules 2021 grant the executive direct oversight of content moderation, allowing bureaucratic agencies to enforce state-aligned narratives while maintaining the appearance of regulatory neutrality. This model reflects a top-down engagement, where bureaucracy is instrumentalized to consolidate centralized control over digital spaces.In contrast, Brazil’s left-wing populist government under Lula operates in a highly fragmented multi-party system, requiring a coalition-based bureaucratic approach. The Fake News Bill (PL 2630/2020) embeds misinformation regulation within judicial and independent regulatory bodies. By leveraging institutional legitimacy through judicial activism and bureaucratic oversight councils, Brazil’s left-wing populists embed ideological influence within procedural mechanisms, ensuring regulatory control while avoiding overt political centralization.

 

This study employs process tracing to analyze how these fake news laws developed, were framed, and possible institutionalization in both countries. By reconstructing the sequence of legislative debates, government justification and media narratives. It identifies the plausible strategic embedding of ideological narratives into regulatory frameworks. Despite ideological differences, both models reinforce populist legitimacy by leveraging bureaucratic authority to control digital information flows while maintaining the appearance of democratic oversight. These findings suggest that populism's relationship with bureaucracy is less about ideology and more about structural power consolidation, where the institutional context determines whether control is centralized or diffused through regulatory networks.