T09P13 - Multistakeholder Participation and Natural Resource Governance in Latin America

Topic : Governance, Policy networks and Multi-level Governance

Panel Chair : Sandra Carrillo - sandra.carrillo@pucp.pe

Panel Second Chair : Juan-Felipe Ortiz-Riomalo - juanfelipe.ortizriomalo@uni-osnabrueck.de

Objectives and Scientific Relevance of the panel

Call for papers

Session 1 Stakeholder Participation and Natural Resource Governance in Latin America - Forestry and biodiversity conservation

Identification and assessment of incentives for the implementation of agroforestry concessions: Experiences from four communities of the province of Mariscal Caceres in the Peruvian Amazon

Nicolas Jose Mesia Rojas - n.mesia.rojas@gmail.com - Institute of International Forestry and Forest Products, Technische Universität Dresden - Germany

Yves Zinngrebe - yzinngr@gwdg.de - Georg-August-Universität - Germany

Agroforestry concession is an important policy instrument to combat deforestation in the Peruvian Amazon. It authorizes small and medium farmers to access in a sustainable way to forest and natural resources, in forest production or protection areas that present some degree of disturbance. The Forestry and Wildlife Law (FWL) and its Regulation (RFWL) have established activities to support agroforestry systems and forest plantations in the context of agroforestry concessions. As the uptake of agroforestry concessions depends on farmers' decisions, incentive systems have to be adjusted to fit local sustainable production systems and farmers' preferences.  This study, therefore, seeks to identify and assess policy options that function as incentives for the effective implementation of agroforestry concessions according to their objectives as specified in the FWL and RFWL. It was carried out in the communities of Marisol, La Primavera, Nueva Esperanza and Gran Pajaten, in the province of Mariscal Caceres, San Martin department, Peru. 86 key stakeholders at the national, regional/local, and farm level provided crucial information through discussion meetings, individual interviews and workshops. A SWOT analysis was applied in order to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of agroforestry concessions as well as strategic actions for its implementation. The application of interviews allowed to identify 19 incentives, which can be grouped as follows: research and extension services, administrative procedures, infrastructure and basic services, market development and financial mechanisms. The results of the research confirm that there are important differences between the political levels. Institutional stakeholders at both levels (national and regional/local), are more concerned in facilitating the process of access to agroforestry concessions because directly affects the implementation of this instrument. In contrast, the proposed incentives by farmers respond to the current needs and limitations on what they have in their daily basis. Taking into account the growing market in agroforestry products, agroforestry concessions offer strong potential for sustainable development in Peru and other tropical countries. However, as the study shows, implementation depends on institutional setting, policy environment and social, economic and environmental conditions of farmers and communities. Therefore, further studies are necessary to explore similarities and differences for a successful implementation in other parts of Peru and other countries.


Yves Zinngrebe - yzinngr@gwdg.de - Georg-August-Universität - Germany

The management of biodiversity and ecosystems is governed by large variety of political actors and sectors. While National Biodiversity Strategies and Actions Plans (NBSAPs) as well as other planning processes are meant to orient all of them, practical solutions require the coordination of conservation with other interests. Therefore, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) calls for “mainstreaming” biodiversity and integrate “conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in plans, programs and sectoral and intersectoral policies” (article 6 of the CBD). I have developed “Biodiversity Policy Integration” (BPI) as a conceptual approach to guide and assess mainstreaming. This article assesses the BPI of National sectors according to the criteria inclusion, operationalisation, coherence, capacity and weighting.

In the megadiverse country Peru, biodiversity is under severe threat by economic and demographic processes related to the sectoral policies of agriculture, fishing, mining and other extractive processes, infrastructural expansion and urbanization. Each of the sectors has developed a multi-annual strategy plan both to articulate sector interests and identify indicators to measure progress. Sector strategies, related legal and strategic documents as well as qualitative expert interviews were used to analyse BPI in the Peruvian political sectors of Agriculture and Irrigation, Economy and Finance, Energy and Mining, Production and Fishery and Communication and Transport.

It can be observed that with the important exception of the Ministry for Economy and Finance, all sectors explicitly refer to the challenge of biodiversity conservation in their policies and related it to their activities. A weak operationalization of biodiversity targets in relation to sector practices, however, prevents not only the identification of coherence and necessary trade-off decisions, but also foregoes the potential of developing effective measure for biodiversity conservation. Based on the findings, I identify the missing operationalization of biodiversity targets, the development of social capital and integrative planning instruments as approached to improve BPI.

Distribution of Power, Stakeholders Dynamics, and Policy Networks in Protected Areas Governance in the Brazilian Amazon

Tiago Jacauna - tiagojacauna@ufam.edu.br - Federal University of Amazonas - Brazil

This research concerns environmental conservation policies of Conservation Units (protected areas) in the Amazon, particularly in the State of Amazonas. The processes that give rise to this kind of environmental policy involved a multiplicity of actors and interests articulated within networks. This paper uses social network analysis to investigate governance and participatory processes in protected areas of the Brazilian Amazon. By looking at the network structure of governance in protected areas, I intend to answers the question: How is the distribution of power and how stakeholders interact in the governance network? The research focus is on the interactions that link the multiplicity of actors in order to demonstrate the influence of social network structures in governance of natural resources. For the purposes of assessing the distribution of power, I considered two categories: concentration and fragmentation, and three types of stakeholders’ interactions: conflict, bargaining, and cooperation. I conducted empirical research in the Jaú National Park and the Rio Unini Extractive Reserve. In these areas, I interviewed residents, state and non-state stakeholders, and collected sociometric data (relational) in order to untangle networks of public policy and environmental governance. The respondents were selected using a snowball interview technique, starting with representatives involved in governance of these particular protected areas and subsequently soliciting respondents for nominations other potential participants. Results demonstrate that NGOs, local residents, and environmental state agencies shared power in decision making. This fragmentation of power depends particularly on the degree of influence that NGOs shave in governance networks. In addition, cooperation is the main type of relationship, characterized by horizontal or hierarchical cooperation depending on the situation. Hierarchical cooperation is present when the NGO commands the policy-making process. This study contributes to understanding of how different types of participation and patterns of state and non-state stakeholders interaction may affect natural resource governance outcomes, therefore particularly suited for this panel.

Session 2 Stakeholder Participation and Natural Resource Governance in Latin America - Extractive industries

Lessons learned in the implementation of Social Funds for Mining Projects: The cases of Michiquillay Mining Project and Las Bambas Mining Project

Ricardo Paredes Castro - rparedes@metisgaia.com - Metis Gaia - Peru

Nathan Nadramija - nnadramija@metisgaia.com - Metis Gaia - Peru

Ricardo Paredes Castro - rparedes@metisgaia.com - Metis Gaia - Peru

In recent years, extractive activity in Latin America has grown significantly. Since Peru has great mineral wealth, it has been one of the countries in which the extractive activity has expanded more. In this way, there have been significant investments in mining projects, contributing greatly to economic growth. Nevertheless, mining activity in Peru has led to multiple conflicts between the population surrounding the project and the mining company, these conflicts have mainly revolved around environmental issues and local economic development. On the one hand, the population is exposed to the environmental risks posed by mining activity and, on the other hand, does not perceive the benefits of this activity.

In this context, the State has sought to improve the mechanisms for managing resources derived from mining activity so that the local population can perceive its benefits. For this reason, it created the mechanism of Social Funds which are constituted by a portion of the resources that the investing company pays to the State as a part of the mining concession, being these independent of both the company and the State. Thus, these resources have an autonomous character and its objective is the execution of social projects in benefit of the populations influenced by the mining project. The administration of this Social Funds is conducted by representatives of the civil society influenced by the mining project and representatives of Proinversion, a public body in charge of executing the national policy for the promotion of private investment in the country.


Given that the results of the Social Funds have been both positive and negative depending on the case, this paper aims to identify the determining factors in its implementation to contribute to local economic development and also the viability of mining projects. Thus, the paper presents a comparative analysis of two cases: The Social Fund of Michiquillay Mining Project and the Social Fund of Las Bambas Mining Project. For this analysis, secondary information of normative and academic nature is scrutinized, and is empirically complemented with the collection of primary information through the conduction of interviews with different actors involved in the implementation of the Social Funds.

Overall, this paper contributes to the discussion and study of the mechanisms under which the State, civil society and the private sector participate and interact with the purpose of fomenting local economic development from the mining activity

Corporate Social Responsibility of the Venezuelan State Oil Company, PdVSA under the tenure of Hugo Chávez and his successor.

Sanghamitra Kalita - sanghamitra082@gmail.com - Jawaharlal Nehru University - India

Corporate Social Responsibility of the Venezuelan State Oil Company, PdVSA under the tenure of Hugo Chávez and his successor.


Keywords: PdVSA, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Hugo Chávez, Venezuela


The role of oil since its discovery in 1920 in the socio-cultural and political life of Venezuela is profound. Terry Lynn Karl (1989) have outlined the various role oil had played since its discovery in Venezuela. Oil retarded the development of a distinctive state identity. The international majors or oil companies were able to effectively limit Venezuela's sovereignty by fashioning the international oil market and the conditions for domestic business in their own favour, thereby redesigning the country's property laws, keeping social forces weak, decisively influencing leaders, and, when necessary, helping to change actual rulers. Second, oil in Venezuela consolidated the high degree of centralisation of authority in the executive. During the pre-independence period centralisation helped in overcoming the regional divisions that had historically wreaked havoc in the country. The president had the power to appoint and remove all ministers, he was the final arbiter with the oil companies, and therefore petrodollars became an essential tool for enhancing the political strength of the nation's ruler in the absence of an independent bureaucratic structure. 

Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999 after the two party pacted democracy of Acción Democrática (AD) and Comité de Organización Politica Electoral Independiente (COPEI) since 1958 came to an end. Soon after coming to power and reposition Venezuela as a Venezuela as a centralised petro-power, Chávez from 1999 to 2003 enacted several measures to take control of state oil industry PDSA (Petroleos de Venezuela, Sociedad Anonima). Chávez undertook a series of steps to achieve full operational control of PDVSA. The gaining of control over PDVSA was termed by Chávez as “re-nationalisation”. Calling PDVSA as a "black box" that operated as a "state within a state," Chávez accused that the oil policy decisions were adopted without concern for the Venezuelan population. After coming to power, Chávez tried to make PdVSA’s operations more transparent and accountable and participatory in nature.   Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the national oil company (NOC) of Venezuela, began its operation from 1st January 1976.


The massive scale of social effort that PDVSA had during Chávez’s tenure had led to a dramatic shift of focus which was earlier concerned exclusively with finding, extracting, refining, and marketing oil but rather running innumerable social initiatives.

The proposed paper will analyse the policies and reforms made during Hugo Chávez’s period to Venezuelan state oil company more participatory and accountable in nature. Secondly, it will look at the various programmes undertaken by the PdVSA in the form of social missions under the category of corporate social responsibility. For PdVSA, operating in a socially-responsible comes under the mutual commitment approach by focusing efforts in sectors like Education, Health, Environment and Local Economy. Finally, the proposed paper will make a critique of the social programmes and policies made by Chávez and his successor.


Barrels, votes and guns: Exploring the relationship between oil revenues and armed clientelism

Juan D. Gutierrez-Rodriguez - juan.gutierrezrodriguez@bsg.ox.ac.uk - Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University - United Kingdom

Since the late 1980s Colombian municipalities where oil is produced have accrued significant revenues from royalties transferred by the national government. Empirical evidence that covers the period 1988-2011 suggests that despite of the fiscal windfalls spent by these municipalities the developmental outcomes (e.g. infant mortality rate) attained by these subnational governments were sub-optimal if compared with the results achieved by governments in non-resource-rich municipalities. Furthermore, empirical evidence in recent literature points out that there is a relationship between oil revenues and the interference of non-state armed groups with local politics. The objective of this paper is to study a specific channel that may contribute to explain the relationship between oil abundance/dependence and sub-optimal policy outcomes: distributional politics. More specifically, the paper aims at tracing how the abundance/dependence on oil revenues may affect the dynamics of political distribution of goods and services. Furthermore, the paper explores the factors or conditions that may offset the negative incentives generated by the abundance/dependence of oil revenues.

The research question is addressed through a comparative case study research of two Colombian municipalities that have been dependent on oil revenues. The results of the case study are based mostly on qualitative evidence, mainly interviews carried out in 2016 and documentary evidence. The interviewees included politicians, public servants, community leaders, journalists, and business sector representatives and the archival work included judicial cases, press reports and official documents. This paper is part of a larger (doctoral) project that includes two other subnational case studies in Colombia and a large-N study that will test the exploratory findings from the case studies.

The research finds that the abundance/dependence on oil revenues incentivized the interference of non-state armed groups in local politics. More specifically, non-state armed groups that aimed at extracting oil rents from subnational governments interfered with the local elections (e.g. affecting entry and exit to local politics) and the deployment of public resources by incumbent governments. Furthermore, the successive alliances of political groups with (different) non-state armed groups entrenched a specific type of distributional politics that may be termed ‘armed clientelism’ whereby a mix of positive and negative (coercive, violent) inducements are used to mobilize (or immobilize) voters. The prevalence of this type of distributive politics made subnational governments less transparent in the management of oil revenues, less responsive to local needs and less accountable to citizens. However, these negative features may be counteracted by the community’s (pre-existing) collective action capacity and the existence existence of economic sectors (different than oil) that offer sources of income for communities.

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